CHAPTER - VII
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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE IN GERMANY (1941-1943)

Bose reached Berlin on 2nd April 1941. Before his arrival no clear plan for Indo-German cooperation was existed. Very few people were informed about Bose's identity. His arrival in Berlin did not arouse much enthusiasm amongst the members of the German Government. During the First World War, Germany had been an active and welcome centre of Indian revolutionaries. But, on Hitler's rise to power, Indians soon realised that they were not welcome. By the time Bose arrived, there were only some thirty-nine Indians registered in Germany, most of them were students or working in industry and commerce, and none of them was

1. According to Girija Mookerjee, "Bose's presence and identity were not disclosed even to the local Indians. In Berlin his movements were watched. His telephones were regularly tapped and his personal belongings periodically searched by some unknown persons. He began writing down his engagements in his diary in Bengali. Girija K. Mookerjee, "Netaji and Hitler", Sunday Statesman, 25 February, 1973.

2. According to N.G.Campuley, "Bose had not come to Europe from Indian National Congress or from any other recognised political organisation in India to discuss and negotiate with the German or the Italian Government the possibilities of armed cooperation. That might have roused their interest to some extent. But Bose was there on his own personal initiative. Naturally in those critical days of war, these two countries could only give him political asylum and treat him as an honoured guest". Netaji in Germany (Bombay, 1959), p.31.
political activist. For the German Government, India was to bargain in its negotiations with Soviet Union.

On 27 September 1940, a tripartite Pact had been signed by the Nazi Germany, Japan and Italy, and India had been assigned to the Russian sphere of influence. Hitler, to whom Indian freedom fighters were 'Asiatic Jugglers' had little eagerness to go against Britain and still less to destroy the British empire. As Hitler had always maintained that his India was in Russia. ¹ At the time of Bose's arrival in the Berlin, the Germans were planning to invade the Soviet Union and they wanted to avoid any move which might alert the Soviets to a desire to modify earlier agreements. ²

The newly established information of the German Foreign Office was directed by Dr. Adon Von Trott with the assistance of Dr. Alexander Werth. They both, however, did not share the ideology of Nazi Party. They were assigned the task of looking after Bose after his arrival in Germany. ³ Soon after the arrival of Bose a 'Working Group India' was established in the Information Department of the Foreign Office headed by Adon Von Trott. His immediate superior was Secretary of State Wilhelm Keppler, but Keppler seems to have taken little interest in the Working Group, leaving most in the hands of Von Trott and another Secretary of State, Ernst Woermann. And it was with officials such as Von Trott

³.According to Alexander Werth, "Netaji's flight to Germany was for Trott and myself and some other colleagues 'in the know' not only top secret matter but a top level matter as well. It opened a new front for a psychological warfare against Great Britain. Besides, it appealed to our personal feelings of sympathy for India and her fight for freedom". Werth & Harbich, Netaji in Germany, (Calcutta, 1970), p.14.
that Bose would have to work on a daily basis. Trott was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford in the thirties where he met a number of Indians and became interested in the question of Indian freedom. Trott was personally able to deal with Bose and produced a friendly relationship with him. It was because of his report to the German Foreign Office that the Germans gave up their initial suspicion of Bose as a British agent. Trott also used his association with the Free India Centre as a cover for his anti-Nazi activities.¹

The second in command of the Working Group was Alexander Werth. He had spent several months in a German detention camp in 1934 for his opposition to Hitler, but had been allowed to join the Foreign Office at the special request of his friend Trott. Soon a German Trade Union leader and also an India specialist, F.J. Furtwängler was recruited to work with Trott and Werth. Therefore, the members of the Working Group, India, were not the customary bureaucrats of the German Foreign Ministry. Their backgrounds and experiences contrasted with those of the government officials with whom they had to work. While their attitudes may have eased their cooperation with Bose, they also tried as far as possible to protect him against unpleasant contacts with the highest officials of the German Government, most of whom were Nazis.²

² According to Alexander Werth, "Bose was therefore lucky to have come into contact immediately after his arrival with a group of men who were sympathetic and who also possessed a certain amount of knowledge about the development in India. Amongst the leaders of the Nazi Party, there existed, as is well known, a great deal of racial prejudice against Indians to which Bose would have reacted violently because of his sensitive nature, if he had come into contact in the first instance with such members of the Nazi party." Bose, Werth & Aiver, A Beacon across Asia, p. 117.
The day after his arrival in Berlin on 3 April 1941, Bose met Secretary of State Ernst Woermann and informed him that while he intended to remain in Germany, he wanted to travel to Rome for a short visit. Bose apparently left his options open regarding his return even while suggesting that he planned to settle in Berlin. Throughout his dealings with the Germans, Bose continually hinted that if the Nazis failed to support his proposals, then he expected others (implying the Soviets or Italians) might receive his suggestions more enthusiastically.

Woermann assured Bose that the German Government intended to formally announce his presence in Berlin within a few weeks and emphasised that there was official interest in Bose's schemes to achieve Indian freedom. Woermann also promised Bose that the announcement of his whereabouts, which were still quite secret, would not be restricted to the German press and would include a broadcast speech to India by Bose. Bose explained Woermann that his aim was to set up a government-in-exile in Germany. He argued that only a force of 100,000 men with modern equipment was required to liberate India. Bose was provided with accommodations in Berlin at the Hotel Excelsior.

2. -ibid- pp. 4-5.
3. Woermann concluded from the interview that Bose was "a very conceited character, who always attempts to press himself into the foreground. He manoeuvres the political opposition to where he wants them," character sketch of Bose, enclosed in Memorandum by Woermann, April 3, 1941, Subhas Chandra Bose & Early Azad Hind Sangh, Edward S. Hayness, Bengal Past & Present, January–June 1977, p.5.
4. Racial prejudices apparently emerged among the German Hotel staff, Sykes narrates, "they treated him in an off-hand-master race manner. Complaints were sent to Auswartige Amt (Foreign Department) after which orders were issued that the Indian leaders should be addressed as "Your Excellency"."
Within a week of his arrival in Germany he had prepared an exhaustive memorandum outlining his proposals. On 9 April, 1941, he submitted it to the German Government on the possibilities of cooperation between Germany and India. This memorandum was divided into six sections as follows:

(A) Work in Europe; (B) Work in Afghanistan; (C) Work in the Tribal territory; (D) Work in India; (E) Question of Finance; and (F) Military aid for destroying British power in India.

In the first place Bose proposed the establishment of a "Free Indian Government". Secondly a treaty should be entered into by Axis powers with the "Free India Government", provided for India's independence in the event of an Axis victory. Thirdly, legations of the Free Indian Government should be established in friendly countries. Finally propaganda, particularly through the radio should be started, calling upon the Indian people to assert their independence, and to rise in revolt against the British authorities. Broadcasting would be done in the name of Free India Radio Station to provide the necessary financing. Bose requested a loan from Germany, to be repaid after the war, when India would secure her independence.¹

The Germans reacted cautiously to his proposals. They were prepared to help organise radio propaganda, but as

¹ This memorandum, entitled 'Plan for cooperation between the Axis Powers and India' is in serial 195, Roll 184A, Frames 139137-143, German Foreign Ministry Archives; also in Bose, Werth & Ayer, A Beacon Across Asia, Appendix VI, pp.281-294. It may be mentioned in this connection that this memorandum described in greater detail the suggestions which Bose had already made to the Italian Minister in Kabul, Sgr. Gueroui. The Italian Minister had already on 2 April 1941, in a report to the Italian Foreign Ministry in Rome, described the conversation he had with Bose. See Subhas Chandra Bose, The Indian Struggle 1920-42, (Calcutta, 1966) pp. 415-18.
Woermann minced they thought that the time has not yet come to recognize Bose's Government-in-exile. Woermann specifically feared that any such step would alienate both Gandhi and Nehru, the leaders of Indian nationalism, and representatives of political forces with which Germany would have to deal when her army reached Kheiber Pass. He also recommended the indefinite postponing of any announcement of Bose's presence in Germany. Two days after, Bose had submitted his formal memorandum, the Foreign Ministry revised timetable for the official announcement of Bose's presence in Germany. The next day Bose visited Woermann and requested a sine die postponement of the announcement. Bose, who was annoyed at the German inaction, informed that he was making plans to return to the Afghan border area to personally direct the underground operations in India. Bose told his Indian co-workers that "for the sake of my country, I have risked my neck to come to Germany. For the same reason I am prepared to risk my neck to return from Europe, If I cannot achieve my purpose. The British C.I.D.is very efficient and just as I escaped in spite of it, I shall escape Gestapo also".

On 29 April, 1941, Bose met Foreign Minister Von Robbentrop in Vienna and stressed that only a prompt declaration of support from the Axis powers could keep the confidence of the Indian masses. The Foreign Minister indicated his

2. ibid- p
sympathy with the Indian people but explained that Germany could not make any haste declaration on the situation.\(^1\)
Perhaps the most interesting exchange between them took place when von Ribbentrop asked Bose about how India felt towards Germany.\(^2\) Bose answered that he wanted to admit in all frankness that feeling against the National Socialists and the fascists had been rather strong in India. For the English and the Communist propaganda had upheld the thesis that National socialism and fascism were striving to dominate the other races. The Foreign Minister interjected at this point that National Socialism merely advocated racial purity, but not its own rule over other races. Racial purity was also valued in India and confirmed to the law of nature.\(^3\) Von Ribbentrop avoided any political commitments, but he was generous in sanctioning money to Bose for the propaganda work and his personal allowance.\(^4\) Bose pressed for a German declaration on Free India - an objective which he never left during his two years in Germany, and one which he never achieved.

After meeting Ribbentrop, Bose returned to Berlin and on 3 May sent a supplementary memorandum to the German Government. He recognised that setting up a Free India Government-in-exile would be difficult, but in memorandum he

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\(^1\) Serial 67, Roll 39, Frames 47245-266, German Foreign Ministry Archives, also Sykes, Christopher, Troubled Loyalty, p.357. Dr. D. Weidmann's article in Aarit Bazar Patrika, 2 Nov. 1967.
\(^2\) The Bose-Von Ribbentrop conversation, Serial 67, Roll 58, Frames 47245-266, C.F.M.A., also in D/XII, No. 425, Documents of German Foreign policy.
\(^3\) -Ibid-
pointed out the importance of an early and open declaration of the German Government on the question of India's independence. He also pointed out the need of the Indian and entire Arab problems to be coordinate and to be taken up as one problem by the German Government.¹

On 19 May 1941, the Foreign Ministry prepared a draft entitled "Declaration of Free India" and right to self-determination in response to Bose's plan to Weermann and Von Ribbentrop. This carefully worded document, written in close cooperation with Bose was scheduled to be released in May in the name of German and Italian Government.² But it was not issued.

Meanwhile Bose sent secret message to his hopeful comrades in India through Rahmet Khan: "I am expecting from the Axis powers within a fortnight an open declaration regarding Indian independence. Immediately, after this declaration I intend starting propaganda and activity including radio propaganda, in the name of the Free India Movement. I expect Axis declaration to say that the constitution of the Free India State will be decided by the Indian people themselves. My propaganda will also avoid party questions and will simply appeal to the Indian people to fight for their liberty and take the help of all friendly powers".³ Bose also instructed his associates to select a site for an air-field and a

military base close to the Afghan border with India and told them to expect the general direction of the German Embassy.¹ Based on Bose's encouraging words, propaganda was increased in Northern India and a Hindi pamphlet entitled "Germany se Subhas Bose Ke Singhnaa" ("Subhas Bose's cry from Germany") and other leaflets were circulated in Bihar and United Provinces.²

Near the end of May 1941, the earlier uncertainty of German Government about Bose and his programmes had increased and he again began to think whether Nazi Germany was the best European ally for Indian nationalists.

BOSE'S VISIT TO ITALY

On 24 May, 1941, Bose notified Woermann that he wanted to make a trip to Rome. Bose's frustrations were now increased by another postponement of the promised Axis declaration on Indian freedom. He had received a formal invitation from the Italian government and Bose implied his hope that Mussolini would be of more use to the Indian cause than Hitler had been.³ Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop however, was extremely reluctant to let Bose go to Rome and requested that Woermann took all steps possible to prevent Bose's visit to Rome. But Woermann anticipated that Bose would remain in Italy only about two weeks and saw "no injurious motive in Bose's trip to Rome" he was convinced that Bose

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2. Govt. of India, Home Department (Political File No.37/86/41 and also file No. 8/9/41, N.A.I., New Delhi.
would work with them.\(^1\) Ribbentrop was worried that Bose might find stronger support in Rome and then Germany would lose the useful propaganda source of a prominent Indian nationalist leader in Berlin, fighting for India’s liberation with clear Nazi support. The German Foreign Ministry also feared an unilateral Italian declaration on Indian Independence. German invasion of the Soviet Union was imminent and Von Ribbentrop may have hoped to keep Bose in Berlin during that delicate period.\(^2\)

Weeraman was unable to prevent Bose’s trip and cautioned the staff of the German Embassy in Rome to cooperate fully with Bose, who would be an official guest of the Italian Government. Also his stay in Rome was to be kept as short as possible so that he would not have much opportunity to move his operation in Rome. Bose arrived in Rome on 29 May and began his talk with Italian leader under close German surveillance.\(^3\) The German radio and press also stepped up their coverage of India with increased attention to growing Indian discontent. Habibur Rahman, who was one of Bose’s associates in Berlin, became a frequent writer on Indian affairs in the official Nazi Party Newspaper 'Volkischer Beobachter'.\(^4\) It seems that Bose had accomplished one of his goals in his trip to Rome, he had forced the German Govt. to pay more attention to the Indian situation.

\(^1\) Ibid, also Documents of German Foreign Policy, D/XII, Nos. 561 & 598, cited in Milan Hauner, p.195.

\(^2\) See Foreign Ministry to Ernst Weeraman, Serial 195, Roll 184, Frame 139167, also in Documents of German Foreign Policy, D/XII, Nos. 561 & 598.

\(^3\) Ibid

Bose met the Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano on 6 June, 1941, in Rome. Bose's proposals for Axis cooperation with the Indian Nationalist movement did not impress him. Ciano observed in his diary on the same day that "Bose would like the Axis to make a declaration on the independence of India, but in Berlin his proposals have been received with a great deal of reserve nor must we be compromised because the value of this upstart is not clear. Past experience has given rather modest results". Ciano held Bose under virtual house arrest in a hotel in Rome, not knowing what to do with him. After five days Bose visited the German Ambassador in Rome and suggested that he was in no hurry to return to Berlin. Probably Bose wanted to wait for a specific request from the Foreign Ministry in Berlin which indicated that they had some interest in his plan.

The Ambassador felt that Bose was more interested in finding support in Rome than his returning to Germany. On learning on 14 June that Bose had scheduled meeting with Ciano, Von Ribbentrop personally met Italian Foreign Minister Ciano, the next day. It appears from Ciano's 'Diplomatic

1. Ciano's Diary, ed. Malcolm Muggeridge (London, 1941), pp. 435-455. By past experience Ciano was evidently referring to Ex-King of Afghanistan who was living in Italy as an exile, fell short of Italian expectation. Similarly the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem who escaped to Iraq was proving to be more a liability than an asset.
4. -ibid-.
papers' that Bose had sufficiently influenced Ribbentrop to feel that he should be helped in his propaganda work by putting the necessary means at his disposal. Ribbentrop restated the German Government's conviction that any public declaration on the part of the Axis, on the future status of India would be premature. It was for this reason to avoid any definite commitment, 1 on the subject. Hitler did not receive Bose. He strongly stated that he intended to keep Bose and his growing Free India Centre in Berlin. 2 However, Bose's meetings with Ciano had not been fruitful. 3

GERMAN'S ATTACK ON SOVIET UNION

When Bose was in Rome, on 22 June, 1941, German troops invaded the Soviet Union. Bose was shocked though he was unable to express his disappointment in relation to the German attack on Soviet Union publicly. 4 After two weeks on 5 July, he wrote to Woermann that the prospect for the realization of his plans looked gloomy in the altered circumstances and I was thinking that an early return to Berlin would not be of much use, till the situation in the East is clarified. The public reaction in my country to the new

1. "Among the reasons for this attitude was the fact that in the secret German negotiations with Russia at the end of 1941, India had been regarded as part of Russian sphere of aspiration when Britain collapsed", Sir Winston Churchill, the Second World War, Vol.II, p.520. According to Hugh Toye Germany was not at war with Russia until 22 June 1941, and could, therefore, not yet undertake any contrary public commitment", Hugh Toye, Subhas Chandra Bose, p.64.
3. Bose to Woermann, 5-7-41, Nanda Mukherjee, Netaji through German Lens (Calcutta, 1977) Appendix VIII.
situation is extremely unfavourable towards your Government." Bose clearly realized the adverse reaction the new German attack would create in India especially among the Indian communists and socialists. The press reaction to this move was also quite hostile to Germany.

Ribbentrop tried to solve Bose's worries and reassure him that his "basic decision has not changed since our conversation in Vienna. We still hold firm to the belief that a declaration must be issued and I ask you to have no apprehension in this regard". It would seem that since the attack on Russia, there was not any reason to maintain the diplomatic sanctity of the Soviet sphere of influence, then German Government might have been free to issue the promised declaration on India.

On 14 July, 1941, Bose arrived in Berlin and met Woermann on 17 July. The report of this interview submitted by the Woermann to the Foreign Minister shows how Bose had retained his independence of outlook in discussions with the highest German authorities, although he was enjoying their hospitality. "Bose at first spoke at length", reported Woermann "about the reaction of the Russian-German War on public opinion in India. The Soviet Union had been popular in India especially among the intellectuals from whom the leaders are drawn. It is

1. Nanda Mookerjee, "Netaji through German Lense", Appendix XIII.
3. Nanda Mookerjee, Netaji through German Lense,Appendix IX, also Milan Hauner, India's Independence and the Axis Powers, p.280.
believed in India that the Soviet Union is an anti-imperialist power and would therefore be an Indian ally against England. "In the German Russian war", the sympathies of the Indian people were very clearly with Russia because the Indian people felt definitely that Germany was the aggressor and was for India, therefore another dangerous imperialist power.\(^1\)

In Nazi Germany nobody dared say such things not even privately to government officials. But as the Germans had already realised that Bose was not like the sycophantic people that usually gathered round them. In his report Woermann observed: "Bose is so strongly influenced by the Soviet thesis on the question of the origin of the German-Russian conflict that it will be one of our tasks to set him right on this point.\(^2\) It was a task in which the Germans were destined to fail.

Bose rightly felt that the threat caused by the approaching German armies might easily be presented to the Indian public through British propaganda as an attempt to substitute German occupation for British rule and not as an attempt to liberate India.\(^3\) To defeat British propaganda Bose strongly urged the German Government for a prompt declaration in favour of free India.

When Bose returned to Berlin on 14 July 1941 the growing concern with India and of the official interest in

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1. Nanda Mookerjee, Netaji through German Lense, Appendix IX, also Milan Hauner, India's Independence & the Axis Powers, p.280.
2. Nanda Mookerjee, Netaji through German Lense, p.53.
supporting Indian nationalism. When Bose was still in Rome, important steps were initiated to reorganize the working group of India and 'the special Department, India' of the Foreign Office was established and Von trott became its official Director.\(^1\) Along with Dr. Alexander Werth who was his Deputy Assistant and F. J. Furtwängler, A. P. Richler and H. T. Leipoldt were recruited. Subordinated sections were established to deal with propaganda, press matters, the planned radio operations to India, and the Indian volunteers in the army.\(^2\) The recruiting of the Special Company of Indian volunteers was accelerated and by mid July there were fifty Indians in training in Germany.\(^3\)

Bose was encouraged by increasing German interest in Indian affairs.\(^4\) The new 'Special Department India (Sonderreferant India) was put under the direct control of the Secretary of the State Wilhelm Keppler who functioned as Liaison Officer to the German Foreign Minister, the Chancellor and other organizations. He maintained the necessary communications with higher departments and avoided any interference on the part of extremely ambitious authorities.\(^5\) In the beginning of August, Bose had the first

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4. Edward S. Haynes writes, "Bose was still distressed about the impact of German invasion of the Soviet Union would have on his plans. Perhaps he still cherished the wish to set up his government-in-exile in Moscow, as had been his original goal during his stay in Kabul." "Subhas Chandra Bose & the Early Azad Hind Sangh", Bengal Past & Present, Jan-June, 1977, p. 11.
5. Werth & Arbich, Netaji in Germany, p. 20.
A detailed conversation with the Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, Mr. Keppler. In the meantime, Keppler had been able to obtain sanction from the German Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, about necessary funds for the organisation and maintenance of work in connection with the Free India Centre.

German interest in India grew during the weeks after the invasion of Russia. Naturally, the German Government was seeking every opportunity to sabotage the British war effort. India was the biggest reservoir of men and material for Britain. Bose's propaganda would encourage the discontent in India to grow into active opposition and thus be directly helpful to Germany.

Early in August, the German Embassy in Kabul reported that Bose's supporters in India could serve important purpose for German policy and, if armed, could be powerful underground force against the British. The only problem was their outspoken sympathy for the Soviet Union. During one of his discussions with the Germans and the Italians in Kabul, Bose had told them that Bhagat Ram Talwar would be their link with India. Later, it was agreed that he would return to Kabul with some young men of Bengal volunteers and the Germans and Italians would train them in sabotage techniques and wireless work. Satyendarayan Bakhshi who was a Bengal volunteer's leader and the close associate of Bose,

1. According to Werth, "basically, Netaji Bose, his Indian friends and the German staff of the Special India Division got along well with Wilhelm Keppler. ibid.
3. N.G.Campulley, Netaji in Germany, p.34.
sent Santimay Ganguly, a Bengal volunteer, to Kabul with Bhagatram. But no fruitful result was achieved by these plans. Meanwhile war broke out between Germany and Russia. Till then the Indian communists had classified the war as an 'imperialist war' with which they would have nothing to do. Now they called it a 'people's war' and immediately joined the war effort. The British Government promptly lifted its ban on them and the communists found themselves able to operate openly for the first time since the party had been founded in the early twenties. Telwar's Kirti Party had merged with the mainstream Indian communists in 1942, and that year all contact with Bose and Telwar was ended.

Continuous German postponement of the declaration on Indian independence, once already promised, led Bose on 15 August, 1941, to address a sharp letter to Ribbentrop. "The march of the German troops towards the East will be regarded as the approach, not of a friend, but of an enemy".

On 29 November, 1941, Bose had a personal interview with the German Foreign Minister. Bose gave his thanks to the German Government for its help and hospitality. He expressed his desire very forcefully for a clear enunciation of the war aims of the German Government as far as Indian independence was concerned. He also expressed his desire to Ribbentrop to speak to Hitler and request him to strike out the passage in the "Main Kampf" expressing contempt for

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the Indians. Ribbentrop, however, maintained that the time had not yet come for the declaration on India.

The conversation was not at all satisfactory as far as Bose was concerned. Nevertheless, Bose did have the opportunity of finding out for himself that the question of liberation for India which was his only and sole concern, did not evoke the right sort of echo or sympathy for amongst the highest officials and leaders of the German Government. The Indian division of the foreign office, however, in spite of all these setbacks, was carrying on effectively with its part of the task. Its work together with the Free India Centre could thus be carried on without any interference.

Bose had been feeling from the beginning that a declaration by the Axis powers about India's independence would give the best start to the working out of his plans in Germany. But neither Italy nor Germany favoured at that time such an open declaration though both were prepared to give all-out help to Bose for carrying out the plan.

1. Hitler had written: "All efforts of the Indians to rebel against the British yoke will most likely never succeed. It is only when Britain will be defeated by the military power of a more powerful enemy that India can expect to be free. States which are politically & militarily weak can never be in a position to overcome the political and military power of a well-organised nation." Adolf Hitler, "Mein Kampf", p.536.
2. Bose's conversation with Von Ribbentrop is in Documents of German Foreign Policy, D/XIII, No.521.
3. Bose, Werth & Ayer, ed, A Beacon Across Asia, p.125. Milan Hauner writes that Ribbentrop rejected the idea of an Indian declaration "the Axis could speak only when German troops were beyond the Caucasus en Suez, for otherwise any propaganda effect would come to naught. It was the guiding principle of German policy not to promise anything that could not be carried out later". India's Independence & Axis Powers, p.284.
In Germany, Bose paid his attentions on the three immediate objectives: (1) Forming a 'Free India Centre' in Berlin, (2) Broadcasting to India and (3) Raising an Indian Legion in Germany. Bose approached the German authorities with a clear-cut programme of work, and a list of his requirements for that purpose.\(^1\) It was agreed that the German Government would bear all the expenses, she would also place at his disposal the necessary technical staff for radio broadcasting and reserve experienced military personnel for the training of young Indians in Germany.\(^2\)

It was further agreed that the monetary aid would be considered as a "national loan" to Bose's personal allowance was fixed at ₹12,000 per month. The monthly grant to the Free India Centre, which started with ₹18,000 in 1942, rose to ₹48,000 in 1944.\(^3\) In fact Bose took these loans very seriously. In 1944, through the German ambassador in Tokyo and with the knowledge of the Japanese government, he sent 500,000 yen as the first instalment in repayment of the loans which the Germans had advanced to the Free India Centre in Berlin. This amount was made up of voluntary contributions made by Indians living in South and East Asia.\(^4\) The expenses of broadcasting and of the Legion were borne entirely by Germany. All payments were made punctually and no accounts had to be submitted to any German authority.

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1. Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany, p.37.
2. Werth & Harbich, Netaji in Germany, p.19.
3. N.G.Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany, p.38.
Accommodation for the Free India Centre was made available in the Tiergarten area, where the foreign embassies were located, and it began to function informally from October, 1941. The Centre was given the status of a diplomatic mission with the usual facilities and staff members were entitled to all facilities allowed to members of other diplomatic missions in Germany.

In Germany, Bose began assembling those Indians who were willing to assist him. Most of these were students who had been studying in Germany and Austria before the outbreak of war. One of the first to join him was N. G. Ganpuley, who had arranged Bose's contacts with German officials in India when Bose was President of the Indian National Congress. N. R. Vyas and N. G. Swami were among the other Indians who joined Bose in the spring of 1941. Emilie Schenkl, who had been his personal secretary during his earlier visits to Austria, came to Berlin in October as his personal secretary. C. N. Namibie, an Indian journalist who was working in Central Europe, for many years, joined him in January 1942. The same month Girija K. Moorkarjee came to Berlin from Paris, and was entrusted with the English broadcasts. Most of the Indians had joined Free India Centre at Bose's personal request, and were drawn to Berlin by his 'charismatic personality'. Bose explained

1. N. G. Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany, pp. 39-40.
2. ibid.
5. N. G. Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany, p. 46.
6. Girija Moorkarjee, Europe at War, p. 207.
to the Indians who had joined his movement that he had no sympathy for the Nazi cause and only desired German assistance in India's fight for freedom. He expressed his belief that the Nazis were not above political bargaining and that "as long as India does not come into their way, they would not mind supporting Indian independence". 1

The first meeting of Free India Centre was held on 2 November, 1941, to discuss its principles and the objectives and framework of rules and regulations. 2 Bose, in a short but impressive speech, outlined the nature of the work he had undertaken and sought the loyal cooperation of his colleagues. 3

The 'Free India Centre' under Bose's leadership was organized into nine groups. The General Department dealt with specific questions relating to the Indian National Congress, Muslim Separatism and international attitudes towards Indian Nationalism. The Press Department kept up with Indian affairs through subscribing to seven daily Indian newspapers and the Radio Department began preparations for the commencement of radio service to South Asia. Another group was concerned with propaganda and a separate department was to supervise military and espionage activities in India. 4

1. -ibid- p.197.
2. Ganputay, Netaji in Germany, p.41.
3. -ibid -
4. Edward Hayness observes that "Bose was obviously attempting to make the Azad Hind Sangh the frame-work for a government in exile, but this status could only be meaningfully declared after the joint Axis declaration on India was in issued. "Subhas Chandra Bose & the Early Azad Hind Sangh, Bengal - Past & Present, January-June, 1977, p. 13."
It was decided to adopt Rabindranath Tagore's 'Jana Gana Mana' as the national anthem. 'JAI HIND' was adopted as a common form of greeting.\(^1\) It may be mentioned here that when India became free Jawaharlal Nehru as the Prime Minister adopted JAI HIND as the national form of greeting. Hindustani written in Roman script was adopted as the official language. The Congress tri-colour with the outline of the springing tiger was accepted as the insignia of the Azad Hind movement.\(^2\) A Planning Commission was established to take up the work of planning for social and economic reorganisation of India after attainment of freedom.\(^3\)

Some members of the Centre suggested that on oath of personal allegiance, Bose, on the pattern of the standard German oath, would be required to all the Indians of the Centre. This was opposed by many students and Bose solved the problem by not insisting on any oath personally to himself, except from the members of the military legion.\(^4\) Similar problems occurred on the title of respect. 'Netaji' for Bose, which was obviously parallel with the German equivalent of 'Fuhrer' (also leader). The younger elements, accustomed to Nazi Germany, thought it an appropriate title but others felt uncomfortable to call Bose 'Netaji' even on informal occasions.\(^5\)

1. According to N.G. Ganpuley "with Jai Hind as a common national greeting, it was thought possible to bring about unity in diversity and at the same time to remind us of our great aim and objective of Free India" Netaji in Germany, p.42.
2. N.G. Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany, pp.45-46.
3. Werth & Harbich, Netaji in Germany, p.21.
4. Girija Mecknerjee, This Europe, p.149.
5. ibid- p.142. Jog, In Freedom's Quest, p.206. Ganpuley writes: "This was in keeping with the Indian tradition of expressing regards for the elders and national heroes. We decided to address Bose as Netaji which combined both a sense of affection & respect for the national hero, Netaji in Germany, p.43."
The staff of the Centre, especially Bose, was kept under almost constant Gestapo surveillance. But the status and comparative independence they had achieved by late 1941 led one Hungarian diplomat to remark: "We are the allies of Germany, but Subhas Bose's organisation enjoys more freedom and rights than any of the East European States." The Centre had started, in fact with only few Indian workers, but in the late summer of 1942, there were 35 active members in the Free India Centre, most of them being Indian students.

AZAD HIND RADIO

Among the diversified activities of the Free India Centre, major attention was paid to broadcasting services. Bose thought that a continuous, purposeful, well-conceived propaganda, suiting the temperament and psychology of the general public, is a powerful weapon for enthusing one's own people and undermining the morale of enemy. Radio broadcasting was not an easy matter as there was nobody trained in broadcasting. With the help of technical facilities of the German Radio through the efforts of special India Division of the German Foreign Office, a group of young students and some Indian journalists was formed and gradually trained for broadcasting work. They had to select the very essential among the abundance of daily incoming information and material. The selected material had afterwards to be processed and translated into several languages and broadcast in a form suitable for Indian listeners. In November 1941, there

1. Quoted in Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany, p.19.
2. Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany, p.48.
3. Werth Alexander, Netaji in Germany, p.23.
there was a team of only 10 well-qualified workers who actually began the work of the Azad Hind Radio.

The technical side necessarily to be left to the Germans but all the editing of the broadcasts was done by the Indians. Radio broadcasts were done under the name of Azad Hind Radio, and was not mixed with any German broadcasting programmes. According to Alexander Werth, "the texts written by the Indians for broadcasting were neither censored before they were broadcast nor were these censored by the Germans after copies of the texts had been received by the letter. Bose had obtained this privilege from the German authorities on his assurance to the German Government that as the Secret Azad Hind broadcasts would be concerned chiefly with Indo-British relations, there was no case for any censoring by the Germans. 1 Although it was agreed that there was to be no censoring of any kind from the German side, yet it is in record that on 30 December, 1941, a meeting was held in the Foreign Office when a decision was taken unanimously to exercise surveillance on radio broadcasts by playing the records without Bose's knowledge. On the same day a special meeting was held in the Ministry of propaganda which was attended by Goebbels and some high officials of the Foreign Office and the German Radio.

1. Bose, Werth, Ayer, - A Beacon Across Asia, p.130. Ganpuley also expressed the same opinion that "There was to be no censorship of any kind from the German side and there was to be no dictation about the subjects to be selected. In spite of all the internal difficulties, all the ups and downs of war, some political troubles in Germany, like the unsuccessful plot of some officers of the Army to murder Hitler, this arrangement was strictly adhered to, without a day's break, till the end of the war". Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany, p.49.
According to the notes of the meeting, censorship on broadcasts was to be conducted with utmost care so that Bose might not know anything.\(^1\) Kissinger who was the Director for external broadcasting with the 'Greater German Radio' himself ordered the censorship of Bose's broadcasts and also carried it out personally.\(^2\)

Goebbels' diaries also prove that he personally kept strict watch on Bose's radio broadcasts. Bose's broadcasts show how tactfully he carried on the propaganda work over the radio. He neither commended nor condemned Nazism. One may of course say that Bose never openly denounced the Nazis during the war. Mainly for tactical reasons he did not depreciate Nazis in public. But without fear he placed his view points before the listeners.

For a long time the location of Azad Hind Radio was kept a guarded secret.\(^3\) The idea was to make the Indian people feel that the broadcasts were being broadcast from some secret station in or near India. Through the broadcasts appeals were made to the Indian people to carry on and intensify the fight for freedom. Initially the broadcasts were only for 45 minutes, but finally these were extended upto three hours and fifty minutes. In the beginning

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1. Mookerjee, Nanda: Netaji through German Lence, p.86.
2. Chattopadhyay, Gautam, Subhas Chandra Bose and Indian Communist, p.32. Also Bhattacharya, S.M., 'Subhas Chandra Bose in self exile. His finest Hour', p.54.
3. Goebbels, in his diaries, writes that "All that better that we have not yet revealed where he is staying. His propaganda can take effect more easily thus" 26 March, 1942. The Goebbels Diaries translated & edited by Louis P. Lachner - Hamilton, London, 1948, p.100.
the talks were written by Bose himself and were broadcast in all the three languages. After some time, his work was taken over by his Indian colleagues. Azad Hind Radio used to broadcast regularly every day in seven languages, English, Hindustani, Bengali, Pashto, Tamil, Telugu and alternately in Gujarati and Marathi.¹ Neither Bose nor Azad Hind Radio ever defended in broadcasts, the policy or the programmes of German National Socialist party.²

The establishment of the Azad Hind Radio more or less coincided with the outbreak of war in the Far East. In November 1941 Japan actively entered the world war when it attacked the United States naval base at Pearl Harbour in Hawaii. Within a few days Japan and Great Britain were at war and within a couple of months the banner of the Rising Sun was carried in triumph across South-East Asia to very centre of world politics. Bose thought that the success of the Axis powers was now firmly equated with India's deliverance from British imperialism. Japanese occupied Singapore which was the eastern bastion of the British power on 15 February 1942.³ Bose found it a fitting opportunity to make his first broadcast to the people and thus made his presence known to public. Till then, his

1. Campuley, Netaji in Germany, P.53.
2. Alexander, Werth writes: "The work done by the Indians under Bose in Germany was based on the firm understanding that without being ideologically involved in the national socialist doctrine, the Indians in Germany would advance the cause of Indian independence." Werth, Alexander & Harbich Walter, Netaji in Germany, p.19.
3. Hugh Toye writes: "For Bose swift advances of Japan in the East rendered German Victors in Russia and North Africa irrelevant. Singapore, Rangoon, Calcutta these were the keys to British dominion over India. The fall of Singapore was irresistible to his eloquence. Hugh Toye, The Springing Tiger, p.55."
presence was kept secret from the outside world and he used to write in the 'Free India Centre's Weekly "The Azad Hind" under the name of Orlando Mazzote. On 19 February, Bose said in his broadcast, "The fall of Singapore means the collapse of the British Empire and the end of the iniquitous regime which it has symbolised, and the dawn of a new era in Indian History". Bose said that he would continue to fight British Imperialism till India would become independent.

"During this struggle and in the subsequent period of reconstruction we will cooperate whole-heartedly with all those who help us to destroy the common enemy". 1 Bose followed this with 'a declaration of war against England. Bose's statement was broadcast and the re-broadcast several times. On 28 February Bose broadcasted again. Goebbels was enthusiastic, he wrote on 1 March 1942, "We shall now begin our official fight on behalf of India, even though we do not as yet admit it openly". 2 Again, on the next day he recorded in his diary "Bose's appeal has made a deep impression on world public opinion. The crisis in India can no longer be denied though he recognised that nothing tangible would emerge till the Japanese gained some more victories. 3

**BOSE ON CRIPPS MISSION**

With the outbreak of the Pacific war in December 1941, India found herself suddenly in the centre of three

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3. -ibid- p.68.
theatre of war: the North-African in the west, the Russian in the North-West, and the South-East Asia in the east. The Japanese 'blitzkrieg' on the South-east Asian mainland brought the war to India's eastern borders. India was the main missing test between the German occupied area of the Soviet Union and Japanese controlled South-East Asia, it was the key to a Japanese domination of the Indian Ocean area. The Indian sub-continent became vital for Allied strategy in the early months of 1942, and an object of Allied concern.¹

When British defences in east and south-east Asia were collapsing, the Cripps Mission was sent to India with two objectives to stabilize the internal situation in India, in order to strengthen the defence of the Indian sub-continent and to demonstrate to the other Allies that there was no lack of British concern to solve the Indian problems.²

Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in India on 23 March, 1942, with promise of Dominion Status after the end of war.³

Bose went on the radio on 25 March "to attack the British policy of deception and warn the Indian people".⁴ He said that "I feel convinced that Sir Stafford Cripps has gone to India to try the age-long policy of British imperialism - 'divide and rule'. Participation in British's war will not

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2. -ibid- p. 362.
only hinder Britain's defeat, but also delay the attainment of independence for India. He advised Indians to reject the Cripps proposal. The Viceroy was worried that Bose's propaganda and attack on Cripps Mission had culminating effect in India.

He made some more broadcasts condemning Cripps for playing the "role of deceit and duplicity. He further said that he was convinced that if India did not participate in Britain's war there was not the least possibility of India being attacked by any of the Axis powers. The Draft Declaration, which Cripps brought to Delhi was rejected by Gandhi as a "post-dated cheque on a Crashing Bank". Even President Roosevelt felt "the deadlock has been caused by the unwillingness of the British Government to concede to the Indians the right of self-government, notwithstanding the willingness of the Indians to entrust technical, military and naval defence control to the competent British authorities".

British called Bose as an enemy agent and a Nazi collaborator in order to alienate his following in India. Despite this, the steady flow of propaganda from Germany, affected a large number of people in India. Even Gandhi was also impressed by Bose's escape to Germany. He had not

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formally approved many of Bose's action", Azad writes, "but now I found a change in his outlook. Many of his remarks convinced me that he admired the courage and resourcefulness Subhas Bose had displayed in making his escape from India. His admiration for Subhas Bose unconsciously coloured his view about the whole war situation... This admiration was also one of the factors which clouded the discussions during the Cripps Mission to India".1

Bose replied back the accusations of British calling him as an enemy agent. "I need no credentials when I speak to my own people. My whole life is one long, persistent, uncompromising struggle against British imperialism, and is the best guarantee of my bona fides. All my life I have been the servant of India. Until the last hour of my life I shall remain one. My allegiance and loyalty have ever been to India alone, no matter in which part of the world I may live".2

2. Selected speeches of Subhas Chandra Bose, p.129.
Bose kept himself aware of all developments in India and broadcasted on all important issues over Azad Hind Radio. He said in one of his speeches, "We cannot get freedom as a gift from Britain. We must win our freedom by shedding our own blood at the altar of our motherland." Goebbels noted in his diary that Bose's propaganda was proving extremely embarrassing to the English. "It is being heard more widely than I at first thought possible. All the better that we have not yet revealed where he is. This makes his propaganda all the more effective." Again Goebbels wrote on 6 April: "Bose's propaganda, conducted and guided from here, is gradually getting on the nerves of the British. In their broadcasts they blamed me especially for Bose's activity.".

QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT

The Indian National Congress passed a Quit India resolution on 14 July for the withdrawal of the British power from India and the Quit India movement.

1. Selected speeches of Subhas Chandra Bose, p.131.
launched by Congress in August 1942. Bose at last found Gandhi and the Congress accepting its views in giving an ultimatum to British. He exhorted his countrymen to seize the opportunity and drive away the Britishers from the motherland. In his broadcast of 31 August 1942 he said "the British Empire will soon collapse and break up as a result of shattering defeats in all the theatres of war. And when the final dismemberment of Empire takes place, power will automatically come into the hands of Indian people... As at home, so also abroad, we stand always for independence, and we shall never permit vital encroachment on our national sovereignty by any foreign powers. Do not be carried away by ideological considerations; do not bother about internal politics of other countries, which is no concern of ours. Believe me when I say that the enemies of British imperialism are our friends and allies. It is to their interest to see the British Empire broken up and India once again free".1

As a result of the Quit India movement, it was felt necessary to open a second secret Radio Station in the name of National Congress Radio.2 Again at the end of 1942, when new tensions developed between the

1. Selected speeches of Subhas Chandra Bose, pp.143-144
2. N.C.Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany, p. 56.
Hindus and the Muslims in India, as a result of the activities of the Muslim League, an Azad Muslim Radio was started to represent the views of the Nationalists Muslims of India and to counter-act those of the separatists.¹ These three radios functioned smoothly in Berlin about one year.

After six months of Bose's departure from Germany it was found necessary to transfer the radio station from Germany to Holland. Within three months of the shifting, the office of the Free India Centre in Berlin, was bombed by the British bombers and completely demolished.² Then when the allied troops invaded France in 1944 and were nearing Holland, the whole establishment was again shifted back to Germany.³ In spite of all the difficulties, all the members of the radio stations continued to function like a team. That showed how well Bose had succeeded, during his contact with them during 1941-43, in inspiring those young intellectuals.⁴

¹. Werth & Harbich, Netaji in Germany, P.30.
². N.G.Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany, pp. 58-59.
³. Bose, Werth & Ayer. A Beacon Across Asia, p.132. In fact, Bose had succeeded in achieving in a miniature form in Europe what he did in a bigger way later in South-East Asia with the INA, namely to inspire every member with the idea of national unity irrespective of any consideration for race, castes, religions and regional beliefs.
The Indian Legion

At the beginning of 1941, some of the senior officials of the German Foreign Office realised that Germany was not making the proper use of her Indian opportunities. A large number of Indian war prisoners were brought to Germany from North Africa. It was felt that anti-British sentiment was generally strong among many of those Indian prisoners. Bose's plan was to train these soldiers and then parachute them into India from bases in Afghanistan, their mission would be to lead guerilla activities against the British. Near the end of April 1941 Cavalry officer Walter Harbich met Bose in Berlin to discuss plans for the Indian units.

In May limited recruiting began for this Indo-German special unit. Walter Harbich and two German sergeant did most of the work for the German side and N.G.Swamy represented Indian national interests with the prisoners. Under the personal command of Harbich, this Indo-German special unit of about 100 men was lodged in the barracks of Meseritz. Bose visited Meseritz very often and was pleased with the progress made in the training of personnel of the unit. In it, he visualized the beginning of a bigger Indian Legion in Germany. In this connection, he met Dr. Adalbert Seifriz with whom he very soon established a very friendly relationship. Bose appreciated his efforts in defending the interests of Indian units and carrying out his instructions.

3. Alexander Werth & Walter Herrich, Netaji in Germany, pp. 47-48
In December 1942, Bose visited the Annaberg Camp where all the Indian prisoners of war were put together by the German military authorities. There was some doubt as to the results this visit would have in view of the officers' and non-commissioned officers' critical attitude. During his visit, Bose tried first to speak individually to the P.O.W. Bose in his many discussions and speeches, held on the second day of his visit, demanded a clear allegiance towards a free India and invite them to volunteer to fight and sacrifice their lives to make India free. Although many of the junior officers were sceptical about what Bose was doing, hundreds of P.O.W joined the legion. Though Bose made emotional speeches to the P.O.W to join the Legion, no pressure was exercised. This is clear from the large number of P.O.W. who did not join the Legion. The understanding which Bose had arrived at with the German Government regarding the Legion was clear and detailed. The Legion was not to be mixed with any German Army formation. The German Army was to provide the necessary training, to staff and facilities to the Legion. It was to be treated on equal terms, so far as food, clothing and equipment were concerned. It was made

1. N.C.Ganpuley, Netaji in German, pp.65-70, also Werth & Habich, Netaji in Germany, pp.33-34. According to A.C.H. Nambier, "Bose took up ardently the idea of raising an Indian Legion, greatly stimulated by accounts of the Czechoslovak & Polish Legion. The parallel did not cover all points", Forward by Nambier Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany, p.ix.

2. According to A.C.H. Nambier, "Nothing bears this out more convincingly than the fact that out of a total of about 15,000 prisoners, only near to 4,000 were enrolled in the Legion. With some a bizarre situation too counted. The Indian Legion in Europe did not enroll any of the small group of commissioned officers taken as prisoners; this is another proof of absence of force", Preface, p.ix in N.C.Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany, also Werth & Habich, Netaji in Germany, p.34.
clear that the Legion was not to be sent on active service to any front except India. The volunteers were brought to the Konigshoek for the proper training. Toward December 1942, one year after the recruitment was started, the Legion reached the strength of four battalions.

In October 1942, the first official manoeuvre was held with three battalions in honour of Bose. Colonel Yamamoto, the military attaché of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin was also present. On the same day all the soldiers of the Indian Legion, i.e. about 3000 men under the command of Lieut. Col. Krappe were sworn into their flag. They expressed loyalty to Hitler and accepted Bose as their leader under whom they were to fight for India's freedom.

Bose's determination that Indians should work for the freedom of their country without any differences of caste and religion, had its influence. The composition of the Indian Legion was not based on the caste, religion or region. The legionaries lived together in a fraternal spirit while

1. N.G. Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany, pp. 70-71.
2. For the details see Walter Herbrich, "A Report on the organisation and training of the Free India Army in Europe, 1941-42, Worth & Herbrich, Netaji in Germany, pp. 47-57
3. Ibid., p. 35.
4. According to Ganpuley, "the rapid expansion of the Legion had posed financial difficulties. By September 1942, it was agreed that instead of giving payment from the monthly grants to the Free India Centre and its office, direct payment should be made to the legionaries and a formal oath of loyalty to the Fuhrer as the supreme commander may be taken by them", Netaji in Germany, p. 96.
5. The oath was as follows: "I swear by God this holy oath, and I will obey the leader of the German State and people, Adolf Hitler, as commander of the German Armed Forces in the fight for the freedom of India in which fight the leader is Subh Chandra Bose, and that as a brave soldier, I am willing to lay down my life for this oath", N.G. Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany, p. 96, also in Hugh Teys, the Springing Tiger, p. 75.
While Bose was busy in broadcasting over the Azad Hind Radio and raising the Indian Legion, he was not satisfied over the attitude of Axis powers on the official declaration of Indian Independence. Since his arrival in Germany he tried to persuade the German, Italian and Japanese Governments to make official declaration on the question of Indian independence. The Special Indian Division often tried to make the government in Berlin agree to Bose's suggestion.

The fall of Singapore in February 1942 raised a great hope in Bose's mind, but Hitler, instead of welcoming Japanese in South-East Asia, remarked: "It means the loss of a whole continent, and that is to be regretted, for it is the white race which is the loser". 1

Meanwhile the German authorities wanted to utilise the Indian Legion to disturb the British war efforts in India, but Bose was determined not to

agree to the German pressure till he was assured of a German guarantee to India's freedom.

Japanese Prime Minister Tojo had already issued a statement in early 1942 in the Diet favouring Indian independence and in March Japan suggested that the Axis powers should announce a common declaration on India.¹ Hitler did not want to make such a declaration, probably because he did not want the end of British domination in India on social grounds. But he unwillingly agreed to discuss the matter with Mussolini.² The meeting between Hitler and Mussolini took place on 29 April, 1942, in Salzburg. Hitler said that a joint declaration on India might lead to "a considerable strengthening of England's determination to fight because of the menace for the entire Empire arising out of such a declaration".³ Dr. Voigt concludes that the remote possibility of a separate peace treaty with Britain in the middle of the war was taken by Hitler as real enough to withhold consent to the Japanese proposal. Answer to the Japanese

On 29 May, 1942, Bose met Hitler at his headquarters situated in the forest of East Prussia. A week before this meeting, Bose wrote a letter to the German Government, stating, "Now the time has come when the final effort should be made for achieving India's political emancipation. It is absolutely essential that I should be in the East where I shall be able to direct the revolution along the right channels... I am now convinced more than ever before that the Tripartite Powers and India have a common destiny. Our common goal the final defeat of Anglo-American Imperialism - demands that I should now go to the East and from close quarters guide the Indian revolution towards that goal."

This letter shows that Bose himself decided to shift his area of operation from the West to the East with the views of latest developments in international situation.

In the meeting of Hitler and Bose, former retained his opposition to the issue of the declaration and described himself as a soldier who conducted the struggle without instruments of power rather than a political propagandist. If he had as much as half a dozen panzer divisions plus several more motorized

1. Nanda Mukerjee, Netaji through German Lease, Appendix XI.
divisions south of the Caucasus to support the Arab and Egyptian insurgents, he would not hesitate to issue such a declaration. But such an opportunity might occur for three months or even for two years.\(^1\) Hitler declared for India that 'She was endlessly remote from Germany' and could be reached only by air or land along the Persian Gulf or across Afghanistan. The real route to India, according to Hitler, would have to be over Russia's dead body.\(^2\) Hitler did, however, admit to Bose that the British Raj could only be broken simultaneously combining popular uprising in India with the military thrust of the Axis.\(^3\) Bose boldly asked Hitler to clarify certain passages in 'Mein Kampf' hostile towards the Indians which were frequently exploited by enemy propaganda.\(^4\) Thus he took up once again one of his earliest criticisms on Nazi racial practice. Hitler could not admit any fault in his racialist views and merely indicated

1. A short German-Italian declaration on the independence of Egypt was nevertheless issued on 2 July, 1942. Milan Hauner.


3. Dr. Werth writes that "Hitler said according to him India would not be able to rule herself for another 150 years. Bose, Werth, Ayer, A Beacon Across Asia, p. 139; also in Syke's Troubled Loyalty, pp. 364-65.

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that the original aim has been to discourage the advocates of passive resistance in Germany who had seen in India an example to be followed.¹

The meeting with Hitler was a total failure and it lost the hopes of Bose, if he had any, about the sincerity of German aid to the national government. He realised finally that all his efforts for many years to convince Hitler about the importance of his political mission had failed. He convinced that neither the German government nor the was in Europe had any direct bearing with his plans for the future. After spending one year in Germany, he now clearly saw that he could not accomplish much in Europe, and he must go to East Asia for the early fulfilment of his plans.

It is very difficult to explain why Hitler refused to make any declaration regarding India's

¹. Milan Hauner, India's Independence and the Axis power, p. 298.

Dr. Alexander Werth in his account of interview says that "Hitler, it seems, refused point-blank to discuss on 'Mein Kampf'. Bose said in private that Hitler had impressed him as the German version of the Fakir of Ipi, Girija Meekarjee, Europe at War, p. 210.

According to K.R.Vyas who was the Personal Secretary to Bose in Berlin, "Hitler did agree that those were based on earlier wrong impressions created by British propaganda and promised to have them deleted in future editions. Times of India, 21 November, 1982.
independence. It seems that his social ideas played an important role in his attitude towards India. In spite of his openly expressed enmity for the British, the total destruction of the British Empire was not at all desirable prospect for the future.\(^1\) India was to remain under British in accord not with his own appreciation of the superior racial qualities the British had displayed as colonial administrators.\(^2\) Even while increasing his military opposition to England, Hitler seems to have continued to cherish a dream of an Anglo-German alliance eliminating the slavic menace of the Soviet Union and this attitude prevent effective German support for Indian nationalism.\(^3\)

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2. Milan Hauner, India's Independence and the Axis Powers, p.307. Hitler writes in his book "Mein Kampf" "En land will lose India either if her own administrative machinery falls a prey to racial decomposition or if she is beset by the sword of a powerful enemy. Indians, however, will never achieve this". Adolf Hitler, "Mein Kampf", p.658. In other words, Hitler seems to have contemplated Britain's loss of India to another world (European) powers, but hardly to the Indians.

Keppler was of the view that Hitler nourished till the end of 1943 the secret hope of a separate peace with Britain for whom he always had a grudging admiration and that is why he was reluctant to do anything that might harden British attitude. ¹

In this meeting Bose expressed his desire to go to East Asia, and Hitler agreed that it was the right step and promised to do everything to help him so that in spite of all the existing war-time difficulties, this journey could take place. ² An assessment of the European situation in the middle 1942 convinced Bose that the scope for the continuation of his work now lay in East Asia rather than Europe. ³ In the autumn of 1942 Bose expressed his views to Admiral Canaris "You know as well as I do that Germany cannot win the war. But this time victorious Britain will lose India. Even the British will not be able to break their promise to give up their dominion over India, a promise made by their own free will in 1940." ⁴


3. Werth & Harbich, Netaji in Germany, p. 36. Edward & Hayness write that by the end of Nov. 1947, Bose's faith in the German government as India's friend and ally had been permanently destroyed both by the repeated postponements of promised Axis declarations of India's right to independence and the growing German political impotence in South Asia after their expulsion from Afghanistan. p. 16.

4. Paul Leverkuhn, German Military Intelligence, (London, 1954), p. 188.
Toyo had already issued statements in the Diet favouring Indian independence in early 1942 and in March the Japanese proposed an Axis declaration in India. Even as early as October 1941 Col. Yamamoto Rin, Japanese Military attaché in Berlin Embassy, had been ordered to "observe and make a report on a man named Bose". In order to meet Bose he required the permission of the German Foreign Ministry. Since permission was not forthcoming, Japanese Ambassador Lieut. General Oshima Hiroshi himself requested for it. When Bose first met with Oshima and Yamamoto both men were impressed with the passion of his appeal and soon Bose became a frequent and welcome visitor to their Embassy. When Bose heard the news of Japan's entry into the war against Britain, he expressed his desire to go over to the Far East to launch the liberation campaign into India. Oshima and Yamamoto passed on Bose's wishes with their affirmative recommendations to the Tokyo Government. But no favourable replies other than 'under consideration' came from Tokyo for months.  

Japan's attempts to organise her group of Indians had been progressing more than the Germans. Japan had thousands of Prisoners of War and first Indian National Army was organised by Captain Mohansingh early in 1942. As many as 45,000 Indian Prisoners of War assembled on 17 February 1942 to join the new Indian Army. It is, however,

2. ibid- pp.110-111, also pp.10-11.
significant to note that Prisoners of War expressed emphatically the need for stable political leadership. In a letter addressed to the 'Fujiiwara Kikan' they expressed the view that the political leadership of Subha Chandra Bose alone would be acceptable to them. "We consider it a point of great honour for us to accept the kind valuable and venerable leadership of Mr. S.C. Bose... We, the members of the Indian National Army, are prepared to shed ever drop of our blood for S.C. Bose. His very name puts new life to us".  

Three million Indians in East Asia were already getting organised under the leadership of an Indian revolutionary Rash Behari Bose, who had been living in exile in Japan for some 30 years. Indian nationalists had long been pressing the Japanese government to bring Bose over from Berlin. Captain Mohansingh had mentioned his name to the Japanese as early in 1941. In the Singapore Conference and the Tokyo Conference (1942) the need of his guidance had been emphasised by the delegates. The Bangkok Conference had invited him to East Asia and heard his message. But in early 1943, the necessity of Bose's presence in East Asia was felt more keenly than ever. Rash Behari Bose might have realised that he had failed to secure a declaration about India from the Government of Japan and Bose might succeed where he had failed. So when the Japanese Mission Officer met Rash Behari Bose with the proposal of inviting Bose to lead the movement in East Asia it was readily accepted.

1. Prisoner's letter, 1 January 1942, I.N.A. History Committee files, All India I.N.A. Relief & Enquiry Committee, Delhi.
About this time the new chief of the Second Bureau of
the Imperial General Headquarters, Lt.Gen. Arisut visited
Singapore and Rash Behari requested him to make 'fast
arrangements' to bring Bose from Germany to EastAsia.
Arisu was worried 'as to the seniority positions between
the two bozes after the arrival of Mr. Subhas Chandra
Bose'. 1 Rash Behari assured him that they need not worry
on this point and he would subordinate himself completely
to Bose. 2 His assurance removed Arisu's fear of conflict
for leadership. Immediately on his return to Tokyo from
Singapore he hurriedly negotiated with the German authorities
to bring Bose to East Asia and to receive him in Japan. 3

The major problem to be solved was how Bose could
reach EastAsia safely. During the summer and autumn of 1942
discussions were held in Berlin and Rome on whether this trip
could be carried out by an Italian long-distance plan. In
June 1942 the Italians had agreed to take Bose non-stop
from Rhodes to Rangoon but the Japanese thought it was too
dangerous. By mid-October another flight was arranged. Bose
handed over charge of the Free India Centre to Nambiar, and
had a farewell meeting with Von Ribentrop on 14 October and
prepared to fly from Rome on the 15th. But as the German
Government had feared the Italians had been unable to keep
the news to themselves. On 12 October 1942 the 'Daily Sketch'
reported that Bose was leaving for the East. The flight

1. Radhendath Rath, ed, Rash Behari Bose and his struggle for
India's independence (Calcutta, 1963), pp.50-51.
2. -ibid- According to one Japanese officer Iwakuro, "I can
hardly believe that there is a man like Mr. Rash Behari
Bose who built up a great work despite many difficulties
and transferred unconditionally his work and position to
3. -ibid- pp.50-51.
was promptly cancelled. While negotiations and arrangements for his travel dragged on, they took eight months to be finalised. Bose to whom his associates had always found cool and patient had become restless and uneasy. He was anxious to utilise the Japanese Victory for his own ends.

In the beginning of 1943, the first Indian National Army had been dissolved as a result of difference of Indians and Japanese. At the time of this crisis Japanese were convinced of the need for a stronger leader among Indians in Asia. At last it was decided that Bose would travel by German and Japanese submarines. Bose's departure was kept a close secret. On 26 January 1943, Bose addressed a meeting in Berlin, which was attended by six hundred people. Two days later he delivered his last speech before the Indian Legion.

On 8 February 1943 Bose left Berlin by train for Kiel and sailed from Kiel in a U-boat, accompanied by Abid Hasan. On 28 April, they were transshipped in a rubber boat to Japanese submarine which had arrived at the chosen spot according to plan to receive them. After ninety-three days' journey Bose reached East Asia.  

1. N.G. Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany, p.128.
2. For the details see K.K. Ghosh, the Indian National Army, pp.94-132, also Joyce C. Lebra, Jungle Alliance pp.90-98, also in this connection see correspondence between Rash Behari Bose, President Council of Action, Indian Independence League and Captain Mohansingh, C.O.C.I.N.A., Indian Independence League papers, file No.5, National Archives of India, New Delhi, also J.A. Thiy, Indian Independence movement in East Asia, Ibid.
3. In an International Netaji Seminar held at Calcutta in January 1982, Lt. General Iwachi Fujibara, Co-founder of the first I.N.A., said that the Japanese forces maintained sea and air superiority in the Bay of Bengal and in the Burma war theatre till the end of 1942. In 1943, the Allied Forces tried to retrieve this position but it was not until around April that they actually succeeded in restoring their superiority. If Bose had reached East Asia from Germany at least one year earlier, in May 1942, and the combined operations by the Japanese Forces and I.N.A. for India's liberation under the guidance of Bose had started in October 1942 through early in 1943, the operations would have been successful and the post-war history of India would certainly have been different.