After going through various scriptures of the world religions one would wonder whether the BG is surpassed by any other world scriptures in giving expressions to the nature of the UR with such aesthetic charm, emotional richness, intellectual depth and mystical insights. It is primarily a Song of the Lord, as the name indicates. The BG is at its best when it "sings" of the Lord filling our whole being with love, light, joy and peace. However, the academic requirements of a thesis like this and the peculiar methodology needed for it, compel us to make a rather piece-meal study concentrating chiefly on the intellectual contents of this topic shorn of its aesthetic attractiveness and mystical overpoweringness.

In this chapter we shall limit ourselves to three sketchy considerations on the UR. First, it will be shown how the UR of BG is the total cause or raison d'être of everything, and then briefly the attributes of transcendence and immanence will be pointed out. In the final section the personalistic aspect of the Supreme Being will be dealt with. And before each consideration under each main heading the concepts will be clarified from the Indian and Western philosophical points of view.

A: THE UR AS THE TOTAL CAUSE

"We are thrown into the world without consulting us and taken away from it without our permission": this existentialistic expression of man's total helplessness in the face of inescapable circumstances and of
total dependence on factors outside oneself is an experience not unfamiliar to most reflecting human beings. Already in the very first chapter of our thesis we saw that one of the basic reasons of religious consciousness is the experience of the limit situation in its negative aspects as the experience of Lord Buddha at the encounter of disease, old age and death, or its positive aspect as at the encounter with the numinous in its varying degrees of intensity and clarity. In other words, the feeling of total dependence on and total overpoweringness by the mysterious numinous form the basis of religious consciousness. And it has been pointed out that this consciousness is something intrinsic and structural to man.

A further "conscientization" of this feeling makes the Upanisadic sages ask the following questions:

...What is the cause? (Is it) Brahman? Whence are we born? By what do we live? And on what are we established? O ye who know Brahman, (tell us) presided over by whom do we live our different conditions in pleasures and other than pleasures (pains).¹

These are obvious causal questions. In the ancient Western Philosophy it was questions of this sort that led Aristotle to arrive at the conclusion of the Motor Immobilia (Unmoved Mover). For he felt that this experience of being imposed upon, of fundamentally being moved and of radically and totally being dependent upon cannot be explained except in terms of such a first principle lest it would lead to an infinite regress of movers and the moved, something which cannot be accepted in the context of the fact of being moved.
The modern western empiricist schools of philosophy, which we may call grammaristic schools of philosophy, in their fascination with scientism and in their reactionism against religious dogmatism and authoritarianism, have succeeded to some extent in making many of the later philosophers feel inhibited in asking these questions or trying to find answers for them. Hume in his antireligious prejudice poohpoohed the question of the Ultimate cause saying that a woman qua woman does not presuppose a husband but a wife qua wife. It is clear that Hume never faced the fundamental experience of helplessness, of being totally overpowered, or of 'being moved'. And it is quite natural that unless one has the experience of 'being moved' one cannot be easily led to the conclusion of an 'Unmoved Mover'.

Nyāya system provided us with the "organon", to use the expression of Radhakrishnan in this regard, for philosophical investigation, and so we shall turn to this school for making certain clarifications on the concept of cause. One of the most acceptable Nyāya definitions of cause is the following: "A cause is to be unconditional, invariable, antecedent of the effect". Three elements could be distinguished in this definition: (i) The cause is antecedent to the effect as fire is antecedent to smoke (ii) The antecedent is invariable (niyata) to show that every antecedent is not a cause, as the ass carrying the clay to the potter's shed is not the cause though an antecedent. (iii) The antecedent has to be unconditional or independently necessary to distinguish from invariable antecedents which are not causes like the colour of the clay is not its cause.
It is not our purpose to embark on a critical analysis of the concept of causation according to the Nyāyikas but rather to get a fairly clear description of this concept. It must however be said in passing, as Bahadurin points out, that for the Nyāyikas "the law of causation is nothing more than the law of sequence" since they fight shy of going beyond the empirical data. It is interesting to note how J.S. Mills reaches a surprisingly similar definition of cause after a parallel analysis. He says: "We may define... the cause of a phenomenon to be the antecedent or the concurrence of antecedents, on which it is invariable and unconditionally consequent."

1. The Classification of Causes

Radhakrishnan briefly describes thus, the three kinds of causes mentioned by Nyāya, comparing them with the Aristotelian categorization:

(1) The material (upadāna) cause is the stuff from out of which the effect is produced, e.g., three threads are the material cause of the cloth or the clay of the jar. (2) the non-material or the non-inherent (asamavāyi) cause is that which inheres in the material cause, and whose efficiency is well known. The conjunction (samyoga) of the threads is the non-material cause.

(3) The efficient cause is distinct from the preceding ones. It refers to the motive power by which the effect originates or the means by which it is produced. The potter is the efficient cause of the jar, while his stick and wheel are regarded as accessory (sahakārī).

According to Radhakrishnan these three kinds of causes correspond to Aristotle's material, formal and efficient causes. Aristotle, however,
proposes, one more cause, viz. the final cause. Radhakrishnan says that the "effect itself may be regarded as the final cause of Aristotle," Here, the author's interpretation of Aristotle is only partially right. The effect as something already produced is not the final cause, as a statue before its production is in the mind of the sculptor is the final cause. Of course, there are various kinds of final causes. If union with the UR as the ultimate purpose of human life, as BG holds, Lord could be called the final cause of man.

What is meant by the total cause? It is used with reference to the UR to indicate that the total explanation of the samsara has to be sought in it. He is, in a sense, the material, formal, efficient and final cause of the world. There is nothing outside him out of which he created the samsara.

2. The Lord's Total Causality According to the BG

The expressions like the following do indicate the causal dependence of the samsara on the UR: Prabhu(Lord, 5:14; 9:18; 10:18) Sarvalokamahesvara(The great Lord of the whole world, 5:29) sarvasyadharam (the ground of everything, 8:9) anusāsite(ruler 8:9), Rījak sarvabhūtānām (the seed of all contingent beings, 7:10; also 9:18), Jagatpati (the Lord of the world, 10:15), Bhūtamejēsvar(great Lord of contingent beings 9:14) Paramēsvar(Supreme Lord, 13:27), Īśvar (Lord, 13:26). These expressions do indicate causal relations between the UR and the contingent realities though the nature of this relationship is not indicated with precision. These expressions in their context do indicate mostly a special kind of efficient causality, and not total causality.
In 8:22 by the expression that the whole universe is spun by him (yena sarva idam tadam) this efficient causal relation is given a further enrichment. This phrase first occurs in 2:17 qualifying the Indescribable (avināśī) Brahman, then in 11:38 when Arjuna says that it is by Kṛṣṇa who is the ultimate based (pārom nīḍhānaṁ), this cosmos has been spun, and finally in 18:46 after saying that the activities of all the contingent beings (yastah pravṛttiḥ bhūtanām). The word 'tataṁ' literally means spun or spread out, and the term 'tantu' (thread, fibre) is a derivative of the same root. Zaehner rightly points out that this expression which is used to express how the world originated from Brahman alone without any pre-existing material cause like prakṛti, is influenced by the Upanisads Brahadāraṇyakopaniṣad (2:1:20) and Mundaka (1:1:7). These texts compare the coming to be of the world from Brahman with the coming to be of the spider's net from the spider. We cannot, however, agree with his statement that "... in traditional Hinduism creation is not ex nihilo". The reason given for this statement is that Brahman "is both the weaver and the warp and woof across which all phenomenal existence is woven (BU, 3:16)."

Zaehner's view is not so much due to the misunderstanding of the BG or the Upanisadic statements as the misunderstanding of the concept ex nihilo. Creation from nothing (ex nihilo) does not go against the principle that out of nothing nothing can come out. The chief thrust of the concept of creation ex nihilo is that the UR created the world without making use of any other realities independent of him as the material cause, and so the total rationale of their coming to be is in
him. Hence we agree with what Radhakrishnan says commenting on 7:5:
"For Christian thinkers, God creates not from any pre-existent matter but out of nothing. Both matter and form are derived from God. A similar view is set forth in this verse."

In 9:18 after stating that he is the beginning, end, witness etc. Krishna declares himself as the bijam avyayam (imperishable seed) of the world. This must be read in connection with 14:3 and 4 where it is said that the great Brahman is the womb in which he deposits the seed (garbham) so that he is rightly called the seed-giving father (bijapradah pitä). If we consider this statement in connection with 9:17 we will see that he is not only the seed-giving father but also the mother thereby transcending duality as in 7:5-6 where he speaks of his two prakrtis. The concept 'seed', in this connection, can be interpreted in terms of material and final causes, though inadequately.

There are a number of statements where the UR is described both as the efficient and final cause, though these categories are imperfect to express the causality implied. In 10:8 the Lord describes himself as the prabhavah (origin) of everything and in 7:6 and 9:18 as both the prabhavah and pralaya thereby describing himself as the source as well as the final end of creatures. In 10:20 and in 10:32 the Lord says that he is the beginning, middle and end of all things. This total causality is graphically described in 9:18.

I am the goal (gatir), the sustainer (bhartä), the lord (prabhuh) the witness (sākṣi), the abode (nivasah) refuge (śaraṇam) friend (suhrt) origin (prabhavah) and dissolution (pralaya), the ground (sthānam) the reposititory (nidhānam) and the eternal seed (bijam avyayam).
Another interesting point to be considered in this connection is that according to BG, the UR is the ultimate goal (ultimate final cause) of man. But this consideration will be made in the context of our treatment of salvation. All the same, it must be said that the jīvātmā finds complete nirvāṇa (5:24-46) undying bliss (sukham aksayam) (5:21) and peace in the UR (5:29), and so there will be no punarjanma (4:9; 8:15; 15:4,6) precisely because He possesses within himself the total value of being and goodness.

What sort of cause then is Brahman? He is not only the source and end of all beings (7:6; 10:32) but also the intelligent witness (9:18) and the presiding principle (mayādhyaksen 9:10) of the world process. If he is said to be the material cause it is not in the sense of clay as the material cause of a pot but in the sense of the sublimated essence of realities as in 7:8-11 and in the description of the vibhūtis. In short, according to the BG there is nothing in the world and no aspect of any reality which is not dependent on the UR, the ultimate reason being that he possesses in himself the total value of being as it will become clearer in the following sections of this chapter.

B: THE UR AS TRANSCENDENT AND IMMANENT

Transcendence is a term derived from Latin (trans + cedere = to climb or move beyond or across) indicating the aspect of superabundance, surpassingness, going-beyondness etc. The Latin prefix trans is equivalent to the Sanskrit one para, as when used in parabrahman, paramatman etc. Immanence also is derived from Latin (in + manere = immancere) signifying the meaning of staying within. The Latin prefix in is equivalent
to the Sanskrit one antar as used in antaryāmin, antarātma etc.

In the context of the UR immanence and transcendence are complementary concepts as is obvious from our consideration of the total causality of Brahman in the previous section. If we were to think of UR as a Platonic Demiurge, the Kantian hypothetical Supreme Architect or a Deistic god, we would not be able to establish such a profound relationship between these concepts. But when we consider the UR as the total raison d'être of the totality of reality, as possessing the total value of being, then, divine transcendence implies also divine immanence. For practical reasons, however, both concepts will be dealt with separately.

1. Transcendence

The Lord in the BG says that there is nobody superior or beyond him(7:7). The text in itself would speak nothing more than that he is the highest, without explicitly denying that he is not highest in a series through para has a meaning of going beyond the series. But this statement is made in the context of "transcendent and non-transcendent natures"(para and apara)(7:5-6). After explaining the nature of the non-transcendent(apara) prakṛti consisting of the various elements or evolutes described in the Sāṅkhya system consisting of mana, buddhi etc. the Lord says: "This is my non-transcendent nature(apara). Know my transcendent nature which is essentially life, by which the world is upheld". Now, what is this para prakṛti?

According to Śaṅkaraśārya, this transcendent nature is the same as the kṣetrajña of chapter 13, and he contrasts it with māya. For Rāmānujaśārya this para prakṛti stands for the individual soul, which
erunasse constitute this transcendent nature and the apara prakṛti for the non-spiritual beings. Aurobindo identifies the apara prakṛti with the Sāṅkhya prakṛti and speaks of the para prakṛti which is the "highest dynamis" in which "the puruṣa and Prakṛti are one". A little later more explicitly the same author explains: "The original and eternal nature of the Spirit and its transcendent and originating Sakti is what is meant by the Para Prakṛti". Radhakrishnan too equates the para prakṛti with the kṣetrajña and says that the "Universal Being of God includes the totality of the unconscious in His lower nature and the totality of the conscious in His higher." In all these interpretations one thing is common in this that this para prakṛti transcends the sāṅkhya prakṛti on the one hand, and yet it sustains the various evolutes of this nature by its conscious functioning. This para prakṛti could be equated with Unmanifest (avyakta) beyond the manifest(vyakta) that is contrasted with the prakṛti that has become evolved, or manifest (8:20). And hence it is also a fortiori beyond the gunas (7:13).

To express the absolute transcendence of the उर, under the aspect of Uttamah Purusah(supreme Person), he is said to be beyond the क्षरा and the आक्षरा as he is beyond the avyakta. As he is beyond the gods (devadevasya, 11:13) he is rightly called paramesvara(11:3) or devadevesa (11:37). The appellations with which Arjuna addressed the Lord in 10:12 and 11:38 like transcendent brahma, transcendent abode etc. explicitly express this transcendent of the उर. It is because of his transcendence he is the changeless and undivided essence in the changing and divided
It is to express his supreme transcendence the Lord says that "All beings in Me but I do not abide in them" (9:4 and also 5). In chapter 13, verses 13 to 17 include a number of paradoxical statements expressing both the transcendence and immanence. In a sense, the description of the Cosmic form of Krishna in the theophany in Chapter 11 is a sort of mystical, poetic and symbolic expression of the divine transcendence.

2. Immanence

To get an idea of immanence we shall take a few sample passages without going for an exhaustive survey. After saying that he is jñānam, jñeyam and jñānagamyam (knowledge, object of knowledge and attainable by knowledge) identifying himself with the intelligible as such declares that "He is seated in the hearts of all". The same idea of indwellingness with transcendence is expressed in 16:18 (ātmāparādeheṣu pradvisanto) 17:6 (ārāmastham) and 18:61 (hrudeṣṭiṣṭati). Speaking of the Supreme Person who transcends the Kṛaṇa and Akaṇḍa, it is stated that he is ruling the three worlds from within (15:17).

To avoid the pitfalls of both "deistic" and "pantheistic" tendencies, the BG too follows the Upanisadic example in expressing the immanence and transcendence of the UR in terms of paradoxes. As in Vedanta, the basic paradox of the UR in BG is that the "Beginningless Brahmanis neither being nor non-being" (13:12) and in both being and non being (9:19). One of the most paradoxical stanzas of the BG is 13:15 which says: "He is without and within all beings. He is unmoving also as moving... He is far away and yet he is near." This is almost a
verbatim repetition of the Upanishad 5 which also says that Brahman is far and near, within and without, moving and unmoving. Obviously this description of the UR shows that immanence is intimately connected with transcendence and that the nature of both of these attributes have to be explained in terms of his being the total cause of everything.

In the light of what we have said about the total causality, a consideration of the vibhūtis of the Lord (10:29-40) and the statements showing how the Lord is the inner essence of all things (7:8-11) can give some insight into the truth of immanence. In mediaeval Western philosophy attributes are given to the UR in three ways: the negative or apophasic, the analogical or kataphatic and the way of transcendence or eminence. The first two could be compared with the first two phases of the Catuskoti of the Vedantins. However, the way of eminence or transcendence after predicating positively and negatively, sublimates the predication to a level of transcendence. If the Lord says that He is Prahalad among deities or lion among the animals it is a very picturesque and symbolic way of expressing this way of transcendence or eminence in giving attributes to the divinity. But in this predication of transcendence duality is overcome in so far as the UR is considered as the inner essence of the changing and impermanent reality of samsāra. In this way we have to understand the statement of the Lord that he is "the taste in waters" "light in the sun and in the moon", "Aum in the Vedas" and the like.

C: THE UR AS A PERSON

1. Some Clarifications on the Concept 'Person'

In the comparative study of Eastern and Western thought, there are
few concepts which are more liable to misinterpretation and confusion
than that of person. Often authors translate the vedantic concept
'nirguna-Brahman' with the concept 'Impersonal God' as though no further
clarification is needed. In fact, this concept has undergone many evo­
lutions since the time of the Greek philosophy through the medieval and
modern philosophy until the contemporary existentialistic philosophy. In
Indian philosophy, 'Purusa' is used as the equivalent for person. Now
the meaning of this concept in the Purusasukta of the Rigveda, in the
Upaniṣads, in the BG and in the Sāṅkhya philosophy are not identical.
This brief reflection is meant to make us cautious about translating
'person', into the Indian context by 'purusa' about a too easy definition
of person and about speaking of the Absolute as personal and impersonal.

The word 'person' seems to come from the Latin word 'persona', a com­
 pound of per + sonare (to sound through). However, "Modern philology
links it with the Etruscan persus, a word found written beside a repre­
sentation of two masked figures. It was used to translate the Greek proso­
pon, face, first in the sense of the actor's mask, which designated his
role. The term gets a technical meaning in the West in the context of
the dogmatic definitions of the Trinity and of Incarnation. In the West
the first philosophical definition seems to come from Boethius according
to whom 'person' means "individual substance of a rational nature." In
the mediaeval philosophy Aquinas adds the property of incommunicability
to Boethius' definition thereby emphasizing the independence and non­
interchangability paving the way for the view that a person is an end in
itself.
According to V.J.G. Jeffko much of traditional philosophy, especially the Western Modern philosophy since the time of Descartes "has adopted an individualistic conception of man" independently of his relations with other men. However, the contemporary philosophers like Buber, Marcel and Macmurray emphasize this relatedness aspects of persons. The author says:

According to this view, interpersonal relatedness pertains to the core or essence of personhood; the unit of personal existence is not 'I' but 'You and I'; and the fundamental or primary human reality is the entire field of persons-in-relation...

There is nothing that can be called truly personal that is not related to and not dependent upon the mutuality of persons.

Keeping the overall Western philosophical tradition in view, this author makes a sharp distinction between human persons and animals, calling the activity of the one as rational while that of the other as non-rational, and then specifically mentions the two different kinds of activities. He says:

First, rational activity is free or autonomous, while non-rational activity is determined. Secondly, rational activity comprehends the inner nature of the Other, while non-rational activity reacts to the other. Since an act of genuine human love is a free subjective response to the objective needs or inner nature of another person, it is rational. On the other hand, a dog who 'loves' his master is merely reacting to stimuli from the Other which are associated with the past satisfaction of the dog's biological needs of food, shelter and comfort.

As we shall see later on, the view that the interpersonal sharing as one of the basic elements of a person is very much based on the
Trinitarian Mystery according to which the three divine persons are subsisting relations whereby not contradicting the oneness of the divinity. Even in an overall view of the Western concept of person one can come to the conclusion that the two essential characteristics of person whether applied to man or God is that of intellectual knowledge and of love with self-giving. It must be clearly noted that in Western Philosophy when God is said to be a person with knowledge and love, knowledge and love must be understood in terms of the apophatic, kathatic and transcendental ways. Knowledge of God is truly intellectual knowledge but not with subject-object duality. In this knowledge the knower and knowable are identical since the Supreme Being is understood as Supreme Truth in the sense of Supreme Knowable. Divine love is understood in terms of the total self-giving of the Father to the Son remaining in the one divine essence. In other words, God's love is not outside his essence. Knowledge of the human person is understood as sensitio-rational with the implicit self-reflection and of course with subject-object duality. Except a few philosophers like Augustine, Aquinas and Bonaventure and of course some of the mediaeval mystics, mystical and intuitive knowledge were not treated systematically applying the usual philosophical methods. Human love is assigned to the faculties of will and affectivity.

As we said above 'person' is rendered into most of the Indian languages by the Sanskrit word 'purusa' often with slight variations. Purus primarily means a male person. It could also be used as a common universal noun meaning man in general as referring to mankind as a whole. In grammar both in Sanskrit and in the languages especially of Sanskritic
origin the 'first person', 'second person' etc. are rendered by 'pratham purus, avidiya purus' etc.

In the Purusa Sukta of the Rgveda (10:80) Purus stands for the primordial cosmic man by the sacrifice of whom the whole cosmos took its origin, paving the way for the Upanisadic and later for the Sankhya parallelism between the microcosm that man is and the macrocosm that the brahmaanda is. In the Taittiriya Upanisad (2:1-5) where the various kosas (sheaths) of the purusa are described, purusa seems to stand for the human person as a body-soul complex with definite external forms. The description of the head, right side left side etc. of this purusa, echoing the Rgvedic description of the cosmic person, seems to indicate that the person referred to here can be applicable only to man. What is interesting to note is that the purusa of these verses is a compound of mineral (anam) vegetative (pran) animal (man), intellectual (vijnana) and bliss (ananda) levels of reality. Radhakrishnan comments: “When our knowledge is submissive to things, we get the hierarchical levels of being, matter, life, animal mind, human intelligence and divine bliss.”

In the Sankhya, purusa stands primarily for the spiritual principle in man contrasting with it the prakriti in whose evolutes are included even buddhi and manas besides other organs and faculties. Hence the Sankhya purusa is quite different from the Rgvedic or the Taittiriya Upanisadic purusa.

In the concept of person and in that of Indian rendering as purusa one of the main characteristic is that of knowledge which implies spirituality or intellectuality. In the mediaeval western philosophy this intellectual knowledge is attributed to God, to the non-corporeal beings called angels and to man with three varying degrees of perfection:
in the following hierarchical order: with no-subject-object duality (God) since in him the knowable and knower are identical as being Pure Intelligence, with intuitive knowledge through concepts that form part of the angelic nature (angels) and with sensitive rational knowledge (man).

In the Indian puruṣa one of the chief characteristics is vijnāna which could be equated to the intellectual knowledge of medieval philosophy assigned to man, a knowledge which implies self-reflection unlike that of the animals. But the knowledge where the knower is identical with the totality of knowables because of its pure intelligence, is not called vijnāna though this type of knowledge is special of the Absolute both in the Western philosophy and in the Indian philosophy. The absolute designated by the vedantic appellation Saccidānanda has this kind of knowledge though this Absolute is not usually called puruṣa especially in the Advaita Vedanta. But the Absolute of the BG with this type of 'transcendental intellectual knowledge' is Puruṣottama, as in other Bhakti literature.

Another important characteristic of person in the Western philosophy is love. As in the case of knowledge, in this case too, in the medieval philosophy of the West three degrees of love are considered referring to God, angels and to human beings in the hierarchical order of perfection. It is pretty certain that love is not a characteristic of the puruṣa of Sānkhyā. After analysing the Upanisadic literature almost exhaustively in understanding the concept of personality, G.S. Ghurye gives a long list of personality attitudes and characteristics. Among these characteristics love is not given a place though many of the constituent elements of love like dayā (compassion), dāna (almsgiving)
sréđha(faith), sangāta(companionship), kāma(desire), soka(sorrow), ānanda(delight), samvid(sympathy) etc. are included. If the Dharmaśāstra literature and Bhakti literature were included, then love would have had a prominent place especially under the aspect of 'ahiṣṭa'.

Manu includes, among the five moral virtues, ahiṣṭa (10:63). And according to MBh, ahiṣṭa is the supreme religion. The purusa either as man or as the Supreme Being(purusottama) of the BG, as we shall see, has the characteristic of love in the bhakti literature especially in the BG and in the Bhāgavad Purāṇa.

In our considerations in this chapter and in the following, by person, we mean those beings which can know intellectually in its different degrees and can love with self-giving in its different degrees. And if these characteristics are found in the Absolute either of the BG or of the MB we call it personal.

2. The Uī as a knower

The Lord says in the fourth chapter that he as well as Arjuna had many births which he alone knows(ved) not Arjuna (4:5), for he knows (vedāhām) the past present and future (7:26). There is a statement by Arjuna that the Lord knows himself through his own self(ātmānāt ātmānam vettah, 10:15) though it is not mentioned that by knowing himself he knows everything else since nothing is independent of him. The Lord is the knower (kṣetrajña) of all the fields (sarvakṣetra 13:12), and also the originator and the knower of the Vedas (vedavit, 15:15).

When Arjuna says that the Lord is the knower and what is to be known (vettasi vedyamca, 11:38) or when the Lord himself affirms that he is
knowledge, the object of knowledge and the goal of knowledge (jñānām, jñeyam, jñānagāryam, 13:17) it must be understood that the UR of the BG is omniscient, since in him the knowable and knowledge are identical, and so he could be called in the Vedantic sense Sat-cit. Because he is the total cause of everything he could say that he is the buddhi of the budhimat (wise, 7:10), and that the intellect (budhi) wisdom (jñānam) freedom from delusion (asamoha) etc. arise from him (10:4-5). For, he is the knower par excellence, knower in the sublimated sense. It is because of his supreme knowledge he reveals to Vivasvat and so on, the sublime knowledge of the great yoga that leads to salvation (4:1). And he is the guardian (11:18) and support or sound (14:27) of the eternal dharma, he comes to the world time and again (4:8) for the re-establishment of dharma when adharma is at its peak (4:7). This implies his perfect knowledge of the totality of the world order and his perfect control over it. Indeed, if he is the ruler, ordainer, sustainer, creator and destroyer of all contingent beings (8:9, 13:16) he is not only omnipotent but also omniscient.

From the above passages it is obvious that the UR of the BG is indeed a knower but not the type of knowledge of the human persons. It is not only trikālajñām but also omniscience in the sense of knowing everything in its totality by knowing his essence. For in his being as such is identical with his essence, and so truth in its totality too is identical with his essence. Therefore, he is not an ordinary knowing-purusa like man but knower in an eminent way, knower in the transcendental way as it befits the Puruṣottama (Supreme Person).
3. The UR as a Loving Person

In 12:14-20 we have a number of solemn protestations by the Lord of his special love for his bhaktas. The phrase sa nepriyah (he is dear to me) with which these verses end has a ring of great tenderness. In 18:64 and 65 Kṛṣṇa declares in the same vein his special love for Arjuna with the affective expressions "īstosi me" and "priya si me". Kṛṣṇa's tender way of calling Arjuna his sakha(friend) in 4:3 reminds one of what Christ told his disciples: "I shall not call you servants any more, because a servant does not know his master's business: I call you friends." (Jnl5:15). This word sakha which occurs also in 11:41 and 44, expressing tender companionship paves the way for the sweet relationship of Rādhā - Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavad Purāṇa. The word suhrda which occurs in 5:29 and 9:18 implies more of depth in the friendship than of sweetness and tenderness.

In 7:11 the Lord makes a very striking statement. He says that he is "kama" which is not against dharma. Now "kama" is used in the context of erotic love which implies much affectivity with sexual connotation. But, here he is not any sort of kama but that which is ordinate, that which is regulated according to the principles of dharma. This affectivity implied in the Lord's love is expressed in considering himself father, mother benefactor, supporter etc. (Cfr. 9:17, 13:13:16; 11:44). These statements have to be understood in terms of his total causality. If he is the cause of the love between the lover and the beloved, between mother and son, father and daughter etc. he must have all these kinds of love in him in a divine way, in a sublimated, transcendental way. But
But the avatari expresses this transcendental love in a human way according to the situations.

From what we have said above it is clear that Lord Krishna's love for his creatures is not some sort of Platonic, affectionless love. He is in fact fully involved in the human affairs. It is his concern for and interest in the world, especially in the world of men that makes him 'reveal' salvation-giving truths to Arjuna and so on, and to take avatar in different yugas (4:1-3). In 3:23 the Lord affirms his tireless activity for man's example though he has no obligation to act (3:22). The terms like mother, father (9:17), sustainer (9:18), teacher (11:43) etc. imply his involvement in the world though this involvement is best expressed as the teacher of saving truths (4:1, 7, 8; 3:31; 9:1-3).

4. The BR as the God of Grace

Here we shall not enter into the various controversial issues connected with the question of grace. What we shall do here is to enumerate in a descriptive way some of the statements in the BG about the Lord's help for man in attaining salvation by union with him. When we deal with the salvific function of avatar various other aspects of this question will be dealt with.

We have just above spoken of the revelation of salvific truths by the Lord. This could be considered grace. Arjuna considers this sort of revelation which removed his bewilderment and confusion as an anugraha (grace 11:1). In 9:22 the Lord makes the promise to his bhaktas of yoga-ksema, that is, granting of the things which one has not, and the protection of the things one has. Though yoga-ksema could be interpreted
primarily as material welfare, from the context it seems to refer to the overall welfare of which life in the path of salvation is primary. It could be interpreted somewhat in the sense of the following statement of Jesus: "Set your hearts on his (God's) kingdom and on his righteousness, and all these other things will be given to you as well." (Mt. 6:33).

To the bhaktas the Lord gives buddhiyoga (integration of the soul) through which the Lord is possessed (10:10), and out of compassion (anukampa) for them, he will destroy by the light of wisdom (jñāna-dipona) the darkness of ignorance (10:11). Indeed, the Lord gives Arjuna the supernatural eye (divyam chāṣu) to see his cosmic form (11:8). And the Lord tells Arjuna that he saw the cosmic form "by my favour" (mayā prasannenno) and not by various rituals or by other human efforts (11:48). This passage is very similar to the well-known Kātapaniṣad passage which says: "This self cannot be attained by instruction, nor by intellectual power, nor even through much hearing. He is to be attained only by the one whom the (self) chooses. To such a one the self reveals his own nature." (1:2:23).

The Lord forgives the sins of those who surrender themselves in bhakti (11:44, 18:66). Indeed, the Lord is the saviour (saumuddhartha) of his bhaktas (12:6-7). In verses 18:56, 58 and 62 the Lord mentions explicitly the term prasad (grace) as a means for man's salvation. Because of the Lord's prasāda (grace) as a means for man's salvation, Arjuna's confusion with regard to the right way of acting has been destroyed (maṣṭo mohah) and found himself in the right path which leads him to liberation. (18:73).
The final verse of the BG(18:73) is a picturesque way of explaining how the divine favour (grace) when accepted with openness of heart and mind, with total self-surrender in bhakti, can bring one to the right path that leads to salvation. Indeed, the whole of BG both in its context and in its content is a graphic, imaginative and symbolic presentation of God-man dialogue in which the loving God reaches out to man to lead him to salvation and the openhearted, openminded human soul in its helplessness surrenders itself in faith and love. This God-man dialogue situation is put in a nutshell by the last verse of the BG: "Wherever Krsna is, the Lord of yoga, and Partha, the archer, I think there will surely be fortune, victory, welfare and sound morality."(18:78). Commenting on this verse Radhakrishnan rightly says: "When the human soul becomes enlightened and united with the Divine, fortune and victory, welfare and morality are assured."

5. Does Love-involvement put Limits in the UR?

We have seen that the UR in the BG is a loving person, that he expresses his love by his involvement in the world and that he is a God of grace who helps out his devotees to attain salvation. On the other hand, the Lord says that he is the same (samohan) in all contingent beings without showing any particular love or hatred (name dvesyo'sti na priyah) for any one in particular (9:29) that he has no special duty (karthavyam) in the three worlds, and that only the fools think that the Lord is a doer. What shall we say about it? Can we ignore these statements while taking seriously those declarations about the Lord's predilection for his devotees? Or should we immediately jump into the conclusion that...
the BG contradicts itself?

The first thing we have to bear in mind is that on the face of problems like this in connection with the divine nature and activities, hardly any one can claim to give clear-cut and uncontestable answers. In fact, such solutions contradict the very nature of the UR which is ineffable and mysterious, the knowledge we have of him is, symbolic, negative and analogical. However, we can find plausible answers, which to some extent can satisfy our curiosity.

When we spoke of the divine knowledge it was pointed out how in the BG the UR knows without subject-object duality in so far as he possesses the total value of being without having anything independent of him, outside of him. Similarly he loves others by 'loving himself'. As he is knowledge itself so he is love also. As it is the nature of the sun to give light and of fire to burn so too his nature is of knowledge and of love. In commenting on 9:29 where the Lord says that he is the same to all contingent beings without special love or hatred, Śaṅkaraçērya uses the example of fire. He says that just as the fire removes the cold from those things which are nearer to the fire, so too the Lord's love is experienced by those bhaktas who come nearer to him. This example to a great extent answers our dilemma, but as any example it too is imperfect. It keeps unanswered the divine initiative in leading man to salvation. This solution may be complemented by the interpretation of Radhakrishnan and of Zachner in the context of this verse that the Lord is impartial and that he is not the respecter of any person. It is more or less in this sense Jesus said of God that he 'causes his sun to rise on bad men as well as good, and his rain to fall on honest and
dishonest men alike (Mt. 5:45).

Something similar could be said about divine activity also. The Lord does not act to get something which he does not have, for he is perfection itself. Then is he inactive? Is it a sufficient answer to say that the Lord's knowledge, love and activities are real only from the vyavahārīcārī standpoint and that all these are unreal from the paramārthika ? Is it really the sense of the BG paradoxes? We shall leave these questions unanswered until the two other central questions of metaphysics vis. the questions of jīva and jagat, shall have been considered. All the same it must be said that a closer consideration of the concept 'liłā' can lead us to fairly satisfactory solutions.

D: Conclusion:

We have seen, at the beginning of this chapter, that the UR according to the BG is the total cause of the world. All that the world is and has to depend totally on the UR. He is the beginning, the middle and the end of everything. He is the eternal and indestructible seed from which the whole of samsāra takes its origin and he is the goal to which it returns. The whole universe is strung on the Lord" like clustered pearls upon a thread" (7:7).

It goes without saying that the question of total causality cannot be adequately explained, as the history of philosophy proves. However, the consideration of immanence and transcendence of the UR can give some clarity to this concept. Though the Lord is the 'material' cause of the world, he transcends the world. But his transcendence is not that of a deistic God who retires to his transcendental throne after creating the
world leaving it to its own resources. Such a view will go against the concept of total causality. He is also immanent according to the BG, not merely in the sense that he is the antaryāmin or the indweller of a world which would be outside of him, and so in a sense would be independent of him. The whole world as a whole and in its parts is permeated by him. This idea is expressed well by the NT in the speech of St. Paul in Athens, in the following words: "Yet in fact he is not far from any of us, since it is in him that we live, and move, and exist" (Act 17:27b to 28a).

The UK according to the BG is omniscient and all-loving. Though he has special predilection for his bhaktas he does not show partiality to any one. If anybody fails to receive his prasād it is not because of the lack of love in the Lord but the lack of right disposition in the persons concerned. The Lord’s knowledge being without subject-object duality and his love being without getting outside of him for an object of love, it is obvious that the knowledge and love we speak of in the Lord is quite different from those in man. It is not far from the truth to say that human knowledge tendentially is towards a knowledge without subject-object duality and human love tendentially is for total union with the source of love. And if this is so, human love and knowledge would be a finite form or human form, of divine knowledge and love. Hence the concept of a monolith is, totally impersonal and monument like dumb absolute has nothing to do with the UR of the BG.

What must be noted is that the UR in his divine type of knowledge and love possesses, shall we say seminally? the other forms of love and
knowledge too so that he can take different forms of incarnation by his own resources. Thus we have a concept of the UR which is highly satisfactory even when approached intellectually and in a piecemeal way.