CONCLUSION
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The emergence of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Superpowers by the forties of the twentieth century is characterised by great revolutionary changes in the history of the world. The course of their respective pasts played a major role in delineating their present.

The study of the American and Soviet approaches towards India during 1947-1964 clearly reflects the historical consciousness with which their foreign policies and diplomatic endeavours are enormously charged. Both attained their Superpower status not by any accident but by sustained efforts of centuries marked by great upheavals.

The U.S., immensely favoured by Geography, came first out of the shackles of colonialism to a new world of Enlightenment. The relentless endeavour of Americans for about hundred and fifty years culminated into a great political, economic and social reorientation. America awakened to the knowledge that it had certain cherished liberties and priceless resources like national character, democracy, unalienable rights and military strength to hold in trust for posterity and all mankind. The Jeffersonian and Wilsonian dream of the world which would turn to America for moral aspiration, infused in Americans a great sense of uniqueness and a messianic role in the affairs of the world.

They built their political, economic and social institutions on the premise and formulated and articulated their foreign policies after a prolonged debate. The
policy-makers with great vision and practical wisdom drew generously from the tested and practised thoughts and actions that brought about renaissance in the European world. They capitalised over the newness of their nation and strengthened it in a secluded and secure Hemisphere of their own. The America’s swing from isolationism to involvement as an eminent actor in international affairs, ultimately brought her face to face with the Soviet Union--- the other Superpower, soon after the end of the World War II.

On the other hand, history ordained a more torturous course for the Soviet Union. Endowed with remote antiquity, it flourished in ancient times. In the Middle Ages the fate of Europe was to a considerable degree determined by Russia. The entire mediaeval history of the Russian state is one of struggle for national independence, the bitterest period of which was the Mongol invasions (13th century) that left Russia, Central Asia and Caucasus in ruins. However, Russia survived the unfavourable conditions but by the 18th century she had taken her place among the great powers as a multinational state whose population was made up of Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, the Baltic peoples and (from the 19th century) the peoples of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. From the break-up of serfdom to the Crimian War (1855), from Tsarism to the first Russian Revolution and from the fall of Tsarism to the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks (1917)--- the Soviet Union, through an unprecedented oppression and exploitation and the resultant Great October Revolution, ultimately triumphed and put Marxism-Leninism into practice for her phenomenal reconstruction as a powerful nation under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin by the time the Second World War began.
Thus the Soviet Union tasted more history than the United States. But, again, history destined both the powers to play a unique role of 'special friendship' against Nazism in the Second World War. And soon at its end, the one time partners changed into antagonists.

Their past historical experiences provided them with different political, social, economic and cultural moulds. They can be summed up as under:

(1) America is more fearful of an opponent than Russia because there is the relative absence of long-term opponents or rivals in American history. Russians have a different historical consciousness. They can deal realistically with their opponents. Having been invaded in the past and suffered the Soviet Union is sensitive to the slightest influence of involvement of outside powers. Remaining 'hidden behind the ocean' for centuries, Americans are always troubled by the vulnerability of their borders. Their entire history has been one of relative security from foreign attacks and invasions. This psychological mechanism of America has prompted her to build collective security through military alliances like NATO and to pamper their military leaders to perpetuate their policy of containment and satellisation. The same factor is also responsible for its failure in foreign relations when it tries for an unattainable stability. There it proves a poor manager of international crisis and critical situations.

(2) The U.S. is urban and has moved beyond the traditional structure of individualism. Its centres of economic and political power are pluralist. Not accustomed to wars, in the past, for many Americans, after the Second World War, the life of the
farm, the close family and the rooted community were over. America searched for a new identity. This domestic socio-psychological context was vented into the Cold War and against the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the Soviet Union is still rural although it has a strong industrial bases. It has a long history of authoritarian rule and a complicated mixture of admiration and disdain for western culture and it is based on a tradition of collectivist values powerfully reinforced by its ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Perhaps this may be one of the reasons that it can better perceive India’s social, economic and cultural melieu than America.

(3) The soviet model of economic development based on the economic doctrine of Marxism-Leninism has an appeal. The governmental control on resources does not come in the way of giving economic and military aids to the Third World countries. Economically, it is willing to accept raw materials and goods as payment, minimising the need for convertible currency. India’s willingness to have economic ties with the USSR is generally guided by this advantage. Historically, the Soviet Union is committed to central control as key means of rapid industrialisation. So, if a third country too resorts to some sort of central control or nationalisation of key industries, the Soviet aid is not adversely affected.

On the contrary, the American aid allows a country ‘real money’ with which to buy high-quality western goods. The American tradition of free-market economy, sometimes, does not suit to the Third World countries for entering into trade contracts with the U.S. More so, profit-motive is the motivating force in the economic history of the U.S. As such its aid is invariably accompanied by conditions and sometimes by
pressure as an instrument of foreign policy. Relying on private enterprise, Americans have made their country the leading example of business civilisation. In private enterprise, protected by the constitution, accumulation of capital confirms political power. A nexus between the American corporation executives, bankers and the policy-makers often influence the foreign policy of the U.S.

(4) The history of Soviet and American culture is quite different in the context of their traditions, customs, ways of looking at things and the way they see themselves and others. History lays a burden of experience on a people that is passed on from one generation to another. Russia went through a harsh revolution yet while it underwent outward industrial transformation, old concerns and patterns of behaviour were reinforced. The Russian sense of uniqueness and fear of outsiders were given support by Stalin's building of 'socialism in one country'. The old Russian tradition of a nation in arms was continued. The new revolutionary institutions carried the signs of an ancient heritage. In addition, the ethnic and geographical base of the Soviet Union remains about the same as it was before the revolution.

On the other hand, the U.S. has long considered herself unique and has given a special place to their country away from corrupting influences of other philosophies and political systems. The Americans remain culturally distinctive in politics and their ideological and political differences are minor in content and effect compared with those of many other peoples. This cultural continuity in politics and foreign policy has lasted despite the extraordinary physical transformation of the U.S. since 1945 --- suburbanisation, sexual revolution, the appearance of feminism, the youth culture, the
drug scene, omnipresent violent crimes and new protest movements centered on environmental nuclear freeze issue.

However, both the U.S. and the USSR share a few similarities in their political cultures—-a feeling of superiority to foreigners, especially Europeans, a suspicion of foreign ways and thinking, a respect of technology and a future orientation.

Because of such a historical basis of their culture, the American elite and public have gained little of the perspective on international relations that is required in a long history of involvement with countries that are equals. They have never really accepted that conflict in international relations is inevitable, that other nations’ pursuit of their interests is normal and should not lead to moral outrage.

Further, American cultural features continue to affect its foreign policy. The American predilection for compromise is a reflection of long-standing domestic political practice in keeping together a large and multi-ethnic society. But a failure of compromise in foreign policy often results in an isolationistic rejection of the other party. The Cold War is an example.

Another American cultural feature is the American unwillingness to accept people not from our main ‘source’ civilisations—-the British Isles, Germany and Scandinavia. This old American prejudice can still be seen in its anti-communism feeling.

As regards to the roots of Russian culture, some specialists hold that on account of its being multi-ethnic country, the USSR has fifteen different countries and there is
no 'average Russian'. It is ironic that the overthrow of Tsarism gave a new lease of life to many age-old traits of Russian political culture. Marxism did bring change but its result was more that of a new attitudinal layer sandwitched in among the old layers of culture than a thoroughly victorious force. The Russian population, whatever its fascination for Western culture, is still very traditionally Russian in terms of political assumptions and values. The feeling of insecurity in the minds of the Russians may be due to the fear of disorder and revolution of a multi-ethnic system, held together ultimately by force.

Hence such diametrically different great powers were bound to act and react. They were poised to compete with each other. A sort of autonomous or self-running process of conflict came into being independent of the importance of the actual issues involved. Actions were taken just to head off the possibility of other actions. Foreign policy was turned over to 'cold-warriors' and the third parties were in a fix, i.e., whether to draw one or the other on their sides.

It is an irony of history that both the American and Russian societies failed to realise the war-time hopes of their peoples. American citizens hoped to return to their farms and close-family norms after the world War II while some Soviet citizens thought that their political apparatus would ease up on them since they had fought so gallantly. But both got frustrated when the Cold War started soon after the War.

A variety of cultural and emotional factors affecting the Soviet-American competition are associated with the origin of the Cold War. Americans were shocked
and angered to find themselves facing a new opponent only a few years after fighting a major war. They had thought victory would bring democracy not Soviet domination to Eastern Europe. Similarly, the Soviet leaders in all probability, had assumed that the U.S. would withdraw to the Western Hemisphere after the War. But both powers found that the post-war period was not to go to the way they had anticipated. This produced a base for frustration, anger and puzzlement in their relationship. The Cold War that followed, was almost inevitable. It was a sordid state that no two players who are so different---one secretive, cautious and plodding, the other willing to take risks and act unpredictably---can get along easily or well. The reasons for their desperate natures are to be found in their cultures and domestic politics and social institutions.

The American policy in South Asia is a testimony to the fact that the U.S. could not formulate correct perceptions of Asian society. Both, Eisenhower and Dulles brought the Cold War in South Asia without fully comprehending the political, social and economic history of the South Asian nations. They were so scared of communist expansionism that they did not make a dispassionate study of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cylone and Nepal---the nature of their colonial past, their aspirations, their social and cultural milieu and their urge for rapid economic emancipation. The Dullesian techniques could only think of defense blocs and alliances but not the basic principles of such policies as India’s non-alignment.

All this resulted in a great fiasco and gave rise to a Third World Movement against racialism, militarism and political and economic imperialism. The major reasons why American policy failed in Asia were: (i) the whole operation has not been
worked out by the foremost specialists in the general field of political sociology, social psychology, history, cultural anthropology and communication, (ii) the Americans assumed that the U.S. has the whole truth and that what is good for America is good for everybody, (iii) America failed to grasp the historical fact that revolution surges on mainland and restlessness stirs the coasts. The U.S. policy-makers were so obsessed with the containment of communism that they could not analyse why the Asian peoples are resentful of the West. America acted as if no social and nationalistic revolution was convulsing in this continent. They failed to comprehend that more than one million people in Asia were full of potential resentment against white people in general and the rich in particular. It failed to appreciate Asia’s age-old distrust of big imperialist or capitalist powers. The consequence of all this was that the U.S. remained in serious danger of losing what friends it still had in Asia, particularly India. (iv) America could not understand that its aim should have been the development of partners for world peace rather than customers for its surplus goods. (v) It made a monumental mistake of thinking that security for itself and other democracies could be found in the balance of armed might and not in political power, and finally (vi) It failed to appreciate the nuance of 'the standard of life' and harped on 'the standard of living'.

As regards to the Soviet policy towards Asia, it adopted a doctrinaire approach to Asia during the thirties and forties under the leadership of Stalin and could not comprehend the aspirations of Asian peoples and Asian leadership. But soon after his death, the Soviet policy became more pragmatic by 1955 after the Bandung Conference. Personal diplomacy became the bedrock of Russian foreign policy. The refusal of Asian
and African countries to join military alliances gave a political edge to Russia. Its policy of co-existence had a salutary effect on Asian and African countries and the economic aid began to flow for building basic industries with a long term objective of making the recipient countries independent and even competitive with European and American economy. The Russian historians read the realities and modified their perceptions of socialist world community, the communist and working class movements of capitalist countries and national liberation movements. This change was mainly motivated by their consciousness of history rather than by a narrow, political gains. It also indicates the proportion of resources within the system that are available for reallocation to new pattern of behaviour which is an important element in the learning capacity of the system.

Coming to the relations between India and the Superpowers, before 1947, the U.S. ties with India was too peripheral, without any tangible help to India’s leadership to accelerate the cause of India’s independence. America’s indifference to entanglements, her self-interest, her preoccupation with the Second World War and close relations with Britain were some of the major causes that induced her to accord a very low priority to India on its political agenda and foreign policy. Whatever little America knew about India was through the British Press and Mayo’s ‘Mother India’. This abject ignorance of America about India was the cause of the failure of its Asian policy.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union did attract some progressive Indian leaders during the national liberation movement and Russia did provide a moral support to
India in fight against British imperialism. But like the U.S., Russia also could not lend any active support to India on account of its preoccupation with the War. All its energies were directed to build Russia anew after its devastation. It was a historical irony that India’s freedom movement coincided with the break of World War II and it opened its eyes in freedom when the two most powerful nations of the world were relentlessly engaged in Cold War.

Apart from ignorance about India, America’s self-perception was another reason that determined its approach to India. The history of the U.S. foreign policy based on the philosophy of uniqueness, claims that in international affairs America’s role is that of an enlightened saviour of mankind. Imbued with this ideology, the U.S. policy-makers began to consider themselves as duty bound to bestow the blessings of American institutions to the rest of mankind. Their dilemma was how to reconcile their policy of isolationism with their commitment to play a larger responsibility in world affairs. On this issue a fierce debate ensued for decades. The Monroe Doctrine was put to test when America performed its ‘duty to annex the Phillipines on the ground that it was its duty to bring the blessings of Western civilisation to little brothers for whom also Christ died’. Subsequently, Wilsonian idealism transformed the passive conception of the U.S. model to a crusading conception to embark upon a crusade not only on behalf of the positive values which the U.S. represents but also, in a negative sense to destroy the enemies of those values! Wilson conceived the establishment of security system for the protection of freedom and independence. His Fourteen Points included a call for self-determination and thought democracy and peace were synoymous. But
his crusading policy received a severe jolt when the U.S. Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles. Then followed President Roosevelt whose considered opinion was that the U.S. should play a major role in world affairs. Shocked by German blitzkrieg in 1940, the U.S. began its defensive preparations. The Atlantic Charter proclaimed war aims for peace and freedom, including international security system and utopian freedom from fear and want.

America's post-war obsession with communist threat brought about the policy of containment and satellisation against communism. It resulted in the Cold War which subsequently posed a dilemma for the Third World.

A foreign policy characterised by a holier-than-thou attitude, and framed out of fear and suspicion dubbed the USSR as an evil to be exterminated. The resentment among the Third World countries was termed as anti-Americanism and all the leftist forces were dubbed as irreconcilably hostile by the U.S.

In such a scenario, the emergence of India as an independent country with its policy of non-alignment was a great historical event. America's sense of uniqueness and self-image of being saviour of mankind clashed with India's pride in her ancient civilisation and cherished values of nonviolence, peace, tolerance and friendly cooperation among nations. Realists like Morgenthau advocated that not morality or law but power was the most potential instrument of achieving national security. America's psychological fear, born out of its long history of isolationism, induced it to build up military alliances for its security and escalate the arms race among its allies against communism.
This concept of world peace based on power and military strength did not match with Indian philosophy of nonviolence. Nehru's refusal to join either bloc could not be appreciated by America. Again, when the concept of balance of power came under severe criticism from more pragmatic quarters, the emphasis shifted to economic aid and diplomacy. In these spheres, too, America, being a country of business civilisation and 'abundance psychology' approached the underdeveloped countries not out of any altruistic motives but by using aid as a potential weapon for political gains.

Here, too, India's policy clashed with America's. Realising the American game, India refused to do what America wanted in exchange of economic aid. Similarly the new concept of American diplomacy of forging common bonds of interest between states and stressing the means for peaceful change in international society, surfaced in the garb of humanistic ideals, proved a sinister game of pressurising the weak to succumb to the American wishes. The new diplomats were so obsessed with the threat of communism that they did not hesitate to depart from the diplomatic niceties while expressing their feeling in public and in international fora and employed all their diplomatic skills to condemn those states that refused to toe their lines.

Thus the basic difference between the Indian and American policies is that while America anchored on its supremacy, power and strength to pressurise poor India to come to its terms in order to contain not only Soviet communism but also the rising power of India, India desired to follow its tradition that the right means must be adopted to achieve a desired end, however much she herself might fall short of the ideal; and her approach to question of war and peace with what may seem an undue emphasis on
negation on means of securing agreement on point of difference. With this backdrop, the American approach to India during the Nehru Era was guided by the following considerations:

(1) America recognised the geopolitical significance of India after the war and tried to win her over for serving its wider aims of containing communism and its hegemony on the rising states of South Asian countries. India became more important for America when in 1949 the Americans supported the regime of Chian- kai-shek but became unsuccessful and a new wave of communism swept over Asia. Its interest was manifest in its economic aid. But later when America started building up military alliance with Pakistan and brought the Cold War at the door of India, it met with Indian resistance.

(2) In the Korean War when India resisted against drawing the Asian countries into war, America called Nehru "the voice of abnegation".

(3) America launched a virulent attack on India when she advocated China's admission into the U.N. and refused to sign the Japaness Peace Treaty.

(4) The Dullesian perception of Pakistan as a country having a 'spiritual faith and the martial spirit' resulted into U.S.- Pakistan agreement on common dangers and common interests and common needs as against the divergence of paths and perception between the U.S. and India during 1949-1953. This military tie up between the U.S. and Pakistan brought the Cold War at India's door. India's opposition to this evoked sharp criticism in the quarters of American Administration.
(5) The initial penetration of American capital during the Second World War and particularly after the partition of India, demanded as a condition for giving financial assistance, that the constitution of India guarantee immunity to foreign capital investment in case of nationalisation of certain branches of industry.

As regards to the Soviet approach to India, history is witness to the fact that after the Great October Revolution of 1917, the Soviet Union embarked upon a new course in international affairs mainly guided by the principles propounded by the Soviet and Comintern literature of the inter-war period. Their belief that with the rise of China, series of revolutions will sweep Asia, was nullified by history. The Soviet preoccupation with the restoration of its war-economy and the stark realities of Cold War strengthened its ideological beliefs, and being a stark opponent of British and American imperialism, could not comprehend India’s leaning to the West in the initial years of her freedom. Consequently, the Stalinist period remained critical of India’s joining the Commonwealth and the inflow of American capital into India. It was only after the death of Stalin that a policy of reapprochment with India commenced. The philosophy of coexistence as propounded later in the 20th Congress of the CPSU further opened a new chapter of friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

The major issues that influenced the Soviet approach to India may be summed up as under:

(1) India’s voting in favour of the U.S. on Korean issue irritated the Soviet Union and evoked sharp responses from Soviet diplomats. But, fortunately, this turned into a
happy reconciliation when Nehru repaired the damages by explaining India's policy on Korean crisis.

(2) The anti-colonialism and anti-racialism stand of India in the U.N. brought about a marked shift in Soviet policy towards India and Pravda proclaimed a new era of friendly relations between India and the U.S.S.R.

(3) India's stand on Indonesia's freedom was defined by the U.S. as "taking the wind over of Russian anti-imperialist sails". This provoked the Soviet Union to keep a silence on Kashmir question.

(4) The exchange of sharp notes between India and China over Tibet evoked the U.S.S.R. to criticise India's policy of neutrality.

(5) The Soviet appreciation of India's advocacy for the recognition of China and her refusal to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty in 1951, culminated into the signing of Indo-Soviet Trade agreement and its favourable comments on Kashmir question.

(6) The phase of cooperation between the two countries was further marked by the Soviet readiness to trade with India in hard currency or rupee on barter basis.

(7) The C.P.I's participation in the First General Election of India and the scathing criticism of Indian public opinion of India's dependence on the U.S. further brought the two countries closer.

(8) From 1954 the new phase of Soviet friendship began. India's contribution at Geneva Conference in 1954, the visit of Chou-En-lai to India, the growing cultural
exchanges between the two countries and their joint stand on several international issues like liquidation of colonialism, East-West dialogue, opposition to military pacts, strengthened their relations.

(9) By 1955, Soviet's determination to help build up Indian economy as a long-term measure to make her self-independent in the form of Bhilai and several other huge industrial projects, gave an edge to Soviet diplomacy in contrast to America's reluctance to give economic assistance on such lines.

(10) Nehru's visit to the U.S.S.R. and the Bulganim-Khrushchev return visit to India, were a landmark in the cooperation between the Soviet Union and India. The personal and direct diplomacy enunciated by the two was a rebuff to the American diplomacy of coercion and pressure.

(11) The tremendous capacity of the Soviets to amend their mistakes, as in the assessment of Gandhi's role in India's freedom movement, generated a favourable atmosphere in India.

(12) The Russian factors like humanization, liberalisation of Russia's Iron age, the danger posed to it by military alliances like SEATO and Baghdad Pact, compelled the Soviet Union to explode hydrogen Bomb and to catch up with the U.S. to launch a drive to bring about the thaw in the Cold War on the one hand, and the Indian factors (resentment and anger in the U.S. about India's foreign policy and the arrival of Cold War at India's door) -were the world realities which compelled both the countries to develop a more accommodative and pragmatic approach towards each other.
(13) The convergency of Soviet and Indian perceptions on Suez Crisis, Hungarian uprising and the laudatory reference to India in the 20th congress of the C.P.S.U., set at rest, the inbuilt suspicion of Indian leadership over the bonafides of the Soviet leaders.

(14) In order to counter the domestic pressure and to counter balance the U.S. economic aid, Nehru's criticism of Communism ("The Basic Approach, 1958") evoked a critical response from Soviet Statesmen and Scholars. But, nevertheless, they were pragmatic enough, not to vitiate the atmosphere of friendship and cooperation with India.

(15) The fissures in Sino-Indian relationship beset the Soviet Union with confusion. It was faced with the basic contradiction between the socialist and imperialist camps on the one hand and the capacity of the Third World Countries to take to a Socialist path. The Soviet diplomacy moved very cautiously. It stressed upon India the negotiated settlement with China and stressed upon China to diffuse the issue. The Russian press, too, kept a deliberate silence over this sensitive issue. However, after the conflict the Soviet Union stressed upon the historical role of both India and China, and India too appreciated the Soviet stand in the crisis.

Coming to self-image, the justification of America's stand as chosen people, was based on Darwin's theory. They were so obsessed of their superiority that they began to think that politics and diplomacy should live with the notion that life was a struggle in which the fittest survived. From this notion, they dervied The first corollary that
success is an indication of fitness. And the secondary corollary that the nation which achieved the ordinary measurements of a great power (large military establishments, economic strength, population) was, by this fact, a fit nation, a chosen nation, qualified to instruct other and less successful nations in the facts of life. This indeed was an erroneous doctrine. Survival, as anyone who observes the results of war can attest, does not always mean survival of the fittest. The politicians forget the phenomenon of mutual aid, to which man owes much of his survival and achievement, by helping each other the members of the human race have risen to wealth and to such security as they have. And the survival of the fittest enthusiasts forgot that the cause of progress was not the struggle of man against man but the struggle of man against his environment. In the heat of the Darwinian dialectic, their subtleties were lost from the views of American diplomats.

It is a sad commentary on world peace, that even in the 19th and 20th centuries the American diplomats basked in the sun of their nation's supremacy and doctrine of mission. They confused the Christian religion with such beliefs and concluded that the American people, a successful people (and therefore, a fit people) were a chosen people, God's anointed. What is worse is that this kind of self-image of the Americans also encumbered itself with racism, with the idea of Anglo-Saxon Aryan superiority. This idea of self-image was quite clearly discernible when Kennan articulated the policy of containment - a policy opposing force by force, of drawing a line and warning Russians---"Thus far shall you go, and no farther". The same song was sung by Dulles who tirelessly advocated that America was the conscience keeper of mankind and it
was foolish to let Marx replace the American thinkers of the 18th Century. It was this thinking that generated the new look of military policy of massive retaliation.

Both the American and Russian leaders, on several occasions exhibited their personal prejudices, idiosyncracies and emotionalism against Gandhi and Nehru - the one the Father of the Nation and another the articulator and executor of India’s Foreign Policy for seventeen years after her independence. The perceptions of the American leaders reflect their abject ignorance of India’s psyche and her traditions and culture. The Russian leaders are more cautious and open to correction if pragmatism of their foreign policy is in jeopardy on account of any misperception. Stalin’s criticism of Nehru was guided by his doctrinaire adherence. Zhukov’s denunciation of Gandhi was due to his inability to comprehend the nuances of Indian "Saintliness", Uyanovosky’s correction about Gandhi’s perception was motivated by the confession of his compatriots’ one-sided approach. Balabushevich apologetic statement about Gandhi’s criticism in Russian quarters was a candid admission of ignorance. But no such instance of amendment is found in American diplomatic history of the period under study.

The perception of American leaders about Nehru was generally motivated by their personal obsession with communism. Whenever Nehru refused to toe the American line, they dubbed Nehru as Communist, ‘a disappointment’.

The historical consciousness of a leader plays an important part in the formation of perception and images. Historical consciousness depends upon a country’s history and its awareness.
The Soviets are more fortunate in this respect than Americans. Russians have a longer zig-zag history; they have suffered more than Americans. They have also a sound Marxist interpretation of history at their command. American history is young, punctuated by adventures to attain supremacy and dominance over others. The American leaders, therefore, are indifferent to the existing historical parallels elsewhere. They are more prone to misperceptions about others than Russians. They have a very scanty past in relation to India's. Little has entered from America into the mainstream of Indian life. They perceive India as an exotic country, having gem-incrested Maharajahs, monkeys and benighted heathen Hindus. They fail to grasp the philosophical foundation of India's Foreign Policy or Gandhism. Russians too could not comprehend India whenever they looked at it from their ideological perspectives.

America's perception of India's internal problems is characterised by scepticism and pessimism. They do not believe she has the capacity to look after herself. Their perceptions have not yet improved over what they got from Mayo's 'Mother India'. On the contrary Russia's awareness of India's socio-economic and cultural milieu has a long history. The study of Indology in the Soviet Union has done a monumental work in understanding India. It is one of the reasons why the Soviet Union does not face dilemmas in dealing with India. The Soviet scholars assessed Indian life rationally and interpreted it on the touchstone of theory. Unlike America, they never said or did anything that amounted to interference in India's affairs.

The approach of the Superpowers towards India and their perceptions of India also depend on the role played by India in the world community. The examination of
India's role vis-a-vis the approach of the Superpowers to her, leads to the following conclusions:

(1) During the period under study the position of India was neither that of a subject-role nor the object-role in the world affairs. It could neither be a dominating and influencing power nor a satellite of either of the two Great Powers. Her international stature, however, is secured in the sense that it has refused to be dragged into the rivalry of the Superpowers, by virtue of her policy of non-alignment.

India, inspite of the pressures, refused to join either camp. Yet it could not be ignored by the Superpowers for she is, undoubtedly, a power by virtue of her geopolitics, size, population, natural resources and tremendous potentiality to modernise herself. India has a right, as a sovereign state, to aspire for a bigger and more effective role in world politics. It is a different matter that its political, social and economic conditions were not conducive enough to enable it to play a dominating role in world politics. But its role during the Nehru Era as a holder of a courageous and autonomous policy much to the annoyance of the U.S. cannot be denied. India did remain a power in the Third World because of its foreign policy and historical consciousness of Jawaharlal Nehru.

(2) Though after independence, India launched its plans for socio-economic development in a big way, but unfortunately, it could not cope up with the enormity of the problems within the framework of her economic planning which had too many constraints and weaknesses. The goals set by the country before itself could not be achieved to the desired level because there was an inherent contradictions in them and
the policy-makers and leaders fail to stand up to face the challenge. These internal weaknesses did affect the approach of the Superpowers towards India.

(3) Another reason that undermined India's position in the eyes of the Superpowers was that even after independence the revivalist trends of Indian leadership continued. Though they appeared original and philosophical but in reality, as Nehru himself admitted, they 'clung tenaciously to the dead form of the past and floated aimlessly in the murky waters of Indian life'. The low standard of their performance not only sapped the very vitals of India's democratic fabric but also gave a bad name to India in international relations.

(4) Soon after independence India was in dire need of a well-knit, disciplined, highly professional cadre of diplomats to face the challenges posed by the bipolar world. But unfortunately, Indian diplomacy, both in its organisation and practice could not match the American or Russian diplomatic offensive. Emotionalism, an urge to speak and debate on every issue, the insufficient knowledge of India's history, culture and philosophy and casualness in attending to diplomatic techniques were some of the reasons which contributed to confusion and suspicion about India in Washington and Moscow.

(5) India's indulgence into moralising and sermonising while dealing with international issues is another cause that generated a lot of misunderstanding and irritation in many capitals of the world. Sometimes its role as a sermoniser harmed its own self-interest and put it in an embarrassing position.
(6) The absence of effective pressure groups in India was another reason which prompted the superpowers not to assign a high priority to India on their political agenda. Indifference of the leaders to this aspect of foreign policy could not appreciate the effectiveness of pressure groups in modern times while dealing with other countries.

(7) India's posture of non-alignment achieved its highest effectiveness in the early 1950s. It emerged as a main source of its power in international relations. India stood as an ideological buffer between the two competing powers. But its policy remained ineffective in relation to Pakistan and China. It could not bring about the Asian unity which it envisaged. The military aid to Pakistan by the USA brought the Cold War at India's door. In fact, the SEATO was not for its purported defense value against Soviet aggression but for the very reason Pakistan had sought aid as a counterforce to the confirmed neutralism of Nehru's India. The Bandung Conference too remained ambiguous and imprecise on controversial issues like colonialism and military pacts. The failure of the Indian diplomacy at Bandung brought much satisfaction to the USA. The glee with which Americans saw the decline of India's power in the Asian context was flashed across the pages of American Press. Her patronising attitude at the Conference, Nehru's denunciation of the USSR of enhancing the danger of war by resuming the unclear tests was not shared by several delegates. The Conference could not gain much for India. In fact, it lost some of its friends and admirers.

(8) Nehru's chief contribution was his courageous and rational foreign policy which he articulated for India. The USA found the policy repellent and irritating. The
main criticism of his policy centred round the fact that it did not maintain an equidistance from both power blocs. On issues like colonialism and racialism, Nehru blamed the Western powers more than the Communist states. But for totalitarianism and deliberate spread of communism, his ire was directed against the USSR. Nehru's outright rejection of the American business-interests in economic aid and his contemptuous dismissal of Russian attitude to the C.P.I, his criticism of the USA on Kashmir issue, his blaming the USA for India and Pak moving to the brink of war, his strongest denunciation of America on arms supply to Pakistan---all these brought retaliatory measures by the Superpowers. The U.S. tirade was directed against Nehru as a leader who leaned towards Russia and tried to develop a strong and dominating power over small Asian countries. In later years the change in his attitude towards Russia brought some economic success to India. There is no doubt Nehru was an important factor in determining the Soviet and American approach to India. However, his role vis-a-vis the Superpowers can best be summed up in the fact that he took a tremendous burden of constructing a framework of democratic socialism for an underdeveloped country without adhering to either scientific socialism or capitalism. His experiment remained unique during his life time.