MAIN FEATURES AND DETERMINING FACTORS OF
IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

Iran's foreign policy during Mohd Reza Shah was based mainly on preservation of sovereignty and integrity of the country followed by economic interest. During this time Iran was heavily indebted to the States of America and certain European countries. The oil crisis Shah had to go into exile for some time in view of demonstrations, strikes and heavy criticism. Majority of population had turned against him on oil issue. Despite repeated pleadings he did not give his consent for nationalization of oil industry as he believed that oil industry was "still" dependent on foreign engineers and technicians. He felt that it was not possible to run the oil industry without foreign engineers and personnel. This antagonized many of Irania which created some such circumstance in which he was forced to go in exile. Immediately after the nationalization of oil industry European boycotted the export of oil and in the absence of oil exports, Iran had to "hide" in America with the help of CIA made attempt and succeeded in seeking the cooperation of clergy and got the Pahlavis reinstated. The reinstatement of the Shah opened a new chapter in the history of Iran's
relations with the US. Shah being an European educated and having been influenced on the Western education, scientific and technological advancement at Europe, pledged to modernize Iran and its line of industrialized nations of the world. Accordingly, he sought the cooperation of United States of America and other powerful European countries to carry on his plan. A large number of scientists, engineers and planners were united to build a modern industrial order. They were accorded special treatment, extra benefits and all other facilities. The indigenous work force and others in the same fields were either deprived of the facilities and immunities or the were less paid. In order to appease the United States of America, Iran granted many concessions to America and supplied oil not only to America but its allies specially Israel. Villages and towns near export were recycled in the share of payment of large number of well imported by Iran. Slowly and gradually people realized how Iranian wealth was being exploited by America and they launched mass demonstrations. As the ill consentment and demonstration against the Shah stepped up in Iran Shah's military, police and intelligence made it tightened and used stronger
measures to stamp out the demonstrations and agitations etc.

As the opposition increased, the repressive measures also increased and this resulted into the ouster or elimination of the Shah and installation of a new system of government.

The Shah during this period shrewdly devised the foreign policy though it was basically inclined towards America. A strong European nation but at the same time was directed to maintain good relations with the countries of Eastern bloc.

There was, no doubt, a tilt towards America and other powerful European countries but he was shrewd enough to maintain good relations with USSR and other countries.

After the establishment of Islamic Republic of Iran on 1st April 1979, a clear change is discernible in the foreign policy of Iran. Before going into the detail of foreign policy of Iran, it is imperative to look into the constitution of Iran finding out the constitutional basis of the foreign policy. As explained in the constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran, the government of Iran is Islamic Republic. In the first Principle of Article of the constitution the concept of Islamic Republic has been explained as understood in Shiaism. The government of Iran claims that the sovereign of Islam who is the law
giver and law-maker. These laws are to be interpreted only by the ulema. In case of there is paucity of a clear-cut divine guidance in any respect new law can be formulated but these laws require clear approval of the ulema before the implementation. The Council of Guardian and Vilayat-e-Faqih stands above the Islamic Republic of Iran. The concept of Vilayat-e-Faqih is a "free concept of Islamic polity. The ruling Vilayat-e-Faqih enjoys arbitrary powers even the popular sovereignty and it in the Parliament is subject to the approval of Vilayat-e-Faqih. This limits the powers of the Parliament (Majlis) to formulate laws. Hence Vilayat-e-Faqih and the Council of Guardians go through and give approval to or test the compatibility of every legislations on Islamic principle. The Vilayat-e-Faqih also enjoys wide discretion in interpretation and applicability of Islamic sources. This curtailment of Parliament's power has come into display in the shape of disapproval of land reform and nationalization of foreign trade which were adjudged incompatible with the Islamic safeguards of private property.

Khomeini stood for a just world order and to him only the Islamic world order had been about justice. And just
Islamic world order would have been established through such a faqih-led Islamic republic as of Iran. It seems that the concept of the Ilavat-e-Faqih (leadership of the jurisprudent) was the outgrowth of Khomeini's political thought. As per old tradition the leadership of the Shia community belongs to God to the prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and to the infallible Imams (Masumins), but the credit of extending it to the faqih, to whom belongs temporal as well as spiritual authorities to Ayatollah Khomeini. Time and again Khomeini emphasized that Islam stands for bringing about justice to the entire world. He reiterated "Islam is not new one to a country, several countries, a group of people or countries or even the Muslims". He further elaborated "Islam wishes to bring all of humanity under the umbrella of its justice".

An Islamic state, in fact, be considered a state that commands the overwhelming loyalty of its people as an Islamic state. Iran being an Islamic state commands the overwhelming loyalty of its people. The government

established in Iran has the overwhelming endorsement of Ummah in Iran as an Islamic state. The other pre-conditions for the Islamic state is whether the state has positively and consciously set out to be an instrument of Allah as expressed in the Quran and in the Sunnah of Prophet Mohammad (P.B.H.). Under the leadership of the Imam the state and its authority set out positively and consciously to establish Islam according the Quran and Sunnah. The third condition is whether or not the state explicitly, both by word and deed seeks to establish Islam within its boundaries. Iran no doubt seeks to do so. Fourthly, whether a state is concern with all Muslims irrespective of geography and divisions along political, ethnic, sectarian class and boundaries that have been created within the Ummah during the recent history. Regarding this one feels that there can be no doubt that if we make the correct distinction between foreign policy and foreign relations, Iran has the long term intention of unifying the Ummah under the authority of Allah. Fifth, whether state embodies a clear vision of contemporary world situation irrespective of short term considerations. In this context there is no doubt that the leadership of Imam clearly manifested that the
state of Iran at that time and thereafter has a clear world view on this issue. Lastly whether state arouses fierce hostility among the traditional enemy of Islam (including the Muslim nation states). In this context we find that the whole world, including the so-called world of Islam, ruled over by nationalist secular leaders, is so fiercely hostile to state of Islam that such hostility has not been labelled throughout history against any other single state. The entire secular international system by and large is opposed to the Islamic state.

During Shah's regime, Iran was bracketed with the Western camp along with other Arab Gulf States. Any dispute among these states was considered a matter within the family. However, Mohd. Reza Shah's downfall brought about a change in the situation. Had Iranian revolutionaries been confined to the overthrowing of the Shah, America could have put up with the situation, but the Iranian revolutionaries went beyond that. In their endeavours of revolution they included the programme of eliminating all American influence from their society and gave calls for Islamic self-reliance and self-sufficiency in the region. The United States being the dominant power in the area took
exceptions to it. It became clear after some time that there was inherent conflict of interests between Washington and Tehran and each tried to gain at the expense of other. This brought the superpower and a rising regional power locked into a conflict. Washington took revolutionary Islam a growing danger and alleged Iran of pursuing expansionist policies under the guise of Islam. Washington found itself in a fix how to tackle this threat to its military and economic interest in the region. It was a major dilemma before the U.S. Though earlier United States had been on the side of religion and religious movements, U.S. considered it to be a powerful tool against Marxist forces. In the case of Iran though it was a religious movement but directed against the U.S. with armoury and ammunition. Though the Iranian religious movement was not a leftist in disguise as it was opposing Marxists at home and the Soviet Union abroad but the U.S. government, discredited it as a leftist in disguise. While looking into the factors determining the foreign policy of Iran since revolution three factors appear to have had an important bearing.

Pan-Islamism-In this respect Pan-Islamism has greatly influenced the foreign policy in Iran being an Islamic state
rather than a state motivated by patriotism, nationalism or secularism motives. These elements assumed secondary importance in Iran. After the proclamation of Islamic Republic and the outbreak of war with Iraq, in September 1980, Iranian leaders made no secret of it and clearly depicted the conflict as between Islam and blasphemy. The west tried to give it a colour of a conflict between Arabs and non-Arabs, Shia and Sunni. However, the Iranian leaders adopted a unified approach and President Khamenei observed,

"If expressions of nationalism are intended, to create barriers between Muslims, cause separations among them and threaten their fraternity, then this is 100 percent forbidden. There are no Arabs and non-Arabs in Islam."

It was apparent that Iran’s claim to such a role and its self assumed exclusive right to judge the credentials of its neighbours alarmed the neighbouring state in the Gulf. It created strains between Iran and the Gulf States. It was also a reflection on the heads of the government of Gulf States. Iran also sought to undermine the leaders politically for not being hostile towards Israel and being over dependant on the United States. Throughout 1979-80 Arab

countries felt threatened and it caused much concern among the Gulf States. Saudi Arabia, though, has always emphasized its religious credentials as an integral aspect of its dynasty's legitimacy but it also felt greatly threatened. On the contrary Gulf States took Iran not as an Islamic Iran and its people as Persians and traditional rivals of the Arabs. Iraq also took it as a sort of revolutionary threat to the Arab World and Arab nationalism as a doctrine.

Anti-Americanism-Tide was contributed not only by the masses but the leaders were also no less outspoken in this regard and the Iranian leaders sought to capitalise on anti-American sentiments. Hashemi-Rafsanjani attributed the American involvement in the Iran-Iraq war with a new chapter in the heroic epic of the revolution.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani observed:

"If we had won the war last year, everyone would have said that a 50 million strong country was victorious over a 14 million strong country. But if we win this year, everyone will know that we are victorious over the United States".

It was in early October 1988 that half a million

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3. Ibid., P.218.
volunteers were prepared in Iran for martyrdom-seeking operations to resist the United States in the Gulf. Anti-American feeling was at its highest pitch on Nov.4, 1986 on the occasion of the anniversary of the seizure of the U.S. embassy. There were massive anti-U.S. demonstrations and the size and vigour of the demonstrations were unprecedented which were never seen before. Anti-American feeling continued to be a useful tool in the hands of the Iranian rulers.

Rafsanjani further reiterated:

"So long as we were arrayed against Iraq and others like her our nation did not feel the need for sacrifice too much. Since the day the Americans came the people are bringing so much pressure-pressure that we must expand the war-mobilize forces to use all our capabilities for the war. [Thus] we managed to strengthen the backing for the war.

Leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini—After the proclamation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini occupied the position of a vice -premier, the ilamat-e-Faqih. This entitled him of taking critical decisions in the country. Khomeini made firm decisions such as to keep the American

4. Ibid., P.219.
diplomats hostage or persist in a devastating war with Iraq.

His decision was in absolute binding on his government regardless of any Iranian reservations any officials were holding. Khomeini also supported the decisions made by his governments. Khomeini did not allow an individual or faction to gain prominence within his government. Moreover, he intervened in favour of leaders, factions who were loyal to the regime and who appeared to be loosing the control in the regime. His unpreparedness to exercise close direction of a policy — to permit any of his lieutenants, to exercise that direction for him was considered to be an important consequence in terms of factional development. However, Khomeini himself advocated the freedom of expression and this was reiterated by his designated successor Ayatollah Khamenei. There arose a point of difference over the question relating to requisite military regarding ideological Islamic purpose. There was perfect agreement on the export of revolution, however, on the point of whether force should be used to export revolution or not had difference of opinion. In this respect there were difference in receptivity to requests of non-Iranian leaders, for material, diplomatic, even clandestine military.
support to advance revolution elsewhere. In the field of foreign policy strategy, lack of central direction was evident. Foreign officials, individual ambassadors and others felt free on many occasions to act in the name of Iran. They sometime generated institutional support for their endeavours. Under these circumstances there was uncertainty in respect of Iran's actual policy. The position of Ayatollah Khomeini is clearly discernible from the confirmation hearings for nominees for cabinet. The selection of nominees should have had the tacit approval of Ayatollah Khomeini, though in some cases there was also rejection of the government nominees despite the fact that Khomeini himself had approved of it. This was most anomalous feature of this authoritarian regime. Khomeini did not permit a faction to triumph. This is evident from several statements of Khomeini given in December 1987 and January 1988. These statements revealed that he was moving in the direction of those who stood for a strong governmental role in social reform and greater equality in income distribution. An important institution like the Council of Guardians was dominated by conservatives. It, therefore, rejected many reformist measures. Though it was rebuked and its veto position was also greatly damaged, Khomeini did not
only rebuke it but also criticised the president of Islamic Republic Ali Khamenei. Despite of all these things, Khomeini’s towering position commanded infallible wisdom among all his lieutenants. His command was final. During Iran-Iraq war Iranian President Ali Khamenei in 1986 warned Kuwait by addressing it as “our friend” not to allow Iraq to use Bubiyan island for military purposes and threatened to invade it in case of non-compliance. Though Iran did not invade and continued its endeavours to improve relations with Kuwait. It was in 1984 that greater coherence in foreign affairs could be developed in Iran. The hijacking of an Air France jet to Tehran in August 1984 triggered a bitter internal debate over how to react. Decision was taken against the hijackers. Khomeini however, denied any Iranian involvement in the incident. He further criticised the state radio for suggesting that Iran planted mines in the Red Sea. In 1984 Khomeini took an important decision regarding foreign relations where he ended the debate by approving diplomatic relations with South Africa and United States etc., with the exception of Israel. Khomeini advocated the independence above all and complete end of any dependence on the United States. In his view a pure Islam will protect the
country and Iran's independence will keep Islam pure. He reiterated the elimination of foreign debts and sought to seek economic self-sufficiency. Following his line Prime Minister Mussavi in Aug. 1986 said that Iran will not borrow and fall into the "ass" of dependence. Iranian rulers wanted Iran to be treated as a model and be able to exercise great influence in the region. However, the first priority was political and economic independence at home to be followed later by the dominion abroad. In February 1979 Khomeini emphasized that the second principle is intrinsic to the first i.e. the dominant requirement is to safeguard the Islamic Republic.

Role of clergy - The short-lived constitutional government established by the revolutionaries in 1906 proved itself politically powerless - in 1925 the military regime of Paza Khan, who rose to power in 1921, was transformed into an absolute monarchy. Official rationalist culture that emerged then was urban oriented, officially mono-lingual, anti-clerical, cultivating a pre-Islamic cultural heritage and Western-oriented.

By the mid-twentieth century the modern class of la intellectuals had come of age, taking for granted the social
and cultural changes: their counterparts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had so vigorously fought for, enjoying the fruit of the seeds planted by the latter, secular nationalism, which was still raw and unpalatable since as yet unfamiliar to the tradition-bound illiterate masses, often these intellectuals were better versed in modern scientific disciplines and ideas than in traditional Islamic thought. Many were ignorant or poorly informed of the abuse of clerical power and religious tolerance that Iranian thinkers in pre-modern times had to encounter periodically.

The spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, the supreme leader was of course a cleric; clerics control the chief offices of the state. This transformation of the political elite is far more extensive than the transformation that occurred when Reza Shah Pahlavi, the father of Mohd. Reza Shah Pahlavi’s father, seized and consolidated power between 1921 and 1926. The new political and bureaucratic elite are among the major material beneficiaries of the revolution, and despite a great deal of talk in Iran today about inviting the evils of making use of the more acceptable men of talent and expertise of the old regime, it is clear
that without another upheaval this change in political elites is now permanent and, for the time being, irreversible. Western labels like "moderate" and "radicals" may not adequately define tendencies within the regime, but they are not completely irrelevant, either. Moderates have a more traditional interpretation of Islam and emphasize its sanctioning of private property. They favor a limited government role in the economy and, unlike the radicals, are willing on occasion to cooperate with certain secular groups.

In foreign affairs, moderates favor a more pragmatic and open approach to the outside world and are less adamant about exporting revolution. They are more suspicious of the Soviet Union, and they favor closer relations with the West not because of pro-Western sympathies but in the context of a non-aligned foreign policy. In sum, their pragmatism fortuitously has a warming cast. For example, Foreign Minister Ali Akber Velayati has often said that if Iran is

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not present on the world scene. Important issues will be decided without it. In November 1981 he therefore called for Iran to have diplomatic relations with all countries. Velayati rejected recommendations by a number of so-called friends that the Islamic republic should ignore Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

The radicals, by contrast, support a more revolutionary interpretation of Islam. In foreign affairs they favour export of revolution and have a much more benign view of the Soviet Union than do the moderates. The Prime Minister Mir Hussein Mousavi, asked by an Iranian reporter why the government is less harsh in its criticism of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc countries than of the West, replied, "We did not sustain as much damage from them as we sustained from the U.S. in the last fifty years."

The radicals attack any sign of pragmatism in Iranian foreign policy even though, in the face of harsh economic realities, Khomeini himself seems to favour ending Iran's international isolation. The radicals are particularly...

paranoid about any possibility of normalizing U.S.-Iranian relations.

The difference in outlook between moderates and radicals clearly lies within the two major policies - those of the economy and those of the war with Iraq. The closest policy differences have been in the economy, with the radicals calling for nationalization of foreign trade and foreign enterprises, and increasing government control of the private sector. All of this was successful in getting their way. The economy was nationalized, and managers were put in charge of the factories which survived the post-revolution nationalization programme. The radicals have also been the main force behind the programme of economic retaliation which began at the start of the Gulf War. The moderates, while being no laissez-faire capitalists, are in favour of encouraging the private sector and providing loans to private companies. The moderate best known to the West, Rafsanjani, is in fact quite radical on economic policy.

The most sensitive issue was the war with Iraq.
Publicly almost all the leaders support the war effort and scorn at the idea of holding peace talks. Yet serious differences exist between the radical and other factions as to the conditions under which an end to the war would be possible. The moderates realise that the majority of the population is war-weary and would like to see a settlement. If they can pull one off, it would certainly be in their interest; this would form part of the understanding between themselves and the public. But the timing and conditions for such a settlement are crucial. Neither the moderates nor the radicals can contemplate negotiating with Saddam Hussein, but the former may be prepared to talk to a Baathist government without Iran's revolution is marked by the need to justify its ideology to its own people. As such, the Iranian leaders have to show that their Islamic system is the best form of government and that it is universally applicable.

For the radicals, this has meant an active policy of exporting the revolution, by financing and even directing terrorist organisations abroad. These organisations are most active in Lebanon but they operate too in Afghanistan and in Europe. Broadly speaking, the moderates are in favour of a
less active policy, preferring Iran to remain as only an example or inspiration to sympathetic groups outside the country. They have worked towards improving relations with Europe. Visits by high-ranking Iranian officials to European capitals, as well as the West German foreign minister's visit to Tehran, have been the direct outcome of their policy. The moderates, however, are being reluctant to extend such goodwill to the US, although last year they were obliged to in the case of the arms deal with the US.

Within the country, the radicals who are most closely associated with Iran's procurement policy. The decision to buy arms from the US was not taken without the approval of Ayatollah Khomeini. The moderates would have been obliged to go along with the policy, despite their reservations.

In an orchestrated attempt embarrass the radicals involved, the moderates arranged for Dr. Velavati, the foreign minister and himself a leading moderate, to be questioned by the Majlis on the issue of exactly who brought the arms and who was most closely involved with the Americans. But Ayatollah Khomeini took the unprecedented step of relieving the foreign minister of his duty.
respond. This action - defence of the radicals thwarted the attempt to reveal their connection with the US. While the US claimed to be opening a door to moderate elements in the government through its policy of arms sales, it was inadvertently reinforcing the position of the more radical forces. In any case, this aimed at the release of US hostages in Lebanon would have had to be held with the radicals since it is '...and not the moderates, who are in charge of such operations'.

Khomeini's pattern of not permitting a 'action to triumph can be illustrated by several decisions. In December 1987 and January 1988, Khomeini made several statements that could reasonably be interpreted as moving him in the direction of those who called for a strong government role in social reform and greater equality in income distribution. The conservative nominated Council of Guardians, which had resisted many reformist measures, was rebuked and its veto position weakened. Khomeini also appeared to be criticizing the centrist president of the Islamic republic. Ali Khamenei. The response, a public:

7. Daneshkhah, Schehrzade. The Fracitcin Within Iran - Leadership. Middle East International (ME), (October 10, 1987), pp.15-113
affirmation of Khomeini's infallible wisdom by all his lieutenants, was an effective reminder that the Iranian regime, despite the anomalies recounted above, was indeed authoritarian.

Khomeini prevailed and agreed to place Rafsanjani, speaker of the Majlis, as the acting commander in chief of all the armed forces. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, a man whose pragmatism inclined him toward taking positions compatible with conservative preferences, was able to move the centre of power back again to the conservative side when Prime Minister Mir Hoseyn Mousavi, who was closer to the progressive end of the sent his nominees for the cabinet to the Majlis, those closely associated with Mohtashemi (Interior Minister) generally received the lowest votes, even though presumably the election had improved their positions, and several were rejected. The high point of the conservative domination came with the approval of United Nations Resolution 598 and the acceptance of a cease-fire. Since then, Khomeini has refused to endorse either side and instead has called for a "free debate between them".8

Ayatollah Montazeri, who is 12 years younger than the man he was expected to succeed, was elected as the spiritual heir to the Ayatollah in 1985 by the Assembly of experts. The decision that Ayatollah Montazeri should resign appears to have been taken on a meeting of the Assembly of experts by the Imam.

Imam Khomeini: "Official should not take his support for granted." Sill over the past few months Mr. Montazeri had not pulled his punches in opposing the mass killings of prisoners who were eligible for amnesty on the 10th anniversary of the revolution. Most of the victims were political rivals of the specific hardliners and supporters of the designated heir. Imam Khomeini’s verdict was the more decisive in various directions. The two senior Foreign Office resignations were attributed by observers to a cleansing of the Foreign Ministry of those who advised in favour of the ceasefire in the Gulf, "the bitter cup of poison" drinker by Imam.

One of the chiefponents of a ceasefire was the speaker of the Majlis, 'Abdollah, yet a few days ago the most radical group of 'Ali had suggested his name for the
presidential elections in July-August.

About Mr. Rafsanjani, it has been said "he signals left turns right". Many observers believe this slogan and the Foreign office resignations of those in favour of the ceasefire against the regime have not yet been able to convince the people who "the poison" could not have been drunk a year earlier when Iran was in a favourable situation in the war.

It is clear that having accepted the compromise of Mr. Rafsanjani as the most likely next President, the radicals are now asserting themselves. There is across-the-board interference in anything and everything said or done in countries with an Islamic population including India. As many as 125 members of the Majlis signed a communiqué on March 1, supporting the anti-Rushdie demonstration in Bombay. Thereafter, Turkey rejected Iran's interference in its internal affairs when 150 Iranian Majlis members criticised the Turkish head of state on a matter relating to the wearing of scarves by women.

Not everything done by these Mullahs is in accordance with their lofty principles. Iran is rebuilding its military...
with assistance from the eastern bloc states. North Korea and China. These were earlier denounced as "atheist" nations with which Iran should have little to do. And that little would certainly not include the head of the world's supreme communist power becoming the first person to receive a written message from the Imam.9

A new tendency has been for the government to lay the blame for all its problems at the door of the Gulf War. Rafsanjani has called the post-war period the reconstruction phase.

"In this phase we could think the revolution has just started...the people should be contented to some extent, they should limit their demands and understand the existing circumstances."10

The pragmatism of Iran's leaders and their readiness to defend the survival of the government has been an ever present feature of the Islamic Republic. At the moment it is being shown in the preoccupation of speaker Rafsanjani and President Khamenei with paving the way for the emergence of

strong leadership and the ideological and power divisions.

Constitutional Factor 1 view of Iran being Islamic republic it was natural to formulate and practise an Islamic foreign policy. Looking into the constitution of Islamic republic one finds the Principles 152 to 155 deal with Iran’s foreign policy. The Principle 152 of the constitution runs as “the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is founded on the basis of ending any type of domination, safeguarding the complete independence and integrity of the territory, defending the rights of Muslims, practising non-alignment with respect to the dominating powers and maintaining peaceful relationship with non-belligerent powers”.

The 1st principle of the Iran’s foreign policy is related to their concern for the Muslims of the world. The second principle of neither East nor West is meant to reject the domination of the two superpowers or of any power of that matter. The third principle of the constitution i.e. non-alignment is implied to mean that Iran will not take side with any of the two superpowers while dealing with them.

(a) Concerned for Islamic Muslims: The first pillar of
Iran's foreign policy is their concern for Islam and Muslims throughout the world. Ayatollah Khomeini rejected the Western concept of "nation-state" which at present is prevalent in the world. He perceived the existing international order as one based not only on power politics but also and primarily on ideology. Under the pretense of ideological righteousness, Khomeini further reasoned that both superpowers sought to "arrogate worldly power to themselves at the expense of the masses of the people". Such an interpretation of the international order led the Iranian cleric to perceive the world system as being divided between the "oppressors" (musta'kbarin) and the "oppressed" (mustaza'afin). Moreover, this division into two clearly defined camps was not limited to the Muslim Umma (community), but purport to encompass the entire world which was dominated, according to Khomeini, by the United States and the Soviet Union.

As an alternative to this existing flawed and unjust international system, Khomeini believed that a new "Islamic world order" must be established, as enunciated in the traditions of Imam or Twelver Shi'ism. Moreover, the Khomeini interpretation of figh asserted that until the
return of the Imam from occultation (ghayba), a supreme jurisprudent (faqih) must guide the religious and non-religious aspects of the Islamic government. While Khomeini acknowledged the establishment of the Vilavat-e-faqih in Iran, he foresaw for his country a wider role in the propagation of his "world order. This universalistic approach does not pretend to impose pan-Sheism on the world, but intends to "liberate" all oppressed masses from the yoke of the oppressors. As the "redeemer nation", Iran was expected to export revolution if it intended to accomplish this objective and insulate itself against potential threats. In this, Khomeini considered the export of the revolution as a protective shield for Iran when he stated:

"We should set aside the thought that we do not export our revolution, because Islam does not regard various Islamic countries differently and is the supporter of all the oppressed peoples of the world. On the other hand, all the superpowers and all the powers have risen to destroy us. If we remain in an isolated environment we shall definitely face defeat."

These objectives aimed first and foremost at protecting Iran, and secondary at promoting the establishment of populist Islamic governments in other parts of the world states particularly Muslim countries.

On 7th March, 1974, Minister of Foreign Affairs stated.

"Since its creation following several decades of genuine Islamic and popular struggle the Islamic Republic of Iran has considered it one of its main duties to defend dear Islam, its sacred aspirations, and the oppressed Muslims in every region of the world."

The concept of exporting revolution is a corollary of the phenomenon of revolution in world history. This proposition also holds true in the more recent example of the Iranian revolution. By intervention, America wants to make the world safe for democracy; witness the cases of Iran, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. The Soviet Union wants to make the world safe for Socialism; witness the cases of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. And by the export of the revolution, Khomeini's Iran wants to make the world safe for Islam; witness the cases of the Persian Gulf, Lebanon and Soviet Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

12. Ramazani, no. 1, p. 41.
Thus the major principles of the foreign policy of Khomeini’s Iran are obvious. First, by rejecting both the Eastern and Western way of life due to lack of religious spirituality, Khomeini invoked his favourite principle of “neither East nor West”. Second, by suggesting that Iran, as the most powerful base of the Islamic world, can easily fill the ideological vacuum everywhere in the world, Khomeini was actually engaging in the export of the revolution. It wants neither East nor West with regard pursuing foreign policy. In Khomeini’s worldview, “Islamic democracy” was superior to both Eastern and Western varieties.\(^\text{13}\).

The principal targets of the export of the revolution consisted of four major geographic circles. These were the Persian Gulf, the Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. In the Persian Gulf the more specific targets were Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and particularly Kuwait. In the Soviet area, they were Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. In Afghanistan and Lebanon, Shia Muslims were the primary targets, although the eight pro-Iranian factions of the Afghan Mujahedins are based in Iran, while the pro-Iranian Hizbollahs are located

\(^{13}\) Ibid., P.81.
within Lebanon. Only in Lebanon has Iran maintained a contingent of Revolutionary Guards, with initial.

Syrian blessing since the invasion of Lebanon by Israel in June 1982. And only in Lebanon have pro-Iranian factions continued to hold western hostages, while Iran claims that its own hostages are held by the Phalangists and are still alive, despite indications to the contrary.

Besides hostage-taking by pro-Iranian factions in Lebanon, Iran was accused of other forcible interventionary acts. These included, for example, the attempted coup in Bahrain in December. Suicide truck bombings against the American and French military contingents in Lebanon in October, 1983, and multiple bombings in Kuwait in December, 1983. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards aided and abetted the local Shia litants, engaging in armed conflict with the Israel forces in Lebanon. The list could be easily expanded if one were to add the accusations against Iran regarding the hijacking and bombing of planes and even the March, 1989 pipe-bombing of a van in the United States for the first time since the Iranian revolution. The van was driven by the wife of Capt. Will Rogers 3rd who had
ordered a missile fired at an Iranian passenger plane over the Persian Gulf on 7 July 1988 resulting in death of 297 people. Militant Iranian students in the United States were suspected of complicity. At the same time we can see Iranian violent diplomacy in other countries as well as their stand about Kashmir, Pushdian Affairs.

(b) Neither East nor West: According to Mir Hussein Musavi this slogan implies that the people of Iran will not, under any circumstances, allow Iran to slip 'toward the East or the West'. Furthermore they want to establish a system of values, independent of East and West in their own country, to expand it and under the all-round cover of this new system of values—which stems from the ideology of Islam—to continue their own way, organize their lives, relations with other countries, nations and liberation movements. Iranian policy makers themselves admit that the slogan 'Neither West, nor East' only in part reflects the influence of their Islamic ideology. 

The main slogan of the revolution, neither 'East nor

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West reflects Khomeini's insistence that Islamic Iran must project itself in the world as a third force, untainted by the influence of the superpowers.

In the early months of revolution there were scattered attacks by militants or individual Americans living in Iran. But the first spectacular action was the invasion of the US Embassy on 4 November 1979, followed by the 444 day hostage crisis. The episode became a symbol of revolutionary Iran's intent to defy the superpowers, as well as the establishments of diplomacy.

However, in retaliation on Carter administration imposed ban on US imports of Iranian oil on 12 Nov, 1979 and frozen about $8 billion of Iranian assets. Moreover, America broke diplomatic relations with Iran and imposed ban on all American exports to Iran and imposition of all American imports from Iran.

The hostages were eventually released when their captors had achieved their internal aims, and calculated that any further advance to the gained from holding them.

15. Ibid., p.13.
either in terms of internal politics or bargaining with the United States, would be outweighed by the damage to Iran's international standing.

The hostage affair was effectively on the other. Iran launched imprisonment—the occasional visitor was a part of violent diplomacy—against the United States which was also conducted elsewhere, notably in Lebanon, where it served the dual purpose of striking at the Great Satan while enhancing the position of pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon. The two most spectacular such actions were the car-bombing attack on the US Embassy in Beirut in April 1983 which resulted in 69 deaths and the attacks on the US Marine headquarters five months later which took the lives of 241 soldiers. These were generally thought to have been carried out by suicide squads from the Hizballah, close to where the Pasdaran are quartered. Whether this was so, or whether an attack closer to the Hizballah was responsible, there is no doubt about the Iranian government's support for both the groups. The car-bomb attack on the US Embassy in Kuwait in December 1983 appeared to be part of the same pattern. The other main line of attack on the US via Lebanon has been by hostage taking.
Pro-Iranian militants have not been responsible for all such abductions, nor, as with the bombings, can direct Iranian involvement easily be demonstrated. But whatever real control Iran may have over the captors, it has certainly used its perceived influence as a powerful lever. The lamentable IranGate episode of 1987 shows how effectively Iran played on American fears for the lives of a handful of captives so as to secure substantial concessions over arms supplies, which ran counter to the whole thrust of US policy towards the Gulf war.16.

According to Khoneini, the world is divided into two groups, the oppressors and the oppressed. In order to accomplish their objectives, the great oppressors have followed a policy of operating through imposed or cultivated puppet regimes in the oppressed world. Thus, it is argued, the illusion is created, as in Iran-Iraq war, of inter-regime conflict in the oppressed world, whereas in fact conflict is simply an oppressors' response to challenges from the oppressed. The Islamic republic of Iran, of course, is the pre-eminent challenger to the oppressors' hegemony.

The Iranian government sees itself, as expected, as the inevitable target of both great oppressors, their lesser oppressor allies such as France, or the usurper Israeli ally and the entire array of the puppet regimes which are allied to the great oppressors.

A central assumption for Khomeini is that the oppressed world generally grossly underestimates its own capability and overestimates that of the oppressors. For example, having sanctioned the taking of American diplomats as hostages, Khomeini endorsed fully his foreign minister’s adamant opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Then both great oppressors and their camp followers in response to this challenge attacked Iran through the instrumentality of Iran. 17.

Iran has a strategic interest in good relations with the United States as counter weight to the Soviet Union. For this reason, secular forces in Iran favour normalization of US-Iranian relations. The regime’s more pragmatic and moderate elements also recognize the need to avoid total

dependence on the Soviet Union.

Khamenei opposition to the ultra-religious faction has moved him increasingly closer to Rafsanjani and his supporters, who favour the renewal of economic and political ties with Western European countries, Japan, and the United States. Indeed, Khamenei's critical stand against the ultra-religious faction and his support for improvement of Iran's relationship with the West has led close observers of Iran's internal politics to conclude that he is close all to Rafsanjani.

Rafsanjani's views have to do with his view of Iran's relationship with the United States, Western European countries, and Japan. There is little doubt that he is interested in renewing Iran's economic and political ties with the West and Japan. This is not, however, because he is ideological moderate but rather because he is a pragmatic politician. He and his supporters realize that without open and direct economic ties with the West and Japan, Iran is incapable of rebuilding its war-torn and shattered economy.

18. Hunter, no. 6, p. 50
Rafsanjani is also aware, however, that any serious attempt to normalize Iran's relationship with the West will immediately invite attacks from his opponents, jeopardizing his newly acquired position and power inside Iran. He undoubtedly remembers how close he came to the end of his political career when news of his secret arms deal with the US and Israel was leaked by his opponents.

The anti-western and particularly the anti-US rhetoric has placed Rafsanjani and his supporters in an ideological straight jacket. How can they propose normalizing economic and political relations with the very government they have been accusing for past eleven years of being terrorist and an enemy of Iranian people.19

Khomeini's reception of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shavardnadze during his visit to Tehran on 25-27 February 1989, appeared to Washington as a tilt toward the East in Iran's foreign policy. Washington saw the Soviet Union poised to exploit the strain between Iran and European communist nations over the Buzdie affair. It also resented Soviet chumminess (friendliness) with Iran while it maintained an embargo on arms sales to the US.19

American hostages were still held captive in alleged Iranian factions in tehran. The visit of the then Mattan speaker and now prime Minister Hashemi-Rafsanjani to the Soviet Union on 20-21 June, 1989, his reception by Mr. Gorbachev as a near of state, and a flurry of economic and military negotiations in particular! American, were interpreted as a show of strength on the Soviet Union.

And yet, paradoxical as it may seem, the move to Washington may well have helped Moscow in following the fundamental tenets of the foreign policy of Iran will have to balance its cooperation with the west with a determination to reduce its dependence on either side. This is the real meaning of Iran is "neither East nor West" principle as interpreted by every major Iranian leader over the past decade. E. Khomeini admitted in his will that Iran's need for foreign aid was an "undiscussed fact", despite his vigorous efforts against Iran being dependent on either the Eastern or Western bloc.

All Khomeini as the successor to Khomeini and Hashemi...
Rafsanjani both these leaders have demonstrated a sense of political realism, including a determination to base Iran's relations with other nations, including the United States, more on the concept of equilibrium than on the idea of a struggle between good and evil. To the extent that such a fundamental change may occur, Iran's future efforts at exporting revolution will be relatively tame during the second decade of the Islamic republic as compared with the first.20.

(c) Toward Non-Aligned Movement: Iran's view and policies at the conference of Non-aligned Nations held in New Delhi on 12 February 1981, Sahlad Nabavi's (Minister of State) address was particularly significant, because, by then, Nabavi had become closely identified with the Islamic Republican Party. Nabavi began by criticizing the way non-alignment had been practiced until recently. In its former form the concept had become meaningless because many of the professed non-aligned countries could not in practice follow a policy independent of the superpowers.

Furthermore, their attempts to play one superpower

against another had proved futile because in the process they had been forced to accept many kinds of dependency. How real independence could be achieved and how the non-aligned movement could pursue its original thesis depended on the understanding of major changes in the Third World.

Since World War II two political poles or two social systems have governed the world: the Washington pole and the Moscow pole. Due to their economic and military power, each of these poles has attracted several countries to itself satellites. Naturally, these countries no longer have the total independence indispensable for a government. For this reason, while the two poles were being formed and strengthened, certain mindful politicians attempted to form a 'Third World. Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia, Dr. Sukarno in Indonesia, Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and Nehru in India expressed similar ideas when forming the famous Bandung conference in 1955, and later the Movement of Non-aligned countries. They decided to modify the two main poles capitalism and communism and prevent the obliteration of the independence of smaller countries.

A study of the 1979 conference showed that although
close to one hundred countries outside the military blocs had joined the Movement, almost every one of them was, in one way or another, dependent upon the superpowers.

For instance, though the Cuban government had been able to abolish US domination of Cuba in the 1960s, it was today in the hands of the Soviet Union. Cuba is in practice one of the active satellites of Russia on the continent of America. Saudi Arabia, an Islamic country which was possessed of a focal point for the "hearts of the world and most natural" serve as a promoter of Islamic ideology, had an interfere with the west that it could hardly be called independent.

Cuba and Saudi Arabia were not only two examples. Other non-aligned countries in Africa, Asia and Far East were in similar condition. Iran before the revolution had also been a secure link in this universal chain of servitude. Its arm and weapons had been under the direct control of United States and its thousands of advisers. The Iranian military unit could act unhindered by American agents, and the American research and military bases which had been discovered only after the revolution. Economically, the country had been so permanently dependent that it was assumed the Islamic regime in Iran would yield or collapse.
immediately after the economic sanctions imposed by the USA and its allies.

Having attacked the non-aligned movement as ineffective and not genuinely independent from the superpowers, the Iranian policy makers turn to the foundations of the Islamic Republic's international position. The most basic of these foundations is ingrained in the slogan of "neither East nor west". This policy has been successful not only regarding domestic affairs, but it has also guaranteed the perpetuation and continuation of the revolution. As Iran viewed this concept, it was the culmination of a prolonged quest by the Third World for a solution to the cultural and political domination of the superpower. However, not only because of the militar superiority of the superpowers, but owing to their cultural oppressiveness, those efforts had not succeeded in opening an independent path for the Third World countries.

Iran assumes geo-political significance in view of geographic location, and vast reserves of oil, gas and

mineral resources. This country is not only big in terms of area but also in terms of its population which provides a big market for the forestic goods but also for foreign goods. Its oil reserves are estimated to be more than two billion barrels. Besides oil and gas country has rich reserves of mineral which still like beneath earth. Though some of the minerals have already been exploited, which serve to be an important source of foreign exchange. The export of these minerals has been on an increase during the last few years. Country is located on a conjugal route of three continents Asia, Africa and Europe. It lies on important route connecting Asia and Europe.