The first question to be considered is, what precisely is a word? The common place answer is that word is that sound which is articulate and significant. (1) Patanjali has raised this question in the beginning of his S'abdānusāsana. He has tried to show that word, in its essential aspect, differs from substance (dravya), action (kriyā), quality (guna), and genus (jāti). A sound, expressive of sense is called S'abda by the people. (2) That which really constitutes the 'word' when one utters 'gauh' is the sound, which, simultaneously with its utterance, gives the idea of an animal possessing dēyalēp, hump, hoofs and horns. A word is therefore sound—tasmāt dhvani S'abdaḥ'. (3)

When a word like 'gauh' is pronounced, the following concepts appear in the mind of the hearer—the individual cow, her action, her qualities, genus cow, the shape of the cow, and also the word made up of 'g', 'au', and 'visarga'. The hearer wants to find out the exact significance. The individual cow, her qualities, etc. are perceived by the eye, while the word 'gauh' is perceived by the ear. So, how can these two perceptions of different senses can be taken as the meaning of the word?

But it can be taken as such on the basis of a rule of the grammarians viz. that a thing is not different from another thing, when it is so also with reference to a third thing not different from that another thing—'tadabhinnābhinnasya tadabhinnatvam'. Mahābhāṣyaśāra, however, says that ākṛti, guna, etc. are not the true significance of S'abdā; but the true significance is Sphota—that which, when manifested, enables the hearer to
Patañjali has given a detailed discussion in the form of pūrva-pakṣa and uttara-pakṣa to prove that vārṇas or sound-units by themselves have no meaning. In order to understand this discussion, we may refer to the opinion of Upavāraśa, accepted by the pūrvamāṁśaka Sābara, and the uttaramāṁśaka Sāmkara. Sābara refers to this view of Upavarsa at Mi.Śu. I.1.5, and Sāmkara refers to it at I.iii.28 in his bhāṣya on the Vedānta sūtras. Sābara holds that 'aṅgarāṇyeva padam' (Sābhāṣya on Mi.Śu. I.1.5)—i.e., the syllables alone constitute a word. Thus, he refuses to recognise sound as distinct from syllables. The pūrvapakṣa as given by Patañjali is akin to this.

Patañjali holds that letters have no meaning. For if they have any meaning, they will be subject to the same rules which apply to those that have meaning. Thus, they will get the designation 'pratipādika', by the rule 'arthavat pratipadikam'; will receive case-affixes after them by the rule 'pratipadikāt'....and will get the designation 'padam' by the rule 'subantam padam'. Again, letters have no meaning because a meaning is not found for every letter and also because the same meaning is not present when there is metathesis, elision, segment or substitution.

Patañjali adds that at times, some of those persons who study equally with the one hope of getting money, get it and others do not. Now, just as it is not necessary that all get money, because one gets money, it is not necessary that all do not get money. So, in the same way, we may hold that such single letters as stand as roots, affixes, stems, and nipātas have meaning. This is quite natural.

The words such as kūpah, (ṣu)pah, yūpah etc. are different letter groups having different meanings. If the change in their meaning is due only to the change of a single letter, the major portion of the meaning of kūpah should lie in sūpah, that of sūpah in kūpah, that of kūpah in yūpah, that of yūpah in kūpah, that of sūpah in yūpah and that of yūpah in sūpah. But we know them as different groups having different meanings. And, it has been very well suggested by the opponent that letters have no
meaning even while actually proving that they have meaning. He who thinks that the meaning of 'kūpa' is in 'kakāra', that of 'sūpa' in 'Sakāra' and that of yūpa is 'yakāra', has to accept that 'upa' is meaningless. (11)

Now, with reference to the objects denoted by words, Patañjali gives a four-fold classification of words viz. words signifying genus, quality, action and personal names (Saṁjña). This division is based on the distinction in regards to things for the signification of which words are used (pṛavṛttinimitta). (12). This division does not apply to things but to their adjuncts (Upādhis). Thus, for Patañjali, words signify these upādhis (upādhāvevasaṁketaḥ). (13).

Nīmaṁśakas:

Now, we will consider the view of the Nīmaṁśakas. Both Jaimini and S'abara hold that the real import of a S'abda is 'ākṛti and not 'vyakti'. S'abara says that 'ākṛti signifies the mere generality that pervades all individuals belonging to a class, while 'vyakti signifies and individual i.e. something which is possessed of certain characteristics which it possesses in common with none else. (14). The question is which of these is expressed by a word. But then, why should there be any doubt in this matter? Well, it is so, because on hearing the word 'go', we get the idea of generality, but when it comes to action, we find that it is related to the generality in an individual. Thus, actual usage would seem to show that a word expresses both 'ākṛti and 'vyakti' (in succession). (15).

S'abara does not accept the vyaktivāda of the pūrva-prakāśa, which he considers fully under Mā, Sū, I, 3, 30-32 (16). S'abara holds that the vyakti-vāda is not fully satisfactory; e.g. take the texts like 'S'yenecitam cinvita'. Now, here, if the word 's'yena' is not 'vākṛtivācaka', how can one obey the said injunction? For, what is needed for making a s'yena is the Sādṛṣ'ya or similarity of the shape carved with bricks, with an actual mṛ s'yena. This Sādṛṣ'ya must naturally be with the form that is common to all s'yenas i.e. with S'yenatva jāti. Now, if the sādṛṣ'ya is with reference to S'yenavyakti, then this will not be possible for all the
sacrificers of different times and places. How can all these hit upon one and the same S'yenavyakti? How could the earlier sacrificers have done it? How, again, will the future sacrificers do it? This, again, cannot be a vyakti, devoid of all Sāmānyas and vis'ēṣas. Thus, some vedic texts favour vyaktivāda, while other vedic texts favour the Ekrtivāda. It is therefore necessary to seek some more decisive grounds on which to solve this problem. (17). We come across such definite ground in the fact that the same word is used in respect of several individuals and this decides the point in favour of the Ekrtivāda. The fact that one and the same word signifies more than one vyakti of the same class, suggests that it signifies something which is common to all. (18) When the word 'go' is applied to other 'go-vyaktis', which are devoid of all Sāmānyavis'ēṣas according to the objector, then, in that case, this absence of all Sāmānyavis'ēṣas' itself is the Sāmānya'signified by the word 'go'. And, it is not safe to suggest that what is signified by a word everything everytime is not the absence of Sāmānyavis'ēṣas but vyakti, which is but the substratum of all these. For then, the word 'go' will be applicable to 'sa'va-vyakti' as well, and not to 'go-vyaktis' alone, since the former also is a vyakti in the sense of the term as seen above (19). In order to avoid this contingency, one cannot argue that the word applies only to those vyaktis where its use is known by the abhyuktas, for, in that case, the word could not be applied to a newly born cow? (20) And we see this actually happening in practice. If for the sake of argument, the above view is accepted, then the class-perception will become impossible, as this or that vyakti for which samketa is known by us by usage alone will be recognised as a guṇa govyakti' but actually in practice we see that any 'go-vyakti' even one so far not seen by us also produces the 'go-patyaya' in us (21). Thus the view that the application of a word to a vyakti depends on usage if to be discarded (22).
Moreover, it can be held that a word may be applied to a vyakti which possesses a certain s'akti (potency), for it is possible that this s'akti may not exist in all the vyaktis denoted by the word. S'akti by its very nature resides in some only. Thus, a word cannot denote vyakti which is without s'akti. And, that s'akti cannot be 'gotva', because to say that the word 'go' applies to that vyakti where 'gotva' is found to exist means that the idea of 'Vis'iṣṭavyakti' is accepted and this means the pratiti (cognition) of 'gotvavis'iṣṭavyakti'. But in such a cognition, 'gotva', the qualifying attribute, will be naturally perceived first, and this means that 'ākṛti' is the first import of a word. (23) Again, it should be noted that here 'ākṛti' is signified by the word not in the fashion of a 'danda' which is a vis'ifcsana and is conveyed by the word 'daṇḍin'. For, such a position is totally unacceptable because if ākṛti is once admitted as the artha of a s'abda e.g. 'go', it must be supposed to have exhausted its 'abhidhā' in its expression. It is not necessary to extend the abhidhā to perceive the vyakti, for 'ākṛti' is inevitably associated with vyakti and due to this, by the perception of ākṛti, vyakti is also perceived (24). So, it is needless to extend abhidhā to vyakti. Anvaya-vyatireka i.e. argument in presence and absence, exists between s'abda and ākṛti and not between s'abda and vyakti. For, one who sees the ākṛti is invariably observed to see the vyakti also, even in the absence of a word. On the other hand, if through some mental disturbance, one is not able to perceive the ākṛti even on the word being uttered, it is not at all possible for him to perceive vyakti. This shows that for the observer, the perception or non-perception of vyakti depends on the perception or non-perception of ākṛti, and that this has no connection whatsoever with the uttering or hearing of a s'abda (25). Thus, on the strength of this anvaya-vyatireka relation between ākṛti and vyakti, it can be concluded that it is not necessary to extend the abhidhās'akti of a word to vyakti.
S'abara holds that the idea of a vyaktivis'ista ākṛti is totally unacceptable for the simple reason that such an assumption would disqualify a word from being applicable to 'vyaktyantaravis'istākṛti' (26). S'abara also holds that primarily the word ākṛti and signifies vyakti only by implication and that it is immaterial for him whether ākṛti is conveyed by a word only as being subordinate to a vyakti, or not. The question of the mutual relationship of ākṛti and vyakti does not fall within the province of S'abdas'akti. It is decided on the strength of some other factor viz., the purpose in view for which the word is employed. If ākṛti is spoken of with reference to itself, it becomes pradhāna or principal, and if it is spoken of with reference to something else, it becomes gauṣa or subordinate. The word is incapable of deciding this (27). He says that the analogy of the word 'dandin' is also inapplicable, because the word 'dandin' is a composite word made up of two separate parts, while it is not so in case of 'gauh'. In case of 'gauh' we do not find two parts conveying 'go-vyakti' and 'gottra' separately. Thus, S'abara holds that ākṛti-vis'istavyaktivāda is not tenable. Even in case of 'dandin', the vis'eśa, vis. danda must be cognised first or else vis'istakalpanā itself becomes impossible and this shows that the perception of the qualifying attribute must come first. Thus, if ākṛti is perceived first, it should naturally be accepted as the real import of a word. Thus, according to S'abara, ākṛti and not vyakti is the real import of a word (28).

Moreover, adds S'abara, the texts enjoying killing and such other acts, will not be rendered useless even on accepting the ākṛti-vāda. Because ākṛti by implication conveys vyakti, so it can be shown that ākṛti-vacana words in such texts are used to mark out vyakti which form the substratum of the acts enjoined by them. Thus when in such cases ākṛti conveys vyakti by implication, ānarthakya is wiped out (29). In the same way the objection on the score of numerals used in apposition to nouns
can also be refuted by pointing out that even here, it is the number that is intended to be enjoined, and that the ākṛtvacana s'ābda is used only as a vis'eṣaka i.e. qualified(30). Similarly, the word 'ānīya' is used with reference to the substitute and is qualified by the ākṛtvacana(31)

Thus, the Mīmāṃsakas hold that words like 'go', 'as'va', etc. are expansive primarily of ākṛti or class and not vyakti or individual.(32)

Different views as mentioned in the V.P.

Thus, we have seen that for the Mīmāṃsakas, words ākṛtvacana are signifying of genus (or universal) and not individual. But we come across a variety of views on this topic as described in the Vākyapadīya III.2.

(33). The view held by Vājapeyāya is in respect of denotation of words is in agreement with that of the Mīmāṃsakas.(34). Viṣṇu was not inclined to this. (35). The main argument in support of ākṛtvacana is that as a positive element directly concerned with action, the individual should be considered as the proper significance of all words. (36). Not the genus 'ghatatva', but the individual 'ghata' serves the purpose of fetching water. But this view is untenable on the face of it. The vyaktivāda is open to the fallacies of endlessness and vagueness. (37). Pāṇini explains that according to Pāṇini both genus and individual are meant by words. (38)

NAYAYIKAS.

The Naiyāyikas define padārtha in a very comprehensive way: 'Vyaktyākṛti jātayastu padārthah' (Nyāya Sūtra II.2.65)-The following is the summary of the views of the Nyāyaśāstra-The class theory of the Mīmāṃsakas is not a sufficient explanation by itself. A class, pure and simple, i.e. as dissociated from individuals, is far from being the significance of a word. The reason is that the very conception of a class invariably comprehends both the individual as well as the particular physical arrangement (ākṛti), whereby the individual is
distinguished from others. (Nyāsū. II. 2.64). The vyaktivāda suffers from

amavasthā (Nyāsū. II. 2.60), because an individual without its correlation
to a particular class is nowhere denoted by a word. (59). An unqualified
individual is nowhere signified by a word. An individual related to its
genus is signified by a s'abda. But even here, there are some difficulties.

So, the Nyāya view holds that padarthas comprehends three elements viz.
(i) individual, (ii) form and (iii) genus—the three which are connected with
one another by inseparable relation—avimābhāva. None of these is singly
signified by a word. Thus, when we consider the import of a word, what we
generally understand is an individual belonging to a particular class
and possessing a certain physical form or configuration peculiar to
itself (Nyāsū. II. 2.58)

The Nyāya practically maintains the same position. Neither
the genus or class nor the individual alone, but the individual condition-
ed or qualified by the genus constitutes the significance (40). The Class-
theory makes the cognition of an individual almost impossible (41),
therefore, it is more reasonable to restrict the sāmiketa to the individual
characterised by the genus. The Nyāya holds that the addition of
ākṛti in the conception of padarthas is quite immaterial in view of the
fact that there is an inseparable relation existing between an individual
and its form. All individuals belonging to the same class have a parti-
cular configuration of their physical structure. Probably this led
Patañjali to hold that a class is determined by ākṛti—the physical form
(42).

VĀKYAPADĪYA OF BHARTḤARI:—

The grammarian Bhartṛhari discusses this topic in two
sections viz. 'jātisamuddesa' and 'vyaktaisamuddesa'. He elaborately
discusses the various issues involved in this problem. He considers and
presents in a logical way, all the different views on the topic and
arrives at a position, which can be regarded as more philosophical than
grammatical. First of all he takes up the class theory for
consideration. A rigid adherence to this view makes us incapable of meeting the situation in which we find that 'jāti' or 'class' is nowhere found directly related to action (kriyā), as signified by the main constituent of a sentence, i.e. the verb. In 'gāmāṇya', kriyā is connected with kāraka (case) and not the class (gotra). The jātavāda's are divided in their way of dealing with this point. One section of them holds class (jāti) as upalakṣaṇa viz. a characteristic mark of the power of signification (s'aktyupalakṣaṇa). The other one holds that jāti itself is signified by the force of implication (43). The former lays stress on association (sāhecarya); the other one on implication (tātparya) (44). By 'association', it is meant that a class comprises of a good many individuals that are naturally associated with the very idea of that class. The Indian philosophers thus recognise more than one kind of 'jāti', such as 'sva-jāti', 's'abdatva-jāti', 'artha-jāti', etc. Bhartrhari says that every word, as a rule, first signifies a'jāti' which is not only uncommon (asādhāraṇa) but also immediately connected with it and then indicates the community of objects (artha-jāti) by means of adhyāropa i.e. transference (45).

Thus, e.g. the word 'gauh', gives the class like 'gos'abdatva' i.e. a class pertaining to all 'go-s'abdas'. Word in its own form 's'abdasvarūpa' implies this kind of 'jāti' which is characterised by the particular form of the word itself. That it differs from the class known as s'abdatva' which inheres in all varieties of words and is not confined to some specific group only (46).

How to bring 's'abda-jāti' and 'artha-jāti' into correlation is a problem. These are not at all convertible in terms of each other but on the contrary for all practical purposes, they remain distinct. As Helārāja observes, the meaning seems to be understood at once from the utterance of a word, because of the supposed identity of s'abda and artha, but here also, succession of time actually intervenes between the two (47).
Actually it so happens that word first gives the idea of its own class (svajāti) and signifies the intended object only later on (48). Through 'adhyāropa' of transference they are made convertible in terms of each other. This sort of āropa becomes the cause of the apparent identity between s'abda and artha. We resort to this same āropa when we try to discern the relation of a word with its meaning.

The jātivādīs thus try to prove that jāti forms the meaning words. For them, the proper names (samjñās'abda) also have a class. This sounds rather strange. They also hold that one class can be included in another class, This position is not philosophical (49). Thus, 'gottva' is capable of having 'gotvatva' and this is not easily conceivable. The considered opinion viz., niḥsāmānyāni sāmānyāniti—a class cannot have another class—is violated. This theory results in a number of misconceptions. Thus, for them, even quality and action are liable to be considered as 'jāti' for the simple reason of their being signified by their corresponding words (50).

For the dravyavādīs all that is signified by words is essentially the property pertaining to 'dravya' (51). So, quality, action, number, class and gender—all might be looked upon as inherent properties of matter. (52)

There are certain common features between these two views. Whether the meaning is either jāti or 'dravya', we have to resort to 'upacāra' or 'adyāropa'. (i.e., transference of sense) (53). Just as for the jātivādi, things other than jāti are also treated as such by the help of upacāra, so also with the other one, quality, action, etc. have been taken up as properties of matter by upacāra.

Bhartrhari also suggests that the problem of 'Padārtha', especially the 'jātivāda', can be approached from an epistemological point of view also (54). The meaning of a word is exactly the same as is connate by it. This is accepted by the vijnānavādī. It is suggested that the use of words gives rise to a kind of intelligence with a definite form which generally corresponds to the object of our experience. (55)
What actually is known by us whenever we hear the sound 'gaah' is the particular form in which the individual makes its impression on the mind. A dravya (thing) is, according to this philosophy, not necessarily a material object, but an intellectual image or form only. (56). A thing denoted by a word is mental than material. What is primarily denoted by a word is the sense that originates in the intellect ('buddhārthaśya vākyatvam'), and the world of objects is only a copy of mental states (antahkarana-dharmasya bhūgāh bahiravasthitah) (VP). For the Vijñānavāda, the whole world of thought is just conceptual; all universals and individuals having their existence in the mind with or without correspondence to the material object perceived by our sense-organs (57). Thus, along with the utterance of a word, a definite intellectual image arises in the mind, and it is that which one usually understands as the significance of words (58). Whether this image has or has not a corresponding embodiment in the world of realities is immaterial (59). Whatever is signified by a word in the mind, may or may not have its objective equivalent. It is possible for us to picture before our mind a purely subjective world of concepts apart from the one we are familiar with. The yogācāra school of the Buddhists actually does so. For them an external world of atoms apart from the internal knowledge, does not exist. The external world is a mere copy of mental impressions.

Bhartrhari finally winds up the discussion with reference to Vedantic monism. The question of jāti and vyakti (i.e. universal and particular) could not stand before the all-eliminating advaita, non-dualism of the vedāntī. Although there appears to be difference due to the 'upādhi' or adjuncts such as time, space etc., yet all things having an ultimate common source are said to be one among themselves (60). Adhyātma - superimposition is the cause of the manifoldness which is only apparent. The difference of adjuncts makes for the distinction between class and individual. We thus fail to visualise a thing in its own and real form.
So, nothing separated from its adjunct—'Upādhi's—is comprehended by us (61). So, it says Bhārtrihari, that there is only one supreme thing beyond the limitations of time and space and possessing all activity by its very nature, and which is beyond division and distinction of any kind (62). Therefore, the categories or 'Padartha's of the Vais'esikas are not different objects of thought but they, in fact, stand for the various types of potency(S'akti) belonging to one and the same thing (63). Thus, the division of padartha into class and individual is more formal or imaginary than real (64). And this division is not inconsistent with the 'advaitavādāl' Bhārtrihari says that the unreal and real elements in all the phenomenal entities, indicate respectively, class and individual (65).

Individuals are of short duration, of limited nature, and suffer distortions and mutations of various kinds. The class is such a reality whereof the essence or identity cannot be removed, and it remains above distortions and mutations of all types and its identity is absolutely unchanging, thus forming a life-giving essence of a thing as well as shining in its own form, detached from individuals (66). We find the Cibhūndogya Upanisad saying—Vāciṣṭhānaṃ Vikāro nāmadhayaṃ mṛttikatyeva satyaṃ—(VI.4)—the earth is real, the modifications viz., ghata, pata etc. are unreal. Patanjali gives the illustration of gold and its modifications (67).

Bhārārāja says that the 'Āgamavid' has identified jāti with the ultimate reality or primordial entity (pratyakṣti) (68), which by itself is an eternal flow of pure consciousness undisturbed from outside. Thus, for the grammarian—āgamika—this is the Highest Being and it gives the loftiest idea of a class. This mahāsattā or mahāsēmānya permeates the entire universe and appears in different forms through all the individuals. This is the summary genus that is ultimately signified by all words, prātipadikas (crude forms), verbal roots, and suffixes like tvā, tal etc. (69).

All words refer to this 'sattā'. It reveals itself, according to Vārṣyāyani in six forms (70). All activity is Sattāvivarta i.e., revelation of 'Sattā' (71). This jāti is eternal and indestructible.
Vyādi and his followers who uphold the theory of 'dravya' (i.e. that words denote things and not class), also give a highly philosophical explanation. Under the Vārtika viś, 'Siddhe s'abdārthasambhūdhe', Patanjali shows how eternality can be attributed to 'dravya'. It is this eternal dravya that constitutes the meaning of all words. 'Dravya' in its ultimate form is like 'Brahma' (72). Bhartrhari also takes dravya in a wider sense. When he gives the following synonyms in V.P. III.1.

-ātmā vastu svabhavas'ca S'arirān tattvamityapi-

Dravyamityasya paryāyāstacc a nityamiti smṛtaṁ (dravya Samuddes'ā) ||

Thus, whether the padārtha or significance of a word happens to be class or an individual, we are to believe that all that we feel and express is but a manifestation of the Eternal.

Buddhists:

The Buddhists advance the doctrine of Apoha in connection with the denotation of words. Apoha means the negation of the contrary. The Buddhists, especially the kṣapabuddhavādins, refused to accept the eternality of anything, either, class or individual. So a word does not signify either, as the reality of them is highly controversial. As there is doubt about about the existence of a constant thing like class, the class theory cannot stand. The same is the case with dravyādā on the same ground of dravya being momentary (73). So, the word signifies 'apoha', i.e. the act of distinguishing one thing or species from those that are distinct from it (74). Thus, 'gauḥ' necessarily implies the differentiation of cow individuals from non-cows' (stādvyāvṛtti). The Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas refute this theory (see S'lokaśāntikā).

Poeticists:

The writers on poetics follow the lead of the grammarians (75). They are interested more in the implication of words which may be at times rendered striking so as to lend some peculiar charm to a piece of literary composition. On the ground of this implication, words
'to go'. Such words are termed as Sanskrit(80). In 'gāndhārī ghoṣaḥ', the word 'gāndhārī' is an example of a laksaka type for it gives the secondary sense of 'gāndhāra'. The yogarūḍha type is represented by words such as 'pasūka' having both the elements of convention and derivation in them. The word 'pasūka' means by convention a lotus and by derivation, 'that which is born in mud'-madhurām-upākara(81). The sense derived from parts (saśayavas'akti) has coincidence with what is conveyed by the same as a whole (saṃsādyas'akti) (82). The yakṣika words are such as 'kṛṣṭa', 'pācaka', 'pāṭhaka' etc. and are signified by their component parts into which they can be grammatically analysed.

Some hold that there is a class such as rūdhayaṣṭakika, slightly similar to the yogarūḍha class. The example in this case is mandara, having two meanings viz. a house, when taken as a whole, and 'one who drinks gruel' when etymologically derived(83). The difference between yogarūḍha and rūdhayaṣṭakika is that in case of the former the meanings indicated mutually correspond with each other, and in case of the latter, the meaning of the whole seems to be different from the meaning of the parts.

The use of certain words in the secondary sense is noticed by the Māyāsakas, Naiyāyikas, and the Vaiśekikas as well. Patanjali has explained the condition of laksana. He has given various examples of laksana under Pā.IV. 1.48(84). We will deal with the functions of a word later on.

The etymologists have a distinct method of classifying words. It is based not on the general meaning denoted by the word, but on direct and indirect implication of action (kriyā) with 'kriyā' as the sole criterion, words are three-fold, (i) Pratyakṣavyaṭṭi, i.e., words having the idea of action implicit; (ii) parokṣavyaṭṭi, or words having kriyā not directly perceptible and (iii) atiparokṣavyaṭṭi i.e., words which are either without kriyā or which require a great effort in locating the element of kriyā in them(85). Durga gives a three-fold explanation of the word 'Nighanta' in line with this (viz. as 'Nigamayitāraḥ, Nigantasvāḥ, Nighantaśvāḥ').
CONCLUSION:

Thus we have tried to record the views of the Vaiyakaraṇas, Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas and Ālaṃkārikas on the nature of word and its import. We could see that the writers on ālāṃkāra show a leaning in the direction of the views held by the Vaiyakaraṇas.
CHAPTER VI- FOOT HOES.

1. त्योगुणनां हि त्यो लोके शब्दः प्रविष्टवः (शबर्मी, न्यु, 1.1.6)

2. अध्याया प्रारम्भपूर्वको होये ध्यानि: शब्द हृतुभैरसे। मुनि, 1.1.1

3. कथा गौरित्वम् कः शब्दः ? किं यत् तत्सार्नाशित्रिः गौरित्वम् विद्यार्जनः स शब्दः मुनि, 1.1.1

नेत्राह! तत्त्वं नाम तत् ... तस्मात् ध्यानि: शब्द

and also कस्ताहि शब्दः ? में ये प्रारम्भितम् सार्वार्थे गौरित्वम् विद्यार्जनाः

प्रारम्भायं भवति स शब्दः अध्याया प्रारम्भपूर्वको होये ध्यानि: शब्द हृतुभैरसे। तत्त्वः शब्दे कुक्त्वां शब्दे काणि: , शब्दायै ध्यानवर्त्त: हृति ध्यानि: कुक्त्वां शब्दे उच्चते। तस्मात् ध्यानि: शब्द

4. गौरित्वम् कः शब्दः ? कार्तिकार्विद्यार्जनः हृति मानानुपानः। (शबर्मी, न्यु, 1.1.5) तथा वाणाः एव तु शब्द हृति मानानुपानः। (शबर्मी, न्यु, 1.1.5)

5. क्यों न तेष्यो त्यतिक्रियान्तु पृष्ट्यनामाति।

6. कि पुरारिये व्यासः कन्याभक्ति कबिन्ति: वाहोत्सिन्त अन्तर्भः? कबिन्ति यत्र ध्याना:।

वाहुप्रारम्भिक्षित्रन्त्रीनां शक्तिनां कबिनित्वाध्यायहे कबिन्ति व्यासः हृति, etc.

and also संयोगितंत्रीनां पन्थापमे कबिन्ति व्यासः हृति, कृतियेयां संयोगाः: करिति: कबिन्ति: अन्तर्भः अन्तर्भः तेष्मात्: व्यासः अन्तर्भः करिति: सुन्दाया: अपि तेष्मात्: अन्तर्भः।

The pūrva-pākṣa as given by Patañjali is akin to this. This pūrva-pākṣa of Patañjali is as below:(This is given while explaining the Sūtra 'hayavaraṭ')-

Do these varṇas or sound-units have meaning or not?(Patañjali starts with the prima-facie view)—Sound-units have meaning, since, there is meaning in one lettered roots, stems, affixes and niṣṭhās.

One-lettered roots having meaning are found as in 'etī' (Viś), adhīṣṭi(Viś), adhīṣṭi(Viś), one-lettered stems having meaning are found as in 'āyam', ebhiḥ, 'esuḥ' Viś etc; affixes such as 'aupagavayaḥ', kāpaṭavah, nipātas as in, a apehi, i indraṃ pasyā, u, uttiṣṭha, a apakrama, and thus letters have meaning.

Again, on account of the change in meaning by change in letters; letters must be meaningful, for meaning changes in words; if one letter is replaced by another, e.g. in kūpaḥ, sūpaḥ, yūpaḥ etc.—the words having different meanings with the change of k, s, y, respectively—
Again, 'varṇānupalabdham cānarthagateh'—on account of the absence of that meaning in the absence of that letter: varṇānupalabdham cānarthagateh manyāmahe arthavanto varṇāḥ iti-

वर्णानुपलब्धम कानार्थागतेः मन्यामाहे अर्थावान्तो वर्णाः इति-

varṇāḥ kāndirah, āndirah, vrksa iti savakāreṇa kās'cidartho gamyate, vrksa iti vakārāpya so'rtho na gamyate. Kāndirah iti savakāreṇa kās'cidartho gamyate, āndirah iti kakārāpya so'rtho na gamyate.

Again, 'Saṁghātārthavatvācca'—on account of the collection having meaning. If the collections of letters have meaning, their parts too have meaning. If the parts have meaning, their wholes too have meaning. If one man, with eyes is able to see, a collection of a hundred such men is able to see. If one sesamum (tilah) is capable of giving oil, its collection is also equally capable of it. But, if the parts have no meaning, their wholes also cannot have any meaning. If one blind man is unable to see; if a collection of a hundred such men also is unable to see; if one particle of sand cannot give any oil, hundred begs of the same cannot do it.

7. यदि ताहि हमे करणं; कहिन्तः, कहित्वत्ताति प्राप्युवन्ति। कानिः कवित्तावदेप- 

यदि ताहि हमे करणं; कहिन्तः, कहित्वत्ताति प्राप्युवन्ति। कानिः कवित्तावदेप-

दिपकम् इति प्रामित्तिकसंद्र, प्रामित्तिकिकात् शति स्वापुत्रिचि। लबुनां पांच हृति सह 

दिपकम् इति प्रामित्तिकसंद्र, प्रामित्तिकिकात् शति स्वापुत्रिचि। लबुनां पांच हृति सह 

पवंशं।

(8) कार्याकस्तु प्रतित्तिकिकात्: कार्याकस्तु वरणाः। कुन्य? प्रतित्तिकिकात्:।

कार्याकस्तु प्रतित्तिकिकात्: कार्याकस्तु वरणाः। कुन्य? प्रतित्तिकिकात्:।

पिन्हिद् प्रतित्तिकिकात्:। वरणाः। वरणाः प्रतित्तिकिकात्।

पिन्हिद् प्रतित्तिकिकात्:। वरणाः। वरणाः प्रतित्तिकिकात्।

M. Bh. I.

(9) वर्णव्यत्यापायपायोपकरणकिरवर्त्त्तमाहेः कर्मकारणात्।

वर्णव्यत्यापायपायोपकरणकिरवर्त्त्तमाहेः कर्मकारणात्।

and also वर्णव्यत्यापायपायोपकरणकिरवर्त्त्तमाहेः कर्मकारणात्।

and also वर्णव्यत्यापायपायोपकरणकिरवर्त्त्तमाहेः कर्मकारणात्।
The authenticity of the s'āstra is unquestionable and we find in some of the scriptures enjoying such acts as killing, sprinkling, and cutting with reference to some 'pasu'. Now, if by this 'pasu'...
only generally is meant, these acts as would be impossible.

Again, it is not sound to argue that words should be generally taken to signify 'akrti', but at times, in order to avoid 'anartha-kya dosa', may be taken to signify 'vyakti'. For, this will drag us in the position where we make the word express two senses, a position which cannot plausibly be allowed to stand. So, now, how to account for the notion of generality that we get from a word?

The objector says that 'akrti' is the mark (cinha, linga) that leads the hearer on to the 'vyakti'. Just as the idea of a 'dandajwe derive from hearing the word 'dandin', only serves as a mark to perceive the man with danda, which alone is the real sense of 'dandin', similarly the 'akrti' which is conveyed by a word, is only the mark (linga) to perceive the 'vyakti' which alone must therefore be taken as the real sense expressed by a word.

Usage also seems to go against akrtivada. We have such expressions as 'sad deyah' and 'Caturvims'atirdeyah' where numerals are used with reference to words like 'gavat'. These seem to signify clearly the vyakties and not 'akrties. Akrti is only one and we cannot think of any numeral except one with reference to it. Again, the acceptance of akrtivada would lead to the futility of the graminidhis'astra. The substitution will be impossible if akrti is accepted as the real import of word like 'pasu'. For, the word 'anya' will have no sense, since any 'pasu' becomes the same and not 'anya' if 'akrti' (i.e. pas'utva) be the meaning of the word 'pasu'. Now every 'pasu' is possessed of 'pas'utva', so much so that no 'pasu' can be described as 'anya'.

To avoid this contingency, vyaktivada is to be accepted.

व्याक्ति: पदार्थ हैति कृतः प्रायोगिकेनायानवाचतः वाच्यप्रयोगानांबिस्तापादीतिः।
प्रायोगिकेनायानां अवकृत्ये रत्नद्वेयेऽप्रवेदे।।
व्यक्तिवाच्यात्यात्तसा व्यक्तिन्द्रिय वति ज्ञातः।
द्वे वाच्यप्रयोगात्तिरिति वेत्ति।
अन्ध व्यन्तिसिद्धान्तव्यवकृतिविशिष्टम् मुद्दा परविश्वति य व्यवधानिकः स गौरिति।
यथा यथा दण्डायित स दण्डीति। न च दण्डनवनों दण्डिशां। स्वभावादीयाः मा.
on 1.3.30, pp.296-301.

and also न तत् इन्द्रेषुकः कर्म: श्रेय: मोक्ष यथावृत्तः श्रावणः मोक्षः। भृगुवंशः भाषा:। व्यास देयः। चुन्द्रशासितः हृदिः। न यथावृत्तः चाराविभि:। तुंग्यादिशुचितः। तत्समात् न
भाज्जुकीकरः।—शाबर, मा। on 1.3.31 p.p.301.

and also यदि पुत्रपालः पुत्रात् वर्ज्यं तथ्यं तद्भक्षयकेष्ठे यथावृत्तः वचनो
श्रेय: प्रेयम्यप्रवरोभयो नौपपपत्यन्ययपः बापः पुत्रपवारः। यथावृत्तः। तत्समाद् व्यक्तिः
कवन यति।—शाबर, मा। 1.3.32 pp.302

(17) भाज्जुकी शब्दाः। कृत्तः। चित्तर्यधिरः। शेषेणिं चिन्तीत हृदि वचनमाल्य: श्रावणः। व्यक्तिन्ते तु न चयनेन शेषेन व्यक्तिकारणपावयतः। श्रावण:।
शक्यावृत्तिकारणदृष्टः। तत्समाद् व्यक्तिः। कवन यति। (शाबर, मा। on 1.3.33)

and also नमुनेन कृतेत्त्वाः अथवः यथा व्यवहितः। नाजुकः। शब्दाः। कृत्त:।
कृत्त: न संबोधितः। शब्दाः। हृदिः। प्रदेशः। बौद्ध व्यक्तिधारण्यः। कृत्तिकिरः। शक्यमन्नः। तापः। शेषेणिं चिन्तीत हृदि। विद्युक्तवृत्तिकारणाः। व्यक्तिरितः। किं पुस्तः ज्यायाः।
(शाबर, मा। on 1.3.33 pp.303)

(18) भाज्जुकी शब्दाः। हृदि। यदि व्यक्तिः शब्दाः। मोक्षे। व्यक्तन्त्रो न प्रयुक्ते। किं
व्यक्तन्त्रो प्रयुक्ते न तापः। व्यक्तिः। सक्तायमान: विशेष्यादिभिं विनिमयसायति हि व्यक्तिरि
स्त्रुच्यते। (शाबर, मा। on 1.3.33)

(19) मेन दोषः। व्यक्तन्त्रो सक्तायमान: विशेष्यादिभिं विनिमयसायति एव वृत्तिविद्यते। यदि
व्यक्तन्त्रो सक्तायमान: विशेष्यादिभिं नौपपपत्यन्ययपः।। शाबर, मा। 1.3.33, pp.303)

(20) अह-देवेन प्रयोगो दृष्ट्वेन विनिमयसायति न सर्व:। न चास्यवाणोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगो
शक्यावृत्तिसंग्रहः। किमिथि न कवनि। (शाबर, मा। 1.3.33 pp.303)

(21) सामान्यप्रवृत्तिसंग्रहः। प्रयोगाति हृदिः। व्ययपि तु हृदिः। बौद्ध व्यक्तिः। स्वतः। वृत्ति
च सामान्यप्रवृत्तिः प्रागाति हृदिः। वृत्ति तत्समाद्य दृष्ट्वेन विनिमयसायति हृदिः। (शाबर, मा। on 1.3.33 pp.303)

(22) शक्यावृत्तिसंग्रहः। गोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगोऽगो
on 1.3.33 pp.303.
The image contains a page with text, but due to the quality and orientation of the image, the text is not legible. It appears to be a page from a document, potentially containing paragraphs of text, but the specifics of the content are not discernible from the image provided.
तस्मात् शाप्चेतन् यत् क्रीति विशेषणे विशिष्ट: क्रीतिते हिति न दु: गोष्ठाकर्मः।
क्रीत्याख्यातः: प्रत्यायः अन्यः व्यक्तः:। यत् उच्चतः तत् ब्रह्मतिरंगोऽसि गोष्ठ क्रृत्विकवः।
न च यथा दिन्त्रस्वो यथे न प्रेक्षा: एवं गोष्ठो नास्ति।तत्रपनि विदाहिनः केवला वृत्तिभिन्नः लोकसंस्कृतः हिति।
तदेवमन्यत्त्वतिरेका: अस्ति स्मृत्वत्त्वतिसंबन्धे
स्ये श्रेष्ठस्मार्थानावृत्तिविवेचनं हिति गम्यते। न तु क्रीणात्मको लक्षणातिरूपः क्रीणात्मको शास्त्रम् प्रेक्षासृष्टिः।
तस्मातः उपायसृष्टिविवेचनम्: शह्द्व: हितेत्यज्ञायः। शाबरः मा। १। ३। ३३ पप्प। ३३। (३२) तद्धीरः ब्रह्मायणविभागः। शह्द्व: १। ३। ३५— बायुभूत्वच चतुर्वस्य यस्या व्यक्तैः
कृत्वा सृष्टिः तत् प्रेक्षा:। प्रेक्षार्थ: हि हितस्य कृत्वथा यस्या:। कान्तः। यदृ प्रकटि
शाक्तम्। धर्ममुख: अनुपन्ततः तस्य। नास्ति:। अक्ष्यतः। तत् क्रीणात्मकः: क्रृत्विकवः।
प्रेक्षेत्तो प्रेक्षावृत्तिविवेचनाया व ह्यात्त्वति प्रत्यायाय्या। ब्रह्मविति। क्रीतिते सती
प्रेक्षासृष्टि विवेचनं विरूप:। केताकृत्वचनं न विकृत:।। हिति। शाबरः मा। १। ३। ३५ पप्प। ३४।
(३०) एवं जाड़ देशा: गान्ते दिकावणार्थः सृष्टिः प्रेक्षायथे गाव हितासृष्टिविवेचनाः
विशेष्यति। शाबरः मा। १। ३। ३५ पप्प। ३५। (३१) तथा अन्तर्गिते किन्तुस्य प्रतिनिधित्वत्त्वसंबंध: तत् पुल्लु:। बायुभूत्व
कृत्वा विशेष्यति हिति। शाबरः मा। १। ३। ३५ पप्प। ३६। (३२) तस्मात् गौरव इत्ययायम्: शह्द्वः बायुभूत्वायामकः हिति सिद्धम्। शाबरः मा।
मा। १। ३। ३५ पप्प। ३७। (३३) पता यानान्चौदृशारे भाटिंतः ह्रे: वेदा:। प्रायः सर्वानां, नित्यासत्त्वसंक्षेपे
तौ। व्यू. ची. २। (३४) वायुपायादात्तैन् पयोष्किनी ज्ञातिभाग्यसामायपक: हेलराजः मा। १।
३। ३५ पप्प। ३५। (३५) सुविज्ञानवस्त्रपणी: अन्तः परिवर्तनः ५४ उपस्थित। राजस्थानः प्रति २। ३। ३५ पप्प। ३५। (३६) द्वारा स्वरूपः द्वाराविशेषः शास्त्राय विहार:। भगवानः मा। १। ३। ३५ पप्प। ३६। (३७) किं पुनः अन्तः पदाय: वाहौस्थ्रायः उपमानित्वाः कर्मः जाक्षे। उपप्रयोगः किं
ह्यात्त्वोऽन्तः दृष्टि: परिश्रमिति। काक्ष्येकि म्भ: १। १। १। १—सी विश्वासोऽन्तः।
पाणिनीकृती ज्ञातिवध्ये विक्रमादित्ये। हेलराजः मा। १। ३। ३५ पप्प। ३७। (३८) न च इत्ययादात्त्वसृष्टि हिताय विन्यासः वाल्मीकः मां मा। १। २। २। ६० (३९) जातिमानः फस्य:। साक्षरायुक्तिविशेषः व्यक्तः:। विवाहितान्तु:।
(४०) जातिपातः हि स्कृतब्धे व्यक्तेमाने सुध्यकरः। शास्त्राया कृतिशिका।
(35) व्यावहारिक व्याख्या: वाक्यिक 45 under Panini I.2.64.

(36) व्याख्याकृति तु स्वस्थाना इन्द्रम्यास्मै नास्ताद कृत्य समन्यायोपवित्र॥

हेलाराज on V.P.III.2.

(42) शास्त्रमूल्यत्वा जाति: M. Bh. on Pa.IV.1.63.

(43) कैलासचित्र साहित्ययुग जाति: ग्रन्थिकल्मानाम् V.P.III.3.

(44) इद वेदार्थात्मक जातिवादिनां एकाधिकायायाचक्षुः: प्रतिपादने जातिवादार्थे-

हेलाराज on V.P.III.3.

(45) स्वा जाति: प्रथम शैव सत्तवादिविद्यालये।

हेलाराज on V.P.III.2 and/ जातिवादियो जात्य दिशा व जातिवादिचिन इव।

(46) स्वा जातीयाय गोशास्त्रिकान्त: सबक शब्दाभासारण प्रथमाविदित: हेलाराज.

(47) जतीय ज्ञात्यस्य शब्दसंहः मद्यमाधिप्योपयोधृचुपि कालप्रतिकार्यतिकार्यायेन-हेलाराज

(48) स्वागतःप्रत्येकास्तन्तरं जातिजीताना गौर्जवीदनात्मकत्या तस्या: शब्दावेत: असरोपस्य कल्पना-हेलाराज

(49) इव च सुन्दरस्वास्वस्वा जातिवादिमात्रे जातिवादात्मिल्येक्षण स्वामां प्रस्तुतः।

हेलाराज on V.P.III.2 also जातिवादियो जात्य दिशा बाह्य जातिवादिचिन इव।

(50) तथा चान्द्रीकृतेण गुणापूर्विकमिवीये जातिरेष्य। इव ग्रहमायपेनेना भिभिये-

हेलाराज on V.P.III.12.

(51) इव व्याख्या: व्याख्या: तु इव व्याख्या: व्याख्या: इव साधिते हस्ते। इव व्याख्यायावृद्धार्थम: सलार्थानि हस्ते।

V.P.III.130.

(52) इव: प्रत्याख्यानाया: गुणाद्वृद्धार्थारोणाः सबौत्त्रियाः इव व्याख्यायात्मिविशेषे-हेलाराज

(53) तथा समावे जातिवादिनास्या मृत्युं जातिवादिर्थास्ति केविकुमदसमात्मिन इति

मृत्युंजयेपुरुषार्थान्त: हेलाराज

(54) इवानी व्याख्यानेत्तरां पार्श्वव्यवस्थामाहृ-हेलाराज on V.P.III.19

(55) अनुवृत्तिहूँ यास्य प्रत्याख्यांवृत्तिः किंहृः।

हेलाराज व्याख्यायां तु इव त्वेक प्रकाशे॥ V.P.III.19

(56) व्याख्यात्मिनि दृश्यान्तः कृष्णाचार्यनि शिष्येष्याराहारियारौ दस्तिः इव व्याख्यात्मिनि प्रश्नाकुवक्ताम्-हेलाराज

(57) व्याख्यात्मिनि दृश्यान्तः प्रश्नायात्मिनि प्रश्नाकुवक्ताम् V.P.III.22 त्वं स्वयं व्याख्यात्मिनि न व्याख्यात्मिनि त्वथा: वाक्यायां: त्सरीत: शा्रक्षमाण on ब्र. पू. II.2.28
(58) संदर्भस्वतः यज्ञार्थितम् सुविद्युतपते तदार्थस्वयं महायते नन्दुप्येः।
हेलाराज on V.P. III. 19।

(59) यह यज्ञार्थितम् सुन्दर्यात्स्वयं न क्षमित्वाय तदार्थस्वयं महायते। -हेलाराज

(60) मनु वस्तुनि देवातितिनिमित्वैः केल हि तदनादर्शादिन्यान्येव ताति
विश्वासस्ति विवेक।

(61) विश्वासस्ति वस्तुनि व्यवहारसायनम् सर्व एव परोपकायो व्यवहारः। -हेलाराज

(62) सर्वधार्मिकत्वमेंव्यवहारसायनम् निर्णयः। भावानात्मकमेव वक्तः भावात्मा
व्यवहारः। सूक्ष्मः। -V.P. III. 22।

(63) तस्माद द्वीक्षणः। स्वाधीनकरणः मिन्नलकारणः। सुशुभः। सुरेताये यात्रिकः
न तु हेलाराज। -V.P. III. 23।

(64) वाचस्मध्ये क्षंतिवै ज्ञाति ज्ञातिविक्रमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादि

(65) यवत्येतो तु यह यज्ञार्थितविक्रमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादि
सत्याय यज्ञार्थितविक्रमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादियमादि
मता वथास्तु यात्रिकः -सूक्ष्मः। -V.P. III. 32।

(66) विकारार्पणेऽस्य सत्या सृष्टिः कुष्ठाः क्रोधः। विकारार्पणेऽस्य सत्या स्थानः क्रोधः
ना यथाः। -V.P।

(67) शुचिनी क्या क्ष्यातिकृत्वा युक्त फिन्नो भविः। फिन्नात्मितिपुरुषः श्रवः। निश्चितः
वाच्यार्थात च भविः। इत्य अनुस्वरूपः। M.bh. I. 1।

(68) Helaraja on V.P. III. 32 says: वन्तः परा प्रृथ्विः। सत्या स्वविविकाः
राणुर्विरसी प्राणात्मककल्लिता स्वदेशी। भूतायातमकवींद्र।

(69) अम्बेदकाराचार्य नैतिक निर्माण गवाहिंशुजागृहिकर्षु तस्या स्वातः
व्यवहारः।

(70) वाच्यार्थातः स्थानः प्राप्तः। V.P. III. 36।

(71) सम्रृः। विश्वासम्। सदा विविकाः। -हेलाराज

(72) तत्वेष बुद्धिः सत्येः। आलंकृतः सत्यायतिः हि क्रुद्धः। -हेलाराज

(73) प्राणमे प्राणम्। स्वरुपानात्मकमेव चित्तः। -उपाध्याय

(74) ज्ञात्वाच्यातिप्रेमः। चार्थिः हि द्वामक्षरायायायाः। हेलाराज

(75) एष्येतेन व्यक्तिप्राप्तिः। स्मृतायूँ गृहः। न व्यक्ति। etc. सं. 5।

(76) स्वात्मात्मिकी लापाणिकः। सर्वार्थं व्य-समाधिः। k. p. 3।

(77) अनाघीप्राणामाश्च तत्त्वभुतः न तुम्हारे दात्मरायनः। -सर्वाविनिः।
(78) वैवाक्यातानामपेतपितीकार आवश्यकः—पृ. 160।
(79) हृद च विखण्ड चैव योगस्ते च योगिकम्। तच्चतुष्याः परः। हृदयोगिनं मन्त्रेतः विक्रियम्।।
श.श.प. प. 16।
(80) सृजन्ति कोऽस्ति। श.श.प।
(81) (पक्ष जनि+फुर्त्च)–यन्नाम सावधवूर्विलिष्यायेन समे स्वार्यसायन्ययोग्यौऽतुः
तन्नाम योगस्ते कथा पक्षकृष्णसपा वर्णाद्वित। श.श.प.प.प. 26।
(82) मण्डलनस्विनामादि कथा चिदवेदवृक्षा योगार्थिमेव कथा चिदवेदमेव शक्ताःस्तु
कहिन्तिमेव। श.श.प।
(83) योगस्ते तु पक्षाविदं विषयवृक्षां स्वार्यसायन्यस्तु खण्डीयें समुदायशन्त्या
चावव तमाधिमेवानुपावति न छन्यम। श.श.प।
(84) एवं च प्राप्तेऽति, हर्षितां ने ग्रामाः गोचर; यष्टिः प्रेमशः।
(85) read दुर्गूः—on Nirukta I.1। शिविशा हि शब्दवेक्षिः। प्रत्ययः वृत्तः म
परोदावृत्तः; अतिपरोदावृत्तः।
CHAPTER VII.

WORD AND ITS RELATION TO MEANING.

We have noted the divergent views as to what exactly forms the import of word. As to the exact relationship between word and meaning also, Indian thinkers differ widely.

The problem of the relationship between word and meaning seems to have been carefully studied by Indian thinkers. We may be able to find the first attempt in this direction in the Nighantu,(1) wherein words are arranged in different groups such as those signifying the same sense, those having multiple sense etc.(2) Patañjali also draws attention to this (3)

Language has both physical and psychological aspects. Our thoughts find audible expression through sounds that are produced through vocal organ. All sounds do not constitute words. Only those sounds that directly signify objects are popularly known as S'abdas.(4) Languages thus provides an instrument of conveying our thoughts and 'semantics' or the science of meaning deals with this psychological aspect of language, thus showing how certain things are signified by certain words, how things are named, how meanings are widened or specialised as the case may be etc. The etymologists (Nairuktas) have attached much importance to this psychological aspect in their principles of derivation. Yāska clearly states that in deriving words that do not give the usual sense according to the grammatical mode of analysis, much attention should be paid to their meanings rather than to their external forms. (5). Thus, grammar is concerned with the formal aspect and Nairukta is concerned more with the semantic aspect of language (6).

The Indian thinkers have tried to approach this problem of the relationship of word and meaning in such a way as to render it more metaphysical than purely linguistic. They approached it from all possible points of view such as metaphysical and linguistic. They looked upon language more as an expression of internal consciousness(7). Naturally therefore, a constant and invariable association of word with sense follows.
On the utterance of any particular word at any time, some particular sense is gathered at once. To signify everything, there is a competent word of it (8). So, the question may be put as follows: How has a word the power to convey the intended sense to the listener?

In the Upaniṣads, the first manifestation of the Indeterminate is said to be dual aspects of mind and speech—S'abda and artha—i.e., consciousness first splits itself up into the categories of subject and object (9). For the Upaniṣads, thought and speech are interchangeable. The mind is fully expressed in the speech and the speech is stated in the mind (10). Again, according to S'ruti, when a man dies, his activity or power of speech sinks into that of the mind and the mind into Prāṇa and so on (11). The implication is that speech is the product of the mind.

According to a S'ruti quoted by Punyarāja, there is some subtle form of speech (Vāk) which is inherent in the soul of pure consciousness, and is not divided from the meaning (12).

Speech and thought are inseparable. This is supposed to be realised only in a stage of higher spiritual attainment. Consciousness presents itself to us in two parts which are unseparable. Thus, it has been said that S'abda and artha are but different aspects of one and the same thing (13).

Bhartṛhari has postulated a peculiar doctrine of evolution which sought to explain the whole phenomenon of the universe as a Vivarta of S'abda Brahma (14). He seems to have been much under the sway of Vedāntic non-dualism and he is an ardent advocate of the view that all speculations about S'abda and artha are more internal than external (15). Thus, for those who hold speech to be purely an internal phenomenon, i.e., a manifestation of the consciousness that lies within—word and meaning, though fundamentally unseparated, appear to be as though distinct, only through māya (16).

THE VAKYAPĀDĪYA:

Now, as for the relation of word and meaning, Bhartṛhari observes in his sambandha samuddeśa, that the relation between word and meaning is by no means such as anyone can deny (17). The relation is fixed...
by nature i.e. by the very nature of word and its meaning. The mutual connexion is proved by the very fact that the word is called Vācaka and the meaning is termed Vaeya(18). When it is said that 'this is indicated by the word' or 'this word expresses this sense' it is understood that there is some kind of connection between Vācya and Vācaka. When Bhartṛhari says—Śabdam yatas'aktitvam—he implies that words by their very nature have the power of signifying the definite ideas of which they are treated as symbols, and that their potency is never exhausted and remains practically inherent in them(19). The meaning of the word is, according to Bhartṛhari, what presents itself to us whenever that word is heard(20). The utterance of the word 'gauh' immediately gives rise to the idea in our mind of a being possessing dewlap, hump etc. and this is naturally the meaning of it.

The word and its meaning seem to have been related from time beyond memory. This relation finds its analogy in the functioning of sense-organs in respect of the object-world. Thus, both are beginning-less(21). Word and meaning are so closely connected with each other that we cannot think of the one without the other. Kālidāsa also, when he tries to describe the undescribable union of Śiva and Pārvatī, says that they are united as, 'Vāgartha—word and sense—suggesting the element of mysticism in the relation of Vāgartha slo. Word, like knowledge, reveals itself as well as the idea of thing comprehended(22).

Now, what is exactly comprehended when a word is; simultaneously comprehended when we utter a word. They are (i) the particular word, (ii) the intention of the speaker, and (iii) the object denoted. (23). A sound, not presenting these three things, is therefore meaningless. These three things are (i) the sound, (ii) the import, and (iii) the actual fact. Thus, if there is no relation existing between word and its meaning, we fail to account logically for the derivation of a meaning from a word. So, Bhartṛhari sees in such a relation the fundamental solution of the question why things are invariably signified by their corresponding words.
Different views:-

The relation of word and meaning has been explained differently by different Schools of thought in India. Thus, for some, the relation between word and sense is permanent or natural—these are the Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians. So, far them, the relation is not caused by human convention. The main argument is that this relation seems to be eternal, because no another of it is mentioned in the scriptures. The Naiyāyikas and the Vais'ēvikas look upon this relation as conventional (saṅkṣetita) or as the creation of the WILL DIVINE. There are others, who maintain that the relation between the sound and sense is just the same as exists between the cause and effect, manifest and the manifest (grāhaka and grāhya) etc. And for others, speech and thought, or word and things are mutually convertible and, there is also some reciprocality of casual connection between the two. Moreover, according to some sound and sense are essentially the same i.e. they come from the same source. The above view is criticised by some who maintain that if both word and meaning i.e. the object denoted by it, be śīriṣṭi identical, you should feel a burn when you say 'Fire', or 'Agni'. But, this criticism is all misdirected. What we actually gather from the view quoted above is that one and the same thing gets itself manifested in different forms in which objects are usually comprehended by all beings. Thus, word and meaning, fundamentally non-different, appear to be different only in popular usage.

We will try to consider the Nyāya-Vais'ēvikas etc. in greater details.

MĪMĀṂSAKA:-

The Mīmāṃsakas have given a serious thought to this problem. Before discussing the relation as such between the word and its meaning, the Vṛttiśār(pp. 43) discusses in the beginning as to whether there is any possibility of there being any relation as such between word and sense. They can't be connected by Saṃśīla or Saṃyoga, because in that case, the
utterance of the word 'ksura'and 'modaka' would have resulted in the cutting and filling of the mouth respectively. This is not our experience.

Again, there cannot be any other relation such as kārāraṇabāhāvā or nimijyāmabāhāvā or ās'rayās'rayābhāvā existing between them. As the s'abda and artha are both 'nitya', the first two relations cannot take place. The third also becomes impossible because of the fact that they have different ās'rayas (substrate) - the s'abda residing in ākāśa and the artha residing in prthīvī. So then, what kind of relation exists between them?

(32). The Mimāṃsakas gives a simple answer, viz. that s'abda is pratyāyaka and artha is pratyāyya. Thus there is pratyāyakapratyāyayabhāvā between them or 'SamjñaSamjñilaksanaSambandha'. Now, if this relation is believed to be existing between s'abda and artha, we should expect s'abda to convey its artha even on its first hearing. On the contrary, our experience goes otherwise. The prathāya S'rūta S'abda is not Pratyāyaka. In that case, the relation should not be pratyāyakapratyāyya type. But this argument can be refuted by pointing out to our experience. It is established by our experience that a s'abda is pratyāyaka and artha is pratyāyya, because we find invariably that s'abda conveys meaning. In case of its being not pratyāyaka when prathamas ājita, it may be observed that it becomes pratyāyaka as many times as it is necessary for it to become so.

Only thus, we can explain our normal experience. We cannot regard eye to be an adhīśrīr only because it fails to see objects in the absence of light. The same is the case here. Light is the sahakāri kāraṇa. In the same way, s'abda is the pratyāyaka, and bahukrt s'aravā is the sahakāri-kāraṇa without which s'abda fails to be pratyāyaka(35).

Jaimini and S'abara reject the view that this relation viz. pratyāyaka-pratyāyya sambandha is a temporal relation and therefore temporary, or impermanent(34) and(35). They hold that it exists permanently and that it is not created after the existence of word and meaning. They have very often made it clear that the relation between s'abda and artha is 'aśṭpattika' i.e. 'nitya' or 'apauruṣeya'. i.e. not man-made.
And according to them, because the S'abdārtha Sambandha is apatikka, a word can be expressive of one and only one signification and that it cannot be made to signify that with which it is not connected naturally.

Now, as far the objection stated above (i.e. the Purvapakṣa), it may be said that the main defect of this view is that there is no Purāṇa whom they can prove to be 'Sambandha'. His existence cannot be proved by direct means. Pratyakṣa. Again, when Pratyakṣa fails, the other pramāṇas dependent on it also fail. You cannot say that he must have been pratyakṣa to people of his times. Because, we do not get any traditional account to the same effect. The tradition can be broken also. But the objectors should furnish us with strong reasons to support their plea. The tanks etc. on the Himalayas e.g. must be the work of some Puruṣa totally unknown to us even by tradition. But here, the absence of break of tradition is caused by des'otāsāha or kulāsāha resulting ultimately in the loss of memory of men. But the same cannot be said about s'abda and artha as we cannot imagine a period when man was not connected with s'abdārthavāpāra.

Thus, in the absence of any break of viyoga, there is no reason why there should be no smarāṣa (memory) of some sambaddha. The absence of his smarāṣa, therefore, can be taken as an indication of the absence of the sambaddha himself. Thus, the objector's view does not stand. (36).

Now, it may be argued that the sambaddha goes out of memory because it was not necessary to remember him in the S'abdārthavāpavāpāra which could be carried on without remembering him. We do forget things when they cease to be useful for our immediate purposes. It does not mean that they did not exist at all. So, mere non-remembrance does not make for the absence of the Sambaddha. But this point of objector can be set aside as fallacious. It is true that people are primarily concerned with the sambandha of S'abda and artha and not with the sambaddha. But you cannot say that the remembrance of the sambaddha is useless, as it is the pre-requisite of vyavahārasiddhi. For any vyavahāra to be fruitful, it should be
necessarily preceded by the full agreement between sambandhakartā and vyavahar- 
arkā, because in the absence of either sampratipatti or vipratipatti, 
arthasiddhi becomes impossible. Thus, the words vṛddhi and mākāra will not 
convey the senses of 'ail' and 'am' and 'sarvaragrutika' respectively, when 
used by a person who does not agree with Pāṇini or Pingala. Now, the 
point is that if there is no smarana of the 'kātya', the sampratipatti, 
illustrated as above can not follow. So, it is wrong to say that kartṛsma- 
reasa is not necessary for our immediate purposes. Therefore, as there is no 
smarana, we conclude that there was no kartā at all(37). Again, says the 
siddhistin, the existence of a thing can be admitted only if it is proved 
by some pramāṇa, but never in the absence of any pramāṇa at all. The mere 
non-remembrance of a thing cannot be taken as ground for postulating the 
existence of a thing as is done by the objector. In that case, since non- 
perception of an existing thing is possible, therefore s'as'avisāna, 
as it is 'amupalabdha', must also be existing(38). 

Jaimini and S'abara hold that the existence of a sambandhakartā can- 
not be proved by arthāpatti. We can resort to it only in the absence of 
every other possible explanation of the given facts. In arthāpatti, we 
explain facts which are apparently inexplicable. Here, we can postulate 
the existence of a thing, only in the absence of any possible alterna- 
tive. Impossibility of any other explanation forms the very basis of 
this pramāṇa(39).

Let us consider the position of the objector in details. For the 
objector, no word was in the beginning connected with any artha at all.

Then, somebody established the connection between 
s'abda and artha; and thus words came to have significations to-day.

This is one of the explanations of S'abdārthavṛddhavyahāra. Then, vṛddhavya-
vahāra furnishes another possible solution. Even to-day we see the 
meaning of a word, young ones getting at the S'abdārtha by first observing the speeches 
and then the consequent transactions of the elders. Thus the elders 
also on their part, might have themselves come across arthajñāna from
those who were senior to them and they two from still senior people and so on. Thus, vrddhavyavahara furnishes yet another solution to the problem of arthajñāna, the first one being the knowledge of the 'S'abdārthasambandhakartā' as in the case of the word vrddhi of Pāṇini, or Makkāga of Pīṇalā. Now, the point is, when vrddhavyavahara can be pointed out as a possible solution, why then postulate the theory of a 'Sambandhakartā'? So, says the Siddhāntin, there is no scope for 'arthāpatti'. 

The other alternative, viz. Vṛddhavyavahara is strengthened by pratyakṣa yamāna and therefore, is more acceptable. The absence of the sambandhakartā can be proved in another way also. It is impossible to think of a day when s'abda and artha had no connection whatsoever with each another, and were for the first time brought into connexion with one another by some human being, such as assumption presupposes sambandhakartā and the sambandhakriyā. But could this sambandhakriyā be carried out? Is it not that the kartā will have to catch hold of some existing words with established meanings with which to establish the sambandha between s'abda and artha, totally unmārkākā themselves? But, were these existing words connected with meaning? It cannot be like that according to the objector. Then the 'kriyā' becomes impossible. The course open to the kartā of the objector is that he should catchhold of some Siddha words whom he knows through Vṛddhavyavahara. Thus, ultimately we have to accept vrddhavyavahara, as the only explanation.

The fact that youngsters catch artha even if they do not know the sambandha, is a matter of day to day experience and it cannot be questioned. They do not come to arthajñāna by the smarana of a sambandhakartā. Thus, it should be rejected. The very presumption of a sambandhakartā is absurd. Sambadhankarana means giving names to things. To assume that all things having names were present when this ceremony of giving names was performed, sounds absurd. At least some things must have come into existence much later. Thus, this points to the futility of the
assumption of a sambandhakerta. (43). Jaimini and S'abara also show that it is impossible to think of any sambandhakerta in case of the Veda also (M.S.I.i.27-32; and S'abara Bhāṣāthereon).

So, the relation stands to be autpattikā, i.e. not man-made, but nitya. The Mīmāṃsakas were compelled to ascribe eternally to both words and their relation to meanings, because, as Kumārila puts it, they maintained the unquestionable trust-worthiness of the Vedas, Kumārila seeks logical justification also (44).

Just as, the operation of the visual organs is said to be the immediate instrument of the cognition of form (rūpa), even though, ultimately, the conjunction of the soul with the mind makes for it, in the same way, the cognition of relation and not that of the word itself popularly considered as what directly helps us in determining the meaning (45).

The Mīmāṃsakas have also discussed the problem as to how to determine the S'abdārtha. The simplest way to determine the S'abdārtha, according to S'abara is-yaḥ pratiyayate sa S'abdārthāḥ. But then, in a sentence viz. Purvo dhāvati, the word 'pūrvaḥ' also suggests the idea of 'apara', which is not apparently the sense of the word 'pūrva' by itself. So, the above mentioned rule can be modified as follows, 'Whatever sense is conveyed and is also intended to be conveyed, is the real significance of the word.' Jaimini says: Tad gāme hi tad drṣṭya etc. S'abara reads: Yaśya gāme yadupajayate sa tasya artha iti ganyate. This may be called the rule of anvaya-vyatireka (46).

The next source of Arthajñāna is the 'abhivyuktas' or the 'Śāstra-śthās', Jaimini says: Śāstrēṇa vē tannimittatāt (S.B. On VIII.2.24 2.1610) and S'abara says: Yaḥ s'āṣṭyāsthamān Sa s'abdārthāḥ (so also, S'abdārthāḥ dhigame abhivyuktadopades'aj pramāṇan) S.B. on I.3.10; pp.226; and abhivyuktah s'abdārtheṣu Sīstāḥ. S.B. On I.10; pp.226; and yaḥ s'āṣtrasthamān Sa S'abdārthāḥ, S.B. on I.3.9; pp.217; and also see SB. on Ma.Śū.I.3.27) who are these s'āṣtrasthas, or abhivyuktas or S'īṣṭas? Why are they taken as pramāṇas? To this, S'abara says that their tradition and acquaintance with
Vedas and the S'āstras is unbroken and hence they are to be looked upon as authority(47)

Yet another source is Mīgama,Mirukta and Vyākaraṇa, especially with regard to words such as:Jarbhari,Turfarītū etc., found in the Vedas. (48). In the case of the words that do not belong to the language of the Āryans, and yet are found at times in the scriptures, Jaimini and S'abara say that here, where it is a question of borrowed words, we should accept their original sense which they usually convey in the language from which they are taken up. So, the rule is: Coditaṃ pratiyātē, avirodhāt premāṇānā. But, if there are such words as are not understood even by the Mlecchas, then, in that case, once again, we have to go to the S'īṣṭas or to Mīgama,Mirukta and Vyākaraṇa.(49). Again, there might be certain cases in which one and the same word might show different usages among different peoples. For this, S'abara says that a usage which is less wide is not to be accepted when it conflicts with another wider one(50)

Another criterion is that, what conflicts with the S'āstras is less acceptable than what, though actually not supported by the S'āstra, at least does not stand in conflict with it. As, the inhabitants of Āryāvarta are much in touch with the S'abdārthopāyas, their view is more acceptable that of the antyajanapadādāśi mleccha(51). Again whenever there is conflict between anumāṇa and pratyākṣa prayogā, or prayoga and smṛti, the latter is to be regarded as stronger in each case(52). And finally, laṅkikāḥ prayogāḥ S'abdārthopariścedagadhetuḥ—words in a Vidhis'āstra like the Vedas or the words of law, should be understood exactly as we understand them in ordinary language.

The Mīmāṃsāsakas have also discussed the problem of the Pravṛttinimitta of S'abda. The word, e.g., putra depends on kṛiti no doubt, but, it can come into existence only if the person referred to by the word is related to somebody as a son. Thus in this case sambandha is the pravṛttinimitta of the word 'putra'. Thus, the word 'yūpa' is a 'samskāra s'abda'. The word 'kāraṇ' depends on the connection between 'karma' and 'kāraṇ' which shows that it is a 'yatjgika' word. Thus, samskāra and yoga are the pravṛttinimittas in these two cases.
Before considering the various pravṛttiṇimittas we should know what actually it means. Here S'abara says:ye naimittikāḥ s'abdāḥ te nimittaṁ upalabhya pravṛttiṇimittaṁ pravṛtyantya yathā daṇḍaḥ pachārtī i.e. only that factor can be called a pravṛttiṇimitta, in the absence of which the term cannot be used. Thus, in the absence of samskāras, a pillar cannot be termed as yūpa.

'Jāti' or 'ākṛti' itself is the chief pravṛttiṇimitta, for, when there is nothing else in particular to be conveyed by a word, it conveys ākṛti, therefore, ākṛti is the pravṛttiṇimitta of such words, and they are Jātinimittāḥ S'abdāḥ or Jātí's'abdāḥ. It should be noted that whenever Jāti becomes the pravṛttiṇimitta of a S'abda, as a rule in language, this S'abda is to be accepted as a Jāti-s'abda, even though in some special cases, the word might appear to convey something else—say for example samskāra etc.—(see MS[I.4.10 and SB thereon)

Lokprayaga becomes the determinant cause in such cases.

The next pravṛttimitta is yoga and such words are yaugika; e.g. the word: Prokṣaṇī. Again S'abara explains the word yaugika when he says: Rājas'abdāḥ prasiddhām Pādāya s'abdam. Thus, when a word comes into usage, not directly for its own artha, but owing to some connexion (yoga or saṃyoga) with some other word already in usage, such a word is called yogasiddha or yaugika. Jaimini suggests this in the Sūtra-Prokṣaṇī अर्थसाम्योगस् (see SB on MS[I.4.11 pp 344–Prokṣaṇī s'abdam prati samdehaḥ kiṃ sāmskāra-nimittakah uta Jātinimittah... etc...tasmādvaṣṭikaḥ). Then, Sāmskāra also is another pravṛttimitta e.g. in case of words such as yūpa etc. If a word is sometimes found to be used as a Jāti's'abda it must be always taken as a Jātí's'abda, even though in certain cases it might appear as a Sāmskāra's'abda e.g. the word 'Barhiḥ'. S'abara justifies the above rule on logical grounds.

If words like 'Barhiḥ' etc. are accepted as sāmskāranimittas, setting aside their lakkika usage, we, in that case, take them as 'alakkika' words. This is not the right approach. The rule regarding the 'balābala' of sāmskāra and Jāti as pravṛttimittas is suggested by Jaimini in the Sūtra: Bharirjorāyasamskārē s'abdālābhāḥ atacchābāḥ. (I.4.10.) See SB thereon
'sambandha' is the fourth pravṛttimimitta. A yānjika word, e.g. 'rajya', is dependent on some Jātis'abda e.g. Rājan which is its 'prasiddhimūla'. But the word Rājan by itself is quite independent. The word 'putra' depends on the relation with the person to whom a man is related as a son. Now in case of the words 'Rājan' and 'rajya', the former is a Jātis'abda and is the foundation-prasiddhimūla-of the usage of the word rajya. But this is not the case with the words 'putra' and 'pitr', which are mutually dependent and therefore called 'samandhi S'abdas. S'abara explains it as: Sambandi S'abdās'ca Sarve Sāpekaḥ vinā padāntareṇa paripūrṣarthaṃ abhivadanti. (Read also SB on VI.7.24 pp.1500-Bahutvam śapekaśikam etc.)

T Rūḍhi is also a pravṛttimimitta. The word kus'ala i.e. 'One who cuts grass', is the illustration. Now it suggests all the qualities that a man should possess while cutting grass. Usage has now restricted the sense of the word to this kipūrṇatā alone. Mammaṭa takes lakṣaṇā here. But it is not so far S'abara. S'abara says that such a phenomenon usually occurs where a word is a composite word. It gives one signification when taken as a samuđāya, and another signification when taken as being composed of parts. In such clasess, S'abara says: avayasaprasiddheḥ s'amaḥ a kutasbhuḥ prasiddheḥ balīyasi. (S.B. On VI.7.21, 22; pp 1499-1500; yathā kus'alaḥ, pravīṇaḥ etc.)

All the pravṛttimimittas refer to the vācyārthas and not the lakṣaṇārtha. In case of lakṣaṇā, there are different pravṛttimimittas.

NAIYĀYIKAS.

We will now turn to the NAIYĀYIKAS' views on the topic of the relation of word and meaning or the association of the symbol and the symbolised. The NAIYĀYIKAS and the VAIŚEŚIKAS do not differ much on this issue. For both, the meaning of a word is determined by 'Samaya' or 'Śamketa' (āryan convention). But the difference of opinions lies in the fact that while the VAIŚEŚIKAS include S'abdādha (verbal cognition) in the category of inference, the NAIYĀYIKAS take it as an independent source of knowledge. (53). It should be noted that the NAIYĀYIKAS and the VAIŚEŚIKAS, both alike, do not recognise the possibility of any
related—Samyoga or Samavāya—between a word and the object it denotes (59).

The author of the Nyāyasmārthi finds fault from logical point of view, with the views of the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaranas who have tried to establish or relation between a word and its denotation (55). The Vaiśeṣika viewpoint is as below. Conjunction or Samyoga is a kind of quality. Sābda being itself a quality of Raksā, cannot possess samyoga—a quality—with the object denoted by it (Gunatvat Vai. Śū. VII. 2. 14), (and also tatha ca guṇasya S'abdasya guṇah samyogah, kathāṃ syāt—Upaskāra). Again, there is no action as such which takes place when things are denoted by words. So, we cannot find out any connection between the two—niṣkriyatvāt—Vai. Śū. VII. 2. 16. Things that are formless (i.e., immaterial) and inactive by nature, can never be related to one another without the intervention of any external force. Again, in cases like 'there is no pot'—one fails to think of any conjunction between the word and its meaning, which is non-existent at present (asti nāstīti ca prayogāt. Vai. Śū. VII. 2. 16). Our universal experience is that things that are mutually related are found to have co-existence. The word 

\[ \text{asti} \] (there is no pot), now uttered, does not logically co-exist with the thing which is simply negated. Similarly, Samvāyasambandha between a word and the object also can be brushed aside. The Niāyikas did not agree even to the idea of natural relation, either Samyoga, or Samavāya but on the contrary, tried to refute the theory of eternal relation between S'abda and artha. A Sambandha i.e. connection as such is negated because there is neither pratyakṣa nor anumāna proof for it (56). Again, a union of the two is not possible as the two do not remain in the same locality. A word exists in the vocal apparatus of the speaker, and the object lies in different space (57). So, in this state of affairs, the conclusion that the words and things denoted by them are not connected, forces itself upon us (58). A sound has its origin in the mouth, while the object lies on the earth. At the same time the entire absence of relationship is also against all popular experience. To deny any relation is to strike at the very root of our knowledge of things. There is at least some relation—whether real or imposed—between the two.
Because, in the absence of any relation whatsoever, any word would have denoted any object e.g. ghaṭa would have denoted pāṭa also (59). On the contrary, we find that the utterance of a definite word is always accompanied by the comprehension of a definite real thing (60). There is no knowledge, which is not associated with its word (61). The cognition of a thing from a word is in itself a strong evidence of some relation existing between the two (62). The Naiyāyikas did not accept the natural connexion between the two, but at the same time, they did not, in any way, deprecate the uniformity of cognition as is represented by words in the way of denoting things (63). If it is asked that in case of the absence of relation between the two, how can the word as a rule denote some object? (64), Kāṇḍa, with the Naiyāyikas, says that the cognition of a meaning is not because of any connection as such, but it results from the Sāṅketa—The will of the God—expressed in the following way—'let this meaning be gathered from this word' (65). Sāṅketa, thus, is caused by Divine will and not established by human beings (66). This relation between vācyā and vācaka will never come to an end, and will continue even in future stage of existence. It is a fact and not a fiction. Vyāsa refers to this in the Yogasūtra (67). A word expresses only that sense which is assigned to it by the Divine Will. Thus, between the word and the object, this relation of Sāṅketa exists, and not Samyoga or Samavāya. The Vaisēṣikas and Naiyāyikas had to go for it. It may be noted, however, that from the nyāya sūtras and the bhāṣya theron, it is not sufficiently clear whether by Sāṅketa is meant the Divine Will or the human will. The expression "Prayujyamānagrahaṇāca samayopayogop laukikānām," ॐ is intended to imply that sāṅketa follows from vṛddhayavahāra. Grammar also contributes to the same purpose by analysing words into prakṛti and pratyaya-samayapaṇḍālanātham caledam pedalakeṣāyā Vaco'navābhyām khyānam vyākaranam. Vācaspati, Jayantabhaṭṭa, and Adādhara have clearly referred to the will of God as Sāṅketa (68). This Divine volition represents the relation and is rightly called the real power of denotative of a word—S'akti—(69).
Gotama also arrives at the same point practically. He holds the relation to be just conventional and certainly not natural or innate. If it were natural, as held by the grammarians, he argues, that the same word would have been used by different races of mankind in the same sense, and consequently no varieties of language would have resulted. The word 'gauh' is so fashioned by the Divine Will, that it always denotes a particular thing and not anything else.

How is this Samketa apprehended? This, it is said that its cognition is current from time without beginning. We cannot think of any people any day incapable of signifying objects by the use of sounds. Udayana says that God became a magician in the beginning and brought the words and objects—Vācya and Vācaka—together. He assumed the dual forms of the denotative and the denoted before he could make the first group of people familiar with the Samketa, which He invented. From this first group of men, the others of later generations gathered the meaning of words. There are various sources of Samketa-grahāṇa. First of all comes the vrddhavyāvahāra. The logicians and the grammarians have explained this. Samketa is two-fold; ajānika (i.e., not of human origin but current from eternity) and adhunika. (77)

Primary signification known as S'akti comes under the former and the technical terms such as Juma, Vrddhi, to come under the latter.

We have already seen the view of the grammarians. The view of Vyādi, as given by Purnarāja, is that there is no another of the relation that exists between words (both Vedic and popular) and the object denoted by them. The grammarians insist on the eternity of both words and meanings. The mabh. says that the words, the meanings and the relation between them are all eternal. Patañjali has explained the word and 'Siddha' as a synonym of Nitya (Nityaparyāyavacā Siddhas'abdah) and also Nityohya-ṛthavatām arthaḥ abhisambandhah—mabh. 1.1.1.

How then is this permanent relation known? To this, it is said that the object for which words are expressly used constitutes in itself
a sufficient proof to show that the relation between words and meanings is natural and permanent (80). In the absence of this permanent and natural relation no one would have ever felt the need for using words for the purposes of communicating thoughts to others.

BHARTRHARI:-

We have noted that for Bhartrhari the S'abdarthasambandha is as beginningless as the indriyarthasambandha. This relation is explained differently. He regards it to be unconventional, (81) as between a noun and adjective. He also suggests that the proper names (such as Dittha) and the technical terms (as vrddhi, guna etc.) are also permanently related to their specialised sense (82). He also shows the mutual causal connexion between S'abda and artha. A word appears to be the immediate antecedent from which the intended meaning is gathered and again, a word is comprehended only through the instrumentality of sense that is previously ascertained by the intellect (83). The meaning of a word is an object which exists externally in the world (84). Again, it is held that both S'abda and artha stay unseparated in our intellect prior to their outward manifestation (85). By this inseparable relation, they become convertible or interchangeable with each other (86). But in the yogasūtra and Nyāyamājarī an objection is raised against such a view. It is as follows: A word, its meaning, and the cognition produced by it are all really meaning different from one another. In ordinary usage, we treat these three as one and identical; e.g. we have no other criterion, but the term 'go' itself to distinguish the word 'go' from its meaning and the cognition (87). The author Yogasūtra says, that this false identification prevents us from understanding the speech of all beings (Yoga Sūtra III. 17), just as Maya hides from us the essential unity of Brahman.

We have already talked of the doctorines of S'abdādhyāsa and S'abdavivarta as held by Bhartrhari. But these doctorines were strongly criticised by the Naiyāyikas. Jayantabhatta refutes the interchangeability of word and meaning (i.e. S'abdādhyāsavāda), and also S'abdavivartaśavāda
and brands it as inadequate and irrational. Bhartṛkāri was a great exponent of the natural relationship between S'abda and artha and considered it as the most plausible explanation explaining to one's reason. He, thus, opposes the theory of Sāṇkṣeta which brings in the unnecessary discussion of human or divine volition. He says that if words were naturally not connected with their meanings, nobody could ever connect the one with the other in any way possible.

Now, in conclusion we may note as to how the meaning is comprehended from a word. The cognition as to the denotative power of the words (s'akti) is usually derived from popular usages. There are other means also: (i) Grammar;—Bhartṛkāri and Jayantabhaṭṭa emphasize the importance of grammar. (91); (ii) Analogy, e.g., 'gavaya' from 'gaṇa'; (iii) lexicon; (iv) testimony (92). Words like Swarga, Apsaras, deva, uttarkuru and as pointed out by Vaiśeṣika, denote objects which are never perceived by human beings. Their meaning is gathered through śāptavākyas. (93) and (94); (v) popular usage i.e. Vṛddhavyabhāṣa, (vi) Contact, (vii) by the help of synonyms, and (viii) association with the words of known signification.

We will treat of these in greater details under Abhidhā (95). In the case of words having multiple meanings more than one meaning, we have to determine its exact meaning with the help of Śaṃyoga, Viprayoga etc. (96). In case of multiplicity of meanings two courses are open to us. We may either hold that one meaning is the conventional and the rest are of secondary importance as held by the Śaṃskārikas such as Māmata and others, held by the Naiyāyikas.

It may be noted that by multiplicity of meanings with reference to the same word, it is implied that there is some laxity of conventional restrictions. Again, this shows the different stages of linguistic development. Many reasons such as analogy, metaphor and the expansion of knowledge etc. can be given for this happening.

CONCLUSION:—Thus we have recorded the different views on the nature of the relationship between word and its meaning. The poeticians do not seem to have devoted much attention to this topic. However, they may be taken to follow the head of the grammarians.
FOOT NOTES.

(1) निश्चय शीतलता क्रमशः मुद्रणे संत्तरति जलविन्यासः।-दुर्गा।
(2) सन्तोषे निर्तिस्मितयुतकलं तथा यान्त्रिकतः एकादशानि तान्त्रिकोन्हितम्।
कल्पितं स्वसंस्काराः निमानुदिक्षितमियचताने निःक्षेत्र IV।
(3) वहाँ वि शुद्धा एकादशा शान्त्वा तद् शुद्धं, पुनरक्षरं। एकादश शुद्धा बहुमूल्यं।
तद् यथा अकान्ता: पापाः: माणाः हितं। m.7 fr unde वार्तिके 16 (पा.III.3.1)
(4) पत-बहु विद्यैं साध्वनुगमः। एक्षे संप्रतियायित्यामि हितं शङ्के।
यथः इत्यकता। m.18.22 वार्तिके 15, पा.III.1-7 और/ संवेदने वि शुद्धान्त्वानायें
यथः इत्यकता।-दत्तार्थार्थिन् on पी.II.3.8।
(5) व्याख्यान्तिर्विवाचने वि शुद्धान्त्वानायें वि शुद्धान्त्वानार्थें।
निःक्षेत्र II. on which हुए।-वि वि हि प्रवर्तनं तद्र्दं गठतं शङ्के।
(6) तस्तातू व्याख्यान्वेवेद व्याख्यान्दर्शितम्। व्याख्यानं हि अन्तःप्रधानभिति
विद्यां। हुए।
(7) प्रत्येकप्रत्ययम् सात्विकप्रक्ष्यम् पराधौकाया शक्तिरिश्वदान्ते। पुप्पार्ज on V.P.1.1।
(8) व्याख्यानं वै नायनमेवशर्दा, वैप्रभृत्यशः, अष्टक्षेप्याच्छ। व्यवहारः। नायनमेव on
न्या. पी.I.4।
(9) स मनसा वाचं निश्चितं समाक्षी। बृ.उप.2.4।
(10) वाक्यं मे मानिस प्रतिष्ठ्यं फलं मे वाचविः प्रतिष्ठितं। लैं.उप.
(11) पुस्तकां प्रत्येकं अन्तुपसंह संपते-सादृशय-उप. VI.8.6।
(12) हुए अनेकाकालकल्पम् स्वत्तं वाचं विभवदानमां उत्तराः विद्यं
व्याख्यानिः च पूर्वं नात्स्यमात्मनि सात्विकमुप्यादानं।-पुप्पार्ज on V.P.1.1।
(13) एक्स्क्वाइल्मोऽ पद्धम विक्षेप्यपुस्तकाः। V.P.11.31।
(14) अन्ननिमित्यं अंशकालं वक्तरं। कवितीयमपिन्नम प्रश्नं ग्याते यत्। V.P.
(15) अयोवैस्वर्गा तेजाकाव्यां नात्स्यमात्मनां भरमासंह। पुप्पार्ज।
(16) तेजाः नात्स्यमात्मनां अभाव्यां शान्त्वा। त्वाः अन्तर्वथे वाच्य अवाच्यः।
तौ च या शान्त्वा अभाव्यां अन्येव एक्स्क्वाइल्मोऽ तक्तस्य संशयानं वश्यत्: वि वि
प्रतिष्ठितं हितं बोध्यम्।-पुप्पार्ज।
(17) मन्त्रणां: सम्बन्धायं-स्थानायं। या निर्दोषो न तु पुनर्गोष्टिः विवेचितः
हत्यं: हेमाराजः on V.P.5बृंचासुङ्गेः। V.P.
(18) स्वायत्त वाचको वाच्य छत्र खचत्र लिखित तो। योगेः शब्दायोस्तत्तक्षणात्तथा व्यवस्थिते।
V.P. संवृष्टि श्रृद्ध के III.3।
(19) V.P.I.6. श शब्दान् यतसंकितः निवारणप्रत्याशानसांसुपुरुषे पुण्यराज।
(20) परिभाषाप्राप्तिते शदे यथा योधः प्रतिष्ठते। तत्त्वाधृतकं तद्वित् नान्यवध्यस्तः लक्षणाः
V.P.II.3.29।
(21) हिन्दुमूलां ततविषयेन तदग्रहितः यथा।
क्लासिसः शब्दान् संबंधः योगस्त तथा। V.P. संवृष्टि श्रृद्ध के III.29।
(22) अतिशयं यथा जाने शैलपुरं च हुरस्ते। परिभाषा तथा शदे स्तुत्वं च प्रकाशते। V.P.I.50।
(23) सर्वं म्हासुकस्थितिः स्तुत्वं च प्रतिष्ठ्यो। स्वेन्द्रविवर्तितः संवेदनः समुद्धितः
V.P.3।
(24) पृष्टि मीरामालो नैचर्यगणो वा स्वास्तिकः शब्दान्तः संबंधः (आधित्याणतः
tतत्त्वाशीला) वाच्याः। on V.P. I.55।
(26) संवृष्टि न कल्पित शब्दान् हैक्येयों। a verse quoted। सूख विभूषकित्वा
पुण्यराज on V.P.I.26।
(25) वाचकैयः शब्दायो सम्बंधः सूफः aham on बौद्धिकस्तु शब्दाः अलः संबंधः
नित्यावर्गातावर्गार्हस्संक्षेपः। 29।।
(27) शब्दायो कार्यार्थानां संवेदनः हृत्येके। पुण्यराज and स्राध्यर्थः च शक्ति लेखते
यथा। तैव सर्वशब्दानं स्त्रूष्णस्वितः। V.P.I। प्राकृतशः प्राकृतशः कार्यार्थानां
हृतः। भान्तर्मात्रात्मस्तस्तु शब्दस्तस्तु संबंधः। V.P.II।
(28) शाक्यार्थार्थमर्यास्त वहिले तेनाप्रियते। तवं च बौद्धिकविवाहार्याच्छिन्नः प्रतिष्ठते।
V.P.III.32।।
(29) श्लोकबालानी भक्ति शब्दायोपकृतिः। V.P。
(30) एकोऽच बक्तिमेऽ भावाल्यम प्रतिष्ठेयो। बुद्धिप्रवृत्तिसारेण बुध्या जानवादनाम।
as quoted by Punyārāja।
(31) quotes Punyārāja। शब्दायोस्तमे व्यवहारे पूर्णकिम्। यतः शब्दायोः
०त्त्वमें तत्व समविवृताः।
(32) ज्ञेय शब्दायोः संबंधः सुप्रस्तृताः यथा। भक्तम् श्लोकादेशे संबंधः
धृश्यार्थार्थार्थो मुखः पालकपुरुणः स्मार्ताः। यदि संवेदनायाः संबंधः साक्ष्मोकोस्मेः
कार्यार्थो भव्यमात्रायते। कार्यार्थो नित्याविवर्तितायाः भावाल्यस्तु संबंधः। शब्दायोनु-
प्रपन्तन्त् यथा। (Vṛtti pp.43।)
Now, it can be said that this relation viz the pratyāyaka pratyāyya Sambandḥa is at any rate man-made and hence 'anitya'. For, it requires to be grasped by hearing the word more than once. There can be no natural connection between S'abda and artha, because the one is seen inside the mouth and the other is seen inside the body, i.e., on the ground. Again, in our normal use of language, we do distinguish the one from the other saying: 'This is S'abda and not artha; and this is artha and not S'abda'. The same thing is suggested by their different natures. S'abda is something to be uttered and artha is something to be perceived. If these two are non-identical, we may conclude that the relation between them must be kṛtaka-as in case of a rope and a jar. So, according to the objector, it can be concluded that the relation between S'abda and artha must have been fixed by some human being at some time and then he must have composed the vedas for Vyavahārasiddhi (35).

a See also, बौद्धविख्यत्वं ज्ञात्यत्वं स ज्ञात्यत्वं मीक. 1. हामानासो ज्ञात्यत्वं मीक. 5 भी, VII. 3. 38 नीतिविश्वाससंवेदना. VII. 2. 5 विकाशो नीतिविश्वाससंवेदना. मीक. 6. 41 उत्तप्पितम-चेतनायो मान्यता प्रथमान्यता स्वाभ मीक. VII. 3. 22 बौद्धविश्वाससंवेदना हि नामिता मानोः संबंधः। सादृश्यम् on VI. 6. 41. pp. 1522. VII. 2. 5; pp. 1543; and VIII. 3. 3. pp. 1560.
(36)तदिनामीपुजये। अपारापण्यत्तां संबंधस्य सिस्मितिः। कर्म सुचर गम्यते अपारापण्ये
एव संबंध हि। ऊत्तमस्य संबंधसुरमादाम। कर्म संबंधो नासिक। प्रत्यक्षाय प्रमाणस्यायामात्
क्तचूर्णैं कल्याणीरिविशाम। न दृश्या १२७ क्रियास्य शवन्याः भैरवाधीन्द्रकलामः।
ि हि चरणः सन्त मस्ते। न च हिमालयां दिदु कुपारामादिविदसूवः महिमेद्विशत।
पुष्कड़नार्योऽि हि तेजस मवति देहशोभायनेव वा कुशोभायनेव वा। न च शास्त्रायवहाराय
विन्योः पुष्कड़नार्यामस्ति। वृद्धि pp.53।

(37) स्वच्छेत्तत् संसाधनवहाराय्रिणः निष्प्रचरणं कृत्यामरणमात्रियमाणं विस्तरे
सुदरित। तन्न। यदि हि क्रूरः कृत्या संबंध यवहार्येत् यवहारानेत्र अस्तं स्वार्यो
भवति। सम्प्रतिजीवि हि क्रूर्यवस्त्रयेष्मि सिद्धति। न विन्युस्ति। न हि वृत्त्राक्षेत्र
अपारीणे ववहारत आदेशः प्रादेशः पाणिन्यकृति स्थलस्यायाम। वा। तत् प्रतिरेषाकि
विन्यस्य न सर्वसम्ख्यः प्रतिवेदः पिल्लक्षितमात्रियमाणस्य वा। तत् कृत्यवहाराय्रि
संप्रतिपौर्णे। केवले व्यवस्थितः कृत्य स्वर्णिनः संबंधस्य कार्यः स्वात्त्व: ववहाराय
च। न हि विस्तृते वृत्तिवार्डः वित्यस्य सूक्तये कर्ति वृत्तिवार्डः सामान्याचारायः।
हि
किन्तु प्रतिवेदः। (बृद्धि on pp.53)

(38) यथावतः विस्मयापुष्पेतः तथापि न प्रमाणाण्यतो विस्मार्यविनयप्रतिवेदः। यथा
विश्वामाणस्य जानस्य मवति नेतायता विनामाणोन भविन्याणोः प्रतिवेदः।
वृद्धि pp.55

(39) अन्तःकिल्लकृतिपः मुष्टिष्टृतः यथा व्यविन्ययां नोपपस्तेत् हल्ल्चकल्नाः।
यथा जीविते देवते गृहाभावाच्यानवी वहिमस्याया: दिक्कुल्कल्नाः। (बृद्धि pp.38)
कहुँस्ते यायेः सुत्रवृत्तो यथा नासिकापकारः। वचननिर्वातं कृत्यव्यवस्थावः या न विक्रृत्।
विक्रृतानेकृतत् क्षणः स्वात् जायेत् तेन चोऽवेशाः। विक्रृतानेकृतमान्य गम्येत् ततो नैऽपि
क्रृत्येत्। (शाबर.भ. on II.2.1 pp.)वववचन ववहारायः क्रृत्येत् जातिन्वक्षिप्यायाने
ववहारायः। (B.B. on VI.6.3. Pp.481)

(40)नन्यत्यपर्यं ववर्ताय ववहाराय ववहाराय ववहारायानुपुल्लायानुपुस्ते। ववहारायः प्रतिवेदः।
प्रतिवेदः प्रमाणेण प्रतिवेदः। ववहारायः प्रमाणेण प्रतिवेदः। ववहारायः प्रमाणेण प्रतिवेदः।
ववहारायः प्रमाणेण प्रतिवेदः। ववहारायः प्रमाणेण प्रतिवेदः। ववहारायः प्रमाणेण प्रतिवेदः।
ववहारायः प्रमाणेण प्रतिवेदः। ववहारायः प्रमाणेण प्रतिवेदः। ववहारायः प्रमाणेण प्रतिवेदः।
ववहारायः प्रमाणेण प्रतिवेदः। ववहारायः प्रमाणेण प्रतिवेदः। ववहारायः प्रमाणेण प्रतिवेदः।
ववहारायः प्रमाणेण प्रतिवेदः। ववहारायः प्रमाणेण प्रतिवेदः।
(बृद्धि 32pp.55。)
(41) न हि संबंधयतीरिक्तः क्रिक्षितातः ब्रजतः। यस्माद् न कृषिनां श्रद्धं कृत्तिक्षणेऽर्जस्तनां ||
संबंध वारसीतुः। क्रमम् सूचवाघ्रवः हि नाप्पस्त्ते। अवस्यमेवः कृत्तिकृत कृतः। तत्र कृत्तिकृत वैवाप्ति
प्रमुखः। तस्मात् संबंधयति कृत्तिकृतः हि नाप्पस्त्ते। क्रमम् सूचवाघ्रवः हि नाप्पस्त्ते। अवस्यमेवः कृत्तिकृत कृतः। तत्र कृत्तिकृत
वैवाप्ति। तस्मात् संबंधयति कृत्तिकृतः हि नाप्पस्त्ते। क्रमम् सूचवाघ्रवः हि नाप्पस्त्ते। अवस्यमेवः कृत्तिकृत कृतः। तत्र कृत्तिकृत
वैवाप्ति। ||
(42) स्यादेततः अप्रतिलम्बशाला: क्षो बृहस्पतिः प्रतिपदन्त इतिनारिसि दृष्टे कुन्यपनः
नामः। दृष्टा बाला दृष्टे प्रतिपदनानातः न च प्रतिपदनातः। संबंधः:संबंधक्यः कहः। तस्मात् बैण्यमुः। (वृद्धि pp.57)
(43) अनुसूचिकृत च देवदयाक्षः जनविक सूचीकराणाः जस्यां च। विशेषणात् प्रतिपदनुम् हि संतः।
दृष्ट विशेषणां च उहिः। तथवीशेषे खाद्यपानेशु उपेक्षणपरवकृष्ट्य प्राप्तेः। तस्मात् वैणारूपोः।
शक्यस्याधृणम् संबंधः। (वृद्धि pp.58)
(44) नित्या-हृदान्ती प्रभावानां तिथ्योकले हैतु। स्तोत्रालिकः
(45) सखीरामनायोगपाठ्यायायायाक्षः विशालासविभावज्ज चत्रः कारणमित्वे।
तैयेकाधि संबंधानमभ्यु प्रसिद्धिः। गौरवात् करणात्कै संतं चेत् कृत्तिकृत। स्तोत्रा
वा। संबंधानमवृद्धि। (42)
(46) खाद्यार्थ-चिन्ति हि प्रियीतः। यथा पूर्वः चावन्ति। स पूर्वः हत्युच्छते यथार्थपरेषा।
तेन पूर्वः हत्युक्ते च परपरे बन्ध्ये। न त्यपपाद प्रावतिति अवणातू प्रश्वये। --प्रयाति हि पूर्वः
हत्युक्ते। पर्याप्ते गम्ये। एव केलकः न तु स विनिशा हृदामिशकियं स्विमिष्यं संबंधः प्रतिपदेः
हस्त केलकः एव। || (8.हेतु महायानम् on IV.1.14. pp1208) and also
खाद्यार्थपरेषा तद्यथे हि वदेस्ते। तथानं खाद्यपानाम् (साहबः म. on IV.1.15)
यथा चागात् हृदास्ते च तस्याः प्रकरणम्। तथानं खाद्यपानाम् खाद्यार्थ्योक्ते।
वस्माद्याद्यात् कव्यावलयः प्रतिपदेः। गौरवात् करणात्। तत्समाहतः च। च
उपजात्। केन साक्षे। हस्तस्वल्या बन्ध्याः। गौरवात् गौरवात् च। (मा.3.9)
(47) साहबः मा.1.3.9. pp217 औः खाद्यप्रतिस्वरूपः। किर्त्याः। त्यतायात्मिच्छन्तः स्पृहः।
स्वेदेः स्वेदेः। केन शिख्तातिनिमितिः प्रतिस्वरूपे च। अवणातू प्रश्वये। त्रिविधिविद्याः।
नाम खाद्यपानेशु बधकुलानाः। अवणाते करणात्मकं यथार्थपरेषा। गौरवम्: समीरिन्तर बालारी भवति। S.B. on मा.1.3.3. pp.53 *
(48) विचारानां प्रश्वम्: प्रमादान्त्यम्। तिमिरिस्थिकिन्याते। तिमिरिस्थिकिन्याते। च च।
क्लमित्वः। तयं हृद्येव जारेति। यथा हृद्येव जारेति। तपूषामात्रिकिन्याते। तथानं च। अवणातू प्रश्वये।
नाम खाद्यपानेशु बधकुलानाः। अवणाते करणात्मकं यथार्थम्। देवयान्ते। च। च।
(47) साहबः मा.1.3.9. pp217 औः खाद्यप्रतिस्वरूपः। किर्त्याः। त्यतायात्मिच्छन्तः स्पृहः।
स्वेदेः स्वेदेः। केन शिख्तातिनिमितिः प्रतिस्वरूपे च। अवणातू प्रश्वये। त्रिविधिविद्याः।
नाम खाद्यपानेशु बधकुलानाः। अवणाते करणात्मकं यथार्थम्। देवयान्ते। च। च।
also SB.on MS.I.3.10

(49) शोधित तु विद्वेषता विरोधार्थ प्रमाणणा। (MS.I.3.10); चौरितमक्षुप्रिपी

शिष्यानन्दनां प्रकटित। अवदानान्तिकस्रवस्त्र्यम् तदक्षरं न श्रव्यायां तत्वायम्। यथा

शिष्याचारः प्रमाणितितत्त्वादक्षरावलम्बयेत्। यत्वमावस्तुः श्वारयं प्रस्तुत हैति।

तत्तथे भविष्यकाण: पदार्थान्योपण्यां कथन्यां च मेधया। यथा निगमनकृत्य व्याकरणम्

नान्यान्यार्थः। (SB.on 1.3.10 pp.225) तत्रानावकेशम् प्रवर्त्तति न व भेदेऽपकलति: शब्दायः। अधि च

निगमनविभिः कथयमाने स्वयंविष्ट: शब्दाय: भेलत् तत्त्वानिश्चयः स्वातः। SB.on MS.I.3.10.pp.225 & 227

(50) अश्वास्तीकः प्रागोगस्य सार्वोद्धेत्रेञ्जः प्रमाणणा विद्ययानसंवाच्चारण्य स्वातः

वभुषणञ्च्यति हि ते जनविनः सार्वप्रमं प्रागोगम्। SB on II.3.3 pp.880।

(51) अधि चावनिविभिः लौकिकाविज्ञानिः प्रत्यक्षिताः: भवनिः। त्वाकार्यविविधाविंशिः

शब्दायांपरायण्यम्युक्तानान्यायाविंशिः कर्मणा चानुविचित्रान्त्यादक्षरवादिः

मेधेऽपा: सर्वचिन्तित्ति शाचारय भवति। शाबराय म्ह om II.3.3 pp.581।

(52) S'abara sayमुर्गोगाच वृत्तिदृष्टिया: or प्रमाणो दुःखः स्मृत: and अनुमानात्

प्रमाणो कल्यानः। स्थैत

(53) तदैव प्राम्यकाण्यस्य स्विस्तरांपर्यप्त्योपवेदुः पन्नुमाने मूलः न भवतिः। वार्त्तायणः

and सूिं ग नियन्त्रितकालित्वात् न पुर्वतः न चारुमाध्यः।-शब्दकि प्राप्तिकां

(54) शब्दसंस्करणां भूस्वै मूल सेम्बोलं तथा चासनी भट्टाचारी सबसा न संयोगे न वा

समताय विद्यते भावः। उपस्कार और also मुर्गमाह पातनमुपवेश संवभिषेकम्

संस्करणाम्। न्यायः म्ह 1.53 and aslo। न हि सावधानीयोऽनुमुखोपायिका वृंदावन:-

स्वभावः ननुनकारारी समयकाला वा सम्भवेऽऽक्रमापुरूषस्यान्तः। न्यायम्। - जरी 4. pp241

(55) न संस्करणारण: स्वायत्संश्चोऽभासिर्मणुपुष्पान्तः। तदुः कार्यारण नियन्त्रितकालिते-

वित्याविद्यावादायः: शब्दमाणे संज्ञन्तः स्तु: (पि निरामायते) तदुः कार्यारिकार्यावाद -

संज्ञन्तः: भूिं निरसितकालात्रि समय विद्यते भूमः। न्यायम्। - जरी।

(56) प्राम्यकाणांस्तु मूलायाः: संस्कारः प्रतिनिधिः। कस्तात् प्रमाणात्।तुष्टः।

वार्त्तायण, on न्यायः म्ह II.1.52

(57) प्राम्यकाणां च गुर्ज्रमाणो च कस्तात् मूलायाः: कस्तात् कर्तनोऽस्तु: प्रतिनिधिः।

वार्त्तायण, on न्यायः म्ह II.1.52 and also

मूलः हि श्वारुपमागेयः नुपानकर्म स्थबराय म्ह OS.I.1.5.

(58) स्वार्थविविध्यां भूत्व: मूलम् VII.2.18: स्वामात्राय नुपानकर्मको श्वारा: पुले हि

स्वारुष्यानां मूलायांस नुपानकर्म स्थबराय and स्वार्थविविध्यान्यायप्रतिनिधिः। न्यायः म्ह II.1.54।
(59) See V.P.1.125: वायुपता चैतुल्क्षणक्सरस्कर्ष्य शास्त्रविद्। प्रकाशि: प्रकाशेष सा हि प्रत्ययव्याख्यि। कथार्ज्ञानु वाय प्रां वान परिवर्तित सैलनि। तदुपात्यात् किंतुः संवेदनं दृष्टये। भुजाकं राजि राजाधिकरण।

(60) कर्मसन्धिस्यापि सान्ताणेल्र अरुणाचल पुनःपराणा।

(61) न सौंपित प्रत्ययों धार्म्य तथा शास्त्राया मात्रे। अनुपदेश्यापि सानं सर्वं सानेन भास्ते।।

V.P.1.124.

(62) सति प्रत्ययवेदुत्व सम्बन्ध उपपचि। शास्त्रायं यतस्तस्त सम्बन्धस्य स्त्रिति ग्रंथे। V.P.Sambandhāsamudeshya III.37

(63) शब्द: सम्बन्धोऽऽ प्रत्ययव्याख्यि प्रत्ययविनियमतुत्तत्त्व णिपपतु न्यायान्तरिक।

(64) ननु वदि न संयोगे न वा समवाय: शब्दायोगस्ताहिः केन संबंधे शब्दोऽऽ नियत्तय। प्रत्ययसक्तित्वम् अवस्था। उपस्कारः

(65) सामाधि: शब्दायूष्यः। वै मू. VII.2.20; न सामाधिकत्वा शब्दायं संप्रत्ययस्य न्या, मू. II.1.55; and also सामाधि शवति समव: ईशवरः साहित्यः। तस्माच्छृद्यावनमें वोधयं हस्ताक्षः। या: शब्दे यस्मिन्नां भावता सृं कैलित स तत्स्य प्रतिपादयति। उपस्कारः

(66) see above.

(67) अति समस्तरेखापि वाच्यावाच्यस्कर्त्त्वकेत्सास्ति सृंकैः फःति। on the सूर्घः

(68) परस्परे: वृत्तादाः यो गवारः सखामन्नोष्म सृंकैः कृत: सोऽऽ कुणा वृद्ध-व्यवहारः प्रात्र्यामानाः। सखावत्वाविद्यक्षाविगमिति प्रात्। ज्ञात्ये गृहिन्मुखः। वात्यरः अन्त:।

(69) संक्षिप्तः: सङ्केतः: इति उक्तम्। न्यायस्य ज्ञाति 4। pp.246.

(70) सामार्थ्: शब्दायूष्याः न सामार्थ्याः। शब्दायणयूर्यक्षानाः यथाकां सङ्केतः। उक्तम् प्रत्ययमूः। प्रत्ययविनियमतु तत्त्वाध्यायः unter न्या, मू. II.1.56.

(71) सिद्धः: सामार्थ्याः: सङ्केतः:। ने डेलारा ज्ञायिन्यायेऽऽ मू. II.1.56

(72) ज्ञातिभोज्याः: नायिन्यायेऽऽ मू. II.1.56

(73) न हि शब्दायूष्यवारः। कस्तित्तकु उपपचिः। न्यायस्य वरी 4। pp.242

(74) वचारिवद्यादीपिकाष्टत्वातिरेऽः सृंवृधितत्वादित्यं सङ्केतकः भावायत्। उपस्कारः। सूर्ज्यः ज्ञाति 2.2.

(75) हेशर्यो पिन्य प्राच्यां अहिष्किन्यापराशास्त्र शास्त्रियों परिष्कृत व्यवहारं कृत्ति तदानन्तरानां शक्ति प्राप्तिः Comm.by हरिदास फस्टनायेऽऽ
(66) न सप्तत्कारित शब्दावलिवाच्यम्। किं तत्रिः सम्यकारितम्। कः पुरायं सप्तः। बल्य शब्दावलिवाच्यम्। एव शर्मावलिवाच्यम्। अस्मिन्निमातितम्। वार्त्याणम्। भवेः।
(77) शायनिधिशरणम्। एव तिष्ठुच्या घोषणा। तिथ्य शायनिधिशरणम्। शब्दानिधिशरणम्।
(78) संवादाचारलक्षणम्। शायनिधिशरणम्। कृतिवाच्यम्। कृतिनिधिशरणम्। शायनिधिशरणम्।
(79) रिकृणि शदायामेते वाचलिख्याति। इ।
(80) क्षण पुरुषायोक्त्व तदानुवाच। संवादाचारलक्षणम्। शदायामेते। एव तिष्ठुच्या घोषणाम्। अस्मिन्निमातितम्। वार्त्याणम्। म्हभृ.१.१।
(81) अद्वैतानिधिशरणम्। विशेषानिधिशरणम्। वार्त्याणम्। विशेषानिधिशरणम्। वार्त्याणम्।
(82) नित्य एव तु सम्पन्नम्। हित्यानिधिशरणम्। गवाह्याविधिशरणम्।
(83) वपू.३.३।।
(84) शब्दायो शब्दायो बहुकल्पवाच्यम्।-केशराज।
(85) यथा हि कुष्ठो शब्दायो। पुरावलिवाच्यम्। केशराजं हुः। केशराज। एवं अस्ते। अस्ते अस्ते। विविधवाच्यम्। अनुप्रयोगवाच्यम्। अन्तरालवाच्यम्।-केशराज।
(86) अनुप्रयोगवाच्यम्। सम्बन्धवाच्यम्। अनुप्रयोगवाच्यम्।-केशराज।
(87) शब्दो नौरित्याथो गौरित्याथाथ गौरित्याथाथ शामिलता य रणां प्रविष्टम्। सर्वसाधिकृतः।
-वाचशास्त्रं।
(88) सम्भवं न सम्बुद्धवाच्यस्वामि। अविवेकौ शिष्य।
(89) इति। समुभावजश्वरीयो। सम्बन्धं।।-केशराज।।
(90) अविवेकम्। सम्बन्धम्। न जुन्यो। नित्यं नित्यं। विवेको अविवेक। सम्बन्धों। नौरित्याथाथ। श्रेणियो। क्षणं। संबंधो।।
(91) अविवेकवाच्यस्वामित्वम्। शब्दो एव निमित्तम्। तत्त्ववाच्यम्। शब्दान्। नातिश्रेष्ठ। विकल्पवाच्यम्।। केशराजं। 13।। and also। साहित्योपन्यासमितलिखिता शिष्यानाथान्। केशराज।।}

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(87) शब्दायो शब्दायो बहुकल्पवाच्यम्। अनुप्रयोगवाच्यम्। अन्तरालवाच्यम्।-केशराज।
(88) सम्भवं न सम्बुद्धवाच्यस्वामि। अविवेकौ शिष्य।
(89) इति। समुभावजश्वरीयो। सम्बन्धं।।-केशराज।।
(90) अविवेकम्। सम्बन्धम्। न जुन्यो। नित्यं नित्यं। विवेको अविवेक। सम्बन्धों। नौरित्याथाथ। श्रेणियो। क्षणं। संबंधो।।
(91) अविवेकवाच्यस्वामित्वम्। शब्दो एव निमित्तम्। तत्त्ववाच्यम्। शब्दान्। नातिश्रेष्ठ। विकल्पवाच्यम्।। केशराजं। 13।। and also। साहित्योपन्यासमितलिखिता शिष्यानाथान्। केशराज।।
रूपांतरण देवास्ते विचारित महीतो। वे व्याकरणसंस्कृतपविचित मुखा नराः।। मूनां
व प्रक्ति०पात्यनस्नियमप्रक्त्यारणेष्वैः मीमांसकं च स्वस्मृताः पड़ताः। यशो व्यासुः वाचं
यथेव गीतांस्ते श्रािर्भिमिति। न्याय म-मरी pp.425,6
(92)आपथोपनेश्यामक्ष्याः स्वार्थप्रत्ययाः।। न्यायः।।II.1.52
(93)स्वार्थप्रत्ययाः वर्णाः।। उच्चाः कुलसंपादयाः।। सुसुधाः भोक्तानिवेश हत्येवमाधेरूपः
स्वार्थाष्ट्र न श्रमात्रातः स्पर्शौं। कि ताहि? वाचे। अयुक्तः।। शबं हत्यतः। स्पर्शौं।।
माण्य on न्यायः।।II.1.53।
(94)सर्वां न हृदयं श्रमात्रातः स्वार्था शौं।। प्रतिपत्ती, किंतु पुरुषं विशेषांगितिसिद्धैन
प्रभासस्त्र प्रतििष त्यामात्राध्यानः स्वार्थापन्न प्रतिपत्ते-न्यायवातिक and also
वृहदक्वास्त्राः।। समाहुमक्वातिचित्र।।V.P.1.121 etc.
(95)Bhartrhari also says- वाक्यान्तः पुरुषाणवावर्त्तिसिद्धःक्वातः।। सदाबाहि
प्रविष्टभवने न समाजेऽक्षी।।V.P.1.316।
( )वृहदिV.P.1.317।।सूतनारि विवर्योगम् etc.