Abhinavagupta follows the Dhvanyāloka in his theories on dhvani and rasa. His two important works on this subject are a commentary on Dhv. known as Locana and a commentary on the Nā. S'ā.of Bharata known as Nātyavedavivṛti and Abhinavabhāratī (A. bh.). The merit of his work lies in clear elaboration and at times subtle explanation and original insights to a certain extent. He was a great philosopher of pratyabhijñā school, and has implicitly taken certain ideas peculiar to that school for granted in his discussions. So his works on the pratyabhijñā school of thought, viz. Tantrāloka, and Is'var-apratyabhijñāvivṛtvitmās'inī incidentally throw some light on some aspects of his theory of poetry.

As the Locana and the A. bh. are commentaries, much of their content is naturally the same as that of Dhv. and Nā. S'ā. For the same reason, much of their treatment is bound to be piece-meal. In the discussion of the contents of Dhv. and Nā. S'ā. I have, as far as possible, confirmed myself to the works themselves. Here, while considering Abhinava's comm.s, I will note the points which have been clarified, elaborated and sometimes improved upon by him. In the treatment of these points some repetition would be unavoidable though I have tried to avoid it as far as possible. As noted just now, the treatment of various topics in these comm.s, particularly in Locana, is piece-meal, and so, in order to give a coherent account, I have brought together the pieces bearing on the same topic and tried to give a connected account. Let us now first consider the Locana.

THE TRADITION (ĀMNAYA) OF DHVANI:

Abhinava holds that the theory of dhvani was laid down by so many intelligent people. He, however, fails to mention any concrete name of an Ālaṅkārika who must have called dhvani to be the soul of poetry. He records an unwritten tradition of the dhwanivādins in the words: aviccMrmena prava-hena tairetaduktam vinā'pi vis'iṣṭapustakēsu vinives'āhā

andāṇātyabhīpaṇyaḥ
Thus, it seems that Abhinava seems to have failed in discovering the names and the works of the original proponents of dhvanivéda.

**DEFINITION OF DHVANI:**

Abhinava accepts the definition of dhvani as given in the Dhv. I.13. He tries to explain the dual in 'vyāṅktaḥ'. By this, according to him, what is meant is that in both the varieties of s'abdas'aktimūla and arthas'aktimūla of dhvani, both word and meaning(s'abda and artha), have a role to perform. Thus, Bhaṭṭarāyaka was wrong in criticising the dual ending in 'vyāṅktaḥ'.

Says he: vyāṅktaḥ iti dvivacanenedasāḥ—yadapyavivakṣitavācyeyo s'abdas eva vyāṅjakaḥ tathāpyarthasāyāpi sahakāritā na truṣṭi, anyathā ajñātārtho'pi s'abdastos vyāṅjakaḥ syāt. Vivakṣitānyaparavācyeyo ca s'abdasyā'pi bhavatyeva. Vis'iṣṭas'abdhāḥ dihyayayā vinā tasyārthasyāvyāṅjakaḥ katvāditi sarvatra s'abdārthayorushbhorapī dhvananām vyāpāraḥ. Tena bhaṭṭāryakena dvivacanam duṣitaṃ tadgajamūlikayāva. arthah s'abdo vā iti vikalpābhidhānam pradhaṃnyābhiprāyeṣa(Locana on Dhv. I.13.)

**Two-meanings of the term dhvani and its five-fold application:**

Abhinava derives the word dhvani in two different ways giving two different meanings. One is dhvanatīti dhvaniḥ i.e. that which sounds, reverberates or implies is dhvani; the second is—dhvanyeṣi dhvaniḥ i.e. that which is sounded, reverberated, or implied is dhvani. The first refers to s'abda which implies some meaning, and also to meaning (vācyārtha) which implies further meaning and also to the process i.e. s'abdana or dhvanana of a word which implies something. The second derivation explains dhvani as something which is implied. This, we might say, is dhvani proper.

In addition, a poem, which consists of all these four also is known as dhvani. Thus he explains dhvani in such a way as to cover all the five aspects. Says he:

Sa iti. artho vē s'abdo vē vyāpāro vē artho'pi vācyo vē dhvanatīti, s'abdo'pyeyam, vyaṅgyo vē dhvanate vyāpāro vē s'abdārthayor dhvananemiti.
Further on, he explains this point in greater detail. He elaborately discusses the Sphotaavāda of the vāyākaraṇas and tries to correlate it with the theory of dhvani. He says: samśābrapi prasiddhebhyaḥ s’abadvāyāprārebho-bhidhātātparyalakṣanārūpebhyyo’tirikto vyāpāraḥ dhvanirityuktaḥ evaḥ catuṣkamapi dhvaniḥ tadyogācoca samastamapi kāvyam dhvanih(Locana on I.13.Dhv). He adds: tena vṛcocy'pi dhvaniḥ, vṛcako'pi s’abdo dhvaniḥ, dvayorapi vyājaratvaḥ dhvanabiti kṛtvā. Samnis'ryate vibhāvānubhāvasamvalansyeti s’abdanaḥ s’abdaḥ s’abdayāpārah, na cāsāvabidhādirūpoḥ, aptivātmbhūtaḥ, so’pi dhvananām dhvaniḥ kāvyaniti vyapadesyas'ca yo’rthah so’pi dhvaniḥ, uktapraķaradhvanicatustaya-myatvāt ata eva sādṛśrapaḥhetumāha-vyājaratvasāmyāditi. This double derivation of dhvani makes it necessary to keep the two meanings apart to avoid confusion. The one suggests an agent or the process of suggestion; the other, what is suggested. There are three main types of dhvanis accepted by both Ānanda and Abhinava viz. Vastudhvani, alaṃkāradhvani and rasadhvani. All the three must come under 'dhvanyate' derivation. The other derivation viz. 'dhvanati;'(and dhvanana) appear to have been given in conformity of the vāyākaraṇas for whom s’abdo or word is 'dhvani’ which reverberates Sphota.(see ch.6.)

THE THREE TYPES OF DHVANI:-

Abhinava accepts the general three-fold classification of dhvani as given by Ānanda. However, he adds some further explanation. For him, the pratiyamāna or implied sense is described as two-fold, (i) laukika or the one that is met with also in ordinary discourse, and (ii) kāvyavāyāprārakaagocara or one which is met with only in poetry. This means that the first is possible in poetry as well as ordinary discourse, while the second is possible only in poetry.

The first viz. laukika dhvani in poetry is of two types, (i) that which suggests vastu or some matter i.e. vastudhvani and, (ii) which suggests a figure of speech i.e. alaṃkāradhvani. This laukika dhvani in its two varities
can equally be expressed directly by its own words as one might ask the mendicant not to go to the place of rendezvous because the dog is killed by a lion. Alamkāradhvani is so terse on the analogy of brāhmaṇa-Sūryaṇa.

The variety of dhvani which is possible in poetry is rasadhvani. Only this rasadhvani is dhvani in the opinion of Abhinava. This alone, it being predominant, is the soul of poetry. Rasadhvani, says Abhinava, can never be expressed by its own name. He holds that this alone is primarily the soul of poetry, and that both vastudhvani and alamkāradhvani finally terminate into rasa-dhvani. Says he: sa ca dhvanireveti, sa eva mukhyatayā एकत...vastudlamp-

kāradhvanyo rasadhvaniparyantatvamevetya vayameva vakṣyāmastra tatretyāstān

men. (= Locana on Dhv. I.4))

Poet: Say he: pratiyamānamātre'pi prakṛnte tṛṭīya eva rasadhvaniriti man-
tavyam. itihāsabālāt prakṛntavṛtīgānantabālācch. tena rasa eva vastuta
tāna, Vastvalamkāradhvani tyarañth rasam prati paryavasyete iti vācyānt-
krṣṭau tāvityabhīprāyena dhvanih kāvyasyātmetyāśēmānyenoktaḥ.

Experience of Rasa- Abhinava has elaborately discussed the nature of the experience of rasa in his Adbh. Here, however, he gives a brief account of it. Rasa is recognized to be of the form of Svāṣaṇa. Abhinava holds that the experience of sentiments and emotions etc. is of the nature of Supreme Joy. In the minds of all the individuals, there are certain permanent impressions such as rati, hāsa, etc., engraved and born of the experience of everyday life. When one looks at some dramatic performance, or reads a poem, one experiences the vibhāva, anubhāva etc., and the permanent fixed emotions are roused to the status of rasa and the cultured man experiences supreme joy. This rasa, then, is of the form of relish and is recognized as the soul of poetry. We will deal with Abhinava's views on rasa-realisation in greater details later on.

We, however, note his words: yastū svayame'pi na svāṣādvāyo na laukika-vyavahārapitīna kintu s'abdasmāryamānyaḥdayasāmyādasandaravibhā-

 ושכ תורבח קינח מורה ויניביתו-yāpārāsaraniyātūpo rasaḥ sa kāvyavyāpāraīka-
gocaro rasadhvaniriti, (Locana on Dhv. I.4.)
Abhinava has also tried to give the possible varieties of dhvani under Dhv. II.31 and Dhv. III.43 in a mathematical way on the basis of varieties given in Dhv. At Dhv. II.31 he gives thirty-five basic varieties of dhvani. It can be explained below:

**Dhvani**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Varieties</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avivakṣitavācya (i.e. lakṣaṇāmūla)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vivakṣitānyaparasācya (i.e. abhidhāmūla)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthāntara- &amp; Atyantati-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampkramita &amp; Raskṛta.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asamlakṣya- &amp; Sampālakṣyakrama.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Manifold and therefore)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termed as one mūla i.e. rasādī-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhvani)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svataḥsambhāvi kavyaprāna-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kavini baddha-眩kṛta dhoktiṣṭha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vastu alamākāra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From vastu or alamākāra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12 varieties of arthas'aktyudbhava)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4+12= 16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padagata vaisyagata</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=32 varieties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ 3 varieties of asamlakṣya. with reference to varpa, samghatam, and prabhanda.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+35 Varieties.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All these when multiplied by the subvarieties of guṇibhūtavānāya, alamākāra, and dhvani through the relation of sampārṣṭi and sampkara, tend to be 7420.

Abhinava tries to illustrate some of them. It has been pointed out by modern writers that Abhinava's calculation of the number of dhvanis is not correct. It should be 9940 and not 7420.

**The abhāvāvādins or the opponents of dhvani**—

Abhinava also treats the views of some dhvanyabhāvāvādins i.e. those who do not accept vyākhyā and dhvani. He tries to classify them and then, in his own way tries to refute the views of the advocates of abhīhitānvaṇavāda,
In this matter also, Abhinava has given us more detailed and elaborate discussion. He says that the abhāvavādins are virtually of five classes though apparently Ānanda has counted only three. The first variety of abhāvavādins are subdivided into three as below: tatrābhāvavikalpasya trayāḥ prakāraḥ—s'abdārtha-guṇālāṃkāraṇāmeva s'abdārthaḥ s'abhākāritvānlokaḥ āstrāti- riktaśundaraḥ s'abdārthavāpasya kāvyasya na s'obhāhetuḥ kas'cidanyo'sti yo's-mābhirna gaṇita ityekāḥ prakāraḥ. yo vā na gaṇitaḥ sa s'obhākāryeva na bhavatīti dvitiyāḥ. atha s'obhākāri bhavai taryasūnād at eva guṇa vālāṃkā- re vāntarbhavati, nāṃśārakaraṇe tu kiyatidam pāṇḍityantathāpyukteṣu guṇā- lāṃkāreṣu vā nāntarbhāvah, tathāpī kiṣiḍāpi-viśīśṭeṣāṃ amāś'ritya nāṃśāraka- ragamupamāviśeṣṭāprakārāṇāṃ samānyayavat tathāpī guṇālāṃkāravāyasyātiriktaṃ bhāvah eva. tāvanmātraṇa ca kiṃ kṛtaman? anyasyaśpi vaicitrasya s'akṣotpre- krṣayavat cirantanaśri bhāratanāmup潏bhārityanayopama eva s'abdārthālām- kāratvēnesto. tatrāpācaṇḍapraṇaraṇam s'ānuṣeṣaeśa tavyaśālāṃkārakārāvah kṛtaman. tadyathā 'karmayān'ityatra ityatra kumābhārādyadhārāryaḥ s'ruttvā svayaṅ nāgaraśrādi s'abda utprayasyante. tāvata kao atmāni bahumānāḥ, evaṃ prakṛ- te'pi tṛtiyāḥ prakāraḥ, evamakāstridhā vikalpāḥ, anyau ca dvāviti pañca vikalpāḥ iti tātāpyārthaḥ. (Locana on Dhw.I.i)

Thus Abhinava classifies these opponents of dhvani as below: (a) those who hold that dhvani does not exist at all or nāstyeva dhvanīḥ; (b) those who say that dhvani is only bhakti or secondary sense—i.e. bhaktireva dvvaiḥ; and (c) those who maintain that dhvani is indescribable i.e. anirvācyo dhvaniḥ. The first variety is subdivided into three types. Thus in all we have five varieties of abhāvavādins.

Abhinava then points out that the theory of the absence of dhvani is a matter of past, while the bhāktavāda is a continuous tradition: bhāktavā- dastvācchinnmah pustakesvityaśānbhiprayenāḥ bhāktanāhuriti nityaprevaṇtamanāpekṣeyābhidhānan. He does not mention any specific name of those abhāvavādins. However, as noted earlier (ch.XXV) he mentions one Manora- thakāri who ridicules dhvani.
Abhinava tries to correlate bhaktavāda with the earlier poeticists such as Bhamaha, Udbhata, Vāmana, etc. He says: *śayeteti-bhāṭṭodbhāṭavāmanādinā.*

(Locana on Dv. I.1)

He goes on to establish vyākhyā and dhvani and tries to silence the abhihitānayavāda, anvītabhedānāvāda, etc. in the following way:

**ABHIHITĀNAYAVĀDA REFUTED:**

The argument of the abhihitānayavāda proceeds as below: The tātparyayṛtti, in case of bhama dhamma etc., has not ended in form of the intended sense. The words such as dṛpta, dharma, tad etc., cannot be correlated and therefore there is mukhyārthabādha or contradiction in the primary sense. Thus, there is no scope for viparītā laksanā having virodha or contradiction for its 'nimitta'.

This viparītā laksanā makes for the sense of negation in this particular illustration viz. bhama dhamma etc. This sense of negation is derived thus only on strength of word (s'abdas'aktimā eva) and therefore, there can not be any sense other than the expressed.

(nanu tātparyas'aktiraparyavasita vivakṣayā dṛptadharmikatadadārthānāvāda-
yanumukhyārthabādhabalena virodhanimittaya eva viparītalaksanāyā ca vyākhyā-
bhūtvaniśedharpātīmabhihitānayadṛṣṭā karotī t s'abdas'aktimā eva so'ṛthā.
evamanoktamiti hi vyavahāraḥ. tamma vyākhyātikto 'nyo'rtha iti.†Locana, Dv. I.4.)

Abhinava, in the discussion of the above view explains the nature and scope of abhidhā, tātparya and laksāna. He holds that in the particular illustration viz. bhama dhamma etc., as there is no mukhyārthabādha or contradiction in the primary sense, correlation is not impossible. So there is no scope for laksanā at all. (ata eva mukhyārthabādha nātra s'ārikya iti na viparīta-
laksanāyā avasaraḥ.)

Abhinava considers the point whether the suggested sense can be gathered in the third stage, viz. laksāna. For him suggestion comes at the fourth stage. He holds that in instances such as gangāyam ghoṣah or simho butah, the sense of coolness, purity etc. with reference to the hamlet, or the sense of
the heroic quality of the baṭu, is gathered by vyāñjana, the fourth power. It

cannot be gathered by anumāna or inference as on account of the fault of

anākāntikatva and the like, or by remembrance, as it is only with reference
to experienced objects, or by abhīcāra in the absence of convention or by
tātparya as it is over with correlation only, or by laksanā on account of
the absence of 'skhaladgatītva' or faultering movement of ānanta i.e., endlessness and vyāhicāra i.e., discrepancy. Thus, the suggested sense is gather-
ed only by suggestion, the fourth power of word.

(Yattividam ghoṣasyātīpavitratvas'italatvasyavatvādikamprayojanama-
s'abdāntaraṅavaṃ punāntarapratisparstam baṭorvā paraṅkramātītas'yāsālit-
vaṃ tatra s'abdasya na tāvanna vyāpāraḥ. tathā hi-tatsāṃpyaḥ taddharmat-
vanumānaṃanākāntikam,Sīṃhas'abdavacayatvam ca baṭoraciddham. atha yatra
yattraivaṃ s'abdāprayogastatra tatra taddharmayoga ityanumānaṃ, tasyāpi
vyāptigrahaṇaḥ maṣaṅken punāntaraṃ vācyatvam na cāsti. na ca amśtiyam,
amuṇahūte tādayogā, niyamapratipattavakṣuretadvidhāyā paraḥ,
yabhāva prasenaṅgoca ityasti tāvadatra s'abdasyaiva vyāpāraḥ. vyāpāra ca
nābhidātmaṃ samāyabhavat. na tātparyaśāna tasyāṃvyavapratītāveva parikṣeyat.
na laksanātma utkādeva hetoḥ skhaladgatītvābhavet. tatraḥ hi skhaladgatīve
punārvaṁḥārthaḥ dhārā nimirmat prayojanam ityanavasthā syaḥ. ata eva yat
kenacillacālataṅkarṣati nāma kṛtam tadvyasanamātraṃ. tasmādabhīdhaḥ tātparya
-laksanāvyavairiktaśpaturbhūtaḥ svayamādhyatmanvyasanaḥ.
vaghamanādī sodaravyapades'ānirūpito'bhupagantavyah. -Locan on Dhv.I.4.)

Abhinava is of the opinion that difference in the functions of word is
gathered on the strength of the difference in the accessories. Abhidhāna
rests on convention, tātparya on correlation, laksanā on the contradiction
of the primary sense-mukhyārthaḥ bāḍha and the like. Vyañjanaḥ or suggestion
is different from these, as it rests on the meaning gathered through
these and also on the intelligence of the hearer. It subordinates the
first three and is termed as the soul of poetry. (tena samayāpekṣaḥ vācyā-
vagamanas'akti rābhīdhiśaktiḥ, tadanyathārupapattisahāyārthāvakṣuraḥ-
Abhinava also silences the anvīṭabhīdānaṇavāda. He argues in the following way. The upholder of the anvīṭabhīdānaṇavāda, on the strength of the maxim viz. yatpārah s'abdaḥ sa s'abdārthaḥ, believes in abhidhā along which operates like an arrow shot by a great hero, and gets at the suggested idea also. Abhinava holds that when the objector expects abhidhā to go further and further, he cannot take the whole process as one and identical, on account of the difference in subject-matter. If the subject-matter is not one but many, then on account of the difference in accessories it is bound to be non-identical. For when the subject-matter is identical, yatpārah s'abdaḥ sa s'abdārthaḥ, the fact of intermittent operation is discarded. If the subject-matter is different, our position viz. that the functions are different, stands.

( Yo'ryañvīṭabhīdānaṇavādṛ ity hrdaye gṛhitvā s'aravaḍabhidhāvyapārmanva dvighadārghamahācchati, tasya yadi dvirgo vyāpāratadadosvāviti lutaḥ bhinnavis'atāvāt. athāněkā' sau tadhivyasaḥahakāriabhēdāsajjātīya eva yuktāh, sajātiya ca kārye vīramavīyapārāh s'abdakarmabuddhīdīnēm padārthavidbhīhi nisīḍhaḥ, asajātiye cāsmanānyā eva.) (Locana on Dhv. I.4.)

Sphoṭavāda silenced:—Abhinava also tries to meet with the upholders of Sphoṭa. He holds that those who accept the non-divisible Sphoṭa, or non-divisible sentence, also have got to accept, on empirical ground, the existence of individual words i.e. padas and the like. Thus, even for them vyāñjanaḥ should be acceptable on empirical ground. When one crosses the bounds of empirical ground, one may accept the maxim-carve svarūthavācacah, and may do away with the difference of abhidhā, laksanā etc. And this position at transcendental level is not
unknown to our author i.e. Anacavardhana who also composed Tattva-loka, a work on philosophy.

(ye' nyāvibhaktam Sphoṭam Vākyam tadartham cānuḥ, tairapyavidyāpadapatitaih sarveyanamāsarenīyā prakriyā. taduttirṇatve tu sarvaṃ parames'varād-vayaṃ brahmetyasmināstrakārenā na na viditaṃ tattvālokaṃ grantham

viraccayatetāśtām. ) (Ločana. Div. I. 4.)
Now we will consider the topic of rasādi dhvani as treated in the Locana. (on Dhv. II.1-4). In the Udyota II, kārikās 1-4, the subject of rasa, bhāva, rasābhāga, bhāva-bhāsa, bhāvas'anti etc., is treated as noted earlier (ch. 21). Abhinava, in Locana on these kārikās, elaborately explains and illustrates these topics. He says a poem lives by its rasa. Even then, some particular element of it happens to charm more and therefore gets projected in some poems. These give rise to bhāvadhvani, bhāvodaya, bhāvas'anti etc.-(yadyapi ca rasenaiva ssxvrn jivati kavyam tatha'pi tasya rasasyaikagha-nacematkārātmano'pi kutas'cidans'atpṛayojakābhūtādadhikos'au camatkāro bhavāyati (Locana on Dhv. II.3.).)

BHĀVA-DHVANI, BHĀVODAYA, etc.--

Abhinava illustrates all these varities-tīṣṭhāt kopa vaśāt etc. is an instance of bhāvadhvani. When a vyabhicārin or a transitory mental state is roused and makes for charm, it is a case of bhāvadhvani. Says he: tatra yadā kas'cidindriktākāsthāṃ prātipanno vyabhicārī camatkārātī yasya-prayojakābhavati tadbhāvadhvanīḥ. (Locana on Dhv. II.3)-tīṣṭhāt kopa vaśāt... etc., is an instance of bhāvadhvani, and the bhāva called 'vitarka' makes for special charm, even though there is the presence of vipralaśbha s'ṛṅgāre. These vyabhicārīn are again to be found either in udaya i.e. rising state, or sthiti i.e. steady state or prāparamāya i.e. in a state of waning. Vyabhicārin in udayāvasthā or a rising state is illustrated as in, yāte gotrāviparyaye... etc. In this particular illustration anger or kopa is the vyabhicārin in a rising state suggested by the words, 'na tu paritaḥ'. (Says he: tatra hi prajyakopasaya ujjijēṣayyaiva yadayāvasthāna tu parita ityādayāvās'anirākramāttadēva kavyajīvitaṃ. -Locana on Dhv. II.3.). Bhāvasthītā is illustrated as in the verse quoted above viz. tīṣṭhāt kopa vaśāt etc. At times charm is generated by a vyabhicārin in
a waning state (pras'ama) as in, ekasmin s'ayane paraśmukataye etc. Here, there is pras'ama or irsyā or jealousy and roṣa as ānāng, Abhinava adds that one can read here the pras'ama of the rasa called irsyāvipralībha also—Says heśatra cersyāvipralāṃbhasya rasasyāpi pras'ama iti s'akyam yojayitu. (Locana on Dhv.II.3). At times bhāvasandhi of some transitory mental states brings about charm as in, 'osuru sumthi āiṃ etc.

Abhinava says that in this, the bhāvasandhi brought about by'kopa' (which is expressed) and 'prasāda', makes for charm (ityatra s'rutyukte tu k kope kopaśāyagyadandrasandrutaśāyena mukhāṃ cumbhitāṃ tenāṃtarasani- geraṇavis'rāṇiparamparāṇāṃ tṛptirjñātā iti kopaprasādasandhis'camat- kārasthānān.—(Locana on Dhv.II.5). At times bhāvasabalaṭā renders charm, to a poem, as in, 'kvākāryaṃ s'as'alaks'manah'.... etc. Here, though 'Vitarka' and 'autsukya', 'mati' and 'smarana', 'S'ahka' and 'dainya', 'dhrtyi' and 'cintana' are mutually exclusive, yet they are all subordinated to 'cintā' which is the principal bhāva. Thus bhāvasabalaṭā makes for charm. Says heśatra hi vitarkautsukya, matismarane, s'ahkādairuye, dhrticint- ane, parasparsam bādhyaḥdakabhāvena dvandvaḥo bhavanti paryante tu cintāya eva pradhānatāṃ dadati paramāsvadasthānām. (Locana, Dhv.II.3)

Abhinava says that there cannot be instances of vibhāvadhvani and anubhāvadhvani because they are only directly expressed. But when they are suggested, they take the form of vastudhvani. (Vibhāvaṃubhāvan tavatsvaś'abduvācyāveva.—Locana on Dhv.II.3). Their tasting also terminates in mental states and hence should not be recognised as separate from the tasting of rasa and bhāva. Says heśṭaccarvaṇe'pi cittavṛttiśveva paryayasyaḥ iti rasabhāveḥbhāvo nādhikam sayeṣayam. (ibid).

Abhinava then takes up the topic of rasabhāsa. He holds that when on account of vibhāvabhāsa (i.e. undue vibhāvas), there is ratyābhāsa (or a false semblance of rati or delight), it is a case of rasabhāsa wherein there is false semblance of tasting,—yada tu vibhāvābhāsaśrdatyābhāsoda- yastadā vibhāvaṃubhāsāccarvaṇābhāsa iti rasabhāsasya viṣayaḥ.— This we
observe when we hear the following poetic utterance of Havāṇa. The illustration is: दृष्टकर्षणमोचसंप्रेमिता इव मे... etc. Abhinava holds that even when the longing is one-sided, it is also to be termed as s'ringārabhāsa. -ata eva abhīlāse ekataṃ saṃhitā s'ringāra'sabdena tatra tatra vyavahāraḥ tadābhāsa -setayē mantavyah—(Locana on Dhv. II.3).—Abhāsa with reference to other rasas is also possible.

Abhinava then says that thus these bhāvadhvanis are just the drippings (nisyanda) of rasadhvani and on account of the special source of charm they are separately cognised. (evam rasadhvanerevāni bhāvadhvaniprabhāyatac nisyandā saāśvade pradhānā pratyakṣajameṣaṁ vibhājaṁ prthivyayavasthāpyate. Locana on Dhv. II.3.)

RASADHVANI—

Rasadhvani occurs there only when for the connoisseur, tasting is brought about by the relish of sthāya in combined with vibhāva, abhāva and vyābhićārin.—rasadhvanistu sa eva yo' tra mukhāṣṭayā vibhāvaḥ bhāvabhāva—vyābhićāri-samyojenidisthāyaḥ pratipattikasya pratipattuḥ sthāyaḥ saacarvāṇaprayuktaḥ evāśvādaprakaraṇah.—Locana on Dhv. II.3.). This is illustrated as in krochren-oruyugam vyatitya etc. Abhinava holds that when this rasa is principally suggested, it becomes the province of asamāllaksyakramadhvani. When rasādi is suggested in a subservient way, it is rasādi alāṅkāra. Says he: tatrābhhiyavaktih pradhānati bhavatvanyāthā vā, pradhānate dhvaniṁ, anyathā rasādyalaṅkāraḥ. (Locana on Dhv. II.4.)

Like Ānanda, he also maintains that the alāṅkāras such as upāma, utprekṣā etc. indirectly, through the body in form of word and sense, embellish rasa, the soul. Rasa is the ultimate alāṅkāra. Just as a dead body cannot be decorated, in the same way, poetry without rasa cannot be embellished:

etaduktam bhavaṁti-upamasyā yadyapi vācyārtho 'lamākriyate tathāpi tasya tade-vālaṅkaraṇān yadvyaṁgyārthābhīvyājjanāsāmārthaḥśāhānemiti vastuto dhvanayātmaiv-alāṅkārayah kaṭakaśyūrdibhiraiyā S'āriḥsaṃavāyibhis'etana atomāva tatteoci-ttavṛttivis'eta ucyāsūcānātmataivālamākriyate—(Locana on Dhv. II.5).
Here, it may be pointed out that the later writers like Mammata, Hisacandra etc. adopt all these ideas regarding **bhavdhwani, rasabhasa** etc. in their works. We may say that the ideas of Dhv. regarding vyanjaria and rasa are, so to say, given completeness by Locana and the A.bh. on the rasa-sutra of the Na.Śa. The later writers draw upon all the three as one source.

**THE SAHRDAYA:**

This rasa-realisation is experienced only by *Sahrdaya* and not by all ordinary people. He explains the term *Sahrdaya* as follows: yeśaṁ kavyāṅkaśānābhyasavasādibhūte manomukure vartanīyanmāyībhavaneśvātāte svahṛdayasaṁvādabhājaḥ.

*Sahrdayaḥ*-(Locana, on Dhv.I.i), *Yathoktam*-(Na.Śa.),(VII.10)

Yo'rttho hṛdayasaṁvādi
tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ;
S'ēriṇeṃ vyāpyate tena
S'uskaṃ kāṣṭhamivāginā...!

i.e.-"The faculty of self-identification with the events represented (the determinants, consequents, etc.) demands that the mirror of the mind should be made completely clear, by means of repeated acquaintance with the practice of poetry. The possessed of heart, those who possess the consent of their own hearts, are those who have this faculty. For it has been said: 'the tasting of that which finds the consent of the heart' arouses the rasa. The body is pervaded by it, as dry wood by fire." The mind and the heart must be mirror-like'vas'ada-vimala), ready to receive all the images which are reflected in themvimalamukurakalpībhūtanijahṛdayaḥ(A.bh.p.37). In the *Tantrāloka* III.200, Abhinavag says:

tathā hi madhure gīte spars'e vā candanādike.)
mādhyasthyavigame yāsau hṛdaye spandasamātā...!

"When the ears are filled with the sound of sweet song or the nostrils with the scent of sandal-wood, etc., the state of indifference (non-participation, impersonality, etc.), disappears and the heart is invaded by a state
of vibration (spandamānata). Such a state is precisely the so-called powers of beatitude, thanks to which man is, 'gifted with heart'. According to the S'āiva of Kashmir, heart is consciousness itself, thought, beatitude, etc. (Gnolly).

In his A. bh. (p. 280) he defines the 'adhikārī as-adhikārī cātra vimalaprati bhāna-S'ālīhvādayah'—i.e. the qualified person is in this, mirror-like power of intuition (pratibhāna). Elsewhere (A. bh. Vol. II. p. 339), Abhinava says that poetic sensibility is the faculty of entering into identity with the heart of the poet (kavihrādayatādāntmyāpattiyogatā).

(Adhinava has tried to record his views on rasa-realisation in the Locana on Dhv. II. 4. He has also recorded and refuted the views of Lollaṭa, S'ānkuka etc. However, we will discuss this in the following chapters wherein we will consider the relevant portion of his A. bh. on the rasa-sutra of Bharata in Nā.S'ā.VI. (ch. XXVIII below).

It may be noted in the end that like Ananda, Abhinava also holds that rasa, bhāva, etc. are always suggested and can never be directly expressed. Says he: rasaabhibhāvatadābhāsatatprasa'māḥ punarā kācidadhīhiyante, atha cāsvādyamānātāprāṇatayā bhānti. Tatra dhvananavyāpārdṛte nāsti kalpanāntaram. (Locana on Dhv. I. 4.)