CHAPTER VIII.
S'abdavṛttis, the nature and Scope of ABHIDHĀ.

According to the sankśrit writers on poetics, words possess three distinct S'aktis or functions called, (i) the abhīdha S'akti, (ii) the laḳṣaṇā S'akti, and (iii) the Vyañjana S'akti. The terms vṛtti and vyāpāra are also used as synonyms for the term S'akti. Thus, by the abhīdha- vṛtti or the power of expression, the word is supposed to give the conventional meaning or the saṃkṣetitārtha, by the laḳṣaṇāvṛtti it gives saṃkṣetitārtha, by the laḳsaṃvṛtti it gives laḳṣyaarthā, or the secondary sense, based upon certain conditions, and by the Vyañjana vṛtti, the word gives the vyañjaya or the suggested sense. Accordingly, the word is said to be vācaka, lakṣaṇa and vyānjaka, and the sense is said to be vācyā, lakṣya and vyañja respectively. We also come across the mention of a fourth vṛtti called the tātparya vṛtti, but as it is connected with the sentence i.e. the correlated meaning of all the words in a given sentence, the abhīdha vṛtti generally and not with words taken individually, the Ālamkārikas generally do not choose to include it under the functions of a word.

As regards the nature of these S'abdavāpāras, there is a lot of difference of opinion among thinkers of different schools. The grammarians and the philosophers (=dāśāṇikas) and even some of the Ālamkārikas do not recognise the function akṣara called the Vyañjana-vyāpāra. Even the earlier authors on ālamkāra such as Bhumāśa, Daṇḍin and Vāmanas failed to recognise or even mention Vyañjana as a separate vṛtti in kāvya. The tārākāsa (i.e. logicians) and the Māmāsakas and some of the later Ālamkārikas also (e.g. Karhira and Bhoja) did not accept it. (2). There are also others who distinguish between gaṇpañ and laḳṣaṇa. We will try to consider the nature of the different vṛttis separately and discuss the difference of opinion with reference to the same.

ABHIDHĀ—

We begin with abhīdha, or the function of expression. Abhīdha is that
function by which the word gives the conventional-Saśkeṣita—or the primary meaning. The word here becomes vācaka and the sense is termed as vācyārtha(3). Thus, for example the word 'gauḥ’ by abhidhāvyāpāra means vācāsamādit-pas'uvīṣ'esah’ or an entity having a dew-lap, horns etc. This conventional or the saśkeṣita artha is gathered directly and hence is called the mukhyārtha or the principal meaning and the word is known as mukhya and the abhidhās'akti is also called mukhyāıkṣa mukhā S’akti, or the mukhyāvyāpāra.

As the nature of saṃketagrahaṇa, there is a considerable difference of opinion. We have already discussed this problem at length earlier (see Ch.6. word and its import). This Saṃketa has been classified in different ways. The Nāyikāyas classify saṃketa as prātipāthika, Nāyikākā 'naimitti-ka’ and 'ānādhi'ka’. When we fix up a name for calling somebody, say, e.g., a father calls his son Devadatta, or when we fix up a technical term to refer to a particular meaning in science, e.g., say dhvani, guṇa, etc., in the alaṃkāraśāstra, it is termed as 'prātipāthikasaṃketa’. Naimittika is that which refers to jāti e.g., as'va, manuṣya etc., and ānādhi is that which refers to the Upādhi. For the Nāyikāka, ānādhi means that 'jāti in which so many āpara-jātis reside e.g., paśu consists of as'va, ga, etc. (4)

For Bhratṛhari, Saṃketa is two-fold viz, ājānīka (or natural) and ādhuṇika (or man-made). By ājānīka is meant the same as naimittika of the Nāyikākas. Thus, ājānīka is nitya. Ādhuṇikasaṃketa is the form of vāda-kādā (i.e. kādaicitka); and the S’āstrākāras make its use (5).

Classification of Abhidhā:-

Abhidhā is said to be three-fold; viz (i) Rūghi, (ii) Yoga and (iii) yogarūghi. These are again known as (i) kevala samudāya S’akti, (ii) kevala-vayavas’akti, and (iii) samudāyavayavas’akti-saṃkara (6). Rūghi is said to be there, where the word as a whole-samudāya-conveys the meaning. Here, we gather the meaning with the help of akhaṇḍas’akti of the word(7). Here, rūghi is formed because the meaning of the components of the word is not at all comprehended separately, or, even if the meaning of the word w
is gathered separately, it is ultimately not recognised. Again, when the

meaning of the components of a word becomes important, in order to get

the full sense of the word as a whole, it becomes the case of yogatma,

abhidha. (8). Yogarudhi is said to be in cases where with avayvas'akti and

samudayas'akti are required (9). In the case of 'pankaja', the etymological

meaning is: 'that which is born in mud'. This can be applicable to anything

other than lotus also. The Naiyayikas do not accept either ruchi or

yoga in this case. Appayya Dikshita holds that it is better to accept

yogarudhi here (10).

At times it happens that there are more than one conventional

meanings attached to one and the same word. Here, abhidhatha is decided with

the help of various factors such as context and others. Bhartihari has

mentioned all these factors. (11). Vis'svanatha also gives a fuller

explanation. (12)

Thus, we have seen that abhidha deals with the directly expressed

sense of a word.

FOOT-NOTES-CHAPTER VIII.

(1) प्रत्ययां जूनायथे वस्त्वास्ति वाणिष्ठू महाविनामः

यथाविचित्रता ववाहातिर्क्तं विभाति राज्यविवाहातिर्क्तम्। अन्या: १.४।

(2) The lakāvahika says व्य-जन्ता तु शक्तिक्षाणान्त्यता

शक्तिक्षणा अश्वाक्षितो तदनात्मादिना अन्यथा सिद्धा।

(3) साहसत्सैक्षितां यहं धर्मीयक्षै स वाचः। क.प. and also तत

सैक्षितायां वै वोक्षायां सिद्धा। S.D.

(4) यदायं वनामातिक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्षक्ष�
(6) स्मरणिया तिन्यां, केलसुदार्यातिक: केलाचार्यातिक: सुभाषाचार्यातिक.
R.G. pp. 141.

(7) नृसिष्णुभवितानामार्गस्मतिप्रतिपालकाः पूर्वी: -वुषिवार्तिक (विष्णुद्वदिक) PP. p.

(8) नृसिष्णुभवितानामार्गस्मतिप्रतिपालकाः योगः: -ibid.

(9) नृसिष्णुभवितानामार्गस्मतिप्रतिपालकाः योगः: -ibid.

(10) नृसिष्णुभवितानामार्गस्मतिप्रतिपालकाः पूर्वी: -वुषिवार्तिक (विष्णुद्वदिक)

(11) संसारो विद्यावृक्ष साध्यं विद्यावृक्ष साध्यं: चामुः श्रीमौर्यिती देवे: कालो व्यक्तिः: स्वरूपः: स्वास्थ्यात्वत्वः

(12) महाभारत श्रीरामचरिक हरित श्रीकृष्ण जन विश्वमथवामिले।
CHAPTER IX. (b) TATPARYAVRTTI

Tatparya Vrtti.

Now, we may consider the tatparya vyrtti. Abhidha and lakshan are the functions of a word, i.e., words taken separately. The meaning of the sentence whole is conveyed neither by abhidha, nor by lakshan, but by a separate power of the sentence called Tatparya. The meaning of the sentence is thus termed as tatparyaarthas. The tatparya'sakti shakti is that power which assimilates the sense gathered by abhidha and gives a new sense (abhinavarthas), which is not just an assimilation of vacyarthas (i.e., not yoga-matra), but is something unique (apadartho pi vakyarthah). The Dhvanivadin call it tatparyavrtti. In this view of the Dhvanivadin we can easily read the influence of the abhihitavayavda of Kumara Bhatta. It may be noted that even though Kumara recognises a separate function for vakyarthas, as something different from abhidha, we do not get the clear mentioning of tatparyavrtti in the Mimamsa-granthas till we come to Mimamsa-kaustubha of Kedarnathadeva (13th or 14th Cent. A.D.).

Vakya, its import:

While treating the nature of this tatparyavrtti, we will at the outset, consider the nature of a sentence or vakya and its import.

Expression of thoughts is the sole proper of the use of language. Ideas, again, are completely and best expressed through the medium of sentences as such and not by means of individual words. Thus, a sentence rightly called the unit of significant speech. An idea becomes definite only when it is capable of being expressed in the usual form of a sentence. Thought in language will therefore mean that a man does not think in isolated words but in a coherent combination of words, in order to give consistency and relevancy to his very mode of thinking. The Naiyayikas have drawn our attention to this important linguistic fact, when they deal with the nature of logical propositions. A logical proposition, as we know, is, as all appearance, a sentence—a combination of words connected together by mutual relation. Jagadisa says that the so-called verbal cognition
sentence as a whole should be distinguished from

(s'abdabodha) is derivable only from a sentence, i.e. to say, when a number of significant words (sarthaka) having expectancy (akṣṛikṣā) and compatibility (yogyaṭā), with one another is related so as to constitute a sentence in the logical sense of the term. (1) Thus, a logical proposition is an idea or judgment expressed in the form of a sentence. It should be carefully noted, however, that the meaning of a sentence, which follows from its constituent parts. Jagadīśa notes that S'abdabodha is not materially the same as S'abdṛtha or the meaning of isolated words. The meaning of the sentence is something more than the mere sum-total of the significations of component parts. (Vilakaṇa bodhaḥ S'.S'. Pra.)

Vākyā. Definition:— Before dealing with the import of a sentence we will try to understand the definition of a sentence. Thus, Patañjali says that action (ākhyāta), with the help of all or each of the following viz. avyaya, kāraka and vis'esaṇam, makes for a sentence (2). A kriyāvis'esaṇam is also included herein (3); just action, aided by vis'esaṇam alone, can also make for a vākyā (ākhyātaṁ savis'esaṇam). At times a sentence is of the nature of an action alone—ekatih (mbh. II. 1.1). (The grammarians hold that the pada-padāma's aspect of a vākyā is ultimately illusory; they accept the sentence-whole and give us the concept of vākyasphota. (4).)

For the Naiyāyikas, a sentence is a collection of words having expectancy (5) (6). Vis'vānātha says that a sentence is a collection of words having compatibility, expectancy and juxta-position (=proximity).

In the Vedas we come across only consolidated sentences, i.e. sentences which are supposed to have been originally undivided into parts. The Taittirīya Śamhitā supports this—Vēg vai parācyayāṇātē. The grammatical method of analysis is a later development in the history of language. This view is strengthened by the definition of Śamhitā or emphonic combination of letters as we find in the Rk Prātiśākhya. Padaprakṛtih Śamhitā.—It is said that the Śamhitā or the close combination of letters as 'Agnimle' is what represents the original form and the practice of breaking it up, i.e. into Agim and Ile, shows only a
grammatical process followed in a much later period. The dictum: 'Padaprakṛṭih Samhitā' gave rise to a great controversy. The Padavādins (Mīmāṃsakas) and the Vākyavādins (Vaiyākaranas) have constructed it in different ways. The Padavādins take Padās as real and significant, and the sentence (inflected words) for them is only a combination of such padās (inflected words). They explain the compound 'padaprakṛṭih' in such a way so as to prove the priority or originality (prakṛṭitva) of the Padās (Padānī Prakṛṭiyasyāḥ). The Vākyavādins take the sentence or better say vākyaspoṭa to be the only significant unit of speech. They simply reject the notion of the precedence or priority of the padās in preference to that of a sentence and thus explain the compound padaprakṛṭih as Padānī yā prakṛṭih Seyam padaprakṛṭih. It is difficult to say which of the two explanations is more acceptable (7).

Durgacārya has some relevant notes on this. It is emphatically stated that the Mantras, revealed as they were through the holy seers of antiquity, manifested themselves in the compact form of the Samhitā or combination and not in that isolated words. The teacher makes the student acquainted first with the Vedas in their Samhitā form before he is allowed to proceed in his study on a grammatical line. Again, at the time of performing Vedic rites, the priest cites the Mantras in their consolidated form.

GRAMMARIANS:

The grammarians attach much importance to Vākyaspoṭa as the really significant element of speech. Thus, spoṭavādins are the same as vākyavādins. The author of the S'abdakaustubha says that of the eight varieties of spoṭa, only vākyaspoṭa is accepted to be real and significant (8). Thus, the spoṭavādin the sentence is an indivisible unit (akhaṇḍa) and the analytical method of grammar that breaks up a sentence into parts is but an artificial device used for the understanding of unintelligent people (9).

Punyarāja also holds that this view is shared even by Pāṇini and Patañjali (10) so, padānyasatyāni vākyameva Satyamityarthāḥ — notes
Punyarajcon V.P.I.174. Bhartrhari establishes this view very ably. He makes use of such technical Vedantic terms as upadhi (superimposition) and adhyasa (superimposition), to explain the cognition of the diversity of words in the unity of a sentence (11). For Bhartrhari, the akhanda is real (sa-yatya), and the divisible-khanda is unreal (asatya). The grammarians enter into investigation of the nature of words but they reach the supreme truth (12). It is thus said as letters like क, क्ष, etc. do not admit of further division into parts, so there are no parts in a word; and words have no separate existence apart from a sentence (13). Again, just as we have recourse to an unreal thing like the practice of analysing a word into prakriti (stem) and pratyaya (formative elements), so we disjoin the words from the sentence in pursuance of the principle of apoddhara (disintegration) (14).

It is also stated that the sense conveyed by a sentence is also indivisible (15). Just as a word (S'abda Sphota) or a sentence does not really consist of any parts, so the meaning conveyed by it does not admit of any division (16). What is particularly emphasised here by the vakyavādins is that words which seem to enter into the composition of a sentence do not retain their separate identity, either in their formal or material aspect. The meaning of each individual word is found to lose itself almost entirely in the sense that is finally expressed by the sentence in its harmonious unity, e.g. the word Drūmaṇa has no separate meaning in the expression Drūmaṇa-kambaḷam (17).

Vākyārtha:

As to the nature of the vākyārtha we come across different views (see Dr. Kapildeva Dwivedi in his arthavijaya or darsana, where he quoted from Jayantabhaṭṭe-This is quoted by Bholaśāṅkar Vyas) as below:

(i) The sense of a sentence is jñāna.
(ii) As kriyā (action) is the most important element in a sentence, the vākyārtha is kriyā.
(iii) The Vākyārtha is Phala (result, fruit) as we perform any action with a view to some phala.
(iv) The Vākyārtha is Purusa (Is'vāra) for the result of action (phala of kriyā) is for Him.

(v) The Vākyārtha is Bhāvanā i.e. the vyāpāra of the karta, with reference to some desired object such as Sverga.

(vi) The Vākyārtha is S'abdabhāvanā or Vidhi.

(vii) The Vākyārtha is Niyoga or Prerana.

(viii) The Vyāk Vākyārtha is Ud yoga.

(ix) The Vākyārtha is Pratibha.

The Naiyāyikas hold phalā to be the Vākyārtha while the Vaiyākaraṇas believe it to be pratibhā or intuition. The view of the Dhamanivāda is not gathered clearly but as the Īlaṃkārikas follow Vaiyākaraṇas in general, we may hold them to do the same here also.

So, according to the Vaiyākaraṇas, the meaning expressed by a sentence is pratibhā or intuition which is innate or ingrained in us all (18). This ṣaṇḍa pratibhā is inborn and not post-natal, neither sense-born acquisition nor a result from common experience. It is termed as Saṃskāra or Bhāvanā, firmly seated in our mind and linked together with the continuous currents of knowledge flowing from previous stages of existence. Thus, it is termed as Purvavāsanā also. The Vaiyākaraṇa has to take recourse to the theory of previous existence in order to explain the concept of pratibhā.

So, what a sentence really signifies is the sense abiding in intelligence (Bhādhārthasya vacytwa). Words may have different meanings, and taken individually; but when grouped together in a sentence, we have a single sense that is different from the padārthas or the meanings of isolated words. This kind of a sense derived from the whole is called pratibhā (19). According to Bṛhatprāṇa Purṇārāja the padārthas, unrelied in themselves, help in the manifestation of pratibhā (20). According to Bhartṛhari the first thing that pratibhā achieves is to bring about an association of the meanings which seem to be otherwise unconnected (asamsāśa). It is the objective (viṣaya) that is directly conveyed by a sentence (21). This pratibhā is directly manifested by the use of words or by the ever
blossoming intellect which originates from the experience or memory of by-gone lives (22). Pratibhā is the source of all popular usages, and serves as the most reliable evidence determining the ultimate reason for one's particular inclination (pravṛti) (23). It is seen in the human beings as well as in all creatures alike (24). The Swan, the moment it comes out of its egg, begins to swim; the younger-one of the monkey clings to the branch of a tree and the newly born babe sucks the mother. Thus, the existence of pratibhā is self-certifying. It flashes upon a being as an intellectual heritage by the force of abhyāsa (practice), experienced in the long chain of previous cycles of births (25). The cuckoo pours its music in the spring, the birds build their nests, and their simple mode of dancing, jumping, amusement, jealousy, and the very manner of their collecting food etc. are inborn with them and all this is due to Pratibhā according to Bhartṛhari (26). Thus, Pratibhā actually means the same as instinct. Bhartṛhari concludes that the use of words rouses this innate intelligence (27). This Pratibhā, again, is six-fold as arising from nature, exercise, repeated practice, concentration of mind, actions done in prior lives and special efficiency or aptitude (28). It is really difficult to define precisely a sentence. From the logical point of view, it is not merely a group of words as Jagadis'a rightly remarks. The words that constitute a sentence should be having expectancy (akāṃketā), compatibility, (yogyaṭā), and proximity (Sannidhi). These are indispensable for the making of a sentence. Proximity pertains to the formal closeness of words and has very little to do with meaning. Expectancy and compatibility, on the other hand, refer to the logical aspect i.e. consistent correlation of meaning (29). Āsatti or sannidhi implies extreme proximity of words without which the very idea of combination becomes impossible (30). Thus, a mere combination, i.e. inconsistent group of words whether subanta or tīrṣanta, is not competent to be a sentence (31). This is how Jagadis'a rejects the definition given by Amarasimha as atiṣypta and avyāpta or too-wide and too-narrow. There is some peculiarity in the logical conception of a sentence. Sometimes, a single
inflected word (pada) is as good as a sentence. To the Naiyāyikas, the form 'ghatam' is as good as sentence, as it conveys karmatya pertaining to a pot (32). Thus, according to this view, ghatam karoti, should therefore be regarded as a mahāvākya or a compound sentence.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, a sentence is a combination of words, with oneness of sense(33). 'Oneness of sense' is an important condition. It implies that a sentence in its synthetical form gives rise to one single idea, though an analysis it is found to be made up of words that are mutually expectant (34). A combination of words, though capable of being split up into many significant parts, is considered by the Mīmāṃsakas as a single sentence, provided it is found to express only one connected idea. Not only is there a formal combination, but the meanings too are related to one another in such a way as to produce one coherent idea resulting from the association of the meanings. The dictum that a sentence signifies either difference or association does not render the oneness of the meaning inconsistent, because a sentence as a whole is generally used for the purpose of conveying an idea that is complete in itself (35). The Mīmāṃsakas attach the greatest importance to the verbal form (kriyāpada) in a sentence. So, according to them, the verb 'yajeta' is the predominant element in the sentence—'Swargākāmo yajeta'—in as much as the force of object of the whole sentence (attainment of heaven) is particularly determined by the verb. 'Apūrva' or the unseen, result to which the action ultimately leads is said to be conveyed by the verb and, by any other word in the sentence (36).

CONSTITUTION OF A SENTENCE : DIFFERENT VIEWS:

Much divergence of opinion as to the constitution of a sentence has been recorded by Bhartrhari in his V.P. He enumerates and discusses about eight different views on this point (37). From the point of view of linguistic studies, the first view is of great importance. It has:

ākhyātas'abdo Vākyam iti. (38).
It is held that a verbal form (ākhyātas'abda) is alone sufficient to constitute a sentence. This will remind us of the vārtika that defines a sentence as 'tīṣa' or verbal form (ekatīṅga). The verb 'varṣati' may be used with the same signification as that expressed by 'varṣati devo jalam'—both the subject and the object being understood from the very association of ideas.

So, according to this view, the essence of a sentence is necessarily action (kriyā) (39). The definition enunciated by the author of the Vārtika has also put emphasis on the predominance of the verb (40). For Kātyāyana, a verb is efficient enough to constitute a sentence in combination with either an indeclinable, a kāraka, an adjective or an adverb, as the case may be, e.g., 'uccaih paṭhati,' where 'uccaih' is an indeclinable (avyaya); or 'odanam pacati,' where 'odanam' is kāraka; etc. Those who look upon indeclinables, cases (kārakas), and adverbs as virtually the same as qualifying adjuncts in relation to the verb are likely to reduce the above definition to a much simpler form, i.e., a verb with its possible adjuncts is competent enough to make a sentence (41). The next vārtika says that a sentence is just 'tīṣa' or 'ekatīṅga' (Va. 10). These two vārtikas lead to the assumption that a sentence should contain one and only one verb. But if there are more than one verb in a sentence, e.g., 'pūrvar upūtī, pacati, tato vrajati;'—we find it difficult to determine whether it is a single sentence or a number of sentences put together (42). Following the second vārtika, we will find herein, at least three sentences as constituted by different verbs. But the Sūtrakāra does not accept it. According to him, 'vrajati' is the main verb with which the sense is completed and the rest are only subordinate to it or are just qualifying attributes of the same (43).

Others find the full import of a sentence in the inflected word (pada). Not only the verbal form as seen above, but also an inflected word is found capable of receiving the designation of a sentence, provided it is one that retains in itself the action usually denoted by a verbal root (44). We find certain sentences in which some words seem to be so predominant by their very nature as to denote the entire meaning by themselves without the
help of others. The meaning of the sentence-गयाको गयाति-can be
gathered by the single word-गयाका-, the verbal form-गयाति-'being unnec-
sary. Only in such cases, a single inflected word is found to stand for the
whole sentence, even independently of the verbal form. But, so far as the
grammatical conception of the sentence is concerned, one cannot just do
away with 'न्यायारा' i.e. action. We can easily notice here that a sentence,
whether consisting of a single word (i.e. either a नामा or an अक्षय्यता), or
a combination of words, must be-as a rule, indicative of some action, either
expressed directly or understood. To the Indian grammarian a sentence
without a verb is an impossibility.

The नैयायिकास, however, do not share this view of the grammarians.
Jagadīśa maintains that a sentence is a combination of mutually expectant
and consistent words, but he does not put much emphasis on the inclusion
of a verb. It is not necessary that the verb should be mentioned explicit-
ly, specially when (क्रिया) (action) is easily understood from the context.
So, Jagadīśa rejects the notion of the grammarians that there can be no
sentence without a verb (45). He bases his contention on popular usage.
'कुतो भवेन?', is a combination of words having no verbal form and yet
forming a sentence. So, it is not correct to say that a sentence without
a verb is practically incomprehensible. For, the grammarian, herein, a verb,
viz. 'क्षणचति' is implied and without it neither the sense is complete nor
is the proper करका, (i.e. अपदेना) determinable.

We have noticed that Bhartṛhari has referred to as many as eight
different views on the constitution of a sentence. These views, generally
speaking, fall under two distinct categories, viz. अक्षय्यद्विप, and
क्षणद्विपा. The श्पोतवादिस who take the sentence to be an indivisible
former unit, support the अक्षय्यद्विप, and the मीमांसाकास and the
नैयायिकास, who take the sentence to be a combination of words, are in
favour of the latter viz. क्षणद्विपा.

We have seen that the श्पोतवादिस, 'श्पोता represents the real word (the
eternal word), sound being only a quality of it (46). 'श्पोता is two-fold-
viz. external and internal (47). The extent Sphota admits of further
division into class and individual—(48). Those who support the indivisi-
bility of a sentence, are likely to take a sentence as forming either a
class (jatisphota) pertaining to a combination (samghatavartinī), or an
individual (vyaktisphota) that is to say that a sentence is one without any
parts (eko 'navayavah), or an intellectual assimilation (buddhanusamhṛtiḥ) (49).
Sphota vadin are duly noticed and explained by Bhartrhari. According to
Sphota vāda, a sentence that is expressive of sense is one and not dissolvable
into parts (50). It represents either vyaktisphota or jatisphota i.e. an
individual or a class in so far as the outward manifestation of Sphota
is concerned. The formal difference seen in these various types of
sentences is said to be simply due to upādiḥ, viz. the operation of vocal
organs employed in the production of sound and so on (51). Sphota has its
internal aspect or vital side and in that it is not at all verbal but
purely intellectual. The intellectual assimilation as showing the internal
form of a sentence means that a sentence, so far as it is related to the
internal world of thought, remains essentially intellectual in its origin
before it is materialised into audible sound. It is Nāda or sound says
Bhartrhari, that turns such intellectually assimilated ideas into concrete
expression of a sentence (52).

For the khandapaksa, a sentence is either an action, a kind of order or
succession, a collection of words, the first inflected word, or inflected
words having mutual expectancy with one another. We have earlier seen
these views. For those who regard the sentence as a 'krama', the word 'krama'
is used in the following way. Though usually the word 'krama' implies a
property of time as 'paurvāpyaya' (53)—i.e., priority and posteriorty, its
particular use in grammar is explained by Bhartrhari and Pundarāja as
below. Every inflected word in a sentence has got some special significance
as that of karmatvā, kartrtvā, etc., which come to our notice in a successive
or well-marked order together with similar meanings (vis'ēma) conveyed by
other words (54). For example, if we want to bring out the sense of a
sentence like, 'Devadatto grāmam gacchati', in a strictly grammatical method, we are apt to express it in the following way: the act of moving which has Devadatta as its agent and the village as its object. Here, the idea of 'karmatva' which adds a special feature to the meaning obtained severally from each inflected word, is called 'Vis'eya' that becomes comprehensible in a fixed or definite order (55). This definite order is regarded as the main factor of a sentence. Again it is started that there can be no sentence made up of words alone, if it happens to be devoid of such an order (56). Thus, which words are combined together in such a way as to express the intended sense (57).

These definitions of a sentence that are acceptable to the khaṇḍa pakṣa, can be classified into two classes on the basis provided by the two well-known schools of the Māṃsa system, viz. Pṛṭṭa (i.e. Kumārila) and guru (i.e. Prabhākara). Kumārila and his followers uphold the 'abhihitāvyavāda' as against the 'anvitābhidhānavaṇḍa' of Prabhākara and his supporters. According to Kumārila, therefore, a sentence should be explained either as a combination of words (sahṣṭha) or as an order (krama) and according to Prabhākara, it is a verbal form (ākhyāta), or the first inflected word (ādyam padam) or inflected words possessing mutual expectancy (sārveṣpadam sākhākṣam) that make for a sentence (58).

These two views, then, refer to the meaning expressed by a sentence. There is a great difference of opinion as to the meaning or the significance of a sentence. For the Sphoṭavādīn it is pratibhā (59). To one who defines Vākya as a verbal form, it is action ('kriyā') that forms the meaning of a sentence (60). For the abhihitāvyavāda it is association (samsārga) (61). 'Samsārga' - 'ASSOCIATION' is used here in its literal sense. It means that a sentence acquires some special feature, or import (tūparyārtha) when it conveys the intended sense (62). It means that when the meanings of different words in a sentence are correlated with one another, there arises invariably some additional significance, distinct from those of the constituents. Thus, the sense that evolves out of such anvaya or correlation of meaning is
something more than a mere sum-total of them (63). Jagadīśa calls it—
'Vilakaṇaṇobodhah' or special significance that results from the correlation
of meanings. For the anvītabhīdhānaśādins, on the other hand, the meaning of a
sentence is for all purposes the same as is signified by its component parts,
(64). Thus the import or the tattvārtha of the anvītabhīdhānaśādins is
nothing more than the meaning given by individual words themselves (65).

As to what forms the 'Nimitta' of the Vākyārtha there prevail different views.
Vācaspati Mis'ra in his Tattvābindu refers to these views and establishes the Bhāṭṭa view as the Siddhānta. We will try to see the different
views in the light of Tattvābindu, as follows:

(i) According to the Spotavādī grammarians the nimitta for the vākyārtha
is akhaṇḍavākyā, the padavārṇamibhāga being only the result of Avidyā (66).

(ii) According to some Māmasakas and Naiyāyikas, the Nimitta for the
vākyārtha is the knowledge that last letter, which is the accompanied by the
samskāras on impression of the experience of the meaning of the preceding
padas (67).

(iii) Or, according to some other Māmasakas, it is that varṇamālā or series
of letters, that is reflected in the mirror of memory, accompanied by the
amūhavabhāvanā of tattad padapādartha (those words and letters) (68).

(iv) Or, Vākyārtha is just the expressed meaning (abhidheyārtha), of the words
correlated with other words on account of expectancy, compatibility, and
juxtaposition. Thus, anvītāpadas or correlated words make for the expression
of vākyārtha. This is according to Prabhākara (69).

(v) The padartha, which is accompanied by ākāṅka, yogatā and Sāmriddhi,
and expressed by the words used, makes for the vākyārtha. Thus, first of all
the padas give padarthas and then with the help of ākāṅka, yogatā, etc.,
they give vākyārtha. This is the abhīhitānvyayavāda of Kumārila. Vācaspati
Mis'ra also accepts this view. On this abhīhitānvyayavāda is based the
idea of Tattvavārtti (70).

*Note: The first view is taken up for consideration.

For the vākyārtha when they are taken individually (vyāsas) or when taken
jointly (semastas)? Now, if it be held that the varṇas in the vyāsas form make
for the Vākyārtha, then the other letters become redundant. If they it is held that samastavار्णas makes for the Vākyārtha, then again, there are two alternate possibilities viz. (a) do they consider this correlation (संस्कृत it) as genuine (वृंदावनिता) or artificial (अपाधिका)? The idea is that whether the वर्णas-letters are naturally (वस्तुतः) (genuinely) correlated to one another or not, we have the experience that they are correlated and thus as they are thus accompanied by the experience of the hearer, they become related. But as वर्णas-letters are mitya and vibhu, they cannot be correlated to one another and as we have the experience of these letters gathered at different times, the experience also cannot be correlated.

The sρhydration also refutes the view of those who held the view that पुर्वa पुर्वa सामक्षरयुक्तa antimavर्णa makes for the Vākyārtha. The sρhydration asks as to what do the varṇavādins mean by the word 'Saṃskāra", or 'impression'. It is either the smṛti or something like the purification of rice etc. by chaffing etc. Certainly, the second alternative is not meant here. So here, the Saṃskāra stands for Smṛti. But Smṛti itself being just a वृंदावनिता or impression, which is of the form of power of the soul, the Vākyārtha-pratiti thus becomes the result of not the Saṃskāra but that of the power of the soul. Again, the sρhydration says that even though we have identical letters in words such as amādi, dīna, sāra, rasā etc. we have different meanings. So, letters in their akhandā form only make for sense. Thus, akhaṇḍavākya should be accepted by the Varṇavādī. The sρhydration cites the illustration of the word 'gauḥ' and says that the experience of the word gauḥ suggests that there is ekatā-onesness—and akhaṇḍatā-wholeness—in this word. For, if we take the different letters to be the objects of our experience it runs contraty to our day to day experience. If it is argued by the varṇavādin that just as the individual soldiers make for the army, or just as individual trees make for the forest, similarly different varṇas make for a pada and thus pada is a upādhi; to this we ask as to what is meant by this 'Upādhi'? 'Upādhi' or attribute can be two-fold: 1) ekājñānaviṣayatā, or becoming the
object of one and the same experience or,(ii)ekābhīdhyapratyayakhetuḥ—i.e. becoming the cause of the experience of one and the same bhūva(ekābhidyaya).

Now, if the upādhi is meant(i), then we will have to accept the padajñāna even before varṇajñāna which goes against the varṇavādī; and if by upādhi is meant(ii), then, there is itaretaras'RAYADOṢA. As arthabhimmatā or difference in meaning—is the cause of the distinction between one pada and a padāmanoth, and as padabhimmatā is gathered with the help of arthabhimmatā, the fault of itaretaras'RAYADOṢA arises. Thus, the Vākyārtha should be connected only with the akhanda-Sphota. This is the view of the Sphota-vādīn, which forms the prima facie view in the Tattvābhidhān.

After explaining the first view held by the Sphota-vādīn in detail, Vācaspati goes on refuting it. Vācaspati argues in the following way: Do the Sphota-vādīns establish their view on the foundation of our(i) normal experience, or(ii) on the difference of senses of pada and vakya?(76-A). If the first alternative is accepted, then again two alternatives prop up therein, as according(a) you accept vakya to be avayāvī, i.e. having avayavas or parts in form of padas, or(b) you do not accept any avayavas or parts with reference to the vakya-rtha. Now(a) cannot be accepted as pada is held to be 'vibhu' or all-pervasive even by the objector, and in that case it is not possible to dream of an avayāvī vakya which is 'vibhubhara'is illogical.(78)

Again, the Naiyāyikas take s'abhāda to be the quality of akṣā and quality or guna is avibhājya—i.e. incapable of division, and it cannot be the samavāya-kāraṇa of anything else, it being always 'dravya'itself. Thus, padas cannot be the akṣa or factors of the vakya-rtha(79). Now, if you accept the second alternative, i.e.(b), viz. that there is no avayava in a vakya, then it follows that the sentence as a whole makes for the sense and neither the varṇa, nor the pada is important and therefore varṇa or pada has no independent existence in a language. Well, it is time that only the sentence exists in a language, and that this akhanda-sphota is manifested by Dhvani, but all this is putting aside the reality and is like the face reflected in a jewel, sword, or a mirror. Again, we ask that if
The first Dhvani reveals the sense, what would be the use of other Dhvanis. Again, your antimadhvani also fails to reveal the Sphota fully. So, this Sphota and akhandavākya is a wrongly postulated hypothesis. The final Dhvani reveals the sense only if it is aided by the impression of the preceding Dhvanis. So they cannot be held as useless. Just as a jeweller gives his opinion about a particular stone after looking at it repeatedly, in the same way, the hearer decides the vākyārtha, with the help of the final Dhvani aided by the impression of the preceding Dhvanis. It is because of this that the padavādins accept the last letter, aided by the impression of the preceding letters to be cause of vākyārtha.80

The varṇavādīn refutes the theory of Sphota, for according to him, for vākyārthagrahāna, there is no necessity to postulate the hypothesis of Sphota. The varṇas themselves, used in the pada, make for arthapraṇitī. When they are in a particular order (say sarah), they give a particular meaning, and when they are in a different order (say Raṣah), they give a different meaning. Thus, the pada gives a particular meaning with the help of krama-sequence—nyūnātiriktatva, Svara, vākya, S'rut, etc. If different letters of the same pada are pronounced by different people, we do not get the meaning. If I say, for example, 'sa' and you say 'rah', we do not get the idea of 'sarah'. Thus, it is necessary that a pada should be pronounced by one and the same man, at one and the same time. Thus, eka-karttya is an important factor in arthānbhava and is the jñāpakahetu of it. So the vākyārthajñāna is the result of varṇasamāha and it is no use postulating the hypothesis of an anāvayava vākya.81

It may be noted that Māṇḍanamis'ra in his Sphota-siddhi finally establishes the Sphota-vāda in an admirable way after refuting the views of Kumārila and his supporters. We need not go into those details here.

Vacaspati then considers the second view held by some Māṃsakas and some Naïyāyikas. This view is slightly better according to him than the first one, as there is no postulation of any adṛṣṭa like Sphota herein. This view takes letters and words to be the cause of
Vākyārthapratīti. We get some trace of this view in the Nyāyabhāṣya of
Vākyayana. According to Vākyayana, when letters are spoken, the hearer listens
to them. These letters are not correlated in form of words-padas-, and
therefore the hearer first of all correlates them and through the agency of
words (padavyavaśāyena) and with the help of memory, he correlates different
words also and gathers thereby the vākyārtha (82).

So, according to this view, we do not hear any sentence fully at a given
moment. The speaker speaks letters one by one. As the letters perish imme­
dately (āśuvināsitva) and in a moment (kṣanikatva), every first letter disappears
whenever the next one is uttered. Thus when the sentence whole is completed, the
listener hears only the last letter at that moment. But he undoubtedly
gathers the whole sentence. The solution to this situation is that even
though the preceding letter or letters die out the moment they are uttered,
they leave behind them their impression in the minds of the listeners. With
the hearing of the last letter this impression comes up in form of memory
and produces the vākyārthadhi (83).

The abhīhitavasādvin (i.e. the Siddhāntin) refutes the above view as
below: Is it so that the last syllable explains the vākyārtha after causing
the memory of the correlation of the meaning of itself and the vākyārtha?
Then, we say that when the mental impression exhibits its impotency strength
viz. the remembering of padārthas, the padapratyaksā, etc., at this moment, the
cause viz. impression, does not exist. At the same time, when a listener
remembers the correlation of pada and padārtha, he cannot clarify the position
of the final syllable of a pada or vākya. So, the hearing of the last letter
accompanied by the memory of the preceding letter etc., cannot make for the
vākyadhī (84).

The third view is supposed to be held by some other Mīmāṃsakas. According
to the commentator of the Tattvabindu, this view is not held by any
particular Īśāyana, but both this and the preceding one are just placed as
prima facie views by Vācaspeta Mīśra (85). According to some this view is
held by the earlier Mīmāṃsaka Upavarga, who is older than Śtābaka (86).
So, according to Upavarsa'g&uh'is constituted of $e, a, u,$ and visarga.

These varṇavādins hold that we gather the meaning of a word or a sentence in the same way in which it is used by the elderly people. Now, these elderly people, in their regular affairs, do not use single letters of words, but use sentences to convey meaning. But a sentence cannot be without parts (anavayava). So, the sentence is just the correlation of syllables (varṇasamṛtha) left in memory. This varṇamālā or Dhvanimālā is the cause and vākyārthadhā is the effect. The knowledge of pada-pārthā is held to be instrumental only (nimittamātra), while the vākyārthadhā follows genuinely from the varṇamālā or a group of phonemes or syllables (87). The Brāhma Miśrasakas do not accept this view. They find two faults with this viz., those of 'gauravadoṣa,' and 'visayabhāvadoṣa' (88). They explain it in the following way— suppose, they say, we take the following eight sentences, viz., 'abhaka, gūm, gānaya, sīla, sām ladana, bala, gāmānaya, arbhaka, gūn badhāna, bhāla, gām badhāna, pālāma gāmānaya, bāmbha, gām badhāna.' Now, in these eight sentences, we can see only seven different words, viz., 'gūm, gānaya, bādhaṇa, arbhaka, sīla, bāla, and bāmbha.' According to the Varṇavādin (i.e., the Third view), we will have to accept separate power of each of the eight sentences. Thus, we will have to accept eight S'aktis in respect of these eight sentences. If we accept the view of the padavādins, we will have to accept only seven S'aktis with reference to seven words. Thus we have to go for unnecessary acceptance of additional S'aktis if we accept the varṇavāda. Thus, it becomes redundant on account of kalpa-gaurava (89). Another fault that is seen in this view is that of Visayabhava. The varṇamālā in a vākyya can cause vākyārthadhā only when there is first pārdadhā, Padārthajñāna is a must before vākyārthajñāna. It is only when the pārdadhās are correlated that the Vākyārtha flashes upon our mind. Thus, pārdadhajñāna is necessary before their correlation (anvaya). In this case, how can we take varṇamālā as the cause of Vākyārthadhā? Again, when we listen to a sentence, we cannot remember the syllables of even five or six words in a sentence, then what to talk of a long sentence full of many words? (90). Thus, this (viz., the third view) cannot be accepted.
The fourth view is held by Prabhakara and his followers who are known as anvitabhidhānāvādins. For them, the words used in a sentence, on account of expectancy, compatibility and proximity, are first correlated and they yield the vākyārtha, through the power called abhidhā(91). The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas or the abhihitānvayavādins object against this view. Their objections are as follows: when the anvitabhidhānāvādī says that the abhidhā power of a word is able to convey its meaning as well as correlation (anvaya), is it so that the vākyārtha is gathered through all the padārthas together or not?. If they (anvitabhidhānāvādins) hold that all the words together do not convey the vākyārtha, then for them only the first word-pada-will convey the vākyārtha. So, the use of other padas becomes redundant, as the vivakṣā (intention) of the speaker will be conveyed by just one word alone!(92). Or, if it be said that other words also convey vākyārtha, then in the sentence, Hariḥ gām badhmāti, wherein we get three words, the meaning of the action 'badhmāti' will not become clear until it is connected with 'Hariḥ' the agent and 'gām' the object. The same is the case with the other words. Thus, there arises the contingency or itaretaras'raya. (The illustration cited by Vācaspati Mīśra is sukhāyāṃ pacet)(92-A).

The fifth view is held by abhihitānvayavādins or by Kūṭaṛiṣṇa and his followers. According to them, the padas first convey their meaning separately, and then after getting correlated, they convey the vākyārtha.

Vācaspatimīśra in his Tatvabindu refutes Prabhakara's anvitabhidhānāvāda and establishes the abhihitānvayavāda as the Siddhānta. The abhihitānvayavādin says that unless a pramāṇa contrary evidence arises, usually, for any effect, we consider the immediately preceding factor as the cause of it. (95). Whenever there is vākyārtha-jñāna, it is preceded by padārthajñānasmtṛti, which should be then recognised as its cause. Again, this padārthasamāraṇa alone is not sufficient for bringing about the sentence-sense, but their correlation is also important. Thus the samāraṇa of the padārthas in the mind, qualified by akāṅkṣā, yogyata and Sānvidhi, makes for the vākyārthadāhū(96). Again the abhihitānvayavādin holds that
the mental impression (manovāsanā) by itself does not create the smṛti-memory of the objects of experiences that were known or unknown earlier. It just makes for the remembrance of the padārthas of a given padasmṛtha qualified by ākāṃkṣa, yogyata etc. Thus, padārtha-smṛti goes with (i.e., is sahākṛta) ākāṃkṣa-dī and thus only (i.e., ākāṃkṣa-dītreyasahākṛta) makes for the knowledge of the vākyārtha.

As for the argument that if padārtha-jñāna is caused by smṛti which is different from padās, then, in that case, it will not be capable of causing knowledge of the vākyārtha, for, in case if it is held to be capable of this, then we will have to accept this as the seventh pramāṇa over and above the six held by the Mīmāṃsā-darsana, or the S'abdaprāṇa will have to be included in this novel pramāṇa, and this is not noticed by S'abara and others, who have not accepted padārtha as a separate pramāṇa because they have already mentioned āgama-prāṇa which could have been only a sub-variety of the new padārtha pramāṇa (97), and also that if āgama-prāṇa is a sub-variety of padārtha, then, padārtha should be mentioned along with the other five pramāṇas, and this means casting aspersions on the scholarship-vidvattā-and omniscience-sarvajñatva-of Bhagavan, Bhāsyakara; moreover, if we take padārtha-jñāna as the nimitta of vākyārtha-jñāna then, we will have to accept either three vṛttis or two, such as (i) the first S'akti that helps the pada to give its individual meanings, and (ii) the second that causes its memory, and (iii) the third that correlates, or at least the two that give padārtha-jñāna and vākyārtha-jñāna respectively; while on the part of the anvītābhidhānavāda only one s'akti is required and thus there is no kalpanāgaurave—or the contingency of imagining many vṛttis (98-99); Vācaspati gives the following reply:

The abhihita-anvayavādin holds that only one S'akti as mentioned by the Prābhākara can not be connected with the anvaya or correlation. For thus, as anvaya or correlation is just one and identical with reference to different padas, we will have to accept the position in which all the padas stand for one another as synonyms!
The abhihitānvyavādīn again asks the following question to the anvitābhīdhānāvādīn: If it so that a pada by its S'akti conveys only the meaning as such (padārthasvarūpa) and not the correlation (anvaya) also which makes for the Vākyārthadhū? Or is it so that it conveys both its meaning and the correlation, both of which help to bring about the Vākyārthadhū?

The knowledge of the correlation of one padartha with another padartha is born of some other pada either known (s̄pāṣṭa) or unknown (aspaṣṭa), and not by the padas themselves. Those who are learned in the Vedas also hold this view and according to them, kriyā by abhidhā, cannot convey the kartā.

Thus, the abhihitānvyavādī accepts another S'akti, different form abhidhā. And it is termed as lakṣaṇās'akti. For them in laukika and vaidika sentences, the Vākyārthadhū is caused by lakṣaṇā. Vācaspatimis'ra clarifies the stages which the S'rotā-listener has to pass through while going from vākyasravāna to vākyārthajñāna. It is as follows: An individual listens to the sentences, spoken by the elderly people and thereby becomes conscious of activity (pravṛtti), inactivity (nivṛtti), joy or sorrow (harsa, S'oka) etc. Thus, he records this sentence as the cause of pravṛtti, nivṛtti etc. As the elderly person goes on using one word (pada) after another, he gathers newer and newer meanings (anupajāta) and this new (or anupajāta) meaning dawns upon the mind only after listening to some particular word (vis'eṣa pada) even though the words already pronounced are very well there. Thus the child takes them to be the cause of it (i.e. knowledge). This knowledge is only with reference to the padartha alone and as such it cannot make for the pravṛtti-nivṛtti, etc. But when the whole sentence sense is gathered then only it causes pravṛtti, nivṛtti etc. This vis'iṣṭā artha goes with the whole sentence. The vṛddhavyavahāra results into this. The words used in the vṛddhavyavahāra have this conveying of the Vis'iṣṭārtha as its object, but by abhidhā they convey only the padartha alone. Thus, as in the case laukika vākyas, so also in the case of vaidika vākyas, the words convey the sentence-sense through lakṣaṇā alone.
It becomes quite clear that for the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas the grasping of the meaning of the sentence, the vākyārtha grahaṇa, is achieved with the help of laksāṇa. Kumārila himself notes in his vārtika that: Vākyārtho laksyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitih.

Pārthasarathi Mis'ra in his Nyāyaratnamālā refutes the anvitābhidhāna-vāda and establishes that even though in a single sentence, we get many padās, still, with the help of ākāṅkṣādi we gather the correlation between different padās (103). Neither the sentence, nor the words by themselves make for the Vākyārthadhil. First of all, from the padaswarāpa we get padārtha through abhidhā and then vākyārtha becomes laksīta i.e., indicated (104). In a sentence there are many words, but when there is vākyārthadhil, all the padārthas are united just as all types of pigeons get together for picking up grains (105).

Vācaspati has made it quite clear that the power that correlates the word-senses in a sentence is quite different from abhidhā, and it is laksāṇa. But this laksāṇa is different from laksāṇa of the ālāṃkārikas, and thus we come across at least four vṛttis, viz., abhidhā, laksāṇa, gaunī and padārthaṇvayāya-śakti. In order to avoid the gaurava of recognising so many vṛttis, the padārthaṇvayāya S'akti is also termed as laksāṇa (106). This laksāṇa in or padārthaṇvayāya-śakti is different from laksāṇa of the ālāṃkārikas and probably because of this, others might have named it differently as Tatparya S'akti.

ALĀṃKĀRIKAS:

As seen above some of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas later on, called it Tātपarya Vṛtti in order to distinguish it from laksāṇa as such. Probably, the Mīmāṃsakas in kāśmirā, followed this tradition which was mentioned by even Abhinava and Mammaṭa. Moreover, Abhinava and Mammaṭa have identified Gaunī and laksāṇa of the Mīmāṃsakas. Thus, for them, Tātपarya becomes the third vṛtti and vyañjana is therefore termed as the Turīya Vṛtti (107).

Abhinava and Mammaṭa also accept this view of the abhihitānvyavāda. It becomes clear when we read: ityantagranthena upapāditasya abhinavaguptācārya-sammatapakṣasya bhuvacenaṃ Sṛṣṭi Mammaṭācāryapādaḥ Svamammatavamuktamiti tīkākāraḥ Sarvaḥ uktamitidik (Bālabodhini, pp. 27).
But lateron, certain Dhvanivādins rejected this Tatparyavṛtti, and Vidyānātha, the author of Pratīparudṛśa, includes Tatparyavṛtti in Vyañjanavṛtti and mentions the Tatparyārtha as identical with the vyāhgyaṛtha. The view viz—Soyam Is'orima dīrgadhāṅghatāro abhidhā vyāpārāḥ, etc., mentioned by Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa, considers Tatparyavṛtti as just a part of abhidhavṛtti. Mahima gathers the tatparyārtha with the help of Anumāṇa. He does not recognise Tatparyavṛtti in gathering the sense of 'Niśedha' from the sentence. Viṣṇu bhakṣya, māṃsya gṛha bhuvrīkṣāḥ. For him, the niśedhārtha does not fall in the province of Sābdabodha, but is gathered by the process of Anumāṇa, where the vācyārtha becomes the hetu. Thus, here we have an instance of Ārthī prakṛtyā and not Sābdī prakṛtyā. (108)
Foot-notes to Ch. IX.

(1) ब्राह्मणावली-तां जात्रे शास्त्रानुसार रूपांतरणा। शशी-प्र.32
(2) आर्यशास्त्र महाभारत विशेषणा वाक्यम्। महाभारत II.1.10.
(3) प्रकृति-विशेषणा च। mbh II 1.1.
(4) उद्देश्यमन्नाम: पदार्थवेत्तानि एकमिन्नमस्माकः वाक्यम्। तद्दुधुष्योन्यताय
पदविभागः कलितः इति। वा. प.टीका-पुष्याराज;
(5) मिश्रः साकादःशास्त्रं युस्मां वाङ्गः चतुर्विश्यः। शशी-प्र.24.
(6) विप्रवधाकर्षणं स्वाध्ययात्वाशाशाशरितं पदविधिः।
(7) नृषिताय on निर्देश I.17. says: संहितायाः प्रूढ़ितिः ज्ञानाः। मन्त्रोत्सरजीकरणं
विविधमस्यमानाः। यात्रायेकेष पूर्णे श्रेष्ठेष्ठेर्मृतः संहितायाङ्गं मतस्त्वः पूर्णमिवाध्यायन्न्य-नृषिताय अन्वित चास्तिकाः। विप्र च याः कपिंगां लक्ष्मीकुलकलाकार:।
(8) पश्चादिकाः फलं उक्तास्तास्पिष्टाः वाक्यानां प्रत्येकाः।
(9) V.P. III.240 says: उपायम्: शिक्षामाणात् बलानामपसापात।
(10) अस्वयं वर्णीं स्तित्वा तत्। सत्यं समीक्षते। and पुष्याराज on V.B.II.57 : तद्दुधुष्योन्यतायः पदार्थवेत्तानि एकमिन्नमस्माकः
वाक्यः। तद्दुधुष्योन्यताय पदविभागः कलितः।
(11) केवल शून्यकारस्य भाष्यकारस्य वाल्लामपराः, स् प्रभुः पुष्याराज on V.P.II.37
(12) उपायम्: प्रतिमाष्ठाः सरलस्वतिः। पदमेव निर्विश्वासः। पुष्याराज on V.P.II.26.
(13) अस्वयं वर्णीं स्तित्वा तत्। सत्यं समीक्षते। and also अभिभवत्यमाणां सूक्ष्णम्। शद्धः। पुष्याराज V.P.II.1293.
(14) पदमेव पदार्थकथाः प्रदक्षिणेण न कस्तन। V.P.I.173.
(15) अवश्यं पदार्थवेत्तान्त्र छत्रिकयां पदार्थमुक्तं इति। V.P.II.10.
(16) पदमेव न पदार्थवेत्तान्त्र छत्रिकयां पदार्थमुक्तं इति।
(17) पदार्थवेत्तान्त्र छत्रिकयां पदार्थमुक्तं इति। V.P.III.12.
(18) पदार्थवेत्तान्त्र छत्रिकयां पदार्थमुक्तं इति। V.P.II.14.
(19) विच्छेदग्रहणोंशा द्याना प्रतिभा केवल जाते।
वाक्यायु ह्वति तामाहुः पदार्थोपपाठितम्। V.P. II. 145।
(20) दैर्घ्यलैौलोप द्वायस्यपादितमामिल्यकामिति। पुष्पराज on V.P. 145।
(21) उपलेखबिचारायणा सा करोद्विचारिता।
साहास्यरचना विचारयत्वो वची। V.P. II. 147।
(22) साधारणवें जनताः वामानगमयेत वा।
इतिकृत्तयायाः तां न करिष्णदिवितं। II. V.P. II. 148।
(23) माण्डलप्रचन्द तां लोकः नवः समुपपथ्यति। V.P. II. 149।
(24) समारयमः प्रतिभन्ते चिंतिः विषयपरि तादृशातः। V.P. II. 149।
(25) जन्मान्त्रयायास्मेहेऽकेभि। पुष्पराज।
(26) स्वरूपं विकृतस्तः मथर्युक्तिन्य कः।
जन्मात्मायः कुमायन्निष्काशे कैन शिक्षिता॥ II. 151।
बाधाप्रतिलोलिताः पुनः विनिर्दितजितः कः।
जात्वन्यस्विनिलोकाः प्रयोक्तः मूर्चनिलोकाम्॥ II. 152।
(27) प्रतिभाभीति कुथः यथू मूलमित्यतः। पुष्पराज।
and also माण्डलनागमरेतचन्द्रायायेत जाते। क्रमः त्रिविषयेक।
माण्डलविकृतः स्पष्टायाः प्रसाधनं। विशिष्टिष्ठेन। V.P. II. 53।
(28) स्वभावपत्रता म्यास्यगृहातोपनाित।
विशिष्टोपिश्च चैति प्रतिभाः भद्विनां विदु। V.P. II. 54।
(29) कथयतात्तसांक्रणह ह्वति अवहारारूपः मूलकुणो। pp. 497।
(30) The S.D. II. says : वंशका विदाहनां पर्वमार्गस्य वामानाधिकारिणी फॉक्स्सी तत्तदाः। पिंपानं जीतत्ववर्त्ती इत्यादिपी वाक्यं स्यात्। अवहारारूपः। निराकारदेशिः वाक्यं गद्यस्य : पुनः हस्ती इत्यादिनिमापिः वाक्यं स्याताः। बाधाप्रतिलोलिताः प्रयोक्तः मूर्चनिलोकाः।
(31) सुप्रतिभाश्च नैवमित्यायाः प्रविष्टिः। शु ॥ 13।
(32) द्वीप-वृत्ति-कुम्भनः। तथा।
(33) साधारणवें वाक्यं साधुवें चैदु विमानं स्यात्मा। V.P. II. 146 and also
dकायः फर्मसूहः वाक्यं साधु! महा। शु ॥ II. 146।
(34) साज्जेश्वरवर दैवी परामाणुनारायणः
कृप्याने गुणानुकूली वाक्यानिष्ठते। V.P.II.4.
(35)पैदा हुलो वा वाक्यार्थ हति यथैते अरुणोदयनामः सा मा। on VI.
S&II.1.45.
(36)तस्मातेष्यः प्रतिगतिः सत्त्वात् प्रतिगतिः प्रतिगतिः भवानी। and also अभुर्यमात्यात्पदः
प्रतिपादितमसः भवानी। and also भावशास्त्रायुर्मुल्ल्य चोड़कः: या मा।
(37) आत्माशाहः कृष्णातो जाति: सत्यात्मात्वकृतिः
एकोऽनुक्षेपः शब्दः क्रमो दुःखमुक्ति।
पदमयं पुमः नस्तवः सार्वात्मात्मात्वकृतिः।
ब्रज्यं प्रति मन्त्रित्वम् बुधवा न्यायवादिनाम्। V.P.II.1.
(38) आत्माशाहो वाक्यात्मिः
आत्माशाहे नियते सार्वां यन गच्छते।
तद्यों समाप्तां वाक्यात्मानी मिहिते। V.P.II.327.
(39) आत्माशाहो वाक्यात्मिः फोऽ कृष्णाः वाक्याः। पुण्यराजः on V.P.II.1.
(40) आत्माः साक्षात्कारकृत्यशैलयाः वाक्यः-क्रांतिः ९ on VI.2.11.1
(41) अयो बाह्यात्मा सक्षेपाणिः माति ख्यातिः सेवितानि कृष्णाकेश्वरानि
mbh- on Vārāhika 9.
(42) ख्यातेमापि कन्यानि सिद्धत्व स्वैकृतिः
तथा निद्रौऽन्नं तत्र खुः तिमकाः स्वैकृतिः। V.P.II.6.
(43) नास्त्यत्वात् वाक्यमेँः गातिरेष्यं विशेषान्यायः विशेषान्यायः विशेषान्यायः
विशेषान्यायः वाक्यान्यायः-पुण्यराजः and also वहुष्प्रियि तिम्याः
साक्षात्कारकृत्यशैलयाः। V.P.II.450.
(44) वाक्यम् तदापि मन्त्रयो यत पदम् चारितकिम्। V.P.II.326.
(45) मृगार्थिस्ते न वाक्यम् अस्ति तत् ख्यातिः प्राणको निचुक्तित्वाधकदेव। या या.
का 13.
(46) स्मारोऽशः 'वनि' श्रापः 'श्रापः' हति। पुण्यराजः V.P.II.1.
(47) स्मारोऽशः 'विधिः' बाह्यात्मकर्तश-पुण्यराजः V.P.II.1.
(48) बाह्यात्मिः 'तिम्यकिम्बितेन विशिष्टः'।
(49) तत्वाश्चन्द्रतो जाति: सेवितानात्वकृतिः श्राकोऽनुक्षेपः शब्दो दुःखमुक्ति
विनिः कृष्णानाति (पुण्यराज on V.P.II.1)
(50) एवं निरेश्वर वाक्य साधकाभाष्य युक्तम् पुण्यराज on V.P.II.12.
(51) यस्ते प्रतिवादः सौंदर्यावत् सप्तख्त्रियः—पुण्यराज on V.P.II.19
(52) यदन्तः शब्दतः तु नादेवेणि ग्नासितोऽ

वादादुरपि श्रवं तस्मी वाक्येऽत्रत्कालया V.P.II.30.
(53) विषयं हि ध्वम्: वाल्लयं तैन वाक्यं न विकाले

dr on V.P.II.61.
(54) सन्ता संस्कृतवाक्य पदार्थं ये पदार्थानुसार 

नेत्र प्रादेशिकान्तान्तरायकाम् V.P.II.50
(55) कर्मसूक्तात् विकालय: सन्ता एव पदार्थः वाल्लयं प्रतिवादः

हृदि य एव वाक्यम् पुण्यराज on V.P.II.56.
(56) क्रियाविश्वास्यात् शब्दात्मकेऽ वाक्यपदाविवाक्यमस्तीत्वाचर्येऽ

(57) क्रम एव वाक्यान्त्विति पदार्थम् वाक्यमुक्तमू पुण्यराज on V.P.II.52.
(58) क्रिया पुरीक्षणं क्रम हस्त्विश्वास्यावत् वक्त्रात्मकहृदि पुण्यराज on V.P.II.1.

and वाक्याचर्येऽः पदार्थार्थियं पृष्ठां सर्वं साधकाभाष्यान्त्विन्धिनीनां निवालयते

(59) लिङ्कांप्रश्नो त्रिविश्वास्य लक्षणान्त्विति प्रतिवादः वाक्यार्थः पुण्यराज V.P.II.1.
(60) वाक्यात्मको वाक्यान्त्विति वर्तमानं फासिन चिद्या वाक्यार्थः| on V.P.II.1
(61) सुशास्त्रध्वम्: क्रमान्त्विति यथा च संस्कृतवाक्यार्थः। पुण्यराज On V.P.II.1.
(62) पदार्थं परत्स्थापनं फार्थशास्त्रातिहितकम् संस्कृतवाक्यार्थः। पुण्यराज on V.P.II.41 and सहस्वले सत्यत्वविश्वास्यपुण्यराजः

वाक्यार्थः मेवः त्रि ग्रामातस्स्मयम् V.P.II.42.
(63) पदार्थं संस्कृतवाक्यार्थः विशेषण वुद्धवाक्यार्थः पित वाक्यार्थः समुलस्वित्व-विश्वास्यवाक्यार्थः 7मस्म । K.P.II.7.
(64) पदार्थः सन्ता एव वाक्यार्थः हस्त्विश्वास्य विवाहवार्तितम्। K.P.II.7.

(65) क्रियान्त्विति यथा वाक्यार्थः य साधनान्त्विति स्वतः

(66) अनकारं मेवः वाक्यमध्यमप्रवृत्तियोपस्वित्ववालयम् नितिनिविनितम् सैलिबः

तत्त्वकेन्द्रम् pp.6.

(67) वाक्यमध्यमप्रवृत्वित्ववालयम् एवं वाक्यमध्यमम् नितिनिविनितम् सैलिबः

क्रियान्त्विति यथा वाक्यार्थः य साधनान्त्विति स्वतः।
(67) We have seen above the view of the Sphoṭavādins as explained by Bhartṛhari. We will try to see how Vācaspati Miśra tries to refute the above-mentioned view of the grammarians. In the beginning, we will the arguments put forward by the Sphoṭavādin, which is the pūrvapakṣa here. For him, akhaṇḍa Sphoṭa is the nimitta for the vākyarthā. When we take Sphoṭa to be akhaṇḍa S'abda, we cannot take the pada-vākyādi vibhāga, which we come across on the ordinary plane (vyāshārika-or empirical plane), to be 'akhaṇḍa S'abda'. The varṇavādins hold varṇas, letters to be nimitta of vākyarthā. But the sphoṭavādins may put the following question before the varṇavādin: Do the varṇas—make-

(71) ... pp.25

(72) ... pp.25

(73) ... pp.25
(75) तस्मात स्वस्थ्याः-त्वामोक्षपथम् कथनेकान्तामुच्षारकुलपरेहतस्वकामोक्षकाः ।
प्रकाशः pp.35 इति।
(76) गौरित्स्केषं हदं फदमितकावमानिः चीरित्य स्पक्षिकारिकायां- pp.49 इति।
(77)स बलमेघाको वाक्याला वाक्यार्नीति: अज्ञाद्वा व्यवस्थाप्ते कर्मिनिधारुता वा
अन्न्य अनुपमावात् - pp.9 इति।
(78) न ताब्यादृश्यः कल्पाः कक्षिकान्तुपरमाणुपाण्यात्वकाः । परमपत्ता व वणगीता
तदनुपपत्तः: pp.9 इति।
(79) गयनुपात्रे च अझ्याम व्ययाभिन्यात्राभावायामावापावात् । pp.10 इति।
(80) पूर्वाधिकारिकान्तुपरमाणुपरमाणुवायुविकारारूपोऽविकारारूपेन्द्रियः तन्न्यो त्यति: स्पूततां
स्मिर्नितिः विशेषस्तोन्नितिः भवति न वैयकध्वित्यादिप्रभुत्तिः नार्त्य भूमिः गताय न
तद्वाचे तदनिपुलितसंस्रवायाभावान्त्यश्वेतस्तादान्तवथा व्यवस्थबासाः ।
पाणीभवावात् । pp.20 इति।
(81) तत्त्वदमेतविषयमेदरस्तुभाष्यम् वा नित्वादिन्युक्तकालोकवायासाक्तीति स्थिते
नान्तनकर्षणेको वाक्यं वाक्यार्थाय योगार्थितः-कश्चित् - pp.76
(82) वाक्यस्य श्रद्धा कुतुं वाक्यमृतं कर्त्तव्य भवति नुतन वाक्यमृतमेव यस्य
प्रतिष्ठानेव प्रतिष्ठानं च व्यवस्थित पदवक्याः स्वरूपं पदार्थं प्रतिपल्ले पद्मूभ्रतिः
संशोधनां रूपं व्यवस्थित समुद्वार्थाः पदार्थाः पदार्थानुमृतिः वाक्यार्थः प्रतिपल्ले।न्यायमूल
वाक्याणुकाः;III.2.62
(83) इस बल्यमन्त्राः कर्त्तव्य: पूर्वप्रक्षेपणाको विकाराणान्तन्त्रान्त्रानिकाचितोऽन्त्रात्मा
विभाजितस्मादेव स्थानस्वरूपसंशोधनान्त्यात्मान्त्रान्त्रानिमुक्तस्त्रिपरिलक्षणार्थाः।
कश्चित् - pp.77
(84) न अन्तन्त्रां श्रद्धाः: स्मृत्या नीति वाक्यार्थार्थाक्तिः pp.76 इति।
(85) एततं नामविवेकावानास्वाधीनोपन्नतं हितं केतिष्ठतत्त्विन्दु दीक्षा तत्त्वविभागः
pp.7
(86) नेनाः तथा हुं शब्दं हितं भावानुभुतं - पीरणामाण्यः I.1,5 and also
gौरित्स्कं कक्षग सः गदाराकाविसिद्धिः इति भावानुभूताः: योगूपाण्यः III.17
gौरित्स्कं कक्षग सः गदाराकाविसिद्धिः इति भावानुभूताः: योगूपाण्यः III.17
(87) व्योमप्रक्षेपणानायाः हि सत्त्वस्वतं न व पदार्थे व्यवहाराः कर्त्तव्याः
वृत्ताः: हितुः वाक्यामेव, तन्न्याद्वयं यमंगीतिः स्मृतिकारकाः वर्णमिता परिलक्षितः
वा च. क्षैरपिन्नेि वाक्यार्थासामायः। परस्यास्तुकस्तु वाक्यविशेषातिविपल्ले
वर्गीयते वाक्यार्थिः हितं। कश्चित् - pp.83,84
(88) गौरित्स्कं कक्षगामाण्यासदुक्षेपेव भावः:
वाक्यार्थार्थाः स्मृतिस्था नादारावति:। कश्चित् - pp.84।
anvita-abhidhāvādī may argue as follows: If we do not accept
the anuvita-abhidhāvāda, then, in that case, we will have to postulate
two abhidhas'aktis, viz. the one that conveys the sense of individual words and the other that conveys the sense of the whole sentence, after correlating the word-sense. Again says he, there is
no fault in our view. Even though every word in a sentence with abhidhā power, conveys the correlated meaning, still, the sense of the sentence is not gathered just by the first word alone. So, it should be held that a word, by abhidhā, conveys its own meaning and correlation and not the meanings of other words. The anuvita-abhidhāvādins again put the following question to the abhidhāvādins viz. - that when we get some knowledge from the words, what type of knowledge is it? The Sūtra speaks of four types of knowledge, viz. pramāṇa, sams'aya, viparyaya and Smrta. Now, arthapratipatti cannot be taken as a pramāṇa, because pramāṇa occurs only with reference to that which is already existent. Padarthā cannot be supposed to be existent before padārthavāṇa. Nor can we take padārthajñāna as either sams'aya or viparyaya (=mithyajñāna). As there is no fifth type of jñāna, we should take padārthajñāna as Smrta only. Thus, a pada depends on Samskārod-bodha and they make for the Smrta in form of padārthajñāna.
The kavyaprakāśa of Mammata also throws light on the anvitābhidhānavāda. Mammata discusses this theory in the second ullāsa and then elaborately in the fifth ullāsa. Accordingly to Prabhākara, the vācyārtha is itself the vyākhyārtha.

(94) वाच्यार्थं एव वाक्यार्थं: हत्यान्तरतामिथानादिति: k.p.

The words in a sentence first express the sāmānya artha, and then the vis'istārtha. These two are the two aspects of the same sentence. This vis'ista artha is nothing else than the vācyārtha itself.

We will treat the anvitābhidhānavāda in greater details below, when we will consider the topic of vyenjanaśādha.

(95) तव तान्दोत्तरनिको न्यायो यद्यति कक्ष्याकामोपायपि साक्षारिणां कार्यं च प्रवा-चनं हि कारणमयति तद्यावाक्ये तथा चार्यमृति वदति।

(96) तद्वृत्तांकेष्वा(मात्रिनां) स्वार्थसृतिनामात्रास्त्यसास्तिकाः किरिणाः

अस्तव: वाक्यार्थप्रवृत्या प्रत्ययस्याः। pp.112.

(97) नूतनं न मन्नान्तरतुतुत्तासमाध्यां स्वत्वार्थस्य एव अन्वर्त्त: एव अन्वर्त्त:।

वाक्यार्थीप्रवृत्यां अवर्त्त: एव अन्वर्त्त:। तदेव प्रेक्षायद्विविधः। सह तु कृत्या-नीति-पत्नशास्त्रमें।

(98) न हि भाषायुविष्ठस्य विष्ठाविति प्रेक्षायेते, प्रेक्षायेते ब्राह्मणार्जुनायाविति वसिष्ठयुविष्ठाविति वाक्यार्थस्य वा लोकिकाः। pp.121.

(99) सत्वा च बताहितः: शास्त्रः: चैव वा। पदार्थं हि तान्दोत्तरमिथानां शक्ति: तत्वसं-पाणां अन्यो-यात्मान्यान्यान्यात्मानां, वाक्यार्थप्रधानिष्ठकाः पदार्थान्यमात्रः।

(100) तन्नान्ततैव वदति वाक्यार्थसाधिति तत्वसंपाणां, स्वार्थस्यान्त्यसात्त्विन्यासात्। pp.123, 125.

(101) अन्तः कथमः: सदायः: हि तद्विष्टवायाः। अत एव बाल्यात्माऽऽ कपिलभाषायितुं

नान्त:। pp.131.

(102) तत्वा हि कुदात्मस्य वाक्यार्थप्रवृत्यां समन्तग्रं त्रिवृत्ति निन्याविषयविद्योत्तमस्त्रितिव:। व्युत्तन-शास्त्रकेष्येको य ईणितप्पोत्तमस्य वाक्यार्थप्रवृत्यां समन्तग्रं सुभव्यः।

तत्वसंपात्तिवेदयेति। न वेदः प्रत्यः: वाक्यार्थसाहित्यः: वाक्यार्थाधिते विष्ठायते। तत्वाधित्याणात: कर्त्त विष्ठायितान्तरौ: बुधेकारेः, तत्वाधित्याणात्त्वसंपात्तिवेदयेति।
फानाम... 

(103)तनिश्चेत्यः योजनेऽवस्तुक्षणः। pp.153.4-5

(104)तस्मात् वाक्यं न फलिन सादवत् वाक्यताः पर्यत्ति किंतु।

(105)वृद्धि: युवान: सिस्व: कपौत्र: को कथा: मी युगपत्तिनि।

(106)संवेदन च न ज्ञातिं पवृत्तिक्लीकणं लक्षणमशोभति भवतु तद्हि चुर्रिं दृष्टवात्

(107)S.D.Spys- 

(108)विषयमाणादपि परापेतु मृि्भोजस्य धारणाम्।

and also वाक्यवृद्धि: सब्ज्ञातिं स्वातिः वाक्यताः पर्यत्ति किंतु।

and also वाक्यवृद्धि: सब्ज्ञातिं स्वातिः वाक्यताः पर्यत्ति किंतु।

and also वाक्यवृद्धि: सब्ज्ञातिं स्वातिः वाक्यताः पर्यत्ति किंतु।

K.P.20

and also वाक्यवृद्धि: सब्ज्ञातिं स्वातिः वाक्यताः पर्यत्ति किंतु।
After considering the nature of Abhidharma and Tatparya we may consider Laksana or the power of indication, or that function of a word which gives us the secondary meaning. The word that gives the secondary sense is called Laksana, the sense, laksyārtha, and the function, lakṣaṇā. That words are at times used in a sense other than the primary was recognised by pioneer grammarians such as Patañjali who admitted a gauni vṛtti besides mukhyā vṛtti. He has explained the conditions that necessitate the recognition of lakṣaṇā as a process of transference of one's attribute to another. The various illustrations of lakṣaṇā cited by him under the rule Pa.4.1.48, are as below: Mañcah hasanti, Gaṅgeyam Ghosah, yaṣṭiḥ praves'aya, etc. These are so clear and typical that they have been often used by others. The Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas and all the other schools of thought recognise lakṣaṇā. Though this vṛtti was generally called lakṣaṇā, other names also were current viz gauni vṛttiḥ, bhaktiḥ or upacāra. Usually when there is a lakṣaṇika use of words, we see commentators saying: "gaunoyam S'abdaprayogaḥ, bhāktaḥ va, or upacāro'yaṃ etc., though in course of course herein we come across different shades of meaning. We will consider this in detail later on.

Lakṣaṇā, then, is a secondary or second function. As Māmaṭa says, the power really belongs to Vācyārtha, though, for all practical purposes it is supposed to belong to VācakaS'abda.(1) Thus, if Gaṅgeyam Ghosah is taken as an instance of lakṣaṇā, the lakṣyārtha of gaṅga-tata is, really speaking conveyed by the Vācyārtha viz. gaṅgepravāha, and not by the word 'gaṅga'. The idea is that the power of the S'abda Ḥ'gaṅga' becomes exhausted in expressing gaṅgepravāha. Now, where lies the possibility of the word, which has become powerless after giving the abhidhārtha, conveying the lakṣyārtha viz. gaṅgatataḥ? Thus, when we say that lakṣaṇā is the power of a word, we are slightly in exact and attribute to the word, a function that belongs to its sense.

CONDITIONS OF LAKŚAṆĀ:-

Lakṣaṇā presupposes three conditions. (2)(i) The Vācyārtha must be
The vācyārtha must be such as is connected with the vācyārtha—(mukhyārtha, or tadyoga), and (iii) the laksāṇa must have been resorted to either (a) in keeping with usage or rūḍhi, or (b) with a definite purpose (prayojana).

The vācyārtha becomes in-applicable or badhita because of its coming into conflict with the pramāṇas. In gāṇḍaṁ ṣīṣe, the mukhyārtha viz. gāṇḍaprajāvahā is badhita, say, by pratyakṣa pramāṇa and again fails to comply with the second requirement of a vākyā viz. 'Yogyatā'. In determining whether a sense is badhita or not, we take note of the tātparya or purport of the words. Thus, when we say that in gāṇḍaṁ ṣīṣe, the mukhyārtha of gāṇḍa is badhita, it is the purport or tenor of the sentence that makes us say so. Otherwise, one could have said that the mukhyārtha of ṣīṣe (and not gāṇḍa) is badhita and that laksāṇa applies to gōṣe and not gāṇḍa.

Now, the laksāṇa must be such as bears some sort of connection—may be even of vaiparitya or contrariety—with the vācyārtha. If this condition is not fulfilled, every sense could be the laksāṇa. The connection may be any one of the five enumerated by Bhartṛmitra and others:

abhidheyena Sambandhat Sādṛṣyat Samavāyatāḥ.

Vai pariṣṭh kriyāyo 'lakṣaṇā pañcadhā mata ā || (4).

(4) Canons of interpretation in Sanskrit, are, on ground of 'gaurava' doga against the secondary use of words, where the primary use would give the same idea.

Lakṣaṇa which is a secondary function, requires justification. Lakṣaṇa is justified on the score of prayojana or rūḍhi. Gāṇḍatāte ṣīṣe will fail to convey the sense—prayojana—of the preponderance of S'aitya and pāvanatva, that is conveyed by 'Gāṇḍaṁ ṣīṣe', which, therefore, is justified. The example of lakṣaṇa based on rūḍhi is 'karmāṇi kusālah' according to Māmata. Vis'vanātha disagrees. Hemacandra does not accept Rūḍhimula lakṣaṇa at all. It might have been that all instances of rūḍhimula must have been thrimuṣṭ prayojanamula in the beginning. The first gentleman who transferred 'Kusālah' to the realms other than that of Barbhagrahana did so on the basis of upacāra (i.e. transfer due to similarity). But constant use
has totally discarded the prayojana element in it. Mānıkyaśandra very critically brings out this viewpoint when he says: Mirūdā iti bhraṣṭopacarapratītayāh. Kumārila also recognised this fact, and even went to the length of saying that even rūḍhīlaksanā may to-day be employed as prayojanalaksanā under certain circumstances. We have seen that 'tadyoga' is one of the requirements for laksanā. This tadyoga may be Śāṁyā, Sambandha, abhāva sambandha, tātkarma, sādṛśya, Svēmibhāṣṭya sambandha, tādārthya etc. Based on these Sambandhas or relations, laksanā is divided into gauni i.e. based on Sādṛśya Sambandha and Suddha i.e. based on Sādṛśyetara Sambandha. We will consider the classification of laksanā later on. It may be noted here also that according to the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas, and certain ālaṃkārikas such as Hemacandra, gauni vṛtti is recognised as distinct form and independent of laksanā. Thus, a word has, in view of the latter, four vṛttis viz. abhīdha, gauni, laksanā and vyanjanā. Vidyānātha, in his Pratāparudriya refutes the view of the Prabhākaras and observes that gauni cannot be a separate function of a word. If at all, it can only be a subdivision of laksanā, as in both there is mukhyārthabādha and tadyoga. If gauni be accepted as a separate function of a word, he observes, then we would have to accept several functions based on several relations. The Naiyāyikas also hold a similar view.

Classification: Māmāta seems to classify laksanā in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Laksanā</th>
<th>Rūdhimulā</th>
<th>Prayojanamulā</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Šādhyavasana</td>
<td>gauni</td>
<td>Suddha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(=gaurvahikah)</td>
<td>(gaurevāyam)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upadāna (iv) (jñahat)</td>
<td>(v) Saropa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuntāh laksanā</td>
<td>pravis'anti</td>
<td>(gṛur gṛtam ghosah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and (vi) Sādhyavasana</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Ṛgvedam)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, gauni laksanā is that which is based on Sādṛśya Sambandha, and Suddhā is one which Sādṛśyetara-sambandhamulā (i.e. the relations of Kāryakāraṇa, tādārthya, tātkarma, etc.). Suddhā is again 4 fold as shown above, while gauni is two-fold.
It should be noted however that these divisions and subdivisions pertain to prayojanavatī laksana alone and not rūdhimālā. Manikyacandra suggests that rūdhī laksana is so well established that we cannot penetrate into its nature. Thus, it is of the type of abhidhā. The S.D. gives a more detailed classification.

Upādānalaksana is also known as ajahatśvārthā or ajahallakṣaṇa. Its definition is, according to Mammaṭa, svasiddhaye prākṣeṣaḥ. It is a subdivision of Suddha. The example is: Kuntāḥ pravis'anti. The Vācyārtha of Kuntāḥ cannot be logically constructed with 'pravis'anti'. So, there is mukhyārthabādha and we derive the idea of 'Kuntin' or 'kuntadhārīṇah'. In this instance, the vācyārtha is completely comprehended in the lakṣyārtha. The idea of 'kuntin' is completely included in that of 'kuntadhārīṇah'. So, it is called upādāna laksana or ajahat-śvārthā.

Lakṣaṇa laksana is defined as: pariṇām śvāsamarpāṇam. It is also termed as Jahallakṣaṇa. This is another subdivision of Suddha. In this particular variety, the vācyārtha surrenders its meaning and yields place to the lakṣyārtha. In gaṅgāyaṃ ghoṣaḥ, the word gaṅgāyaṃ surrenders for the lakṣyārtha. This variety is called laksana laksana because gaṅgā here serves as the characteristic (laksana) both of the Vācyārtha and the lakṣyārtha. The Sampradāya-prakāśiṇī explains laksana as laksanam upalaksana. Manikyacandra and others explain the word laksanā as laksanam taṭādijñāpāṇena. According to Nāgës'vārī it is laksanena śvārthasamarpāṇena upalaksitā. This Śvārthasamarpāṇa is total and not partial.

These two, viz. upādāna and laksana are the subhīrakṣa varieties of Suddha only, and not of gauni. While to refute with upādāna laksana, Mammaṭa takes care to refute the views of two different schools. The first view refuted is that of Maṇḍana Mis'ra according to Uṣyota or that of Mukula bhaṭṭa, according to Maṇikyachandra. According to this view the Jāti-vācaka S'abdas like gauḥ conveys vyaṭti by upādāna laksana. Abhidhā is exhausted in giving the sense of gotwa and therefore govyakti is indicated by the word gauḥ, through the process of upādāna laksana. For Mammaṭa it is
According to him govyakti is gathered by Avinabhavamula ākṣepa. Laksana is not possible for want of either prayojana or rūdhī. Govyakti is here ākṣepagrahyā, i.e. gathered by implication.

The second view refuted is probably the one held by the Mīmāṃsakas. According to this view, ātriḥbhojana in case of Devadatta who is stout and yet does not take his food by day, is a matter of laksyaṁrtha. Again, ātriḥbhojana includes the idea of divā-abhojana. Therefore, it is the case of upādāna laksana who holds that this is a case of antarpakti. But, not so, according to Mammaṭa, which should be accepted here as it involves a lesser amount of gaurava than laksana. We have seen above that Sūddhā is so called as it has no reference to upacāra; gauni on the other hand is based on upacāra. Upacāra is based on resemblance.

Sāropā and Sādhyavasānā are two sub-divisions common to the Sūddhā and gauni. Both Sāropā and Sādhyavasānā involve āropa, to a smaller or greater extent. In sāropā, the āropa is associated with a consciousness of distinction between the object superimposed and that superimposed upon; and in sādhyavasānā, the āropa is carried to such an extent that all consciousness of distinctness between the two objects is lost owing to the latter being merged into the former. Again, if the instances involve the idea of Sādṛṣya, they become the sub-divisions of gauni and if they involve the relations of Sādṛṣyetasampanḍha they become the sub-varities of Sūddhā. Thus gaurvāhikah and gaurevāyam are instances of gauni sāropā and gauni sādhyavasānā, while Sūṣṭhulam and Sāyoḥvedam are instances of sāropā Sūddhā and sādhyavasānā Sūddhā. In short, we have a lesser degree of āropa in sāropā then in sādhyavasānā where it is termed as adhyavasaṇā. It may be noted, that when based on Sādṛṣya, Sāropā becomes the basis of rūpakālaṃkāraḥ and sādhyavasāṇāḥ, that of atis'ayokti.

Mammaṭa and Vis'vanātha give three different views as to the functioning of laksana in the instance-gaurvāhikah. They are as below: (i) According to the first view, gauḥ in gaurvāhikah indicates gogatajādyamāṇyāśadignas. As these are found to be common to Vāhika also, the word gauḥ expresses Vāhikārtha. (ii) The second view says that gauḥ indicates vāhikagatajādyamāṇyāśadignas (not gogata guṇas as in the first view). These guṇas through avinabhāva—
The third view is that gauh indicates vāhika himself being the substratum of jādyamāndyādī common to both. The third view is accepted by Mamāta. We do not know exactly as to who held the first two views. The third is held by the Mimamsakas as is clear from a citation from Kumārila in support. In Kumārila's Tantravārttika (Śrā. cen. A.D.) which constitutes the commentary on the last three pādas of the 1st adhyāya and also the 2nd and 3rd adhyāyas of the Śābarabhāṣya, we read the following māṇīntarsaviruddhe tu mukhyārthasya perigratae. abhidheya-vinābhūtaratitirlakṣāṇopocyate| lākṣyamāṇaganjāryogat vyśteṣīṣyā tu gauṇatā.||

As to the second view, Mamātaka andra notes that it is very close to that of Mukula(16).

Mamāta also mentions certain Sādhyatrasamānbandhas such as Kāryakārana-bhāva, tādārthya, Svasvāmibhāva, avayavāyasvabhāva, tātākarmya, etc. Manikyaandra adds Māna e.g. ādhihaka as'nāti, dhārana (=holding) e.g. tulādhārtam candanaś tulājādhīpatya (=leadership) as in Pumānāyan gotram (=This person is family); Sthāna as ināśūnāh kroṣ'anti etc. The Sambandhas are numerous(17).

As to the classification of lākṣāṇā, many authors on the alamkāraśāstra differ. We have seen Mamāta's view. Jagannātha's view is almost similar. Vis'vanātha gives in as many as eighty varities of lākṣāṇā. The Vṛttivārttikākāra (Appayya Dīksita) gives a seven-fold division of prayojanavatī lākṣāṇā(20). It may be noted that Mamāta also admits the gṛudhatva and agṛudhatva of the prayojana.

Lākṣāṇā not accepted:- There are certain alamkārikas who do not accept lākṣāṇā as a separate vṛtti at all. e.g. Mukulabhāṭṭa, Mahimabhāṭṭa and Kuntaka accept only abhidhā. They do not accept lākṣāṇā as a s'abdhāasyā. Bhaṭṭe Mukula suggests this, when at the end of Abhidhāvṛttimatṛkā he says:

The alamkārikas who do not accept lākṣāṇā as a separate vṛtti at all. e.g. Mukulabhāṭṭa, Mahimabhāṭṭa and Kuntaka accept only abhidhā. They do not accept lākṣāṇā as a s'abdhāasyā. Bhaṭṭe Mukula suggests this, when at the end of Abhidhāvṛttimatṛkā he says: ityēsabhidhāvṛttam daśadhātra vivecitam. He includes the varieties of lākṣāṇā under his ten-fold scheme of abhidhā. According to him, he treats of lākṣāṇā only because for him the Dhvani of Vyañjanavādins is not different from lākṣāṇā(19). We will consider Mukula's views in the chapter on Dhvanivirodha. For Mahima also, the word has only one S'akti and that is abhidhā(20).
For Mahima, lakṣyārtha becomes anumita through vācyārtha which serves as a hetu. According to him, in gargaśāṃkha when we derive the meaning of people staying on the Ganges, it is anumitigamyas. Similarly, in gaurvāhika, there is no laṅgāṇavyāpāra, but we have anumāna of the similarity of Vāhikah and gauh, on the strength of the superimposition of gotva on vāhika. If it is otherwise, who will superimpose a thing on something totally different? (21).

Next comes Kuntaka. Kuntaka does not clearly negate lakṣanā at any place. But when he describes vakrokti as 'vicitrā abhiddā' we get a glimpse of his approach(22). The Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas accept lakṣanā as a separate vṛtti.

CONCLUSION:

From the above discussion it is clear that lakṣanā is a derived function of language. The primary sense of a word used in several contexts gets modified or transferred by these. An attempt has been made by Sanskrit writers to note down as many such contexts as possible. For example, the relation of similarity which gives the varities of gauhā, the relations of nearness, causality, ownership, possession, tātkārya etc. - these are responsible for the derived meanings of words. As we have seen, writers like Mukula Bhātta do not consider it necessary to consider lakṣanā, because, they think that it is derived from abhiddā conditioned by contexts. But the grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas and logicians recognise lakṣanā as a separate function, because it is necessary for them, for logical clarification, to distinguish the different meanings conveyed by a word in different contexts.
CHAPTER X. FOOTNOTES

(1) मूलमें अनुभव: कृतकल्प-स वारोपित: स्मृत्यापार: सान्तरामिणिहों जहानात। K.P.
also प्रदीप-शाक्त्याविलयाविद्यालयाकार बारोपित एव स व्यापार:वसतु।
अनिष्ठ: व्यक्तिः। तेलंकुम सान्तरामिणिः हि। also उपोक-सान्तरामिणिः
हि सार्वरां परिपर्य: शब्दनिष्ठ हत्यः।also साहित्यवृद्धमणि-
बन्तार अवधानं कल्पितः सांतार: तयायं निष्ठा तत्त्वसः।

(2) मुख्यार्थभाषे तत्परे रुद्धता थ प्रहोक्तात्
कन्यागोऽर रुद्धे बलात्लानाः रोपिता विएः। K.P.II.

(3) See मणिकंत:-मुखः पुस्तकेतुप्रमाणाच् पुरुषार्थविद्यमणि वाचे।
साहित्य वृद्धमणिalso observes- वाचः प्रमाणपरसत्त्वम्
illustrations

(4) मणिकंतः gives the following /
( i)लाभते-संज्ञां, गणवायाः प्राप्तः:
( ii)शास्त्र्य-गौर्वीकोः, गौर्वितामितः
( iii)समवाय-सार्वरेणु-कुन्ता: प्रविशान्ति,\( \text{iv} \)
बैच्छविलिनिः-स्नेसः meaning बैच्छुः:
( v)त्रियायां:-नहंति समरे श्रुता: तत्त्वः
श्रुता, a Proper name is used with reference to a slayer of enemies.)

(5)तत्प्रार्थकता notes :आत्स्य जागारावृत्ति: समविव्याहारीसितः

(6) कैलिका कृपीण कुशः हि स्वाभूमिहरति। तेषामेव।\( \text{ii} \) कृष्णांशकीक्रो मुखः
रोः: प्रियसे स्मरकन्तिवेचकत्वादिवशः सत्तयंबंधीनाः कदाहेत् कही
सत्तयः। तदन्त्वे न कन्यांते। कृष्णांसमविवाहस्य सुलभमः
ध्वनि-स्वायत्वः हि स्वघन्नेष सुलभस्य विविधयोक्ति सन्तोषीय। सुलभस्य गुरुः
कृष्णां: कैलिके स्मृत्यान्थ लघुः। कृष्णांस्वायत्वः सुलभस्य गौर्वायः
कन्याकायःपुपा प्रमाणात्। S.D.

(7) कुशः-विदितः-विद्यार्ककृितिविन्यासयुगः तेषाति न रुढ़िवद्वस्य
कृपीण हृदत्तृपाविप्रतिक्षा कर्मः (काव्यांशाख)

(8) Kumārīla- निष्ठा जहानाः: कृष्णाञकर्मविद्यमानवत्।
क्रियान्ति सामायं कर्मिः कर्मिनांशैव त्वरितिः।।

(9) -गौणवृद्धमणिकातो विभूषित हि प्रमाचारः। कदन्तुः
तस्या: जहानाः अन्तान्तातुः।-प्रतापः

(10) -साहित्यवृद्धमणिको विदितेत्रिष्टे गौणी वृद्धिरिति भीमासिकः। सा च
विविधतिका नेति नैवाचिक: वासु:।-प्रतापः
(11) मानिक्वन्द notes : सूक्ष्मता या लाभार या लोकस्वे प्राप्ती गते त न तपतः नेयत्तुम।

(12) अधमिर व्यक्तिमुष्ठूलुगृहस्त्याकिं भावः।

(13) मानिक्वन्द-गः शहः सक्रिया स्वमिष्टिः त्वज्जनन् जयांति कत् लक्ष्मण तत्र दिपावपूजने करणः।

(14)-उपकारित हि नाम वर्तमान विश्वासितोऽव: पाञ्चायोऽऽ साद्द साद्द साद्द महिमाप्रभृतिः प्राचीनविश्वासमाध्य। S.D.

सुभाषिक कहते explains as -उपकारित साद्द साद्द साद्द महिमाप्रभृतिः प्राचीनविश्वासमाध्य।

(15)सुभाषिक कहते says : गौरवीय श्राद्धविवेचन मैंने प्रबोधायोऽऽ का रोपणमुखुमार।

(16) S.D. explains : कध केकि दारुः-गोप्तार गुणां गाष्ठीमेषु-कादायेऽऽ लक्षप्ते। ते का गोश्चिक वार्षिकाधि मित्रों सामनान्त्रित। तदः गोस्वायूगः सहेन्द्र वार्षिकाधि मित्रों तस्मात् गोश्चार्यां बाह्यवाहनायाः। सुभाषिक कहते विवाहान्तः विवाहान्तः पुनर्मायामारवातः।

बन्धु पुनर्मायामारवातः वार्षिकाधि नाभिदीयते किं तु स्वार्थस्वार्थायूपयोगसाज्जायेत वार्षिकाधि- गता गुणा एवं लक्षने। तदः प्रख्यायेत। का गोश्चार्यां वार्षिकाधि प्रख्यायेत, न वा।

(17) मानिक्वन्द says : सहारना-स्थान-ताल्लुक-वृक्ष-पूजा-सारणीय- योग-साथा-अधिकार्यः-मां-कर-राज-संकु-चन्दन-गुड़ा-शक-वनुकुण्डलूः अद्वालूः पि तदुपत्ते॥

(18) गोश्चार्याः, गोश्चार्याः, गोश्चार्याः, सारणीय, सारणीय, गुणां एवं गौरविः (हत्वें स्वतीया बलधारणा)
From the discussion given above, it is clear that laksana is a derived function of language. The primary sense of a word used in several contexts gets modified or transformed by these. An attempt has been made by Sanskrit writers to note down as many such contexts as possible. For example, the relations of similarity which gives us the several varieties of gauṇī. The relations of nearness, causality, ownership, possession, tātkarṇya—these are responsible for the derived meanings of words. As we have seen, writers like Mukula Bhatta do not consider it necessary to recognise laksana, because they think that it is derived from abhidha conditioned by contextual relations. But the grammarians the logicians and the Mimamsakas recognise laksana as a separate function because it is necessary for them, for logical clarity to distinguish the different meanings conveyed by a word in several contexts).
CHAPTER XI. (d) Vyānjanāvṛtti.

We now consider the nature of what is termed as vyānjanāvṛtti. As noticed already, it is recognised to be the turiyāvṛtti, the first three being abhidhā, tātparya and lakṣanā. We have also seen that the tātparya-vṛtti is called a S'abdavṛtti only through upācāra and the gaṇḍi of the Mimāmsa-sakas is included in lakṣanā, though certain writers on alamkāra such as Hemacandra mention it as a separate vṛtti.

The Dhvanyālōka says that in poetry there is something which is beyond the expressed sense and it is this, is the true essence of poetry (1). We will see later on in due course, that some modern European writers also have underlined two uses of language, viz. the scientific and the emotive and that the latter one has a special role in poetry.

For the realisation of this implied or the pratiyamāna or vyāgyārtha i.e. the suggested sense, the writers on alamkāra have established a separate vṛtti of a word, and it is termed as the vyānjanāvṛtti, which is not identical with either abhidhā or lakṣanā. With the help of vyānjana, a word, subordinating itself and its meaning, suggests the vyāngyārtha which is more important and is termed as 'Dhvani' in a poem (2). Just as an object, already existing beforehand, is manifested by light, in the same way this pratiyamānārtha becomes manifested with the help of vyānjana. The pratibhā of the reader also plays a major role in gathering this vyāngyārtha, observes Hemacandra (3). The Vyāgartha is only an instrument, a nīmitta, in the realisation of vyāngyārtha. The stock example is—'ganagyan ghosah'—wherein the idea of coolness and purity is gathered through a separate power called vyānjana.

Nāmaṣṭa in his k.p. II. 9 days:

Yaṣya pratiṣṭhātuḥ lakṣanā samupāsyate

phale S'abakaganye'tra vyānjanāṃaparā kriyā.||

and adder-prayojana-pratipaddayiṣayā yatra lakṣaṇayā S'abdapravogah tatra nā

nāyaṣtatpratipattirapi tu tasmādeva S'abdāt, na cātra vyānjanaḍṛtyo

vyāpārah.
i.e. with reference to this fruit, for conveying the apprehension of which indication is resorted to, (and) which is understood from the (indicative) word alone, (there is) no other function than suggestion......where (as in a sentence) a word is used with indication with the desire of conveying the matrix motive, there the apprehension of that motive does not arise from anything else, but from that word alone. And where (i.e. with reference to the motive) there is no other function except vyanjana,

Mammata brings in the topic of vyanjana while concluding the topic of laksana. He says that laksana again can be three-fold, viz. (phased on vuddhi and the other two varieties based on prayojana which may be guđha i.e. concealed or aguđha i.e. not-concealed. To convey this prayojana the vyanjana of the function resorted to is always vyanjana. It is not abhidha in the absence of convention or samaya, and it is not laksana in the absence of further prayojana (II.10.). Again, the vyanjara is not identical with the laksyartha because, the latter one is not the primary sense or the mukhya rtha, nor is there any incompatibility i.e. bāđha, nor any connexion with the fruit (yogah phalena no), nor any motive herein (na prayājanametasmin), nor does the word fail in conveying the motive (na ca S'abdah Skhaladgatiḥ). (K.P. II.11.). Mammata adds the following explanation: As the word Gaṅgā indicates the sense viz. the bank, because it is incomplete with the present context in its primary sense of the stream, like that if it were inasplex incompatible with the present context in its indicated sense of the bank also, then it would further indicate the motive. And the bank is not the primary sense of here the word Gaṅgā. Also, there is no incompatibility. And there is no connection of the bank, which is the indicated sense of the word Gaṅgā, with properties like coolness, holiness etc., which are to be further indicated by that motive which is supposed to be indicated. Moreover the word Gaṅgā is not unable to convey the motive, as it is to convey the sense of the bank, in the absence of the three conditions (4). Mammata adds that in this there would be anavastha, the absence of finality which would cause the destruction of the very root (mūlaksayakārini anavastha, K.P. II.129.). If this prayojana is to be indicated,
it would be indicated by yet another motive, and that second motive also will be indicated by a third one and so on. Thus, want of finality or regressus ad infinitum, causing the non-apprehension of the matter in hand i.e. the first motive, would result. Mammata also rejects the case of the indicated sense being accompanied with or qualified by the motive. The object of knowledge is different from knowledge; and the fruit of knowledge is also different from it. The object of direct perception and the like is a blue thing and the like.

But the fruit is knowliness or self-consciousness. Thus, with reference to a qualified object, Indication is not possible. But properties or qualities such as holiness and the like are realised as residing in the bank and are apprehended by a function other than expression, purport or Indication. And this function is designated by terms such as vyanjana, dhvanana, dyotaha etc. and it should be necessarily admitted as having an independent existence. (5)

Classification:

Mammata has classified vyanjana into laksanamula or that based on laksana and abhidhmula or that based on abhidha. The laksanamula is illustrated as in 'Gangayam ghosah', The abhidha mula occurs when the function of expression of a word having more than one primary sense, is restricted to one sense by means of conjunction and the like; the process which produces the apprehension of a sense that is not expressed is suggestion (6). Conjunction (or Samyogah), disjunction (or viprayogah), association (or Sahacarya), antagonism (or virodhitah), motive (arthah), context (or prakarana), special mark (or lingam), proximity of another word (i.e. 'abdasangyasya samidhih'), capability (i.e. samarthiyam), property (or aucitya), place (or des'ah), time (or kalah), gender (vyaktih), accent (svara) and etc are the causes of recollection i.e. apprehension of a particular meaning, when there is no decision or determination regarding the meaning of a word. Mammata also gives proper illustrations for all these cases. He concludes that, when though the power to express other primary senses of a word having more more than one primary sense, is thus blocked by means of the said factors such as conjunction and the like, a word
still conveys another sense in some cases, there it is not done by the function of Expression, nor by Indication. But the process involved herein is aṣṭa, or vyaṣṭa. Abhinava also holds that vyaṣṭa is the fourth function, an independent one, and is different from abhidhamśa, lakṣaṇa and tātparya(7).

Mammaṭa says that a word having the suggested sense is termed vyaṣṭa (II.15). Again, when it is said that a word is suggestive, the suggestiveness of the meaning also is taken as a co-operative agent (S'abda-sya vyaṣṭatve arthasya sahakāritvan). Thus, both word and sense co-operate in bringing about the suggested sense.

Mammaṭa holds that vyaṣṭa is said to be ārthī when that function or operation of the three-fold sense, which owing to the speciality of the speaker, the person addressed, the modulation of voice or intonation (kāku), the sentence, the expressed sense, the proximity of another word, the occasion (prastāva), the place, time, and the like, becomes the cause of the apprehension of another sense, in the case of the people having poetic genius (pratibhājusām). (K.P.III.2). Mammaṭa adds that 'artha' becomes thus suggestive, the word also co-operates. He says that, since a sense, which is conveyed by means of proof (pramāna) viz. word, suggests another sense, therefore, in the matter of the suggestiveness of the sense, co-operation of the word exists.

Thus, it should be noted carefully that context plays a major role in vyaṣṭa. It may be again observed that while Mammaṭa and Vis'vanātha mention these factors viz. the peculiarity of speaker, hearer and the like, with reference to ārthī vyaṣṭa, Pradīpakāra Govinda. Thakura observes that these are important even in certain cases of S'abdi vyaṣṭa (10).

We have seen above that vyaṣṭa is generally classified into S'abdi and ārthi. S'abdi again is two-fold viz. (i) based on vācaka S'abdi and (ii) based on lākṣaṇika S'abdi, and thus we get abhidhamśa S'abdi, and lakṣaṇa-mūla S'abdi.

In case of abhidhamśa S'abdi there is necessarily found to be the use of a S'liṣṭa word or S'leṣa i.e. paronomasia. The S.D. also explains the case of
abhiddhamula vyajanan in the same way as Mamata(11). It may be noted that
abhiddhamula vyajanan is not identical with S'leSã. The former is dependent
three factors viz.(i) a word having more than one primary sense, (ii) the
abhidhartha of such a word is decided by factors such as Sanyoga, or
conjunction and the like, and (iii) the sahdraya with his light of pratibhã or
intuition sees the further aprakaranika meaning. Where both the meanings viz.
the contextual and the non-contextual are gathered by abhidhã, it is a case
S'leSã or paronomasia.

As for the S'aBdi abhiddhamula vyajanan, writers on alamkara hold
different views. Appayya Diksita and Mahima Bhatta do not accept this
variety at all. There are others who reject the whole of S'aBdi vyajanan
which, according to them falls within the scope of S'leSã. Still others
accept abhiddhamula S'aBdi only in certain cases. He holds that in the
particular illustration viz. asauvadayamuruqhaã kantiMan raktaManjalãh,
the earlier authors recognise a case for abhiddhamula S'aBdi vyajanan(12).
But for him, it is a case of pure S'leSã, as both the meanings are
gathered by abhidhã(13). Appayya Diksita does not accept S'abdas'aktim-
mula vyajanan, but he does accept S'abdas'aktimula Dhvani on the grounds
that herein ikã charm is dependent on the use of certain words only(14).

Vis'vanatha observes that Mahima's view viz. that in the particular
illustration viz. Durgilagita vigraho etc. there is no presence of any
ie non-contextual meaning
aprakaranikartha, whatsoever, is only gejanimilikã on his part(15).

Jagannatha has his own view. He holds that both in case of nãnartha
S'abdas'aktimula dhvani and in case of S'leSã kavya, there can not be any
obstruction in gathering both the meanings (i.e. prakarañika and apraka-
rañika) simultaneously. It is no use saying that while in S'leSã there is
tatparyaajana with reference to both the senses, it is not so in the case of vyajanan. Jagannatha is of the opinion that in S'abdas'aktimula
dhvani both the meanings are equally vãcya or expressed and that both
are gathered through abhidhã. It is therefore not wise to accept
vyajanan for gathering the other sense-apararthapratiti.(16).
Thus he does not seem to agree with the Dhvanivādins in general in case of the S'abdās'aktimuladhvani. But at places he agrees. He believes that in case of words having multiple sense, when rūḍha or yamāṇika words are used, even the aprākaraṇaṅkārtha is vācya. But when it is a case of yogarūḍha or yamāṅkarūḍha padas having a multiple sense, according to Jagannātha, the non-contextual sense is gathered through ṣyāṅjāna. (17). The illustration cited is—abālānā S'riyam hṛtvā...etc. Here, in respect of the first meaning in form of lightening and the cloud, there is rūḍhas'abda. But in respect of the the second meaning, there is either rūḍhi nor yoga. Again the second meaning is not awavayavalabhya only, as in the case of yamāṅka words. This is, therefore, a proper instance of ṣyāṅjāna. Thus says he,

-Yogarūḍhasya S'abdāya yoge rūḍhi niyentrite,

dhiyam yogasārṣyōrthāsya yē sūte ṣyāṅjānaiva iyā
dhada becomes restricted by rūḍhisātu,
i.e. when yogas'akti in case of yogarūḍha (according to the dictum—rūḍhīryog-
gādabaliyaśi—) the yogārtha is derived through ṣyāṅjāna alone.

MODERN VIEWS:

Modern European thinking as to the function of language in poetry bears some striking resemblance. We may look into it in the light of Susan stebbing (Introduction to Logic), and I. A. Richard (Meaning of Meaning, Principles of literary criticism...etc), and other authors.

Language conveys both information and emotion. When the emotional element is subdued or suppressed as far as possible, we have the informative function of language. When, however, the main function is to convey emotion and use information even for the purpose of evoking emotion as in rhetoric and poetry, we call it the emotive function of language. The first is termed the scientific use of language, and the other, the emotive use of language.

Thus, one important function of language is to communicate information. For science, this is the only function, and for this, it evolves a terminology i.e. a set of technical terms which aim at precision, i.e. uniqueness of reference. A scientific statement is, qua scientific, precise. The aim
of the scientist is to use his verbal symbols so as to achieve uniqueness of reference and thus to use language in order to communicate information that is exact and precise.

However, we see in our day to day life, that very often statements are made not merely to communicate information, but to arouse in the hearer a certain state of mind. Literary Critics, everywhere, have realised that the poet uses language not mainly to express statements that are true or false, but to express what is neither true nor false. Thus, when e.g. Shelley says:

"...Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass, Stains the white radiance of eternity.

Until death tramples it to fragments.",

he is neither taking nonsense, nor making an assertion that must be accepted or rejected as true or false. The question of truth or falsity does not arise at all. The poet is using language for an entirely different purpose from the scientist who says, "The Specific heat of air at constant pressure is 0.2734." To distinguish between these two uses of language, Mr. I.A. Richards has suggested the convenient terminology viz. "the Scientific use of language", and "the emotive use of language" (Principles of literary criticism Ch. XXXIV and also Meaning of Meaning, pp. 226-9, 255-60, 271-5).

When language is used simply in order to refer to a referent, its use is scientific. When it is used in order to arouse an emotional attitude in the hearer, to influence him in any way other than giving him information, then its use is emotive. The most unmistakable examples of the emotive use of language can be found in literature, just because it is not the main function of literature to instruct. Owen Barfield in his, 'Poetic Diction, A Study in Meaning' pp. 13, 14, says: "When words are selected and arranged in such a way that their meaning either arouses, or is obviously intended to arouse aesthetic imagination, the result may be described as poetic fiction".
He adds, "...the same sounds and signs may easily be vehicles of poetry at this place and not in that, at this time and not at that, to this person and not to the other". The Scientist uses words so as to eliminate this variation of response. It may be noted that what is called logical connection has little relevance to the emotive use of language. Whereas, it is the condition of success in scientific language (see, Such an stebins, Introduction to Logic).

* Susan Stebbing: Introduction to Logic.

Resemblance is not brought out
CHAPTER XI. FOOT-NOTES

See: Introduction to Log & Susan, Stabbing.

1. प्रचालक 1.13 यास । शरदो । तर्क प्रत्यक्षीतृतीय स्मारक यास । भाषा: शास्त्रीय शिक्षण: शास्त्रीय अभिव्यक्ति: कथित।

2. प्रचालक 1.6. प्रीति यास । पुनर्विद्वाद वपस्त्रित सांस्कृतिक दातव्य स्मारक यास । यदि विवेकयात्रा शिक्षण: शास्त्रीय अभिव्यक्ति: कथित।

3. हेमचन्द्र explains:—तच्छक्त्रयुगानि यास । प्रत्यक्षीतृतीय स्मारक यास । वैतत्त्वानि शास्त्रीय अभिव्यक्ति: कथित।

4. क.प. I.11- शरदो न मुख्य, नामेन भाषा: योग: खलन नी।

यथा गद्गास्त्र: रक्षाविधि सांस्कृत श्रेणी तर्क लोकतंत्र, तथापि तत्व न्याय विद्वान पुनर्विद्वाद तच्छक्त्रयुगानि स्मारक यास। न च तपस्य मुख्य: नामेन भाषा:। न च गद्गास्त्रार्थ तच्छक्त्रयुगानि स्मारक यास।

5. प्राकृतिक सांस्कृत श्रेणी न युक्त:। क.प. I.12.

कृत्व हत्या,

शास्त्रीय विषययो श्रेणी: रक्षाविधि सांस्कृत कृत्व हत्या,

प्राकृतिक सांस्कृतिक धिन्देही श्रेणी: लघु तय श्रेणी रक्षाकर्म.

विश्वास ज्ञान उपयोग श्रेणी:।

विषययो: स्पष्ट प्रमाण तथा।

तदार्थ विषययो: प्राकृत भाषात्मक सांस्कृतिक श्रेणी: व्यापारन्तरेष गम्या। तत् श्रेणी:। क.प. I.14.

6. अन्यथा श्रेणी उत्तम श्रेणी शास्त्रीय अभिव्यक्ति:।

संयोगस्या व्यापारिक श्रेणी:।

7. तत्वादिक सांस्कृतिक श्रेणी: श्रेणी:। क.प. I.14.

8. अन्यथा श्रेणी:। अन्यथा श्रेणी:। अन्यथा श्रेणी:। क.प. I.3.
(9) S.D.II. वक्तृत्वात्मकग्रंथाशः अन्यलिङ्गप्रार्थनायः
प्रतिवेदकालां तेन्द्रितयां विकस्यते।

(10) साहित्य-अखाद्यां वक्तृत्वात्मकग्रंथाशः अन्यलिङ्गप्रार्थनायः
न तु शर्यांकाः साहित्य-अखाद्यां
मुख्यालयां प्रथममें वित्तियां
श्रीप्रार्थनात्तितिः।

(11) S.D.II.-अनेकार्थ्य शर्यांकाः
प्रार्थनात्तितिः।
एकाक्षण्यां म्यथीषुद्ध-जना सांप्रदायिकाः।

(12) क ग्राहः--तव श्रावकाः व्यक्त-जनाधाराः
एव शरणाम् गत्यन्तरालानाः
वृत्तिवाचास्ति। pp.9

(13) कर्त्तरः भुमः,- ध्यानमयार्णः
हत्यारो श्रावकाः क्षेत्रः सार्वजनिकक्षेत्रः
प्रवश्यायन्यात्मक निम्नता विश्वासम्
रुपाधारिणी निम्नतात्मक क्षेत्रः
प्रार्थनात्तितिः क्रमांकः
एव शरणामार्गः
वर्तमानार्थिः।

(14) ननु एव प्रस्तुतार्थिंश्रावकाः वस्त्रार्थिंश्रावकाः
श्रावकाः क्रमांकः
यथाकालप्रार्थनार्थिः।

(15) घुड़िप्रत्याहं-एव वित्तितीयाः नास्त्येव श्वासः
शयनस्मि नास्त्येव श्वासः
वर्तमानार्थिः।

(16) S.D.V.

(17) जनार्थि ता चामृत्याः
बिषम्यार्थिः।
एवमेव वित्तितीयाः
वर्तमानार्थिः।

R.C. pp.141.

R.C. pp.144.