INTRODUCTION
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THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF STUDY

One of the most fascinating chapters in the history of contemporary world is the emergence of three actors on the world scene during the mid twentieth century - the U.S., the USSR and India - with their characteristically different personalities. The first two emerged as the Superpowers by the end of the World War II, and the third was born not into one world but two. The phenomenal changes in the international scenario during 1947-1964 considerably influenced the behaviour of these actors towards each other as a natural consequence of their interdependence.

Thinking about the approaches between countries shares, to a high degree, the problems of thinking about any other area of social life. The intention of the author here is not to make an exposition of the methods of the social sciences, which would be, by necessity, both lengthy and controvertial, and instead merely to refer to some useful catagories of thinking.

By their very nature all social phenomena demand classification and categorisation and some specific characteristics which are unique to them. As the social life is a seamless robe one has to define both the boundaries of the subject and its linkage with the context. Social realities have conflicting characteristics - conflict with cooperation, strength with weakness, idealism with realism, concern with the past with the vision of the future. Any study which excludes these, is incomplete.
When we speak about the relations between the Soviet Union and India or the United States with India, we sometimes tend to believe as if they are individuals, and, therefore, we begin to think about them in the same way. We forget that they, in fact, are our mental constructs. The present study, therefore, is a slight departure from the studies of "relationships" between states, and tries to analyse the forces that influence their attitudinal and institutional make-up. As such the significance of the past in relation to the present is emphasised.

THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The broad theoretical framework of the present study is built on the premise that the past plays an important role in making of the foreign policies of the modern states. Qualitatively and quantitatively, the levels of historical consciousness of all the three actors—the U.S., the USSR and India—are different from each other. More so, their interplay in the manifestations of their political, economic, social and cultural status, attained through the zig-zag of history, makes a fascinating study of international relations.

Historically, though the U.S. is the youngest actor, yet in an age increasingly dominated by science and technology, its political thinkers advocate the need for looking at the past. There is a growing realisation in them that they cannot solve their present-day problems by casting off the heavy burden of the past. Speaking about America's historical consciousness, Francis L. Leowenheim says:
"It (historical influence) has made itself felt in some of our most passionate national debates in the last half century. Who has forgotten the great debates in the country in the twenties and thirties over the question of "war-guilt" and American intervention in the First World War? Who has forgotten the bitter debates of the forties and fifties over Pearl Harbour, the war-time conferences, and the Communist triumph in China? Who is not aware of the fact that much of what we say and do these days about the urgent problems of American foreign policy, about our relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China, about Cuba and Vietnam, is based to a considerable extent on our idea of recent history, the extent to which we think our time resembles the years before 1914 or before 1939? Who can ignore the fact that many of our current differences of opinion about the meaning of America's historical experience and its place and role in world affairs?"¹

The interplay of history and diplomacy in America has been justified on the ground that all great Presidents--Jefferson, Lincoln, Roosevelt, Wilson, Eisenhower, Truman and Keneddy and their policy-makers like Dean Rusk, Kennan and John Foster Dulles --- felt most the weight of the past. Speaking at the University of California in March, 1962, Kennedy said:

"No one who examines the modern world can doubt that the great currents of history are carrying the world away from the monolithic idea toward the pluralistic idea... No one can doubt that the wave of the future is not the conquest

of the world by a single dogmatic creed but the liberation of
the diverse energies of free nations and free men."²

What is true of America is truer of the USSR. The Communist leaders have a
greater sense of historical consciousness for they are fortified with a theory and a
dogma that put history on their side. In Marxism "God is personified History". The
dialectical materialist conception of history elaborated by the genius of Marx and
Engels and profoundly developed by Lenin, has played a leading role in the struggle
for peace and social progress in present-day society. Society's history is made by people.
"History", Marx wrote, "does nothing, it possesses no immense wealth, it wages no
battles. It is man, real living man, that does all that; that possesses and fights; history is
not a person apart, using man as a means for its own particular aims, history is nothing
but the activity of man pursuing his aim."³ It follows, therefore, it is social man who is
creator and vehicle of social progress, not a man in general, however, but specific and
social class force of society. On the basis of such an historical interpretation of society,
the USSR, under the leadership of Lenin, demolished the citadel of Tsarism paved the
way for a new era of transition --- socialism and capitalism. The historical role of the
CPSU in formulating and executing the Soviet foreign policy with such an ideological
content of peaceful coexistence is the history that permeates throughout the Soviet
approach to other nations after the 1917 Revolution.

What is true of the Superpowers' historical consciousness may not be equally
true of India; but it is a nation having a great and glorious past, an ancient heritage and

a pluralistic society. India’s longest and unique history forms the philosophical
foundation of its foreign policy in modern times. Aurobindo Ghosh said:

"The true nature of the Indian polity can only be
realised if we look at it not as a separate thing, a machinery,
independent of the rest of the mind and life of people, but as
a part of, and in relation to, the organic totality of social
existence."\(^4\)

The writings of Vivekanand, Tagore, Tilak, Gandhi and Nehru show that the
ancient values are very much alive in modern Indian thought, however much in practice
may have fallen short of the ideals. To illustrate: said Prime Minister Nehru in
Parliament on 9 Dec. 1958:

"What I have done is to give voice to that policy
(non-alignment)... I have not originated it. It is a policy
inherent in the circumstances in India, inherent in the past
thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of
India, inherent in the conditioning of Indian mind."\(^5\)

The historical experience is the bedrock of India’s foreign policy since 1946. In
the Cold War politics of today India has assiduously avoided taking sides. The pluralistic
outlook of the Indian mind has made the Indian people react instinctively against
communism and its claim to be the sole truth; likewise it has prevented from joining
the anti-communists. The bitterness and hatred with which communism is regarded in
Western countries is a puzzle to the Indian people, for the communistic ideals of
egalitarianism, sympathy for the underdog, economic betterment --- has some appeal
to them.

5. Jawaharlal Nehru: "India's Foreign Policy" Delhi,1961,p.80
To sum up, the present study takes into account the historical experiences as the backdrop of the great drama enacted by all the three actors in one of the most crucial periods of mankind.

THE SCOPE

The subject of this study is the approach of the Superpowers towards India --- a historical study. The U.S. with its assumption of a messianic global role for itself and its policy of containment and satellisation viewed India not only as a continuous irritant but also as an inveterate claimant to an independent role in international politics. Non-alignment became anathema to most Americans, and Nehru was dubbed an "aide and ally" of Communism by American leaders like George Meany and others.

Likewise, the Soviet Union's initial posture towards India was cool, distant and somewhat hostile. But it was the rigid insistence of the U.S. to go through with the arms agreement with Pakistan, brushing aside Indian objections, that was to create both the incentive and the opportunity for India and the USSR to draw closer together.

Between these two powers India was put to a great historical test. Given to its size, population, strategic location, historical past and creativity of its people, India embarked upon an innovative but courageous role in international politics at a time when the world was divided into two rigid camps. Its refusal to get stampeded into membership of either camp made it respectable for scores of other new nations. "What does", Nehru asked,"joining a bloc mean? After all it can only mean one thing: give up your view about a particular question, adopt the other party's view on that question in
order to please it and gain its favour. It was indeed, the desire to be independent in making India's own decisions and not to be a satellite of others that Nehru gave expression to such a role for India in the future.

Thus the approach of the Superpowers towards India encompasses not only the diplomatic manoeuvres of the two powers to a Third World country but it also highlights the undercurrents-their ideological moorings, their historical awareness, their techniques of pressures and their desire to keep their hegemony in tact. Since approaches are determined by reciprocal responses, it also includes the role of India towards them.

APPROACHES AND THEIR DIMENSIONS

Many of the conflicts in international relations are miserable predicaments in which nations become involved not because any one is right or wrong but because history has not blessed them in the same way and at the same time. The great currents of human life and their zig-zag movements make the march of civilisation too vast for comprehension. Perhaps, it is this phenomenon that gave birth to the antithesis of utopia and reality in the formulations of approaches. C.H. Carr beautifully summarises it. Says he:

"The two methods of approach -- the inclination to ignore what was and what is in contemplation of what should be, and the inclination to deduce what should be from what was and what is -- determine opposite attitudes towards every problem." 7

This antithesis is further underlined by Albert Sorl. He says: "It is the eternal dispute between those who imagine the world to suit their policy, and those who arrange their policy to suit the realities of the world."\textsuperscript{8}

Approaches are generally born of problems and attempts for their solutions. It becomes a historical compulsion to evolve bilateral and multilateral organisations like the League of Nations and the United Nations Organisation. But one of the reasons of their failure on several occasions is that an approach to a particular issue emerges not from the peoples but from the governments. Joseph Frankel, an authority on international affairs, has perceived this dilemma in a forthright manner. According to him:

"Political life does not invariably conform to legal rules determining competence, but in the making of foreign policy the formal decision-makers are particularly important. On the whole, the governments fully monopolise the control of foreign policy. This is partly due to the historical traditions dating from the absolutist period, and partly to the logic of the present situation, in which, as a rule, governments alone deal with other governments, command the best sources of information, and have the monopoly of legitimate, and a near-monopoly of physical force. Any influence on foreign policy coming from other sources must be exercised through governments," \textsuperscript{9}

However, sometimes, it emerges from an individual who is at the top of the

\textsuperscript{8} Quoted by William Ebenstein in his "Modern Political Thought", New York, 1947, p.796

\textsuperscript{9} Joseph Frankel: "International Relations in a Changing World", OUP, 1988, p.82
administrative hierarchy. "The McArthur affair reveals how far amok an official can go and the consequences of such a situation for foreign policy."\textsuperscript{10}

Similarly, Stalin narrowed the opportunities for a creative participation of masses. This led to the standardization of thought. "The idea of socialism got impeded because of the visage of a command-style bureaucratic administrative system."\textsuperscript{11} The head of government usually plays a decisive role. "In the United States, the members of the President's Cabinet are merely advisors; although this is oversimplified, it is fundamentally true, as President Truman remarked: "President makes foreign policy."\textsuperscript{12}

Another dimension to a nation's approach can be gauged by the fact that in the vortex of international relations and diplomacy it is always the representatives of a single dominant political faction or its coalition that roost the goose. The CPSU in the USSR, the Republicans or Democrats in the U.S. or the Congress Party of India have been the actual desiderata of the totality of the people in question.

The concept of ethics and morality -- a characteristic of the spirit of our civilisation also helps formulate approaches. No modern nation can afford to deny that altruism and sacrifice are the basic contents of man's life. Speaking on the disillusionment brought by the new Western civilisation, Pandit Nehru said:

"Communism comes in the wake of this disillusionment and offers some kind of faith and some of

\textsuperscript{10} L.Larry Leonard: "Elements of American Foreign Policy", New York, 1953,p.93
\textsuperscript{11} Soviet Review, No. 1983,p.32
\textsuperscript{12} Op.cit. p.9
discipline. To some extent it fills the vacuum. It succeeds in some measure in giving a content to man's life." 13 William O. Douglas gave a turn to American approach towards Asia when he said: "The greatest heritage that America has in the East comes from our teachers and missionaries. We must go to the East with humility not condescension, mindful of our debt for the great culture which the East has given us." 14

However, decision-makers disagree violently on ultimate, supreme values as much as do philosophers; some seek them primarily in individuals, as in the U.S., served by the collectivity of the state and others primarily in the collectivity, as in the USSR, which is to be served by its members; some pursue narrow nationalistic and others ecumenical values, be they ideological, religious, racial or regional. Whatever the substance of their beliefs, they are all concerned, above all, with the preservation of the essential features of social organisations of their respective states.

Approaches are also influenced by individual impulses and sentimentalities. The post-war history of diplomacy is littered with such examples when the diplomats and the decision-makers succumb to the temptation of public applause or present their country's case in a fit of emotional outburst. As Such, they render a great disservice not only to their own country but to the world at large, particularly so "when the bipolar system is so unsafe; when both blocs are in competitive contact...and the ambition of both is fired by the crusading zeal of a universal mission." 15

The economic realities also colour the approaches of a country in recent decades. Hardly any one would quarrel with the statement of Prof. Hans Morgenthau that "of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into practice of foreign policy none has proved more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid."\textsuperscript{16} The economic aid has become an instrument of foreign policy to be used along with other instruments, for the achievements of the donor's objectives. It is used as a 'craft' either to gain favour or to pressurise a country. More so, sometimes, the regular recipient of aid considers it an insult or injury when the aid is withdrawn or stopped.

Lastly, approaches have been considerably influenced by the historical reality that is now reflected in the rise of new nations, which have become independent of their colonial past and whose needs are quite different. In a bipolar world these countries having pluralistic societies and economic backwardness are subjected to the Superpowers' rivalry and competition.

Thus, these dimensions of approach help build the theoretical framework of this study.

**IMAGES AND PERCEPTIONS: THEIR CHARACTERISTICS**

In international relations, any study of approach cannot be said to be complete without analysing the characteristics of images and perceptions which play a prominent role in the formulation of approaches.

\textsuperscript{16} Hans Morgenthau: "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid", American Political Science Review, 56, 1962, p.301
The characteristics of images and perceptions can be summed up as under:

Firstly, the images and perceptions have the propensity of being mere inventions or distortions resulting from fears, irrational concerns or sometimes reflection of self-image.

Secondly, they also, sometimes, exhibit pre-dilections and prejudices on the basis of "information" internalised in the thought processes of the leaders and the public. Robert Jervis points out: "Among all events witnessed, first hand, those that occur early in the person's adult life have an especially great impact on his perceptual predilection...at an early stage in their lives people are open to new ideas and concepts that are once they have taken root, maintain a discernible influence for the rest of the person's life. Later events, although not without impact, are seen within a more established framework and so leave an impression that is not only reduced but also influenced by the earlier events... Many of the person's most fundamental orientations of his feelings, about his ability, to influence his environment, his judgement, whether the world is hostile or benign --- are formed in his childhood."\(^{17}\) The psychological aspect of perceptions sometimes lead to violent swings in rhetorics and politics. The mind of Dean Acheson is aptly summed up by Surjit Mansing: "At the Second World War there existed in America a profound ignorance of Asia in general and India in particular. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson's persistent childhood illusions that if the world were round, the Indians must be standing on their heads represented the vagueness prevailing even among educated Americans."\(^{18}\)

Thirdly, perceptions are also marked by exaggerations and oversimplifications. It so happens because politicians engage in the manipulation of people's attitude. The classic example may have been Winston Churchill's eloquent "iron-curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, in 1946.

Fourthly, perceptions and images are also influenced by the agents of political socialisation like religion. The decision-makers, who are inclined to religion, who are regular visitors of churches, are prone to form their perceptions on the basis of what picture the priests project about the peoples of other lands. It was the moralist and spiritual bringing of Dulles that explains his hatred for godless Russia or the Indian leadership of pre-independence era which was swept by a double current i.e., the development of religious and spiritual life and eping of the western concept of matter and life.

Fifthly, different cultural patterns also often trouble and alarm each other's peoples and leaders. Their perceptions, therefore, are either marked by a cool or classic competition or by emotional outbursts which affect their relation. Speaking about the U.S.-USSR cultural differences, George F. Kennan said: "The permanent environmental factors of the Soviet-American relationship are differing traditions and customs, differing ways of looking at things and differences in the ways of the two peoples see themselves and each other."19 The same is true of India vis-a-vis the Superpowers.

Sixthly, perceptions are also governed by the past history of a nation. The shift in America’s foreign policy from ‘isolationism’ to ‘involvement’ or the shift in Soviet policy from ‘exporting revolution’ to ‘co-existence’ are the examples of the role of history in the formation of images and perceptions.

Lastly, once created, perceptions or misperceptions cannot be uncreated. This irreversibility provides an ample fodder to nostalgia and, therefore, many present decisions are influenced by what was perceived in the past.

**INDIA’S ROLE: A DETERMINING FACTOR**

The study of the approach of the Superpowers cannot reach to its logical end, if India’s role is forgotten. How can it be justifiable if a conclusion is drawn out of the Superpowers’ approach without examining India’s attitude to them. In the context of this study what Washington or Moscow do and think about India depends also on what New Delhi thinks and does to these two powers.

A country’s role is not a random occurrence but is basically a function of its position in the power hierarchy in the world. Though it is the great powers that have a prior and initiating role, the lesser powers do act and react defensively. Under the policy of satellisation, great powers regard middle powers "as regional allies in context with other great powers and proceed to reinforce them competitively, possibly as a means to reapportionment by way of reclientization."  

However, underlying the policy of nonalignment, Nehru perceived a future

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power role for India. He, thus, clothed his perception in moral language: "A free India, with her vast resources can render great service to the world or to humanity. India will always make a difference to the world; fate has marked us for big things. When we fall, we fall low; when we rise, inevitably we play our part in the world drama."  How far India could achieve its aim? Could her dreams realise? What were the reasons that undermined the fulfilment of her perception as a power in the comity of nations? How her role affected the approach of the Superpowers -- are some of the questions that need examination in the light of the scope proposed for the study.

THE TIME SCALE: THE RAISON D'ETRE

The choice of the period under review (1947-1964) is guided by the following considerations:

One, because it heralds the arrival of independent India (15 Aug, 1947) on the world scene as the seventh largest state with the second largest population in the world with a relatively large stock of natural resources. It has the power potential necessary for influencing, to some extent, the course of world politics. It provides her an opportunity of being a major determinant of the broad orientation and strategy of her foreign policy and to contribute her mite to international peace, cooperation and friendship.

Two, because its span is characterised by the beginning and the end of the Nehru Era --- a distinctive phase not only in the national life but also in international affairs. It

is distinctive because Nehru articulated the foreign policy of India with his profound history consciousness and implemented it throughout his life with a great awareness of the broad forces of contemporary international politics. Though Nehru denied this credit to himself and attributed it to the historical experience and mind of India yet it is inconceivable to think of any other Indian leader who could lead the country at a time when it was born to the world characterised by Cold War. For example, his clear thinking on world affairs is well reflected when he speaks of Indian approach to world powers. Says he:

"Whatever the problems, difficult or simple, the manner of approach will make a difference. So the Indian approach whether you live up to it or not is a different manner, but the philosophy behind the Indian approach is, as far as possible, a friendly approach; not giving in or accepting what we consider wrong, nevertheless trying to tone down, first our actions and words, and if possible, our thinking ... to some extent from Cold War thinking ... to hold to what we consider right, firmly and without fear and yet not to speak about opponents in terms which would worsen the situation...."\(^{22}\)

Much is written about Nehru. What is pertinent to this study is the rebelliousness and courage of Nehru who bluntly refused to follow the dictates of the Superpowers or join either of the camp.

Three, because during this period great events and new political trends swept across the world. To provide an exhaustive catalogue of these momentous events is

neither necessary nor feasible here. However, some of the major events and trends that characterised this period were: the American policy of containment and satellisation, the new ideological perspective of the Soviet Union, new lessons in international diplomacy --- quick adaptation to new situations, clever use of psychological opening, retreat and advance as the situation may occur,--- regional conflicts (such as the Communist take-over of Czechoslovakia (Feb, 1948), Division of Germany (Aug.1949), Kashmir Crisis (1947), Hungarian Uprising (1956); emergence of great leaders with a unique sense of history in Truman, Churchill, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Khrushchev, Chou-En-lai, Nasser, Marshal Tito, Nehru and Sukarno and the accelerated pace of nationalist movements in Asia and Africa which shattered the myth of European invincibility and broke the shackles of colonialism and imperialism.

Thus the theoretical framework of the Present study is divided into following chapters:

Chapter One deals with the historical background. In order to provide a sequential treatment to the historical aspect of the study, it is subdivided into four sections: (i) the emergence of America and the Soviet Union as 'superpowers', (ii) the pattern and influence of the Cold War, (iii) the policy of the Superpowers towards South Asia, and (iv) the historical relations of the Superpowers with India upto 1947. In view of the vastness of the theme only the major trends, which have a direct bearing on their March to 'superpower' status, have been dealt with in section (i). Here an attempt is also made to compare the comparable trends. Similarly Sections (ii),(iii) and (iv) are also concerned with the most essentials as a prelude to the theme of the study.
Chapter two discusses the American approach towards India during the Nehru Era. The American philosophy of uniqueness overshot its marks in the pursuit of idealism and brandished the Soviet Union as an 'evil'. When India was caught in the whirlwind of the Cold War, it resisted by refusing to join either camp. With this background the Chapter proceeds to deal with the historical, political and economic factors which were responsible in formulating the American approach to India on some major issues of regional and international significance. In order to stress upon the role and make-up of the American administration in relation to India, a case-study of the great famine of India (1943) is also discussed at length. The Chapter also highlights the indifference of the American policy-makers to the criticism of the American foreign policy towards India made by several American scholars and statesmen. The Chapter also examines the 'modus operandi' of the American aid to India and its effect on the Indo-Soviet ties in general and India's economic programme in particular.

Chapter Three surveys the Soviet approach to India. It commences with the Soviet interest in the Asian milieu and the U.S. overtures to net Pakistan in the military alliance thereby bringing the Cold War in South Asia. Initially, the Soviet Union played a minor role and was disenchanted by India's 'bourgeois nationalism'. But soon after the death of Stalin, the Soviet policy reappraised the South Asian scene and perceived among other things, the benefit of cultivating and aiding India through contact-diplomacy and so embarrassing and opposing Pakistan and thus also its ally. Perhaps the Soviet Union was already apprehensive about its relation with China and appreciated the geopolitical position of India in that context. India too responded to
Russia's offers of economic aid, very essential for giving an ambitious content to her Second Five Year Plan (1955-61). The Chapter, therefore, not only examines the Soviet approach during the misty dawn of the Soviet-Indian relations but also the reasons that prompted the Soviet Government to realise the realities of India's foreign policy and modify its own policies during the post-Stalin period. It also deals with some of the major regional and international issues that underlined the Soviet approach towards India.

Chapter Four discusses how do leaders of both the Superpowers perceive their own nations and how do they perceive India and its actions? How realistic or illusory are these perceptions? When, in what regard, and under what conditions? In what matters are the Superpowers obtuse or blind? To what extent the American and Soviet governments function as source of mass deception, myth and self-deception? To what extent these great powers can foresee the consequences of their actions? The answers to such questions are vital to analyse the approaches in their multifarious dimensions.

Chapter Five analyses the role of India in the context of the American and Soviet approach. It deals with various questions such as: Has India succeeded in preserving her identity? What does this identity consist of? How is a sense of identity and how is the reality of identity acquired, and how is it lost? To what extent India has acquired temporary roles of power and privilege and how deeply can it become addicted to the flattering self-images? What happens to India's thoughts and feelings when it suffers from the loss of power? Such questions need answers for an objective and rational discussion of the approach of Superpowers towards India. After all, their approaches
are also determined by the way India thinks and acts in relation to them and other countries of the world. Hence, an attempt is made in this chapter to take an analytical overview of India's identity and her political, social, economic and cultural aspirations during the years when the world is characterised by bipolarity and charged with unprecedented fear and suspicion.

Lastly, an attempt is made to conclude, on the basis of the extrapolation, some earlier events or observations. However, they are guesses, projecting some time-series of events and experiences from the past. But there are many such series: they may run parallel, or converge or diverge; they may cross over so as to make relatively small what once was big, and to make what was small in the past big in the future. All said, we cannot foresee the future with certainty. It involves too many probabilities, singly and in combination. But though we cannot foresee precisely or reliably, we can try to provide some different angle to look at. Even knowing what a problem is meant to be half-way toward its solution. The greatest question is to recognise the problem of our common survival. This Chapter is an humble attempt in analysis of the experiences of all the three actors of the study and to what extent they have learnt from their experiences.

In the post-war years, several scholars and researchers have produced excellent studies on relationship between India and the United States and between India and the Soviet Union. However, it is felt that in the world where inescapable interdependence meets with inadequate control, bilateral relations alone cannot shape the world affairs to our will. We need to look beyond ‘relationship’ by examining changes which are
stimulated by a meeting of the newer behavioural sciences of psychology, sociology, and anthropology with the longer established disciplines of political science, history and economics. This lends a new perspective to the subject of study and worth attempting. The task, no doubt, is onerous for it is not simple ‘relationship’ but much more beyond that. It is rightly said that if civilisation is killed it will not be killed by famine or plague but by foreign policy and international relation. The superpowers possess unprecedented instruments for national action in the forms of ideologies and weapons. They are more dangerous vehicles of international conflict carrying the potential for its escalation to mutual destruction and ultimate annihilation. India’s initiation to this scenario is a test for her development and for her very survival. She has her foreign policy to strike a balance between the two. The ‘game’ played by three actors deserves a closer examination. Who is right or who is wrong is not that important as why one behaves in a particular manner.

Hence this study is an humble attempt to analyse the behaviour of the nation-states in the light of their history. By virtue of the academic compulsion, this study, therefore, is inter-disciplinary in nature. It also tries to add a new dimension by examining the role of India vis-a-vis the Superpowers’ approach in order to provide a more balanced view.

It is pertinent to point out here that the world-politics has witnessed a sea-change after the death of Nehru (1964). The end of the Cold War brought about a radical change in international diplomacy. Rising quest for peace and disarmament in both the Superpowers generated a new climate of rapprochement during the eighties
and nineties of the present century. Added to these, a great change swept the USSR under the leadership of President Gorbachev who initiated the great reforms in all walks of Soviet life with his policy of 'Perestroika' and 'glasnost'. In his unprecedented hurry and radicalism, the Soviet Republics found an opportunity to assert their identities and to demand freedom from the Soviet Union. This all resulted into the disintegration of the USSR and formation of a commonwealth known as Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.). This new scenario shall provide much to the historians and political scientists to research further. But the present study, in a sense, assumes greater significance in the light of these changes of 1990s. The reason being that what has happened of the USSR or what new political and economic equations emerge between the USA and the USSR or how the Third World countries react to the new developments, have their roots in the past experience of these countries. Hence, this study may serve as a background of the present happenings and should be viewed independently in terms of the time-span and not in the context of the immediate present.

This modest exercise has been limited by a few constraints. We have not been able to meet and discuss with key figures in the formulation and implementation of foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union. Nor has there been any access to the unpublished personal records and diaries of such people. Only the library sources as available in India have been utilized. The primary and secondary sources used are listed at the end.

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