CHAPTER 7

Evaluation of Ramanuja and Hegel's Views

Uptill now we have comparatively discussed Ramanuja and Hegel's conceptions of One ultimate reality concepts of many selves and concepts of relation between ultimate reality and many selves. Now we will proceed to see how for their conceptions are compatible with reference to our criteria which we have noted in first chapter.

I Evaluation of Ramanuja and Hegel's conception of One reality:

(1) One must be uniquely one:

Ramanuja and Hegel both believe that the ultimate reality is one.

Ramanuja accepts cit, scit and Isvara as ultimately real. For him these three constitutes One reality which is ultimate reality i.e. Brahman. ¹ Hegel also considers reality as only One. 'The Absolute is the supreme truth and the supreme truth is One.'²
Now question is that how far their claim for oneness of one is acceptable?

Ramanuja's this claims for oneness of the Brahman can not be accepted by us. You see a being which is constitute by three elements can not be unity. Oneness of One may be maintained to say that the many are unreal or to say that the many are different from One as Madhwa says. But we know that for Ramanuja many are real and they are non-different from One. If position is that then Ramanuja can not claim the unity of the One. Thus Ramanuja's claims for oneness of one cannot be sustained.

Again Hegel's claim is also not acceptal by us. Because his Absolute is composed of parts. Absoluties is totality. It is not individual whole apart from many so it can not be unity in true sense of the term unity.

In addition to the above we can say that both's claim for the oneness of One is not sustained because both believe that One is both efficient and material cause of the world. And these two kinds of causalities would bring a sort of duality which goes against the oneness of One.
(2) One must be ultimate:

Rāmānuja accepts Brahman and Hegel accepts Absolute as the ultimate reality. 'Brahman is ultimate readily' says Rāmānuja and 'The ultimate readily' say Hegel 'is an Absolute Mind or Spirit'.

Here we can say that though both accept One as ultimate reality yet their conception is not satisfactory.

Rāmānuja’s Brahman is constituted of cit and acit. We can not think about Brahman without cit and acit which constitutes its body. It means Brahman depends upon many for its constitution and a being which is dependent can not be ultimate.

Hegel’s One - Absolute is totality of many. He himself has noted that we can not think about Absolute without world. And a being which is not thinkable without world, how can be ultimate?

Hence we can say that both Rāmānuja and Hegel have failed to satisfy our this criterion of the concept of One.

(3) One must be independent:

Rāmānuja claims for the independency of One - Brahman. He very much wants to preserve the independance of Brahman. In his attempt to preserve the
independence of the Brahman, he has even pointed out a defect in his 'Śarīra-Śarīri' analogy. In Gita-bhasya commenting, he acknowledge that there is a kind of mutual dependence between self and body, in that the soul is dependent on the body for the accomplishment of its purpose. But in the case of God's relation to the universe of cit and acit 'I am the supporter of all beings, they are of no help at all to me at any time'.

Here we can say that if 'Śarīra-Śarīri' analogy is defective because of conception of interdependence, then Rāmānuja should accept another analogy to explain complete independence of One reality. But fact is that he has not accepted another analogy. He has accepted 'Śarīra-Śarīri' analogy. This analogy is fundamental in his philosophy. And this analogy is defective so it is the defect of his philosophy which he himself shows.

Thus 'Śarīra-Śarīri' analogy harms the independence of One reality and Rāmānuja has accepted this analogy as roof concept. So we can say that although Rāmānuja very well wanted to preserve the independence of One reality but because of logical
difficulty to explain the independence of One, he fails to satisfy our this criterion of the concept of One.

Hegel also does not satisfy our this criterion of the concept of One. Because his Absolute can not be independent. He himself has noted that Absolute is a whole and many are its constituent parts.

This clearly means that One has to depend on many in order to be constituted. Thus we can say that his Absolute depends upon many so can not be independent.

(4) One must be 'Causa-Sui'

Both Rāmānuja and Hegel have fulfilled our this criterion of the concept of One.

According to Rāmānuja Brahman is only ultimate reality. There is nothing higher or prior than Brahman who caused this Brahman. So it is causa-sui.

Hegel also accepts Absolute as the self-determinate, self-existent being. For Hegel as W.T. Stace 7 has pointed out that 'Reason which is
ultimate reality is reason of itself'.

(5) One must be efficient cause only that is not also material cause:

According to Rāmānuja Brahman is only cause of the world, material as well as efficient cause of the world. God is association with cit and acit in subtle form, is the upādāna-kārana of the world, God with the resolution of 'I shall be many' is the efficient cause of the world. Thus Rāmānuja accepts Brahman as both efficient and material cause of the world. So we can say that Rāmānuja's this conception is not satisfactory with reference to our criterion of 'One must be efficient cause only'.

Hegel also considers Absolute as the only ultimate reality. And it follows from this that it must be both material and efficient cause of the world.

Hence we can say that he has also failed to satisfy our this criterion.

Again their conception of One as both efficient and material cause of the world is also not satisfactory.
Because these two types of causalities would bring a sort of duality which goes against the oneness of One. To be material cause it is one thing and to be efficient cause is another.

In addition to this we can say that Rāmānuja's conception of God's 'wish for līla' is the efficient cause of the world is not dignifiable for both One as well as many selves because from this conception it follows that God is all and the souls are merely instruments to the pleasure of God. This not only goes against the perfection, transcendence and independence of God but also tells against the status of the souls who, being absolutely subordinate to God, can not be said to have any distinctive purpose of their own.

This position is not creditable for both One reality as well as many selves.

Again Hegel's conception of 'divine discontent' cause of Absolute's manifestation as many, is also not satisfactory. A being which is Ultimate manifests for its any discontent, shows its imperfection.

(6) One must be both immanent and transcendent being; according to Rāmānuja Brahmān is both immanent
and transcendent. For him God is not an external architect of the cosmic structure, manipulating an external machine. He is the inner soul and the core of the cosmos. It does not act outside the world but it acts within it." Yet it is not totally immanent being. It has also transcendental aspect. Brahman transcendence physical nature and finite selves. 12

Hence Rāmānuja has claimed for the immense and transcendence of the Brahman.

Here we must note that some commentator has not accepted Rāmānuja's this claim. For them there is no real transcendence in the philosophy of the Ramanuja, because for Rāmānuja cit and acit are constituent elements of the God. Cit and acit constitute its body so one can never think about one reality without cit and acit and so it can not be transcendence in real sense.

Here we will take liberty to say that this accusation against Rāmānuja is not correct. Rāmānuja's One is not composed of cit and acit. His God as God remains as individual whole. His God as God is immanent in cit and acit, not God as having cit
and acit is immanent in cit and acit. Thus in philosophy of Rāmānuja, Brahman has some kind of transcendence.

Hence Rāmānuja’s claim for the immanence and transcendence of One reality is quite right.

Whereas Hegel has not satisfied our this criterion of the concept of One.

Hegel has emphasized on the immanent aspect of the Absolute. Absolute, in Hegel’s strict view as a philosopher, is not a transcendent being apart from the world but ‘Reason immanent in it’, an impersonal system of objective thoughts which actualizes itself at different levels in nature which is a system of unconscious thought and mind.14 This shows that Hegel’s One is wholly immanent being. It has no transcendence.

Here it is all important to note that some time Hegel talks about the transcendence of the Absolute. As Copleston has noted ‘Thus subject matter of logic is the truth as it is without husk and for itself. One can therefore express the matter by saying that its content is the presentation of God as he is in his
eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit.15

This assertion only shows that Hegel wants to claim the transcendence of One. But this concept of him is not compatible with his conception of the Absolute as the totality of the parts.

Further let us believe that his Absolute is also transcendent but his Absolute can not be transcendent in the sense in which the God of religion is said to transcend the created universe.

Now here a point is important to note that Hegel's some assertion shows that Absolute is only reality and many are appearances. If it is so, then it means that Absolute is transcendent being. But it can not be immanent because there are no many as real.

Hence either his Absolute is totally immanent or totally transcendent. In any manner it cannot be both immanent and transcendent.

Therefore we can say that he has failed to satisfy our this criterion.
Rāmānuja emphasises on the perfectness of the Brahman. For him Brahman is perfectly developed being. 'It is immutable and perfect in all respects.'

Now, the question is, how far his claim for the perfectness of the Brahman is acceptable?

Argument against his this conception is that for Rāmānuja ultimate reality is only one and many as real beings constitute its body. Now if One is perfect then what is the explanation of imperfections and mutability of the many which are constituent elements of its body?

Rāmānuja explains this as that "the imperfections adhering to the body do not affect self, and good qualities belonging to the self do not extend to the body, in the same way as youth, childhood and old age, which are attributes of embodied beings such as Gods or men, belong to the body only, not to the embodied self, while knowledge, pleasure and so on belong to the conscious self only, not to the body."
With reference to this we may say that Ramanuja seems to have forgotten that the above analogy clearly indicates the difference between body and soul. The imperfections and changes of the body do not touch the soul because later is totally different and admits of being separated from the former. But as Ramanuja has emphasised non-difference and inseparability between God and his body i.e. cit and acit, above analogy fails to serve his purpose. Thus we find that with all sympathy for Ramanuja's love for immutability and perfection of God, it must be said that it is against all logic to hold that the universe of real imperfections and real changes form an integral part of reality which is conceived to be really perfect and changeless.

Thus his claims for the perfectness of the Brahman is not satisfactory.

In context of Hegel, we have a question that can we say his Absolute is perfect?

Of course some times Hegel says as W.K. Wright states' Reality is perfect and self-complete' but on the other hand he has constantly talked about the development of the Absolute. For him Absolute is developing reality. It is the living, moving reason
of the world. It reveals itself in the world, in
nature and in history, nature and history are
necessary stages in the evolution of God into self-
consciousness. His whole philosophy is based on the
conception of developing Absolute-One.

Here we find conflict in Hegel's philosophy.
A being which is perfect can not be developing and a
being which is developing can not be perfect. Perfect-
ness and development can not go together. If One is
in itself - self-complete and eternally realized in
itself, it is quite pertinent to ask : how is this
self-complete, perfect or eternally self-realizedness
of One reality to be reconciled with its development
which is incompatible to say that where one and the
same being is complete and perfect and at the same
time it is developing.

Thus though Hegel some times says that One is
perfect yet we can not accept his claim because he
very much talks about the development of the Absolute
and his whole philosophy is based on the developing
nature of the Absolute.

If we accept that his Absolute is perfect and
immutable then all the world becomes illusion. And if we accept that his Absolute is developing itself then it cannot be perfect.

(8) One must be goal of human being:

Rāmānuja like most of Indian thinkers believes that to know and realize Brahman is the ultimate goal of human life. Hence in this conception we don't find any fallacy as far as our this criterion is concerned.

Now question is that can we call Hegel's One as the ultimate goal of the human beings? Though Hegel has not explicitly described that Absolute is the goal of the human beings yet we can say that in a sense it is the goal. In Hegel's philosophy we see a process towards synthesis and highest synthesis is the ultimate goal of the existence. Here we can say that in strict sense it is not the goal of the human beings. Highest synthesis is the goal of the Absolute. Absolute always goes towards higher synthesis to become a self-conscious.

(9) One must be individual:

Rāmānuja's Brahman as possessing body is really
a individual beings. His 'sarira-sariri' analogy clearly shows the individuality of the One-Brahman, which we have already discussed in the last chapter. Thus his conception of the One as individual is alright as far as our this criterion is concerned.

With regards to Hegel's philosophy we can not say that his Absolute is individual being.

Here one may ask that if Hegel identifies Absolute with the God, then it must some type of personality.

Here we would take liberty to say that this only shows that Hegel wants to claim personality for his One. But he has not made any further attempt in this line.

Again his conception of identity of Absolute and God is also not acceptable. We can not accept the view that a Being which is a mere apotheosis of an impersonal logical process or which is identical with the whole system of things or with process of human evolution and which supplies us with no criterion whereby we may distinguish what is from what ought to be, is the same as what religion means by God.
Hegel's mind seems to oscillate between two ideas of God or the Absolute. We can not worship a God who is only a logical idea, who always works by his own divint discontent.

(10) One must be indivisible:

With regard to this criterion we can say that both Ramanuja and Hegel have failed to satisfy our this criterion.

According to Ramanuja Brahman is without heterogeneous and homogeneous distinctions. But for him Brahman possesses svagata bhedhas. He accepts cit and acit as the internal parts of the Brahman. So his Brahman cannot be indivisible being.

Further Hegel's One cannot be accepted by us as indivisible being. Hegel accepts many as the internal parts, elements of the Absolute whole so we can say that It also possesses internal differences.

In addition to this we find avasthābhedā in it. His Absolute once manifestes itself as matter, then again as mind, then as life and so on. If means that there is avasthābhedā in the Absolute.
One must be knowable:

Rāmānuja's Brahman is not unknowable deity. But he emphasises that a man can know Brahman, realize Brahman and achieve similarity with Brahman. For him man can get the final satisfaction to know Absolute. His basal 'sarira-Sariri' analogy implies the accessibility of God to the universe, especially in his relationship with the Jiva.

Whereas in Hegel's philosophy man suffers special kind of philosophical misfortune because man can not know the Absolute, but Absolute knows itself through man, in man. In his philosophy man has not achieved anything for itself. He simply contributes the self-knowledge of the Absolute. Hence not only many but even Absolute suffers the philosophical misfortune because it has to know itself by man.

Thus in his philosophy One is knowable not for man that for itself. Absolute gets self knowledge by man. Here we would like to congratulate him for this achievement. But it is our great misfortune that we will not be there.
II Evaluation of Ramanuja and Hegel's views about many selves:

(1) Reality of many:

It is very well known that Ramanuja has accepted cit, acit and God as real. This means that for him many beings are as real as One. Here it is notable that though many are as real as One yet they are not independent realities like Brahman.

Hence with reference to this criterion of the concept of many we can't say anything against Ramanuja.

Now a question arises that can we say that Hegel has accepted many as the real beings? In reply to this question, we can say that there are contradictory assertions in Hegel's philosophy from which a confusion arises in our minds. If we accept his conception of the perfect and self-complete Absolute then it clearly follows that many are only appearances or illusions but if we accept that Absolute is a developing reality and in process of its development it manifestes itself as many. It means many are its real manifestations. Thus we can say that he has accepted many as the real beings.
(2) Eternality of many:

Rāmānuja consideres many as the eternal beings. For him creation and destruction and all other characteristics of the material body do not belong to many, for they are eternal. Hence Ramanuja's this conception is alright with reference to our this criterion of the concept of many.

With regards to Hegel's conception of the eternity of many, our argument is the same as we have noted above. If many are not real then question of eternity of the many does not arise. And if we acceptes his conception of the many as the real manifestations of the Absolute then we can say that many are as eternal as Absolute-One, because they are only others of the One.

(3) Individuality of many:

According to Rāmānuja there are innumerable individual souls which are real and eternal. We know that he has accepted quantitative difference between many, not only on this phenomenal level but for him their individuality is retained even at the transcendence level.
Hence his conception is alright as far as our this criterion is concerned.

Hegel has also accepted many as individual beings. Hegel has talked about the subjective spirit and persistence of this spirit. But this individuality is preserved beyond this universe or no? Hegel has not said anything about this.

(4) Uniqueness of each of many:

Ramanuja has failed to fulfill our this criterion. Because he accepts only quantitative difference among many. For him selves are essentially alike. They are not qualitatively different. He does not admit any distinction between different selves instate of transcendent. They don't have their own unique personality. Essential nature of the one soul is same as that of another. Thus we can say that his pluralism applies only to empirical egos, is something which can not be denied by any one.
Showing the logical weakness of Rāmānuja's doctrine of the quantitative pluralism of selves Radhakrishnan has rightly asked: when the soul casts off the body and enters on the state of release, it seems to become bare point of mere existence. It is not cut off from God, since the current of divine life flow through it. Will there not be an overlapping of these souls? If not, what is it that distinguishes these souls from each other? Rāmānuja has no answer to this question.

In short we can say that he has failed to satisfy our this criterion.

With reference to Hegel we can say that he has not explicitly described that many are different from one another or they are essentially same. Again we can not find conception of uniqueness even implicitly in his philosophy so we would say that he has not accepted many as the unique beings and so he fails to satisfy our this criterion of the concept of many.

(5) Many must be free:

According to Rāmānuja many have ethical
freedom. Of course they are not ontologically free like Brahman. He believes that many can act according to their freewill.

In context of Hegel we can say that for him many as they are, they have ethical freedom. Many are free at this state. In addition to this we can say that Hegel is undoubtedly idealist and idealists are the believer of the free will. So he must be the believer of the freedom of will. And thus he has fulfilled our this criterion.

(6) Progressiveness of many:

With reference to this criterion we could say that both Râmânuja and Hegel have failed to satisfy our this criterion. How?

Râmânuja believes that many always progress towards Brahma-realization. But for him after Brahma-realization they cease to exist as progressive. Their progress has come to an end at this level. It means that for him liberation is the state of in action. Hence we can not say that Râmânuja’s many are essentially progressive
Hegel's position is also same. Hegel's many always progress towards some kind of higher progress. Of course they are not progressing towards higher synthesis for any achievement but in the process of Absolute's self-knowledge they are progressing.

Now the question is that after the self-knowledge of the Absolute what is the position of the soul? He has not answered. But we can say that self-knowledge of the Absolute is the ultimate goal of the Absolute. And after achieving this goal Absolute has no need of progression of many and even manys.

(7) Atomic size of many:

According to Rāmānuja many are not all-pervasive but atomic in size. So we can not say anything against Rāmānuja as far as our this criterion is concerned.

Hegel has not satisfied our this criterion. He has not discussed the question of the size of the many. Again he can not say that many are atomic because for him matter and so atoms are not reality but it is only our appearance.
III EVALUATION OF RAMANUJA AND HEGEL'S CONCEPTION
OF RELATION BETWEEN ONE AND MANY

(1) Though Ramanuja believes that many have
metaphysical dependence on One, not only at the
worldly state but also at the state of liberation
yet his conception is not satisfactory. Because
we find that his One also depends upon many. He
has said that One is the soul of the many and
many are the body of the God. That means many who
are the body of the One and One is the soul of
the many depends upon many for his expression.
This position is not dignifiable for God.

Ramanuja also feels defect of his analogy.
In Gita-Bhasya he tries to save himself for this
acusaion to say that dependence is not reciproc.
But if we accept 'sarira-sarir' analogy which
Ramanuja has used to show the relation between One
and many then it must follow that they are inter-
dependence. Thus his conception is not satisfactory.

Again his definition of 'sariri' harms the
dignity of both, One and many. In accordance to
this definition Brahman uses many as the instrument of his own lila and Many are only means for the pleasure of One. This is not dignifiable position for both.

Further we can say that Hegel has also not satisfied this criterion of relation between One and many. He has also accepted interdependence between One and many.

Again we have already noted that Hegel at one time says that relation between One and many is that of whole and parts, and on the other hand has shown that many are manifestations of the One and again we find some assertion in Hegel which shows that many are only illusions. Now question is that how can this three conceptions go together?

If we accept whole and parts relation between One and many this means that they should be eternally there. We can not think about whole without parts and parts without whole. We can not say that in beginning there was only whole in existence and then parts came in existence or first there were parts
and they whole came in existence but they should be eternally together. If position is such then how can we say that one manifestes as many? If we say One manifestes itself as many it means that first there was only One and then many come in existence. This is purely contradictory with 'whole-parts' concept.

His concept of whole and parts preserve his 'One', there is no status of many. And his conception of 'One manifests as many' emphasis on the many who are always there. And from later view point One remains as only a logical postulate and only a imagination.

Further if we accept his conception that Absolute is only reality and many are only its appearances then many as having phenomenal reality and Absolute as having ultimate reality can not be related with one another so with reference to this conception, question of relation between Absolute and many self does not arise.

(2) One as the receding goal of human life:

Both have failed to satisfy our this criterion of concept of relation between One and Many.
Though Ramanuja considers One as the goal of human life yet his conception is not satisfactory. Because it is not receding goal. For him many can achieve similarity with One but after realizing One they cease to exist as active. It means that for him we can fully realise One, fully get the company with One and after this achievement we becomes inactive.

This conception is not compatible with our this criterion. And so he fails to satisfy our criterion.

In one sense Hegel has also accepted Absolute as the goal of human beings, object of world desire. For him world of many is the other or manifestation of the Absolute and Absolute tries to realize its own being by this manifestation so 'self conscious Absolute' is the goal of Absolute and many are its other so it is also the goal of many.

But it is obvious that Hegel's Absolute is not receding goal as we have maintained in our criterion so we can say that he has not fulfilled our this criterion.
At the end of this chapter we would like to give our final impression about these two philosophers, Rāmānuja as well as Hegel.

Our conclusion regarding Rāmānuja's position is that he tries to save the ontological status of many and sovereignty of One but he has not succeeded. His conceptions regarding relation between One and Many harms dignity of both One and Many. He has insisted more on the analogy of 'Sarira-sarir' In other words we can say that his whole philosophy is based on 'sarira-sarir' analogy and this analogy illustrates : 'interdependence between God and soul which harms the ultimacy of God. Again his conception of 'lila' harms the dignity of both God and many. Rāmānuja says that "The motive which prompts Brahman - all whose wishes are fulfilled and who is perfect in himself to the creation of a world comprising all kinds of sentient and non-sentient beings dependent on his volition, is nothing else but sport play". It means we human beings are only instruments for the sport of God. We dont have any independent purpose of our own. We are only puppets of the God. This position is shameful for both soul and God; God who
is omnipotence, omnipresent, omniscient uses ourselves for his play.

Hence we can say that Rāmānuja has very much tried to solve the problem of One and Many, he very much wanted to solve the problem but he has not succeeded. On the contrary he gives a philosophy which harms the ontological status and dignity of the God and souls.

With respect to Hegel's conception we can say that our final impression is that somehow he has created a logical world which is not concerned with physical and psychical world of our experiences. We can compare Hegel with a man who creates a world in dreams which is not concerned with empirical world.

In this context we would like to note D.M. Edward's opinion about Hegel's conception of One and Many. Edward has rightly pointed out that "It is true that Hegel discards static categories and lays great stress on the idea of development. But according to one main line of thought in his philosophy, the development is merely a logical and not an historical One, in other words, it is purely
formal and schematic and not involve any real strenuousness or output of energy. It costs no effort on the part of the Absolute for logical concept to evolve its own opposite or for both to generate a higher synthesis. They are but momentary phases of timeless reality. Conflicts are explained by the mutual contradictoriness of concepts. But conflicts between disembodied thought entities involves no real physical or psychical wear and tear. Bloodless categories have no blood to shed, hence the battle is nothing more than a shamfight and its issue a forgone conclusion. There is after all at the heart of things no real flux as we know it is experience, for the movement is purely dialectical.

All this arises from Hegel's onesided intellectualism. His world is but a network of logical relations. It is a world of ideas which have been so universalized as to be cut away from their living roots in psychic experience and empty abstractions. The Absolute has no history and never comes out into the open on the field of human experience. From the point of view of the
Eternal Being, time and history are illusion.

We well aware that there is another line
of thought in Hegel which is difficult to reconcile
with the above. At times no one has a greater sense
of the importance of history than he. He speaks
impressively of 'the tremendous labour of world-
history' patiently undertaken by the world spirit
in the long extent of time'. Time is real at least
in the sense that it is the field within which the
Absolute comes to itself and attains full self-
consciousness. But the other equally fundamental
side of his teaching reduces history into a spectacular
show in which "We are no other than a moving row,

Of course shapes that come and go,

Round with this sun-illuminel lantern hed

In midnight by the master of thetho"

The following passage makes clear this especiall
clear: within the range of the finite we can
never see or experience, that the End has been
really secured, the consumption of the infinite
End, therefore consists merely in removing the
illusion which makes it seem yet unaccomplished.
The Good, the absolutely Good, is eternally accomplishing itself in the world, and the result is that it need not wait upon us, but is already by implication, as well as in full actuality accomplished. This is the illusion under which we live ...... In the course of its process the Idea creates that illusion by setting an antithesis to confront itself, and its action consists in getting rid of the illusion it has created. Here the word "illusion" four time repeat leaves no room to doubt that the it conflicts of life and history are but appearances of an eternally complete Absolute which has no unfulfilled purposes or unsolves problems and which "needs not wait upon us". But as Pringle Pattson says in commenting on this passage, this is "to paralyse our energies at their source if the antagonisms of the moral life are not real, then we have no standard of reality left. Such a theory provides no satisfactory status for individual persons. Individuals like ourselves shrink in to the position of mere adjectives of the Absolute, which alone has substantial reality.
The universe is reduced into an impersonal logical process of which human persons are merely foci. The mechanism of the thought-process tends to absorb into itself all psychical inwardness, and with it all spiritual content. Thus man becomes a merely passive tool wielded by the Absolute, rather than an active co-operator and partner with God in the spiritual enterprise.

And the swelling up of the individual by the universal leads to the annihilation of ethical values.

This theory is morally enervating so it is speculatively unsatisfying. It leaves unanswered the question why should Absolute perfection to which there is nothing 'unaccomplished.' delight in creating illusion of imperfection? How is perfection in general to be reconciled with even the appearance of many particular imperfections?

In short we can say that though both have very much tried to solve the problem yet they have not succeeded.