CHAPTER IV

THE WAR AND THE DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN

(1937-1942)

Since the onset of the Second World War on September 3, 1939, the Congress grew more persistent in the pursuit of its aim of India's independence. On the other hand, the Muslim League became more keen for its recognition as the representative body of Muslims and acceptance of Muslims as a separate nation as also a separate State in the north-western and eastern zones of India. The League was to render all possible help in the prosecution of the war, if the Government assured to accept these demands. The British Government realized that whereas the Congress demand had the immediate consequence of departure of the British from India the League's demand not only had no effect on the then policies of the British Government but also contained a potential prospect of blunting the very edge of the national movement. By then, the Muslim League had opened its branches throughout the country. The British Government preferred to exploit the Muslim League to fulfill its urgent need i.e. mobilisation of all possible resources of India for winning the war. Furthermore, the Congress had earlier declared non-cooperation with the British aims while the Muslim League had created no difficulties in the British war efforts even though the Government had not accepted the League's demand. Moreover, the Muslims in ratio to their population, made a very great contribution to the army in all parts of India. The Muslim League propagated to cooperate with the British to win their cherished goal of a separate Muslim homeland.

On February 3, 1940, Linlithgow said to Sikandar Hyat Khan that the position of Muslims, as maintained by Jinnah, was "unhelpful" and "static" to a"dangerous degree". Linlithgow assured his help and Jinnah assured to strengthen the position of the Muslim League by preparing an alternate scheme to the 1935 Act, with manifest programmes in the interest of the Muslims. Further, Zetland, on December 13, 1940, had also expressed doubts as to how Jinnah would be able to find adequate resources in the NWFP and he had anticipated the beginning of an endless civil war in India. Jinnah was seized of all these aspects of the problems of the proposed area of Pakistan, which was quite backward economically. He had also to convince all sects of Muslims in India of the genuineness of the Pakistan
demand, for enlisting their support. It goes to the credit of Jinnah's capability and farsightedness that he fought successfully on all these fronts, and completed the 'Five Year Plan' for the revival, reorganisation and revitalization of the Muslim League in 1941 successfully.

To revitalise the League's machinery through the length and breadth of India, he organised Provincial Committees and divided each province into divisions. Big cities were divided into wards. Branches in the Wards were called Primary Muslim Leagues. Membership of not more than one Primary Muslim League was allowed to individuals. Representatives of Primary League formed the District Muslim League. The District League elected members to form the Provincial Muslim League. Jinnah was doing all these things with the specific encouragement of the British Government.

The growing strength of the Muslim League membership may be assessed from the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary League</th>
<th>Number of Membership</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>43,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>88,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>1,12,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.P.</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.P.</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,000 - 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(in each district)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>May 13, 1944</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,30,000</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(25% of the adult male Muslim population)</td>
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Congress Disengagement with the British

On October 17, 1937, Lord Linlithgow, after interviewing about fifty Indians, including Gandhiji, Nehru and Jinnah, had issued a statement.

reiterating that Dominion Status was the goal of the British policy and that the 1935 Act would be open to modification giving full weight to the opinions of minorities. He also proposed, "the establishment of a consultative group, representative of all major political parties in British India and of the Indian Princes, over which the Governor-General would himself preside". The Congress, condemning the proclamation, had later adopted the policy of non-cooperation at Ramgarh.

The Congress did not change its policy towards the British during the period from 1937 to 1938. As a result when the War broke out, Nehru hurried back to India from his tour in China and, considering the conflict between democracy and freedom on the one hand, and fascism and democracy on the other, declared: "our sympathies must inevitably be on the side of the democracy ... I should like India to play her full part and throw all her resources into the struggle for a new order. The CWC emergency session met at Wardha on September 8-14, 1939, and offered its cooperation in the struggle against fascism, but emphasised that it was to be "a cooperation between equals by mutual consent for a cause which both considered to be worthy", which Nehru said was the only honourable course to adopt.

On September 11, 1939, Gandhiji explained that "his sympathy with England and France were reasoned". The CWC, by its statement of September 14, 1939, "demanded from the British as a condition for India's participation in the war the declaration of war aims for the liquidation of imperialism" and questioned "the Anglo-French declaration that the war was being carried in the cause of democracy and freedom". The war aims, as Nehru expected, were liberation of countries, extension of democracy and freedom and ending of racial discrimination.

5. Harijan (Ahmedabad), September 11, 1939.
8. Ibid., p. 217.
In mid-November of 1939, the CWC interpreted the British attitude "as a desire to maintain imperialist domination of India in alliance with the reactionary elements in the country" and declared that "in no event can the Congress accept the responsibility of government, even in the transitional period, without real power being given to popular representatives". The Congress emphasised that the Constituent Assembly was "the only democratic method of determining the constitution of a free country". However, the Congress hoped for an honourable settlement and adopted the policy of non-violent and peaceful settlement.

Further, the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow had realized that he had committed a mistake by declaring the war on behalf of the Indians without consulting the Indian political leaders. To make up for this omission, he invited the Indian leaders for consultation, but he was dejected when the Congress declared that "after the war British would concede Indians 'the right of self-determination by framing their own constitution through a Constituent Assembly". In fact, he did not like to invite any political party to participate effectively in the central government as it was never the British policy "to expedite in India constitutional changes for their own sake or gratuitously to hurry the handing over of controls to Indian hands".

To understand the future political development and situation, it seems necessary to survey the swaying waves of thought in the country during the first half of November, 1939. In Bengal, it was conceived that there would be some proposal acceptable to the Congress, the Muslims and the Viceroy to settle the communal problem. The Congress thought that its position would "be betrayed by acceding to Mr. Jinnah's demand" and the League feared that "Mr. Jinnah might not prove firm enough". However,

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
the Congress and Hindu papers continued to "denounce Mr. Jinnah for his intransigence" and for his "constantly expanding list of demands" taking the line, as usual, that "the problem of minorities was entirely fictitious, that democratic principles could not be followed except by leaving such minorities as actually might exist to make their own terms with the majority, and that Mr. Jinnah and his Muslim League had no right to claim that they represented unanimous Muslim opinion in view of the substantial number of Muslims who repudiated him". The Hindusthan Standard, without ignoring the Hindu-Muslim differences, wrote that "concrete issues must be faced on both sides in a spirit of give and take".

In Punjab, it was blamed on all sides that the Congress was putting "the clock back many years" and that it was unable "to carry all Hindu opinion in the Punjab with it in its recent decisions". Pratap observed that the British aim was to show that the Hindus and the Muslims quarrelling with each other was obstructing political advance and charged that the Congress by opening parleys with the League has reduced its position to the level of Hindu Sabha and surrendered to communalist Muslims. In the Hindu, Bhai Parmanand wrote that Gandhiji's theory about the Hindu-Muslim unity, first, was 'entirely wrong', and, secondly, the foundation of Swaraj, was misleading to the country. In another issue of the Hindu, he recalled Gandhiji's statement that "the Congress did not represent the Hindus" and argued that it was, therefore, "impossible for Congress, being a non-Hindu body, to negotiate and reach a settlement with the Muslim League". He held "the Congress leaders more responsible than the British Government for bringing up the communal question". Ihsan, criticising the Congress attitude, called the Congress uncareful of the country's future, and declared that "the Muslims would now offer their sacrifices and would defend India by the power of their arm". The Inqilab argued that "Congress was not prepared for a compromise and that it was obscuring the real issue by its absurd and aimless objections. It stood by the constituent assembly scheme by which it hoped to get all the

15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 34.
19. Ibid.
minorities unconditionally under its control". Secret organizations were in preparation for a possible civil disobedience movement. The newspapers were publishing exciting reports to highlight the spirit and enthusiasm of the people and were committed to printing objectionable articles.

The Congress ministries resigned on November 3, 1939. The Searchlight reported that the appointment of two Advisers establishing a bureaucratic government did not follow any violent change in the Government policy. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, following Mahatma Gandhi, declared that "the country is not ready for civil disobedience, that Congressmen must always be thoroughly non-violent and that the immediate aim of every Congress man should be the achievement of communal unity". The Left Wing of the Congress, the Forward Bloc, the Congress Socialists and Kisan Sabha and Communists, being too weak to start a movement or unable to be combined, forced the hands of the Congress Right Wing. At Hathwa (Saran), the League declared that "Muslims had no quarrel with the Hindus". The Hindu Sabha, observing Hindu Nation Day (October 27, 1939) declared "India for the Hindus".

In Orissa, a section of Congressmen, who did not appreciate Gandhiji's policy of 'unconditional support in the War' criticised him openly. In Cuttack, the League was "looked upon with suspicion by the educated Muhammadans who avoided meetings of Maulvi Yakub Ali Qurashi, whose criticisms of some local Muhammadans, had given rise to a defamation case.

In Assam, the Congress Ministry tendered its resignation on November 15, 1939. The newspapers criticised the "capitalistic elements". The Times of Assam observed: "It is no use denying the difficulties of this outstanding communal problem and democracy cannot foster in the Indian soil unless our communal problems are solved in the light of our national self-consciousness. Democracy without this consciousness will

20. Jhang Sial (Jhang), Khalea (Gujranwala), Film Magazine (Lahore), Jarida Al-Islah (Lahore), Pratap (Lahore), Ihsan (Lahore), Milap (Lahore), Daler Khalsa (Gurmukhi Weekly - Lahore), Shardhanand (Urdu Weekly - RawalPindi).


22. Saptake (Silchar), Assam Herald, Assam Tribune and Times of Assam.
surely turn out to be either despotism of the majority or tyranny of the minority.\(^\text{23}\)

In the NWFP, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan toured Peshawar and Mardan districts alleging that "if Great Britain were really out to fight the freedom of small nations, she would have done so in the cases of Abyssinia, Czechoslovakia and so on" and charged that "Muslim League leaders have, indeed, done more than good to their cause by the intolerance shown in their speeches in the Assembly." Under the Indian Press Emergency Act, 1931, Rikhthini-Khudai-Khidmatgar was warned for its criticizing Britain's war aims. The Forward Block press material was refused publication since it appealed to the public to refuse to enlist in the British army.

In Sind, the Congress circles looked upon the Working Committee's instructions to the Ministries to resign as a fitting measure for countering the policy of the British. Anti-ministerial and communal speeches continued. One speaker remarked that "India, from Kashmir to Cape Comorin, belonged to the Hindus, and that the Muslims, who came later as guests of the Hindus, had no right to have any say in matters affecting the political destiny of India." The Beawar Municipal Elections campaign was started. The Hindu coalition (consisting of members of the Mahasabhis and the Arya Samaj and certain other Hindus attached to no-party but having non-Congress sympathy) opposed the Congress because, they believed, the Congress had failed to protect Hindu rights. The position of the Congress was quite precarious. The Congress was "opposed by Muslims as being anti-Muslim and by the ardent Hindus as not being sufficiently pro-Hindu." The attempt to reconcile conflicting communal aims was, thus, in effect, resulting into the alienation of members from both wings.

During the second half of November, 1939, in Madras, as a result of Government prosecutions, there was a marked decrease in the number of anti-war speeches, but recruitment did not suffer noticeably as a result

\(^{23}\) Report on the Political Events in Assam during the First Half of November, 1939, NAI, p. 61.

\(^{24}\) Report on the Political Events in NWFP during the First Half of November, 1939, NAI, p. 63.


\(^{26}\) Fortnightly Report for Ajmer-Merwara for the First Half of November, 1939, NAI, p. 77.
of critical speeches. Many speakers were warned. Objectionable pamphlets were distributed and slogans written on walls. Sir Currimbhoy Ibrahim, a member of the WCML, visited Madras and Malabar and exhorted Muslims to join the Muslim League. In Cuddapah, the enthusiasm was so intense. The Pesh Imam of a Mosque was "deposted by his congregation for having insulted Mr. Jinnah in a sermon". The Muslim League on November 25, in Banganapalle State resolved "appealing to the Government not to abolish the State but to replace the present Nawab, if found unfit, by another member of the ruling family". On November 30, 1939, Rajagopalachari addressing a crowded meeting in Bombay City, urged that "foreign control could not be eliminated unless India were united in a common programme" with the Muslims. The Muslim League on November 25, in Banganapalle State resolved "appealing to the Government not to abolish the State but to replace the present Nawab, if found unfit, by another member of the ruling family". On November 30, 1939, Rajagopalachari addressing a crowded meeting in Bombay City, urged that "foreign control could not be eliminated unless India were united in a common programme" with the Muslims. The Muslim League on November 25, in Banganapalle State resolved "appealing to the Government not to abolish the State but to replace the present Nawab, if found unfit, by another member of the ruling family". On November 30, 1939, Rajagopalachari addressing a crowded meeting in Bombay City, urged that "foreign control could not be eliminated unless India were united in a common programme" with the Muslims. The Muslim League on November 25, in Banganapalle State resolved "appealing to the Government not to abolish the State but to replace the present Nawab, if found unfit, by another member of the ruling family". On November 30, 1939, Rajagopalachari addressing a crowded meeting in Bombay City, urged that "foreign control could not be eliminated unless India were united in a common programme" with the Muslims.

In Bengal, Subhas Bose was the most vocal politician. He ridiculed the Congress policy and Gandhiji's insistence for communal unity to improve the communal situation. Referring to the Allahabad resolution of the AICC, he said, it amounted to "licking the feet that kick" and intended to "hoodwink and bluff" the country into inaction. Bose's Forward Bloc insisted that the time was ripe for taking "definite and active steps". Criticising Gandhiji, he questioned whether "his leadership will not result in a diminution of Congress prestige". M.N. Roy and Dr. Moonje also criticised the Congress policies. Moonje, on behalf of the Hindu Mahasabha said the Congress "repudiation of the federal scheme and the resignation of Congress ministries were blunders which have betrayed Hindu interests". Moonje observed that the communal problem

28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 90.
30. Ibid., p. 91.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
was somewhat improved when an excellent impression was created by Jinnah's broadcast on the conclusion of the Ramazan fast, who "made an eloquent plea for toleration and a "cultural synthesis". In respect of Hindus, he said that "the Congress is not a suitable representative of their communal interests and a growing demand that the Hindu Mahasabha must be a party to any communal settlement particularly as regards Bengali". Communal tension increased in Malda on the question of "music before mosques" and "a Muhammadan taking part in the Kali Puja procession and behaving roughly" in Burdwan. The Congress blamed Britain for the emergence of the problem which was said to be "due to deliberate encouragement of communal feeling among the Moslems". The Hindusthan Standard declared that the Congress "failed to recognise the consistent demand for the development of a Moslem culture". Commenting on the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha was reported to have said that "in any settlement of communal difference this body should be treated on the same terms as the Moslem League". The Amrita Bazar Patrika declared that "The British Government have no legal or moral justification for treating the League differently from the Hindu Mahasabha".

In Punjab, people were unusually quiet, but peace was occasionally disturbed by party meetings. At Lahore, Sardul Singh Kavisher, the leader of the Forward Bloc in the Punjab, in an intemperate speech openly "preached revolt from the restraint imposed by Mr. Gandhi and declared that it was impossible for the country to obtain freedom otherwise than by resolt to force". The Manzilgah affair in Sindh had embittered communal relations in Punjab.

In Bihar, the communal tension had such an impact that even a trivial incident led to a riot. The Darbhanga Muslim League Annual session, under the presidentship of Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, M.L.A. (Delhi), from November 24-26, 1939, was attended by 15 to 20 thousand Muslims

34. Ibid., p. 104.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 107.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
including Fazlul Haq, the Prime Minister of Bengal, Aziz of Patna, Maulvi Abdul Hamid of Budaun and Maulvi Barhanul Haque of Central Provinces. The Conference described the "oppression of the Congress Ministries and the need for unity among Muslims". Their resolution condemned the system of joint electorates. At another meeting of the League, it was expressed that "Swaraj in India in the present circumstances could mean nothing but Hindu Raj". At Gaya, the League supported the British Government provided it safeguarded the rights and privileges of the Muslims. On the occasion of the Id prayers, in Monghyr, the followers of Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the League held their prayers separately as they had difference of opinion on the electoral system. Dr. Moonje visited Darbhanga and declared that "the British were the friends of the Muslims as the latter had promised support in the war". Moonje advocated the Hindus "to unite, obtain military training as volunteers and try for Swaraj without caring for the support of the Muslims". Shareef, an influential member of the League at Patna, wrote to Searchlight that the "British master is infinitely better than the Congress or Hindu master and, therefore, there could be no unity between Hindus and Muslims".

In the Central Provinces and Berar, D.K. Mehta, Manganlal Bagdi and Dandekar addressed meetings. The organisers of the Pratap Vyayamshala, Wardha, decided to start a Congress Sena Dal, on the lines of the Rashtriya Swayam Sewa Sangh (RSS). R.P. Paranjpe of Poona said that the Congress had committed a blunder in refusing to cooperate with the British Government. At Nagpur, the Hindu Mahasabha in a meeting, chaired by Moonje and attended by Bhai Parmanand of Punjab, the Congress was criticised for its conciliatory attitude towards the Muslims. Bhai Parmanand said: "The more the Congress wooes the Muslims, the greater did their demands become".

42. Ibid., p. 128.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
In Assam, Srijut Kuladhar Chaliha, M.L.A. (Central) remarked on "non-violence as to insinuate the efficacy of violence". The Muslim League was also active in organising the students of the Assam Valley.

In the NWFP, Congress meetings were held but with small audience. There were a few anti-recruiting posters in Hazara District, but without any effect on the people. In Orissa, the Congress held a very large number of meetings and laid great stress "on achieving unity between Hindus and Muhammadans" and the Congress workers were asked "to give this their first consideration".

In Sind, at the Second Sahiti Congress Conference held at Deparja, Nawabshah District, Khan Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai of Baluchistan appealed to the people to join the Congress. Prof. Ghanshuam J.Shivdasani remarked that "England's statement that she was fighting Germany for the freedom of small nations was false, as she was really fighting to preserve her Imperialism which was threatened by the growing power of Germany. Moulvi Mahomed Sidik at the Karachi Congress Committee meeting said that the Viceroy considered the Indians were "a herd of goats which could be dragged into war as in 1914". Hafiz Nasir Ahmad Atta Mahomed at the same meeting said that "Mr. Jinnah was mistaken if he thought that every Muslim would support him in prolonging the British domination of India and he assured the Congress that the Muslims were as anxious to attain freedom as any other community". He asserted that the various communities in India would come to an immediate settlement if the British left them alone to settle their own affairs.

The most tragic event was the Manzilgah riots during the second fortnight of November, 1939. The Hindus alleged that the Muslim shrine of Zind Pir (a small island in the Indus between Old Sukkur and Rohri) was in reality a Hindu shrine and was taken forcible possession of by Muslims many years ago. Communal agitation led to the decision of the Rohri Panchayat to boycott of Muslim meat shops and to open Jhatka shops. On the call of the Restoration Committee, thousands of Muslims gathered...

to resist the police on November 15. When negotiations failed, the
Government ordered eviction of the shrine's vicinity from the Satyagrahis
by a police lathi charge and use of tear gas, while the Hindu Sabha
volunteers were strutting about the streets in khaki uniforms, joined
by the police "who seemed to be getting out of control owing to communal
feeling in their ranks". On November 22, the Working Committee of the
Baluchistan Muslim League at Quetta sympathising with the Muslims
alleged to have been attacked by the Hindus and urged the Government at
Sukkur to restore the Sukkur Manzilgah to the Muslims and severely punish
those responsible for the riots.

Another serious incident in Sind was the forcible eviction of a
small Makrani colony unauthorisedly occupying a plot of land near the
railway station at Hyderabad. The leaflet issued by a Moulvi and other
leaders of Hyderabad Makrani Jamiat proclaimed that the police pulled
down the Makrani dwellings and an alleged mosque and appealed to the
Muslim police to rise equal to the occasion, as did the Hindus not long
ago when faced with the demolition in Karachi of the Hanuman Temple.

The Hindu-Muslim tension had become very grave in this period. The
Arya Samajist said that "every Arya Samajist should get a lathi and a
knife for self-defence". At meetings of Arya Samaj, the audience were
exhorted to enlist in the Hindu Volunteer Corps. One Kundai of Hyderabad
distributed short iron dandas amongst the local Hindus and offered
another fifty to the Hyderabad Arya Samaj. Arya Vir Dal, on the line of
Khaksar, was organised, who praded with lathis in uniforms for the
protection of Hindus. Amil Sheva Dal and Yogi Physical Culture resolved
that Hindus should arm themselves with defensive weapons. The Hindus
refused to purchase newspapers from Muslim vendors. A Moulvi at an Idgah
meeting in Dadu District advised Muslims not to purchase sweetmeats from
Hindu halwais as they were made in an impure way. It was alleged that the
Hindus of Hyderabad distributed "four thousand lathis, hundreds of spears
and had stored acid, on account of which the authorities were warned that
the Muslims could not be held responsible for any breach of the peace"
Syed Ahmed of Karachi said that Khaksars were to be organised in order to
re-establish Muslim rule in India lost since the time of Shah Jehan and
Aurangzeb.

50. Ibid., p. 161.
51. Ibid., p. 162.
52. Ibid.
On November 16, Hyat accused the Sind Ministry of "dancing at the beck and call of Hindus, who in order to eliminate Muslims were endeavouring to usurp Muslim rights to so great an extent that they were now interfering in the religious affairs of the Muslims". The Qurbani (November 16) alleged that the Sind Muslims were making daily attacks against the life, honour and property of Hindus. The Dawat-e-Islam (Sukkur) was equally violent in its attacks on Hindus. The Islah (November 20) condemned Hindu propaganda against Muslims and opined that a Civil War would result if such propaganda continued. The Kumar (November 21) alleged that Muslim police at Sukkur failed to prevent Muslim rioters from attacking Hindus and burning Hindu houses and even helped Muslims to do so. Al-Wahid, Qurbani, Dharamvir, Dawat-e-Islam, Sindhi and Sind Zamindar were warned not to publish any article on Manzilgah for one month. Zamindar, Ahsan and Shahbaz (Punjab newspapers) held the Sind Government responsible for the Sukkur riots. A poster in Karachi refers "to the heartless and oppressive manner in which innocent and oppressed Muslims of Sukkur have been ruined and compares the conditions at Sukkur to those obtaining in the days of Hilakookhan and Changezkhan".

On January 7, 1940, Jinnah reiterated League's demand for recognition as the sole, authentic and representative organization of Muslims in India. Nehru stated that the Congress did not recognize the League as sole representative of Muslims. On January 10, 1940, Nehru at Ghaziabad declared that "there could be no question of settlement with government or of return of Congress ministries to office until question of India's freedom finally settled". Linlithgow, in view of the Congress-League conflict, thought that their differences "would strengthen Britain's hold on India for many years". Having carefully considered negotiated with numerous parties and individuals, he favoured maintenance of "the political status quo". Nehru, interpreting this Viceroy's policy, wrote to Gandhiji: "The same old game is played again, the background is the same, the

53. Ibid., p. 163.
54. Ibid., p. 164.
57. Ibid.
various epithets are the same and the actors are the same and the results must be the same. Notwithstanding the fact that the Congress and the Government were drifting apart, but there was still a possibility of modus vivendi between them. Nehru came to know that Jinnah was in a cooperative mood and invited "Jinnah to join the Congress in protesting against India being plunged into the war, without her consent" hence, by appealing to Jinnah's patriotism, he wrote: "Our dignity and self-respect as Indians has been insulted". Jinnah seemed cordial, but he did not commit himself and continued the conversations.

Muslim League Appeasement of the British

The Muslim League, "neither accepted nor rejected the Viceroy's statement, but asked for further discussion and clarification". The League commended the assurance of giving weight to the interests of the minorities and condemned the amendment of the Federal part of the Act and, on the whole, demanded that the whole constitutional problem should be considered afresh.

After the Congress Ministries had resigned in October, 1939, the Governors in the Non-Muslim majority states and the Muslim League in the Muslim majority provinces had taken over the provincial administration, the Viceroy began "to lean more on the support of the Muslim League" and "with the Congress in wilderness and Jinnah's hands considerably strengthened, waverers among the Muslims began trickling into the League". For all practical purposes Jinnah was given a veto on further constitutional progress and an "adroit politician that he was, he made the very most of the situation". It was then generally held that the question of minorities was given more importance than it deserved in the light of Zetland's speech declaring the Congress demand for self-determination to be unacceptable.

58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
61. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 69.
62. Ibid., p. 70.
63. N.P.A. Smith to F.H. Puckle, Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, NAI, p. 8.
On November 5, 1939, Jinnah addressed the Viceroy, asking for assurance on the following four points:

"(1) that as soon as circumstances permitted, or immediately after the war, the entire problem of India's future constitution (apart from the Government of India Act, 1935) would be examined and reconsidered de novo;

(2) that no declaration would, either in principle or otherwise, be made or any constitution be enacted by His Majesty's Government or Parliament without the approval and consent of the two major communities of India;

(3) that His Majesty's Government would try to meet all reasonable national demands of the Arabs in Palestine; and

(4) that Indian troops would not be used outside India against any Muslim power or country".

Up to that moment, the League had not created any difficulty nor had embarrassed the British in their war prosecution but the provinces, where the League had a dominant voice, "had been left free to cooperate with the British Government pending their consideration with regard to the assurances they had asked for in particular that the British Government should make no declaration regarding the future constitutional problems of India and the vital issues that were raised in that connection without their approval and consent".

Jinnah's Five Points

The Congress on September 15, 1939, had resolved that the issue of war and peace was to be decided by the Indians, and the British Government in view of the growing discontent and increasing gravity of the situation, had declared that the Viceroy's Executive Council would be expanded to include in it the representatives of major political parties. The Congress was against the formation of the coalition ministries as an interim settlement during the War. Meanwhile, in November, 1939, the Muslim League put forth five points before the Congress for an interim settlement:

"(1) Establishment of coalition ministries in the provinces;"

64. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 70.


66. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 72.
(2) Congress acceptance of the formula that no legislative measure affecting Muslims would be passed by a Provincial Lower House of two-thirds, if the Muslim representatives in that House were opposed to it;

(3) An undertaking from the Congress not to fly their flag on public institutions;

(4) An understanding as regards the singing of Bande Matram;

(5) Congress undertaking to cease its hostile campaign against the Muslim League.

The above proposals did not bring any fruitful results and the gulf between the Congress and the League rather widened.

Jinnah, after the resignation of the Congress ministire felt "relief at the termination of the majority tyranny which was so ruthlessly exercised in the course of the last 27 months". Jinnah observed the 'Day of Deliverance' on December 22, 1939, and released the following statement, which was "vitriolic attack on the Congress Party":

"That the Congress Ministry both in the discharge of their duties of the administration and in the Legislature have done their best to flout the Muslim opinion, to destroy Muslim culture, and have interfered with their religious and social life, and trampled upon their economic and political rights; that in matter of differences and disputes the Congress Ministry invariably have sided with, supported and advanced the cause of the Hindus in total disregard and to the prejudice of the Muslim interest".

Expressing strong resentment, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Jinnah, in December, 1939:

"It thus seems that politically we have no common ground and that our objectives are different. That in itself makes discussion difficult and fruitless".

Obviously, these communications marked the turning point of Jinnah's policy with his assertion that the British Government should revise the whole problem of India's future constitution de novo, as, according to him, "no new constitutional scheme for India could be evolved and implemented without the consent and approval of the Indian Muslim League".

end of 1939, the Hindu-Muslim unity had almost completely evaporated in the air. Nehru had put his heart on the constituent assembly elected on the basis of adult franchise, and Jinnah's proposal for constituent assembly was utopian.

**Indifference of the Viceroy**

The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, was, on the one hand, taking a sympathetic view of the activities and demands of the Muslim League, and, on the other, was becoming increasingly antagonistic towards the Congress for its resolution of conditional accord with regard to the War Aims. He became so resolute in his policy against the Congress that proposals of some well-wishers to bridge the gulf between the Congress and the Government were turned down by the Viceroy. For instance, G.D. Birla "laid stress on the fact that it was of vital importance to make some move, but the Viceroy was not disposed to take any action." 72

The problem of constitutional development in India became a subject of discussion in England. Sir Stafford Cripps, in December, 1939, on his way to China, stayed for a few days in India and stated to the press that "some kind of Constituent Assembly (not necessarily quite in the form advocated by the Congress) should be set up after the war". 73 Cripps endorsed the conception of the British people that "when the next move was to be made India's constitution should, to the largest possible extent, be framed by Indians in India." 74

**Viceroy's Offer**

In January, 1940, the Viceroy in Bombay offered "India "dominion status" of the "Statute of Westminster variety" at the end of the war, in which Gandhiji saw "germs of an honourable settlement", but when the two met in February in Delhi and the Viceroy told Gandhiji "to examine

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71. B.R. Nanda, n. 4, p. 166.
72. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 72.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
the entire field of constitutional progress in consultation with the representatives of all parties and interests in India\textsuperscript{76}, the Congress was again disillusioned. The British view was to enact the 1935 Act for: 
\textit{(a) an immediate expansion of the executive council; and after the war (b) the revival of the federal scheme to expedite the achievement of dominion status}.\textsuperscript{77}

On February 3-6, 1940, the League Working Committee met in New Delhi, and Jinnah proclaimed that Western democracy was unsuited for India. To break the deadlock, Fazlul Haq, on February 4, suggested that a coalition government should be set up in provinces for the duration of war. The Viceroy, on February 5, met Gandhiji and pleaded to break political deadlock. The Viceroy also met Jinnah on February 6, Lord Zetland appealed on February 11, to the Congress leaders to "escape from the tyranny of phrases".

\textbf{Pakistan Resolution}

However, in the course of political unsettlement, chaos and disturbances in the country, the Lahore resolution was adopted on March 23, 1940, which "India's newspaper headlines next day pronounced" as 'Pakistan Resolution' and "so it remained". Jinnah replied hard opposition almost from all parties and Non-League Muslim organizations, but Jinnah, a born orator, distorted and silenced the drums being beaten against him. Consequently, a large number of Muslims, mostly aristocrates and high born, who sided with Jinnah on communal grounds, joined the League and along with them the Muslims of other sects also followed Jinnah's plank of 'Islam in Danger' or a 'Muslim Pak Homeland'. Jinnah had, by then, created a large number of his followers throughout India and had stood fast to his position and ambition for the creation of Pakistan. To vitalise this goal, he observed 'Pakistan Day' on April 19, 1940, and thousands of League meetings were held in the country.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Maurice and Taya Zinkin, 'Impressions, 1938-47', in C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright, n.1, p. 562.
**Sikander Hyat's Opposition**

Sir Sikander Hyat Khan found the concept of partition of India "insupportable till the bitter end, for it was at once a repudiation of his Unionist Party's basic platform of Hindu-Muslim-Sikh coexistence, and his potential to win personal leadership over the League". He became aware of the fact that "his days of aspiring to supreme leadership of the Muslims of India was numbered". News of Sikander's rivalry at the League's Subject Committee on March 23, 1940, flashed out and an angry crowd of young Muslims shouted "Sikander Murdabad" (Death to Sikander), but when Jinnah came out of the pandal, they shouted "Quaid-i-Azam Zindabad" (Long Life to Quaid-i-Azam).

**Scheme Based on Anglo-Egyptian Agreement (1922)**

The Hindu (Madras) in early March, 1940, published a scheme broadly based on the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1922, which sought that India would be free to draft her own constitution at the end of the war with complete freedom subject to the condition:

"(1) the constitution to be acceptable to the Muslims and other minorities;

(2) a prior agreement between the representatives of Britain and India 'in a spirit of friendly accommodation' - a phrase used in the Anglo-Egyptian agreement - on (a) defence, (b) British interests, and (c) the Indian states."

Such a declaration could be coupled with an offer from the Viceroy accepting the principle of a provisional national government at the centre, the details of which could be worked out by a conference of the premiers of the eleven provinces. Gandhiji accepted this formula, but response from the British side was negative.

**Congress Session, Ramgarh**

The Congress at the Ramgarh session held on March 19-20, 1940,

80. Ibid., p. 184.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
presided over by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, reiterating its demand for "complete independence" formally resolved: "nothing short of Complete Independence can be accepted by the people of India" and that no permanent solution was possible "except through a Constituent Assembly". This session reiterated the demands of September 14, 1939, for the declaration of British war aims. However, the session felt that Civil Disobedience was "the only course left" (emphasis added). The session did not take any extreme action when England was involved in a life-and-death struggle with the Germans, as Gandhiji, on April 6, 1940, wrote: "We do not seek our independence out of Britain's ruin". Nehru on May 20, 1940, stated: "Launching a Civil Disobedience campaign at a time when Britain is engaged in a life-and-death struggle would be an act derogatory to India's honour". He later observed: "Congress which had been on the verge of civil disobedience could not think in terms of any such movement while the very existence of free England hung in balance".

When the Congress was engaged in deciding about launching a Civil Disobedience Movement, the Muslim leaders belonging to different non-League parties were thinking over the possibility of creation of Pakistan due to constitutional deadlock between the Congress and the League. They wanted true settlement between the two major parties. To evolve a common solution, they held meetings and conferences, such as the Azad Muslim Conference of April, 1940.

The White Paper

In view of the divergent claims of the Congress, the League, the Depressed Classes and the Princes, and particularly abrupt ending of conversation of Gandhiji with the Viceroy, on February 5, 1940, Linlithgow preferred to adopt a policy of "wait and see". On April 10, the Government

84. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 79. See also R.J. Moore, 'British Policy and the Indian Problem, 1936-40', in C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright, n. 1, p. 93.
85. Deva Narayan Malik, n. 6, p. 19.
89. Jawaharlal Nehru, n. 9, p. 435.
published the White Paper on "India and the War", which described all the events of the period and concluded that "in view of the impasse, the Government had no option but to seek the approval of Parliament for the continuance of the Section 93 proclamations in the seven provinces', which was approved by the Parliament on April 18, 1940. Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State, spoke in the House of Lords:-

"But that does not mean that the future constitution of India is to be a constitution dictated by the Government and Parliament of this country against the wishes of the Indian people. The undertaking given by His Majesty's Government to examine the constitutional field in consultation with representatives of all parties and interests in India connotes not dictation but negotiation. Admittedly a substantial measure of agreement amongst the communities in India is essential if the vision of a united India which has inspired the labours of so many Indians and Englishmen is to become a reality, for I cannot believe that any Government or Parliament in this country would attempt to impose by force upon, for example 80 million Moslem subjects of His Majesty in India a form of constitution under which they would not live peacefully and contentedly".

The Viceroy underlining the above portion of speech sent it to Jinnah on April 19, 1940, assuring that "no declaration would be made and that no constitution would be enforced by His Majesty's Government, or enacted by Parliament without the approval and consent of the Musalmans of India", which completed the deadlock of constitutional development.

All-India Azad Muslim Conference

More than one hundred Muslim leaders, belonging to "different non-League parties", seriously felt the severity of the League's demand for Pakistan in view of the Congress refusal to make any concessions to the League. They condemned the Pakistan Resolution and realised that "the demand of Pakistan amounted to clear repudiation of the idea of the main political life of the Hindus and Muslims". They anticipated

90.V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 85.
91.Ibid. Setland reaffirmed his conviction that "political unity of India was unattainable without a communal settlement", Times (London), April 19, 1940.
92.Subhas Chandra Bose, n. 88, p. 344.
93.Times of India (New Delhi), March 27, 1940, p. 8.
that establishment of such a state without the support of the common people was impossible. Further, they foresaw that their political influence would be lost and their loyalty would be divided between two states. Therefore, they supported the Congress demand for a constituent assembly and earnestly wanted to search out a formula to retain the Motherland united. Representatives of "various Muslim nationalist groups like the Ahrars, Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the Shia Policy Council" held a four-day conference in Delhi on April 27, 1940, under the presidency of the Sind Premier, Allah Baksh Somru. The Conference, styled as the All-India Azad Muslim Conference, accepted Maulana Hafizur Rehman's resolution, which demanded:

"(1) immediate convening of a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of adult franchise; and

(2) exclusive right for the elected Muslim members of the proposed constituent Assembly to lay down the safeguards for the protection of rights and interests of the community".

At the same conference, Asaf Ali presented another resolution, according to which 27 member board was to be constituted to consider such issues as follows:

"(i) protection of Muslim culture, personal law, and religious rights;

(ii) political rights of the Muslims and their protection;

(iii) non-unitary, federal constitution in which the federal government should have only limited powers;

(iv) safeguards for the economic, social and cultural rights of the Muslims; and

(v) the Muslim share in the public services".

The conference condemned the partition of India demanded by the Muslim League and did not agree to Jinnah's claim that the League was the only representative body of the Muslims. They called upon the "Muslims to fight shoulder to shoulder with their other countrymen for the attainment of complete independence". The conference, however, could not make

94. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 83.
96. Ibid.
97. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 83.
any impression on the general Muslim masses.

On May 14, the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, Lord Zetland, wrote:

"I attach no particular importance to the Delhi Conference of the Muslims which took place a few days ago. It has been well organised and the British press machine has written it up admirably ... We both are, of course, aware that there is a *not unimportant* Muslim element outside the Muslim League ... Indeed, I am sure that Jinnah remains the man to deal with on the Muslim side".

Disregarding the 100 representatives, the Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State that "Jinnah is our man and we accept him as a representative of all Muslims" and that "the Khaksars have formally renewed their offer to me of 50,000 men to help in the war", but since Jinnah accepted "no responsibility for Khaksars of their activities", the Viceroy did not consider it advisable "to enter into any correspondence with them or their leaders". Further, the British made it clear "to every Indian Muslim that except Jinnah and the Muslim League, they were not ready to accept any other party". Thus, the Muslims were obliged to join the Muslim League. It is questionable when the British favoured Jinnah so much, why they did not accept Jinnah's Fourteen Points.

**Congress Rejection of Two-Nation Theory**

The Lahore Resolution of March, 1940, and Jinnah's elucidation of Two-Nation theory, perturbed the Congress. The Congress refused to accept the theory of Jinnah, who continued to insist that the Congress should first accede to the League demand for Pakistan. Till this time, Jinnah was not sure of getting a decisive verdict in favour of Pakistan, due to opposition of the nationalist Muslims, who "were denounced and condemned on absurd grounds in the most intemperate language". They were rebuked by the Leaguers for "accepting money as a price for their...

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99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

patriotism. Hence, the partition cannot be regarded as a result of intrigue of selfish leaders. If considered in the light of personal emotions, it is said that "Jinnah's consummate political skill lay in the manner in which he harnessed these forces under his personal direction for the achievement of personal glory and the establishment of the political identity for the community".

However, following the Ramgarh policy, Nehru remarked: "He would be prepared to face all consequences of it but he would not be prepared to live with such people." Many knots of the Hindu-Muslim problem, Nehru said, "had been merged into one knot, which could not be unravelled by ordinary methods, but would need an operation ... he would say one thing very frankly that he had begun to consider them (Muslim Leaguers) and people like himself, as separate nations".

Gandhiji, in one of the series of articles in Harijan, wrote on May 4, 1940: "The British can retain their hold on India only by a policy of 'divide and rule'". He opined that "a true solution will come with the end of the (British) rule" and if the demand of Pakistan is a desirable goal, "why should it be prevented?".

On May 6, 1940, Nehru at Poona said that neither the Hindu Mahasabha nor the Muslim League had positive programme and "characterized the Pakistan scheme as foolish and said that it "would not last 24 hours". The Congress was, however, appalled that the "cry of Pakistan swept the Muslims off their feet". The extent of the delusion of Muslims that "Pakistan was good for them" was a most astonishing phenomenon.

104. The Leader (Allahabad), April 15, 1940.
105. Ibid., April 16, 1940.
106. Harijan (Ahmedabad), May 4, 1940.
107. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
Change in British Government

Meanwhile, on May 10, 1940, Winston Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister and on May 19, 1940, L.S. Amery took over from Lord Zetland as Secretary of State for India. Lord Linlithgow, however, remained the Viceroy of India. Amery, on May 23, 1940, in the House of Commons, declared that "attainment by India of full and equal partnership in Commonwealth was goal of British policy".

ML Conference, Hubli

Jinnah, at the Bombay Presidency Provincial Muslim League Conference, held at Hubli on May 26, 1940, said:

"I am asked, will the British agree to the basic and fundamental principles of the Lahore Resolution, namely, to create independent Muslim states in North-Western and Eastern Zones of India? Whether they agree or whether they do not, we shall fight for it to the last ditch. I know that the British politicians, press and public are still holding on to the conception of unity and one India; but I am convinced that it is a self-deception and complete ignorance of reality. At the same time I am confident that we have successfully dispelled the false propaganda and removed the delusion under which the British public are suffering, they with their sense of sagacity, will not fail to meet us".

Jinnah remarked that he was astonished that men like Gandhi talked in such a manner that reflected their willingness to partition. Jinnah had never used the word 'vivisection' in the Lahore Resolution, but Gandhi in reply to his statement of Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan. Gandhiji and Rajagopalachari talked about the partition as "cutting the baby into two halves". Jinnah, in the light of these statements, foresaw the division and partition of India, and did not doubt that "in near future Muslim India and Hindu India would exist on the physical map of India". Jinnah sarcastically said that he could not understand the reason why "there was so much hue and cry against the Lahore Resolution". Jinnah

113. Harijan (Ahmedabad), April 13, 1940.
114. Dr. J.J. Pal, n. 95, p. 89.
115. Ibid.
added that India was composed of nationalities and not only castes and that he "did not see in India any Central National Government whose authority was being smashed".

By mid-June, 1940, there was a radical change in the attitude of Gandhiji. On June 15, 1940, he wrote:

"The Muslim League is frankly communal and wants to divide India into two parts ... Thus for the present purpose there are only two parties - the Congress and those who side with the Congress, and the parties who do not. Between the two there is no meeting ground without the one or the other surrendering its purpose".

This was Gandhiji's first such a harsh statement which aroused suspicions in the League's circle that the Congress Raj was really a danger to the future of Muslims as a distinct social identity. Consequently, Sikander Hyat Khan, leader of the Moderate Section, lost his all cards when the League's Subject Committee on June 15 and 16, 1940, endorsed Jinnah's policy and authorised him to proceed with his negotiations with the Viceroy and resolved:

"No other member of the Committee should negotiate with Congress leaders without Mr. Jinnah's permission. Nor should Moslems serve on War Committee pending further instructions from Mr. Jinnah".

Thus, the challenge of Gandhiji and Jinnah's response thereto ensured that "the two nation theory was to be fully applied in terms of constitutional arithmetic".

CWC Meeting, Wardha, 1940

The Committee resolved that "the national struggle for India's independence must continue on its non-violent course; the war committees sponsored by Government should not be supported, and no Congressmen should contribute to the war funds or enlist in civil guards under official control".

116. Ibid.
118. Ibid., p. 243. See also V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 88.
120. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 89.
After Germany occupied France, it began air raids on Great Britain on June 18, 1940. Premier Winston Churchill in the House of Commons said: "The battle of France is over; the battle of Britain is about to begin". The Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy appealed to the Indians "to realize the gravity of the military situation of the war and extend all possible cooperation and support".

By the end of June, 1940, Germany attacked massively and it was apprehended that Britain would also shortly follow suit. In view of the international situation, the Congress decided to extend conditional support to the Government in the war efforts. Gandhiji opposed India's participation in the war. To him the issue was one of pacifism, and not of India's freedom, while the Congress President Maulana Azad, like many others, declared that "the Indian National Congress was not a Pacifist organization but one for achieving India's freedom". Gandhiji was opposed also on the question of Council entry as against the wishes of Gandhiji the CWC advised the Congressmen to accept the Ministry on certain conditions.

The Viceroy interviewed Jinnah on June 27, 1940. Jinnah expressed his readiness to cooperate with the Government on the basis of the offer of November, 1939, to expand the Executive Council and he hoped that the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikhs and the Scheduled Castes would also agree to do so. Jinnah insisted that whatever constitution is declared by His Majesty's Government, it should not preclude "a fair and unprejudiced hearing of the Muslim League proposal for the creation of two Indias".

The Viceroy interviewed Gandhiji two days after he had interviewed Jinnah on June 27, and explained the possible declaration "purporting to give India a status similar to that of the self-governing dominions within one year after the termination of the war ... subject to an agreed understanding with regard to British commercial interests, defence, external affairs, the rights of minorities and treaty obligations to the princes", to which Gandhiji opposed because he believed that the

122. V.P. Menon, n. 3, pp. 88-89.
123. A.K. Azad, n. 86, pp. 33-34.
124. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 89.
125. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
'exploratory processes' were to "regard rather than to advance the progress" of constitutional development, during the war.

The Viceroy also discussed with Savarkar, President of the Hindu Mahasabha, and with the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes.

On July 1, 1940, Jinnah wrote to the Viceroy demanding:

'(i) the British government should not make any statement which would, in any way, antagonise the Lahore resolution about the partition of India;

(ii) the government should not frame and adopt any "interim or final constitution without the previous approval of the Muslim League";

(iii) the Muslims must be given equal partnership with the non-Muslims at the centre and in the provinces so that they might be able to secure "equal shares in the authority and control" of the central and provincial governments;

(iv) if the Executive Council was to be expanded, the number of Muslim members must be equal to that of the Hindus, and if the Congress did not join, the Muslims must have a majority share;

(v) the Muslims should have the majority of the non-official advisers in the provinces ruled by the governors; and

(vi) sufficient representation should be given to the Indian princes in the proposed war advisory committee, and regarding representation from British India, representation of Muslim India must be equal to that of the Hindus if the Congress came in, otherwise they should have the majority".

Linlithgow, in reply to above, wrote to Jinnah on July 6, 1940, that "any Council so expanded would co-operate as a whole and as a single Government of India", which would not strike a balance between interests or preserve the proportions between the important parties. However, he assured to keep in mind to secure adequate representation for Muslim interests in the event of any expansion.

126. Ibid., p. 90.
127. Francis Low (ed.), The Indian Year-Book, 1941-42 (Bombay: Bennett, Coleman & Co.Ltd.), p. 916. See also L.A. Sherwani, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan, 1940-1947 (Delhi: Daya Publishing House, 1985), p. 44.
128. Francis Low (ed.), Ibid., pp. 916-17. See also L.A. Sherwani, Ibid., p. 45.
On the one hand, the CWC at Delhi on July 7, 1940, pressed the British to declare complete independence and, at the first step, to create a provisional national government responsible to Central Legislative Assembly. On the other side, Jinnah opposed it in strongest possible terms and charged that the demand for a so-called national government meant a Congress Raj and if the demand was conceded "it would mean a Hindu-majority government - a permanent Hindu majority government - a position which would never be acceptable to the Muslims". However, the Government did not accept the Congress demand and took it as a "price" demanded by the Congress for extending help to the British in the war. Lord Linlithgow, considering the Congress help no more indispensable, turned his favour towards Jinnah, who had expressed desire to cooperate with the Government in the War efforts. The AICC met in Poona on July 27, 1940, and ratified the CWC Delhi resolution of July 7.

The August Declaration, 1940

On the basis of interviews with the political leaders, the Secretary of State declared the aims and intentions of His Majesty's Government, to break the political deadlock. The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, issued a statement on "India and the War" on August 8, 1940, that "Dominion Status was their objective for India" and instead of constituting a national Government, provided for the "expansion of the Governor-General's Council to include a certain number of representatives of political parties", setting up a Consultative Committee and a War Advisory Council. The Declaration appeased the Muslim League ensuring that the British Government would not agree to "any system of Government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life, nor could be a party to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a government". Obviously, it meant that no constitutional scheme was acceptable to the Government unless and until the same was agreed to

131. Home Poll. 4/17/1940, Fortnightly Reports, Government of India, NAI.
132. Linlithgow Collection, Microfilm No. 15, Telegram No. 262, from Viceroy to Secretary of State, June 28, 1940, p. 183, NAI. See also Sandhya Chaudhri, Gandhi and the Partition of India (New Delhi: Sterling, 1984), p. 69.
133. I.A. Sherwani, n. 127, p. 47.
134. B.R. Nanda, n. 4, pp. 167-68.
by the Muslim League. Thus, the Government had perfected its plan of a knock-out blow at the Congress declaring its "determination to crush that organization (Congress) as a whole" due to its antipathy to the Khadi-clad, vegetarian, jail-going Congressmen who were the avowed enemies of the British raj".

The Viceroy made it clear that (1) "full weight should be given to the views of the minorities" and (2) a representative body of principal elements of India's national life, after the conclusion of the war, would be set up "to devise the framework of the new constitution". Meanwhile, the Viceroy said that the Indians should reach a friendly agreement, "firstly, on the form which the post-war representative body should take, and the methods by which it should arrive at its conclusions, and secondly, upon the principles and outlines of the constitution itself". The Viceroy hoped that the Declaration would pave the way towards the attainment by India of that "free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth which remains the proclaimed and accepted goal of the Imperial Crown and of the British Parliament".

In fact, on the very day the Declaration was made, Jinnah had signed a "secret letter to the governors informing them of the plans", which reveals that the Government had planned "for a knock-out blow at the Congress, a declared determination to crush that organization as a whole". Some British officials "welcomed this (Pakistan) plan as a means of checkmating Congress demands". The British Government hoped that Jinnah's partition proposal would not be accepted by other parties and, thus, a political deadlock will continue indefinitely and will perpetuate the British rule in India.

138. Ibid.
139. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
140. B.R. Nanda, n. 4, p. 168.
Jinnah met the Viceroy on August 11 and 13, 1940, and asked for certain clarifications, but he did not commit himself. Gandhiji wrote to the Viceroy:

"I have very carefully read your pronouncement and slept over it. It has made me sad. Its implications frighten me. I cannot help feeling that a profound mistake has been made".

On August 13, 1942, Savarkar sent a letter to the Viceroy stating that "the expansion of the Executive Council was looked upon by the Hindu Mahasabha as a step in the right direction". With regard to Dominion Status, he was satisfied, but with regard to the minorities "he thought it a pity that the Government should deliberately have chosen terms too strong, too vague and too alarming to the Hindus. Any attempt to cut at the root of the indivisibility of India as a political unit, 'could not fail to evoke an undying opposition from Hindudom as a whole". The Sikhs, the Scheduled Castes and other organizations expressed their readiness to accept the August offer.

The Secretary of State, Amery, also encouraged the Pakistan proposal in a speech in the House of Commons on April 14, 1940:

"... the foremost among these elements stands the great Muslim Community, 90 million strong and constituting a majority both in northwestern and northeastern India, but scattered as a minority over the whole subcontinent. In religious and social outlook, in historic tradition and culture; the difference between them and their Hindu fellow countrymen goes as deep, if not deeper, than any similar differences in Europe".

The two statements of August 8 and 14, were drafted very cleverly. On the one hand, they agreed to the demand for the 'partition' and the 'two-nation theory', and, on the other, they admiring the cultural unity


144. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 94.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid., p. 95.

147. V.V. Nagarkar, Genesis of Pakistan (Bombay: Allied, 1975), p.327. See also E.R. Nanda, n. 4, p. 168.
of India emphasized the Britishers' contribution to India's political and administrative unity, which they hoped would be preserved with the help of the British.

Jinnah interpreted the Declaration as an acceptance of the 'Demand for Pakistan'. The Congress leaders also foresaw the partition of India in the light of the Declaration.

The Congress Working Committee recorded:

"The rejection of the Congress proposals is a proof of the British Government's determination to continue to hold India by the sword . . ."

Maulana Azad, the Congress President, concluded:

"Now that British has rejected all the offers made by the Congress, we have only one thing left to do and that is to non-cooperate in every way with the war effort".

On August 14, 1940, Linlithgow, in a letter to Jinnah, confirmed that, before issuing his statement, he had promised the League leader to safeguard the Muslim position and, in return, Jinnah had assured League's cooperation at the Centre. The Viceroy asked Jinnah to give a panel of four names of Muslims so as to select two for the expanded Council, which was likely to be in the neighbourhood of eleven; and a panel of names to select five Muslims for the War Advisory Council, whose representatives were to be around twenty.

The League Working Committee expressed in a resolution on September 2, 1940, that the Viceroy's offer was unsatisfactory and requested him to reconsider the matter. However, the League was satisfied that the offer


150. Nripendra Nath Mitra (ed.), The Indian Annual Register, July - December, 1940 (Calcutta: The Annual Register Office), pp. 256-57; see also L.A. Sherwani, n. 127, n. 49.

151. Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League from April, 1940 to April, 1941, published by (Nawabzada) Liaquat Ali Khan, M.A. (Oxon.), M.I.A. (Central), Barrister-at Law, Honorary Secretary, All India Muslim League, Delhi, pp. 13-15; see also L.A. Sherwani, n. 127, p. 50.
had conceded to the Pakistan resolution. The Hindu Mahasabha adopted a conciliatory attitude and T.B. Sapru, representing the Liberation Federation, said that the Declaration opened "a new vista" and urged its acceptance. Sir Sikandar of the Punjab Unionist Party, considered it "a substantial concession to Indian opinion" and suggested that the Congress and the League should "concentrate their attention on points of substance", but to the Congress, the Declaration was nothing but disappointing. Therefore, the Congress President, Maulana Azad, refused an invitation from the Viceroy to discuss the matter with him, without consulting the CWC members.

A day after the AICC met in Bombay on September 15, 1940. Rajagopalachari advocated a "sporting offer". Emphasising an agreement with the Muslim League, it said: "If His Majesty's Government agree to a provisional national government being formed at once, I will undertake to persuade my colleagues to agree to the Muslim League being invited to nominate the Prime Minister and to let him form a government as he would consider best".

The League Working Committee in New Delhi on September 28, 1940, demanded 5 seats in the War Council and 3 seats in the proposed expansion of Governor-General's Executive Council, while the Hindu Mahasabha Working Committee meeting in Bombay in the third week of September, announced acceptance of the offer "on honourable terms of equity and justice" and demanded 6 seats in the Executive Council and 15 seats in the War Council. However, the Hindu Mahasabha did not agree to the partition of India.

Civil Disobedience Movement

Disappointed by the Viceroy's statement, the Congress, on September 15, 1940, withdrew the offer of cooperation it had made on July 27, and Gandhiji decided to launch a resistance to the British war efforts and announced his plan for "direct action". Consequently, individual

152. D.C. Gupta, n. 121, p. 198.
153. Ibid.
155. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 95.
156. Ibid., p. 100.
Satyagraha was started on November 7, 1940. In view of the Tripartite Agreement (between Germany, Italy and Japan), the Government, to control the situation, let loose repressive measures. On October 30, 1940, Nehru was arrested and in November all the Congress Ministers in eight provinces, who took part in the Movement, were put behind the bars. Maulana Azad, who had not yet offered individual Satyagraha, was arrested on January 3, 1941, and by March 3, as many as 4,749 Congressmen were arrested and 2,09,663 were fined. The Muslim League, on February 23, 1941, characterized the Congress move as an attempt to bring pressure on the British Government to concede its demand and warned the Viceroy that if he conceded to the Congress demands, the League would resist with all their power. During 1941, the Movement lost its sting as it failed to produce any significant favourable results. An Intelligence Report says: "In some areas it was limping along, in others, it was moribund and still in others, it seemed to be dead". In the meanwhile, the position of the Allies became very critical and the War seemed to be going the Nazis and the Fascists way. In the East, there was every likelihood of Japanese attack on India, which could uproot the British from Indian soil. Therefore, the CWC met at Bardoli on December 30, 1941, and suspended the Movement advising the Congressmen to stick to their posts and to organise the country for an effective defence.

Jinnah, encouraged by Amery's and Linlithgow's statements and the arrest of the Congress leaders during the Civil Disobedience Movement, found a favourable climate to push the idea of Pakistan deep into the Muslim minds. He indefatigably kept pleading his demand for Pakistan. In a speech delivered in Delhi in November, 1940, he said:

"The whole effort of the Congress seems to me to be like that of a bat which has entered a room and flies round and round knocking against the walls but will not, cannot, see that the door is wide open. That is what the policy of the Congress is like. It is, therefore, not possible for us to view this movement with equanimity. We must view it with serious anxiety. I say to Musalmans, please don't get mixed up or involved in this terrible situations, for which the Congress alone is responsible. But if we find at any time that our interests are at stake we cannot remain as onlookers and spectators but we shall play our part and intervene, if necessary. Let that be understood" (Emphasis added)

157. Dr. J.J. Pal, n. 95, p. 100.
158. Ibid.
159. Home Pol. 18/10/1941, Fortnightly Report, U.P., NAI. See also File No. 4/8/1941, NAI.
The above statement, on the one hand, expresses the fears of Jinnah towards the Congress, which he declared at the Muslim Students' Conference held at New Delhi in November, 1940, to be a Hindu body and its objective was to establish a Hindu Raj dominating over the Muslims and all the other minorities. He, in support of this statement, referred to the declarations of Dr. Moonje and Savarkar, that Muslims were like Jews in Germany and should be treated as such. The Jews were being brutally killed at a very large scale by the Germans during the then continuing Second World War. These declarations of the Hindu leaders, he thought will encourage the Hindus to massively massacre the Muslims, which apprehension became true during the riots in those days. Jinnah concluded that the Congress proclamation of 'nationalism' was a veil over the 'perverted nationalism' of the Congress, which actually meant the domination and destruction of Muslims, politically, economically, educationally, culturally, and in all ways. In view of the Congress attitude, he smelled these dangers and became sure that the Congress would never embrace the Muslims and, hence, he found refuge in the establishment of a separate Muslim homeland, that is, Pakistan. Jinnah's fears are pronounced in his speech delivered in the Legislative Assembly on November 19, 1940, when he addressed the British Government:

"I want your help. I am in danger and so are you. We will not apportion the degree of danger between us both. We both are in danger. I am willing to throw into the pool all the resources that I can, and I say, 'I am ready, let us both sink or swim'. All right so far, but what about my having a voice in the use of the assets that I being into this pool, leave alone the share in the victory. Am I not to have some share, some voice, some day as to how it is going to be used, and how the joint venture is to be run".

Based on his fears, Jinnah became more and more determined to found Pakistan. In his birthday message on December 24, 1940, demanding Pakistan, he said:

"We have now to prove to the world that we are fit to govern and achieve our goal as laid down by the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League, popularly known as Pakistan, our organisation, which is undoubtedly the only authoritative and representative body of the Muslims of India, has given us a flag, a platform, a programme, and a cherished goal, which we are determined to fight for and, if necessary, to die for. But we have yet to do many before we can achieve our political emancipation".

161. Ibid., p. 185.
162. Ibid., pp. 202-203.
Jinnah's demand for Pakistan became a subject of debate at all levels. The newspapers and national intelligentsia engaged in thinking about the pros and cons of Pakistan. However, the most important and thought-provoking document, which appeared on the issue of Pakistan in those days, was, at the end of 1940, Dr. Ambedkar's *Thoughts on Pakistan*, which put forth the following arguments relating to the creation of Pakistan:

(i) The Hindu-Muslim relations were too slender to bridge the gulf of treating each a separate community, as the Hindus cherished the memory of the warriors who had fought the Muslim invaders, whom the Muslim consider as heroes of Islam.

(ii) The Muslims claim themselves a nation instead of a community and they were not agreeable to accept the position of the French-Canadian people in Canada.

(iii) Due to Congress refusal to accept the Muslim League as a sole representative of the Muslims, the gulf between the Congress and the League had widened.

(iv) The Congress did not agree to share power with the effective representative of the minorities and, thus, excluded the Muslims from political power.

(v) The League's charges and grievances were exaggerated, but these were manufactured to gain power.

(vi) The Congress argument regarding unity of India was wrong because India's unity was broken several times during the past eight centuries. The separation of Burma from India was not protested against.

(vii) The Army was predominantly Muslims recruited from the Hindu-majority provinces and it was doubtful how they would react in case of invasion from Afghanistan. Thus, the Congress faced the choice: "to have a safe army or a safe border". "To oppose Pakistan on this ground was to buy a sure weapon of their own destruction. A safe army was better than a safe border".

(viii) The creation of Pakistan would not solve the communal problem.

(ix) The League claim over the whole of Punjab and Bengal was totally unjustified and it was necessary to re-draw their boundaries.

(x) Political unity without social unity would prove precarious. If India got independence without partition, India would have a continuous struggle between the Congress and the League. It inferred that partition was better than unity.

(xi) The efforts of the All India Azad Muslim Conference held in April, 1940, to formulate a charter of Muslim demand, as an alternative to Pakistan, had failed to submit any report.

163. Dr. J.J. Pal, n. 95, pp. 93-94.
On January 2, 1941, in reply to the question asked by Professor Radhakumud Mukerjee of the Lucknow University, as to what would be the future constitution of India, Jinnah explained:

"So long as the Central Government was unitary it would be impossible to talk in terms of autonomy of units. The question is not merely cultural but of political, economic and social problems which can only be solved according to our genius in our homeslands, provided that they are independent states and in no way under the control of any centre for all India. Safeguards, constitutional or otherwise, will be of no use. So long as there is communal Hindu majority at the centre, safeguards will remain on paper. Therefore, I think of nothing better or more suitable having regard to the condition and realities than separation of Muslims in my proposed homeslands".

Prof. Mukerjee asked Jinnah whether Pakistan joined with some foreign power would not be a danger to India. Removing the misapprehension, Jinnah replied:

"The Muslims in such separate homeslands in the first instance would be very foolish indeed to invite some other Muslim Power to rule over their homeslands, government of which would be in their own hands. It is quite clear that tendency now is more towards territorial sovereignty as history and development of Muslim sovereign powers in the East and the Far East have recently shown. Therefore, on the contrary, I am sure that Hindu India will find Muslim India not only a friendly neighbour but will defend India against foreign invasion and in that case, so to say, Monroe Doctrine will come into action in the interests of both Hindu India and Muslim India. And in that sense I want to say that North-Western Muslim independent states should be counted as India's outposts on the Frontier".

Jinnah toured India for levelling the ground for creation of Pakistan reiterating everywhere the demand for Pakistan. On January 3, 1940, in an address to the Muslim Progress Society and the Muslim Youth Majlis, Jinnah said:

"Muslims were not out for dominating the whole of India and they had no desires and designs to rule over the Hindus. What the Muslim League wanted was the Muslims should have opportunity to have their own governments to grow freely and develop their own culture in the two zones which they considered as their homeslands".

165. Ibid.
166. Dr. J.J. Pal, n. 95, p. 95.
In plain words, Jinnah wanted the League domination in the east and west and the Congress over other parts of India, both developing their governments according to their own genius. Jinnah went ahead beyond acceptance without thinking it impossible to say at the annual meeting of the Muslim Educational Service League at Bombay on January 10, 1941, that all parties concerned should accept the scheme of Pakistan so as "to settle the Hindus and the Muslims in their respective nations", which involved the suggestion for large-scale exchange and migration of population.

In February, 1941, Jinnah called upon the Muslims to observe March 23, 1941, as the 'Pakistan Day' and appealed to the Government, the Princes and the Hindus to accept the Pakistan scheme, on the plea that Pakistan had been existing for centuries and would exist till eternity. Jinnah, speaking at the meeting to observe the first Pakistan Day, emphasised to say that the Congress-League differences had entered such an orbit where Hindu-Muslim joint rule was quite impossible. This emphasis obviously rejected the possibility of a Congress-League coalition ministry in the centre. The thought echoing in Jinnah's mind burst out when he spoke addressing the first Conference of the Kanpur Muslim Students' Federation on March 30, 1941:

"... the last 30 years efforts had been made to bring about communal unity, but no settlement could be arrived at due to the fact that the basis with which the Hindus and their leaders started for the purpose of negotiations were totally different. The Hindus began with the truth that the Muslims were a minority and as such they might be given necessary safeguards, but the Muslims started on the basis that they were a separate entity, and as such they could come to no settlement. The Congress made this point clear when it came into power in seven provinces by treating the Muslims as a minority. The Muslim League had, therefore, to formulate its goal which was done on 23 March 1940 at Lahore by passing a resolution about Pakistan".

Jinnah also asserted that the Congress had been deceiving the Muslims by proclaiming that it was "fighting for the freedom of the country and that it was a national organisation".

167. Ibid., p. 96.
168. The Hindu (Madras), January 11, 1941.
169. Dr. J.J. Pal, n. 95, p. 96.
Anti-Communal Conferences

While these developments regarding partition were taking place, the newspapers gave coloured versions of the developments for catering to the thrill and scandal seeking instincts of their readers which fueled communal hostilities and communal riots broke out more frequently throughout the whole subcontinent; the most severe ones occurred in Ahmedabad, Bombay, Bihar Sharif and Dacca. There was a great need to stop the great loss of life and property and it was only possible through launching campaign of Hindu-Muslim cooperation and friendship. Neither all the Muslims were the leaguers nor all the Hindus were enemies of the Muslims. There was only an orthodox communal group which fomented the riots to achieve their own ends out of the blood and ashes of their own brethren. The innately traditional people were easy victims to the viles of communal leaders and as such they were exploited by those who took interest in playing with fire and tears. An earnest effort to check the situation came in the shape of an Anti-Communal Conference called in March, 1941, at Lahore, under the Presidentship of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The Conference denounced "the Pakistan scheme (as) extremely unpatriotic, anti-national and absolutely injurious to the interests of the country". Three months later, an Anti-Separation Conference at Kumbhakonam, under the Presidentship of Muhammed Yusuf Shareef and attended largely by the South Indian Muslims, totally opposed the "two-nation theory" and challenged the League's claim to represent the Muslim community.

Muslim League Session, 1941

The session held at Madras started on April 12, 1941. It is significant in the history of partition of India because it was attended by very eminent leaders like E.V. Ramaswami Naicker, the leader of the Justice Party; R.K. Shammukham Chetty, Dewan of Cochin; K.V. Reddy, A.P. Patro, Kumararajah, M.A. Muttiah Chettiar; C.R. Srinivasan, the editor of the Swadesi Mitran; and M.C. Rajah, besides N. Sivaraj and other non-Brahmin leaders and that it demanded another sovereign state

171. Dr. J.J. Pal, n. 95, p. 100.
172. Ibid. See also Convocation Address by S. Sultan Ahmad at the Aligarh Muslim University, December, 1941. He ridiculed the notion that Hindu and Muslim cultures are entirely different.
in the South (Hyderabad). In his Presidential speech, Jinnah forcefully said:

"In this subcontinent you have two different societies, the Muslim society and the Hindu society and particularly in this land, there is another nation, that is the Dravidian. This land is really Draviddstan, and imagine its three percent of electioneering, three percent of them should secure a majority. Is this democracy or is this a farce? Therefore, I have the fullest sympathy and give my fullest support to the non-Brahmins, and I say to them: "The only way for you to come into your own is to live your own life, according to your culture, according to your language, etc. etc."

Defending the demand for Pakistan, Jinnah argued that:

"... the democracy for representative government was suitable only for a nation, harmonious and homogenous. But could not work in a country like India where there were more than two nations".

Jinnah, most bitterly, criticised the Congress position as absolutely communal, by saying that:

"the Hindu Mahasabha, the All India Hindu League, and the Liberal Federation were minor offshoots of the Congress which meant nothing else than the solid body of the Hindus. If Hindu India was represented by anything, it was by the Congress".

The most important feature of this session was that the League included the Lahore Resolution in its constitution. Moving this amendment for inclusion, Liaquat Ali Khan stated:

"Pakistan had become their article of faith and the amendment now before the House will be an effective reply to those who have alleged that it is merely a counter for bargaining".

The amendment also implied that "every Muslim who is to join the

175. Ibid.
League from now onwards will have to taken an oath of allegiance to Pakistan".

Referring to the Gandhiji's Civil Disobedience Movement, the session characterised it a pressure tactic on the Government to accede to the Congress demand. The participants asserted that the Congress aimed at nothing but to achieve sovereign power for the Hindus and to relegate the 100 million Muslims and other minorities to mere subjects of Hindu Raj. The League warned the Government that "any constitutional change, either interim or final, made without the approval of the League, would mean violation of the solemn pledges of August, 1940", and also threatened that "if any attempt was made to depart, in any way, from the declarations of August, 1940, the Muslims would feel constrained to resort to any measure and method to resist it with all the powers they possessed".

Inclusion of the protagonists of the demand of a 'Dravidistan' and the zealous support extended to them by Jinnah is clearly indicative of the liaison that existed between the Muslim League and the British and underlines the role of the League leaders as willing instruments of the policies of Imperial rulers.

On April 17, 1941, referring to the statement of Dr. Rajendra Prasad that he accepted the principles of partition, Jinnah said:

"Will it not be more logical course that the Congress should first make up their mind and accept the basic principles laid down in the Lahore Resolution of the All India Muslim League popularly known as Pakistan? Babu Rajendra Prasad with his judicial mind ought to know that first, the principle of partitioning India must be agreed upon then alone comes the question of what ways and means should be adopted to give effect to that decision. The question of details will arise then and with goodwill, understanding and statesmanship, we shall, let us hope, settle them among ourselves".

177. Ibid.
178. Dr. J.J. Pal, n. 95, p. 100.
On April 18, 1941, the Foreign Committee of the All India Muslim League published the details of the scheme for India's partition, which envisaged the formation of three sovereign Muslim states; one in the northwest extending up to Delhi; the second comprising Bengal and Assam; and the third in the south comprising Hyderabad and Berar. Favouring this demand, Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung of Hyderabad, President of the All India States Muslim League, in a speech at Bangalore in April, supporting the demand for Pakistan, said that "India had never been a nation nor could she never be a single political unit". This followed the formation of the Majlis Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen in Hyderabad State. At its foundation conference, it was declared that "the Muslims incarnated the sovereignty of Hyderabad State, and that the Nizam was the true representative of the Muslims". The involvement of Hyderabad and Berar in the Pakistan scheme disturbed the Congressmen and they began to think seriously of a solution by way of a Congress-League settlement, but they found no way except to come to terms of the League by acceding the demand for Pakistan.

**Amery's Statement**

The authorities in England also had adopted a more reactionary attitude towards the Congress demand. On April 22, 1941, the Secretary of State for India, Leopold S. Amery, in a speech in the House of Commons, said:

"Anxious as we are to see the responsibility of Indian Government resting on Indian shoulders we can only transfer it to an authority that can assume it without immediately breaking down or breaking up. At this crisis of the war the basis of administrative and legislative power could not be changed, or the direction of India's war efforts given to an entirely new Executive ... Indian statesmen must first find the indispensable measure of agreement, freely reached, before Britain could contribute further towards her own task of joining with them in crowning peace and unity with freedom ...".

The phrase "indispensable measure of agreement" was highly objectionable to the Congress. Gandhiji called it "Amery's "callousness" and

181. The Statesman (Calcutta), April 19, 1941.
182. Dr. J.J. Pal, n. 95, p. 97.
183. Ibid., p. 98.
184. Ibid., pp. 200-201.
"contemptuous disregard of the situation in India" and charged that "The Secretary of State had insulted Indian intelligence by reiterating ad nauseam that Indian political parties have but to agree among themselves and Britain will register the will of united India". Gandhiji also admitted that "the gap between the Congress and the Muslim League seemed unbridgeable, but if the British statesmen withdrew, recognizing that this was only a domestic quarrel, Congress, the League and all other parties would come together out of self-interest and devise a homemade scheme for the Government of India". T.B. Sapru described Amery's statement "indiscreet and unfortunate" and V.N. Savarkar, President of the National Liberal Federation, observed that the speech had caused "depression and hopelessness among all who had worked for a better understanding between Britain and India".

The Atlantic Charter

In December, 1940, the German attacks seemed to destroy England for ever. Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote several letters to the U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt arguing that if the United States would not defend the United Kingdom, the U.S. own security would also be jeopardised, as a result Roosevelt, on January 6, 1941, enunciated the doctrine of "Four Freedoms" - freedom of speech and expression everywhere in the world, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. On August 14, 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill met "somewhere at sea" and issued a joint declaration, known as the Atlantic Charter, stating that: "after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want". The Charter also embodied that: Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to

185. Dr. J.J. Pal, n. 95, p.201.
186. Ibid.
187. Ibid.
preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world.

Gandhiji urged that the Atlantic Charter should be applied to India also. On September 9, 1941, Churchill replied that "those principles referred only to European countries and not to the evolution of self-government within the Empire", which disappointed the Indians, who observed that the British Government was not willing to concede Congress demands for complete independence of India.

While Great Britain was involved in the War, the Congress was carrying on the Civil Disobedience Movement, the League's demand for Pakistan was gaining more and more strength, and the leaders had lost all interest in the war efforts. In view of the gravity of the war situation, the British, to gain their war ends, released many of the Congress leaders, including Azad and Nehru, on December 4, 1941. On January 16, 1942, the CWC passed a resolution offering cooperation in the war effort once again subject to the government changing its attitude, but the British made no immediate response.

Towards the end of February, 1942, Roosevelt emphasised "on the possibility of a settlement between the British Government and the Indian political leaders". Roosevelt after consulting Churchill declared that the Atlantic Charter was applicable to the whole world. Similarly, Evatt, the Foreign Secretary of Australia, declared in the Australian Parliament that self-government should be conceded to India to enable her to participate in the War efforts effectively. On March 10, 1942, two days after the fall of Rangoon, Roosevelt sent a long cable to Churchill stating: "It is merely a thought of mine to suggest the setting up of a temporary government in India, headed by a small representative group - this group to be recognized as a temporary Dominion Government ... This representative group would be charged with the duty of considering

190. Ibid., p. 6.
the structure of the permanent government in India. Perhaps some such method might cause the people of India to forget past hard feelings and to become more loyal to the British Empire ..."

In view of the Congress attitude for cooperation, Roosevelt's suggestion and grave danger to India's defence, the War Cabinet-Churchill and his colleagues - felt it necessary to break the political deadlock in India "in the most impressive manner" and decided to send Sir Stafford Cripps to India "to conduct direct discussion on the spot with the leaders of all Indian parties and communities". Consequently, Churchill, on March 11, announced the Cripps Mission to impress that the Americans and the British attach great importance to the solution of India's problem, but, in fact, he wanted to gain time for the problem to be calmly solved.

Cripps Mission, 1942

Sir Stafford Cripps was in close touch with Nehru and the Congress and had supported India's independence demand during his visit to India in 1939. Cripps arrived on March 23, 1942, and "dispelled somewhat the gloom that enveloped the Congress circles and roused great expectation". Cripps, aiming to win confidence of the Indian leaders, stated to the press:

"I have come here because I am, as always have been, a great friend and admirer of India, and because I want to play my part as a member of War Cabinet in arriving at a final settlement of the political difficulties which have long vexed our relationships".

On March 24 and 25, Cripps met with the Viceroy, members of the Executive Council and other official advisers. On March 25, Cripps and


196. AICC File No. 55/1940, Proceedings of the AICC, NMML.

Jinnah met. Cripps explained that "in case a majority of less than 60 per cent of members of Provincial Assembly voted in favour of accession or non-accession, the minority legislators would have the right to demand a plebiscite of the adult population on the accession issue". Initially, Jinnah, agreeing with this plebiscite formula, responded to the proposal favourably though he was doubtful "whether 40 per cent was the right figure to apply to minority for deciding the question of accession". However, Jinnah wished for setting up a second dominion and said to place the proposal before the League Working Committee and to inform him of the outcome accordingly.

Jinnah and Cripps again met on March 28, 1942, to seek certain clarifications and Cripps assessed that the proposals were already accepted by the Muslim League in principle. Later, Sikandar Hyat Khan, the Punjab Premier, confirmed in a meeting that the League had accepted the scheme as a whole. Cripps met Nehru and other Congress leaders, whose refusal to accept the proposals gave an impression to him that it was due to the influence of Gandhiji, whose "policy was one of 'total pacifism', and who described the declaration as a 'post-dated cheque' and decided to take no part in the discussion". On the same day, on the question of control of defence, Rajagopalachari requested Cripps to redraft the last paragraph of the proposals making a provision for the appointment of an Indian Defence Minister before presenting the scheme to the CWC for approval. Cripps did not agree to appoint an Indian called Defence Minister. He, however, agreed to create a Ministry of Defence Coordination under charge of the Commander-in-Chief as a member of the Government of India and enumerated a list of transferred subjects. The Congress rejected the proposal as the transferred subjects were unimportant and made the position of the Indian Defence Member ridiculous.

Cripps, between March 26 and 28, conferred with leaders of all

200. Ibid.
201. Ibid., p. 512.
203. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 126.
204. Ibid., p. 127.
parties and representatives of communities, and on March 29, 1942, addressing a gathering issued the 'Draft Declaration' (published on March 30, 1942) and said: "The Constituent Assembly can start with a declaration of Independence" and "It was completely free to decide whether the new Union of India should remain within the Empire or not". He explained that the new Indian Union shall "constitute a Dominion associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect in no way subordinate in any respect of its domestic and external affairs". Thus, the Declaration had conceded the basic demand of the Congress recognising India's right to frame a constitution through a constituent assembly after the War. The other clause laid down that "any province or provinces which did not acquiesce in the new constitution would be entitled to frame a constitution of their own giving them 'the same full status as the Indian Union'. The non-acceding provinces could then form their own union with 'complete self-government'.

On March 29, 1942, Cripps gave impression to Maulana Azad, the Congress President, that he agreed to consider the Executive Council as a National Government functioning like a Cabinet and the Viceroy to be a constitutional head, which he said might be done with the help of a convention. But at the Viceroy's instance, Cripps changed his version and his interpretations became vague and ambiguous. He said to Azad that the legal position would remain unchanged and to this effect the Viceroy could be discussed.

Cripps in a broadcast on March 30, 1942, appealed to the Indian people to accept these proposals, and said: "Let the dead past bury its dead, and let us march together side by side through the night of

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205. See for full text Appendix V.
206. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 123.
208. B.R. Nanda, n. 4, p. 169.
210. AICC File No. 26/1942, Part II, pp. 72-73, NMML.
high endeavour and courage to the already waking down of a new world of liberty for all the peoples'.

Cripps declared:

"(a) Immediately upon cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in India ... an elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution for India.

(b) Provision shall be made for participation of Indian States in the constitution-making body.

(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to (i) the right of any province of British India, that is not prepared to accept the new constitution, to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so decides".

This transfer of power to the Indians was subject to the further reservation that Defence was to continue under the British control.

On the question of effectiveness of the proposal, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel observed:

"No more mischievous scheme had been conceived up-to-date. It was designed to keep the British authority firmly in India after the war. That scheme was, in fact, responsible for the decision of the Congress to ask the British to quit India ... If India was to effectively resist external aggression, her people should have the fullest freedom and independence. The British were not fighting for the protection of India but for maintaining their own authority permanently. If they had been fighting for Indian defence, they would have had no hesitation in accepting the Congress demands".

When asked to "Give India a National Government now and don't worry about post-war arrangements", Cripps replied that Amery had a hand in shaping them with the consent of Churchill.

212. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 125.
Azad and Nehru while conversing with Cripps demanded that there should be immediately a National Government without waiting for a constitutional change and that the new government should function as a free government whose members would act as members of a Cabinet in a constitutional government. Sapru and Jayakar in their Memorandum of April 5, 1942, transmitted by Lord Linlithgow to Amery in London, pointed out that "Indian opinion attaches the greatest importance to the transfer of real power in the Central Government at the present moment and it is for this reason that we emphasize the necessity of the complete non-officialization of Government without the reservation of any portfolio during the interim period'.

On this issue, the Muslim League adopted a conciliatory attitude but with firm and bold steps. Jinnah, at 'Pakistan Day' public meeting in Delhi, on March 23, 1942, said:

"It is true that Cripps is friend of Congress but we should not be afraid on that score ... If we have adopted attitude of non-embarrassment towards British Government, we know that if British Government are broken we are also in danger... We are prepared to face all consequences if any scheme detrimental to interests of Muslims is forced upon us. We shall resist it to utmost; if we have to die in attempt we shall die fighting. We have two opponents - Hindu leadership and British leadership. It is futile to attempt to create differences and disruption among Muslims and Muslim League is only authoritative organisation of Muslims. We cannot tolerate Muslims in camp of enemy. Non-League Muslims are traitors in enemy camp".

Jinnah's statement shows that he thought the continuance of British Raj in India as a safeguard to the rights of the Muslims.

Constitutional Settlement

Cripps on April 30, 1942, in his first broadcast said in New Delhi:

"I want to play my part as a member of the War Cabinet in reaching a final settlement of the political difficulties which have long vexed our relationships. Once these questions

217. Telegram, MSS, EUR.F. 125/29; in Ibid., pp. 467-68.
are resolved, and I hope they may be quickly and satisfactorily resolved, the Indian peoples will be enabled to associate themselves fully and freely not only with Great Britain and other Dominions but with our great Allies, Russia, China and the United States of America so that together we can assert our determination to preserve the liberty of the peoples of the world".

Maulana Azad, on behalf of the Congress, observed:

"We did not ask for any legal changes, but we did ask for definite assurances and conventions which would indicate that the new Government would function as a free government, the members of which act as members of a Cabinet in a constitutional government".

In regard to the constituent assembly, Cripps' mind had also been working on the lines that the executive council could be converted into a cabinet enlarging the powers and even the size of the legislature and the Viceroy be made a normal constitutional head of the government. Azad and Nehru emphasised that there should be definite assurance indicating that the new government would function as a free government whose members would act as members of a Cabinet in a constitutional government. Jinnah on March 25, 1942, had said, talking with Cripps that he would like to "treat the Executive as a Cabinet rather than as the Executive according to the constitution".

With regard to the new constitution, Cripps, on March 25, 1942, explained to Jinnah that "all Provinces should formally accede to the New Constitution by vote of their Legislative Assemblies but that in cases where there was less than a three-fifths majority in favour of accession, the two-fifths minority should have the right to demand a plebiscite of the total adult male population of the province and that the plebiscite taken should then determine the question of accession or non-accession". Jinnah said that "the only question was as to whether 40% was the right figure to apply to the minority". Jinnah saw that Cripps proposal went to meet the Pakistan case, but side by side it

219. Ibid.
220. Ibid., p. 428.
222. Ibid.
223. Ibid.
224. Ibid.
offered the provision of the establishment of two or more independent unions in India.

Nonaccession Clause

The non-accession clause reflected the mischievous spirit of the Cripps Declaration. The CWC on April 2, 1942, rejected it and recorded that the Congress can not compel "the people of any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will", which encouraged the Muslim League and gave boost to the Pakistan movement. Acceptance of this principle inevitably involved guarantee of territorial unit having "fullest possible autonomy within the Union, but all this should exist in consonance with a strong national state". Gandhiji, who met Cripps on his insistence, realised the danger of turning India into pieces and advised Cripps on April 4, to take the first plane home.

Nehru and Azad approached Cripps and proposed in lieu of the non-accession clause inclusion of a clause to give the right of secession after five or ten years of constitution-making, but Cripps, to their dejection, replied that the clause about non-accession was provided in the scheme to accommodate the demand of the Muslim league for Pakistan. They obviously foresaw the British vindictive motive of converting India into a political chequerboard. Jawaharlal Nehru expressed his fear of 'balkanization' of India in a telegram to Krishna Menon in England criticising "the whole conception (of) leading (to) break up (of) India with British forces guarding States interfering (with) freedom (of the) union, encouraging disruptive tendencies"(emphasis added). Cripps defending the 'non-accession' of provinces in a broadcast said: "The door must be left open. If you want to persuade a number of people who are inclined to be antagonistic to enter the same room, it is unwise to tell them that once they go in, there is no way out". Maulana Azad remarked that "the main purpose of the Cripps mission should be the

225. Dr. J.J. Pal, n. 95, p. 102.
228. Ibid.
settlement of political issues like the communal question, and the question of the states should not be relevant at that stage, for such matters should be settled by Indians themselves.

Jinnah welcomed the non-accession clause. It was a "veiled recognition" of Pakistan and not in unequivocal terms. He demanded amendment to ensure the secession of the provinces he claimed for Pakistan. Cripps favoured the sentiments of partition because he believed that the British Government would readily concede to it. The Hindu Mahasabha on April 3, rejected the long-term plan on the ground that "the option given to provinces to stay out of the Union would destroy the unity of the country". The Sikhs, on March 31, protested that they shall "resist by all possible means separation of the Punjab from the All-India Union". The Depressed classes, on April 1, denounced them because they believed that the proposals were "calculated to do the greatest harm to the Depressed Classes" and were "sure to place them under an unmitigated system of Hindu rule".

**Defence Formula**

Cripps in his proposals had also said that during the War period, the British Government would inevitably retain the control and direction of the Defence of India as a part of their world war efforts and would also organise to the full the military, moral and material resources of India with the co-operation of the people of India.

In early April, 1942, Philips, Sapru, Rajagopalachari, Menon and B.N. Rau evolved a formula overnight and finalised it in the early hours of the morning as follows:

"(a) India shall in every possible respect be treated as a free member of the Commonwealth.

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232. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 126.
233. Ibid.
234. Ibid.
235. See for details Appendix VI.
His Majesty's Government therefore invite the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people to undertake the governance of their country and to participate in the counsels of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations in the world war effort.

(b) The members of the Executive Council of the Governor-General will function on the principles of joint responsibility in the manner of a Council of Ministers.

(c) The policies and measures of the Government of India in respect to the prosecution of the war will be subject to the decisions of the British War Cabinet. There will be the closest association and co-operation between the Defence Member and the Commander-in-Chief; but this will not affect the authority or responsibility of each in his own sphere.

Meanwhile, Colonel Louis Johnson, President Roosevelt's Personal Envoy, arrived in Delhi, on April 3, 1942, as the head of the American Technical Mission. He, after consulting with Cripps and Nehru, found the matter more complicated. Cripps presented the following new formula, on behalf of the British War Cabinet:

"(a) The Commander-in-Chief should retain a seat in the Viceroy's Executive Council as 'War Member' and should retain his full control over all the war activities of the armed forces in India, subject to the control of His Majesty's Government and the War Cabinet, upon which a representative Indian should sit with equal powers in all matters relating to the defence of India. Membership of the Pacific Council would likewise be offered to a representative of India.

(b) An Indian representative member would be added to the Viceroy's Executive, who would take over those sections of the Department of Defence which can organizationally be separated immediately from the Commander-in-Chief's War Department and which are specified under head (i) of the annexure. In addition, this member would take over the Defence Co-ordination Department which is at present directly under the Viceroy, and certain other important functions of the Government of India which do not fall under any of the other existing departments and which are specified under the head (ii) of the annexure".

Cripps assured that if the above formula would be accepted, the British Government would take up the task of forming the new National Government "in consultation with the leaders of Indian opinion". However, the matter of defence became most important, which created a deadlock in the negotiations.

237. Ibid., pp. 432-33.
Johnson produced the following formula:

"In amplification of clause(e) of the draft Declaration His Majesty's Government make the following proposition upon the subject-matter of the Defence of India:

(a) The Defence Department shall be placed in the charge of a representative Indian member with the exception of functions to be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief as War Member of the Executive Council.

(b) A War Department will be constituted which will take over such functions of the Defence Department as are not retained by the Defence Member".

Apparently, this formula is a classic example of the old wine in a new bottle.

Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Johnson on April 8, 1942, that Cripps new formula "were entirely unsatisfactory". He observed:

"Both the approach and the allocation of subjects were, in our opinion, wrong, and there was no real transfer of responsibility for Defence to representative Indians in the National Government. Such transfer is essential for the successful defence of the country, for on it depends the full mobilisation of the war potential of the country".

Nehru, in the same letter, found the Johnson formula somewhat "more healthy", on which further discussions could be made. However, he emphasised that "a very great deal depends on the allocation of subjects between the Defence Committee and the War Department, and until this is done, it is not possible to give a final opinion". With this in mind, he suggested the following formula to form the basis of discussion:

"(a) The Defence Department shall be placed in the charge of a representative Indian member, but certain functions relating to the conduct of the war will be exercised for the duration of the war by the Commander-in-Chief, who will be in control of the war activities of the armed forces in India and who will be an extraordinary member of the National Cabinet for that purpose."

239. Ibid.
240. Jawaharlal Nehru to Colonel Louis Johnson, April 8, 1942, Nehru Papers, NMML.
241. Ibid.
242. Ibid.
(b) A War Department will be constituted under the Commander-in-Chief. This Department will take over such functions as are exercised by the C-in-C. A list of such functions has been prepared and is attached.

(c) The Defence Member shall be in charge of all other matters relating to Defence, including those now dealt with by the Defence Coordination Committee.

The Congress Working Committee amended the formula very much and proposed to consider the national Government responsible for the whole of administration, including defence, which was conceded by the Viceroy, Cripps and Johnson. However, Sir Stafford Cripps finalised the draft on April 8, 1942. By that time, there had emerged quite a few differences between Johnson and the Congress leadership, on the one hand, and between Cripps and the Viceroy, on the other. Cripps sent home his formula recommending its acceptance, but the Viceroy also sent his disapproval of it.

Cripps, on the question of Azad and Nehru as to what would be the position of the Governor-General in the proposed scheme, had relied, without consulting Viceroy Linlithgow and "presumably with the assistance of Louis Johnson" that the Governor-General will "function as constitutional head like the King in the United Kingdom" and that "power would rest with the Council as it rests with the British Cabinet". This made the Viceroy feel offended and disregarded. The Viceroy wrote to Churchill that he and Cripps "could have got Nehru's agreement to the original proposal, had not Cripps and Johnson worked out this new arrangement". Churchill read the communication to John Hopkins and George C. Marshall and expressed grave concern that India demanded self-government "at a time when the Japanese were dangerously close to her borders and destroying shipping in the Indian Ocean at an alarming rate". The same

244. A.K. Azad, n. 86, p. 49.
246. Hopkins was the Administrative Assistant and a great confident of Roosevelt, and Marshall was the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, who were in London to discuss with Churchill on war plans.
day, Churchill wrote to Cripps that he would be repudiated if he "went too far". When Azad met again with Cripps he did not say categorically that the Executive Council would have "full and unfettered freedom of decision". He said to Azad that "the position now enjoyed by the Viceroy could not be changed without a change in the law". Cripps realised his inability to proceed further and the talks closed down. Consequently, no favourable amendments could be made in the proposals and all the parties rejected the Cripps proposal for one reason or the other.

The Congress, on April 10, 1942, rejected the proposal on the ground that the British Cabinet and the Viceroy were not agreeable to transfer the portfolio of Defence to Indian hands; it was dissatisfied with the provision of non-accession and position of the Executive Council; the claims of princely States were disregarded and the proposal could lead to the formation of Pakistan. The CWC reaffirmed these decisions on April 11, 1942. Maulana Azad remarked that "the main purpose of the Cripps mission should be the settlement of political issues like the communal question, and the question of the States should not be relevant at that stage, for such matters should be settled by Indians themselves".

The Muslim League rejected the plan on April 11, 1942, because Pakistan was not conceded equivocally and the right of Muslims' self-determination was denied, and there was no clear indication of two constituent assemblies - one for the Muslim majority provinces and the other for Hindu majority provinces. In fact, the proposals attempted to please every section of India but ended in pleasing none. As a result, Cripps flew back to England on April 12, 1942, leaving the impression

249. Ibid.
250. V.P. Menon, n. 3, pp. 130 and 136.
253. The Statesman (Calcutta), April 30, 1942.
254. See Appendix VII : Resolution of the Muslim League Working Committee on the Draft Declaration, April 11, 1942.
that the Government actually did not want to extend any power to the Indians but meant only to pacify the international critics of British policy in India.

After the departure of the Cripps Mission, the political deadlock continued on communal problems and the Congress and the League came out blaming each other for the failure of the Cripps Mission. It was understood that Gandhiji had telephoned from Sevagram to the Congress leaders at Delhi to reject the proposals. Maulana Azad, in a press statement, on April 11, 1942, said:

"It would be entirely untrue to suggest that the Working Committee's decision has in any way been influenced by Gandhi's views as he (Gandhi) made it clear to the Working Committee members that they were perfectly free to come to their own decisions on the merits of the proposals".

Rajagopalachari said:

"I can say authoritatively that Mahatmaji, who was absent from Delhi during the later stages was not responsible for anything that took place".

On June 16, 1942, Cripps in a press interview said:

"The assurance that the Congress Working Committee had accepted the proposals came through the press and other sources. Then further consultations took place in which, I understand, Mr. Gandhi was consulted and after some further delay, the Congress turned down the proposals".

Gandhiji, replying to Cripps's statement on June 28, 1942, said to the representative of the United Press of London:

"The deliberations, therefore, of the Working Committee at New Delhi, were carried on without any interference or guidance on my part. Therefore, the negotiations had nothing to do at any stage with the question of non-violence".


257. M. Subrahmanyan, Why Cripps Failed (New Delhi: The Hindustan Times Press, 1943), p. 41; see also AICC File No. 55/1940, pp. 30-40, NMML.

258. M. Subrahmanyan, Ibid., pp. 41-42.


Nehru said: "No question of violence or non-violence arose in our talks ... We rejected the proposals purely on political grounds".

In October, 1942, Cripps changed his view and said:

"I do not believe that Gandhi who was not present when the decision was taken was personally responsible for the rejection of the Government's proposal".

**Opinion About the Mission**

Gandhiji wrote that the negotiations failed due to differences with Cripps as to what powers the British Government wanted to part with during the war. Nehru said that on the question of transfer of power the British Government was "determined to hold on to what it had. Behind them stood the imposing figure of Mr. Winston Churchill".

Dr. Rajendra Prasad commented that the tongue was that of Cripps, the language was that of Amery and no group in India was prepared to accept the Proposals in April, 1942, dressed in a different way". Moonje said that the Proposals encouraged Jinnah to stick to a position that rapprochement was impossible without acceptance of Pakistan. Mudaliar said that the purpose of the Mission was to convince the Labour Government that a constitutional settlement was impossible by the Indians. Majumdar stated that Churchill stopped the negotiations between Cripps and the Congress. Louis Fischer, the American journalist, wrote that Cripps was not allowed to make good his assurance about the National Government. Harold Laski ascribed that some of the Cripps' colleagues

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264. Jawaharlal Nehru, n. 9, p. 464.
265. The Tribune (Lahore), April 19, 1942.
266. AICC File No. 65/1942, Press Statement, February 2, 1943, Moonje Papers, NMML.
267. Home Poll. File No. 727, Sr. No. 16, Jayakar Papers, NAI.
were jealous and afraid of his success. The nationalist press opined that Cripps Mission was an unsuccessful drama to befool the world. The Statesman wrote that Cripps was not strong enough to do his drafting and he succumbed to the influence of New Delhi. However, the Mission recognised India's right of self-determination and independence, a Dominion Status and framing of their own constitution. It gave shape to the fancy of Pakistan and a new enthusiasm to the Muslim League to achieve their goal. Hodson rightly observes: "This was a hole in the dyke which Mr. Jinnah was determined to widen".

**Rajaji's Acceptance of Pakistan**

After the departure of the Cripps Mission, Gandhiji became, in the summer of 1942, a great advocate of mass action to drive the British out of the Indian subcontinent, while the danger of Japanese attack on Calcutta was increasing as on April 6, Cocanada and Vizagapatam were already bombed by the Japanese and their warships were cruising in the Bay of Bengal. In view of all the disarray of political parties and war likely to be fought between Great Britain and Japan, Rajagopalachari (better known Rajaji) thought that the root of all these catastrophe and disaster was the Congress-League differences on the question of demand for Pakistan by the League. This issue had also created great disturbance and distrust among the Muslims and Hindus and riots were occurring. Rajaji thought that if the League demand was accepted, the Congress-League conflict would end and pave the way for establishment of a unity and a solid front against the British. He believed that Congress-League combined strength alone would make the country independent from foreign yoke, whether Great Britain or the Japs. As Nehru stated, India was in a "helpless and inert, bitter and sullen" condition, the Madras Congress Legislature Party met on April 23, 1942, and recommended to the All-India Congress to "acknowledge the Muslim League's claim...

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270. *Dawn* (Delhi), September 24, 1944.
272. *The Tribune* (Lahore), April 13, 1942 (The Editorial commented on the news item which appeared in the Statesman).
274. See for full details *The Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, April 25, 1942; see also I.A. Sherwani, n. 127, p. 65.
for separation”. Rajaji moved the resolution at the AICC met at Allahabad, on May 2, 1942, but it was rejected - 15 members voting for, and 120 members against. Pandit Jagat Narayan's resolution, disagreeing Rajaji's proposal, was adopted (92 members voting and 17 against). Gandhiji's view was that the "question of majority and minority is a creation of the British Government and would disappear on their withdrawal".

Rajaji, disappointed at having lost his Pakistan resolution at Allahabad, campaigned in favour of the demand for Pakistan by the League and, in June, met several times with Jinnah to obtain a measure of Congress-League unity, but failed, and Jinnah, on June 22, 1942, said that Pakistan demand was "immutable" and warned again that if the Government surrendered to the Congress in any matter detrimental to Muslim interests serious consequences would follow.

**Quit India Movement**

Gandhiji and Nehru had divergent views on the question of launching a direct resistance against the Government. Gandhiji suggested non-violent non-cooperation against the Japanese if they controlled India and demand of British withdrawal from India. Nehru and Azad were not convinced as to how Gandhiji would be able to drive Japanese. Gandhi-Nehru differences developed to the extent that Gandhiji asked Nehru and Azad "to resign from the Congress Working Committee if they were too sure of the efficacy of their stand", but Patel intervened and the crisis was averted. The Wardha CWC held on July 14, 1942, adopted that the Congress proposal was "not only in the interest of India but also that of Britain and of the cause of freedom to which the United Nations proclaim their adherence". The Wardha resolution also stated that if the Government did not heed to the Congress proposal, Gandhiji would be authorised to launch a

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275. The Indian Annual Register, January-June, 1942, pp. 294-95; see I.A. Sherwani, n. 127, p. 66.
276. Ibid.
277. The Civil and Military Gazette, (Lahore), May 3, 1942.
279. D.C. Gupta, n. 121, p. 221.
non-violent and wide-spread struggle. The resolution was to be ratified by the AICC on August 7, 1942, at Bombay. Soon, the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, in New Delhi, ordered arrest of Gandhiji, Nehru and principal members of the CWC. However, the authorities in London and Washington anxiously began to wait the conclusions of the CWC on August 7. The CWC at Bombay on August 8, 1942, endorsed the 14th July resolution and resolved "in the event of continued British recalcitrance, to start "a mass struggle on non-violent lines" under the leadership of Gandhiji, if the British and the United Nations failed to respond to the call of reason and justice for an honourable settlement, and that "only after all attempts to bring about an agreement were frustrated by the British and Gandhiji gave the sanction".

Churchill and Linlithgow had already planned to crush the "mass struggle", better known as "Quit India Movement". In the morning Gandhiji, Nehru, Azad, Patel, Rajendra Prasad, Kripalani, Asaf Ali, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu and about 148 Congress leaders were arrested and this was followed with the imprisonment of the rank and file of Congressmen all over the country. Nehru observed: "For the first time since the great revolt of 1857, vast numbers of people rose to challenge by force (but a force without arms!) the fabric of British rule in India". The Provincial Governments were given discretionary powers for proscribing the movement. By the end of 1942, police and army resorted to firing 538 times, as a result 40 persons were killed, 1,630 injured, 26,000 convicted and 18,000 detained under the DIR. The Government collected Rs.25,000,000 as fines.

Reactions to the Movement

There were a number of parties, organizations and eminent persons, who opposed the Quit India Movement, most probably due to its timing when the British Government was likely to fall. T.B. Sapru, the Liberal

282. Ibid.
leaders called the Wardha resolution "ill-considered" and "ill-opportune" and urged a concerted effort for settlement of internal conflict. Ambedkar, the leader of the Depressed Classes, described the Civil Disobedience Movement as "irresponsible and insane" and wished that Gandhiji and Jinnah should both better quit politics. Savarkar, the spokesman of the Hindu Mahasabha, appealed to all Hindus not to lend any support "to the Congress move". The Sikhs, loyal to the Government, remained aloof from the Movement and decried it. The British Labour Party leader, Clement Attlee, then Deputy Prime Minister, issued a statement on August 12, making "an earnest appeal to the Indian people" that the Movement would endanger "not merely Indian freedom but the freedom of the whole world", whereas the United States expressed belief that "the establishment of a free India in the post-War world is secure and is not endangered by any possibility of evasion or procrastination by the British Government". In the United States, eminent authors like Pearl Buck and Lin Yu Tang, and publicmen like Wendell Willkie and Henry A. Wallace "espoused the cause of dependent India". The newspapers like The New York Herald, Tribune, Washington Post, Washington Star, Washington Time Herald, Baltimore Sun, Christian Science Monitor held the Congress Party responsible for the "ugly situation", "violent activities" and "lawlessness" in India, in strong terms.

The Muslim League Working Committee on August 20, 1942, "denounced the decision arrived at by the All-India Congress Committee on August 8, 1942, to launch an 'open rebellion' by resorting to mass civil disobedience movement in pursuance of their objective of establishing Congress-Hindu domination in India, which has resulted in lawlessness and
considerable destruction of life and property". The League charged that the Congress had launched the movement to force the Government to hand over power to a Hindu oligarchy and to "force the Mussalmans to submit and surrender to the Congress terms and dictation". Therefore, the League called upon the Muslims "to abstain from any participation in the movement initiated by the Congress and continue to pursue their normal peaceful life". Jinnah "appealed to the Hindu public to "stop this internecine civil war before it was too late". Jinnah declared the Quit India Movement a "reckless and thoughtless act" and an attempt to dominate the Congress over the Muslim League.

Only Chiang Kai-shek sent a "columinous" protest against arrest of the Congress leaders to Roosevelt, who sent it to Churchill. The British Premier resented the "intervention" of the Chinese Premier and advised him to "mind his own business". By the end of 1942, the Movement came to an end.

**CONCLUSION**

The Muslim and Non-Muslim organizations stood poles apart and failed to settle their differences. Jinnah at the Lahore Session, 1940, resolved for partition of India. The nationalist Muslims opposed the resolution, while the Muslim League massively propagated the demand. The British officials focussed upon the dangers and the consequences of the partition. Differences between Gandhiji and Jinnah became quite unreconciliable. The former offered assistance in the War aims subject to immediate transfer of power to the Congress, while the latter offered assistance unconditionally and demanded transfer of power to Hindu India and Muslim India. Cripps Mission failed as it satisfied neither to the Congress nor to the Muslim League. Quit India Movement failed.
due to opposition mainly of the Muslim League. The foreign and Indian statesmen and papers opposed the idea of partition, but the Muslim League, conscious of the prospects of its being conceded ultimately not only by the British but by the Congress leadership also - Gandhiji's personal objections notwithstanding - stuck to its demand of homeland for Muslims.