CHAPTER V

(11) S'abda Pramāṇa.

Following his predecessors, Gv. touches Upamāṇa, the third Pramāṇa casually. He treats the S’abda Pramāṇa in detail. The S’abda Pramāṇa is not accepted by Vais'ēikas and Saudhās as an independent one. They, however, do not challenge its validity. Ks. here follows Nyāya system, and, therefore, discusses its contents.

Gv’s treatment.

Gv. starts the discussion by examining the objector’s view that the definition of S’abda as given by Ks. is not satisfactory as the word - " शब्दः " alone is sufficient to convey the whole sense. But, he does not go further and concludes that " शब्दः " तद्भवति न शब्दं अब्राह्मणं वाक्यं प्रमाणं अस्ति। वाक्यं शब्दं प्रयोगं वाक्यं प्रमाणं कर्णवाचः।". Gv’s discussion in detail.

Gv. enters into a detailed discussion of the various aspects related to this Pramāṇa.

He deals with certain new points also like the eternity of the Sabda, the role of memory, the power of S'abda Lakshana, etc., that are not even touched by GV. During this discussion, he also cites the opinions of eminent logicians like Pakehadhar Mis'ra, Raghunētha S'iropani and others.

Ganges'a's view.

After explaining the objection anticipated by the GV, Gn. explains the definition of S'abda Pramāṇa as given by GV., viz., "अक्षरानि संख्याकृतिः बालकम् श्रेयः" 179. He quotes Ganges'a in this context. A word that is used to convey the real essence of the "सब्द" is Pramāṇa. Nobody utters a word unless one is aware of the sense behind it. It happens, however, that parrots and children sometimes utter such words that convey the real sense of an object, though themselves are unaware of it. Gn. rules out this objection by stating that in such cases God's knowledge is implied. He further makes it clear that the word "S'abda" stands for both - the word as well as the S'abda Pramāṇa by "dērāṇī kāpūṣāyām".

Apta.

"इन्द्र" is defined as "दर्शनभुजस्यार्थव्यक्तयोग- 181. dērāṇī kāpūṣāyām" by Ke. Gn., following GV., makes it

अयं विवेकसंक्षेपं गृहुक्तम् विशेषेऽपि नवमात्रेऽपि।"
"MSV P. 26."
clear that "दार्शिनिक" should be understood in its proper sense. Gns. favours a pragmatic approach and lays stress on the proper context of the statement. The purpose of the speaker should always be considered before ascertaining the final sense of a statement.

In discussing "अवृत्त कार्य", Gn. supports Ke.'s view that it will be better to regard - "पद" to be "उपाय" rather than "सेवा शक्ति" or the soul. GV. meets the different arguments of the objector successfully and ultimately concludes "एको जातिका अवृत्त कार्य". Gn. explains this and elaborates it with suitable illustrations.

Gn. has not to say much on the remaining two requisites of a sentence, viz., "ओषधन" and "उपायार्थ".

Non-éternity of the S'abda.

He opens a new discussion, viz., on the

182. TT.PP. 310-313, Vis'vanätha accepts "तात्पर्य" also as one of the means of verbal comprehension. "इत्यादि यो यथा काहेरो तात्पर्याकालावधारणे" T.R.B.P. PP. 166-170-171.


184. TT.PP. 315-316.
en the problem of the non-eternity of the S'abda. He has discussed this problem with minute details though it is untouched by both Ke. and GV. Generally, Gn. specifies the schools by names - that hold different views from the Nyāya-School. Strangely enough here he does not mention - Mīmāṃsakas by name, when he present the arguments of the "तुष्टिका" , who believe the S'abda to be eternal.

Objector's arguments.

He gives five arguments of the "पूर्वचट्ट" to prove the eternity of the S'abda as a S'abda - is eternal, because:-

i) It is the only special quality of "अस्तित्व".

ii) It is not the counter-entity of the destruction.

iii) It is the special quality of only one substance.

iv) It is the special quality of the eternal "मूल दृष्टि" other than the earth, and

v) Being "अतियोग्य, अध्ययनः तर्कितः", it is the (special) quality of that which is other than the soul.

185. Ibid. P. 315.
He explains all of these arguments and also shows how they are justified by the "पुनःसर्वसि". 186.

Gns.'s arguments for the non-eternity of the S'abda.

Curiously enough, without refuting these arguments of the "पुनःसर्वसि", Gn. merely presents the four arguments of the "अर्थमानिषिद्धः" as the S'abda is non-eternal, because:

1) The S'abda being existent is produced.
ii) It is grasped by our (i.e. other than Yogis) external sense being possessed of a Jāti.
iii) It is the "धर्मार्थविद्" of persons like us, and
iv) It is of the nature of "अद्वैतपरम".

He then proceeds to justify all these arguments.

In course of this discussion, he also shows that all the above 'hetus' are pure and free from any Upāchī. His main arguments are, however, two, viz.,

1) the word is produced, and
ii) It has the gradation in its pitch, therefore, it should be considered as non-eternal. 187

Cognition of the S'abda.

Gn. now explains the process by which the S'abda is cognized. A S'abda is a compound of letters and they cannot be pronounced simultaneously. They are uttered one after another. But in doing so, the letter which is pronounced first, is destroyed in a moment and thus does not persist last until other letters are made the object of cognition together. So, it will not be possible to cognize the S'abda at all. Gn. solves this difficulty stating that, when the first letter is destroyed, its experience leaves its " अः " (impression) in the mind of the hearer. The last letter being in direct context ( अः अः अः ) of the ear, one has an experience about it. This experience of the last letter accompanied by the " अः " of the preceding ones, enables one to cognize the whole S'abda. The " अः " of the previous letters gives rise to their memory. This cause is analogous to " अः अः अः " (re-collection), where the past experience is recalled to memory. Thus, the cognition of the S'abda consists of two situations, viz. direct experience (of the last letter) and memory born of " अः " (In case of the previous letters).

*187 (continued) It will be seen that Gn.'s arguments mainly based on those of Rs as explained by Vatsyayana. See NDB. FP. 179-200.
Gn. also lays stress on the fact that mere cognition of the S'abd is not sufficient. It must be supported by the knowledge of the conventional sense assigned to the S'abd. The memory of the S'abd thus cognized recalls the memory of the sense ( ) that again leads to their mutual contact in the form of a sentence, i.e. " एकत्वं नास "

Sūtrā

This discussion leads to the discussion of the creation of the " स्मृति ". Gn. refutes arguments of different objectors in this connection and concludes that the cause of the " स्मृति " is " अनुभव " and not " अवस्थित " and not " अवस्थित " and not " अवस्थित " Curiously enough, he does not accept " अवस्थित " and not " अवस्थित " and not " अवस्थित " and not " अवस्थित ". He refers to Mis'ra and S'iromani during the discussion. He also makes a passing reference to Sundalopādyāya, who believes that every " अवस्थित " can be correct. But Gn. dispenses with this view by saying that it will be a " अवस्थित " and nothing more.

The objector, however, argues that, if a " अवस्थित " can be the cause of " स्मृति ", there will not be any " स्मृति " in case of " ज्ञानमेव दैव " where there is absence of any " सावध "

189. T.T.PP. 324-325.
Gn. cites the view of the neo-logicians in defence. It is true that there cannot be "सूक्ष्म", in case of "सूक्ष्म" विवेका, but it is not because of "सूक्ष्म" विवेका. In "सूक्ष्म" विवेका, there is no possibility of any "सूक्ष्म" and it is because of the absence of this "सूक्ष्म", no "सूक्ष्म" can take place. Gn. concludes the discussion with "सूक्ष्म" विवेका. 192

Cārvāka's view and its refutation.

Gn. now proceeds to examine Cārvāka's view in connection with Pramāṇas. Cārvāka accepts only perception. He includes both Anumāṇa and S'abda in the Pratyaksha. According to him, in Anumāṇa, it is the Pratyaksha that plays the predominant role. The ground on which a Vyāpti is based, are not free from defects. Even Naiyāyikas themselves have accepted "व्याप्तिः प्राणम् स्वाभाविक", in the root of the formation of a Vyāpti, and the "प्राणम् स्वाभाविक" is but a kind of perception. Cārvāka's view is based on pragmatic necessity. To him any Vyāpti is nothing but a mere probability, and a probability, how much -

191-192. Ibid. P. 333.
193. Ibid. P. 333.
valid it may seem, can never be a certainty, unless it is confirmed by a perception. The necessity of an Anumāṇa, in case of knowing the "अभिप्रेत " object, is summarily rejected by Cārvaka, by not accepting any "अत्यत्तर " object at all.

Similarly, in case of the S'abda Pramāṇa, it is all perception. The words are actually grasped by the ear. It is "अत्यत्तर " , and nothing else.

The only answer found here by Naiyāyikas, is the belief that there will be "गौरव " , in considering the S'abda Pramāṇa as the perception, because it will lead to a very complicated process, viz., (i) शाश्वसनयोः तत्सस्य: अनुभवान्तः प्रत्ययः।
(ii) तदनन्तरं शाश्वसनान्तः प्रत्ययावतः प्रत्ययः।
(iii) तै: तरं गौरवम् गौरवायोः प्रत्ययः।
(iv) तस्मात् शाश्वसनां कार्यायोः पदार्थार्थाः।
(v) तेन शाश्वसने पदार्थार्थाः। and
(vi) तदनन्तरं पदार्थार्थां पदार्थार्थां पदार्थार्थां पदार्थार्थां।

To include all this under the Pratyakṣa, is to

194. Ibid. P. 334.
ask too much from the later.

Gārvāka, however, says that all this is nothing but what is called as "अस्मार्थम् सत्याः". In "सत्यार्थम् सत्यामयी", one perceives arise to another, as when perceives a piece of sandalwood, from a distance, one at once knows that it is fragrant though the later is not felt by nose. It is perceived here by "सत्यार्थम् सत्यायामयी" based on previous experience when both the sandal piece and its fragrance were perceived together. Similarly, in S'abda one has known as word like "अद्वय " by actually perceiving with eyes and has also arisen is meaning. And also when one hears the word like "न " now, one understands the meaning of the sentence by "अद्वयायामयी" in form of "अद्वय ".

Gn.'s reply to this argument is more an academic than a logical one. He says that here one has a "सत्यार्थम् " ( अद्वय ) अवस्थाबल्थि", and not that of a Pratyaksha. Hence, S'abda Pramāṇa is an independent one.

In fact, one should not forget that S'abda Pramāṇa is altogether different from the perception of the word. In S'abda Pramāṇa, the Premāṇastva is based on the authority of "Apta",

193. Tr. as quoted in Ts. n. P. 214.
196. Tt. P. 335.
197. Ibid. P. 336.
while in the perception of a word, it is the hearing of the word. Čārvaka's view as stated by Gn., and his own contention both are based on mis-understanding the difference between S'abda-pramâna and S'abda-Pratyaksha.

"क्योऽय "

and

"स्त्रूण "

Gn. states in brief the Naiyâyikas' view that a word possesses power ( विरूः ) to convey the sense ( विरूः ). This S'akti is nothing but the desire of God that from a particular word a particular sense is to be understood. Without entering into details he passes on the discussion of "स्त्रूण ".

Naiyâyikas admit two kinds of the power of a word, viz., "विरूः " and "स्त्रूण " . The grammarians and rhetoricians admit one more kind, viz., "सांवराव " , but it is included under the first two kinds by Naiyâyikas.

Gn. explains "स्त्रूण " and gives two views about the nature of "स्त्रूण " . The neo-logicians' view is that "तावद " is not necessary. There is "तावद स्त्रूण " in "स्त्रूण " and that is enough. Ancient

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198. Ibid. P. 336. See also TD. PP. 50-51 and NSH. PP. 265-276.
Naiyāyikas do not agree to it. They think that "तत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति" is necessary in "तत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति", and hence, there must be "तत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति". Gn. does not show his preference to either of these two kinds. However, the view of neo-logicians seems to be more logical.

Gn. also points out the controversy whether the "मात्रमथात्मथति" imply "तत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति" or "तत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति". He finally quotes the "तत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति" that "सत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति" is not used in "तत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति". He then follows Ganges'a in the classification of "तत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति" and divides it into (i) "सत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति" and (ii) "तत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति", and explains them in brief.

The other varieties of "बिजुवि", "विजु", "सत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति" and "सत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति" are included in "सत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति" by Gn.

Veda.

Incidentally, Gn. explains Veda's S'abha.

Pramāṇa. Veda is "तत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति". Veda.


TS. shows a third variety "सत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति". P. 51. NB. divides "सत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति" into "सत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति" and "सत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति" and includes the first two varieties under the "सत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति". Rhetoricians have discussed "सत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति" in detail, e.g. "सत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति" divides "सत्त्वमात्रमथात्मथात्मथति", thus:

...
is the creation from the Knowledge of God. A "देवदात्त" is different from "वल्लभदवादिक" in the sense that while in the case of the later there is a possibility of conviction through perception, in the former it is not so.

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(12) "अध्ययन" and "अनुपलाब्धी"

Arthāpatti.

After explaining fully the nature and scope of the four Pramāṇas, K. shows that some other Pramāṇas like Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhi, accepted by Mīmāṃsakas are not independent. Arthāpatti can be included under Vyātireki-anumāna and Anupalabdhi can be included under Pratyakṣa.

Gn., following GV., does not discuss much about Arthāpatti.

Anupalabdhi.

On coming to the problem of the non-existence ("अनुचित" or "उद्धृती"), Gn. makes it clear that both Nyāyaikas and Bhaṭṭas School of Mīmāṃsakas do not deny the reality of non-existence. He also shows that only "अनुपलाब्धी"
should be understood by the term " नात्तकोऽरु " .

The non-existence means the non-existence of an object that might be existent before or that which has its counter-entity (" असंपत्तिः "). The difference between Naiyāyikas and Bhāttas lies regarding the comprehension of the non-existence. Naiyāyikas believe that non-existence is directly perceived by the senses like all other external objects. Kumārila, on the other hand, rejects this view and says that it is comprehended by a separate Pramāṇa called Anupalabdhi.

" नुद्दककटम् "

The arguments of the " नुद्दककटम् " against the Nyāya-view that the non-existence is perceived by senses - as presented by Ka. and explained by Chn and GV, can be summed up thus -

The direct perception of the non-existence is not possible. The senses generate knowledge of that object only with which they came in a direct contact. But no such contact is possible between the senses and non-existence. For the relation of the contact, is either " नुद्दककटम् असंपत्तिः " . But neither of these two is found to exist between the senses and the non-existence. If it is argued that the perception of the non-existence can take place by a peculiar relation called " नुद्दककटम् असंपत्तिः ",

it will not hold good in as much as the "विषेषणार्थशून्यकोण शून्यशून्याभाव" is not a relation at all.

Refutation.

The objection is refuted by Ka., who says that the principle of senses reaching an object for the direct perception is applicable only in the case of positive objects (अर्थसूचकता). The same maxim need not be applied in the case of "अर्थसूचकता तः" अर्थात् "is perceived by senses by means of अर्थविशेषज्ञ अर्थविशेषज्ञाभाव",.

In absence of such kind of a "अर्थसूचकता", if a separate Pramāṇa is accepted for the comprehension of "कोण", it will be difficult to account for the process by which the said comprehension can occur. If no relation is accepted, and yet "कोण" is to be asserted, then one can equally comprehend a "दिक्षितात्", even when a "दीर्घ" is present on the ground. Hence, there is an invariability of some kind of "संबंध" here - and that "संबंध" is "अर्थविशेषाभ्यास", where, though the empty ground is seen, it is "दिक्षितात् रिवर्धा वर्ग", and thus it gives raise to the comprehension of the "दिक्षितात्".

203. Ibid. Pp. 335-357.