Anti-romanticism, in short, had no resources for becoming anything more than a Post-Romantic Movement.  

Eliot's observation that "the twentieth century is still the nineteenth although it may in time acquire its character" is (SE, 305) intended to express his vexation at the early twentieth century evaluation of Dryden, which, for him, derives its pabulum from nineteenth century critical canons. Ironically enough the comment—especially the first part of the comment—holds good, to a considerable extent, for Eliot's criticism and which poetry have not escaped the influence of the nineteenth century. Eliot himself is quite aware, as mentioned in the previous chapter, that a revolutionary is after all the child of his age that has its roots in the immediate past and that it is impossible for him to snap all ties with it (OPP, 58). In "American Literature and Language", Eliot remarks, "The writers of the past
especially of the immediate past in one's place and language may be valuable to the young writer simply as something to rebel against. He will recognize the common ancestry; but he need not like his relatives" (TCCW, 56). Herein lies embedded Eliot's tacit confession that behind the facade of his 'classical' revolution lies something of the 'romantic' heritage which he cannot shake off. Even as early as 1928 when his anti-romantic animus was burning intensely in him, Eliot admitted that his "taste is probably too romantic" and that this accounted for his failure to appreciate epigrams.Obviously Eliot considers himself "too romantic" at least in some respects, though he has helped the twentieth century to acquire its 'modern' character. His romantic leanings are seen in his preoccupation with emotion as integral component in poetry, with the 'unconscious' and 'expressive' character of poetry and with pure poetry. Romanticism casts its shadow on his concern with the issues of personality and impersonality, of subjectivity and objectivity, of the individual and the universal, and finally on his concept of imagination. Before getting into grips with these issues, we may notice how the Romantic tradition of the nineteenth century maintains certain parallels as well as its continuity.
with the modern age through Eliot. The first thing that strikes us is the situational congruency. The older tradition in each case became otiose and a sensitive artist had to stage a rebellion with critical and creative programme to galvanise poetry. As Carlyle's "Philosophy of Clothes" exemplifies, the paradoxical principle of the simultaneity of continuity and discontinuity in tradition in that the old clothes have to be discarded but new ones have to be put on in their place. The revolutions of Wordsworth and T.S.Eliot illustrate the same paradoxical principle. Both of them could not completely emancipate themselves from the clutches of the preceding centuries - Wordsworth from the eighteenth and Eliot from the nineteenth century. The 'romantic' Wordsworth agrees with Aristotle's opinion that poetic truth is not local and individual but general and operative. He recognized "rules of art and workmanship" and conceded that the "composition of verse is infinitely more of an art than men are prepared to believe ..." Similarly Eliot shares some common ground with the Romantics.

Further, Wordsworth's "Preface" to *Lyrical Ballads* and Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual Talent" mark
two significant revolutions in the history of English literature. They proclaim new poetic theories, prepare the ground for the appreciation of the new kind of poetry written by them, and raise a storm of controversy by taking extreme positions. In both "the value of the essay must be discussed in terms of the contribution to forwarding a radical examination of the nature of poetry." 7

Further, the artist was in a similar predicament in both the contexts - at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He found himself alienated from his fellowmen. Confronted with a meaningless, cold, inanimate world disfigured by materialism and debased values, and bereft of an external frame of reference, the Romantic poet had to fall back upon his own resources so that he might create, to use a phrase from Stephen Spender, "luminous value" 8 which would envelop the earth, which would impose an order on it. He attempted "to overcome the sense of alienation by healing the cleavage between subject and object, between the vital, purposeful, valueful world of private experience and the dead, postulated world of extension, quantity and motion. To establish that
man shares his own life with nature was to reanimate the
dead universe of the materialists and at the same time
most effectively to tie the man back into his milieu."9
Eliot had to rehearse the part played by the Romantics,
in a similar hostile world mauled worse by secularism,
in somewhat altered circumstances. The identical nature
of the literary scenes and of the predilections in which
Wordsworth and he found themselves leading to his dis­
covery of a kindred spirit in the Romantic poet, was
confirmed by Eliot himself in his appreciation of the
Romantic ancestor's plea for the adoption of the
"very language of men" - a plea that was renewed by
him and Pound in the modern age - and in the recognition
of the fact that Wordsworth's poems like his own were
greeted with hostile criticism (UPUC, 70-71). Further
the common factor binding the early nineteenth with
the early twentieth century is a reaction to a
scientific world-view. The artist had to toil "in
secret and without aid" to discover values that would
enable him to give shape, order and significance to
the world which is "an immense panorama of futility
and anarchy".10 When the artist toils in alienation,
he undergoes an experience which invariably comes to
him in the shape of suffering; and this is a process
of self-realization and self-integration.
Incidentally both for Eliot and the Romantics, suffering is integral to poetic experience and that is why it is assigned an important place in their aesthetics. Eliot seems to be annoyed at the prejudice against the view that "poetry not only must be found through suffering but can find its material only in suffering" (SE, 262). He praises Shelley for his statement that "our sweetest songs are those which tell of saddest thoughts" (SE, 264). Baudelaire is the recipient of his liberal eulogy by virtue of his enormous strength to suffer, to undergo a suffering in which Eliot perceives something supernatural and superhuman (SE, 423). Herein lurks Eliot's concept of suffering which has both theological and artistic dimensions and both of them seem to be linked together. In "Dante" Eliot asserts that "souls in purgatory suffer because they wish to suffer for purgation" (SE, 256). These lines, as Matthiessen observes, "connect directly with Eliot's belief that the creation of poetry itself springs out of suffering, a reiterated belief which helps define the particular nature of his poetry." He seems to maintain that great art issues from the effort to "metamorphose private failures and disappointments." He adduces the instance of Shakespeare: "Shakespeare, too,
was occupied with the struggle - which alone constitutes life for a poet - to transmute his personal and private agonies into something rich and strange, something universal and impersonal" (SE, 137). Incidentally it may be noted that Edgar Stanley Hyman comments while speaking about Eliot's view of the transmutation of suffering into art, "This ... is actually ... the very quintessence of romantic individualism and Protestantism ..."12 The anaemic nature of Arnold's poetry, according to Eliot, results from his ignorance of the discipline of suffering. This explains his failure to notice, Eliot complains, that the essential advantage for a poet "is not to have a beautiful world with which to deal; it is to be able to see beneath beauty and ugliness; to see the boredom, horror and the glory" (UPUC, 106). Suffering is the stuff out of which poetry is made in the sense that it sharpens the poet's understanding of human life.

The concept of suffering is an inalienable aspect of the tragic writer who is concerned with the problem of good and evil. The sensitive writer with his painful perceptions, rips open the veil of appearance, unmasks the "horror" and "ugliness" with forthright candour and shores up fragments of "glory", that can rejuvenate or regenerate mankind. That is what Eliot does in a number of his poems.
His experience in this connection is at once personal
and impersonal - personal in the sense that it is a
process of self-integration and self-realization,
and impersonal in the sense that it suggests a possi-
bility of the salvation of mankind.

Eliot has his forbears in the Romantics in regard
to his concept of suffering and the tragic view of life.
Keats apportions a significant place to suffering
and pain in his theory of the world as a vale of soul-
making. He calls the world a school and the human
heart the horn-book. A world of pains and troubles is
necessary to school an intelligence and make it a soul;
the heart must feel and suffer in a thousand ways in
this world; it is the "Mind's Bible." Keats's Moneta
of "Hyperion", as Frank Kermode points out, is an
emblem of poetry, and to "prostrate himself before this
figure" itself is the reward of the poet's suffering. This
symbolizes the Romantic notion that poetry is born
out of suffering. Keats had the conviction that a poet
could evolve his identity, discover his personality by
coming into contact with the miseries of the world.
Though Keats employs certain religious terms in his
elucidation of suffering as a necessary experience,
he does not attach to it a specific theological significance as Eliot does, but beyond any doubt, adds to it a spiritual dimension. Again in the passage explaining the Mansion of Many Apartments, he writes that what sharpens one's vision into the heart and nature of man is the knowledge that "the World is full of Misery and Heartbreak, Sickness and Oppression." This knowledge is the well-spring of his poetry. Wordsworth's Prelude, his spiritual autobiography, emphasizes the value of suffering and disillusionment in enabling his poetic powers to burgeon. His great poetry issues from his listening to "the still sad music of humanity". Shelley, who, we have seen just now, is complimented by Eliot, had a tragic view of life in the sense that he looked upon the world, as A.C. Bradley says, "as a melancholy place, a dim vast vale of tears", illuminated in flashes by a hidden power. The bulk of his poetry, according to Graham Hough, was written in moments of dejection. So in Shelley's case too sorrow, anguish, despair and suffering constituted a fertile soil for the production of poetry, as well as for the improvement of moral goodness of man. But his concept of suffering had not even a tenuous link with orthodox religion. Then Carlyle, as if anticipating Eliot in a sense, observes in his "The Hero as Poet -
Dante, Shakespeare*, expresses his belief that it is their suffering and sorrows that helped Dante and Shakespeare to produce great works of art.\textsuperscript{19}

The experiences or the sufferings referred to above both in the case of Eliot and the Romantics stem from the poet's adoption of the "chameleon\textsuperscript{18}" mode or the Shakespearean mode on the one hand and the "egotistical\textsuperscript{20}" mode or Miltonic mode\textsuperscript{21} on the other. (These two modes may also be conveniently called 'aesthetic' mode and 'personal' mode, social function being subsumed in the latter.) This phenomenon accounts for the poetry of the Romantics and of T.S. Eliot moving between the poles of aesthetic detachment and social responsibility.

The critical pronouncements and poetic practice of Eliot and of the Romantics emerge from their assumption of the two modes. The two modes enable them to engage themselves in the exploration of the self and the outer world, which leads them along the path of experience, a path, narrow and strait, to self-integration and self-discovery. While the 'personal' mode fulfills the obligation of the poet to the society, the aesthetic mode gratifies his deepest artistic urges. The former reaches
out to the external world whereas the latter is concerned with the inner world of the poet. The poet projects into the past or nature or into another object and explores the outer reality to evolve his identity through role-playing. The 'aesthetic' mode enables him to delve deep within his own mind and seek the ideal which he cannot acquire in the materialistic, sordid, anarchic world. The poet integrates the findings of the within and then without, the ideal and the real. He "conceives of the ideal as existing only in conjunction with the real," and the real only in conjunction with the ideal. "The two are brought into conjunction only in the act of perception ..." 22

For, instance, Keats performs an empathic projection into the nightingale in his famous ode, in order to examine the possibility of effecting an escape from the fret and fever of the world. During his imaginary flight, he is aware of the separate identities of his own and of the bird. Thwarted in his attempt to escape, he realizes his existential commitment to life and arrives at self-discovery. His exploration of the outer reality through the role-playing entailed by his identification with the bird, leads him to self-realization and self-discovery. A similar kind of identification, its attendant role-
playing and the eventual self-discovery form the features of Eliot's "Prufrock". Eliot, through his identification with Prufrock and the ensuing role-playing, explores the outer reality, and attains self-understanding with the discovery that a sensitive soul placed in sordid environments and hostile circumstances has to remain enmeshed in skepticism and consequent inaction. The difference lies in the fact that while Nature serves for Keats as an arena for quest taking him to self-realization, Dionysiac urban setting provides the ground for Eliot.

While the Romantics, soaring on the wings of imagination, create what they look upon as a world of higher reality, Eliot visualizes a world of supra-reality, a world permeated with spiritual grace, where man, purged of all his sins in which he has hitherto wallowed in this materialistic world, can enjoy "Shantih". The ideal world which Eliot and the Romantics conceive takes shape from within, from their minds, against which they measure the real world of ours; and this conjunction of the ideal and the real, which is born out of their intense experience, both within and without, brings them the realization of the inadequacy of the real and of the near-impossibility of obtaining the ideal. This process of experience helps
their self-discovery. Though it may be conceded that Eliot's ideal world appears more plausible than the one conjured up by the Romantic imagination, this statement itself requires some qualification. Such a concept of an ideal world, whatever its nature may be - whether more credible or less credible - argues subjective idealism. Eliot's assent to subjective idealism is reflected in his appreciation of the solipsistic world which Swinburne has fabricated in his poetry: "The world of Swinburne does not depend upon some other world which it simulates; it has the necessary completeness and self-sufficiency for justification and permanence" (SW, 149). Eliot's concern for the autonomy of art can be construed as emanating from subjective idealism. Of course, it is an aspect of the aesthetic mode, which shall be discussed later in this chapter. His assertion that "my mind ... is a point of view from which I cannot possibly escape" (KE, 145), proclaims his faith in subjective idealism; and it is, it may be noticed, a more sophisticated version of Shelley's statement: that "all things exist as they are perceived; at least in relation to the percipient."23 He articulates his creed of solipsism: "I can know no point of view but my own" (KE, 141), and "everything, the whole world is private to myself" (KE, 204).

But Eliot is averse to fettering himself to a solipsistic position for long on account of his innate
predilection for a viable compromise. He concludes that the subjective can function well only in co-operation with the objective: "For minds may be intended objects; and their objectivity is continuous with their subjectivity, the mental continuous with the merely mechanistic" (KE, 145). And "the subjective is continuous with the self as object" (KE, 147). Such a view of Eliot impinges on his critical pronouncement that "permanent literature is ... either a presentation of thought or a presentation of feeling by a statement of events in human action or objects in the external world" (SW, 64-5).

These ideas of Eliot on the joint action of the subjective and the objective resemble Wordsworth's. Wordsworth describes the mind as

... creator and receiver both,
Working but in alliance with the works
Which it beholds (The Prelude, II, 260-262, WPW, 22)

Thus Wordsworth postulates a theory which is a compromise between Hartley's mechanistic psychology and Coleridge's transcendentalism - a theory which at once recognizes the objective existence of the object and the active principle of the mind. Elsewhere Wordsworth insists on "internal
feelings co-operating with external accidents."\textsuperscript{24} Coleridge too recognizes that "in every work of art there is a reconciliation of the eternal with the internal."\textsuperscript{25} In his Preface, to \textit{Prometheus Unbound}, Shelley makes a similar observation: "... a poet is the combined product of ... internal powers ... and of such external influences as excite and sustain these powers."\textsuperscript{26}

This view of the union of the subjective with the objective is linked with the poet's exploration of the ideal and the real, which has been discussed above and which needs a little more elucidation with the help of the critical ideas of Eliot and of the Romantics. Eliot's desire that the poet should not lose contact with the reality or with this world of ours, manifests itself in his admonitory statement that the poet who, transcending the frontiers of consciousness, explores the twilight regions of the inarticulate and of the unidentifiable feelings, should be able to "return and report to his fellow-citizens" (\textit{TCCW}, 134). The function of art, according to Eliot, is to impose "a credible order upon ordinary reality" (\textit{OPP}, 87). While the stigma of living cooped up in a world of fantasy cut asunder from the reality may stick to the decadent Romanticists, the earlier Romantics recognized the value of kinship with the human
society. Coleridge, for instance, insists that "the artist must first eloign himself from nature in order to return to her with full effect." Wordsworth's definition of the poet as a man speaking to man, and his advocacy of the use of the language of men, demonstrate that he has not abjured human society. Even Keats whom the conventional criticism has done injustice by calling him an escapist, expresses often his obligation to the workaday world. In his early poem, "Sleep and Poetry," he conveys his desire to bid farewell to sensuous joys:

Yes, I must pass them for a nobler life,
Where I may find the agonies, the strife
Of human hearts: (ll. 123-125, KSP, 37-38)

In fact, Romantic theory is predicated, as Robert Barth observes, "not simply on creation but on imaginative recreation, the poet's subjective ordering responding to an order of things at least sensed in the reality outside him." Then Eliot can be said to be in line with the major Romantics in his dealing with the ideal and the real.
The exploration of the ideal and the real, the issue of the subjective and the objective, is a subject intimately connected with imagination. Imagination occupies a conspicuous place in Eliot's works. He does not distrust like Dr. Johnson, nor does he assign to it the petty role of the photographic representation of objects, or of receiving impressions from them with fidelity to their material character as Addison does. His concept of imagination possesses a romantic dimension. In this connection Denis Donoghue observes that modern aesthetics recognizes "the primacy of the creative imagination ... represented by Coleridge."

Eliot describes literature as "primarily works of imagination" (SE, 388). He speaks of "a logic of the imagination as well as a logic of concepts" that goes into the making of poetry. The logic of the imagination is no other than what Coleridge calls "the laws which the imagination acts by", or "the rules of imagination (as he calls it in his Biographia Literaria, II p. 65). This claims kinship with Shelley's ideas on imagination as creating order "according to its own idea". So Eliot's logic of the imagination which is clearly established as a descendant of the views of the Romantics implies
imaginative coherence, and the rejection of discursive elements like cogent narration or description or rational discourse. Its pivotal axis, as for the laws of imagination, is images. Hence Eliot's demand that the reader should allow the images of which the poem is made, “to fall into his memory without questioning the reasonableness of each at the moment”\(^{33}\) so that a total effect may be produced. Coleridge remarks, as if anticipating Eliot in a way, that poetic power "makes everything present by a series of images"\(^{34}\) by appealing to imagination. It is not the dead, abstract concepts, but the imagination, and the romantic imagination at that, that can reach the inapprehensible and express the inexpressible. When Eliot observes that "there is poetry which represents an attempt to extend the confines of human consciousness and to report of things unknown, to express the inexpressible," (OPP, 169) he has at the back of his mind the poetry shaped by the romantic imagination. Dante's greatness, he believes, is due to his ability to realize the inapprehensible (SE, 267). Only a transcendental imagination can realize the inapprehensible. Again his recognition of imagination as an inexplicable, mystic element in poetry is seen in his declaration: "When the poem has been made, something new
has happened, something that cannot be wholly explained by anything that went before" (OPP, 112). This passage makes an oblique reference to the telescopic activities of inspiration, the unconscious and the imagination, that are involved in the poetic process - a process that cannot be reduced to explicit terms of articulation.

In *The Use of Poetry and The Use of Criticism*, Eliot expounds the concept of "auditory imagination" to which he assigns the function of exploring "below the conscious levels of thought and feeling." Eliot writes: "What I call the auditory imagination is the feeling for syllable and rhythm, penetrating far below the conscious levels of thought and feeling, invigorating every word; sinking to the most primitive and forgotten, returning to the origin and bringing something back, seeking the beginning and the end. It works through meanings, certainly, or not without meanings in the ordinary sense, and fuses the old and obliterated and the trite, the current, and the new and surprising, the most ancient and the most civilised mentality" (UFUC, 118-9). Similarity to Eliot's concept of 'auditory imagination' is found in J.Isaac's view of Romantic poetry, which according to him, "records and preserves emotions by
means of the force that lie within words, as a result of their past experiences, the company they have kept, the adventures they have had, the emotional and even cultural accretions they have taken to themselves. Eliot's tenet of "auditory imagination" stems from his grouse against Arnold that he is insensitive to the musical qualities of verse. Then his "auditory imagination" holds musical quality of verse as a fundamental virtue of poetry, a virtue which the Romantics also esteemed as will be noted in the next chapter. But no Romantic has emphasized more than Eliot the feeling for syllable and rhythm below the conscious levels of thought. However, his representation of the imagination as working through meanings shows his concern with the words and their meanings in poetry, which brings him again closer to Coleridge. Coleridge includes "in the meaning of a word not only its correspondent object but likewise all the associations which it recalls." This passage whose content will meet with the approval of Eliot can invite a favourable comparison with Eliot's statement in "Andrew Marvell" that "suggestiveness is the aura around a bright clear centre" (SE, 300). His description of "the auditory imagination" as the agent of the fusion of the opposites is reminiscent of Coleridge's well-known concept of imagination as the instrument.
synthesizing polarities. His earlier description of the mechanism of sensibility as "amalgamating disparate experience" (SE, 287) savours of the Coleridgean notion of imagination. It is noteworthy that in elucidating wit Eliot approvingly quotes Coleridge's definition of imagination to show how the wit operates (SE, 298). His invoking of the Coleridgean idea of imagination to expound the poetical quality of the metaphysical wit underscores the fact that Eliot approximates the metaphysical wit to the Romantic imagination. But Eliot himself will hasten to add that the main difference lies in the "tough reasonableness" informing the wit.

Eliot's emphasis on fusion, on the poet's experience and exploration, leads us to a brief discussion of the symbolic imagination, the kind of imagination which the Romantics had. It is pertinent to point out that Richard Ellmann and Charles Eidelson, Jr. use the term, symbolic imagination, in connection with Coleridge, Blake and Wordsworth. The symbolic imagination derives from the concept of imagination as a symbol-making faculty, and of the symbol as being "sacramental". A sacrament is a sign pointing to a higher reality, and brings into unity man and God, the temporal and the spiritual. A symbol also performs a
similar function. The symbolic imagination, therefore, assumes a sacramental character. It engages itself in the task of fusion or consubstantiation. It fuses the disparate elements of sameness with difference, the abstract with the concrete, the ideal with the real, the individual with the representative, thought with feeling, the old with the trite, the natural with the transcendental, the conscious with the unconscious. It is on the one hand an image of the union of the poet and his experience, leading to the union of the poem and the reader. It involves a symbolic vision, intensely personal, yet universal and deeply mysterious. It orders chaos, not conceptually but mythically. Such a poetry of the symbolic imagination is, to use the words of Barth, "the poetry of encounter" — a poetry which draws the reader into its experience, "which is at the same time an experience of the poet and of his world." Eliot also speaks about such a poetry of encounter. "... the author may have been writing some peculiar personal experience ... yet for the reader the poem may become the expression of a general situation, as well as of some private experience of his own" (OPP, 30-31). Then Eliot's concept of poetry as the product of the fusion of diverse elements, springing from intense personal experience, but at the same time reflecting the experience of the reader and of mankind in general, is that of the poetry
of the symbolic imagination. Thus Eliot's idea of imagination resembles very closely Coleridge's. But Eliot has not exactly repeated Coleridge. When he says that "a degree of heterogeneity of material is compelled into unity by the operation of the poet's mind" (SE, 283) or that the task of the poet is to assemble "the most disparate and unlikely material to make a new whole" (OPP, 108), he seems to make an allowance for the discordant elements to remain in a sort of tension without getting perfectly harmonised and integrated as in Coleridge. Coleridge disapproves of "the juxtaposition and apparent reconciliation". Shelley in his Preface to The Revolt of Islam provides for "the contending creeds", in poetry but insists on their harmonization. Hence R.A. Foakes's view that the Romantics were interested in "resolution of things into a general harmony". But John Keats's 'Negative Capability' as interpreted by Ellman and Fiedelson Jr. as "the acceptance of uncertainties, mysteries and doubts without any compulsion to resolve them in rational terms" may be said to come nearer to Eliot's notion. The significant achievement of Eliot, that has contributed to modernism, is his addition of a new dimension to the poetic imagination by strengthening it with wit, parody and irony and by his simultaneous preoccupation
with the sordid and the ideal, by his ability to see the boredom and the horror and the glory beneath beauty and ugliness; and this, in truth, is unified sensibility. It may be contended that the Romantics also conceived beauty and horror as remaining in close alliance. They spoke of terrible beauty or "the tempestuous loveliness of terror" as symbolised by the Medusa, and created weird, unearthly characters, a Geraldine, a Lamia and a La Belle Dame Sans Merci. But Eliot perceived horror beneath beauty, not in a world of fantasy but in the contemporary metropolis, in the workaday world of ours.

There is, however, no gainsaying the fact that the mainstay of Eliot's belief is that the imagination is the reconciling agent of diverse things. For him as for Coleridge, the imagination imposes order on chaos and brings about unity. Unity is the criterion for a poem. Hence his insistence that a poetic drama as well as a lyrical poem must have "emotional unity", "a dominant tone" (SE, 214) or the "unity of sentiment" (UFUC, 46). He finds fault with "Kubla Khan" for its lack of unity. "A single verse is not poetry, unless it is a one verse poem" (UFUC, 146).
Of the elements that are fused into unity by the imagination are the subject and the object, the perceiver and the perceived. There are two modes by the assumption of which the imagination operates in this unifying process, and they are Shakespearean and the Miltonic modes in Keats's phraseology, which have already been referred to as a means of the poet's experience in the outer and the inner world. Eliot perceives the possibility of either of these modes of imagination functioning in drama. "The author is just as likely to identify the character with himself, as he himself with the character" (OPP, 95). The former is the Miltonic or egotistic mode of imagination by which the author casts a character in the mould of his personality; consequently the character becomes the mouthpiece of the author or the revealer of the author's personality. The latter part of Eliot's statement, which sums up the Shakespearean or the chameleon mode of imagination, means that the author can merge himself into his character by completely obliterating his own personality. Eliot complains that Maud has neither a dramatic nor a lyrical form, because "Tennyson neither identifies himself with the lover, nor identifies the lover with himself;" and this accounts for Tennyson's inability to express his
real feelings (SE, 332-33). In other words, for Eliot, Tennyson's failure to adopt either the aesthetic or egotistical mode of imagination in Maud, causes his emotional strangulation. Eliot himself has assumed the Miltonic or egotistic mode in his Murder in the Cathedral. He had to identify himself, he says, with the chorus in the play and "its members were speaking for me" (OPP, 91).

Again the elements that are fused by the imagination are the real and the ideal, that is, the actual reality of the mundane world and a higher spiritual reality. Eliot's view of doubleness of action in poetic drama performs this function of imagination - action at the level of reality in common parlance and action at the level of reality "from which we are shut out."

"...What distinguishes poetic drama from prosaic drama is a kind of doubleness in the action, as if it took place on two planes of reality.... The drama has an underpattern, less manifest than the theatrical one. We sometimes feel, in following the words and behaviour of some of the characters of Dostoevsky, that they are living at once on the plane that we know and on some other plane of reality from which we are shut out; their behaviour does not seem crazy, but rather in conformity with the laws of some world that
we cannot perceive" (SE, 229). The reality "from which we are shut out" is a higher reality; and "the laws of some world that we cannot perceive" are the laws of a world of higher reality. To a question put by Kristian Smidt about the functional significance of poetry Eliot replied that "poetry could help us to approach an understanding of an ultimate reality; and thus he affirms his faith more in higher reality. This higher spiritual reality can be apprehended only by the 'romantic' imagination. The Romantics, like Eliot, believed that "The world of transcendent reality ... shares a community of being with the world of temporal, sensible things" and that "eternal and temporal, ideal and sensible, are consubstantial one with the other." So Eliot's "doubleness in action" is an allotropic modification of Coleridge's description of the symbol as "characterised by a translucence of the Special in the Individual or of the General in the Especial or of the Universal in the General. Above all by the translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal. It always partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative." The emphasis must be on "by the translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal,"
for it highlights the idea of action on two planes.

The discussion of the symbolic imagination leads to the subject of the mythical method. Eliot in his review of James Joyce's *Ulysses* explains the mythical method which, he believes, Joyce adopted in his work. The mythical method enables the poet to manipulate "a continuous parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity", and as "simply a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history." The mythical method is no other than the symbolic method, and the myth is a symbol. What has been said about the symbol applies to myth with equal force. Elizabeth Drew elucidates the symbol employed in Eliot's mythical method. The symbol, she says, gains in concentration as a result of the coalescence of object and meaning perceived in it. It cannot be pinned down to a single meaning. It embodies, she continues, both thought and sensation; "it is body and mind in one," it has "shape and significance", imbued with a meaning "which points beyond body". "It is complete in itself and yet life, inward and outward life, are not only contained in it, but flow from it in every direction." It synthesizes, she proceeds to observe, disparate experi-
ence and reduces multiplicity to unity and herein lies the essence of the symbolical or mythical method of grasping experience. Drew seems to echo Coleridge's definition of symbol quoted above. The Romantic symbol is likely to be personal in practice, though it admits of the fusion of the individual and the representative, the peculiar and the general, in theory, whereas Eliot's myth as symbol is more universal as it has embodied the recurrent of human behaviour, though it may have its origin in the individual psychic experiences. The myth is used as an objective correlative to the poet's ideas and emotions, as a vehicle for his "personal point of view." To that extent the subjective is fused with the objective.

Incidentally the views in the Augustan and Romantic periods, concerning myth may be glanced at. Eighteenth century neo-classicism with its apotheosis of reason, considered myth as something dead and fossilised and could at best use it as a detachable ornament or as a mechanical accessory to heighten the effect intended by the poet. The Rosicrucian myth which Pope employed in his "Rape of the Lock" is a case in point. On the other hand, symbolism, "animism and mythopoeia, in richly diverse forms, explicit or submerged were so pervasive" in the Romantic age as to
form a distinct feature of 'romantic' poetry. Hartley Coleridge compliments Keats, Shelley and Wordsworth for having revitalized myth and predicts that it will have an uninterrupted existence "because of the pregnancy of its symbols, and the plastic facility with which it accommodates itself to the fancy and feelings of mankind". His prediction has come true in that modern writers like Yeats, Eliot and Joyce employ myths in their works. Wordsworth's imagination, M.H.Abrams writes, "rejecting all hereditary symbols and without violence to the truth of perception, operates as myth in process rather than on myth in being." Keats's "Ode to Psyche" is purely fanciful concerned with the exploration of his interior landscape. Blake comes very near to the moderns with his statement that "the mysteries of the divine as well as of the human and world life, with all the complexity of historical destiny" can be understood by means of the mythical imagination of the artist and in terms of their inherent mythical meaning. To put it simply, mythical imagination, according to him can enlighten our comprehension of history better in terms of mythical meaning. Shelley uses the myth of Prometheus to dramatise the innate aspiration of humanity for freedom combating the tyrannical, authoritarian forces. While Shelley employs
a particular single myth through which to convey his political philosophy, Eliot culls from different sources to impart to his poem a more representative and universal character. Whereas the Romantics' use of myth appears more subjective, Eliot's is designed to be impersonal in the sense he tries to objectify his personal emotions through myth. Eliot's debt to the Romantics lies in his recognition of the symbolic significance, and the perennial value of the living traditions of myth from which a poet can quarry to construct his poetry, and more than that, in understanding the need to build it into the very structure of the poem so as to make it organic and integral to the themes of the poet. It must be pointed out that no Romantic explicitly speaks of the mythical method as Eliot does, in his criticism, though he may use myth as an integral and inseparable part of his poetry. But Coleridge's notion of the symbolic language (as well as his definition of the symbol) as objective correlative to something within him that already and forever exists, may suggest how the mythical method can operate by being the objective equivalent to the poet's thoughts and feelings.
Eliot's concept of imagination, symbolist or mythical, is seen to operate on the two planes, 'aesthetic' and 'personal'. This naturally leads on to the subject of the personal and the impersonal.

Though Eliot enunciates his doctrines of impersonality in respect of the creative artist chiefly in "Tradition and the Individual Talent", he has scattered his ideas on it in several of his earlier seesys. He insists on the poet adhering to tradition to achieve impersonality and this is certainly 'classical'. Blake (SW, 155) and Goethe (SW, 66) are castigated for the embodiment of their private philosophies in their works. A dependence on personal beliefs tends to make an artistic work formless and eccentric. By the same token, he praises Dante and Lucretius for making use of accepted beliefs (SW, 162-63) by virtue of which they become 'classical'. He recommends for a poet the employment of "a situation remote from his personal experience". 56
This seems to be an echo of Coleridge's notion that a poet should choose his subjects outside his private interests and circumstances. 57

Another aspect of Eliot's theory of impersonality is related to his "aesthetic mode. In the early phase of his critical career, Eliot was a staunch proponent of the doctrine of 'pure' poetry, the main plank of 'aesthetic' mode. His concern with the purity of poetry is borne out by his claim that "a poem in some sense, has its own life" 58 and that certainly poetry is not the inculcation of morals or the direction of politics" (SW, ix-x). Again he avers that an artistic work is autotelic and that art need not serve ends beyond itself and that it can perform its function better by being indifferent to them (SE, 30, 34). Even in 1944, in "Johnson, the Poet and Critic", he reiterates the same idea with the statement that we distrust the verse in which the author is deliberatively aiming to instruct or persuade (OPP, 184). It recalls Keats's dictum that poetry should have no palpable design upon us, and also his counsel to Shelley that "the artist must serve Mammon." 59 Again Eliot insists that "When we are considering poetry, we must consider it primarily as poetry and not another thing"
Further, "Poetry is not a substitute for philosophy or theology or religion ... it has its own function" (SE, 137-38). So Eliot enjoins the poet merely to present thought and feeling, remote from personal experience, without being actuated by extraneous considerations. Eliot's plea for pure poetry shows his concern for the preservation of autonomy of poetry by means of its non-didactic and unintentional character. But he has no objection to moral elements getting themselves accreted to the poem when the poet is preoccupied with technical problems.

The ideas of a poem as a heterocosm is repugnant to eighteenth-century classicism whose matter-of-fact attitude can be summed up in the statement that poetry centres on truth of fact or historical truth known to men. It contravenes the classical practice which establishes a relation between life and art through the mimetic doctrine that art is the imitation or representation of life. This notion of pure poetry which holds that the world of poetry is neither a replica nor a facsimile of this world but a world of its own, sui generis, subject only to its own laws, whose existence is an end in itself, is 'romantic'. It would be abhorrent to Dr. Johnson who reflects the 'classical' position with the assertion that "there is
always an appeal open from criticism to nature. The idea of the autonomy of poetry is, therefore, a 'romantic' creed.

Wordsworth had the conviction that the truth of poetry is not contingent upon external testimony but "its own testimony which gives competence and confidence to the tribunal to which it appeals, and receives them from the same tribunal." It means that poetry is a world of its own and that its truth can be grasped intransitively and without regard to extrinsic factors. Coleridge's observation that imagination seeks "a truth self-grounded, unconditional and known by its own light," and his demand for "a willing suspension of disbelief" from the readers, support the principle of the autonomy of poetry. Keats's theory of "Negative Capability" is at once an indirect plea for the assumption of an impersonal attitude on the part of the poet, and for the protection of the purity of poetry. Shelley too disapproves of the direct conveyance of morals. For him, Milton's "bold neglect of a direct moral purpose is the most decisive proof of the supremacy of Milton's genius." In his Preface to Prometheus Unbound, he asserts that "didactic poetry is my abhorrence," and that he is averse to using poetry
Northrop Frye's observation on Blake's interpretation of Aristotle's dianoia (thought) as the structure of the fable informed by a latent moral significance, shows his (Blake's) objection to deliberate insertion of morals. According to Blake, Frye says, "it destroys its imaginative quality to assume that some external moral attached to it can be a definitive translation of 'thought'." Walter Pater pleads passionately for the love of art for its own sake, with the affirmation that "art comes to you, proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments." The aesthetic character of art finds a staunch proponent in Oscar Wilde who declares, "Art never expresses anything but itself. It has an independent life ... and develops purely on its own lines." His assertion that "all art is useless" registers emphatically his opposition to didacticism and realism which implies that poetic truth is independent of external reference.

Such affiliations should show that Eliot's aesthetic mode has descended from the Romantic tradition itself. Then like the Romantics, he has taken up a stance which is at variance with that of a classicist like Johnson who lays stress on explicit preaching. But his aesthetic mode springs from the desire to make poetry more
intellectual and esoteric. It is neither a cult of artificiality as with Wilde nor a comfortable refuge from the sordidness of the world, nor a means of intellectual epicurianism as in the case of Pater.

Eliot is seen to subscribe to the cardinal tenets of Romanticism, which are, to put in the words of M.H. Abrams: "poetry has intrinsic value and as poetry, only intrinsic value. It is to be estimated by the literary critic solely as poetry, as an end in itself, without reference to its possible effects on the thought, feeling or conduct of its readers." Any extrinsic value it possesses, he seems to add, is rather as an indirect means to moral and social effects beyond itself.

Incidentally, we may glance at C.K. Stead's opinion that Eliot's "particular achievement" is his elevation of the aesthetic concern to "a higher kind of morals". But this view can be traced to the Romantics, for it lies embedded, for instance, in Shelley's concept of imagination as "the greatest instrument of moral good." Graham Hough points out Shelley's view is that poetry should work by "its own imaginative processes", but that "the aim is still to
awaken and stimulate the moral sense." Pater echoes Shelley's idea when he says in *Marius the Epicurean* that art is "the organ of moral knowledge." 

Eliot explores further in the aesthetic mode by divorcing thought from poetry. He attributes the artistic greatness of Shakespeare and Dante to their concentration on writing poetry without being in the least troubled by thought: "In truth neither Shakespeare nor Dante did any real thinking — that was not their job" (SE, 136). Coleridge's failure to bring out his best is imputed by Eliot to his simultaneous preoccupation with philosophy and poetry: "I believe that for a poet to be also a philosopher he would have to be virtually two men;... the work is better performed inside two skulls than one. Coleridge is the apparent example but I believe that he was only able to exercise the one activity at the expense of the other" (UPUC, 98-99).

Having insulated poetry from thought, Eliot's aesthetic mode finds its extreme expression in the total rejection of all meaning in poetry. "If poetry is a form of communication yet that which is to be communicated is the poem itself," says Eliot, "and incidentally the
experience and the thought which have gone into it" (UPUC, 30). He decr
des the reader's habit of groping about to discover a meaning which is not meant to be there. A
disparaging reference is made to the meaning of a poem when Eliot compares it to a bit of nice meat intended to ke
keep the house-dog quiet and diverted (UPUC, 151). Th
ough Eliot thus accepts the Romantic principle that a
poem should not mean but be, he goes one better in the
sense that no Romantic in his criticism has sought to ba
nish thought or meaning from poetry so much as Eliot has
done. In practice, while the Romantics' aesthetic mode
harked back to the Middle Ages and they were concerned even with the weird and the exotic as in "Kubla Khan",
"Lamia" and "The Lady of Shalott", Eliot's centres on the more familiar and the ordinary in an urban set
ting. Further what sets off his aesthetic mode is that it ope
rates within the framework of tradition and orthodox sensibility on account of his mind's saturation in them.
A distinct feature of Eliot's aesthetic mode is his view that if the poet is engaged in his technical problems, the poem will emerge from the depth of his being. His aesthetic mode is on the one hand, connected with the craf
smithanship, and on the other, with his concern for the integrity of poetry.
Eliot's aesthetic mode which tends to eliminate thought or meaning from poetry is linked with his emotive view of poetry on the one hand, and his unconscious theory of poetry on the other. Meaning which is of the conscious mind, Eliot apprehends, will smuggle in the personality of the artist, and it is injurious to pure poetry. The pure poetry is a matter of the unconscious. The theory of the unconscious is invariably intertwined with the concepts of inspiration and of organic growth. The examination of the one naturally entails the discussion of the other two.

In his pursuit of pure poetry which, as we have seen, pertains to his aesthetic mode, brings unobtrusively into the focus of his discussion of the unconscious the subjects of inspiration and organic growth. Three landmarks can be fixed up where these theories appear in conjunction, and they are, "Tradition and the Individual Talent", "Three Voices of Poetry" and "Rudyard Kipling". In the first essay, they lie muffled under the blare of the Impersonal theory. The second essay denotes a significant stage where he comes more into the open with his inhibitions discarded. In the third, they again a clear and emphatic articulation which reveals undisguisedly the author as a romantic. His comments on these subjects are strewed in his critical...
essays that span between these landmarks.

In "Tradition and the Individual Talent", Eliot posits the thesis that the mind remains "inert", "neutral" and passive (SW, 54) during the poetic creation. He, of course, refers to the conscious mind, which, he holds, should not interfere with the poetic process to colour it with the personality of the poet, or to introduce into it his private ideas by even meaning. Wordsworth and Keats seem to have anticipated Eliot in assigning to the conscious mind an inactive role during the poetic process. Keats's observation that "men of genius are greater as certain chemicals operating on the Mass of neutral intellect" denies to mind an active functioning. Wordsworth's credo that "poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings" carries the implication that the conscious mind is "inert" as in Eliot's notion of the poetic process. Eliot seems to be welloreently romantic, when he, knocking out of the "mind" any trace of life, represents it as an inanimate medium "in which impressions and experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected ways" (SW, 56). Obviously Eliot is referring to the unconscious mind, though he cautiously avoids the term "unconscious". It must be noticed that Eliot does not speak of the poet
organising and shaping the "impressions and experiences" for specific purposes for which he needs them, but he merely says they "combine," thereby implying that the poet has no conscious control over the internal arrangement during the poetic process. Moreover, the words "peculiar" and "unexpected" in the above passage are the key-words, for they suggest inspiration. "... numberless feelings, phrases, images," Eliot continues, remain in the mind "until all the particles which can unite to form a new compound are present together" (SW, 55). The poet can neither predict nor know when all the particles will be present or when a fusion of them all will occur. The sudden arrival of a new particle which Eliot speaks of as setting in motion the process of poetic creation, is a part of the unconscious process. How the arrival of a new particle comes about or whether it acts as a stimulus or what its nature is like, Eliot steers clear of these issues. He perhaps feels that the poet himself is quite unaware of these. This arrival, we infer, heralds the advent of inspiration which initiates and sustains the artistic process. It is "the motion terminating in an arrangement of words on paper" (UPUC, 145). It is "a passive attending upon the event" (SW, 58). Then Eliot's explanation of the poetic process is no more
than a dressing up of the theory of artistic "automatism" in his own terminology. It must be stressed that Eliot has relegated the most important moment in the artistic creation of a poem from the sphere of reason and intellect to a dark abyss and located it in a mystic artistic faculty whose efficacy may be judged from the effect it engenders in terms of intensity. Here Eliot comes close, Kristian Smidt observes, to the ideas of accepting supernatural inspiration. One can easily perceive that Eliot's tacit recognition of inspiration lurks in his exposition of the poetic process, however scrupulously and carefully he may avoid using the term "inspiration".

The poetic process that Eliot describes in "Tradition and the Individual Talent" as outlined above, conveys the idea that form and matter are co-extensive and co-terminate with the completion of the process of the fusion of various elements, and that meaning inheres in the fusion. It is the "organic" theory associated with Romanticism.

"Tradition and the Individual Talent" reveals Eliot as having far greater reliance on the unconscious than a Romantic like Wordsworth, and this is seen in his rejection of Wordsworth's formula of "emotion recollected in tranquillity".
He seems to contend that the source of poetry is not a single emotion as implied in Wordsworth's tenet, but a deep, obscure and complex surging up of feelings, images and experiences, which the poet can apprehend only after they are born. Further, recollection is a conscious, deliberate process, which militates against Eliot's view of poetic process taking place "below the conscious levels of thought". Poetry, for Eliot, "is a concentration which does not happen consciously or of deliberation" (SW, 58). It may not be out of place to bring in F.R. Leavis's interpretation of Wordsworth's "emotion recollected in tranquillity", which highlights the implicit operation of critical intelligence "in the process." The process covered by this phrase, Leavis observes, "was one of emotional discipline, critical exploration, pondered valuation and maturing reflection. As a result of it an organization is engaged in Wordsworth's poetry and the activity and the standards of critical intelligence are implicit. This remark reinforces the view that Wordsworth's poetic process is far less unconscious than Eliot's.

This essay bears out another aspect of Eliot's preoccupation with the unconscious, that is in relation to the poet's imagery. Speaking of Canto XV of Dante's
Inferno. Eliot remarks, "The last quatrain gives an image, a feeling attaching to an image, which 'came,' which did not develop simply out of what precedes, but which was probably in suspension in the poet's mind until the proper combination arrived for it to add itself to" (SW, 55). An analysis of the passage yields the following points: Eliot refers to an image charged with feeling, and not to the intellectual quality of the image; the image comes all of a sudden and unpremeditated from the unconscious depth; and it has no logical sequence with what the poet has already written, and lodges itself in an alien surrounding. Then the poetic image springs from the unconscious, emotive in character and though seemingly illogical and inharmonious, gets synthesized into the texture of the poem to heighten the poetic effect. Such an image, for Eliot, incarnates itself from the intensely personal and emotional life of the poet. (Underlining is mine to stress the personal and emotional nature of the image which has its life in the mind of the poet.)

In The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism Eliot reiterates his 'unconscious' theory of poetic imagery, but this time in relation to Shakespeare: "... again and again the right imagery saturated, while it lay in the depths
of Shakespeare's memory, will rise like Anadyomene from
the sea.\textsuperscript{82} (UPUC, 146-47). Like the Romantics, he is of
the view that Shakespeare's greatness is largely due to
the 'unconscious' nature of his poetry which is made of
such images.\textsuperscript{83}

His unconscious theory of imagery finds a fuller
expression in his elucidation of the contribution
that is made by the buried past of the poet's life.
He says:

\ldots a part of an author's imagery comes from his
reading. It comes from the whole of his sensitive
life since early childhood \ldots The song of one
bird, the leap of one fish, at a particular place
and time, the scent of one flower, an old woman
on a German mountain path, six ruffians seen
through an open window playing cards at a small
French railway junction where there was a water-
mill; such memories may have symbolic value, but
of what we cannot tell, for they come to rep-
resent the depths of feeling into which we cannot
peer.\ldots (they are) the faded poor souvenirs of
passionate moments (UPUC, 148) (underlining mine).

The underlined clause has to be stressed, as it places the
image in the "unconscious". Such an image, according to
Eliot, impregnated with intensely personal and emotional
significance, leaps up suddenly from the mind to get into
the poem.
Just like the image, the characters of a play also, are nourished in the subterranean zone of the mind. Such characters are superior to those coming from the conscious region and take on a 'third dimension', pulsating with life. Some of the characters of Jonson, like Volpone, Busy and Fitzodottrel, Eliot declares, fall into this category, for they are animated by a power "which comes from below the intellect and for which no theory of humours will account" (SE, 157). The just inference is that even a classicist like Jonson cannot resist the power of the unconscious, which upsets his calculated and schematic approach. Quite aware of the gap between the intention and performance, which results from the irrepressible operation of the unconscious, Eliot affirms that "the poet does many things upon instinct, for which he can give no better account than anybody else" (UPUC, 129-30). "Instinct" here is the pseudonym of the 'unconscious'. Again Eliot vouches for the tremendous power of the unconscious even in his later essays as in "American Literature and the American Language" (1953) where he asserts that there is in Twain a great unconscious depth which imparts to Huckleberry Finn a profound symbolic value - "a symbolism all the more powerful for being uncalculated and unconscious" (TCCW, 54).
Eliot's 'unconscious' theory (which he does not state as such anywhere explicitly) operates in his exposition of the relation between the poet's experience and his technique. In his Introduction to Ezra Pound's *Selected Poems*, Eliot says:

There is a great deal of the gradual accumulation of experience, like a Tantalus Jar; it may be only once in five years or ten years that experience accumulates to form a new whole and finds its appropriate expression.... The development of experience is largely unconscious and subterranean so that we cannot gauge its progress except once in every five years, but in the meantime, the poet must be working; he must be experimenting and trying his technique so that it will be ready like a well-oiled fire engine, when the moment comes to strain it to its utmost.

The above passage states that the poet's experience is unconscious, and that all he can do is to remain ready, equipped with his technique, so that when the experience rises all of a sudden to the surface of the mind the technique may seize it and fuse itself organically with it. The poet cannot peer into the nature of the experience that lies dormant waiting to be poetised nor can he know when the experience accumulated in the mind below the conscious level will come up to yoke itself to the technique which he keeps ready. The unconscious process described here, recalls the poetic
process expatiated upon in "Tradition and the Individual Talent", which has been already noticed.

His tacit faith in what may be termed 'automatic writing', again comes out in his comparison of the poet to subhuman creatures like bee and spider that simply act instinctively, uninstructed by conscious intellect or rational faculty: "The poet makes poetry, the metaphysician makes metaphysics, the bee makes the honey, the spider secretes a filament; he merely does" (SE, 138). The 'unconscious' theory of poetry can go no further. The poet is made a mechanical agent. Eliot is pleased to discover a resemblance between his view and that of Housman who in his Name and Nature of Poetry says:

"In short I think that production of poetry in its first stage, is less an active than a passive and involuntary process....I should call it a secretion, whether a natural secretion, like turpentine in the fir, or a morbid secretion like the pearl in the oyster" (UPUC, 144-45). It must be borne in mind that Housman is a romanticist and his view is none other than the Romantic doctrine of poetic automatism, with which Eliot voices his concurrence. He deprives the poet of any conscious responsibility for his poetic product and transforms him into a mere
unthinking automaton: "The poet may hardly be aware of what he is communicating, and what is there to be communicated was not in existence before the poem was completed" (UPUC, 138). Ivor Winters is not far from truth in dubbing such a view of art as "an extreme form of romantic mysticism". 85

Though Eliot expounds and recommends the unconscious poetic process without naming it so, he is at first reluctant to associate inspiration along with it, lest he presumably should be exposed to the charge of being contaminated by the Romantic influence. Some "forms of ill-health," he concedes, "debility or anaemia, may ... produce an efflux of poetry in a way approaching the condition of automatic writing" (UPUC, 144). He tries to tackle the issue of inspiration cautiously by constructing the theory of incubation. The poetic material, he argues, has undergone a long incubation, "though we do not know until the shell breaks what kind of egg we have been sitting on."

"To me it seems that at these moments," he proceeds to say, "which are characterised by the sudden lifting of the burden of anxiety and fear which presses upon daily life so steadily that we are unaware of it, what happens is something negative: that is to say, not 'inspiration'"
as we commonly think of it, but the breaking down of strong habitual barriers - which tend to re-form very quickly. The accompanying feeling is less like what we know as positive pleasure, than a sudden relief from an intolerable burden" (UPUC, 144-45). Obviously Eliot is put to great strain in avoiding the use of the term, "inspiration" and attempts to substitute the theory of incubation for the theory of inspiration, but as we have seen, he has tacitly accepted it in his description of the 'unconscious' poetic process. Though Eliot's opposition to inspiration is on the score that it works fitfully and that it cannot produce one sustained piece of good poetry (UPUC, 146; SE, 405), he acknowledges openly its rightful place and function in poetry. "Organisation," he pronounces, "is necessary as well as inspiration" (UPUC, 146). In "The Pensees" of Pascal, he admits that even long passages may be produced by inspiration, "which require little or no touch" (SE, 405). Eliot actually uses the word 'inspiration' and admits its efficacy in artistic creation. For him, Dickens's characters owe their superiority over those of Collins to the fact that they are a creation of inspiration not of a process of calculation or fabrication of consummate skill as in the case of the latter. Eliot proceeds to observe that Dickens's characters belong to
poetry like those of Dante and Shakespeare (SE, 462).
Here is Eliot's tacit acknowledgment that great poetic
characters are naturally the creation of inspiration.

Eliot's essay on Rudyard Kipling throws light not
only on Eliot's concept about the nature of poetry but
also on what type of poet Eliot is. Eliot calls Kipling's
poetic work as "great verse" (OPP, 251). He has ready-made
forms and subjects and he has to merely fit his subjects
into the forms. He is not impelled by an inner compul-
sion to write. He is "a performer" (Eliot means a cons-
cious performer) with "craftsmanship more reliable than
that of some greater poets" (OPP, 235). Eliot writes
further:

I know of no writer of such great gifts for whom
poetry seems to have been more purely an instrument.
Most of us are interested in the form for its own
sake - not apart from the content, but because we
aim at making something which shall first of all
be something which in consequence will have the
capability of exciting within a limited range, a
considerable variety of responses from different
readers. For Kipling the poem is something which is
intended to act - and for the most part his poems
are intended to elicit the same response from all
readers and only the response which they can make
in common. For other poets - at least, for some other
poets - the poem may begin to shape itself in
fragments of musical rhythm, and its structure will
first appear in terms of something analogous to
musical form; and such poets find it expedient to
occupy their conscious mind with the craftsman's
problems, leaving the deeper meaning to emerge from
a lower level" (OPP, 238). [underlining mine]
A scrutiny of this passage reveals the distinction between verse and poetry as conceived by Eliot, and his consistency of thinking on the subject of the unconscious process of poetry. For Kipling a poem is intended to act and not something which shall be. It follows that verse is designed to act while poetry should be. Kipling employs his poems as instruments for some purpose. Eliot makes a similar observation elsewhere in this essay, that "there is a harmonious poetry which not merely is beyond their range but would interfere with the intention" (OPP. 251). What Eliot means is that Kipling's verse cannot rise to the heights of poetry, because such poetry will be injurious to its purpose. It is the obverse of the statement that a doctrinaire approach or a didactic intention is inimical to the spirit of genuine poetry — which is an aspect of pure poetry of which Eliot has been a tireless advocate.

Kipling's verse which shall act can elicit a uniform response from all readers. On the other hand, poetry evokes "A considerable variety of responses from different readers." This idea is reiterated in "The Music of Poetry": "A poem may appear to mean very different things to different readers, and all of these meanings may be different
from what the author thought he meant” (OPP, 30).

The above quoted passage from "Rudyard Kipling" implies that form and content are coextensive and co-terminous in great poetry. In other words, for Eliot, real poetry is organic in its growth and structure. While the poet is consciously engaged in technical problems, the meaning comes "from a lower level, germinating as musical rhythm". It is unlike Kipling’s verse where there is a dichotomy between form and matter, because it is interested in discovering form at first and then in pouring the content into it.

Kipling, we are told, depicts the outward and ephemeral aspects of life such as the imperialistic grandeur of the British Empire; and his development as a poet is a process of mutations, contingent on external situations or environments, on "the man himself" (OPP, 245). By man, Eliot means the thoughts and feelings of the man in his conscious mind. Then for Eliot, verse deals with surface life and derives its strength from its ideas and impressions about external circumstances, while poetry springs from the depth of the poet’s mind and depends on the inner resources for its sustenance; it is the result
of "inner compulsion" (OPP, 236) and the product of the fusion of various elements below the levels of consciousness as explained by Eliot in "Tradition and the Individual Talent". The expressions, "inner compulsion" and "emerge from deeper levels" argue for an implied concept of inspiration. Eliot himself is no longer hesitant but comes out explicitly to recognize the role of inspiration in poetry. Eliot says about Kipling and Dryden: "They arrive at poetry through eloquence; for both wisdom has the primacy over inspiration; and both are more concerned with the world about them than with their own joys and sorrows, and concerned with their own feelings in their likeness to those of other men rather than in their particularity" (OPP, 244). It is clear that real poetry is a product of inspiration while verse is fed by the wisdom of the poet, that real poetry is concerned with the personal joys and sorrows and particular feelings of the poet whereas verse deals with the outer world and general feelings.

To sum up, the differences between "verse" and "poetry" as Eliot sees them, are:

(1) Verse is something that acts; Poetry is something that is.
(2) Verse is didactic or doctrinaire as it is written on purpose. Poetry is 'autotelic' and 'pure'.

(3) Verse is 'conscious' as it comes from the conscious mind; and poetry is 'unconscious' as it emerges from below the levels of consciousness.

(4) Verse feeds on external circumstances and deals with the world outside. Poetry which results from inner compulsion derives its sustenance from the inner resources of the poet's mind.

(5) Verse expresses the precise meaning intended by the author. But poetry does not bother about conscious meaning - as the meaning comes from the unconscious, Paradoxically enough, it communicates different meanings to different readers.

(6) Verse issues from 'wisdom', but poetry is the creation of inspiration.

(7) Verse insists on the separation between form and matter. Poetry considers form and matter as inseparable, as organic.

(8) Verse depicts general feelings while poetry portrays personal emotions of the poet like his joys and sorrows.
Eliot observes that Kipling and Dryden "had much in common" and that "they were classical rather than romantic poets" (OPP, 244). Then obviously from Eliot's point of view, Dryden's poetic works are verses like those of Kipling. We may not err if we say that Eliot looks upon the classical poetry of England as verse, and Romantic poetry as poetry.

Further, Eliot affirms that his own poetry, like that of Yeats, differs from Kipling's: "I confess furthermore that introspection into my own process affords no assistance - part of the fascination of the subject is in the exploration of a mind so different from one's own" [underlining is mine] (OPP, 236). The implication is that he is different from Kipling who can only write verses and that his is a poetry, that belongs to the Romantic type. Thus "Rudyard Kipling" unfolds Eliot's concept of the nature of poetry and thereby helps us to identify Eliot's own position as a poet.

Tracking down his 'unconscious theory', we come to "The Three Voices of Poetry". In relation to the first voice of poetry, Eliot says:

He [poet] has something germinating in him for which he must find words; but he cannot know
what words he wants until he has found the words; he cannot identify this embryo until it has been transformed into an arrangement of the right words in the right order. When you have the words for it, the 'thing' for which the words had to be found has disappeared, replaced by a poem. What you start from is nothing so definite as an emotion, in any ordinary sense; it is still more certainly not an idea - to adapt the two lines of Beddoes to a different meaning - a

bodiless child of life in the gloom
Crying with frog voice, 'what shall I be?'

I agree with Gottfried Benn, and I would go a little further. In a poem which is neither didactic nor narrative, and not animated by any other social purpose, the poet may be concerned solely with expressing in verse - using all his resources of words, with their history, their connotations and their music - this obscure impulse. He does not know what he has to say until he has said it; and in the effort to say he is not concerned with making other people understand anything. He is not concerned at this stage, with other people at all; only with finding the right words or, any how the least wrong words. He is not concerned, whether anybody else will ever listen to them or not, whether anybody else will ever understand them if he does. He is oppressed by a burden which he must bring to birth in order to obtain relief. Or, to change the figure of speech, he is haunted by a demon, a demon against which he feels powerless, because in its first manifestation it has no face, no name, nothing; and the words, the poem he makes, are a kind of form of exorcism of this demon. In other words again, he is going to all that trouble, not in order to communicate with anyone, but to gain relief from acute discomfort; and when the words are finally arranged in the right way - or in what he comes to accept as the best arrangement he can find - he may experience a moment of exhaustion, of appeasement, of absolution, and of something very near annihilation, which is in itself indescribable. And then he can say to the poem: 'Go away! Find a place for yourself in a book ... (OFF, 97-98)."
This passage seems to expound Eliot's view of poetic creation in its entirety. Some of the points enumerated in "Rudyard Kipling" are repeated. For instance, his emphasis on pure poetry - a poem is neither didactic nor an instrument for any social purpose - recurs. "The conscious mind" (The phrase used in "Rudyard Kipling") is preoccupied with technical problems such as the use of all resources of words "with their history, their connotations, their music", and it does not interfere with the poetic process or "psychic material" taking shape beneath the levels of consciousness. The idea of poetry as being the result of "inner compulsion" animates the whole procedure dilated on here. While Eliot's attention in "Rudyard Kipling" is focused on the elucidation of the nature of poetry with Kipling's verse as an antithetical standard of reference, here in this passage he is concerned with the explanation of poetic creation. The figure, "demon" which Eliot employs here is an unmistakable metaphor for inspiration.

The sentence, "He does not know what he has to say until he has said it", again testifies to his steadfast belief in the unconscious poetic process. It invites
a comparison with the observation of Schelling: "The artist is driven to production involuntarily ... the artist ... seems to be under the influence of a power that sunder him from all other men and forces him to express or represent things that he himself does not entirely fathom, and whose significance is infinite."\(^{59}\) Eliot's passage on the whole conveys a poetic view analogous to the 'romantic' theory. It is akin to the 'expressive' theory as summed up by M.H. Abrams:

A work of art is essentially the internal made external, resulting from a creative process operating under the impulse of feeling, and embodying the combined product of the poet's perceptions, thoughts and feelings. The primary source and subject matter of a poem, therefore, are the attributes and actions of the poet's own mind. ... The paramount cause of poetry is not, as in Aristotle, a formal cause, determined primarily by the human actions and qualities imitated; nor, as in neo-classic criticism a final cause, the effect intended upon the audience, but instead an efficient cause - the impulse within the poet of feelings and desires seeking expression, or the compulsion of the 'creative' imagination which ... has its internal source of motion."\(^{90}\)

It can be observed that the passage of Eliot has neither the Aristotelian nor the neo-classical colour but only a romantic hue.
Though the passage describing the first voice of poetry suggests indirectly Eliot's 'organic' view of poetry, he soon makes it clear with the statement:

"In the poem in which the first voice, that of the poet talking to himself, dominates, the 'psychic material' tends to create its own form - the eventual form will be to a greater or less degree the form for that one poem and for no other .... what happens is a simultaneous development of form and material ... and finally the material is identified with its form" (OPP, 101).

Thus the 'organic' tenet of poetry which has been embodied latently in "Rudyard Kipling" is voiced more explicitly.

The word, "unconscious", also finds a more direct and clearer expression, as Eliot envisages the unconscious mind playing a positive role in the second voice of poetry.

"It is in the beginning, the pressure of some rude unknown psychic material that directs the poet to tell that particular story. And on the other hand, the frame, once chosen, within which the author has elected to work, may itself evoke other psychic material; and then lines of poetry come into being, not from the original impulse, but from a secondary stimulation of the unconscious mind" (OPP, 101).
Eliot visualises the role of the unconscious and inspiration in the third voice of poetry too. A character which succeeds in interesting its author, says Eliot, elicits from the author latent potentialities of his own being; the author infuses something of himself into his characters, and at the same time, he is influenced by the characters he creates (OPP. 94). "The fact that a number of characters in a play have claims upon the author for their allotment of poetic speech, compels him to try to extract the poetry from the character, rather than impose his poetry upon it" (OPP. 95). [underlining is mine]

A classicist would insist on the author's control over his character as well as over the poetic speech given to that character, and enjoin the development of both according to a pre-meditated design. But Eliot speaks of the poet being influenced by the character itself as if it takes possession of the author and dictates to him so that he is no more than a passive medium recording automatically. He seems to affirm that it is the character that inspires the playwright.

Of course Eliot does not ignore the conscious aspect of poetry. He requires the poet to concentrate on technical
problems so that the material will take care of itself. He, therefore, pleads that a poet should be both conscious and unconscious at the right 'places', for "the bad poet is usually unconscious where he ought to be conscious" (SW, 58). An agreeable feature in Dr. Lowes's *Road to Xanadu*, for Eliot, is its demonstration of "the importance of instinctive and unconscious, as well as deliberate selection..." (UFUC, 78). This view of Eliot, again reveals an affinity between him and the Romantics. Coleridge in his *On Poesy or Art* recognizes the operation of both the conscious and the unconscious in poetic activity: "He who combines the two [the conscious and the unconscious] is the man of genius and for that reason must partake of both," 91 According to Coleridge, Shakespeare's participation in both accounts for his towering eminence as a poet: "And even such is the appropriate excellence of her chosen poet, of our own Shakespeare, himself a nature humanized, a genial understanding directing self-consciously a power and an implicit wisdom deeper than consciousness."92 [underlining is mine]

Again when Coleridge affirms that "good sense is the body of poetic genius", 93 he recognizes the vital function of the conscious mind in the poetic creation. Wordsworth's emphasis on "judgment" as one of the "powers requisite for
production of poetry" and his praise of Shakespeare for his judgment "in the selection of his materials," which he considers equal to his imagination, and "his intuitive knowledge of human nature," clearly show his reliance on the conscious powers of the mind as indispensable implement in forging poetry. Wordsworth also acknowledged the share of consciousness, as seen earlier, in poetic composition. He lays emphasis on workmanship and practice as the virtues of a young writer. "poetry," he admits, "is infinitely more of an art than the world is disposed to believe," and "absolute success in it depends upon innumerable minutiae." He further expresses his disapprobation of Milton's talk of "pouring easy his unpremeditated verse." In "The Prelude, Bk. IV, he speaks of having been" harassed with the toil of verse, "with much pains and little progress" (11. 111-12). Even the 'lyrical' Shelley who depends on spontaneity is known to have engaged himself in careful craftsmanship but Leavis adds in this connection that the critical labour expected by him on his verse is not governed by intelligent thinking. Carlyle, while recognizing the conscious exertion on the parts of Shakespeare, believes that his works "grow up withal unconsciously, from the unknown deeps in him." But Walter Pater, an exponent of the aestheticism which
derives from the Romantic movement, regards poetry as a "conscious, artistic structure" in which intelligence operates. For Wilde, "all imaginative work is self-conscious and deliberate." The inescapable fact is that "good sense" and "judgment" the qualities which Wordsworth and Coleridge esteem and recommend for a poet are the legacy of eighteenth century neo-classicism, and that the conscious craftsmanship which most of the Romantics up to Wilde approve of in theory and follow in practice traces its pedigree to classicism. So Eliot's concern with craftsmanship is distinctly classical.

It is rather superfluous at this juncture to stress the obvious fact that the inspirational, unconscious and organic theories which Eliot has been seen to dwell on so far in a disguised fashion, are valuable contributions of the nineteenth century Romantic movement to literary criticism. The unconscious was posited as a condition in which the creative imagination functioned. Coleridge pronounced that "there is in genius itself an unconscious activity." For Shelley, poetry is not governed by the active powers of the mind and its birth is independent of the consciousness or will.
At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the Romantics like Coleridge and Wordsworth, Pater and Wilde, as we have seen earlier, admit the role of the conscious powers in the production of poetry. But no Romantic has stressed the importance of craftsmanship as well as the need for the poet to engage himself in technical problems as emphatically as Eliot. It is doubtful whether any romantic could have insisted on the critical labour of an artist as Eliot - the labour of sifting, combining, constructing, expunging, correcting, testing (SE, 30) - has. Eliot even goes to the extent of saying that if the poet concentrates on his task, on the technical side, matter and meaning will emerge from the unconscious mind. In other words, Eliot seems to declare that poetry is the result of the interaction of an inner 'romanticism' with an outer 'classicism'. Further, his 'unconscious' theory is an appendage, a corollary, to his impersonality doctrine giving us the impression that it has no existence by itself in his critical corpus and that it is not propounded for its own sake. On the other hand the Romantics believe that poetry in its very essence is 'unconscious' as it springs from inspiration and that in fact, the more unconscious it is, the better it will be.
While the Romantics attach primary importance to the unconscious nature of poetry, Eliot allots to it a subsidiary part. As for Eliot's organic theory, though Steinman tries to insist on the dissimilarities between his and Coleridge's simply on the score of the different metaphors employed by them — one, vegetable imagery and the other, more personal image of terrors and desires — it is identical with Coleridge's concept in spirit. Incidentally, the point to be stressed here is that the impersonality which the poet achieves on account of the unconscious poetic process [which, we have seen, is linked with the aesthetic mode p. 86] is "romantic" impersonality, as it comes from within, and that it differs from "classical" impersonality which is obtained by adherence to something external, tradition or rules or conventions of the society. For instance, when Eliot declares that a poet progresses by continual extinction of personality by surrendering to tradition (SW, 53), this deliberate process invests him with 'classical' impersonality. Likewise the impersonality achieved by a poet by consciously incorporating accepted beliefs as Dante and Lucretius did (SW, 161-163), is 'classical' impersonality. Similarly a poet obtains 'classical' impersonality by means of (conscious) imitation as defined in his essay.
Eliot's concern with impersonality is a reaction against what he considered nineteenth century preoccupation with personality. While he has repudiated personality in a number of his essays, he has recognized its value in many essays, perhaps bewitched by "the ghost of Coleridge" that beckons to him "from the shadows" (UPUC, 156). In fact, he seems to be equally concerned with personality. As Mowbray Allan rightly observes, Eliot's conception of the role of personality both in the creation and criticism of poetry reveals the continuity of his critical thought with that of the Romantics as well as his determination to combat it.

In "Tradition and the Individual Talent" where Eliot insists on the poet escaping from his personality, he stipulates a proviso: "Only those who have personality and emotions know what it means to escape from these things" (SW, 58). He thus postulates that the precondition to slough off personality is the possession of it. This idea is reinforced by his statement that great literature is "a personal work of art" issuing from "the transformation of personality." Marlowe's and Jonson's comedies
were a view of life; they were as great literature is, the transformation of a personality into a personal work of art, their life-time's work long and short" (SE, 217). The just inference is that no transformation is possible without personality. Eliot, even in the early phase of his career, acknowledges the need for a writer to have a personal point of view. The notion of the 'point of view' as posited by Eliot in his Clark Lectures, implies the transference 'of the locus of reality from the external world to the perceiving mind.' Writing from a point of view, Eliot seems to suggest is "psychological, individualist." The full appreciation of a work, he feels, is rendered possible only by the grasp of the author's point of view. According to him, the discussion of Jonson's theory and practice becomes vapid and futile without seizing his point of view (SW, 117).

Eliot even in the days of his 'hectic campaign' against Romanticism, did not exclude personality altogether from the poetic ambience. He has no objection to the involvement of personality in poetry, but he qualifies it. "No artist," he says, "produces great art by a deliberate attempt to express his personality." An artist, he adds, "expresses his personality indirectly through concentration upon a task" (SE, 114).
The year 1924 witnesses a further shift in his position. In the preface to Le Serpent by Paul Valéry, he declares that the greatest art "is impersonal in the sense that personal emotion, personal experience, is extended and completed in something impersonal, not in the sense of something divorced from personal experience and passion". Eliot concedes that the greatest art is not divested of personal experiences and passion. In other words, it contains a modicum of the poet's personality. In "Yeats", he retreats rather apologetically from the extreme stand he took in "Tradition and the Individual Talent", in respect of impersonality and presents a modified version which accommodates personality. He speaks of a mature form of impersonality which is "of the poet, who, out of intense and personal experience, is able to express a general truth, retaining all the particularity of his experience to make of it a general symbol" (OPP, 255). The key phrase in the sentence is "all the particularity of experience".

Soon Eliot is seen moving towards the position of accepting 'personality' without reserve. Here he does not speak of any deliberate attempt on the part of the author to metamorphose his personal experience into
something impersonal or to imbue it with a universal significance. His only business, he seems to affirm, is merely to convey his unique personal experience, to express himself. Eliot's "Critical Note" prefaced to the Collected Poems of Harold Monro insists upon the poet expressing "the spirit of one man" and his "personal vision". Again, in "The Music of Poetry," Eliot asserts (as mentioned earlier during the discussion of the symbolic imagination in p. 76 in this chapter) that the peculiar personal experience which an author writes will be construed by the reader not as his autobiographical account but as "the expression of a general situation as well as some private experience of his own". He, thus defends a writer's direct and deliberate expression of his personality. It is not an obiter dictum; that in fact, he remains anchored in this position of maintaining the author's right to self-expression is perceived in his observation in "Virgil and the Christian World" (1951): "A poet may believe that he is expressing only his private experience, his lines may be for him only a means of talking about himself ... yet for his readers what he has written may come to be the expression both of their own secret feelings and of the exultation or despair of a generation" (OPP, 122-23).
Thus for Eliot, a poet may write about himself but will be acclaimed as the representative of his time. He seems to support the Coleridgean principle of "involution of the universal in the individual." A similar idea is echoed by Wilde when he says, "The more objective a creation appears to be, the more subjective it really is." K.N. Cameron remarks that Shelley's self-analysis in Epipsychidion "as in Wordsworth's The Prelude is based on the feeling that the analysis of one mind would reveal truth about men in general." The above passages show Eliot's belief in the Romantic tenet that if a writer delves deep into his self, he will come upon the universal self. Therefore, the poetry that emerges from the depth of the poet's mind will be invested with universal validity and significance.

Eliot applies this criterion to his estimates of individual writers. Of Ezra Pound's "Hugh Selwyn Mauberly," he remarks, "It is composed of the experience of a certain man in a certain place at a certain time; and it is also a document of an epoch." The Revenger's Tragedy "is a document on humanity, chiefly because it is a document on one human being, Tourneur." (SE, 190).
While Eliot is slow to acknowledge 'personality' in his general theoretical criticism, his 'practical' criticism reveals his interest even at an early date in personality. His critical comments on individual writers testify to his recognition of the importance of personality in an artistic work. Pound's 'Lustral', Eliot comments, "is fine poetry, it is more personal than 'Cathay'." He seems to attribute the fineness of poetry to the personal quality of the author inhering in it. Coleridge's "Dejection: an Ode" receives his warm appreciation on account of its passionate self-revelation which elevates the poem almost to the height of great poetry (UPUC, 67). According to him, the best of Arnold's poetry registers honestly the poet's "genuinely feelings of unrest, loneliness and dissatisfaction" (UPUC, 106). Eliot extols Harry Crosby for attempting to carve an identity for himself by searching for "personal symbolism of imagery" and by evolving "a particular way of apprehending life." He sets little store by Yeats's earlier volumes, but their redeeming feature, according to him, is that they contain a line or two in which he finds "that sense of a unique personality which makes one sit up in excitement and eagerness to learn more about mind..."
and feelings" (OPP, 255). Eliot owns that it is the
author's personality in his work, that stimulates his
interest. Dr. Johnson's generalizations in 'London'
Eliot complains, are flat. But "what keeps the poem
alive is the undercurrent of personal feeling, the
bitterness of hardships, slights, injuries and pri-
vations, really experienced by Johnson in his youth"
(OPP, 179). Eliot who claims to be classical, dis-
misses Johnson's generalizations as untrue but is
pleased with his expression of personal feeling. For
him, the outstanding merit of Herrick is that his poems
give the impression of "a unifying personality." We
understand his personality, he proceeds to observe,
"By reading all of his poems, and for having read all
of his poems, we enjoy still better the ones we like
best" (OPP, 47). Eliot means explicitly here that a
knowledge of the author's personal life contribu-
tes to a greater enjoyment of his work. He eulogises
Shakespeare as the supreme writer, because all his works
in his estimation, are "united by one significant, con-
sistent and developing personality" (SE, 203). This
statement purports that for Eliot, Shakespeare's su-
periority has a great deal to do with the vitalising
power of his personality which binds his plays together.
He seems to hint here that the personality of the poet has a unifying power that can hold his work together, investing it with a unique form. Marston's *Malcontent* rises higher in his estimate than his other plays, because in it, "Marston does something that no one else does at all: there is a distinct Marston tone" (SE, 227). The play, then, owes its superiority to the distinct individuality of the dramatist.

It can, therefore, be inferred that Eliot requires a writer to stamp his personality on his work, firstly because for him it makes the work vibrant with life; secondly because it heightens the artistic merit; thirdly because it holds the reader's interest and conduces to greater enjoyment, and lastly because a great work of art cannot be produced without the energising force of personality or individuality.

Eliot seems to be so captivated by 'personality' that he allows a playwright to express his personality even in dramatic poetry which he terms the third voice of poetry and which is expected to be objective. A dramatist can put into a character "some traits of his own, some strength or weakness, some tendency to violence or
indecision, some eccentricity even, that he has found in himself." He could make some characters speak for him as he did in his "Rock" (OPP, 91).

Eliot's unequivocal acceptance of personality is reflected furthermore in his deploring the absence of personality or individuality in certain works and writers. He recognizes individuality in a writer: "A poet is also individually different from other people and from other poets" (OPP, 20). The task of the poet differs according to his personal constitution" (OPP, 35). In "Religion and Literature", he expresses his dissatisfaction at the absence of individuality in modern novelists. "When the contemporary novelist is an individual," observes Eliot, "thinking for himself in isolation, he may have something important to offer. He who is alone may speak to the individual. But the majority of the novelists are persons drifting only a little faster" (SE, 393). In "Blake", he blames the English general education for promoting impersonal ideas and thereby maiming the individuality of a writer who receives it. For him Tennyson is a case in point, for he has allowed his individuality to be oblitered by the "parasitic opinion" he obtained through general education. The tragedy of the education, he
complains, is that it transmits a mass of impersonal ideas which "obscure what we really are and feel, what we really want and what really excites our interest" (SW, 154). He diagnoses the deficiency of Massinger as the lack of a personality to "create a great farce" (SE, 220). Heywood is labelled a mediocre playwright, because he is not endowed with a distinct personality or sensibility. "The sensibility is merely that of ordinary people in ordinary life" (SE, 175). He dismisses Ford's most famous play as meaningless on the ground that the characters in it are anaemic because of their failure to derive sustenance from the inner resources of the dramatist (SE, 196). "Ford's poetry, as well as Beaumont and Fletcher's," observes Eliot, "is of the surface; that is to say, it is the result of the stock expressions of feeling accumulated by the greater men" (SE, 204). Eliot condemns the Georgian poets for their being "impersonal" and for possessing a vision which "belongs to the sensibility of the ordinary sensitive person, not primarily only to that of the sensitive poet." It is "not always easy to distinguish the work of one author from the work of another." 116
Personality and originality are but two different editions of the same text. Novelty can be subsumed under their aegis. Byron comes in for praise on account of his novelty. "I have come to find in him," Eliot says, "certain qualities, besides his abundance, that are too uncommon in English poetry ..." (OPP, 206). 'Uncommon' is the term to be stressed due to its connotation of individuality. According to him, the success of "Don Juan" comes from Byron's never failing invention; and the shipwreck in the poem has an aura of novelty about it (OPP, 204). Eliot estimates Goldsmith's The Deserted Village as a better poem than any poem by Gray or Johnson, because he regards it as more original and prophetic (OPP, 181). It may be noticed that Eliot esteems originality and prophetic character which are romantic traits. Classicism favours what oft was thought but was never so well expressed but shudders at originality. Massinger's failure to produce 'living' characters, is ascribed to his docile acceptance of tradition and his inability to bring his personal experience to bear on them. "He inherits," Eliot argues, "the traditions of conduct, female chastity, hymeneal sanctity, the fashion of honour, without either criticizing or informing them from his own experience" (SE, 212-13).
Eliot's demand for originality is concerned with matter as well as with language. He stands for technical innovation: "Forms have to be broken and remade; but I believe that any language, imposes its laws and restrictions and permits its own licence. ... He in turn has the privilege of contributing to the development and maintaining the quality, the capacity of the language to express a wide range, and subtle gradation of feeling and emotion ..." (OPP, 37-38). Ford's "distinct personal rhythm" in blank verse, Eliot assures us, will confer on him immortality (SE, 199). He applauds Milton and Dryden for their strong individual idiom while he is dissatisfied with Byron for his lapse at the linguistic level, for his failure to experiment with sounds and meanings of individual words (OPP, 200-201). Incidentally it may be pointed out that classicism does not approve of experimentation which Eliot has favoured in theory and followed in practice. All these remarks carry the import that Eliot feels convinced that a creative work tends to be insipid without the galvanizing power of the personality or the individuality of its author. Eliot does not object to novelty or originality but to "their glorification for their own sake" (ASC, 23), or to their being pushed to extremity.
Eliot's tradition itself is a matter of a personal choice of his own. He defines tradition by quoting a statement from Remy de Gourmont: "Eriger en lois ses impressions personnelles, c'est le grand effort d'un homme s'il est sincère" (SW, 1). The passage is translated by Van Wyck Brooks as: "To erect into law one's personal impressions, this is the great effort of a man if he is sincere." Having thus obtained the sanction from Remy de Gourmont, Eliot has formed his own tradition out of his personal impressions and preferences to suit his purpose. His tradition is selective and exclusive which leaves out the poets whom he does not like. It includes Donne who cannot be considered a classicist by any stretch of imagination, and the French Symbolists who carried the Romantic tradition to its culmination.

Eliot's predilection for novelty and individuality impinges on his concept of tradition. As D.E.S. Maxwell points out, Eliot's notion of tradition is different from that of the eighteenth century; for Augustan poets, at least in theory, tradition was rather immutable and complete in all ways, but for Eliot it is being continuously expanded. With him, tradition is not a blind or timid adherence to the success of the previous generation.
He recognises changes as an essential condition to the vitality of tradition. When he speaks of the relation between the writer and the tradition, he says, "The existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the introduction of the new (the really new) work of art among them. The existing order is complete before the new work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly altered" (SW, 50). The words that are to be underscored are "new", "really new" and "novelty". Undoubtedly he maintains that newness is the hallmark of a work of art: "...it would not be new and would therefore not be a work of art" (SW, 50). A writer, for Eliot, should possess individuality so that he can make his own contribution to the tradition in order to develop and enrich it. Here his classicism is in league with Romanticism.

Eliot hints that change and novelty go hand in hand. He has the conviction that "a living literature is always in the process of change" (TCCW, 57). He holds that change is an inevitable condition not only in the course of literature but also in the life of an individual.
This is reminiscent of Carlyle's statement that change is the very essence of our life in this world. Incidentally it may be noted that classicism frowns upon the idea of change and invariably prefers stability or repose. Eliot himself associates classicism with "a state of equilibrium" and classical moment with "a moment of stasis." Only a poet, Eliot affirms, who is aware of the changes in the society in every decade, can present something new by capturing the zeitgeist. Eliot expects the poet to be in advance of his time in respect of the poetic material. "There should always be a small vanguard of people, appreciative of poetry, who are independent and somewhat in advance of their time or ready to assimilate novelty more quickly" (OPP, 21). A real poet, in Eliot's reckoning, purveys for such an elite and his business is to deal in novelty. Then Eliot's emphasis on the flux (change) instead of fixity, and on the author's need to cultivate individuality and personality in order to imbue his work with a genuine artistic quality, put him almost in the Romantic 'camp'.

Just as Eliot in the beginning of his career urged zealously a creative artist to refrain from projecting his personality into his work, he exhorted the critic to
evaluate a work of art objectively without allowing his judgment to be deflected by extraneous considerations. He insisted that the critic should rivet his attention only on the poem and that he should keep away from his focus the biography of the poet, his psychological state at the time of his composition and the social milieu in which he lived and other extrinsic data. This plea of Eliot arises from his concern for the integrity of art. Criticism, Eliot said, should not be vitiated by the personal proclivities and crotchets of the critic; nor should he dig into an artistic work for the autobiographical details of the author. Eliot himself has deviated from the norm which he formulated.

Eliot assures us that our total comprehension of Wordsworth's "Resolution and Independence" rests on our appreciation of "the purposes and social passions which animated its author" (UPUC, 73). Wordsworth's inability to appreciate Pope is the concomitant of his failure to understand such peripheral subjects as are necessary to form the correct estimate of a writer. All human affairs, he affirms, are so closely inter-related that if we are to understand the poetry of a period, we must have an idea of them, though they do not seem to be relevant at
first sight (UPUC, 76). When Arnold insists on judging Wordsworth's eminence as a poet, purely on the basis of the text of his poems without having recourse to his personal opinions, his theory of diction and nature philosophy, Eliot disagrees with him by raising the question: "If we dismiss Wordsworth's interests and beliefs, just how much, I wonder, remains?" (UPUC, 87-88). He holds that the knowledge of Wordsworth's beliefs and interests is essential not only to our understanding of his poetry but to the estimate of Wordsworth's greatness as a poet. In the case of Milton too, the yardstick forged on the anvil of pure poetry will falter in the evaluation of his poetic worth, and personal elements are bound to enter into the critical calculation. It is difficult, he remarks, to consider Milton's poetry simply as poetry without our theological and political dispositions making an entry (OPP, 76). He brings a similar 'personal' formula to bear on the assessment of Byron. It is difficult," he asserts, "in considering Byron's poetry not to be drawn into an analysis of the man" (OPP, 205). He commends "Don Juan", because he perceives in it a truer portrait of Byron than in his earlier work. He identifies the innocence of Don Juan with the "passivity of Byron" and establishes the resemblance of the lover of Donna Julia
and of Haidee, with Byron. He conjectures that only a personal experience could have helped Byron to depict particular scenes with success. Byron's experience with the Countess of Oxford, he suggests, would have stood him in good stead in the delineation of the scene concerning the introduction of the lover of Julia to Catherine the Great (OPP, 203-4). Here he is interested in what Wellek calls "anecdotal personality". Again his curiosity for the "anecdotal personality" shows up when he attempts to speculate upon the "personal experience" around which, he is sure, Vita Nuova was written (SE, 273).

Eliot's instinct for ferreting out personality from an artistic work manifests itself in his verdict on the Elizabethan dramatists: "... in all these dramatists there is the essential as well as the superfices of poetry; they give them the pattern or we may say the undertone, of the personal emotion, the personal drama and struggle, which no biography however full and intimate, could give us but our experience of the plays themselves" (SE, 203). His observations on Byron and the Elizabethan dramatists unmistakably signify that the critic, according to Eliot, should look for personality in an artistic work. He confesses that a critic who is interested in
nothing but literature will have nothing to say to us as his literature will be a pure abstraction (OPP, 116).

To sum up, Eliot believes that the criticism that does not take into consideration the biographical and sociological details relating to the poet and his personal beliefs and interests, is incomplete, if not otiose.

Eliot's concern with personality can therefore be regarded a continuation of the Romantic tradition. Interest in personality is a literary phenomenon that arose in the Romantic age. As Abrams observes, "... the widespread use of literature as an index - as the most reliable index - to personality was a product of the characteristic aesthetic orientation of the early nineteenth century." The fact that the Romantics looked upon literature as a revelation of personality is corroborated by the remark of Carlyle. Carlyle esteems Shakespeare's works, because they record his biography. The neo-classical age regarded the poet as one who was a spokesman of the society or one whose function was to make an artefact according to the accepted standards, and this notion scarcely gave room for the theoretical intrusion of the author's personality. Even Johnson's Lives does not evince a 'romantic' interest in personality,
for he does not explore the works to discover the personality, nor does he use the incidents that occurred in the author's life to interpret certain details in the works. His criticism of works does not establish a significant correlation between them and the author that produced them. The biographical portions merely reflect Johnson's humanistic interest. The contrastive approaches belonging to two schools can be highlighted by juxtaposing Johnson's Lives with Patrick Murdoch's "Account of the Life and Writings of James thomson" which promulgates the manifestation of a new trend in the history of hermeneutics:

"It is commonly said that the life of a good writer is best read in his works; which can scarce fail to receive a peculiar tincture from his temper, manners, and habits; the distinguishing character of his mind, his ruling passion, at least, will there appear undisguised .... As for [Thomson's] more distinguishing qualities of mind and heart, they are better represented in his writings than they can be by the pen of any biographer."130 The second part of the last sentence in this passage sounds very much like Eliot's biographical reading of the Elizabethan dramatists. Eliot, then in his appreciation of the personality pattern emerging from a work of art, follows the nineteenth century. So this concern with what Allen
Austin describes "the aesthetic value of personal expression" is a legacy handed down by Romanticism. Both Rene Wellek and Allen Austin seem to suggest that it is a preoccupation peculiar to Eliot - a feature that distinguishes him from the Romantics - and that Eliot keeps aloof from "the anecdotal personality." But it has been already noticed that Eliot is interested in "the aesthetic value of the personal expression" as well as in "anecdotal personality" as borne out by his biographical reading of Byron and Coleridge's "Dejection: an Ode". But he does not hold the more popular Romantic view that a work of art invariably betrays its author.

Personality has two circuits in relation to the critic and both of them, Eliot thought in the initial stage of his career, would short-circuit criticism. One is the critic's attempt to read the personality of the author in his work or to interpret the work in the light of the beliefs and interests of the poet; and the other is a purely personal approach of the critic to an artistic work. Eliot pleaded for objectivity in criticism as a part of his 'classical' campaign. Criticism, he maintained, was a disinterested exercise of intelligence (SW, 12).
The critic "must not coerce, he must not make judgments of worse and better. He must simply elucidate..." (SW, 11). He should possess a "sense of fact" (SE, 31) and interpretation should be avoided as it deverts the critic from his purpose (SW, 96). But a distinct shift in his position is discernible in The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism. Eliot insists on a critic being personal in his assessment of an artistic work. A critic, he agrees, will be ineluctably governed by his taste, his prejudices and his predilections in his judgment. A glance at the following statements of Eliot reveals how he lays emphasis on the need for a critic to have personality and to make a personal approach:

1. "One's taste in poetry cannot be isolated from one's other interests and passions" (UPUC, 36).
2. "...Our individual taste in poetry bears the indelible traces of our individual lives with all their experience, pleasurable and painful" (UPUC, 141).
3. "No one of us when he thinks about poetry is without his own bias" (UPUC, 149).
4. "It is not worthwhile to have a discussion of poetry with a man whose taste is not coloured by his personality" (UPUC, 35-36).
5. "... the question, 'what is poetry?' issues from our experience" (UPUC, 19).

That Eliot has not resiled from this position later is confirmed by his remark in "To Criticize the Critic": "... in discussing the subject of literary criticism... we cannot escape personal bias" (TCCW, 25). Eliot acknowledges candidly that any theorizing about poetry is purely from a personal point of view and that approach to poetry is a personal matter. Good criticism, he pontificates, must be enlivened and enriched with personality.

His own criticism in his early days of revolution as elucidated in the first chapter was tinted by his biases and prejudices and governed by his personal requirements. He seems to settle the issue with the pronouncement that "... a good deal of the value of an interpretation is... that it should be mine own interpretation" (OPB, 114). It means that the most satisfactory interpretation is our own interpretation. Thus for Eliot criticism has discarded objectivity and assumed the mantle of 'personality'. It may not be stretching too far, if Eliot is subjected to the strictures of Arnold's 'personal fallacy' and concomitant impressionism. The definition of
'affective fallacy' by Wimsatt, Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley, which is followed after a few pages by their brief discussion refuting Eliot's thesis that Hamlet's emotion is inexpressible, seems to suggest that Eliot is guilty of 'affective fallacy' and thereby impressionism. His impressionistic disposition comes to the fore again in his critical examination of Kipling (OPP, 228-251), which violates his objective canons. Ruth C. Child points out the sentimentally biased nature of Eliot's criticism as revealed in his unjust comparison between Tennyson and the Metaphysicals aimed at boosting the image of the latter: "In various essays he dragged in illustrations gratuitously, choosing some of Tennyson's poorest lines, for instance, and holding them up quite irrelevantly for comparison with the Metaphysical best." The corollary is that Eliot believes "poetry can be isolated in short passages, fragments and single lines," and, of course, numerous examples can be adduced from his criticism, in support of this belief. John Bayley observes that it is the normal nineteenth century view which Eliot has accepted without question. One more point relating to the issue discussed here is that Eliot urges a literary critic "to help his readers to understand and enjoy", poetry (OPP, 116). The term 'enjoy' implies appreciation, which has a romantic savour.
The problem of poetry and belief is an aspect of Eliot's personal-impersonal theory, over which he has expended considerable critical speculation. Eliot observes that "the reader can obtain full literary or ... 'aesthetic' enjoyment without sharing the beliefs of the author" (SE, 269). He is quite aware of the difficulties inhering in his own thesis and he does not even hesitate to confess that all his endeavours to discover a satisfactory solution to this problem have led him into a cul-de-sac. "The relation whether a poem has more to give us if we share the beliefs of its author, is one which has never been answered satisfactorily: the present writer has made some attempt to the solution of the problem and remains dissatisfied with his attempts."

Though he remains for sometime indecisive, he finally arrives at the conclusion that makes room for 'personal' intrusion. The reader can enjoy an artistic work more, he asserts, if he shares the belief of the author, but there is a distinct pleasure in the perusal of poetry whose philosophy has no appeal at all to him. In the same breath, he affirms, "I cannot, in practice, wholly separate my poetic appreciation from my personal beliefs" (SE, 271). He cannot bring himself to be in rapport with Tennyson and Arnold on account of their views of life and in truth he might have estimated them as
greater poets, if "they had held a different view of life" (OPP, 210). Poetic appreciation, he opines, cannot be isolated from one's personal beliefs and passions. It is crippled or enhanced as he finds the views and the philosophy embodied in an artistic work repulsive or agreeable. Personal element, Eliot concludes, always counts a great deal in the enjoyment or criticism of poetry. Pure "literary appreciation is an abstraction," he avers, "and pure poetry a phantom; and that both in creation and enjoyment much always enters which is, from the point of view of 'art' irrelevant" (SE, 271).

It is clear that Eliot favours the expression of personality in an artistic work, and subjectivity in criticism. But he need not be accused of equivocation or tergiversation. But in fairness to him, it may be contended that like the Romantics, he follows the paradigm of the 'aesthetic' mode and the 'personal' mode and this explains his concern with impersonality (as a result of the 'unconscious') and personality. His 'subjective' and 'objective' bear a close affinity with Romantic polysemy of which these two are components. For instance, Eliot's observation that "the world of a great poetic dramatist is a world in which
the creator is everywhere hidden" (OPP, 102), can be said to have descended from Coleridge's view that

"Shakespeare is the Spinozistic deity - an omnipresent creativeness.... Shakespeare's poetry is characterless, it does not reflect the individual Shakespeare." 140

Eliot's approval of indirect expression of personality (SE, 114) is a variant of the Romantic concept that poetry is an indirect and disguised expression of an author's temperament. 141 Allen Austin's remark that "the pattern of the characters' actions reveals the personality of the man" is relevant to the issue of indirect expression of personality. 142 But one perceptible difference in Eliot with regard to the personality issue is that his emphasis falls on the concentration of the task on the part of the poet, which for him, conduces to the indirect expression of personality. But even this insistence which figures largely in the earlier works has yielded place later to his acceptance of the direct expression of personality as noticed above in this chapter. Another distinction that can be noticed in his early phase, is his approval of 'personality' on the condition that it should be directed and governed by tradition and orthodoxy.
The issue of personality is bound up with emotion and feeling. It may not be far from truth to say that emotion is a segment of personality. Eliot asserts that poetry has primarily to do with the expression of feeling and emotion and that it is the vehicle of feeling and emotion (OPP, 6). In "Tradition and the Individual Talent", he says that the two elements that enter poetry are feelings and emotions. He does not maintain any distinction between them. But C.K. Stead has tried to point out, taking into consideration a few essays, how Eliot has consistently used them in opposition in the sense that feelings are associated with the 'unconscious' and are hence impersonal while emotions belong to the conscious mind and hence personal. But when Eliot speaks of "feelings inhering for the writer in particular words or phrases or images", we have to assume that he means something personal and peculiar to the writer, and not impersonal as suggested by Stead. Therefore Charles Moorman's assertion that feelings inherent in words and images are of public and general nature is also erroneous. In his Paris interview, Eliot affirms that the words he employed in his poetry were fused with his personal feelings: "I got my feeling into words for myself. I now have the equivalent in words for that
much of what I have felt." Incidentally it may be noted that J. Isaacs declares that poetry that exploits emotions underlying words is Romantic poetry.

Even in the days when Eliot was assuming a bellicose 'classical' posture, he did not advise an aspiring poet to totally suppress his emotion. In "Tradition and the Individual Talent", Eliot accepts personal emotion as a basic unit in poetry, but he insists that the poet must escape from it. Again his penchant for personal emotion manifests itself in his observation that feeling and emotion are particular but thought is general (OPP, 19). They are particular in the sense that they are personal. In "Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca", he affirms, "What every poet starts from is his own emotions" (SE, 137). Undoubtedly Eliot feels intensely the value and power of personal emotions in poetry. But he urges the poet to objectify them. The point one is tempted to make here is that personal emotions may be so strong and profound that some will remain recalcitrant to transmutation into the impersonal and thereby will expose a facet of his personality. Eliot does not broach this issue at all, for he presumably assumed that all personal emotions could be totally impersonalised. He adduces the instances of
Dante and Shakespeare to illustrate his point of view (SE, 137). Here is Eliot's biographical reading of Shakespeare and Dante, for which C.S.Lewis charges him with the "personal heresy".

Eliot recommends the objectification of personal emotions by means of objective corollaries. He investigates Hamlet, applying his doctrine of objective correlative to it. In the process, he seems to expose himself to the charge of genetic fallacy as well as the personal heresy. He appears to represent the emotional problem of Hamlet as that of Shakespeare himself. "And the supposed identity of Hamlet with his author is genuine to this point: that Hamlet's bafflement at the absence of objective equivalent to his feelings is a prolongation of the bafflement of his creator in the face of his artistic problem" (SW, 101). He seems to suggest that more "facts in his biography" (SW, 102) can throw light on the psychological predicament of Shakespeare, which in its turn can shed light on Hamlet's predicament. What is more important is the view lurking beneath his discussion of Hamlet that the emotions of a character are more or less identical with the emotions of its creator. Does it not mean that a character reveals the personal
emotion of the author? As J. Hillis Miller observes, the objective correlative is not really so objective.\textsuperscript{149}

One more thing to be noticed is that the objective correlative which Eliot is supposed to have invented, is conclusively proved by John J. Duffy to be a theory that had its birth in Coleridge and that had been nourished by Washington Allston, Emerson and James Marsh in the nineteenth century New England. Duffy clinches the matter with the asseveration: "Clearly, then, despite T.S.Eliot's claim of authorship to the 'objective correlative,' a claim still being made as late as 1947, it was a Romantic commonplace in the vocabulary of artists, intellectuals, and students of New England in the 1830's."\textsuperscript{150} Donald Davie endorses H.M.McLuhan's view that "The Solitary Reaper" is "the poetry of 'objective correlative', which presents "a symbolic landscape or action which may stand as its equivalent."\textsuperscript{151} Wordsworth's "Solitary Reaper" is given as an example.

Allen Austin asserts, "the concept is central to Romantic theory, being expressed at one time or another by almost every Romantic poet and critic", but there had been no term to designate it. The interpretation put on 'objective correlative' in the context of Eliot's text is the absence of adequate motivation, and this is of course a valid
interpretations. Shakespeare's failure, according to Eliot, Austin says, "is his inability to provide a situation capable of motivating an emotion which is convincing to the audience." Coleridge's criticism of Iago's "motiveless malignity" may be considered as the lack of an objective correlative for the malignity of the villain.

Coming back to the issue of personal emotions, we may find that Eliot soon sheds his mask of the objective correlative, relaxes his rigid posture of impersonality and even allows partial betrayal of personal feelings, as seen earlier in this chapter. He appreciates Pound's Ripostes of 1912, because he perceives "deeper personal feelings" which is not invariably so far found in the poems of most important technical accomplishment, and this marks a definite advance over his personas. Eliot seems to prize the expression of personal feelings more than the technical accomplishment. A poem, for Eliot, can be reckoned perfect only if there is a unity of personal feeling and "versification". A dramatic character too, if it is to be true to life, should not be constructed out of observations of human nature, but should issue from
within, composed "of the parts which are felt together" (SE, 212) [underlining is mine].

Then, a character comes from a unity of personal feelings, from below the levels of consciousness. Eliot shrugs off "Maud" because "the real feelings of Tennyson ... never arrive at expression" (SE, 333). Eliot agrees with the Romantics in the recognition of emotion and feeling as an important ingredient of poetry. Eighteenth century classicism is not interested in emotion as an integral component of poetry. Hume held the view that wit, poetry and passion were incompatible, and he can be looked upon as the representative of the neo-classical position. In fact the eighteenth century in the apotheosis of thought or the soul of poetry, nearly expelled feelings from its purview. James Torrens who is inclined to label Eliot as a classicist, concedes that Eliot's insistent concern for poetry as emotional formulation is unthinkable without the Romantic Revolt. Eliot's concern with feelings and emotions nominates him as a lineal descendant of the Romantics. But his objection is against "the general mess of imprecision of feeling, / Undisciplined squads of emotion" (FQ, 31) of which, according to Eliot, the Romantics were guilty.
But it may not be out of place to point out that neither Romantic poetry nor Romantic aesthetics in its entirety is always concerned with the excess of emotions. When Wordsworth says that poetry is the spontaneous overflow of emotions, he qualifies it with the proviso that it trace its origin from emotions recollected in tranquillity. "This implies," as Furst pertinently observes, "none of that wild passion conjured up by the term 'overflow', but rather a reflecting detachment on the part of the poet who expresses his feelings to some purpose. To Wordsworth poetry was in fact a more serious business than the self-indulgent outpouring of emotions.... Feeling was for Wordsworth a means whereby to convey to men's hearts that ultimate truth which is the real quest of his poetry." 

His grief over the death of Lucy as expressed in the poem "Lucy",

But she is in her grave, and, oh, the difference to me! (11. 11-12, WP, 86)

is restrained. He does not portray turbulent emotion in "Michael" or "Resolution and Independence" but only heroic endurance. Both Wordsworth and Coleridge recommend the use of metre in order to regulate emotions. Byron chafes at sentimentality and praises a distressed
she was not a sentimental mourner
Parading all her sensibility (Don Juan, XVI, 65 BP, 850)

In fact it is Eliot who deploys the terms, feeling and emotion more often than the Romantics. This fact, perhaps, has so nettled Vincent Buckley that he remarks, "The word 'emotion' plays a much greater and a more confusing part in Eliot's criticism than we realize it at first or second reading. It is in fact bafflingly ubiquitous in his prose; he seems to be obsessed with emotion." Eliot associates it with morals, meaning, image and the function of poetry.

As for the function of poetry, Eliot affirms that it is emotional and not intellectual (SE, 139). The poet, Eliot feels, can make his readers share consciously new feelings which they had not experienced before (OPP, 20). Without poets, men will lose the "ability not merely to express, but even to feel any but the crudest emotions" (OPP, 21). There is something in poetry, which "enlarges our consciousness or refines our sensibility." The enlarging of the consciousness, is then
through emotional effects. Wordsworth, more or less, anticipates Eliot with regard to the emotional impact of poetry which he couches in a language available to him at that time. He proclaims that the function of poetry is to enlighten the reader and to strengthen and purify his "affections." He holds that poetry must serve as a stimulus to right feelings and the right kind of awareness and that the poet widens the sphere of human sensibility. Then Eliot's views, as Hillis Miller points out, that "the origin of poetry is "emotion" and that "the meaning of a finished product is emotive too," are Eliot's version of the Romantic tenets.

Though Eliot scoffs rightly at the extravagance of emotions, he has not ignored the poetic potentialities of intense emotion. In "Tradition and the Individual Talent," Eliot tells us that the greatness of a creative work depends not on emotional intensity but on "the intensity of artistic process, the pressure, so to speak, under which the fusion takes place" (SW, 55), and this is an emphatic rejection of emotional intensity. Incidentally even here Eliot's resemblance with the Romantics is discernible. A work of art, as Coleridge puts it, will be rich in proportion to the variety of parts which it holds in unity. Coleridge is also of opinion that the rich-
ness of a work of art hinges on its intensity of fusion. Keats cherished the notion that it is intensity in art that makes all disagreeables evaporate.

However, Eliot asserts that the language of poetry "reaches intensity" at dramatic moments (Opp, 92). Here intensity may mean the force of emotions that the dramatic utterance to a glowing heat. Macbeth's "Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow" which is not beautiful poetry in itself rises to the great height of poetry on account of the emotional fervour with the dramatic context or moment invests it. It emphasises "the weariness of the weak man who had been forced by his wife to realize his own half-hearted desires and her ambitions, and who, with her death, is left without motive to continue" (Opp, 83). Poetry, he affirms, "intensifies the dramatic situation" (Opp, 83); for "it is helping to extract the utmost emotional intensity out of the situation" (Opp, 93). His preoccupation with emotional intensity is again brought out by his statement that the aim of Shakespeare was to express the emotional intensity of his time (SE, 137). When he insists on the artist intensifying the world to his emotions (Sw, 102) he perhaps means that the artist has to change the arid world with intense
emotions, in other words the world cannot supply him with such intense emotions as the artist is required to express, and for which he has to depend upon his inner resources.

Eliot's exploration of the emotional aspect of poetry is so penetrative that he cannot even conceive of an image attached to it. In "Tradition and the Individual Talent", he speaks of "an image" in the last quatrain of Canto XV of the Inferno with "a feeling attaching to an image" (SW, 55). In the matter of expecting an image to be charged with feeling, he differs little from Coleridge who refers to images modified by a predominant passion. Wordsworth too speaks of words as "symbols of the passion". In the Preface to The Cenci, Shelley says that there must be interpenetration of imagery and the passion in a dramatic composition. What he recommends for drama is equally valid for poetry.

Eliot's belief in emotion as the soul of poetry makes him relegates meaning to a subordinate place. It has been already noticed above in pp.94-95 that Eliot seems to ignore meaning as inconsequential to his concept of pure poetry, an aspect of his aesthetics modes. But here the focus is on examining how meaning which encompasses thought and experience is kept subordinate to, and sometimes in opposition to, emotion. Eliot's statement that the poem communicates itself and incidentally experience and thought that have gone into it (UPUC, 30) raises the
what is it the poem communicates if it is not meaning? Eliot does not answer directly. We have to make our inference from another statement of his: "If we are moved by a poem, it has meant something, perhaps something important to us; if we are not moved then it is as poetry meaningless" (OPP, 30). Here the emphasis falls on the power of poetry to move. Then what the poem communicates is something that moves us. Hence what it communicates must be emotion. The same idea is articulated even more explicitly in Eliot's assertion that "genuine poetry can communicate before it is understood" (SE, 238). Winters, irked by this statement, wonders whether Eliot here echoes Poe's romantic notion that a poet need not bother about the meaning. 167

Eliot, in a number of places, tries to disassociate poetry from meaning. He maintains that a piece of poetry containing many unknown words and unfamiliar structure of sentences communicated to him something immediate, vivid and unique. On the other hand, he could not understand a prose passage unless he became well acquainted with the meanings of the words in it as well as with the rules of the grammar and the syntax of the language (OPP, 23). A seasoned reader who has reached a state
of purity in his poetic appreciation "does not bother about understanding", and he cites himself as a case in point in respect of his appreciation of Shakespeare (UPUC, 151). What he implies is that he surrenders to the indefinable spell of poetry, which is independent of its meaning, but presumably dependent on its emotion. "A great deal in the way of meaning belongs to prose rather than to poetry" (UPUC, 152). Hence the poet need not try to inject meaning or ideas into his work. For Eliot, Dante and Shakespeare are obvious exemplars. His declaration that they did not: real thinking (SE, 136), suggests not merely the elimination of thought or meaning from poetry, but the antithesis between thought and emotion. This impression gets strengthened when we examine some of his remarks. "If Shakespeare had written according to a better philosophy," he proceeds to say, "he would have written worse poetry; it was his business to express the greatest emotional intensity of his time ..." (SE, 137). The implication is that if Shakespeare had consciously thought and embodied a better philosophy deliberately, it would have atrophied his emotion and this in turn would have impaired the quality of his poetry. Eliot, like the Romantics, seems to shudder at the deleterious effect of "meddling intellect" and of the touch of "cold philosophy." Eliot's partiality for feelings comes
out in his remark on the drama Massinger bequeathed to Dryden: "The intellect had perhaps exhausted the old conventions. It was not able to supply the impoverishment of feeling" (SE, 215). He perhaps means that intellect cannot be a substitute for feeling and in fact, is inferior to it. His affirmation that Henry had a mind so fine that no idea could violate it provoked Lionel Trilling to comment, "when he speaks of the mind being violated by an idea, Mr. Eliot, like the Romantics, is simply voicing his horror at the prospect of life being intellectualised out of all spontaneity and reality." Undoubtedly some of his statements are marked by anti-intellectualism. But they are a part of the "unconscious" aesthetic mode, an inheritance from the Romantic movement. So Eliot's objection to conscious thinking and to the deliberate supervision of meaning stems from his concern for the integrity or autonomy of poetry.

An extension of this proposition is also seen in Eliot - that meaning remains latent in the emotion or feeling itself. Here a note of caution must be added, that no contradiction arises when it is said that meaning or thought dwells in conjunction with emotion,
rather in a sort of symbiotic union. What has been expounded so far amounts to the thesis that meaning or thought cannot co-exist with emotion or feeling if it is deliberately or violently thrust into the work, for conscious intention will positively impoverish emotive quality of poetry. The point to be emphasized is that at the unconscious level, meaning which has its origin along with feeling or emotion lies encapsulated in it.

That such a proposition is entertained by Eliot is evidenced by his statement that "I would suggest that none of the plays of Shakespeare has a "meaning" although it would be equally false to say that a play of Shakespeare is meaningless" (SE, 135). We can safely assume that what Eliot means is that Shakespeare did not consciously impart a "meaning" to any of his plays, and in that sense "none of the plays of Shakespeare has a meaning." When Eliot affirms that a play of Shakespeare is not altogether meaningless, he means that the meaning possessed by a play comes from a deeper level, the unconscious level, and is in-built in emotion. Eliot's insistence that Dante and Shakespeare did not think but that they expressed the emotional intensity of their time, issues from his
belief that the emotional intensity invests their works with a profound meaning or thought which conscious thinking is incapable of giving. This notion accounts for Eliot's observation that the superiority of Shakespeare over Jonson is not due to his superior thought at the conscious level, but due to "his susceptibility to a greater range of emotion, and emotion deeper and more obscure" (SE, 158). Only this idea leads Eliot to make the pronouncement rather in a tone of disparagement, that the poet who 'thinks' is merely the poet who can express the emotional equivalent of thought (SE, 135). Finding an emotional equivalent to thought is a conscious process which Eliot rejects on the ground that it is repugnant to great poetry.

The poetic process enunciated in "Tradition and the Individual Talent" clearly denotes the birth of meaning in the unconscious mind. (We have seen it already). When Eliot speaks of the fusion of feelings, images, phrases and impressions that lie stored up in the mind of the poet (SW, 55) he implies that this fusion which is poetry contains meaning. Eliot's elucidation of the first voice of poetry in the "Three Voices of Poetry" gives
us further assurance that meaning coalesces with emotion or feeling below the levels of consciousness.

Eliot's tacit view that meaning incubated in the unconscious comes to the surface in union with emotion drives from Romanticism. Wordsworth's theory that poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings, suggests that meaning or thought comes along with the feelings. That meaning lies embedded in feeling, inheres in the 'unconscious' and 'organic' theories of the Romantic movement.

Thus Eliot shows his affinity with the Romantic tradition in his notion of poetry as a matter of emotions and feelings, in his insistence on the emotive quality of images, and in his view that meaning remains in-built in emotion. But the difference lies in Eliot's advocacy of restrained emotions, of "the structure of emotions" consistent with the form chosen (SW, 168-169), of the use of precise emotions" (SE, 135) and of "genuine and substantial human emotions, such emotions as observation can confirm" (SE, 41). He objects to "an internal incoherence of feelings, a concatenation of emotions which signifies
nothing" (SW, 135). Eliot's significant contribution to the aesthetics of emotion is the popularisation of the doctrine of 'objective correlative,' an invention of the Romantic age, as an instrument for objectifying personal emotion into art emotion. When Eliot insists on deliberate objectification of emotion or on the presentation of clear emotions, he evinces his 'classical' propensity. Hence Rene Wellek's remark that there is a conflict in Eliot's critical theory between the emotional concept of poetry, (which is a descendant of Romanticism) on the one hand, and the ideological superstructure of classicism on the other, is not untenable (the clause within brackets is mine).

So far the discussion has centred on the aesthetic mode and the 'personal' mode in all their ramifications, in which both Eliot and the Romantics are equally interested, and in the treatment of which they have several similarities as well as a few differences. A broader aspect of the personal mode is yet to be examined, that is the social function of poetry. Reference has been already made to the fact that both Eliot and a Romantic like Wordsworth claim that the aim of poetry is to improve the affective and cognitive dispositions of the readers.
They even concur in the mode which the poet has to adopt to heighten the awareness and to refine the sensibility of the readers. Eliot believes that a poet has some direct social utility (UPUC, 154). He claims: "[Poetry] may help to break up the conventional modes of perception and valuation which are perpetually forming, and make people see the world afresh, or some new part of it. It may make us from time to time a little more aware of the deeper, unnamed feelings which form the substratum of our being, to which we rarely penetrate; for our lives are mostly a constant evasion of ourselves, and an evasion of the visible and sensible world" (UPUC, 155). While speaking of the tasks allotted to himself and to Wordsworth in the joint-venture of the Lyrical Ballads, the business of Wordsworth, Coleridge says, is to awaken "the mind's attention from the lethargy of custom" and direct it to "the wonders of the world before us; an inexhaustible treasure, but for which, in consequence of the film of familiarity and selfish solicitude, we have eyes yet see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand." Shelley speaks of poetry "as purging from our inward sight the film of familiarity.
familiarity." "It compels us to feel that which we perceive, and to imagine that which we know."\(^{172}\) Eliot and the Romantics, therefore realize and aim that poetry should expand the frontiers of human consciousness by removing "the film of familiarity," by demolishing the conventional mode of perception, that benumbs sensibility. But Eliot does not let himself be swept off his feet by the exaggerated claims made on behalf of poetry by the Romantics in all their unbridled enthusiasm. He may not agree with Wordsworth's declaration that "Poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge; it is the impassioned expression which is the countenance of all science";\(^{173}\) nor will he support Shelley's idea that "poetry is indeed something divine" and that "it is at once the centre and circumference of knowledge."\(^{174}\) He is inclined to regard poetry as a "superior amusement" (SW, viii) or "a mug's game" (UPUC, 154) and this view would be spurned by the Romantics. However, it must be stressed that his concern with poetry is really serious and this accounts for his zealous, reformist approach to poetry.

Eliot and the Romantics have to choose such subjects as would enable them to achieve their object of sensitizing
the readers and sharpening their perception. Here their minds have to exercise themselves at two levels, higher and lower - one intellectual and the other pedestrian. At the lower plane, they believe that there is no such thing as an intrinsically poetic subject. Eliot's opinion that the essential advantage for a poet is not to have a beautiful world to deal with (UPUC, 106) or his insistence "on the contemplation of the horrid or sordid or disgusting, by an artist" (SW, 169) conforms to the spirit of Wordsworth's utterance that "the meanest flower that blows can give thoughts that lie too deep for tears ("Ode: Intimations of Immortality," 11. 206-7) or that he "will choose incidents and situations from common life" to be treated as subjects in his poems. His imagination seized on an Idiot Boy, Alice Fell and Marther Ray of 'The Thorn'. It has close affinity with Keats's theory that poetry lives in gusto, be its theme "foul or fair, high or low, rich or poor, mean or elevated, it has as much delight in conceiving Imogen as in creating Iago; and it does no harm from its relish of the dark side of things any more than from its tests for a bright one." For Keats, Thorpe observes, "objects in the world, actions, no matter how trivial or mean or ugly - become in
themselves apart from any moral relationships of interest and value as subjects for poetry. 

Oscar Wilde says, are the materials for art. Shelley goes one step further in depicting the ugly and the repulsive with his olfactory imagery which reeks of the charnel-house with its stench of decay and pestilence. In The Revolt of Islam he writes:

...the air did claim
All moisture, and a rotting vapour passed
From the unburied dead, invisible and fast.

Each well
Was choked with rotting corpses, and became
A cauldron of green mist.

(115-17; 181-83)

On the contrary, eighteenth century neo-classicism despised the low and mean, the horrible and the ugly in the name of decorum.

While at the pedestrian level, Eliot and the Romantics recognized the possibility of embodying any subject in poetry, they were at a more intellectual plane, concerned with the problem of poetry and philosophy. Eliot reckons the value of philosophy in poetry with certain qualifications. He knows
philosophy is the best material for the greatest poetry and that "the poet must be rated in the end by the philosophy he realized in poetry and by the fulness and adequacy of that realization." Keats understood the necessity on the part of the poet to equip himself with knowledge and philosophy. He writes to Taylor that his road as a poet "lies through application, study and thought," and that "I shall turn my soul to philosophy." Keats recognizes philosophy only as a means to prepare the intellect of the poet for its most significant adventures, and as an essential aid to great poetry. But Coleridge goes one step further and says that "no man was ever a great poet, without being at the same time a profound philosopher." 

The question that naturally engaged the attention of Eliot and the Romantics is the kind of language they have to employ in poetry while they adopt the personal mode, in other words, while they perform the social function. Both of them prefer the language of the common man, the qualification they prescribe being that common speech is only a raw material. In "The Music of Poetry", Eliot says, "it is the poet's business to use the speech which he finds about him, that with which he is
is most familiar.... Of course we do not want the poet merely to reproduce exactly the conversational idiom of himself, his family, his friends and his particular district, but what he finds there is the raw material out of which he must make his poetry" (OPP, 31-32).

This view accords broadly with Wordsworth's advocacy of the employment of the selection of the real language of men in poetic composition. Shelley too voices almost the same opinion with regard to the language that is used in poetry. In the Preface to The Cenci, he says, "... in order to move men to true sympathy, we must use the familiar language of men.... But it must be the real language of men in general..." Further, Wordsworth and Eliot seem to feel that poetry and prose should be brought close if the poet is to perform effectively his social function. Eliot's statement that good poetry should have the virtues of good prose is not alien in spirit to the less sophisticated but more controversial assertion of Wordsworth that neither there is nor can be any essential difference between the language of prose and that of metrical composition.
One can thus finally see that Eliot's interests coalesce with those of the Romantics and that his major critical statements derive from Romantic theories of the nineteenth century but with new dimensions added to them to meet the demands of the modern times, or modified by his acquired classical tendency.

NOTES


4. cf. The innovations of romantic writers "include many of the points of view and procedures" which manifest themselves "in the criticism of our own time, including some criticism which professes to be anti-romantic."


   cf. (b) Wellek's observation: "Paradoxically, modern professedly antiromantic criticism, while it has rejected much romantic poetry and some of the metaphysical claims advanced for poetry by romantic criticism, has nevertheless revived its basic tenets." [Rene Wellek, A History of Modern Criticism: 1750-1950: The Later Eighteenth Century (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), p. 4.]


8. Stephen Spender, The Struggle of the Modern, p. 34.


34. Terence Hawkes, ed., and arranged, *Coleridge on Shakespeare*, p. 66.


cf. "... the poet gives us the liveliest image of succession with the feeling of simultaneousness". (*Biographia Literaria*, II, 18).


34. Terence Hawkes, ed., and arranged, *Coleridge on Shakespeare*, p. 66.

cf. "... the poet gives us the liveliest image of succession with the feeling of simultaneousness." (*Biographia Literaria*, II, 18).


40. Biographia Literaria, II, 68.


45. cf. Hazlitt's observation in his lecture, "On Shakespeare and Milton:" 'The poet may be said, for the time, to identify himself with the character he wishes to represent...'. (Quoted by M.H. Abrams, in Mirror and the Lamp, p. 245.)

46. cf. Heike's observation in his lecture, "On Shakespeare and Milton:" 'The poet may be said, for the time, to identify himself with the character he wishes to represent...'. (Quoted by M.H. Abrams, in Mirror and the Lamp, p. 245.)

47. Keats writes in one of his letters: "As to the poetical character... it has no self.... he [a poet] has no identity - he is continually in for - and filling some other Body." (M.B. Forman, ed., The Letters of John Keats, pp. 226-227.)

47. Robert Barth, The Symbolic Imagination, p. 112.


   cf. Frank Kermode's description of a work of art in Romantic Image, p. 44. "The work of art itself is symbol ... 'concrete', yet fluid and suggestive; a means to truth, a truth unrelated to, and more exalted than, that of positivist science, or any observation depending upon the discursive reason; out of participation in a higher order of existence, because coextensive in matter and form, resistant to explication ..."


55. Ibid., p. 620.


58. cf. "... it is no less an essential mark of true genius that its sensibility is excited by any other cause more powerfully than by its own personal interests" (*Biographia*, I, 30).

58. It may be noticed that Wilbur Scott in his *Five Approaches to Literary Criticism* (New York: Collier Books, 1966), p. 179, points out that Coleridge observed that "a literary piece exists in its own way, with its own kind of life."


60. "Tennyson, decorated the morality he found in vogue .... As for the present time, the lack of curiosity in technical matters of the academic poets of today (Georgians et caetera) is only an indication of their lack of curiosity in moral matters." *The Lesson of Baudelaire*, "Tyro", 1922, quoted by C.K. Stead, *The New Poetic* [1964; rpt. Penguin, 1969], p. 133).


cf. ibid., p. 113: "Those in whom the poetical faculty, though great, is less intense, as Euripides, Lucan, Tasso, Spenser, have frequently affected a moral aim, and the effect of their poetry is diminished in exact proportion to the degree in which they compel us to advert to this purpose."
cf. Bradley's remark about Shelley: "... what he is really attacking is the attempt to give, in the strict sense, moral instruction, to communicate doctrines, to offer argumentative statements of opinion on right and wrong."  


cf. Eliot's remark: "... the theory of 'art for art's sake' is valid on the score that it exhorts the artist to stick to his job." (SE, 442).  


ibid., p. 17.  

Johnson, in his "Preface to Shakespeare," *English Critical Texts*, ed. D.J. Enright and Ernst De Chickera, p. 140, reproached Shakespeare for sacrificing virtue to convenience, for "being more careful to please than to instruct." He deplors that Shakespeare "seems to write without any moral purpose."  


When Wordsworth (W.J.B. Owen, ed., *Wordsworth's Literary Criticism*, p. 194), says that in the higher poetry, an enlightened critic looks for a reflection of the wisdom of the heart and the grandeur of the imagination, the implicit idea is that wisdom lies in-built in the imagination.


76. It may be noticed that J.A.K. Thomson points out how the modern tendency of evacuating meaning from poetry militates against Greek classicism: "A Greek had the feeling that a work of art ought to mean something... Consequently he would have repudiated as entirely false the doctrine which is in vogue today, that a work of literary art need not have any meaning at all."


Eighteenth century neo-classicism links poetry to idea or thought and it has never dreamt of the meaningless character of poetry. Eliot himself quotes Dryden as saying in his *Preface to Annus Mirabilis* that the poet's imagination must find out at first thought (UPUC, 28).


80. Cf. "Surprisingly most modern poets support the inspiration version of the poetic process, although they might not like the term." (René Wellek, *Discriminations*, p. 259.)

82. cf. Wordsworth also uses a similar language when he speaks of the sudden emergence of an image from his mind:

... at once
some lovely image in the song rose up
Full-formed, like Venus rising from the sea;

(The Prelude, IV, 112-114; WPL, 43.

83. Describing Jonson's poetry as the "poetry of surface", Eliot compares him with other Elizabethan dramatists, especially Shakespeare: "... Shakespeare and also Donne and Webster and Tourneur (and sometimes Middleton), have a depth, a third dimension ... which Jonson's work has not. Their words have often a network of tentacular roots reaching down to the deepest terrors and desires" (SE, 155). Eliot proceeds to hint that Shakespeare's superiority lies in "his susceptibility to ... emotion deeper and more obscure" (SE, 158). The phrase: "tentacular roots reaching down to the deepest terrors and desires and "emotion deeper and more obscure," unmistakably point to the 'unconscious'.


86. It is interesting to notice J. Isaacs's distinction between classical poetry and romantic poetry, which accords with Eliot's distinction between Kipling's verse on the one hand, and "poetry" on the other: The classical poet hopes at least to be in charge of what he is releasing. From the petrol pump of classical poetry you get measured out only the quantity you are paying for. Romantic poetry gives a perpetual bonus. ... That is why it is possible to find more 'meaning' in romantic poetry than the poet himself knows." [The Background of Modern Poetry, pp. 79-80] Isaacs is also of opinion that classical poetry like Kipling's verse, yields a particular meaning.


3) The separation of form and content is again stressed by Abrams. "According to the most fundamental neo-classic frame of reference, language is the dress, and figures are the ornaments of the language..." (M.H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp*, p. 290.)

88. "I mention Yeats at this point." Eliot says, "because of the contrast between his development ... and Kipling's development ..." (OPP, 236).


400. The classical position which rejects inspiration is represented by Pope who says in "An Essay on Criticism," English Critical Texts, ed. D.J. Enright and Ernst De Chickera, p. 120, that "true ease in writing comes from art and not chance" (1. 362) where "art" suggests careful painstaking craftsmanship and "chance", inspiration. On the other hand the Romantics relied on inspiration as the motive force of poetry. Blake, for instance, believed that his poems were dictated to him. (R.A. Scott-James, The Making of Literature, p. 211). Shelley describes the poets as "the hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration." (English Critical Essays, ed. E. Jones, p. 138). Herbert Read sums up tersely the attitudes of the classicists and romantics in his "The Nature of Criticism": "The attitude of the rationalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was essentially the same; the concept of inspiration was contrary to common sense and was generally condemned (in religion no less than in art) as a pernicious form of enthusiasm (italicized). It was only with the romantic revival that the concept was once more reinstated, and began to be seriously investigated.... One might say that the historical distinction between classicism and romanticism is determined by this concept. (Collected Essays in Literary Criticism [London: Faber and Faber, mcmli], p. 134.
Morse Peckham observes that the unconscious is a contribution made by nineteenth century movement and that it "continues today without the divine sanction as part of present day critical theory." [Shiv K. Kumar, ed. *British Romantic Poets: Recent Revaluation*, p. 11.]

It may be added that the post-symbolist concern with the unconscious must have been strengthened by the psychoanalysis.

102. *Biographia Literaria* II, 258.


105. cf. An auxiliar light
Came from my mind which on the setting sun
Bestowed new splendour.


"Whate'er the senses take or may refuse,
The mind's internal heaven shall shed her dews Of inspiration on the humblest lay."

O lady! we receive but what we give,
And in our life alone does nature live:

Coleridge, "Dejection: An Ode,"
47-48, ACS, 81.

"... the mind in creation is as a fading coal,
which some invisible influence, like an inconstant wind,
awakens to transitory brightness; this power arises from
within ..." (Shelley, "Defence of Poetry," English Critical

These passages demonstrate that the emphasis of Roman­
ticism is rather on the mind, the inner world, though it
has not ignored the outer world. Northrop Frye sums up
the effect of the revolution brought about by Rousseau:
"the basis of civilisation is now the creative power of
man, its model is the human vision revealed in arts ....
[This] model as well as the sources of creative power,
are now located in the mind's internal heaven, the external
world being seen as a mirror reflecting and making visible
what is within" (Stubborn Structure, pp. 206-207).

Raissa Maritain quotes "C.F. Fredrich, the painter and
poet of the first epoch of German Romanticism" as saying,
"The only true source of art is in our hearts, ... an
interior impulsion creates it, often without the artist's
knowing"[ The Situation of Poetry: Four Essays on the
Relations between Poetry, Mysticism, Magic and Knowledge
Jaque and Raissa Maritain (Philosophical Library: New
York, 1955), p. 20.]

106. Mowbray Allan, T.S. Eliot's Impersonal Theory
of Poetry, (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1974),
p. 15.

107. Eliot's Clark Lectures II: 23, quoted by Edward
Lobb in T.S. Eliot and the Romantic Critical Tradition,

by Mark Wardle, 1924, quoted by F.O. Matthiessen, The
Achievement of T.S. Eliot, p. 146.

110. Biographia Literaria II, 33, (f.n.).


112. K.N. Cameron, ed., Shelley: Selected Poetry and Prose, p. XI.


114. ibid., p. 80.


117. Eliot's tension between his assumed classical role and his inherited romantic tendencies may be noticed in his observation that "Originality" does not require the rejection of convention" (OPP, 182) which has a classical flavour about it. The personality, originality and novelty which are discussed here have a definite romantic ring about them. Elsewhere he defines convention as "some quite new selection or structure or distortion in subject matter or technique, ..." (SE, 112). 'New selection or structure implies that originality relating to this concept of convention, means something 'very much new'.
But his classical stance introduced cautiously as if it were on second thoughts the 'distortion' which means modification in order to temper the effect of the connotation of 'new'. It may be also noted that the elements of 'novelty' and the 'unconscious' appreciated by Eliot in respect of a Romantic poet like Byron, do not definitely fall within the purview of convention.

118.

C.K. Stead in The New Poetic claims that Eliot rejects "the prophetic strain, which also runs out of the great Romantics (particularly from Blake, Wordsworth and Shelley) and degenerates through the nineteenth century to touch nadir in poets like Alfred Austin ..." (p. 132). But Eliot has not altogether eschewed the prophetic strain in his poetry. He values the prophetic quality ans is not averse to clothing a poet in the vestiture of a prophet. While asserting that a poet "need not know what his poetry will come to mean to others", he equates him to a prophet who "need not understand the meaning of his prophetic utterance" (OPP, 123). His essay, "Thoughts after Lambeth" reveals a prophetic strain: "The world is trying the experiment of attempting to form a civilized but non-Christian mentality. The experiment will fail but we must be very patient in awaiting its collapse; meanwhile redeeming the time: so that the Faith may be preserved alive through the dark ages before us; to renew and rebuild civilization, and save the world from suicide (SE, 387). The second section of "Little Gidding" and the last five lines of the poem are prophetic. David Wrd remarks that in The Waste Land, "Eliot assumes something of a prophetic manner", though it is often ill-mannered prophecy, crotchty and grumpy [Eliot Between Two Worlds: A Reading of T.S.Eliot's Poetry and Plays (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 70].

M.C. Bradbrook also points out the prophetic character of the poems Triumphal March and Difficulties of a Statesman in anticipating "the spirit of Nazi Germany and the spirit of Munich" B.Rajan, ed., T.S.Eliot and a Study of His Writings by Several Hands (London: Dennis Dobson Ltd.), p. 126.
Eliot again proves to be a gloomy prophet in his prognostication that the future may bring neither a Christian civilization nor a material civilization. It is quite possible that the future may bring nothing but chaos or torpor." (SE, 515).


121. Selective tradition is an important characteristic of modern poetry (Stephen Spender, The Struggle of the Modern, p. 91.) But my contention is that the selective tradition is based on personal preferences.

122. Eliot calls Donne a 'voluptuary of thought' (Clark Lectures V:20, V:21). He complains that there is hardly any attempt at organization in his poetry, that in lack of architectonic. In Eliot's view "Donne has retired into his skull", meaning that he is not concerned with the external world. For Eliot, Donne is something of "the sorcerer of emotional orgy", a poet who "lacked spiritual discipline" (SE, 345). To put it laconically, Eliot himself feels that Donne is not a classicist.


124. Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, pp. 51, 78: "... in clothes, as in all other external things whatsoever, no fashion will continue"; and "all ... lives through perpetual metamorphoses."

126. (a) "... certainly poetry is something over and above and something quite different from a collection of psychological data about the minds or the history of an epoch...." (SW, IX). Eliot proceeds to observe that the parts of a poem "form something quite different from a body of neatly ordered biographical data" (SW, X).

(B) "Honest criticism and sensitive appreciation is directed not upon the poet but upon poetry" (SW, 53).


It must be noticed that Wellek denies that Eliot is interested in "anecdotal personality", and this view is unacceptable.


133. cf. "The best of my literary criticism ... consists of essays on poets and poetic dramatists who had influenced me" (OPP, 106). "A poet-critic when he is young and actively engaged in battling for the kind of poetry which he practises ... is not so much a judge as an advocate" (OPP, 25).


Rene Wellek, for instance, observes that "the whole theory of criticism propounded by Eliot is in total contradiction to his objectivist philosophy". There is some valid truth in this observation. But this may be sympathetically resolved in the light of two facts that compel our attention - Eliot's adoption of Romantic polysemy and his own ambivalent attitude to Romanticism (instinctively inherent) and classicism (deliberately assumed).

cf. Henry Crabb Robinson is quoted by M.H. Abrams as saying in an article on Goethe in the "Monthly Repository" (1833), "The dramatic poet must unite the powers of both [objective and subjective] in an equal degree." *The Mirror and the Lamp*, p. 2431.


cf. Keble avers that "poetry is the indirect expression in words." [Quoted by M.H. Abrams, ibid., p. 145.]


143. "It is true that great poetry captures and puts into literature an emotion." [T.S. Eliot, "Prose and Verse", Chapbook, no. 22 (Apr. 1921), quoted by Allen Austin in his *T.S. Eliot: The Literary and Social Criticism*, p. 109.]


155. The following definitions of wit will testify to the neo-classical exaltation of thought:

(1) "Wit written is that which is well-defined, the happy result of thought ..." (Dryden, "An Account of the Ensuing Poem, in a Letter to the Honourable Sir Robert Howard," prefixed to Annus Mirabilis, in Of Dramatic Poesy and Other Critical Essays, ed. with an introd. George Watson, London: Everyman's Library, 1964), I, 98.

(2) "... propriety of thoughts and words; or in other terms, thoughts and words elegantly adapted to the subject." (Dryden, "The Author's Apology for Heroic Poesy," in Of Dramatic Poesy and Other Critical Essays, ed. George Watson, I, 207).
(3) "What oft was thought but ne'er so well express'd," (Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, 1. 298 in English Critical Texts, ed. Enright and Chickera, p. 118).


Refer to the view of F.R. Leavis on "emotion recollected in tranquillity."


161. Hillis Miller, Poets of Reality, p. 149.

162. Biographia Literaria, II, 255.


164. Biographia Literaria, II, 16.


(a) According to Eliot, Blake is guilty of too much preoccupation with ideas; "It is that Blake did not see enough, became too much occupied with ideas" (SW, 156).

(b) Eliot says that it is the dreary rationalism that has distorted the vision of George Eliot and made her an eccentric moralist (ASC, 54).

(c) Ref. to Eliot's remark on Coleridge in UPUC, 178-99, quoted earlier in p. 92.

Discriminations, p. 265.

*Biographia Literaria* II, 6.


ibid., p. 132.


It may be noticed that the classical poetry is rhetorical and approximates to oratory and that it disdains ordinary conversational style. For instance, Addison in Addison and Steele and Others: The Spectator, ed. Gregory Smith, Vol. 2 (1907; rpt. London: Everyman's Library, 1963), p. 349, says, "... since it often happens that the most obvious phrases, and those which are used in ordinary
Conversation, become too familiar to the Ear, and contract a kind of Meanness by passing through the Mouths of the Vulgar, a Poet should take particular care to guard himself against Idiomatick Ways of speaking." Likewise Lord Chesterfield in his letter of October 26, 1739 to his son, in Lord Chesterfield's Letters to His Son and Others, introd. R.K. Root (1929, rpt. London: Everyman's Library, 1969), p. 2, writes, "Poetry] makes use of the same figures of Rhetoric [as Oratory] .... "Poetical diction, that is, poetical language, is more sublime and lofty than prose.... In verse, things are seldom said plainly and simply, as one would say them in prose ... they are described and embellished."


Austin's observation that "Eliot's distinction between poetry and prose follows closely the Romantic concept that the distinguishing quality is the nature of its images," is germane to our subject. (Austin Allen, T.S.Eliot: The Literary and Social Criticism, p. 21.)