Chapter 5

First Gulf War and Its Aftermath: The Jordan - Israel Peace Treaty
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THE JORDAN – ISRAEL PEACE TREATY

The Iraq – Kuwait Conflict and Jordan

Iraq had been complaining against the over-production of oil by some of the Arab producers (like Kuwait), which hurt some of their fellow Arabs like Iraq, due to a sharp fall in oil revenues. One 19 July, 1990 Kuwait sent a formal letter to the Arab League Secretary General expressing “astonishment and surprise” at the Iraqi accusations. For some reason, the Arab League did not take any initiative to defuse the Iraq-Kuwait war of words. Two days later, the OPEC ministerial meeting held in Geneva (26-27 July, 1990) supported in principle the Iraqi contention on crude oil prices and production quotas.

The minimum demands made by Iraq were reported to be that Kuwait should promise to abide by the OPEC rules: (i) ceding the southern part of Rumailah oilfields; (ii) pay $ 2.4 billion as compensation for oil extracted from the Rumailah oil field, and (iii) some form of debt write off and additional financial compensation for oil market losses and for the war efforts. Kuwait asserted that the loans will be written off and financial compensation will be paid, provided Iraq agrees to sign a favourable border treaty.
Iraq could not repay about $80 billion that had been borrowed to finance the Iran-Iraq war. It could argue that the war was in Kuwait and Saudi interests since the enemy was Iranian messianic Shiite fundamentalism, which potentially threatened them. Kuwaiti decision not to forgive Iraq's $65 billion debt provided to Iraq economic and emotional justification for the invasion. Another bone of contention between the two countries was Romaila oil field part of which lay in the disputed region. Kuwait was drawing oil from it and Iraq was claiming that it was the oil of Iraq, which Kuwait illegally drew.

Another factor in the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait was the leadership of the Arab World. With its long history and geography, Iraq is the pre-eminent power in the Arab world. But this was denied to her for a variety of reasons in the 1960 and 1970s; and Saudi Arabia usurped this position with its enormous oil wealth. The outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War in September 1980 and the subsequent years saw Iraq bleeding in its War with Iran. With the sea routes through Shatt al-Arab closing down, Syria closing the oil pipeline through its territory, Iraq oil revenues came down to a trickle. It was forced to depend on the material and monetary support given by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait at the end of the war with Iran in August 1988, which Iraq considers it fought against Persian invasion of Arab land. Iraq became a client state of its two rich neighbours. Clearly Iraq was unwilling to accept this humiliation from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. With a million strong battles trained army, Iraq wanted to assert its position in the region.

On 2 August 1990, Iraq launched what was in pure military professional terms a brilliant operation. At 0200 hours, three Iraqi Republican Guard armoured divisions with nearly 300 tanks (mostly T-72s) rolled over the Kuwaiti frontier, in a move coordinated with heliborne air assault with nearly three commando battalions of the
Special Forces. The main force of commandos were landed on Kuwait international airport to make it secure for troops flown in by transport aircraft immediately afterwards. The second element of the heliborne commandos quickly captured most of the key points in the city including the command and control centres of the Kuwaiti army. There was hardly any resistance except by the guards at the royal palace. Complete surprise had been achieved. By 5 August; US satellites photos showed that Iraqi troops had dug in along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border. By that time, 130,000 troops and 500 tanks were believed to have been deployed in Kuwait.

Six days later the Iraqi government declared comprehensive merger between the two countries. On 10 August, Iraq declared for a Jihad or holy war against the Americans and Israelis. Same day it ordered closing down of all embassies in Kuwait. On 12 August the Iraqi President Saddam Hussain declared that Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait, if Israel withdraws from West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Golan Heights and Syria from Lebanon, and arrangements are made between Iraq and Kuwait. First, however, UN sanctions against Iraq must end, allied forces must withdraw from Saudi Arabia and be replaced by pan-Arab forces not including Egyptians. The US and Israel rejected the Saddam offer of conditional withdrawal.

In fact the international response to Iraq's invasion was remarkable swift. Within hours Iraq's assets were frozen worldwide and the first of 11 critical UN Security Council resolutions, Resolution 660, calling for an immediate Iraqi withdrawal had been passed. The speed of the response was due, in no small part, to the fact that neither the USSR nor China – both permanent members of the Security Council – attempted to oppose the resolutions. The following day, a majority in the Arab League condemned the Iraqi invasion at a vituperative
meeting hastily convened in Cairo. Three days later, the UN imposed wide-ranging import and export sanctions against Iraq. (1)

Iraqi oil exports were thus virtually blocked, while exports by sea through the Gulf were blocked by western naval powers. In a nationwide address on 8 August 1990, President George Bush defined the basic objectives of the American policy as follows:

1. Immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait.
2. Restoration of the legitimate government in Kuwait.
4. Protection of lives of Americans abroad.

US troops began landing at Dehran in Saudi Arabia on 8 August and Turkey closed vital Iraqi oil pipelines and terminals on the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Entire Arab World was divided into two groups firstly those, which had supported the US - led, and United Nation sanctioned coalition, the GCC, Syria (together with its protégé, Lebanon), Egypt, Morocco and those, which were neutral or opposed to it (North Africa, Sudan, Libya, Jordan, Yemen and the PLO).

Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait the Palestinians and the PLO supported Saddam Hussain. Officially Jordan in its own interests, remained neutral in the conflict. King Hussein ‘regretted’ but did not condemn the action of Saddam Hussain in invading Kuwait, and Jordanian public opinion was solidly pro-Iraq for the duration of the crisis. Arab League ministers, attending a meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Cairo on 3 August 1990, issued a statement, opposed by Jordan, condemning the invasion and demanding Iraq’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal. At the emergency summit meeting of the Arab League, held in Cairo on 10
August, Jordan abstained in a vote to denounce the annexation of Kuwait and to advocate the deployment of a pan-Arab force to defend Saudi Arabia and neighboring states from invasion by the forces of Saddam Hussain. King Hussein welcomed Saddam Hussain's Proposal, on 12 August, to link Iraq's occupation of Kuwait with the continued Israeli occupation, and he held talks with the Iraqi leader in Baghdad on the following day. Another Arab League meeting in Cairo (30-31 August) was boycotted by Jordan and other Arab nations, which supported Iraq. King Hussein persistently argued in favour of an Arab solution to the crisis and opposed the deployment of a multinational-armed force in the Gulf region.

In the West, which had always regarded King Hussein as one of its chief allies in region, there much criticism of the King's Pro-Iraq stance, though this was tempered with acknowledgement of the extremely difficult position in which he found himself. Talks in the USA between the King and President Bush, at Kennebunkport on 16 August, resulted in promises of US financial assistance in return for Jordanian observance of the economic embargo imposed on Iraq. A report by a UN envoy in October 1990 estimated that the crisis would cost Jordan some 30% of its GDP in 1990 and as much as 50% in 1991.

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Jordan was overwhemed by an influx of refugees, who included thousands of migrant workers from Egypt and the Indian sub-continent, fleeing the conflict. The congestion was such that Jordan was forced temporarily to close its border with Iraq in late August 1990, in an attempt to cope with the accumulation of refugees who could not immediately be transported to the Red Sea port of Aqaba or airlifted to their countries of origin. On 3 September Jordan issued an urgent appeal for international aid, partially to offset the costs of caring for the refugees. By October some
800,000 refugees had passed through the country, at a cost of some $40 million, to the Jordanian authorities.

In mid-September 1990 two of King Hussein’s former Palestinian opponents, George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Naif Hawatmeh of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), who had been expelled during the civil war in 1970, were allowed to return to Amman for a pro-Iraqi conference of Arab Popular Forces. The two Damascus-based leaders were received by the King in a display of unity and reconciliation fostered by the Gulf crisis. The conference, which was opened by the Speaker of the Jordanian House of Representatives (although not attended by the King), heard severe criticisms of governments opposed to Saddam Hussain and ended with pledges to wage a jihad against foreign forces in the Gulf region if Iraq were attacked. This led to a denunciation of King Hussein by the Saudi Arabian ambassador in Washington, and Saudi Arabia subsequently expelled Jordanian diplomats and many Jordanian immigrant workers. It also halted oil supplies to the Kingdom, claiming that Jordan had not paid for earlier deliveries.

King Hussein invested considerable personal effort in the search for a peaceful solution to the crisis, visiting London, Paris and Washington. In late August 1990 he arrived in Libya at the start of a peace mission among Arab leaders. He continued to advocate an Arab solution to the crisis and, in a televised message to the US Congress and people on 23 September, he urged the immediate withdrawal of the multinational force from the Gulf region. Speaking at the World Climate Conference in Geneva on 6 November, the King warned of the potentially disastrous environmental consequences of war in the Gulf region (a fear which was subsequently realized when Iraq released oil into the waters of the Gulf and ignited Kuwait’s oil installations).
Following talks in Baghdad with Saddam Hussain on 4 December 1990, the King proposed a peace plan linking the Iraqi-Kuwait dispute and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He urged the convening of a peace conference on the Middle East, and that all Arab leaders should take part in a dialogue on the crisis, to take place simultaneously with the talks between the USA and Iraq, which had been proposed by President Bush at the end of November.

The King’s diplomatic efforts continued into 1991, when he embarked, in January on a fresh tour of European capitals in a final attempt to avert war in the Gulf region. Diplomatic ties with Iran, severed in 1981 after the start of the Iran-Iraq war, were resumed in mid January 1991, and Jordan was later reported to be supporting Iranian proposals to end the crisis. On 10 January Jordan had closed its ar-Ruweishid border post, on the frontier with Iraq, to all except Jordanian refugees. As war became imminent, Jordan feared a further influx of refugees from Iraq and Kuwait, and claimed that it had still not received UN aid promised for the August 1990 exodus. However, after receiving assurances of UN assistance with the cost of caring for the refugees, the border was reopened on 18 January 1991.

Following the outbreak of hostilities on 16 January 1991, the Jordanian Government condemned the bombardment of Iraq as a brutal onslaught against the Arab and Muslim nation; Large-scale anti-western and anti-Israeli demonstrations occurred throughout the country, and overwhelming popular support for Iraq was expressed in all sections of society. Sentiments were further aroused when air attacks on goods vehicles (including tanker-trucks carrying oil) on the Baghdad-Ruweishid highway in late January killed at least six Jordanian civilians. Jordan had been entirely dependant on Iraqi oil since Saudi Arabian supplies were suspended in September 1990. Now
these consignments were halted, and Jordan, which introduced petrol-rationing in February, was obliged to obtain more expensive supplies from Syria and Yemen. Oil imports from Iraq were eventually resumed in April 1991.

In a televised address in February 1991, King Hussein paid tribute to the people and armed forces of Iraq, describing them as victims of this ‘savage and large-scale war’ and claiming that the war was directed against all Arabs and Muslim. The speech was condemned by the USA Administration, which accused Jordan of abandoning its neutrality and threatened to review its economic aid. In March the US Congress approved legislation canceling a $57 million aid programme. President Bush signed the law in April. However, the effects were offset, to some extent, by the announcement of a $450 million Japanese concessionary loan. As the multinational force launched a ground offensive to liberate Kuwait on 24 February, Prime Minister Badran announced that the conflict had at that point cost Jordan some $8,000 million.

Fears that Iraq would provoke Israel into entering the conflict, thus making Jordan part of the combat zone, were not realized, owing to the Israeli decision not to retaliate in response to the scud missile attacks launched by Iraq against its territory. At the end of December 1990, Jordan had deployed 80,000 troops in defensive positions facing Israel. King Hussein declared, in Mid-January 1991, that Jordan would defend its territory and air space against any incursions. In early February a Jordanian air force officer and a truck-driver were executed, having been convicted by a military court of spying for Israel.\(^{(3)}\)

On balance, King Hussein acted calculatingly in 1988 and early 1989 to prevent upheaval in 1990. Still while the regime had been
thrown back on its heels, it was still standing. The Kuwait crisis worsened Jordan’s economic situation. Aqaba was brought to a near stand still, income from tourism plunged to near zero, remittances were severely reduced, oil from Saudi Arabia was cut off, and Jordanian products were prevented from the Gulf by Saudi diktat. In addition, Jordan’s Saudi subsidy was eliminated and special privileges formerly enjoyed in Saudi by Palestinians with Jordanian passports, such as being able to work without having a specific Saudi sponsor, were rescinded. As bad luck had it, the market for Jordanian phosphates was also depressed. Unemployment, hovering at around 15 Percent before 1990, reached nearly 40 percent by the spring of 1991. Most ironically, because of the crisis, Iraq had a good excuse not to repay what it owed to Jordan, which stood at about $835 million in the fall of 1989.

As a result, the International Monetary Fund estimated that Jordan’s GNP measured at market prices would shrink 16.5 percent when 1990 figures were accumulated, and projections for 1991 still expected negatives rates. These predictions were too dire; the 1990 shortfall was 8.5 percent, and the economy did better in 1991 than most expected. But there in no question that the Kuwait crisis hurt, and the impact of about 300,000 Palestinians returning to Jordan from the Gulf by fall 1991; and the continued shutoff of Saudi subsidies and trade, suggested to most analysts that the worst was yet to come. Moreover, the crisis furnished precisely what Jordan’s Islamists needed in order to take the modest political space opened up by the November 1989 election and enlarge it. Until 1990, the Jordanian regime had been adept at co-opting and accommodating religious forces. This was made easier by the fact that it is not noteworthy to be an orthodox Moslem in a traditional monarchy, and the general religious atmosphere in Jordan undercut fundamentalist
criticisms. Although there was a logic for religious sensibilities to translate into political mobilization against the regime in the 1979-85 period-rampant materialism;\(^{10}\) the ostentation of new suburbs around Amman, the fact that alcohol and immodestly dressed women coexisted in some areas of the capital with mosques and Madrassas-a catalyst was lacking. On or about August 2, one arrived.

Radical scenarios seemed far-fetched before the Kuwait crisis because a thorough overturning of the status quo would have required four improbable things to happen simultaneously or in near sequence. One was a deep economic unraveling, with little help for the country from outside when it happened. Second, the regional environment would have had to be particularly crisis-prone either because of war, sudden regime transitions in nearby countries, or other equally serious dislocations. Third, there would have had to be a new cadre of united radical leadership. Fourth, the King would have had to die, fall seriously ill, or abdicate. The Kuwait crisis furnished the first three conditions in total or in part, and, conceivably, biology or a bullet might have provided the fourth before the war ended. The question of an opposition leadership underwent the most dramatic change. Before 1989, it was hard to identify an incipient opposition leadership cadre to challenge the regime; political activism and violence were at a twenty-five year low. Nor it was easy to find an East Bank cadre devoted to an Islamic revolution. Aside from Laith Shubailat, the maverick Islamic legislator, little was known about the new generation of politically minded Islamist activists.\(^{11}\) But after the election and the Kuwait crisis, this new elite became more visible, and the rise of popular support for Iraq among the most disenchanted segments of Jordanian society propelled this new leadership forward with great speed. A united political front, led by Islamists, formed in August 1990, and it effectively
By not applying royal influence in August 1990, the regime courted further challenges. In October, Parliament, led by Shubailat, demanded that the regime arm the people to confront the expected war with Israel.\(^{(13)}\) Neither the King nor the Prime Minister, Mudar Badran, wanted to do that. In mid-May 1990 there had been serious riots by Palestinians in Jordan's refugee camps in the aftermath of the Rishon Lezion incident, when a deranged Israeli killed seven Palestinians on their way to work in Israel.\(^{(14)}\) The regime hit upon a compromise: the Palestinians would be given people's Army uniforms and trained by the regular army—but they would not be allowed to take their weapons out of the secured training areas such as Amman's football stadium.\(^{(15)}\) Then, on November 17, 1990, Jordan's lower house elected a fundamentalist as speaker over the opposition of secular leftists and liberals. This spelled trouble to come between parliament and the King, but by the end of 1990 the trouble was still latent. As long as regime and street moved in the same general direction, a tense internal peace endured.

**The 1991 Gulf War And Jordan’s Economy**

The Gulf war divided the Arab world into two camps, with a small group supporting Iraq (Jordan, PLO, Sudan, Yemen), and the rest supporting Kuwait. Many countries would feel the consequences of the invasion, but few are still as deeply affected as Jordan has been by that conflict’s economic and political fall-out. Even though Jordan is not, of course, itself a Gulf state, its interests are very much influenced by events there. Lacking oil and valuable natural resources itself, trade and aid involving Gulf States are vital for Jordan’s economy. As part of the Arab world and Middle East, Jordan also has a special interest in events.
in that sub-region. Eight percent of its area is desert and another portion arid mountains that contains no oil. Among its population of 4.9 million people almost 40 percent of them under 15 years of age, Jordan requires an inflow of capital to provide jobs and services.\(^{(16)}\)

During the 1980s, a very significant part of its income depended on billions of dollars in remittances from Jordanian expatriates and hundreds of millions of dollars in financial aid granted by some of the Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). Jordan also exported agricultural and industrial products to the Gulf States and Iraq. In addition, Jordanian trucks transported agricultural and industrial products all over the Middle East and beyond. As a result of the 1991 Gulf war, Jordan, Iraq's main economic partner, found itself in a crisis that it did not create. In an attempt to save Jordan from its precarious position, King Hussein proposed the Arab League mediate the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. Although the attempt failed, King Hussein was seen by some as the best hope for a peaceful solution.\(^{(17)}\) After the mediation attempt failed and the conflict escalated, Jordan became affected by all the social, military, political and economical consequences. Jordan's position was especially complicated by the trade sanctions imposed on Iraq by the UN that resulted in a siege of Aqaba, Jordan's Red sea port. The massive inflow of returning Jordanians and, temporarily, by the arrival of many foreign refugees on the way back to their home countries contributed to the economic crisis. A side from their common characteristics as Arab and Muslim neighbors, there was a special historical bond between Jordan and Iraq. When they emerged from the Ottoman Empire after world war One, both countries were ruled by members of the Hashemite family. Abdullah become King of Jordan and his brother Faisal became King of Iraq. In Iraq, a 1958 military
coup overthrew that regime and created a republic. Still, relations eventually recovered. During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, Jordan and its people genuinely supported Iraq both as a fellow Arab state and as a protector against Iran's brand of radical Islamism, giving the relationship an increasingly important strategic dimension. When Jordan faced a deep economic crisis in 1989, it Gulf friends refused to help, further increasing Baghdad's relative important for Amman. The economic aspect of relations was quite critical in all these years. During the war with Iran, Jordan's economy—including transportation, trade, agriculture, and industry—all became essential for Iraq. In exchange, Iraq supplied Jordan with cheap oil, grants, and low-interest loans. Today, Iraq remains the major supplier of discounted oil and Iraqi continues to be the largest market for Jordanian products. Delivering these goods in both directions has become one of the main pillars of Jordan's transportation sector.

Jordan's economy faced many problems before the Gulf War. There was a high unemployment rate of 20 percent. The foreign debt, exceeding $11 billion, was triple the annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP). And the level of financial transfers from Jordanians working in the Gulf was declining. As a result, Jordan had to devalue its currency by 50 percent in 1989. Another factor was Jordan's sensitivity to trade levels and its dependence on international commerce. For instance, exports were worth almost $1 billion in 1989, with a further $181 million in goods being re-exported through Jordan. Considering that Jordan's GDP was a mere $4.3 billion, this is a staggering figure. No less important to Jordanian living standards, the country imported $2.16 billion worth of goods in that same year.

Before the Gulf war, well over half of Jordan's exports were sent to Gulf states. Iraq alone was the market for 23 percent of its exports; Saudi
Arabia was generally the market for at least 10 percent more. Iraq's importance was underlined by the fact that it was the source of between 10 and 17 percent of total Jordanian imports by the late 1980s.

Largely as a reaction to the problems of deficit and debts described above, the International Monetary fund (IMF) pushed Jordan to apply a tough economic reform program to increase production, decrease imports, reduce government spending, and stop government subsidies. These steps led to massive riots in April 1989 starting in Ma'an, Capital of Jordan's transport sector, and swept throughout the country, forcing King Hussein to change the government and keep subsidies for most basic products. By 1990, Jordan's economy had begun recovering from the 1989 crisis but still needed serious domestic efforts, international support, and time to reach better levels of performance.\(^{20}\)

Immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 661 which invoked economic trade sanctions against Iraq, a decision with which Jordan complied. UN sanctions deeply affected Jordan's interests and economy since, as stated above, Iraq was the largest Jordanian trade partner for the previous ten years. Many Jordanian companies lost large amounts because Iraqi companies were unable to repay their debts due to the sanctions. Moreover, key Jordanian economic sectors such as transportation, agriculture, and industry, mainly serving Iraq, were severely affected by the UN resolution. The Amman Chamber of Commerce announced in November 1990 that the trade sanctions had already cost Jordan $2 billion, and the loss was growing. According to the same source, they expected it to reach $3.6 billion in 1991.\(^{21}\) In addition, before the resolution Iraq was supplying 80 percent of Jordanian oil at reduced
The sanctions forced Jordan to import oil from the international market at the going rates.

Iraq was highly dependent on Jordan as the route for importing and exporting needed products. Each year, million of tons of goods were handled for Iraq in the Jordan's part of Aqaba and this aspect of Jordan's economy had been growing rapidly before the sanctions took effect. Imports via the port went from 6.2 million tons in 1989 to 3.2 million in 1990 to 7.7 million in 1991. The trade sanctions also caused the cancellation of many shipping visits, and as a direct result, the number of ships arriving at Aqaba decreased from 2,583 in 1988 to 2,075 in 1991. This, in turn, made it harder and longer for Jordan to receive products it needed for local industry and agriculture, in addition to disrupting Jordanian exports. Allied warships searched thousands of vessels each year and turned back many shipments belonging to Jordanian merchants who had business relations with Iraq, even if they were targeted for local consumption. Jordanian phosphate and potassium exports were also disrupted since they depended on Aqaba's port.

The Gulf War affected (in various ways) forty countries around the world. Some countries lost their exports to the Gulf area. Others lost the remittances of their expatriates. A few had to accommodate thousands of their citizens who returned from the Gulf area. Most countries were affected as a result of the interest rate increase on their old debts and difficulty to get new credits. Many were affected by the increase in oil prices. Jordan, however, was severely affected by all of these issues.

Crown Prince Hassan announced that the effect of Gulf War on Jordan could be summarized in three dimensions: the trade sanctions against Iraq, the refugees who fled the Gulf area and passed through
Jordan, and the Jordanian expatriates who returned to Jordan.\(^{(26)}\) At the time of the crisis, estimates one what losses would occur due to the conflict varied, but in Jordan, they were believed to be massive. Mudhar Badran, Jordan's Prime Minister at the time, estimated Jordan's total loss at $8 billion, Badhran added that while Jordan’s exports to other Arab countries were $485.7 million in 1989 and had increased by $42.8 million in the first half of 1990, they had since decreased gradually after August 2, 1990 reaching Zero at the end of 1990 and first three months of 1991.\(^{(27)}\) The Jordanian daily al-Dustur reported that Jordan's loss would reach $1.4 billion in the last five months of 1990, and would reach $8.4 billion in 1991, including both direct and indirect losses.\(^{(28)}\) According to another Jordanian daily, Sawt al-Sha'b, the UN had estimated that Jordan lost $1.52 billion in 1990, and expected it to lose another $3.4 billion in 1991.\(^{(29)}\) Sawt al-Sha'b's Sameh Hanandeh reported in November 1991 that Jordan had lost $1.68 billion in 1990 and would lose $3.97 billion in 1991.\(^{(30)}\)

Regardless of how much these figures (especially Badhran's) were an attempt to get more foreign aid; the real impact was vast and did cause Jordan's leadership to worry enormously about the future of its economy. Jordan's GNP declined by more than 8 percent, and Jordan's general economic growth dropped especially in the first five months after the war.\(^{(31)}\) Jordanian reserves of foreign currencies and government revenues declined leading to an estimated budget deficit of $308 million in 1991, excluding interest payments. The crisis affected almost all production sectors, led to an increase in the unemployment rate to nearly 30 percent, and also resulted in an increase of the poverty rate to 33 percent. Moreover, Jordan had to postpone the application of the IMF reform program, writing in al-Dustur, Odeh Suleiman al-Swais concluded that, after the Iraqi and Kuwaiti
economies, Jordan's economy suffered the most due to the Kuwait crisis. Indeed, when compared to other countries, the serious effect on Jordan becomes even clearer. During the eight months after the Gulf War, Jordan lost an estimated $4 billion while Turkey, India and Yemen combined lost $5.5 billion. Turkey estimated its losses to be $3 billion, Yemen announced a loss of $830 million, and India estimated its loss to about $1.6 billion. Even Egypt's actual loss did not exceed $1 billion dollars. In addition, while those countries' losses were less than Jordan's, they received more and better credits. Jordan obtained only US $1 billion from Japan and the European Union.

Furthermore, before the crisis Arab and international financial support was vital for Jordan's economy. Before the Gulf War Jordan was receiving almost $600 million a year from the wealthy Gulf States alone. As a result of the Jordanian support of Iraq during the war, those countries such as the US and Japan took the same steps (a situation not reversed until Jordan became involved in the peace process with Israel, most especially after the Wye River Agreement). In addition, Iraq and Kuwait themselves had previously been the source of 30 percent of the total financial aid received by Jordan.

Jordanian exports to Arab and other countries also declined. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia prohibited the import of Jordanian products because of Jordan's political position during the war. Jordanian agriculture, industry and trade sectors were thus shut out of the most important Gulf markets. The transportation sector was paralyzed as a result of the trade sanctions and the decline in exports and imports. Moreover, the tourism sector was harshly affected by the Gulf war. Having taken nearly a decade to recover from the loss of the important tourist sites of Jerusalem and Bethlehem in 1967, by 1990, the industry in Jordan had reached all-time highs, with almost 2.6 million tourists.
entering in that year alone (most of whom were Arabs). Utilizing its sites like Jerash and Petra to their fullest, tourism had even out performed phosphates (Jordan’s leading export) in net receipts. However, by 1991, this number dropped by almost 25 percent to 2 million visitors.\(^{36}\)

**Return of Jordanians**

There were many groups of people who passed through or returned to Jordan due to the Gulf War. These people can be classified into five categories: first, Jordanians who carry Jordanian passport and have Jordan as their only home and who consequently returned to Jordan. Second, Jordan had to host Palestinians who carried identification papers issued by other Arab countries that then refused to receive them. Third, Palestinians from the West Bank, who had Jordanian passports, were forced to stay for a long period in Jordan until Israel allowed them to go back to the West Bank. Fourth, over 300,000 Iraqi refugees who escaped Iraq eventually settled in Jordan. Finally, as many as one million refugees during the last five of months of 1990, according to Prime Minister Badhran.\(^{37}\) Jordan was one of the largest providers of white-collar employees to the Gulf countries. Jordanians living in the Gulf countries before the crisis exceeded one million (20 percent of Jordan's total population) distributed among Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. These Jordanians living abroad also became the main supplier of foreign currency to Jordan, which official statics estimated at over $ 1.2 billion annually in the mid-1980s (an official estimates ran as high as $ 3 billion). Jordanians in Kuwait and Iraq alone accounted for almost 40 percent of the total Jordanian expatriate transfers, as these two countries hosted over half a million Jordanians. However, as
a result of the war, these remittances decreased to $460 million (the official statistic) in 1991. It was estimated that Jordan had lost $122 million in 1990 and $318 million in 1991 due to the decrease in the employee transfers. In addition, it was estimated that Jordanian expatriates lost $1.4 billion of their deposits in Kuwait and $1.5 billion of their belongings. Making matter worse, after the Gulf War, former Jordanians working outside Jordan, previously a source of national income, suddenly became a major burden inside Jordan.

Jordanians started to migrate to Kuwait in the 1950, and the total number of Jordanians working in Kuwait before the Iraqi invasion was almost 400,000. Jordanian labor helped in building modern Kuwait, with Jordanian employees working in many government departments such as education, health care, military, as well as in the private sector. The Jordanian media reported that Jordanians were treated as second-class citizens, even though most of them had lived many years there and many were even born and raised in Kuwait. Before the Iraqi invasion many articles requesting the government to deport Jordanians appeared in Kuwaiti newspapers, and the slogan "Kuwait is for Kuwaitis" became widespread. Jordanians were unable to buy private houses or operate their own businesses in Kuwait. Following the liberation, Kuwait started a comprehensive campaign to deport Jordanians out of Kuwait and an estimated 330,000 Jordanians returned to Jordan after the Iraqi troops were expelled from Kuwait by the US-led UN coalition. Many other Jordanians, under indirect pressure and changing economic conditions, returned from other Gulf countries such as Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.

The return of 330,000 Jordanians from the Gulf area, in addition to one million refugees who passed through Jordan, had many serious
negative effects on Jordan. Jordanian unemployment rate soared from 20 percent to 30 percent.\(^{(40)}\) White-collar employees were the main victims since Jordan was one of the major exporters of white-collar employees to the Gulf area. The situation worsened after the return of Jordanians from Kuwait and Iraq, a situation, which continued until Jordan created more jobs and found vacancies abroad for the large number of unemployed. Returnees increased the pressure on the limited natural resources (e.g., education facilities, housing, and health care units). The return of the large number of Jordanians in a short period increased the number of Jordanians who lived under the poverty level up to one-third of the population. Before the Gulf crisis the total number of Jordanians who were living under poverty was 600,000—almost 20 percent of the population. A study of 500 Jordanian families revealed that Jordan stepped down from a middle-income country to a low-income country.\(^{(41)}\) Salamah Hammad, writing in Sawt al-Sha’b, reported that over 1,625,000 persons had entered Jordan between August and December 1990, out of whom 885,000 continued their trip to their home countries (e.g., India, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and Egypt). This number equals 23 percent of Jordan’s population and would be equivalent to 13 million people passing through England. In order to help these refugees, the Jordanian Government spent over $60 million of its budget, though the UN eventually reimbursed only $12 million of that amount. Thousands of Palestinians also stayed in Jordan because the other Arab countries that issued their papers refused to receive them. Additionally, many other nationalities like Somalis, Liberians and Eritreans stayed in Jordan for longer periods until they could find another country that would accept them.\(^{(42)}\) Jordanian authorities did not charge the refugees or international airlines taking the refugees home any of the fees normally paid by travelers. It also
gave up the privileges of the national Jordanian Airline Company (Royal Jordanian) and cancelled many of its flights to allow other airline companies to carry the refugees.

**Jordan and the United States during the Crisis**

The Jordanian King was criticized sharply by a range of US observers for his pro-Iraqi tilt during the Gulf War, and initially even administration officials joined the chorus. There was, admittedly, much to be annoyed about.

At the least, Washington accepted some Jordanian equivocation under the circumstances but did not really get it. Indeed, the president was so annoyed with the extent of King Hussein's early support for Iraq that he lost his temper, at a televised August 5 news conference, when ABC's Ann Compton began describing a Pro-Iraqi interview given that day by the King. "I can read, "Bush shot back, clearly more annoyed with the King than with Compton. It was the only time Bush lost his temper publicly throughout the crisis.

As the days passed, Jordanian behavior worsened from the US point of view. In particular, the endlessly repeated Hashemite refrain that had it not been for the hasty introduction of US forces an Arab solution could have been found annoyed officials in Washington, who knew it was just not true and found it difficult to believe that even the King himself took the argument seriously. And days after the invasion, as Bush was characterizing Saddam Hussein as a Hitler, King Hussein told NBC news that Saddam was "a person to be trusted and dealt with". (46) Thereafter, despite King Hussein visit to Kennebunk port on August 16, Jordan's seemingly two-faced behavior with respect to sanctions, its complaints about the US embassy monitoring the Jordanian-Iraqi border as the refugee problem grew in scope, its
colorful, conspiracy-bedecked anti-US rhetoric, and the King's gambit to bring the Europeans to undermine US strategy, all of this annoyed Washington further through out the nearly six months before the beginning of the air war on January 16, 1991.

In response to this, the US Navy blockaded Aqaba and the administration urged Jordanian neutrality at the least.\(^{(47)}\) After the air war began, it also sent Ambassador Richard L Armitage to Jordan on January 23 to calm nerves and, with Lawrence Eagleburger in Israel, to try to prevent a second Middle East war from breaking out between Israel and Jordan.\(^{(48)}\) This genuinely worried Jordan as well as the United States and Israel. King Hussein was not exaggerating when he said on November 17 that Jordan was at a cross roads and that the Middle East was on the "verge of a catastrophe which would destroy our existence", nor was Crown Prince Hassan just mouthing words when he said, "plainly put, our small country of 3.5 million people is on the brink of destruction".\(^{(49)}\) He went on to describe Jordan as "hell's firewood".

In addition to what Jordan was saying about the crisis, other irritations surfaced as well. There were unconfirmed claims that Jordan was training Iraqis on captured Hawk missiles, that Jordanian intelligence was aiding Iraq;\(^{(50)}\) that Jordanian weapons had been sent to Iraq before and during the fighting;\(^{(51)}\) that Jordan was laundering money for Iraq;\(^{(52)}\) and that some Iraqi mobile SCUD launchers were hiding in Jordan despite the best efforts of coalition air forces to find them.\(^{(53)}\) Meanwhile, Jordanian truck drivers were still plying the Iraqi-Jordanian desert highway in violation of the UN embargo, and, in early February, they too felt the brunt of coalition air attacks.

King Hussein delivered harsh anti-US Speech on February 6, seemingly triggered by the deaths of Jordanian truck drivers on that
The administration, in response, expressed its bitter disappointment with Hussein, suspended aid to Jordan, and commenced to review next year’s aid allotment as well. An unnamed senior administration spokesman, possibly Secretary Baker himself, told the New York Times, "There is a war going on now. Americans are at risk, and what the King is doing is putting them more at risk. That is not the way friends behave—even friends under pressure. We cannot be the ones always doing what we can to help him and then he goes and pockets that and doesn’t care if he says things that make life more difficult for us. There are limits to our patience, and he needs to know that more clearly."\(^{(55)}\)

The Jordanians, in turn, professed outrage, anger, and dismay at US actions, and it appeared that US Jordanian relations had plummeted to their lowest point ever.\(^{(56)}\)

However bad this looked, some of the anger and dismay was probably staged. The experts on the US side knew how sharply Hussein’s domestic situation limited his options. More important, the sheer horror of contemplating a Hussein-less Jordan in the midst of the Kuwait crisis. Indeed, the day after the King’s speech, Secretary Baker told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that lines of communication with Jordan had to remain open because “when we look at alternative we don’t see what we perceive to be a particularly pretty picture”\(^{(57)}\). And, while public evidence is lacking, it may be that a certain level of anti-Jordanian remarks by US officials was expected to aid King Hussein in the court of Jordanian public opinion, where to be an enemy of the United States was to be a friend “of the people”.

In this regard, US Jordanian discussions at Kennebunkport on August 16 and in the months there after may have led to more than just
an exchange of sensitivities. Details are not public knowledge, but Thomas Friedman remarked in the New York Time on February 9, administration officials say they are ready to accept a certain amount of posturing by the King, who has provided some useful intelligence on Iraq, and tacit military cooperation since the Gulf War began.\(^{(58)}\)

Notwithstanding this diplomatic subtext to US Jordanian relation during the crisis, the US cold shoulder persisted for a time after the war ended.\(^{(59)}\) Secretary Baker snubbed Hussein on his first two-post war trips to the region, and policy Planning Director Dennis Ross dubbed the King "a master of strategic misjudgment".\(^{(60)}\) At the same time, however, both the King and the administration were commencing efforts to patch up their spat. As early as his news conference on March 1, President Bush acknowledged difficulties with Jordan, but he cited extenuating circumstances and added, "clearly we do not want to see a destabilized Jordan. I have no personal animosity towards His Majesty the King".\(^{(61)}\) Later, on March 26, State Department spokesman Margaret Tutweiler said on the occasion of Adnan Abu-Odeh's trip to Washington that despite US disappointment with Jordan during the Kuwait crisis, Jordan still had a very important role to play in the search for peace and security in the region. This statement was duly broadcast by Jordanian media.\(^{(62)}\)

Luckily for Jordan, disappointment or not, the administration had even less interest in the PLO. It was clear by early autumn that there would be no renewed US-PLO dialogue after the war. The president himself said on March 9 that he was not in any rush to restart direct talks with the PLO which, he said, had lost much credibility in the war by siding with Iraq.\(^{(63)}\)
Even more important, the administration’s approach to the peace process was first to concentrate on getting the Arab states engaged with Israel, then to address the Palestinian aspect of the process, which was when Jordan’s role would become paramount—hence Baker’s avoidance of Amman during his first two trips to the region after the Gulf War. The president said on March 9 that “it is high time that the combatants of the Arab-Israeli conflict recognized Israel’s right to exist and we can then turn our attention to the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict”. So the administration had not forgotten Jordan, and it knew it did not have the luxury of remaining angry at the King. Instead, though perhaps regretting the lack of alternatives, Washington waited for the right moment to recast US-Jordanian ties and involve the King in the peace process.\(^\text{(64)}\)

**Jordan and the Middle East Peace Process**

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, Bush administration on its own agreed for a negotiated settlement of Arab Israeli conflict. The Bush administration gained a position of diplomatic dominance within the Middle East acting more positively as compared to its earlier counterparts. For that matter, the 1991 Gulf War provided the catalyst and induced peace efforts at much faster pace than the earlier four decades. The intrinsic advantage of this regime was its dependence upon elite less courteous and favourable to Israel. Bush emerged as the biggest beneficiary from the end of cold war and the Gulf war. It gave him domestic applause and a favourable position to initiate the peace process.\(^\text{(67)}\)

On 20-21 July 1991, US Secretary of State James Baker visited Jordan when King Hussein announced his intention to accept an invitation to Jordan to attend a Middle East peace conference
sponsored by the US and the USSR. It was hoped that the conference would be attended by delegations from Israel, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, and by a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation; and that it would thus become the first occasion when Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab nations would participate in direct negotiations.

The Jordanian House of Representatives opposed the plan, however, demanding Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories and East Jerusalem as a precondition for Jordan's attendance; and rejecting Israel's insistence that neither Palestinians from East Jerusalem nor overt supporters of the PLO should be allowed to attend. James Baker visited Amman again in September and October. He had visited the regions eight times since the end of the Gulf War, for further rounds of pre-Conference diplomacy, and on 12 October King Hussein announced that a Jordanian delegation would attend the conference, in spite of intense opposition from the Muslim Brotherhood and leftist political groupings. He stated that he had received assurances from the USA that it would do its utmost to ensure that a transitional period of Palestinian 'autonomy' in the Occupied Territories would be negotiated within one year of the opening of the conference; and that he had considered abdicating over the Arab-Israeli confrontation, but believed that attending the conference would increase international pressure on Israel to withdraw from the Occupied Territories. The Central Council of the PLO, meeting in Tunis on 16-17 October, approved the formation of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, a decision strongly criticized by the leader of the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), George Habbash.
Jordan and the Peace Process

Just as the United States had use for Jordan, Jordan had use for the United States and the peace Process it created and shepherded. King Hussein had six good, interlocking reasons for wanting to partake in post-Gulf War peace diplomacy.

First and most important, while Jordan was weak, the PLO was even weaker. The chance to take advantage of Yasser Arafat while the PLO was down must have seemed irresistible to the King. King Hussein and Arafat had been sparring for decades, before and after the 1974 Rabat Summit empowered the PLO, at Hashemite expense, as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. After Rabat, the King fought a holding action against a rising tide of Palestinian nationalism that threatened Jordan’s position in the West Bank and, ultimately, Hashemite rule in the East Bank. After the Gulf War, finally, the tables were turned and the King, though tottering, prepared to attack.

Second, with Syria and Israel likely to become the major focus of post-Gulf War diplomacy, Jordan did not want to be left out on the off chance that a new peace process achieved success. And even if it did not, Syria was Jordan’s once and perhaps future adversary after Saddam Hussein had been reduced. As always, the King to head off trouble, has always preferred to deal with danger by snuggling up to it rather than by confronting it. Third, King Hussein had to appear active diplomatically in order to raise money. The country was broke; and Amman needed all it could get and only from Washington. It was through US pressure, too, that the King hoped for a renewal of Saudi aid to the Hashemite Kingdom.

Fourth, the King hoped that a helpful diplomacy would buy protection from Washington against future Israeli predations. The
specter of "transfer" a euphemism for expelling Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza into Jordan—was foremost among Jordanian fears, albeit an exaggerated one.

Fifth, the very process of a peace diplomacy was useful to Hussein. It allowed Jordan to sidestep trouble with Washington over continuing Jordan-Iraqi ties, including Jordan's importing roughly 55,000 barrels of Iraqi oil a day, about $400 million a year from Iraq. It helped drive Jordanian opinion toward moderation and thus helped the King isolate the Islamist challenge. It worked to help mend Jordanian-Saudi ties. It worked against extremism in Israeli politics, which the King greatly feared, and helped isolate Syrian rejectionism.

Last, there were the benefits of peace itself, if only peace could be attained. For decades King Hussein has been waiting for a convergence of forces that would allow him to take prudent risks for peace. In the denouement of the Gulf War, this convergence seemed to hover into view. King Hussein has always needed four keys, ready to be turned in sequence. The Arab key, the Palestinian key, the Israeli key, and the superpower key.  

As to the Arab key, King Hussein has needed to know that no Arab state or group of States would veto his effort. Jordan remained concerned about Syria, but with Saudi Arabia and Egypt more or less in League, and with Arab radicals like Iraq and Libya on the sidelines, Hussein was buoyed. Indeed, the fact that Jordan was able to scorn Syria's insistence that Jordan and other Arab states stay away from multilateral talks after Madrid, and demur entering bilateral talks with Israel in the absence of US and Soviet diplomats, proved that the tables have turned.
King Hussein has also needed Palestinians to share the risk of compromise, lest he meet the fate of his grandfather, King Abdullah. After the Gulf War, the PLO’s weakness and the Intifade-induced shift of the center of gravity of Palestinian nationalism toward the more moderate Palestinians under occupation appeared to place this key in readiness. Arafat, in particular, was sidelined by the entire process, and West Bank Palestinians inherently more amenable to Jordanian interests were raised up in his stead. The King knew Arafat was not about to go quietly into the Arab night as chairman-emeritus, but never had the Palestinian national movement as a whole looked better from the Hashemite point of view.\(^{74}\)

The Israeli key appeared not to be in readiness at Madrid, but the King had reason to be patient. King Hussein knew that Israeli opinion—which favors land for peace by more than half and which opposes the frenzied settlement policy of the Likud government might, under the right circumstances, bring to power in Israel a government with that key in hand.

Last, while Jordan disparaged both the skill and the seriousness of the Carter and Reagan administrations, it had infinitely more faith in the Bush administration’s professionalism and determination.

The opening session of the historic Middle East peace conference, convened within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, and chaired by President Bush of the USA and the Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev, was held in Madrid, Spain, during 30 October-1 November 1991. The Joint Jordanian Palestinian delegation was led by Kamel Abu Jaber, who had been appointed Jordan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs following the resignation, on 3 October, of Dr Abdullah an-Nusur. The delegation included
diplomats, civil servants and academics. In his speech, calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Occupied lands, Abu Jaber stated that King Hussein would have preferred a separate Palestinian delegation but 'we have no objection to providing an umbrella for our Palestinian brethren, the Palestinian people must be allowed to exercise their right of self-determination in their ancestral homeland.

He added, Jordan has never been Palestine and will not be so. In Washington and Moscow, subsequent negotiations between the Israeli and the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegations remained deadlocked. However, secret talks between the PLO and the Israeli Government in Norway, which had begun early in 1993, led to an agreement on a Declaration of Principles on 19 August 1993 which involved a degree of Palestinian self-government in the occupied Territories. The Declaration of Principles was signed in Washington on 13 September 1993. This agreement came as a surprise to King Hussein who had not been informed that negotiations were taking place in Oslo, and the agreement is reported to have caused grave embarrassment to the Palestinian negotiators in Washington. Despite the King's initial irritation at the Israeli-PLO accord, which presented a socio-economic as well as a political challenge for Jordan, the King quickly accepted the Declaration of Principles. On 14 September, the day after the Washington signature of the accord, Jordan and Israel concluded a 'common agenda' for subsequent negotiations between the two countries. The agenda aimed to achieve a just lasting and comprehensive peace' between the Arab States, the Palestinians and Israel. Jordan and Israel agreed to respect each other's security and to discuss future co-operation on territorial and economic issues. The signing of the agenda was publicized as being the first agreement between an Arab State and Israel since the peace agreement between
Egypt and Israel in 1979. King Hussein, however, stressed that the agenda was not a peace agreement but an outline of topics to be discussed at future talks. Much of the agenda had already been agreed in 1992 but an official signing was delayed because of objections by the Palestinians.\(^{(70)}\)

Within Jordan, news of the Israeli-PLO accord was greeted with considerable cynicism. Opposition to the accord appeared to be strongest in the vast Palestinian refugee Camp at Baqaa. Most Islamist and leftist politicians condemned the accord. The agreement between the PLO and Israel in September 1993 initiated a sometimes acrimonious debate on the vexed question of Palestinian identity and the future of Palestinians in Jordan. Since October 1993 Jordan had become increasingly frustrated with the PLO over its failure to implement agreements on closer co-operation. In particular Jordan was concerned that the PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat, appeared to be unwilling to sign a draft economic agreement that had been drawn up earlier in the year. At the beginning of 1994 King Hussein publicly criticized Arafat because Jordan had not been continuously advised about the progress of talks between the PLO and Israel concerning the implementation of Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho and economic co-operation. He requested that Arafat stop making references to a future Jordanian-Palestinian confederation because this was an issue on which no decision had yet been made. In the past King Hussein had appeared to favour such an arrangement, but more recently Jordan had decided not to discuss the final relationship with the Occupied Territories. Following the King's criticisms, a PLO delegation led by Farouk Kaddoumi, the head of the PLO's political department visited Amman and an agreement on economic co-operation, covering tourism, agriculture, infrastructure, investment
promotion, and private sector co-operation, was signed on 7 January 1994. Just over a week later, Jordan and the PLO drew up a draft accord on security and the exchange of intelligence information. Jordan was particularly concerned about who would control the bridges across the Jordan River after the establishment of Palestinian autonomy. Jordanian experts were reported to be present as observers at talks between the PLO and Israel in Paris on economic and monetary questions. Yet in spite of a personal visit to Amman by Arafat to brief King Hussein on the Cairo talks with Israel, relation between Jordan and the PLO remained strained. At the end of March King Hussein blamed the PLO for mishandling the negotiations leading up to Security Council Resolution 904, which had allowed the USA to abstain on the paragraph in the preamble concerning Jerusalem. The King argued that the American vote could have been avoided if the PLO had consulted Jordan. There was a relatively low-key reaction from the Jordanian Government to the Cairo accord between Israel and the PLO signed on 4 May. Arafat visited Amman on 5 May to brief King Hussein on the Cairo agreement but the King remained disillusioned by Arafat’s failure to liaise with Jordan in the peace process.\(^{(71)}\)

Following a secret meeting in November 1993 between King Hussein and Shimon Peres, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, there was optimism in Israeli government circles that Jordan would soon sign a formal peace agreement with Israel. These hopes were dashed in late January 1994 when King Hussein insisted that the key issues which lay behind the Arab-Israeli conflict must be discussed before any accord could be signed and that it was unacceptable to leave negotiations until after the signing. Jordan, together with Syria and Lebanon, withdrew temporarily from the rounds of bilateral talks with Israel in Washington immediately after the Hebron massacre in February, although the
gesture appeared to be largely symbolic and aimed at appeasing public anger at the incident. The King firmly rejected calls made by Islamist deputies for Jordan to withdraw permanently from the peace talks.

The National Assembly requested that the Government link Jordan's resumption of peace negotiations with new arrangements for inspecting ships with cargo bound for Iraq through Aqaba port. There had been growing criticism of the policy of intercepting and searching ships bound for Aqaba in the Tiran Straits by a multinational inspection force led by the US navy. The system of inspection, introduced in August 1991 in order to verify compliance with international sanctions against Iraq, resulted in long delays and loss of revenue to the Jordanian authorities. When the USA failed to respond to Jordanian requests for new arrangements, this was interpreted in Amman as a means of putting pressure on Jordan to finalize a peace agreement with Israel. In Late March 1994 King Hussein announced that Jordan would not resume peace negotiations with Israel unless the naval blockade of Aqaba was lifted. However, it was not until the end of April that the USA accepted a Jordanian proposal for a new land-based system of inspection.\(^{72}\) Prime Minister Majali told the press on 25 April that his government was now willing to sign agreements on all individual items on the Jordan- Israel agenda and to participate in all multilateral talks in the hope that the negotiations would lead eventually to a peace treaty. He emphasized that a peace treaty could only be achieved in this way.

**Jordan- Israel Peace Treaty**

In May-June 1994 the peace process received a new impetus, after King Hussein unexpectedly decided to proceed unilaterally with talks with Israel. After talks between the King and Israeli Prime
Minister, Itzhak Rabin, in London, United Kingdom, at the end of May, negotiations resumed at a meeting of the Jordanian-Israeli-US Trilateral Commission, held on 6-7 June in Washington, DC. At the meeting Jordan and Israel agreed to hold future bilateral talks in Israel and Jordan, and to establish joint sub-commissions on boundary demarcation, security, and water and environmental issues. These sub-commissions began work on 18-19 July, at a meeting on the Jordanian-Israeli border.

On 25 July 1994 at a ceremony at the White House, King Hussein and the Prime Minister of Israel, Itzhak Rabin, signed the 'Washington Declaration' ending the state of war which had existed between the two countries since 1948. The declaration stopped short of a full peace treaty, but US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, state that he expected it to speed the process for formal peace agreement 'within a matter of months'.

In Jordan opposition to the Declaration was limited, and there were no large-scale protests. Islamists declared 'a day of Sadness and Mourning' and at a modest protest meeting at the central mosque in Amman, Bahjat Abu-Gharbiah, head of the Arab-Jordanian popular committee Against Normalization, told the demonstrations that the peace was 'an attempt to consolidate the hegemony of the Zionist entity through normalization that allows its cancerous spread until the shores of the Arabian Gulf. The PLO Chairman Arafat sent his congratulations to the Israeli and Jordanian leaders on the declaration and expressed the hope that Syria and Lebanon would also make peace with Israel. However, Palestinian leaders were angered by a statement in the Declaration endorsing the special role of King Hussein as guardian of the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem. They argued that it undermined the Palestinian claim to sovereignty over Jerusalem, and
that it contradicted the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles, which stated that the final status of Jerusalem would be determined by negotiation between Israel and the PLO. The Syrian press criticized the Washington Declaration, arguing that separate peace deals weakened the Arab cause. Nevertheless, President Assad appeared to be privately reconciled to the negotiations.

Bilateral talks between Jordanian and Israeli delegations continued in August and September 1994. In mid-October, despite reports that problems remained over border demarcation and water resource allocation, the Israeli Prime Minister, Itzhak Rabin, visited Amman, and agreement was reached on a final peace treaty between the two countries. On 26 October the Treaty was formally signed at a ceremony held on the Jordanian-Israeli border, Jordan thus becoming only the second Arab state (After Egypt) to conclude a peace treaty with Israel. The Peace Treaty included agreement on border demarcation security, water allocation and the restoration of economic relations between the two states. King Hussein role as guardian of the Muslim Shrines in Jerusalem was also reaffirmed. The Treaty was adopted by both houses of the Jordanian National Assembly, and ratified by King Hussein on 9 November. As agreed in the Treaty, full diplomatic relations between Jordan and Israel were established in Late November. Also in November the Jordanian-Israeli border was opened to citizens of the two countries, and Israeli troops began withdrawing from some 340 sq km of land occupied since the 1967 war. Within Jordan little effort had been made to prepare public opinion for the peace agreement. Following a demonstration against the treaty in Amman by some 5,000 people, organized by Islamic groups, the Government banned all public meetings.\(^{76}\)
The Islamic Action Front (IAF) and its allies continued to oppose the treaty and began a campaign in the National Assembly against the normalization of relations with Israel. They attempted to prevent the repeal of legislation limiting relations with Israel, including a law (adopted in 1973) prohibiting land sales to Israelis, a 1958 law imposing a total economic boycott of Israel, and legislation from 1953 outlawing trade between the two states. The Peace Treaty did little to improve relations with the Palestinian leadership. The reaffirmation of King Hussein's special role as guardian of the Muslim holy places East Jerusalem was criticized by the PLO leadership. In September 1994 the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) had claimed responsibility for all Islamic institutions in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza. In response, Jordan had agreed to relinquish its rights over sites in the West Bank and Gaza, but it refused to renounce its guardianship over the holy Shrines of East Jerusalem. A compromise was reached on the issue in late January 1995, when an accord was signed by the two sides. The Palestinians agreed to recognize the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty, thus implying de facto recognition of Jordanian rights over the Jerusalem Shrines, at least until the city came under Palestinian sovereignty. In return, Jordan reaffirmed its support for Palestinian autonomy and for the future creation of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. The accord also covered economic, cultural and administrative affairs, and included an agreement to use the Jordanian currency in Palestinian territories. The timing of the agreement prompted observers to argue that Arafat was seeking better relations with Jordan, because of Israel's increasingly unco-operative approach on the Palestinian question, and as a response to growing pressure from Islamic groups violently opposed to the PLO-Israel accords.
Main Points of Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty

The Jordan Peace Treaty with Israel comprises 30 articles, five annexes which address boundary demarcation, water issues, police cooperation, environmental issues and mutual border crossings, and six maps.\(^{(78)}\)

- **The main provisions of the treaty are as follows:**

  **International boundary**

  The agreement delimits the agreed international boundary between Jordan and Israel including territorial waters and airspace. This boundary is delimited with reference to the Mandate boundary and is shown on the maps attached to the agreement. The Agreement provides for some minor mutual border modifications which will enable Israeli farmers in the Arava to continue to cultivate their land.

  The Baqura Area and Zofar Area will fall under Jordanian sovereignty with Israeli private land use rights. These rights include unimpeded freedom of entry to, exit from and movement within the area. These areas are not subject to customs or immigration legislation. These rights will remain in force for 25 years and will be renewed automatically for the same period unless either country wishes to terminate the arrangement, in which case consultations will be taken.

  **Security**

  The two parties will refrain from any acts of belligerency or hostility, will ensure that no threats of violence against the other party originate from within their territory, and undertake to take necessary and effective measures to prevent acts of terrorism. They will also refrain from joining a coalition whose objectives includes military aggression against the other party. Israel and Jordan will abstain from
hostile propaganda and will repeal all discriminatory references and expressions of hostility in their respective legislation. The two countries will establish a Conference on security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME) which will be modeled after the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This is an ambitious attempt to replace the more classical view of security by substituting the old nations of deterrence and military preparedness with confidence building measures. In due time, confidence will lead to the establishment of mutual trust and institutions aimed at preventing war and enhancing cooperation.

\(<\) Water

Israel and Jordan have agreed on allocations of water from the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers and from Araba ground water. Israel has agreed to transfer to Jordan 50 million cubic meters of water annually from the northern part of the country. In addition the two countries have agreed to cooperate to alleviate the water shortage by developing existing and new water resources, by preventing contamination of water resources and by minimizing water wastage. (79)

\(<\) Freedom of Passage

Nationals from both countries and their vehicles will be permitted freedom of movement through open roads and border-crossings. Vessels from either country will have the right to passage through territorial waters, and will be granted access to ports. Negotiations are underway towards a Civil Aviation Agreement. The Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are considered international waterways, open to all nations for freedom of navigation and over flight.

\(<\) Places of Historical and Religious Significance
There will be freedom of access to the places of religious and historical significance. In accordance with the Washington Declaration, Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy Shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status, as detailed in the Declaration of Principles, will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these Shrines.

**Refugees and Displaced Persons**

The parties recognize the human problems caused by the conflict in the Middle East, and agree to alleviate them on a bilateral level and to try to resolve them through three channels.

- The quadripartite committee with Egypt and the Palestinians with regard to displaced persons.
- The Multilateral Working Group on Refugees.
- Negotiations in a framework to be agreed upon—bilateral or otherwise in conjunction with permanent status negotiation detailed in the Declaration of Principles.

**Normalization of Relations between Jordan and Israel.**

The peace treaty deals not only with an end to war, but also normalization. Various articles of the treaty deal with practical issues of normalization in such matters as culture and science, the war against crime and drugs, transportation and roads, postal services and telecommunication, tourism the environment, energy, health, agriculture, and the development of the Jordan Rift valley and the Aqaba /Eliat area.
Economic cooperation is seen as one of the pillars of peace, vital to the promotion of secure and harmonious relations between the two peoples. Diplomatic relations between Jordan and Israel were established on November 27, 1994, including the appointment of ambassadors and the opening of embassies.

Jordan and Israel will maintain good neighborly relations by cooperating in many spheres on joint projects. Among the projects are: Development of energy and water sources, protecting the natural environment, joint tourism development and the development of the Jordan Rift valley.

As a result of continuing negotiations over the last year, bilateral agreements have been signed between Jordan and Israel in the areas of tourism, environmental cooperation, trade, police cooperation and agriculture. 

**Relations with the USA**

In October 1991, following Jordan's acceptance of an invitation to attend the opening session of the Middle East peace conference in Madrid, President Bush announced the USA's intention to resume military aid to Jordan. In June 1992 the USA postponed a joint military exercise with Jordan in order to express its disapproval of the assistance that Jordan was allegedly providing to Iraq to enable it to circumvent the UN trade embargo and the USA proposed that UN observers should be dispatched to Jordan in order to suppress the smuggling of goods to Iraq. Jordan rejected the proposal outright as an infringement of its sovereignty. In August both the Jordanian Government and the House of Representatives condemned Western plans to establish an air exclusion zone in southern Iraq. In January 1993, King Hussein strongly criticized renewed air attacks on targets in
Iraq by Western air forces, but did not express support for the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein. King Hussein emphasized that Jordan would remain on friendly terms with the USA under the newly-elected Clinton administration. In June King Hussein visited the USA, where he held talks, for the first time with president Clinton. In late 1994, King Hussein visited the USA where he met President Clinton and the secretary of state, Warren Christopher. Their talks included discussions about the Arab-Israeli peace process and future USA arms sales to Jordan. In March, new tensions emerged with the USA over Jerusalem and over the U.S-led naval blockade of Jordan's only port at Aqaba. After the adoption of Resolution 904 by the UN Security Council on 18 March 1994, Jordan protested strongly about the U.S position on the status of Jerusalem. The USA abstained on two paragraphs in the preamble, in which East Jerusalem was referred to as part of the Occupied Territories. However, most King Hussein's fury over this reversal was directed towards PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat who was accused of mishandling the negotiations which preceded the adoption of the Resolution by failing to consult with Jordan on its wording. As part of King Hussein's improve relations with the USA, the King in March 1995 visited the USA and an agreement was signed by both countries for canceling $420 million of Jordan's outstanding debt. The USA made efforts to persuade Jordan to sever all of its economic links with Iraq, but these efforts were rejected. In January 1996, the US Secretary of Defense announced that the USA would supply Jordan with 12 F-16A and four F-16B fighter aircraft, and in late February President Clinton authorized the supply of military equipment worth $100 million as a grant to Jordan. After King Hussein visited Washington, DC, in March, the USA announced that military co-operation between the two countries would be expanded and in April, 34 US F-15 and F-16
fighter aircraft were stationed in Jordan for an indefinite period in order to undertake flights over southern Iraq. In June 1996 King Hussein was the first Arab leader to visit Washington, DC, after the right-wing Likud victory in the Israeli elections. Discussions focused on the Middle East peace process and on Jordan's strategic relationship with the USA. Soon after the King's visit another series of joint military manoeuvres were carried out in southern Jordan, and at the end of the month the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, visited Jordan to strengthen the military relationship between the two countries. In October, after violent clashes between Israelis and Palestinians following Israel's decisions to open a tunnel in Jerusalem close to Muslim holy places, President Clinton invited King Hussein, the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, and the new Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, to Washington in order to reduce tensions and it was agreed that direct talks would be resumed between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority on the redeployment of Israeli troops in Hebron. In November President Clinton announced that Jordan was being granted special military status, thus making the Kingdom eligible for increases in US military aid. In December Jordan received the first US $ 100 million installment of a $ 300 million package of military equipment as part as of a US commitment to help modernize the Jordanian armed forces. Joint exercises between Jordanian and US forces continued, and the first group of F-16 fighter aircraft, pledged under the rearmament agreement that had been signed with the USA at the end of 1996, arrived in December 1997; with the rest of the aircraft scheduled for delivery in early 1998. In October 1997 the US Government accorded Irbid in northern Jordan, where there were a number of Jordanian-Israeli joint ventures, the status of 'qualifying industrial Zon', there by allowing all goods exported from it duty-free
access to the US market. In November Jordan dispatched a high-level
delegation, headed by Jawad al-Anani, to the US sponsored Middle
East and North Africa economic conference in Doha, Qatar, while both
Egypt and Saudi Arabia decided to boycott the meeting, owing to Israeli
participation. Despite the close alliance with the US Government and
the suppression of pro-Iraqi demonstrations during the increased
tension between the USA and Iraq in early 1998, Jordan indicated that
it would not allow its territory or airspace to be used for an attack on
Iraq. In July 1998 King Hussein arrived in the USA for further cancer
treatment and remained there for almost six months. The King's
mediation at the US-brokered peace Summit, which took place between
Israel and the Palestinians at the Wye Plantation, Maryland, in
October, was crucial to the signing of the Wye River Memorandum. In
December, after renewed US and British air strikes against, Iraq the
Jordanian authorities allowed pro-Iraqi demonstrations by the public,
but ensured that they were contained and policed.

Relations with Arab States

Jordan since the end of the Gulf War has continued to distance
itself from Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq and has tried to improve
relations with the Gulf States. In November 1994, Jordan welcomed the
decision of Iraq to recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Kuwait. Jordan continued to favor the international rehabilitation of
Iraq, including the relaxation of UN sanctions. In June 1995 King
Hussein was openly critical of US policy towards Iraq. After a visit to
Amman later that month by Viktor Possovalyuk, the Russian Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs, both Jordan and Russia agreed to co-
operate to end UN sanctions against Iraq.
At the end of November 1993 King Hussein made his first official visit to Egypt since the Gulf crisis. Relations with Egypt had slowly improved after diplomatic efforts by the King who made an unofficial visit to Cairo in October 1992 to offer condolences just after the Egyptian capital suffered a serious earthquake. During a visit to Amman by the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs in October 1993 it was agreed to reconvene the Higher Jordanian-Egyptian Joint Committee which had not met since the Gulf crisis. In January 1995 President Mubarak of Egypt made his first official visit to Jordan since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and in February Jordan, together a summit meeting in Cairo, in an attempt to avert a breakdown in the peace process. In March the Higher Jordanian-Egyptian Joint Committee convened in Cairo, where it was agreed to co-ordinate the activities of the two countries.

Following visits by Crown Prince Hassan to Doha in late 1993 and by Sheikh Hamad bin Jaber ath-Thani, the Qatari Minister of foreign Affairs, to Amman at the beginning of 1994, normal relations between Jordan and Qatar were restored after being strained by Jordan’s support for Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. In March 1994 King Hussein made his first visit to Doha since the Gulf crisis. However, the normalization of relations with Qatar did not include the resumption of financial aid to Jordan from the Emirate. King Hussein also visited Oman, where discussions included the efforts by both countries to mediate between the two factions in Yemen, but visits to Bahrain and the UAE were cancelled.\(^{(83)}\)

In November 1994 a three-year programme of bilateral co-operation in educations, science and culture was agreed with Qatar, and in January 1995 King Hussein made a visit to Oman for talks with Sultan Qaboos. There were also signs of some improvement in
relations with Bahrain and the UAE. After the coup in Qatar in June 1995 in which Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa ath-Thani deposed his father, King Hussein offered his congratulations to the new Amir, who had been largely responsible for the policy of improving relations with Jordan. During the second half of 1995 relations with Yemen were also strengthened.

In 1994-1995 there was some improvement in relations with Kuwait, which had been severely strained since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A senior Jordanian diplomat visited Kuwait in September 1994, and it was later announced that the Jordanian embassy in Kuwait would reopen and that Kuwait had agreed to allow several thousand Jordanians who had been expelled in 1991 to return.

In late 1994 and 1995 relations with Saudi Arabia began to improve, tentative signs of rapprochement were evident in late 1994. In September co-operation on border issues resumed. A ban on granting residence permits to the dependants of all Jordanians and Palestinians working in Saudi Arabia, which had been imposed since the Gulf crisis, was partly revoked in March 1995, when residence permits were granted to the families of those Jordanians employed in 'vital position'. After a visit to Riyadh by the Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs in July there were signs that Saudi Arabia was ready to restore diplomatic representation with Jordan to ambassadorial level.

During the second half of 1997 there were indications that King Hussein wished to achieve an improvement in relations with Syria. Speaking at Irbid, a city in the north part of Jordan near the border of Syria, the King praised President Assad, but also urged the Syrian Government to reciprocate by ceasing to support some Jordanian opposition parties. For their part, the Jordanian authorities ordered the
head of the Syrian branch of the MB's information office in Amman to leave the country. (84)

Although relation with Syria appeared to improve during the early part of 1998, by the end of the year they had deteriorated again. In October Mustafa Tlass, the Syrian Minister of Defence, claimed that Jordan was 'Judaizing' its people, and accused the authorities there of having refused to allow army units from Saudi Arabia to assist Syria during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. On the Death of King Hussein in early February 1999, the Syrian Government immediately announced three days of official mourning and President Assad attended the King's funeral at the head of a high-level Syrian delegation.

Further evidence of an improvement in bilateral relations emerged when, in early May 1999, it was announced that Syria would supply Jordan with water, in order to ease Jordan's drought over the summer months. Syria began to supply the water in mid-May and was to continue for four months. Jordan and Syria also agreed to proceed with the long-standing Yarmouk dam project, and to seek financing jointly.

Breakdown in Relations with Iraq

In early August 1995 King Hussein granted political asylum to Hussain Kamel al-Majid, his brother Saddam Kamel and their wives after they fled from Baghdad to Amman. Hussein and Saddam Kamel had been senior figures in the Iraqi regime and were married to daughters of Saddam Hussain, the Iraqi leader. Their defection marked a sharp deterioration in relations between Jordan and Iraq. Hussain Kamel appealed for the removal of Saddam Hussain and spoke of his hopes of leading an Iraqi opposition movement to rescue Iraqis from their worsening plight. King Hussein delivered a speech in which he praised Hussain Kamel as a great patriot and strongly criticized the
Iraqi leader. In response, Iraq denounced Hussain Kamel as a traitor and a US agent, but carefully avoided attacks on King Hussein. Despite the political rupture, economic co-operation continued, with Iraq remaining Jordan's main source of oil supplies. Jordan continued to provide Iraq with a vitally important link with the outside world. In October King Hussein renewed his attack on the Iraqi regime, denouncing the presidential elections in Iraq as a farce. He also established contact with Iraqi opposition groups in London United Kingdom, and promoted the idea of holding congress in Amman to bring the different factions together in order to discuss political change in Iraq. However, the proposed congress drew criticism, especially from Syria, and the idea was abandoned. His support for Hussain Kamel was short-lived. It quickly became clear that Kamel had few supporters in Iraq, while his appeals to the Iraqi opposition— in exile were firmly rejected. By the end of 1995 his presence in Jordan had become something of an embarrassment. When Hussain Kamel and his brother decided to return to Iraq in February 1996, after Iraq announced that they had been pardoned. Nevertheless, the brutal murder of the two men by order of Saddam Hussain only days after their return was strongly condemned by Jordan.

In April 1996, after US aircraft were stationed at Azraq to enforce the air exclusion zone in southern Iraq, the Jordanian Government insisted that it would not permit the country to be used as a base for attacks against Iraq. King Hussein met with Iraqi opposition leaders in London, United Kingdom, in March 1996 and gave permission for the Iraqi National Accord (INA) to open an office in Amman. In March there was another high-level defection from Iraq when Gen. Nizar Kazraji, a former Chief of staff of the Iraqi army, arrived in Jordan and associated himself with the INA. In late March, amid speculation that Iraqi agents
operating in Jordan might be seeking to target Jordanians, the first explosion of an Iraqi diplomat from Jordan occurred. In retaliation, Iraq expelled a Jordanian diplomat.

Jordan’s new policy towards Iraq caused disquiet in Egypt and Syria, which feared that it could lead to a new, US-backed strategic reorientation in the region. The Egyptian and Syrian press accused King Hussein of pursuing his own ambitions in Iraq. The King had talks with President Mubarak of Egypt in Washington, DC, at the end of September 1995 during the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and in late December President Mubarak visited Amman. At the end of his visit to Jordan the two leaders issued a joint statement in which they emphasized the need to ensure the unity of Iraq and to allow the Iraqi people to decide their own future.

The tense relations that had existed with Iraq since August 1995, improved slightly in December 1996, when the Iraqi Ministers of Trade and Foreign Affairs held talks in Amman with senior Jordanian officials, marking a resumption in high-level contacts between the two countries. The invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan by Saddam Hussain forces in August 1996, and the destruction of the Iraqi opposition based there, may have convinced the King that an early removal of the Iraqi leader was extremely unlikely. The Jordanian Government deliberately refrained from commenting on the Iraqi invasion, but voiced concern over the US missile attack against Iraq. The Jordanian National Assembly, in contrast, strongly condemned the American action. The Iraqi National Accord (INA) was allowed to keep its office in Amman, despite reports that the group had been infiltrated by Iraqi agent, but the Jordanian Government repeatedly asserted that Jordan would not be used as a base for operations against the Iraqi regime.
In December 1997 relations between the two countries once again became strained, after the Iraqi authorities executed four Jordanian nationals who had been convicted of smuggling offences. King Hussein condemned the executions, expelled a number of Iraqi diplomats from Amman, and recalled the Jordanian charge affairs from Baghdad. In an attempt to improve relations, Iraq announced that it would commute the death sentence of a fifth Jordanian convicted of smuggling and release a number of Jordanian held in Iraqi prisons. The Killing of Iraq's charge affairs in Amman in January 1998 prompted rumours that Iraqi government agents may have been responsible. In May, however, the Jordanian Minister of the Interior announced that a number of Jordanian nationals had been arrested in connection with the Killing, which, had not been politically motivated and did not involve 'neighboring countries'. Despite Jordan's close alliance with the US Government, the authorities indicated that they would not allow Jordanian territory or airspace to be used for air strikes against Iraq, but they urged the Iraqi Government to comply with all UN resolutions and allow UN weapons inspectors access to all suspect sites. Jordanian support for the Arab League's efforts to resolve the crisis by diplomatic means contributed to an improvement in relations with some other Arab states, notably Egypt. Although relations with Iraq remained uneasy, economic co-operation continued, and in February 1998 the two countries renewed the 1991 oil agreement. In December 1998, public demonstrations were allowed in protest at US and British air strikes against Iraq. The Jordanian Government also strongly condemned the attacks. In December 1998, an emergency meeting of the Arab Parliamentary Union was held in Amman at which Crown Prince Hassan, called for the lifting of sanctions against Iraq. However, comments made by Crown Prince Hassan regarding the need for
greater democracy in Iraq, and his demands for the release of all Kuwaiti prisoners of war held there angered the Iraqi delegation.

Jordan River Dispute

The struggle for fresh water in the Middle East was a primary cause of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and has contributed to other military disputes in the region. Like other conflicts that revolve around scarce environmental resources, there are ways to determine the likehood of water issues escalating into a large-scale multi-national conflict. The probability that the degree of scarcity of water to a region, the need of several nations to share one fresh water source, the military or economic power of the state that controls the water, and existence of other fresh water sources aids the ability to predict the causes and possible solutions for these conflicts. Perhaps the clearest example of a region where fresh water supplies have had strategic implications is the Middle East.\(^{87}\)

The Jordan River originates in the mountains of eastern Lebanon. As the Jordan River flows south through the enterance to the Great Syrian Rift Valley, it is fed from underground sources and small streams at various points in Jordan, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. The Jordan's main sources are the Hasbani River, which flows from Lebanon to Israel, the Banyas River, which flows from Syria to Israel, the Dan River, which begins and flows inside Israel, and the Yarmouk River, which begins near the Golan Heights and flows to the Jordan River. Following its flow into 'Lake of Galilee' the Jordan River continues southward into the center of the Jordan Valley, forming the border between the western edge of Jordan and eastern side of Israel including part of the Palestinian Autonomy. The Jordan continues
flowing into the Dead Sea, and then through a smaller stream it flows eventually into the Red Sea.\(^{(88)}\)

It is important to emphasize that the Jordan River, inspite of its relative large size in Israel, is actually a small river in international terms. The Jordan flows in a narrow valley. Its average width is about 1200 meters, and sometimes it limit itself into 500 meters only.\(^{(89)}\) The lower part of the river between Lake of Galilee and the Dead Sea is very curved. While the air distance between Lake of Galilee and the Dead Sea is 105 km, the flow distance is 220 km.\(^{(90)}\)

The Middle East region is known for the fact that it is extremely arid. The scarcity of water is connected to meteorologic, geographic and demographic factors. Throughout most of the Middle East region rainfall is irregular. The rainy season is short, between 6-8 months a year, and rainfall varies between 250-400 mm annually, which is insufficient for basic agriculture which requires at least 400 mm of regular rainfall. Irrigated agriculture is further restricted because there are only few major rivers in the Middle East- the Jordan River and the Nile among further more, there is the issue of the vastly expanding population in the Middle East. This population growth stems from two sources, in Jordan the population increase is due to the birthrate and in Israel the large waves of immigrants in recent year have increased the population.\(^{(91)}\) According to recent statistics, the population of Jordan is predicted to be 6.5 (millions) in 2010. The population of Israel (including the West Bank and Gaza) suppose to grow into 10.9 (millions) in the year of 2010.\(^{(92)}\)

The Jordan River supplies Israel and Jordan with the vast majority of their water. Some hydrologists have identified 1000 cubic meters per person per year as a minimum water requirement for an
efficient moderately industrialized nation. Inside Israel's border, the availability of water per-capita in 1990 was 740 cubic meters.\(^{(93)}\) It is estimated that by the year 2025 this availability will be reduced to 310 cubic meters. As such, over 50 percent of Israel's water sources rely on rain which falls outside of the Israeli border. Israel depends on water supply which either comes from rivers that originates outside the border, or from disputed lands.

For the Kingdom of Jordan, the Jordan River supplies about 75 percent of its need.\(^{(94)}\) In contrast to Israel, only 36 percent of the river flow originates outside the Jordanian border. However, in terms of water availability for the year of 1990, Jordan had only 260 cubic meters per capita, which is almost \(\frac{1}{4}\) less than the minimum water requirement for an industrial nation. Moreover, by the year 2025 it is estimated that Jordan will only have 80 cubic meters per capita per year.\(^{(95)}\)

Jordan and Israel are highly dependent upon the Jordan River. Jordan, however, is facing another environmental problem which increases the state's dependency on the water of the Jordan River. The main rivers in Jordan are the Jordan, the Yarmouk, and the Zarqa. While the water quality of the Jordan and the Yarmouk River considered to be good, the Zarqa River, flowing entirely within Jordan's borders, faces a pollution crisis that prohibit both access and the use of its water.

The need for water and the continuing hostility between Israel and the surrounding Arab States has placed the Jordan River as a central bargaining chip since Israel's establishment in 1948. The Israeli War of Independence was rooted in the fact that the Arab countries considered the state of Israel to be illegitimate. Connected to these declarations, the Arab states have persistently denounced the unilateral diversion of the Jordan River as completely illegal. The Israeli response
has been that the surrounding Arab nations were never willing to let Israel exist in peace. These historical disagreements interwine with the dispute between Israel and Jordan in which the Jordan River plays a main role.

In order to understand the core of the conflict between Israel and Jordan around the Jordan River, it is important to note the different perceptions of water between the two countries. Jordan, as part of the Arab world, perceived the water problem as part of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, for Jordanian, water was always a matter of an Arab national pride. For Israel, water seemed to be an integral part of territory and a necessary resource for development.

As the population of Israel grew, the reliance on the Jordan River grew to over 50 percent of their water wage. In the early 50's Israel created a National Water Carrier to transport water from the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee to the Negev desert. These new waterways permitted cultivation of additional desert land. However, in the eyes of Arab nations in the 1950's, the National Water Carrier became a symbol of Israel's aggressive expansionism. In reaction, in 1955 Syrian artillery units opened fire on the Israeli construction team. In an attempt to settle the water dispute, American President Eisenhower appointed Eric Johnston as mediator. Negotiations between Arab States and Israel on regional water-sharing agreement continued for more than two years with no actual success beyond a cease-fire.

Following more than 10 year of silent tensions, the conflict flared again. The Syrian government, inside its borders, attempted to divert the Banyas River which is one of the Jordan River's tributaries. This was following by three Israeli army and air force attacks on the site of the diversion. These incidents regarding water issues led up to the outbreak of the Six-Day war in June 1967 between Israel against Syria,
Jordan, and Egypt. During the war, Israel captured the Golan Heights and the site of the Banyas headwaters, which enabled Israel to prevent the diversion of the Banyas by the Syrians. Israel also gained control of the West Bank, the Jordan River as well as the northern bank of the Yarmouk.\(^{(99)}\)

In the year following the Six-Day War, Israel increased its water use from the Jordan River by 33 percent.\(^{(100)}\) Jordan, on the other hand, lost to significant access water from the Jordan River. The Jordanian's plans to expand usage of the river and its canal system had to be terminated by the outcome of the war. Following the war, a large percentage of the sources of the Jordan River were controlled by Israel. In addition, Palestinians also took control over large sectors of the Jordan valley that held this source water.\(^{(101)}\)

For Israel, the West Bank valley became a key water source because of its underground flow of water and wells. In order to provide water to north and central parts of the country, Israel depends on the water that comes from the Golan Heights as well as this area. These water sources are key elements in Israel's strategy to hold onto the West Bank and the Golan Heights.\(^{(102)}\)

In the past twenty-five years, Israel and Jordan have searched for alternatives to maximize the use of water. For Jordan, the main projects were the rehabilitation of the East Gohr Canal, the repair of the Yarmouk main canal tunnel, and the constructions of the rockfill dam on the Zarqa River-the King Talal dam. The economic benefits of these projects are enormous in terms of agricultural production and water supply to the region. About 36 new town and villages have been built in the area and the agricultural productivity has greatly increased. It is important to note
that the Yarmouk Project required a mutual understanding with Israel, which has rights to the Jordan-Yarmouk waters.\(^{103}\)

Israel, has recently sought solutions to its water problems by applying advanced technology and environmental research to its efforts by bring water to the entire country. Large amounts of financial resources have been dedicated to find ways to increase efficiency of water usage. One remarkable breakthrough was the Israeli refined drip irrigation system, which delivers water directly to the root of the plant. The use of cloud seeding has also aided conservation efforts. Another plan was to use mediterranean water, which required a process of desalination. Desalination involves removing the impurities from seawater by using either heat or pressure.\(^{104}\)

Each country developed independent alternatives in order to provide fresh water to their people, but this very expensive. It became clear to Israel and to Jordan that any solution they developed would be only a temporary answer to the water problems. In the beginning of the 1990s, water for both countries became an object for cooperation.\(^{105}\)

In addition to the need for cooperation around water, both Israel and Jordan have come to realize that water is an object that needs protection.\(^{106}\) However, this time it was not a protection from the enemy, but from pollution and other environmental disasters. Nevertheless, the two countries posses a different standard of living, which allows a different approach to the problem, Israel as a first world country, may concern itself with environmental issues and seek solution, while Jordan, as a developing country, does not have the ability to deal with such problem.\(^{107}\) As part of their new approach towards cooperation, Israel and Jordan to seek a peace settlement,
which would include water agreements and would take into consideration the relative economic ability of each country.

On October 26, 1994, the Prime Ministers of Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty. This peace agreement put an end to the state of war which had lasted for almost 50 years between the two countries. Some specific articles of the agreement deal with the Jordan River. Israel and Jordan agreed to share the river. Both countries will create storage facilities to hold excess water from rain floods as well as build dams for river flow management. The parties agreed to provide water to one another. In terms of environmental conservation, Jordan and Israel are obligated to protect the river from pollution, contamination, or industrial disposal. Furthermore, according to the treaty, the countries will establish a joint water committee to oversee issues regarding the quality of the water.\(^{(108)}\)

In these ways the 1994 agreement is doubly powerful in terms of water saving and environment protection as it ensures the supply of quality fresh water to both parties. According to Israeli news in 1997, Israel is ready to transfer 75 million cubic meters of high quality water to Jordan within the next three years. However, this treaty is only the beginning of a wider regional agreement which will need to include Syria and Lebanon. These countries, which are still in a state of war with Israel, struggle for the control over the Hasbani River and the Golan Heights rivers that are part of the tributaries to the Jordan River.

**Death of King Hussein**

In July 1998 King Hussein began to undergo treatment in the USA for lymphatic cancer. In August the King issued a royal decree, which transferred responsibility for certain executive duties, including the appointment of ministers, to his brother, Crown Prince Hassan. On King Hussein's return to Jordan on 19 January 1999, amid considerable
public celebration and government assurances that his death had been restored, the King prompted renewed speculation about the royal succession by appointing Crown Prince Hassan as his ‘deputy’. On 24 January King Hussein issued a royal decree naming his eldest son, Abdullah, as Crown Prince of Jordan. Some sections of the US press suggested that the Clinton administration had encouraged the replacement of Hassan as Crown Prince, owing to his perceived hostility towards the Palestinian negotiators and willingness to ally himself to the extremist Muslim Brotherhood.

On 26 January 1999 King Hussein left Jordan for emergency treatment in the USA, following a rapid deterioration in his health. However, King Hussein returned to Amman on 5 February, and was pronounced dead on 7 February. The Jordanian public had been given little accurate information about the King’s condition by the official media, and were genuinely shocked by the news of his death. King Hussein had been the Middle East’s longest-serving ruler, controlling the fortunes of Jordan for the greater part of its modern history. The funeral of King Hussein, held in Amman on 8 February, was attended by more than 50 heads of state or government, including US President Clinton (accompanied by three former US Presidents), the Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, and Syria’s President Hafez Assad.  

**King Abdullah takes Control**

A few hours after King Hussein’s death, on 7 February 1999 the Newly-appointed Crown Prince was sworn in as King Abdullah Ibn al-Hussein of Jordan. After formal education in the United Kingdom and the USA, Abdullah had embarked on a distinguished military career, becoming Commander of Special Forces with the rank of major general. Abdullah is reported to have good relations with younger members of the ruling families of the Gulf States, as well as useful contacts within the US political establishment. Soon after his father’s
death, the new King made a televised address to the nation, appealing for Jordanian unity and pledging to continue his father's policies. He subsequently named his brother, and the youngest son of King Hussein, Prince Hamzeh Ibn al-Hussein, as the new Crown Prince of Jordan in accordance with the wishes of the Late King Hussein.

Before the official 40-day period of mourning for King Hussein had ended, the new King made a number of Key changes at the Royal Palace and in the military high command and also appointed a new Government. On 21 March King Abdullah issued a royal decree naming his wife, Rania, the Queen of Jordan.\(^{110}\)

On 4 March 1999 King Abdullah appointed a new 24-member Cabinet, with Abd ar- Rouf ar-Rawabdeh replacing Fayez at-Tarawneh as Prime Minister. Ar-Rawabdeh's Cabinet contained eight Minister from the outgoing administration, including the three Key portfolios of the interior, finance and foreign affairs. In his letter of appointment to the new Prime Minister, King Abdullah prescribed 'fundamental reforms', including the strengthening of the rule of law and further democratization; he also called on ar-Rawabdeh to address the serious problems of poverty and unemployment in Jordan, and to encourage investment. In his policy statement to the National Assembly, ar-Rawabdeh acknowledged that Jordan had entered a period of recession, and stated that his aim was to accelerate the implementation of economic reforms and to eradicate corrupt practices.

After his accession, King Abdullah immediately made efforts to strengthen relations with the Arab world as well as relations with the USA and Western Countries. King Abdullah also assured Israel that he was committed his father's support for the Middle East peace process.
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