CHAPTER IV.

(i)

(9) Anumāna (Inference)

(i)

After the Pratyaksha Pramāṇa, Anumāna is to be discussed. This Pramāṇa is accepted by all except Ārāmaṇa.

Definition.

Ke. defines Anumāna as 'तत्त्वार्थमानिश्च' and explains 'तत्त्वार्थमानिश्च' as 'स्वाधिकारितैत्तिकाभिभक्तम्' and again - 'तत्त्वार्थमानिश्च' as 'साधारणविनियमम्'.

Three steps.

In explaining his view point, he states there is the perception of the 'hetu' (probans) (e.g. smoke) and the Sādhya (probandum, e.g. fire) in many places, and thus the formation of the invariable concomitance (Vyāpti) between them. Secondly, there is the perception of the probans on the subject (e.g. a hill). Lastly, on remembering the Vyāpti, there is the inference of the Sādhya on the Pakshe.

As this is the touch stone of the ancient and modern philosophers, the commentators discuss this 'तत्त्वार्थमानिश्च' and its components, like 'प्रत्येक', 'कारौं' and 'आर्यपि' in minute technical detail.

113 Tbr. PP. 30-33. 114 Ibid. PP. 32-37. 115 Tok. P. 31.
Parāmāsa's.

GV. starts the discussion with the term Parāmāsa. He states that 'रत्ना' should not be interpreted as 'रत्नानुपानक(रत्नानुपान)'. He shows the defects in that understanding and concludes it as 'रत्नानुपानक(रत्नानुपान)'.

Gn. fully supporting the viewpoint of GV, elaborates the definition.

In explaining the term 'रत्नानुपानक(रत्नानुपान)', GV refutes the objection that the definition includes 'पार्षद', Gn. points out that this objection is stated by (Prakṣabhāra)Mal;'raj. He thinks it necessary to explain the term 'रत्ना' and supports GV.


116. TT. PP. 183-184 Cf. 'स्वाभाविकविवरणप्रचारविवरण' परम्या:।

Ts. P. 34. See also NB. on it PP. 35-36.

* It is interesting to note that Gn., when discussing the nature of Parāmāsa has not accepted the definition of the "रत्नानुपान" as "विद्याधर विद्याधर" (TT. P. 67 - especially in case of "स्वप्न प्रार्थना " ), here he has no objection in accepting it, because he accepts "धर्म एव" " to be the cause of "यद वृत्तिः तत् " (TT. P. 183). However, afterwards, he makes it clear that "स्वाभाविकविवरण " is the "चर्चा " of "अनुसूचय " and "विवाह " is "विवाह", but to those who believe in the "विवाहकारण" (TT. PP. 246-247) "

50.

(ii)

Vyāpti.

While coming on the nature and the definition of the Vyāpti, GV. starts neologistic discussion, but does not go deep into it and abruptly stops saying, "इत्यादि विधानोऽविद्यते किंयते तिथिः कलाङ्गाद्विताः।"

Gn., however, is not satisfied thus. He follows Ganges'ā, the pioneer of Navya-Nyāya. Several definitions of the Vyāpti are presented, criticised and modified sometimes by Gn.

Thus, he brings out the fullest meaning of both the terms, viz., "सत्य च चारं" and "विवेकयं" of the definition of the Vyāpti (सत्य च चारं विवेकयं), as given by Ke. Gn. explains "सत्यचारं" as 120 "सत्यायं चारं विवेकयं", and "विवेकयं" as "विषयविशेषणं चारंसू " and writes "कर्म अ कार्यवेक्षणविवेकयं, मायामयविवेकयं दुःखाविवेकयं।"

Other definitions of Vyāpti.

Now, he proceeds to examine a definition of Vyāpti as quoted by GV. "सत्यायं चारं विवेकयं अविवेकत्वं त्योमविवेकयं आद्यत्योमत्योमविवेकयं।" 122. Gn. makes it -

119. Tpk. P. 33.
120. TT. pp. 137-138.
121. TT. pp. 137-138.
122. Tpk. P. 32.
51.

Thus, the definition is faulty in the sense that it is not applicable in the inference "हामी सिद्धांतः भावः अवधारणा: एव तर्कः न होतः भावः इदं व्याकरणम् न तद्विद्यायाः नद्यद्विद्यायाः निर्देशः संबंधः। तद्विद्यायाः इन्द्रियं अज्जितं रूपम्। अनुभवार्धः कथेन्द्रः कथान्तरार्धः।"

He then gives in detail various objections against this definition and proves that this definition is faulty. During this discussion, he also refers to the view of his father and ultimately concludes with the words "दृष्टान्तः इस्ते रूपम्। अधिकः विद्वान्मव्यायः एवम्।"

Second definition.

Now, Gn. starts to examine another definition of the Vyāpti "व्याप्तिः सिद्धांतावलं भावावलं आदिवलं।" He shows that it is also faulty, as it cannot be applied in the inference "हारसिद्धांतः भावः", "अनुभवायाः", because the "अनुभवायाः" of "अनुभवायाः" is "अनुभवायाः". He fully explores the concepts of "व्रतियोग सर्वस्वप्रेरिता अस्वप्रेरिता भावः" and "समावेशस्वप्रेरिता अस्वप्रेरिता भावः". In this connection, he also discusses the nature of "अभावोः" with reference to the "अभावोः" and criticises the view of नव्य-मेयेयिक्स etc.

One more definition.

Similarly, he examines one more definition.

125 Ibid. P. 190. 126 Ibid. P. 195.
of the Vyāpti quoted by GV., viz., "क्षणम्वतत्पित्र-योग्यताधिकारण्यम्. ग्रन्थसन्मतत्र।" 129

Gn. explains this definition by "पदेव कृतस्य " method. He shows that it is applicable to the "के व्यापरमार्थ न भवित ", and hence, is free from any fault that lies with the former definition. Gn. however, points out that even this definition is not faultless. It is not applicable even in the pet example, "धृतीर्घातः, धृतीर्घात! ". Here, one can find "उपपत्ति जन्य " of "धृतिः " with "धृतस्य ", because "न्यायोजन " is "अत्यादात्मकता ".

At least in some part ( of the hill ), the absence of "धृतिः " with "धृतस्य ", can be found out. He winds up the discussion implying the reader to refer to Sriromani Tippeśā.

GV's final definition.

Gn. now gives the definition of the Vyāpti, which is considered to be faultless by GV. It is "सत्यत्वम् रासायनलीकरणः चतुर्द्वितीयः कर्तव्यम् ". 132

Gn. shows how this definition can be applied to all kinds of the valid inference.

129. Tpk. P. 32. 130. TT. P. 211.
133. Ibid. PP. 217-221.
53.

Śiromani's definition.

Gn., summing up the discussion, gives that definition of Vyāpti that is accepted by all. It is given by Śiromani, thus, "तत्त्वज्ञानस्य स्यां माय सत्त्वगृहिणीम् विद्यमान
tतितिः प्रतिज्ञानवल्लकरं भवं [ चक्षुं ]", which simply means the absence of the locus other than the Hetu. Gn. concludes the discussion suggesting to refer to the Hārideva-Tippaṇa for further detail.

(iii)

Avacchedaka.

As the term "प्रत्ययेदां " plays the key-role in the various definitions of Vyāpti and of other such important technical terms in other schools too. Gn. rightly explains its meaning. He states "प्रत्ययेदां " to be a "स्कन्द-समस्यां
विनिकुल " It is a differentia and not an externally conspicuous property ( गुणविभाजन ), because it is not connected with the very essence of the thing, e.g. "कव्यकोलापायिति सर्व " is the " गुणविभाजन " of a "घट "; but it is not the essence of the "घट ", and, therefore, not an "प्रत्ययेदां ".
It always co-exists with the "स्थायिः " and never co-exists with anything other than the "स्थायिः ". Understood in this sense, it will help to make the definition of any term precise, exact and perhaps, perfect.
(iv)

On the necessity of the three steps of Paramārtha.

While discussing the three steps of "सङ्केतकता", Gən. gives prominence to the first step, i.e., the comprehension of the Vyāpti. If Vyāpti is remembered simultaneously with the perception of "सङ्केतक "then there can be "सङ्केतकता "directly in the very first step. And, if it is remembered immediately after the perception of "सङ्केतक", the "सङ्केतकता "can take place at the second step. There is no necessity of the third step.

(v)

Validity of the Vyāpti.

Gən. now proceeds to discuss the validity of the Vyāpti. Kumārila says that Vyāpti is known through repeated observation (अवचेष्टतेन). When we experience smoke and fire together in a number of cases, we connect smoke in general with fire in general after eliminating their non-recurrent features (सङ्केतकत्व), such as a particular shade of colour, a particular shape or size, etc.

136. T.P. 228.
Thus, Vyāpti is induction per simple enumeration.

"भूयोदर्तः").

Naiṣṭhikas also generally accept the
"भूयोदर्तः" as one of the means to know Vyāpti.
(त्यागतःग्रहणयं), but it is not the absolute
means. Ganges's openly criticises "भूयोदर्तः"
139.
saying, "त्यागतः नै भूयोदर्तःग्रहणयाया". Gn., following
Ganges's cites following three alternatives,
(i) observation in many places, (ii) observation
of many instances, or (iii) observation of the same
instances many times. The first two will not help
as the observation of colour of a particular
object may be perceived in all the places wherever
the object is, but it may not yield any fruitful
knowledge. The third alternative becomes useless
when only one instance is found where the relation
between the supposed "देतु" and "सत्य" is
violated.

Anticipating this difficulty, Ke. inserts
the word "स्वदेशिका" with "भूयोदर्तः" and
-says "भूयोदर्तःभूयोदर्तः". Dr. Hatt. Epist. of the Hatt School of
Parva Mimansa. PP. 222-223.

139. TC. 140. TT.P. 233.
140. Ibid. P. 234. Cp. also "क्रियात्मकालिकाकोणक "Vyāpti क्रियात्मक"
T.C.
like other Naiyāyikas, explains the word "यशोदर्शी" as "नृद्धिकार्य" and states that "भूयोदर्शी" will lead to the knowledge of Vyāpti only when there is no "चर्या". Otherwise, mere "भूयोदर्शी" will lead to a "चार्यचर्याचार्यछल", e.g. the Vyāpti between "अत्रललागत" and "अत्याचर्य", which can be vitiated by her any future son born with white complexion. This Vyāpti is vitiated, because "अत्रललागत" is not the cause of "अत्याचर्य", but "क्षात्रीय घर्ण परिणाम" is the real cause. This vitiating factor or the condition is called "उपाधि" that prevents the "चत्वारिष्ठमन्त्ररूप" in spite of the "भूयोदर्शी". Hence, the stress is laid on "अत्याचर्य" rather than on "भूयोदर्शी". G. concludes, - चत्वारिष्ठमन्त्ररूपं भूयोदर्शी भूवोदर्शी विभेदेऽत्याचर्यात्मकः। कपिलस्वयं "चयवित्तार्य वियमणविश्रावः। चयवित्तार्यांमारणां।" "तृषु" ऐसे अत्याचर्य चयवित्त गर्भाधिनि मिशोर स्वयमः।

**Absence of Upāchī.**

This, a Vyāpti can be free from "चयवित्तार्य" if no such Upāchī is found. The purpose of the...

140. *Ibid.* P. 234. *op. also* चयवित्तार्यांमारणांसि। कपिलसेवनीचिन्तामणी। । तृषु, चयवित्त चयवित्ता मारणां उपाध्यायविशेष्टमारणां। S.P. "T.C."
Upadhi is to show that 'hetu', i.e. the middle term is not "ध्वेण्यापि". It should be "ध्वेण्या" to be a real one. The Upadhi finds out the defect of the 'hetu' and shows that it is not the proper 'hetu', but a - "एकं द्वितीयं भागं"
. Thus, Upadhi itself is "not necessarily a defect, since it misleads only when it is not recognized". So, whenever an Upadhi is suspected every effort should be made to locate it by "अर्थार्थं-तत्त्वंतिप्रक्रिया" method. If this Upadhi is only imaginary (अर्थार्थं-तत्त्वंतिप्रक्रिया), it is needless to go after it. But, if it is real, "(तोर्य)" it can be detected.

But, how can it be detected? "अर्थार्थं-तत्त्वंतिप्रक्रिया" instances are not sufficient. Gn. quotes Ganges'a and says the absence of the "तोर्य" , Upadhi, should be ascertained with the help of the hypothetical reasoning (तपस्वी). He also quotes Udayana for the support.

Gn. now examines certain other views on the "तपस्वी". He quotes Mimamsaka view-perhaps that of Prabhakara—according to which the knowledge of Vyapti is obtained by a single act of sense-perception. The Vyapti between smoke and fire

141. Dr. Radhakrishnan, I.Phil. Vol. II. P. 87.
142. TT. PP. 236-237.
143. Ibid. P. 237.
is apprehended in the very first observation of the two together and what subsequent observations do is merely to remove Upādhi, if there is any. Gn. states that this view is not acceptable to ancient Naiyāyikas. He concludes that it can be successful only when helped by the revival of the memory-impressions of previous experiences.

The above view of ancient Naiyāyikas is not acceptable to the neo-logicians. Gn. explains the same.

Gārvāka's view.

Gārvāka refuses to accept any of these views as he thinks that the very concept of Vyāpti as baseless and consequently, disregards Anumāna as Pramāṇa at all.

Conclusion:

Gn., summing up the discussion, states that the "व्याप्ति-" wedded with the absence of "विद्ययः", the later being ascertained with the help of Tarka, is the only criteria of the knowledge of a Vyāpti. The "नूत्तरकोश" helps?

144. Ibid. PP. 241-242, see also Epi. of the Bhāṭṭa School...P. 234-235.
145. TT. PP. 241-242, cf. अर्थात् अनुभव प्रकोष्ठमेण समनुस्यादि करण्यसे श्रुतिः स्वस्यादिक अवस्यादि करण्यसे समारोहयः।

146. TT. P. 242.

147. Ibid. P. 243.
the function of the Tarka by supplying instances of both "सन्यास" and "मेध्यक" types.

He further explains the role of Vyāpti in the formation of Parāśars'as.

(vi)

However, the problem of "व्याप्तिः किं देशारणा" remains yet unsolved. All the means to get the correct knowledge of Vyāpti, viz., "सन्यासयत्निक", "गूढ़ोदेश्वर", "पुरकिर्नामस" and "तात्क" are yet inadequate. These are eliminating factors no doubt, but have their own limitations. They do exclude a possibility of an exception. Ganges'a resorts to "सन्यासय वेदिण्या प्रत्यास्थिति" (apprehension of the universals), making it a variety of "अलोकिक प्रत्यक्ष". When a particular smoke is perceived through the visual organ, allsmokes are perceived in a non-sensuous way through "fireness" which is their generic character.

Gn. while discussing the nature of "स्तम्भकर्तव्यम्" explores the significance of "स्तम्भकर्तव्यम् प्रत्यास्थिति" making a casual -

148-149. Ibid. PP. 246-251.

150. "व्याप्तिः किं देशारणा" सन्यासयत्निक प्रत्यास्थिति सन्यासय वेदिण्या अलोकिक प्रत्यक्ष "व्याप्तिः, कपालस्थानम् पर्यावृष्टम् व्याप्तिः अक्षमादुपितकः। त.स. (अनुभववर्णे)\)
60.

reference to "कोल-कृत्तिका" and "नमकरणकाल प्रत्यास्परित"

It should be noted that neither Ke. nor GV. has -
touched this point. Gn. follows Gaag's in explaining
the nature of this "प्रतिनिधि अर्द्ध". He says though
there is "उत्तमीदः के अर्द्ध" "here, it is based
on "कौमः के अर्द्ध" 151. In a way is an
'inductive jump' from known to unknown as suggested
by Mill.

The proof of "अतिराज्यभाषण-धारणार्थम" can be found in our day-to-day experience. A person
always wants to acquire an un-attained pleasure -
through an object which afforded him similar -
pleasure in the past. When he perceived a pleasure
in the past. When he perceived a pleasure in the past
he had perceived all similar pleasures through -
"अतिराज्यभाषण-धारणार्थम". Therefore, he desires
to attain it in the present. Knowledge is the
cause of a desire, desire is the cause of volition,
and voluntary pursuits of future pleasures -
pre-suppose the "अतिराज्यभाषण-धारणार्थम" of all the
similar pleasures.

(Vii)

Threesfold
Hetu.

The three-fold division of a "कोल-कृत्तिका", viz.

151-152. T.T. 251-254. T.C.
"अन्यायस्वत्यत्तियः" "केषरकः उपयोगः" "and"
"केषरकः-चारणः" - is discussed in detail by
Gn. though G.V. does not discuss it much.

With suitable illustrations, he tries to
bring out in full the difference between "केषरकः-
न्दनः" "and" "केषरकःचारणः गुणः". The "न्दनः"
of a "केषरकःचारणः गुणः" is also "केषरकःचारणः,"
I.e., its "अप्रत्ययः भाषा" exists nowhere, which
means that "न्दनः" co-exists with the whole class
of the existing objects. So, there is no "न्दनः".
In the case of the "केषरकःचारणः गुणः", the "न्दनः"
has a negative Vyāpti with the absence of the "न्दनः"
Here, both "न्दनः" and "न्दनः" stay in the "पशु"
only. There is no "न्दनः" here. Gn. takes
the stock example "पुरुषाः" कल्पिते भाषा "पर्यायः, पुरुषः" and
indulges into a suitable discussion typical
to the Navya-Vyāsa school.

During the discussion, Gn. accepts the
view of Udayana, that even "केषरकःचारणः चारणः"
can be presented in an "उत्तर बाथः" from to
make "व्यायामितिविधापर्यायः" तत्त्वः "possible to -
arrive at" "अणुसूचितः". But at the same time,
he proves that even in "केषरकःचारणः चारणः" the
above formula can be applicable.

153. Ibid. PP. 261-274.
154. Ibid. PP. 268-271. Cp. TD. P. 41qsee also
   Ts. notes PP. 285-287.
155. TT. PP. 272-273.
Ke. defines "प्रति" as "प्रति (प्रति) सत्यायतना" i.e. when the presence of "सत्य" is doubtful. Because, if the presence of "सत्य" (i.e. fire) is certain on the hill, there is no need of an inference at all. But some times, even though the fire is ascertained in the hill, somebody may have a desire to prove it by an inference - (अनुमान) j to convince the other person. This definition, therefore,"अनुमान" as shown by GV.

GV. now gives another definition of - "प्रति" as "अनुमानस्वरूप सत्यायतन स्वयं" which simply means that no inference is possible - when there is no desire to infer and the object to be inferred is already known.

Gn. explores fully the meaning of - "विचारार्थ" in the above definition. He makes it clear by giving three-fold explanation as, "विचारार्थ मापक" 156"विचारार्थ मापक" 156 and "विचारार्थ विचार॥ 156-157 Tpk. P. 42; see also notes PP. 28-29.

157. TT. PP. 275-278.

158°"
After explaining "पञ्जाठ" *, Gm. ignoring "ठप्प है" refers to "बापस है" - and concludes the discussion on "अनुशासन".

**

(10) Hetvābhasas.

Ke. has discussed the hetvābhasas twice in Tbh, viz. (i) while dealing with the anumānas - and (ii) while discussing actual hetvābhasas as - the thirteenth category. GV. as a commentator - follows the path, but he limits himself at the first place by discussing "वत्तापार्थविधिः" 158-*
hetvābhasa. Gm. follows GV. in this respect - and avoids the repetition. Both the commentators discuss hetvābhasas at their proper place.

Ke's view on hetvābhasa.

Ke. explains hetvābhasa, those 'hetus'- that lack in any one of the five requisites (viz. "पञ्जाठ धमसंवय", "सर्वपदेः सर्वसम", "सर्वपदेः अर्हतयम्", "सर्वपदेः उच्चारयति", "अर्हतयम् परशी " and "अवापित- 
सिनियम") of a valid 'hetu'. 160.

158-* Tbh. PP. 42-45 and 101-110.
159. "सर्वपदेः अर्हतयम्: तत्त्वस्ति कार्यस्तु पूणः विहारसः:।।
Tpk. P. 42.
160. Tbh. P. 42.
64.

**GV's definition.**

But seeing that this is more an explanation than a definition of 'hetvābhasa', GV gives the definition of the same as,

"प्राप्तवर्णितार्थविनिर्देश निर्देश अन्तर्यां विख्यतः अवधेशक्रिया (विशेष) न्यायान् बास्तव [विषय] त्ैवमात्मान्यत् [व]। 161"

**Gn.'s discussion.**

Gn. explores the significance of this definition in full, and shows how it applies to all of the five 'hetvābhasas'. He quotes Ganges'a's definition of 'hetvābhasa', which is also adopted by Annembehatta with a slight change.

This definition, however, is defective in some way as it does not cover the 'hetudōgas' like "व्यवस्था", "द्विस्तम", "स्त्राधिकारिनि" and "क्षत्रीयानि", which prevent an anumiti indirectly, i.e. through "व्याख्यातिरिक्त" or 
"व्याख्यातिरिक्त" or "परमार्श". Considering this defect, the author of Didhiti suggests to understand anumiti as "विद्यते (क)विधिति", i.e. "यद्यपीयम्
वाक्यं", as "तवायत्वायम् ध्वनिवत् परंतो प्राप्तक".

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162. TT. PP. 597-603.
163. "अनुपातवर्णितार्थविनिर्देशार्थिर्विनिष्ठार्थिर्विनिष्ठधर्मसृजनितः। अतः। प 600
cf. अनुपातवर्णविनिष्ठार्थिर्विनिष्ठार्थिर्विनिष्ठधर्मसृजनितः। ज्ञानाधिकः। [ सङ्गम 44 ]
" TD. P. 44.
Other writers have also seen this defect and added the adjective "कर्मस्थितः" to be free from it. In this respect GV's definition seems to be more correct. Its elucidation by Gn. proves the same.

MUTUAL difference among धेत्वाभासस।

Gn. shows the minute difference of each of the 'धेत्वाभासस' from each other. Ke. quotes the definition of "अति" as given by Udayana - which is equally applicable to "कृत्यः" and other 'धेत्वाभासस'. Ke. defending Udayana states

164. TS. Notes P. 295. See also NSV. P. 78 ff. also "वधुः भुवनायान अवलयांगितिः विज्ञानिति [रेत्वाभासस]" NSM. P. 238 and "अनुवक्तानवामिति राजानिति ऐसे प्रकरणं यथा धेत्वाभासस जो द्रविष्णवी अथात्॥"

"Ibid. P. 244. See also Dinakari on this.

165. TT. PP. 598-600.
166-167. "तर्क भोजनमः भाषात्तथ विचारवेलं प्रत्येकं भएः। पद्धतियोऽदिनः (स)मित्रबाबुंद्री विद्वानापतिः। वर्ष वर्षम् विपरीतहरूः सत्कारप्रवृत्तिः त्रिविंशत्रम् प्रत्येके। वर्षानि विविधान्तम् न धारणं तथा लेख्यं। शहि यत्र सधनोति दीर्घः पुरुषः अध्यात्मिक दुर्घटनाः अहुः। विकृत्ति दाहिन्दा कागजाः। दुःखिन्निस्तिरम् भावत्। अति॥"

Thb. P. 102. Gv. explains that "अति" takes place when there is "मनोनामवयांगितः. (Tpk. P. 102). Gn. explaining "मनोनामवयांगितः" as "कर्मस्थितः" suggests that "अति धेत्वाभासस" can happen -
that where several 'hetvabhāsa' are possible that which occurs prominently to one's mind at first, should be pointed out and not else.

"स्व वाक " in "स्वप्रतिज्ञात "

GV. follows Ke. Gn. clearly states that there is nothing wrong in "स्व वाक " of "प्रतिज्ञात " . In such cases a particular, "Hetvabhāsa", will be marked out conscientiously, and, therefore, to find out another 'hetvabhāsa' may be considered useless. ("स्वप्रतिज्ञात न देक्तम"")

166-167 (continued), either by the absence of the proper Vyāpti or that of the "प्रतिज्ञात " . The absence of the knowledge of Vyāpti is found also in "वेद कव " and "अवकेशात्मक" . Therefore, these two can be included in the present definition of "प्रतिज्ञात " .

168-169. TT. FF. 605-606 Cp. (In. अवकेशात्मक अवकेशात्मक) अनुवाद है विद्वान् "अवकेशात्मक" "वाक में अवकेशात्मक परावर्तित कारणोऽप्राप्तम् यथावस्तुः - अपाध्याय अवकेशात्मक महाकालः दशमी अवकेशात्मकानां बुद्धिगान परमात्मक महाकालः।

Dadhichi quotes by Athley Ts. No. P.294.
Cf. also - आत्मकार्यसाध्यारूपाणि आत्मकार्यसाध्यारूपाणि द्वादशात्मकानां तत्र अवकेशात्मकानां (उद्देश्यकोपनिर्धारित) च। तद्भवतात्मकम् (अलंकारैः)।

NSM. P. 245.
Following Ke. and GV. "वग्नप्रत्यय् सिद्धे:"
is stated as two fold by Gn. In the first type he
 cites the example "अमृत सत नल आयुकम", -
 where there is no need of उपःधिः, it can be
 rejected on the ground of rejecting the Vyāpti, at
 all. Gn. elaborates the meaning of the terms -
 उपाधि. He examines its definition, viz.,"स्त्रध्य
 चतुर्भुजाय सति अपेरुतो चेतुः", in detail refuting
 the possible objections against it.

Difference between

Following GV., Gn. makes clear the
difference between "वग्नप्रत्यय्" and "अनौपकारिकम्"
(उपप्रत्यय्), "चतुर्भुजाय is a "चातुर्भुजाय"
The "वग्नप्रत्यय्" for a valid Vyāpti is the
 presence of a 'हेतु' in a "वग्नप्रत्यय्" and its
 absence in a "चातुर्भुजाय". So, there is "चातुर्भुजाय"
if (i) the 'हेतु' is found in both "वग्नप्रत्यय्" and
"वग्नप्रत्यय्" (ii) is absent in both of them or
(iii) is present in "वग्नप्रत्यय्" and absence in
"वग्नप्रत्यय्". The first two cases give rise
to "उपप्रत्यय्" and "अनौपकारिकम् उपप्रत्यय्"
respectively. The third, however, is the case of
"वग्नप्रत्यय्". So, it is natural if somebody
wants to include "चातुर्भुजाय", under "अनौपकारिकम् के"
To avoid this, Ke. has inserted the adjective -
Curiously enough Gn. tries to show -
difference between "स्प्रत्तिक्ष्" and "सङ्केते",
which is not even suggested either by Kes. or by GV.
He states, in "स्प्रत्तिक्ष्", nothing is decided, the
same is the case with "सङ्केते". Gn. thinks
that there is "किं तानम्" in "रक्तम्" "while
there is "किं तानम्" in "सङ्केते", which is
not correct.

In fact, the second variety of "सङ्केते"
resembles much with "रक्तम्", There is also
"किं तानम्" "owing to the "प्रयोगकोलम". In
"स्प्रत्तिक्ष्" a counter argument confronts the
first sometimes to gain victory over the opponent.

Hence, it is not a rule that there is always "सङ्केते"
in "रक्तम्".

170. Thh. P. 42; Tt. PP. 293-281.
175. Tt. P. 612.
176. "रक्तम्", "किं तानम्" यथेतस्य उपलब्धिक्षिप्तम् नाना (प्रयोगकोलम)
"सङ्केते". Thh.P.92.

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