CHAPTER – VII
CONTRIBUTION OF PANDIT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO
INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

India’s foreign policy has its historical background. Pandit Nehru, under the auspices of the Indian National congress played a decisive and dynamic role in the evolution of India's foreign policy. Nehru is aptly regarded as the mains architect of India's foreign policy. He took the lead and initiative in shaping the congress outlook on world affairs from 1927 on words. Nothing is permanent, but change is permanent, accordingly, any policy whether domestic or foreign changes according to circumstances and conception of national interests. So, here, a sincere attempt is made to understand India's foreign policy with reference to the attitude of the Indian National congress and role played by Pandit Nehru to words the evolution of foreign policy of India.

Pandit Nehru, viewed the Indian struggle for independence in a world perspective, to inspire and encourage Afro-Asian Nations, to launch their struggle for their emancipation from an alien rule. His initiative in moving number of resolutions by the Indian National congress reflected his radical outlook; He always stood for complete independence but not for Dominion status. He fully agreed with the goal of the congress of 1920 towards swarj, which marked the beginning of a new era in the history of the Indian National congress. It has been remarked that the nationalist movement took interest in international affairs, particularly, after the arrival of Pandit Nehru on the political science. After the First World War, the congress became more articulate was responsible for developing a kind of foreign office of its own, with Nehru in charge. The resolutions passed by the Indian National congress
from time to time reveal that the congress took a deep interest in world affairs from its inception. At the same time, Nehru's leadership provided a new dynamism to the congress to take such interest in foreign affairs. During the course of nationalist movement between 1989 and 1929, the Indian National congress began to formulate her policy, towards various developments in the world and also thought of establishing India's links with other countries. The Delhi Congress held in 1918 put forth for the first time, the demand for Indian freedom is the contest of the world setting. The congress also became a strong and staunch steward of the league of Nation the first International organization, established after the First World War two main peaces and security of the world. In 1921, the congress adopted the declaration of independence from the British foreign policy and made a statement regarding the foreign, policy, which an independent nation would like to pursue. While doing so, the congress did not believe and aim at isolation of India from the western world. That is why, Mahatma Gandhi said. An India awakened and free has a message of peace and goodwill to a groaning world. Non-cooperation is designed to supply her with a platform from which she will preach the message."1.

Mahatma Gandhi, stood for nationalism based on international co-operation but not on isolation such constructive stand inspired Nehru, to participate in the International congress against imperialism held at Brussels in 1927, marking an important landmark in the evolution of the Indian outlook on world affairs. It paved the way for looking the world from new ways and interests. Therefore, "Nehru suggested that national organizations in the Asian countries should foster direct contact among themselves through exchange of publications and visitors"2. According to Nehru, the Brussels congress was the most important and outward symbol of the intense desire for mutual co-
operation towards taking possession or stock of the oppressed and exploited people all over the world. As a sort of warning he made it clear the stand of India in the interest of the world and India's great concern with those great movements and forces that were responsible for shaping the future. Therefore, the congress declared that the Indian struggle was a part of the general world struggle against imperialism, and desired India should develop contacts with other countries and peoples. Who were also combating imperialism? It also decided to open a "Foreign Dept in its office, to develop such contacts"³. Appreciating the role of the communists, in the league against imperialism, Nehru remarked "The communists are undoubtedly the greatest opponent of imperialism today and as such their co-operation is welcome but in no sense do they dominate the league"⁴. Nehru had always the fear of the outbreak of the second world war and warned that "If war broke out, Britain would fight largely with the Indian blood and treasure and would thereby seek to strengthen still further her hold over India and other Asian countries, Such a war could be avoided if Indians made it clear in advance that they would in no way co-operate with the British war effort."⁵.

The congress passed resolution to that effect. Nehru was the most vehement critic of American imperialism and its alliance with British imperialism which together created an Anglo-Saxon imperialism to dominate the world. Therefore, in his report on that congress, Nehru wrote: "Most of us, especially from Asia, were wholly ignorant of the problems of South America and of how the rising imperialism of the US, with its tremendous resources and its immunity from outside attack, is gradually taking, strangle hold of central and South America. But we are not likely to remain ignorant much longer for the great problem of the near future will be, American imperialism, even more than Births imperialism, which appears to have had its day and is
crumbling fast or it', may be and all indications point to it that the two will unite together in all endeavor, to create a powerful Anglo-Saxon bloc to dominate the world "6. Thus, from the Years 1920 to 1929 we notice the strong reactions of the congress to imperialism everywhere and sympathy for all those struggling; for national freedom from all alien rules. In the year 1936, when Nehru became the president of the Congress, he began to take more active and keen interest in world affairs. The notable landmark was the setting up of a Foreign Department, with Rammanohar Lohia as, its head. The office began to establish contacts with many individuals and organization in foreign countries. As a result of Gandhi Irwin pact, after the suspension, of the civil Disobedience movement in 1931 several developments took place, bearing on the evolution of Indian outlook on world affairs. The most important landmark was the Classification of the position of the congress on the question of future relationship of India with Great Britain. In 1931, the leaders of congress gave greater importance to the India's problem of "defense" Nehru stressed the importance of India's defensive strength which was relative to the strength of others and to the world situation. He looked to a world balance of power and speedy reconstruction of defense force fully disagreeing with Gandhi's stand of a guarantee of protection from Britain and civil Disobedience.

Compared to Gandhi, Nehru showed keener interest in defense and foreign affairs as Nehru wrote. "India, with her problems and struggles, become just a part of this mighty, world drama, of the great struggle of political and economic force that was going on everywhere nationally and internationally"7. Nehru’s vast knowledge and study of the problems of so many countries made him to understand the problems of India in a world perspective. He believed only in socialist and nationalist order but not in imperialist and fascist one. The congress, under the leadership of Nehru, sided
and sympathized with the countries struggling for Independence against imperialist and fascist forces. Imperialism, according to Nehru, was the negation of peace. The importance of peace was reiterated at "World Peace congress". The congress reemphasized that imperialism was a continuing cause of war. So it adopted an attitude toward collective security, which was nothing but complete elimination of imperialism. About the importance of collective security Nehru remarked: "There can be no collective security or peace on the basis of imperialism, just as there can be no peace, if fascism holds away. There can be no pooled security, unless the problems of India and like problems are solved. India will throw her whole weight in any real scheme of collective security and peace but if her own freedom is ignored she will consider the scheme, a sham and a farce". The period of Second World War witnessed the strengthening the solidarity and unity of Asian countries and China. The congress also had been condemning Fascism and Nazism, responsible for the outbreak of war. Emphasizing the need for unity and cooperation in Asian countries at the Asian-Relations conference held in Delhi, in 1947, Nehru, declared in his inaugural address.

"In this conference, and in this work, there are no leaders and followers. All countries of Asia have to meet together on an equal basis, in a common task and endeavor. It is fitting that India should play part in this new phase of Asian development Apart from the fact. India herself is emerging into freedom and independence she is the natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work and Asia Geography is a compelling facto and geographically she is so situated as to be the meeting point of western and Northern and Eastern and south East-Asia". During period of its history of struggle for independence, the congress went on registering its keen interest in world affairs. As independence drew near and near, the congress realized the need for an
independent foreign policy. Apart from the reactions of the congress to world affairs between 1945 and 1947, it had the basis assumption of India's big role in world affairs. In 1946, Dec.13, Nehru moved the resolution on the objectives of new constitution in constituent Assembly and included in it. India's rightful and honored place in the world and its ability to make its full willing contribution to the promotion of world peace and welfare of mankind. Broadcasting as vice-President of the in term Government, on Sept. 7, 1946, Nehru, pleaded for the need for freedom of all peoples and to banish war and conflicts. According to Nehru, the Interim Government, was for the emanupation of colonial and dependent countries and was for promoting racial equality at the same time, he realized the importance of the ideal of one world through the UN. In his opinion, the world organization would be effective only when none of the great powers was interested in the dispute. He believed in extending India's abiding faith in the UN. He made it clear that India never had any interest in power politics of the great powers. He maintained that all nations were knit together peace was indivisible, likewise freedom and prosperity were also so one world according to him was the real ideal which all the nations could cherish and realize.

NEHRU AND PANCHSHEEL:

Panchsheel constitutes a major feature and principle of the foreign policy of India. Pandit Nehru, who is known as the main architect of the foreign policy of India and an apostle of peace firmly, believed that if the nations of the world accepted some code of conduct, wars could be prevented. War cannot be considered as an instrument of foreign policy. He believed that war was an obsolete and futile, irrelevant and inconsistent with the humanity. It was in human, ridiculous and irrelevant to talk of war. As Nehru said; "I think
that the biggest idea that has gradually evolved in people's minds all over the world is the futility of war, that war does not solve any major issues and that therefore all problems, however difficult and intricate, should be approached peacefully and this heralds an entirely new approach all over the world"¹⁰. Nehru considered Panchsheel as a principle applicable to a particular context. There was nothing new about applying it to some particular situation and solve the problems peacefully was India's contribution. Panchsheel implies five principles of peaceful coexistence, which were first formulated in the preamble to the agreement between India and China in regard to Tibet, which was signed on April 29, 1954, the five principles were said to be

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and Sovereignty,
2. Mutual non-aggression,
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
4. Equally and mutual benefit,
5. Peaceful co-existence.

The principles, it was believed that, would lay the foundation for the pattern of future world peace, Mr. Chou-en-lai, Prime Minister of China visited India in 1954 and agreed to Mr. Nehru on their joint statement and affirmed the five principles of India-Chinese agreement on Tibet. Both the leaders recognized the different social and political systems existed in various parts of Asia and the world. And they made recourse to Panchsheel as the guiding principle to maintain co-ordinal and peaceful relations and to create durable peace both in Asia and the world.

It would result in the new era of perfect understanding free from war and conflicts. The Panchsheel was based on the idea of 'Live and Let Live'.
The principles of peaceful co-existence formed the basis of conducting international relations. It was the only panacea for the tension-ridden world to come out from the deadly consequences of war. According to Nehru, Panchsheel should acquire a specific meaning in world affairs. The world situation wanted non interference, so Nehru said; “The idea of Panchsheel lays down the very important truth that each nation must ultimately fend for itself. I am not thinking in terms of military fending but in terms of striving intellectually, morally, spiritually and in terms of opening out all our windows to ideas from others, and learning from the experience of others. Each country should look up on such an endeavor on the part of the other with sympathy and friendly understanding and without interference or imposition. It is a sincere policy based essentially on goodwill and fellowship with other countries with no ill will for any country  ". The principles, being the foundations of India's relations with other countries would assume peace and co-operation everywhere as Nehru remarked; "These principles form the basis of our relations with other nations. We are convinced that on this basis, the relationship between the countries will be healthy, peaceful and co-operative, because it rests on equally and mutual respect and peaceful co-existence and rules out aggression and internal interference. Trouble arises when one country dominates over another and interference in another's internal affairs. If Panchsheel is fully and sincerely accepted by all the countries, peace would be assumed everywhere and cooperation would follow".

The essence of Panchsheel, according to Nehru was the lesson of tolerance and peaceful co-existence, establishing friendly relations with all countries and enmity with none. The principle of co-existence was not new to India as Nehru said; "It is not a new idea for us in India. It has been our way of life and is as old as our thought and culture. About, 2200 year ago, a great son
of India, Ashoka, proclaimed it and inscribed it on rock and stone, which exist today and give us his message. Ashoka told us that we should respect the faith of others and that a person who extols his own faith and decries another faith and injures his own faith. This is the lesson of tolerance and peaceful co-existence and co-operation which India has believed in through the ages. In the old days, we talked of religion and philosophy, now; we talk more of the economic and social system. But the approach is the same now as before. That is the reason, why we try to be friendly with all countries, whether we agree with them or not. That is the reason why refrain from criticizing other countries even though, we disagree with their policies, unless circumstances compel us to explain our view point. From this, it has naturally followed that we should keep ourselves free from military or like alliances and from the great power groups that dominate the world today. It is in no spirit of pride or arrogance that we pursue our own independent policy. We would not do otherwise unless we are false to everything India has stood for in the past and stands for today, we welcome association and friendship with all and the flow of thought and ideas of all kinds, own path. That is the essence of Panchsheel. Indirectly, Nehru, referred to the policy of non-alignment, while explaining the essence of Panchsheel especially of the principles of non-interference and co-existence, Nehru believed that Panchsheel should be accepted by, peace-loving nations and it should be a universal of moral principle guiding the relations between and among nations.

Therefore he incessantly persuaded the UN to pass a resolution to make those principles universally binding on all the nations. The resolution sponsored by India, (at the initiative Nehru), Yugoslavia and Sweden put emphasis on the principle of co-existence, creations an atmosphere, where all the problems of the day could be considered in an objective way. The
Panchsheel Principles exalted and embodied the ideals of the UN. Like, strengthening international peace, develops friendly and peaceful relations among states, fall in line with the objectives of the UN charter, to maintain, international peace and security, develop relations based on the principles of mutual respect and benefit, non-aggression, respect for each other's sovereignty, equally and territorial integrity and non-interference in another's internal affairs and to fulfill the principles and purposes of the UN. Having firmly believed only in peace as the ultimate reality, Nehru said, "Surely, it should be wiser to have peace, before a war comes and to work for it and not to allow others to be driven into war. It is particularly, so when we have reached the age of ballistic missiles and age of hydrogen bombs and space travel". Nehru conceived of Panchsheel as the firm found alien of international relationship. But when Acharya Kriplani criticized Panchshell on the ground that it had been violated and broken in many parts of the world, When the countries resorted to war, as instrument to achieve their national interests, Nehru justified and defended it by saying that: “It is true that the ideals of Panchsheel have been broken and are likely to be broken in future. The ideal of truth has been broken and deride, but that does not make truth, untruth. A good ideal does not become, a he ideal if the man, who proclaimed it has not acted upon it. We are imperfect people in an in imperfect world. We cannot live up to cue protestations, often enough. We are weak or the circumstances are against are we then to give up our ideals? The philosopher night examine the situation and say that the right thing was said but the world was not ready for it.

But whenever truth in proclaimed it is good. More especially, in a democracy, we have to have not only truth but receptiveness to truth, the capacity to face truth and capacity to act up to truth and capacity to act up to truth. The real difficulty in any human behavior is that a high truth may be
proclaimed and practiced by a prophet or a great leader but the prophet, however great he may be, will not succeed unless he can convince others of truth. He can convince them only to the extent that they are receptive and prepared for it. Even so, he has to tone down his ideals because others can seldom be wholly ready for them. When we come down to the place of action, i.e. democratic one, we have always to see how for the people will go us acting up to the principles laid down. However, the fact that some countries have not lived up to their protestation does not weaken the force of a correct policy like Panchsheel. Panchsheel in nothing new if I may say so respectfully, the thought of applying that word struck me in can add moment. It just fits in with our way of thinking and with the way we have grown up. She mere fact that it Soochow caught on once it was applied, shows that there is something real about it. Even people who do not accept it or do not particularly fancy, the way the Panchsheel idea came into existence, still pay tribute to it. Every country says that it is the only way. That shows the utter strength and rightness of the idea. Indeed if we examine it from the purely practical point of view, and leave out light morality, there, is no other way in which nations can behave to each other. The alternative would be can flit and domination of one over the other."\textsuperscript{15}. The five principles of peaceful co-existence were adopted by Russia, Yugoslavia and Poland later. The 29-nation, Afro-Asian conference was held at Bandung on April 18, 1955 and considered the position of Asia and Africa and suggested the ways and means to solve, economic and soul problems of mutual importance. The conference also gave importance to racial equality disarmament etc. The Panchsheel was expanded at Bandung conference and it included the principles like

a) Free from distrust and fear.

b) Confidence and good will towards each other.
c) Nations should practice tolerance and live together with one another, as good neighbors.

d) Develop friendly co-operation on the basis of the following principles.

1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

2) Recognition of equality of all races & nations

3) Abstention from international in the internal affairs of another country.

4) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with the UN charter.

5) Abstention from the arrangements of collective deference to serve the particular interests of the big powers.

6) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.

7) Refraining from acts or Threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.

8) Settlement of international disputes by peaceful means (Negotiation, conciliation, arbitration)

9) Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation.

10) Respect for justice and international obligation.

So the conference declared its conviction that such friendly co-operation would promote international peace and security. Inspite of the occupation of Tibet by China, India did not entangle with China. Rather, India's relations with China grew more intimate with the visit of Chou-en-lai to India in 1954 and visit of Nehru to China. Both the premiers played their dynamic role at the conference. But it was reported that India's relations with China were spoiled when Dalia lama was granted political asylum by India in 1959. Border disputes and other subsequent Chinese aggressions on the Indian border, still
worsened the situation. American policy of containing China was opposed by
India. Because, American strategy aimed at making Asian countries as a means
to expand its influence. This means that "India and other Asian countries
believe that the possibilities of revived from of western colonialism are more
real than the possibilities of Chinese expansionism."\textsuperscript{16} Though, China attacked
India in 1962 it was held and criticized that the Panchsheel was violated. So
according to Acharya Kriplani, the doctrine was born in sin because it was
enunciated to put the seal of our approval upon the destruction of an ancient
nation (Tibet), which was associated with spiritually and culturally When
China had annexed Tibet Dalai lama as political head, was made to migrate
India. All this indicated that there was no deviation or departure from
Panchsheel or the policy of peaceful co-existence. The critics also painted out
the principles did not take into account the problems of the world divided into
cold war conflicts and tensions. But however, so for as the ideal of peace is
concerned, Panchsheel should be regarded as the means through which India's
foreign policy goals are achieved. It laid the foundation of the non-alignment
principle, which is known as one of the most important principles underlying
the foreign policy of India. That is why Pandit Nehru is aptly known as after a
pastel of peace\textsuperscript{15} so, in this world of the threat of nuclear weapons and wars,
the principles of peaceful co-existence cannot be exaggerated.

We have reached such a stage today, that the world distance has been
reduced to maintain peaceful and cordial relations, based on the principles of
Co-operation and inter-dependence. The road to the world is peace and
survival of the humanity from the unwarranted dangers of war to save
ourselves from the horrors of war, we have to take the right path to shape our
destiny and reach our destination, which is possible only through Panchsheel.
It may be recalled that India achieved independence at a time when the world
was on the threshold of the cold War and when the countries of the world were getting polarized into two blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union. In the circumstance, it was imperative for India to steer clear of these blocs if it wanted to maintain its independence in world politics. Besides, such a line was essential to insulate India from big-power conflicts. Therefore, free India’s move was directed to carve out a new role for itself, and, if possible to play the role of a bridge-builder between the blocs, and thus promote world peace and international understanding. Of course, objectivity and impartiality were the pre-requisites to effectively play that role. And nonalignment became the keystone of that policy. This broad line of nonalignment that India chose was not the brainchild of any single individual, but was the legacy of the freedom struggle. Indeed, Jawaharlal Nehru Publicly affirmed, in 1958, that he was not the originator of free India’s foreign policy. He said: It is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India inherent in conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom and inherent in the circumstances of the world today. I come in by the mere accidental fact that during these few years I have represented that policy as Foreign Minister. I am quite convinced that whoever might have been in charge of the foreign affairs of India, and whatever party might have been in power in India, they could not have deviated from this policy. Nehru tried to give shape to the concept of nonalignment even before India became independent.

In a broadcast to the nation on 7 September 1946, Nehru drew the contours of it saying that India would keep away from the power politics of groups aligned against one another, which has led in the past two world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale. Similarly, after independence, at a joint session of the US Congress in October 1949, he
said that nonalignment did not exclude commitment to principles. ‘Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral.’ A few days later, on 16 October 1959, he said: ‘When man’s liberty or peace is in danger, we cannot be and shall not be neutral; neutrality would be a betrayal of what we have fought for and stood for.’ Nehru’s considered view of the concept of nonalignment can be found in an article he wrote in a New York journal, *Foreign Affairs*, in 1963, just a year before his death. Underlining India’s interest in cultivating’ friendly cooperation with all countries’ and in ‘keeping world peace as the sine qua non of everything else’, Nehru wrote that nonalignment was ‘a summary description of this policy of friendship toward all nations, uncompromised by adherence to any military pacts’. He emphasized the need to judge each issue on its merits ‘in full freedom and without any pre-conceived partisan bias’, and said that’ essentially, “nonalignment” is freedom of auction which is part of independence’. Thus nonalignment became the quintessence of India’s foreign policy. Other elements of that policy were good neighborliness, promotion of international peace and understanding, decolonization of the world, promotion of racial equality, etc. On the whole, India’s foreign policy was based on sound principles which had tremendous potentiality to bring rich dividends to the country in terms of its image and influence abroad, besides certain broad objectives which India wanted to pursue in world politics. In fact, India enjoyed greater prestige whenever these principles and objectives were pursued in a steadfast manner.

This was quite conspicuous during the first decade of India’s independence when the international community looked, with interest, towards New Delhi, as to what India thought of a particular world problem. Indeed, during that period India could exercise considerable influence and moral
authority over the thinking of other world capitals on major issues. It may be mentioned that independent India’s policy of nonalignment did not receive instant recognition from important world capitals. While a country like Great Britain accorded instant recognition to the genuineness of India’s nonaligned policy, other big powers like the Soviet Union and the United States viewed it with deep suspicion. Whereas the Russians called India the running dog of imperialists, the United States thought that India was hands in glove with the communists. When Nehru visited the United States in October 1949, a Soviet magazine *New Times*, had gone to the extent of calling him Chiang Kai-Shek’s successor.21 Similarly, for Americans like John Foster Dulles, nonalignment was immoral and short-sighted. According to them the nonaligned countries were more dangerous than the communists because of their ‘veiled’ function as ‘friends of communism’.22 However, gradually they realized India’s earnestness in pursuing nonalignment. The prestige and influence India enjoyed in world politics in the early 1950s, which undoubtedly was highly disproportionate to its power stature, was a clear demonstration of the benefits India can gain from practicing a credible nonaligned policy. In this paper, I would like to confine my critical overview of Nehru’s foreign policy by focusing attention mainly on how he handled three most important developments which had long-term implications for India’s image and national interest – viz. Nonalignment, the Tibetan question, and the Kashmir problem.

**Non-Alignment**

Jawaharlal Nehru’s practice of nonalignment came in for serious criticism for the first time, with certain degree of justification, in the letter half of 1956, for his manifestly dissimilar attitudes toward two contemporary international events—the Crisis and the Soviet intervention in Hungary. The
countries which were directly involved in these two crises were: Britain and France in the Soviet Union in Hungary. It is pertinent to recollect that in the wake of the Crisis Jawaharlal Nehru vehemently criticized the Anglo-French move to regain control over the Canal, stating that India was against any attempt of big powers to impose their will on small nations. He reacted vocally against the British decision to use force in the, although Britain was India’s very close and reliable friend. He criticized the British move saying that ‘this is a reversal of history which none of us can tolerate’. He said that ‘nothing can justify aggression and attack on the freedom of a country’. Indeed, India had gone to the extent of registering an official protest to Britain in this regard. Compared to the spirited and vocal reaction Nehru displayed against Britain on the question, his reaction to the Soviet intervention in Hungary was muted although the Soviet intervention in Hungary also deserved his strong and open condemnation, as it also constituted an attempt on the part of a big power to impose its will on a small nation. Nehru was fully aware that the Soviet troops and tanks had moved into Hungary to suppress a widespread national uprising for liberalization and that there had been large-scale violence. Even then, there was no strong and instant reaction against the Soviet action either from Nehru or from the Government of India, comparable to the ones they made against the Anglo-French action in the Suez. The hiatus between Nehru’s approaches towards the Anglo-French intervention and to the Soviet intervention was so glaring even to the senior officials in government that in a note to Nehru, on 2 November 1956, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs wrote: If it is true those Soviet troops are trying to occupy Budapest and other areas in Hungary, whatever the ostensible reason, and if it is true also that this is being opposed by the Hungarian Government that they have appealed to the
United Nations, we cannot afford to be indifferent in regard to those developments.

I am not suggesting that we should raise our voice in the same way as certain others are doing; and I think the time has come for us to give further thought to the Hungarian situation with a view to deciding our attitude in the light of the principles [of merit] we have been advocating.\(^\text{25}\) No doubt Nehru’s criticism of the Soviet intervention in Hungary and the brutalities the Soviet army committed there were conspicuously subdued. In contrast with the strident manner in which he conveyed his protests to Britain over the questions, his approach to the Soviet intervention was to let Moscow know India’s reactions ‘informally’ through its ambassador in Moscow, K.P.S. Menon.\(^\text{26}\) The pretext was that any public condemnation of Soviet Union would be counter-productive and that the best way to assist nationalist forces in Hungary would be ‘to bring pressure on Moscow in private’- a convenient cliché used repeatedly to evade public criticism of the Soviet Union for its outrages since then. This vacillation on the part of Nehru to state publicly what the Soviet Union should do to undo the wrong it committed in Hungary came in for severe criticism at the hands of top leaders in India. On 5 November 1956, Jayaprakash Narayan wrote to Nehru: ‘If you do not speak out you will be held guilty of abetting enslavement of a brave people by a new imperialism more dangerous than the old because it masquerades revolutionary. ‘Already India found itself in an awkward position as it abstained from vote on a resolution in the UN General Assembly on 4 November 1956, which called upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Hungary immediately. This abstention was widely interpreted as an expression of silent support for the Soviet Union. In response to these criticism, and to forestall further criticisms of a similar nature, Nehru spoke on 5 November 1956 on the Soviet
intervention in Hungary, in mildly critical terms, for the first time and expressed his sympathy for the nationalist forces in Hungary.

This could hardly dispel suspicion. On 9 November 1956, when the UN General Assembly repeated its request to the Soviet Union. India even voted with the Soviet bloc! 27 By the time Nehru spoke in the Lok Sabha, on 19 November 1956. More clearly and positively against the Soviet intervention in Hungary, it was too late. 28 The situation got stabilized in favour of the Soviet Union. However, this delayed criticism by Nehru seems to have served dual purpose, it helped to clear his conscience without frustrating Soviet designs. The much awaited Soviet withdrawal from Hungary in response to the ‘Internal’ protests by countries like India never came off. Nehru’s handling of the Hungarian and questions in 1956 gave the impression that he applied double standards in the practice of nonalignment, with a clear bias in favour of the Soviet Union. Many observers, in India and abroad, criticized that Nehru had adopted a double standard in judging two contemporary events and showed a tendency to condone the intervention of the Soviet Union. But, evidences now available clearly show that this line was not entirely the result of Nehru’s own judgment on the merit of the issue. Sarvepalli Gopal, Nehru’s biographer, has now revealed that when the Indian Prime Minister was engaged in formulating his attitude to the Soviet intervention in Hungary, the Soviet Union tried to ‘blackmail’ Nehru. Surprisingly, when India moved a resolution at the United Nations requesting the Government of Hungary to receive the UN observers and urging the Soviet Union to accept the resolution and invite the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, to visit Hungary, the Soviet ambassador in India called on Nehru, on 23 November 1956, and started talking to him about the situation in Kashmir—obviously an effort at gentle
blackmail – a reminder of Soviet support to India on this issue as well as a hint of possible withdrawal of such support’.  

Nehru was greatly annoyed at this cheap tactic of the Russians to bully him. The Russians applied the same tactic when, following the abduction of the Hungarian leader Imre Nagy, Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia sought Nehru’s support for the action he might be forced to take. At that time both N.S. Khrushchev and N.A. Bulganin, Soviet leaders, summoned the Indian representative in Moscow and told them plainly that India should keep in mind that Hungary was as close to the Soviet Union as Kashmir was to India. What impact these Soviet attempts to ‘blackmail’ Nehru had on him is a matter of debate. However, one wonders if Nehru was forced to peg down his nonalignment on account of the Soviet blackmail over Kashmir as early as 1956! It is astonishing that the Soviet Union ventured to blackmail a tall leader like Jawaharlal Nehru at the time when the Indo-Soviet relationship, following the exchange of the much publicized visits by Nehru to the Soviet Union, in 1954 and by Khrushchev and Bulganin to India in 1955, was passing through a honeymoon period. As far as Nehru’s practice of nonalignment was concerned, the example set in 1956 was not a laudable one in the sense that it was not an expression of independence to judge every issue on merit. That style is still haunting India’s Foreign Office, often posing questions marks on the way nonalignment is practiced.

**Sino-Indian Border Question**

Another aspect of Nehru’s conduct of foreign policy which deserves critical evaluation is his unrealistic perceptions about the potential threats to India’s security. In this connation, it may be pointed out that during the British rule India’s security was ensured through a sound strategy of preserving buffer
states between the Indian subcontinent and its two big neighbors – China and the Soviet Union. The chief objective was not to have common borders between India and these two neighboring countries and forestall any direct territorial conflict with them. All along Britain had resolutely thwarted every attempt of these two big powers to make inroads into these buffer states and destroy their independence.

Preservation of Tibet, in the north, and Afghanistan, in the north-west as independent countries between Indian on the one side and China and the Soviet Union on the other was a fundamental element of this strategy. But, after India’s independence, it appears that Jawaharlal Nehru hardly gave this sound strategy the seriousness it deserved. Prior to India’s independence, Britain kept the Chinese away from the Indian borders by way of preserving Tibet as a buffer state between India and China, and by maintaining certain right for India in Tibet. The rights India retained in Tibet under the Shimla convention of 1914, which, among other India and Tibet, was adequate for India to insist upon the maintenance of Tibetan autonomy. Though the convention recognized China’s Suzerainty over Tibet, Tibet was to be completely free from the control of the Chinese Government in civil as well as military matters. Under the Convention; India had the right to have a trade Agent in Gyantse and Yatung, and also an escort Platoon of a few hundred soldiers. There was also to be an Indian Government representative in Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. Britain preserved all these rights in Tibet undiluted as it thought that preservation of an autonomous Tibet was essential for India’s safety and security. But, it appears that Jawaharlal Nehru overlooked these overriding strategic considerations in a flurry of a make-believe friendship with China and allowed the disappearance of Tibet as an autonomous buffer state. He did this, even without asking the Chinese to officially recognize the McMahon Line as the border between India
and China, although Nehru was fully aware of the fact that, though drawn in full agreement with the Chinese representative at the Shimla Convention, the McMahon Line was not formally ratified by the Chinese Government.

It is all the more shocking that Jawaharlal Nehru chose to do this against the well-considered advice given to him by his senior colleague in the Government, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, in 1950, and also by senior officials like G.S. Bajpai, Secretary-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a candid letter to Nehru on 7 November 1950, written in the context of the occupation of Tibet by the Chinese forces, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel indicated the need to settle the question of McMahon Line with the Chinese as a pre-requisite while dealing with the questions of Tibet’s future status and India’s rights over Tibet. In that letter Patel warned Nehru that the Chinese were trying to delude India’ by professions of peaceful intentions’. Calling the sending of Chinese forces to Tibet as an act of ‘perfidy’ Patel wrote to Nehru. Even though we regard ourselves as friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences.

*It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.* In the background of this we have to consider that new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. ... In 1914 we entered into a Convention with Tibet which was not endorsed by the Chinese. . . . The undefined state of the frontier and the existence of a Population with affinities to Tibetans of Chinese have all the elements of potential trouble between China
and ourselves... Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include important parts of Assam. In my judgment, therefore, the situation is one in which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it.

Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policy to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident. In view of this potential danger from China to India’s northern frontier, besides the north-west, Patel urged a reassessment of our military requirements, including forces and armour, improvement of communication – rail, road, air and wireless – in border areas and frontier outposts, policing and intelligence of frontier posts and a policy in regard to the McMahon Line. Similar, advises were given, in November 1951 to Nehru by his senior civil servants like G.S.Bajpai, Secretary-General, Ministry. They wanted that recognition of McMahon Line by China should be made a part of general settlement between India and China over Tibet, and that India should not withdraw its military personnel from Gyantse and Yatung without securing it. But, Nehru ignored all these suggestions which were put to him to safeguard India’s long-term security interests. Perhaps, he was swayed by the pretentious of friendship by the Chinese leaders. Nehru contended that the borders between India and China were ‘well known’ and beyond dispute. He ruled out ‘any major attack on India by China’. In the Parliament, he stated on 29 November 1950. The frontier from Bhutan eastwards has been clearly defined by the McMahon Line which was fixed by the Shimla Convention of 1914. The frontier from Ladakh to Nepal is defined chiefly by long usage and custom. Our maps show that the McMahon Line is our boundary – map or no map. That fact remains and we stand by that.
boundary, and we will not allow anybody to come across that boundary.\textsuperscript{35} This unilateral assertion of Nehru without verifying what the new communist regime in China thought about it was nothing more than naive. He remained under this illusion nothing more than naive.

He remained under this illusion even when, as late as August 1953, when Foreign Office officials like T.N. Kaul, suggested to him that the boundary question should be included in India’s negotiations with China on Tibet. At that Nehru ‘ruled’ that the issue need not be raised ‘for the present’.\textsuperscript{36} This was a crucial folly which proved very costly for Indian in the succeeding years. The future status of the McMahon Line should have been part of the treaty between India and China on Tibet in 1954.

After all, in the ultimate analysis it may be found that so far as India was concerned, the prime question to be settled in the relationship between India and China was the question of India’s northern borders, which, with the movement of China into Tibet, became a long border between India and China. Therefore, during the Sino-Indian negotiations on Tibet between 1950 and 1954. India should have sought fresh acceptance of India’s frontier with China as part of general settlement. Without securing that India should not have agreed to withdraw its military presence in Gyantse and Yatung in Tibet. Why Nehru did not do that, and lost a unique opportunity to settle India’s borders with China through negotiations when it was possible, remains in mystery. Sardar Patel passed away on 15 December 1950, five weeks after he wrote that historical letter to Nehru. Therefore, when Nehru signed away India’s rights over Tibet, which was so firmly maintained by the British against all odds, in 1954; for nothing in return, Patel was not there to prevent Nehru from doing that grave mistake which grievously endangered India’s security. By the treaty
signed in April 1954, India recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, with no reference, whatsoever to the McMahon Line. Indeed, it was an unwise act to do so when India was provided with an excellent opportunity to settle the border question and forestall any dispute over it subsequently. It is incomprehensible that while negotiations between India and China over Tibet went on for 4 years, Nehru did not raise the question of recognition of McMahon Line even once and gave a serious test to the Chinese intentions about its future status.

Instead, he chose to attribute meanings into vague references of the Chinese leaders and took solace in his own imaginary interpretations of the Chinese intentions in future. No wonder he did not follow up Sardar Patel’s well considered suggestions. Nor did he listen to the timely advice of his senior officials. If that was done at that time it would have averted the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 and all the trauma which accompanied it. For Nehru’s tactlessness at a crucial moment, the country had to pay a heavy price subsequently in terms of human lives and resources in 1962 when the Chinese launched an attack on India, challenging the border line. Of course, Nehru himself paid a heavy price for it. He did not recover from the shock he received from the Chinese betrayal in 1962. Now, strangely enough, historians like Sarvepalli Gopal put the blame for this mishandling of negotiations with China on Sardar K.M. Phanikkar, Indian Ambassador that he did not follow the instructions sent to him from New Delhi. But, that is only a feeble attempt to absolve Nehru from the responsibility of inept handling of a crucial negotiation with China. Indeed, shifting the blame on subordinates is not considered an honorable course in a parliamentary system of government. The fact is that in a flurry of friendship, Nehru hastily accepted the Chinese assertion that Tibet was a Chinese territory and, therefore, that it had the right to liberate it. By using the term ‘sovereignty’ for ‘suzerainty’, which according to S.Gopal was
due to an oversight, and by not mentioning the boundary question in the note presented, in 1952, to the Chinese Foreign office on India’s interest in Tibet, India bungled in its communications with China on Tibet.

Moreover, the negotiating positions Nehru had adopted was, to a great extent, based on his own presumptions about Chinese thinking rather than on any realistic assessment. Certainly, as Prime Minister, Nehru should have been more discreet and realistic in his judgments about China’s future intentions about our borders, before he agreed to withdraw India’s military escorts from Tibet and abandon its extraterritorial privileges there. However, as S.Gopal concludes, through skilful negotiations, ‘The Chinese had secured all they wanted and given away little’, and ‘the chance of securing a clear and explicit recognition of India’s frontier at a time when India had something to offer in return had been lost’.

The Kashmir Problem

Another aspect of Nehru’s policy which deserves critical scrutiny is his unimaginative handling of the Kashmir problem in 1947, and its spillover effects since then which bedeviled India’s relations with Pakistan. It may be recalled that when the ‘tribesmen’ from the northwest of Pakistan invaded Kashmir in October 1947, Pakistan did not make any territorial claim over Kashmir. Notably, when India requested the UN Security Council on 1 January 1948 to direct Pakistan not to assist or participate in the Invasion. Pakistan admitted the presence of its troops in Kashmir only in August 1948. It is difficult to understand why, when Jammu Kashmir’s accession to the Indian Union took place on 26 October 1947, under the provision of Indian independence Act, in the same manner as other Indian states joined the Indian Union, i.e., the Maharaj, Hari Singh, and the Government of Kashmir and the
largest political party in the state, the national conference led by Sheikh Abdullah, decided to do so, Nehru chose to make an unasked for offer to hold ‘plebiscite or referendum’ under ‘international auspices’ to ‘decide their future’. It is equally difficult to comprehend why, at a critical stage when the Indian army was successfully engaged in clearing off the invading ‘tribesmen’ from the whole of Kashmir, including from the present Azad Kashmir, Nehru firmly stopped the army from completing their task and created a ceasefire line within Kashmir.

It is worth nothing that Nehru did this while Major General Kalwant Singh, Commander of the Indian forces in Kashmir, was reportedly pleading ‘endlessly’ with Nehru to allow him to advance and give him some more days to complete the task and bring the entire territory of Kashmir under India’s control! If Nehru had shown a little wisdom and imagination at that decisive moment it would have saved India from a lot of future troubles over Kashmir. In an interesting account of the Indian Army’s operations against the tribal invaders in Kashmir during its most decisive phase in May 1948, Russel Brines writes: The Indians launched an offensive in the spring of 1948 after increasing their force to two divisions. One wing of the drive was aimed at Poonch, the key to the logistics’ campaign along the western front, where the Indian garrison had been besieged for a year. In a second thrust, the Indian army sent one column towards Uri with a flanking movement over the mountains of the north. The flank attack under the colorful General Thimmaya was so successful that he captures Tithwal on May 23 and looked down on Muzaffarabad, only eighteen miles away. Muzaffarabad, now the capital of Azad Kashmir, was the political key to the campaign. The threat to Muzaffarabad forced a Pakistani withdrawal from the entire northern sector, but he Indian stopped, apparently and their own volition, and a Pakistani brigade stabilized the situation. In this
account and in the guarded words of the official Indian military version of this northern campaign, there appears some confirmation for the general belief now held in New Delhi that he Indian advance was halted on Nehru’s orders. If only he had allowed the campaign to continue for five more days, we would not have this trouble over Kashmir. With the capture of Muzaffarabad, the Indians could have gone on to reclaim all of Kashmir. Thus, it may be seen that each one of successive decisions Nehru took on Kashmir—offer to plebiscite or referendum, taking the Kashmir question to the UN Security Council, stopping the Indian Army in the final stage of its successful operations, and the creation of cease-fire line inside Kashmir in 1947 and 1948 proved inimical to India’s interests.

Nehru did all these after bypassing the advice of his senior colleagues like Vallabhai Patel. In brief, through a series of follies, the Kashmir problem which was essentially one of security of a state acceded to the Indian Union was transformed into an Indo-Pakistan problem, and the United Nations was brought into the picture, with all its accompanying ill effects for India. Indeed, as T.N. Kaul noted, ‘it was the beginning of our difficulties with Pakistan’. It is quite clear that a military operation for a few more days, as General Kalwant Singh pleaded, would have solved this problem once for ever without making it a bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Politically also, after a temporary period of trading allegations, India and Pakistan would have settled down into a more enduring, friendly and fruitful relationship. Militarily also it would have been easy for India to accomplish it at that time as Pakistan was denying any role in the ‘tribesmen’s invasion of Kashmir, and as India was militarily far superior to Pakistan. It would have also freed both the countries from becoming somewhat permanent dependents of super powers – India on the Soviet Union and Pakistan on the United States – ostensibly to maintain
support for their respective positions on Kashmir in the UN Security Council. Some eminent historians have tried to camouflages’ these grave mistakes of Nehru by apportioning the blame on Lord Mountbatten, then Governor-General of India. Nehru’s Biographer, Sarvepalli Gopal, does exactly the same. Arguments in the same vein are found in the writings of T.N. Kaul also. However, the fact remains that these feeble attempts to absolve Prime Minister Nehru from full responsibility of crucial decisions of Kashmir, including the one to take it to the UN, emanates clearly from a realization in them also that the handling of the Kashmir problem in 1947 and 1948 was a flawed one which caused as in the case of Tibet, a perennial drain on India’s resources, and Pakistan’s as well, since then.

Nehru’s voluntary offer of holding a referendum in Kashmir became a source of extreme embarrassment for India in international gatherings that whenever someone reminded India of Nehru’s unfulfilled public commitment to hold a referendum in Kashmir India treated them as unfriendly. A general feature of Nehru’s conduct of foreign policy was his reliance on imaginary friendliness of other countries towards India, coupled with his lack of interest in giving a hard headed assessment of the long-team intentions of big powers, like Soviet Union and China, in India’s neighborhood. Although Nehru’s deep understanding of the history of nations provided him with authentic evidence of the basically expansionist nature of Russia and China, about which he made repeated references for quite some time he mistook their pretensions of friendship as genuine ones. Despite the fact that there is little in common, socially, politically or ideologically, between Indian and the Soviet Union and China, Nehru believed that, under the changed leadership, these countries would not follow the traditional path of expansionism and would behave decently with India. As a result, for a short period he was drawn into their
friendly postures, couched in terms like ‘bhai, bhai’, especially after his visits to China and the Soviet Union in 1954 and 1955 respectively. But, soon he began to realize the exploitative nature of friendship with India which began to manifest itself in 1956 when, in order to force India to silence over the Soviet intervention in Hungary and the Russian army’s atrocities there, including the abduction of Mire Nagy, Prime Minister (who was later executed), the Russian leaders tried to ‘blackmail’ Nehru over Kashmir. The quality of friendship with China revealed itself when, in 1962 the Chinese launched a massive attack on India, betraying the trust Nehru reposed on friendship with China.

When India was under attack from China, the Soviet Union took a pro-
Chinese stand and asked Nehru to settle the dispute on Chinese terms. Now, it has come to light that he Chinese held prior consultations also with the Soviet leadership in Moscow on 13 and 14 October 1962, and got an assurance that Moscow would not take a neutral attitude on the Sino-Indian boundary questions, before they launched a massive attack on India on 20 October 1962. Besides, when Nehru, during the course of the Chinese aggression, wanted the Soviet Union to expedite the delivery of MiG-21s, which was already a scheduled item for delivery, Moscow turned its back on India saying that China was a brother and India was a friend which forces Nehru to turn to the United States and Great Britain for air squadrons. These developments came as shock for Nehru who made an open confession that the Chinese aggression made him to realize that he was getting ‘out of touch with reality’ and that he was living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation’. Nehru belatedly realized that the Soviet Union and China were untrustworthy, graceless, and deceptive. On the other hand, he was deeply impressed by the spirit with which democratic like USA and UK came forward to support India against the Chinese aggression at one of the worst moments in independent India’s history.
He realized that whatever the nature and extent of periodical ups and downs in relationships between India and the US and UK, these countries would ultimately come forward to defend India whenever its security is seriously threatened from outside, without asking a price for it in return, like a compromise on India’s nonaligned position. That remained his conviction till he breathed his last on 27 May 1964. It is not necessary to cite more instances to show that the record of foreign policy under Nehru was a mixed bag.

Through nonalignment, India carved out a role for itself and for other newly emerging nations. This was certainly a laudable one. But it was not practiced in the spirit in which it was conceived. At the same time, there was a strong element of misperception in Nehru which led to damaging decisions, as the ones on Tibet and Kashmir, which created perennial security problems for the country, causing great drain on India’s resources. With hindsight, it is quite clear that compared to Nehru, Vallabhai Patel, though not acknowledged as a wizard in foreign policy, had a clearer and realistic perception of potential dangers to India’s security, whereas Nehru seems to have remained in an artificial world of his own creation, away from realities.

NEHRU – COLD WAR AND DISARMAMENT:

Pandit Nehru, as the staunch advocate of the policy of non-alignment, knew, very well the consequences of cold war after the Second World War. The era of cold war marked all age of crisis, which disrupted peace and security of humanity so, Nehru remarked, "Till this crisis of spirit is resolved, it will be difficult to find a solution for other crises that afflict us". Though, there was need for world government and world order, but still the devil of war always was the constant fear, violations the very spirit of world government. Though, Mahatma Gandhi, believed in nonviolence and morality as the means
to achieve peace, but still, we did not get rid of the evils of war. So, Nehru remark said, "So long as we do not recognize the supremacy of the moral law in our national and national and international relations, we shall have no enduring peace. So long as, we do not adhere to right means, the end will not be right and fresh evil will flow from it. That was the essence of Gandhiji's message and mankind will have to appreciate it in order to see and act cleanly. When eyes are bloodshot, vision is limited." 39. Nehru emphases the importance of world got as an alternative to world's sickness. So the best way to have it was to extend the feudal principle, an idea underlying the UN. But unfortunately, there was no correlation between the rights and duties or obligations on the part of the individuals and nations.

The world order was possible only when the fear of war got rid of. Pandit Nehru made reference to problems and causes of war and also the need for co-operation among nations to achieve world peace and Security. Though, force was inevitable, but it was necessary for country's protection internally and externally. Talking about, preservation of peace Nehruji was greatly upset by the dread weapons of war. The Hydrogen bomb possessed by the two super powers, made Nehru, to come to a conclusion that such weapons of war brought known and unknown consequences and horrors, resulting in the destruction of the total humanity. Fear and dread resulting from, such weapons would result in Mass destruction. So what was necessary was to check the same. So Nehru ultimately suggested that the issues could be referred to the UN. So, that it could check and control the same, by persuading or requesting the superpowers. Nehru was happy over the initiative taken by the two super powers to make certain proposals, in the direction of achieving peace by suspension of nuclear tests. It is true that, all the nations talk of peace and security, but the practical difficulty lies in the implementation. Nehru was
worried much about the problems of cold war, which was responsible for creating number of problems. The nuclear tests by the two powers. Military, alliances, creation of different worlds, ideologically, the different opinions of the super powers on different issues, surprise attacks, misunderstanding, suspicion, confusion violation of the principles of the UN, etc, were the problems resulting from cold war, which created a certain kind of confusion in the public mind. The Policies of the nations were in direct conflict with the provisions of the UN charter. The result was troubled and turbulent world. All the nations, pursuing their foreign policies, aimed at achieving their own national interests, even by making a resort to war, at the cost of the UN.

The UN had become a plaything at the hands of super-powers. There was no place for diplomacy by conference. So all the attempts at creating peaceful atmosphere in the world became futile due to such problems of cold war. Regarding the curious result of cold war Nehru said: "A rather curious result of this cold war is that well-known words with very definite meanings are distorted and they begin to mean something different or used in another context. If a country is tied to group in a military alliance, then that country is supposed to be a standard bearer of light and freedom, whatever it may do or whatever institutions it may have. If a country is on the other side, then it is described by the opposite side as sunk in reaction or its other bad things. We see the use of words "Democracy" and free world" and we also hear the word "peace" being bandied about. Everybody wants peace and sometimes people want peace with the atom bomb combined. At times peace is talked about are terms which appear to be almost more violent than the terms of war and the threats of war. "Democracy" too is used in a curious, way in connection with a country which has martial law. It is for each country, of course, to determine what kind of government, or control it has. What I am venturing to point out is
not what happens in that country but the reactions in other countries, to what happens in that country. That is what I find interesting, the attempts to explain martial law as some kind of an extension of the democratic principle. This intrigues me. This shows to what extent, thinking can be distorted because, ultimately, of the cold war technique. Such contradictions were the results of cold war. With another example of the South African policy of apartheid and at the same time, passing of the Human Rights Declaration of the UN, Nehru pointed out another major contradiction resulting from the same as he observes: “The Human Rights Declaration was passed ten years ago with nobody dissenting in the UN. While the Practical application of it has been discussed ever since, all the Principles were accepted unanimously. Now, by no stretch of imagination can the policy Pursued by South African Government, namely the policy of apartheid be reconciled with any human rights. It is in direct conflict not only with the charter of the UN, but the Declaration of Human Rights.

We hear certainly some criticism of the policy occasionally in other countries: but when the matter comes up before the UN. Countries that stand for democracy, freedom anti-racialism and the rest, support, for some technical reason, the attitude of South African Union Government, in regard to apartheid or at any rate they refuse to criticize or condemn it. Such contradictions create a lot of confusion in the public mind as Nehru observed: "The only Yardstick left is not that of Principle but of who is with us in the cold war, irrespective of what happens in South Africa or Hungary or in some country, having martial law. Even in England, Which has been on the whole free from anti-racial Sentiments, there was a few months back, some unfortunate rioting, not against Indians as such but against West Africans. Gradually the Principles for which the UN or the Various countries are supposed to stand get so mixed
up with other matters that they get blurred and people tend to act in a wrong
direction." So, the question of cold war, according to Nehru, covered every
question in the world. It was inherent in the situation in the world. Every issue
whether in the Western bloc or communist bloc was a part of the cold war. To
think in terms of cold war meant constant appeals to hatred, violence, and fear
and suspicion cold war come in the way of peace creating problems. So, to get
out of such evil consequences of cold war, Nehru switched out his attention, to
the problems of peace and disarmament.

**DISARMAMENT EFFORTS OF NEHRU:**

Nehru, therefore stressed the need for constructive approach, which was
nothing but disarmament through the UN, Nehru was a visitor at a meeting at
the League of Nations in Geneva and witnessed Hitler's threats of war. Like
that the real problems of peace were.

a) Hitler's threats of war,
b) Non-representation of Asia and Africa in the UN.
c) Structural difficulties in the UN.
d) Failure in the activities of the UN.
e) Split world & diversity of the world etc.

Disarmament Mirrors the most serious dilemma that world faces in this
these troubled times. Since 1945, the world has been witnessing an unabated
and ever-mantling arms race, "At the summit of the international system, the
two super powers armed with an enormous over-skill of nuclear weapons, have
shown no restraint in the further development of their strategic forces. Both
have actively continued to improve qualitatively not quantitatively their
strategic nuclear forces. The main nuclear arms race has continued, unabated:
advances in military technology have significantly increased its already
formidable and frightening momentum". SIPRI Yearbook 1972, Introduction. The appalling arms race has proceeded amidst uninterrupted negotiation for disarmament. Since 1945, the Soviet Union and USA met officially six thousand times, calling for disarmament. Since 1945, So much noise was made, resources spent, time devoted but only a little was achieved in the field of disarmament because of the negative attitude of the two super-powers. As Mrs. Alva Myrdal pointed out that: "We have accomplished no real disarmament and that we can hardly any tangible results of our work aid that the underlying major causes must be that the super powers have not seriously fried to achieve disarmament. The properly must also be made that there will be no disarmament". Mrs. Myrdal has correctly described the history of disarmament as a history of "uniquely Squandered opportunities". But however, disarmament occupies a marginal place is several books during Nehru period. But according to the work of Arthur Lall, there is an illuminating account of the contribution made by the non-aligned group led by Nehru, to the negotiations heading to the partial test ban treaty it is a super-power oriented study and it contributed to the mythology that the superpowers were seriously engaged in a meaningful disarmament treaty.

Similarly, According to the Report of a study group, set up by the Indian council of world affairs, in the mid fifties, there was less than six of its 2/3 pages to India's contribution to the disarmament negotiations. In the words of Bhabhani Sen Gupta. India could not have a disarmament policy, because it was not a nuclear power she was not running the race either for nuclear or conventional arms, she could only take a few timely initiatives in order to press the nuclear powers to negotiate seriously, to iron out differences between the two super-powers and to place at the disposal of negotiations agencies. Such specialized services as she could provide". During 1950's, when Nehru took
initiatives regarding disarmament, certainly, he had in his mind, certain vital issuer of his foreign policy and India's national interest. Nehru's initiatives were at the UN. Because being a non-nuclear power, India could not be admitted into the corridors of nuclear power politics. Nehru's disarmament initiatives came in the years 1953-54, 1957-58 and 1962. It is said that "Nehru's first major disarmament came only after the USSR had become a full-fledged thermo nuclear power." Nehru was realistic enough to realize that his call for a halt in the nuclear arms race had a chance of being heard only after there had come to be established a certain balance of nuclear power between the two cold war blocs. In 1946, under the leadership of Nehru, India supported the "BARUCH PLAN" of American government, which had a provision for complete international control of the entire process of producing atomic weapons. But the Soviet Union considered it as American domination over the world's nuclear weapon resources. The two super-powers were antagonistic with each other.

In 1948, Nehru evolved a kind of nuclear diplomacy, taking a decision to make India a peaceful nuclear power. Negotiations with the western powers aimed at securing one or two nuclear reactors. America agreed to bring the world's nuclear energy resources under international control. But however, Nehru including Mrs. Vijayalaxmi Pandit took the decision to build for an India an autonomous peaceful nuclear capability. Nehru rejected Eisenhower' proposal to impose international control over the world's nuclear energy resources. Regarding the same Nehru said, "It means that all our raw-materials and controlled by that independent body, which is independent even of the UN, after it is created, in immediate consideration is who will be in it. Either you make the body as big as the UN with all the countries represented or it will be some relatively small body, inevitably the great powers sitting is it and lording
it over. I say with all respect to them that they will have a grip over all the atomic energy areas and raw-materials in every country. New, for a country like India, is it a desirable prospect. During 1953-54, in the field of disarmament negotiations, three major changes emerged in the disarmament negotiation's position of the two super-powers i.e.

1. The US no longer insisted on an improvement in the international political climate as a precondition to disarmament negotiations.

2. The western powers recognized that any measures of disarmament to be effective must be acceptable to the USSR.

3. The USSR showed willingness to conduct negotiations on the basis of western proposals for nuclear and conventional disarmament.

In 1953, the Disarmament commission holding its meeting, adopted "for the first time a unanimous report which expressed the hope that recent international events like the ending of the Korean war, and changes in the US & USSR government would create a more propitious atmosphere for reconsideration of the disarmament question. But in 1954, American explosion of hydrogen bomb at Bikini resulted in heavy loss to Japanese fishermen. After the Bikini explosion, Nehru came out with his four concrete proposals to control the nuclear arms race speaking in the Loksabha he said; "A new weapon of unprecedented power both in volume and intensity, with an unascertained and probably unascertainable, range of destructive potential in respect of time and space, that is, both as regards duration and the extent of consequences, is being tested, unleashing its massive power for use as a weapon of war.

We know that its use threatens the existence of man and civilization as we know it. We are told that there is no effective protection against the
hydrogen bomb and that millions of people may be exterminated by a single explosion and many more injured, and perhaps still many more condemned to slow death or to live under the shadow of the fear of disease and death.” Nehru suggested certain concrete measures to arrest the dire end by a standstill agreement in respect of actual explosions even if agreements about the discontinuous of production and stockpiling must await more substantial agreement amongst those principally concerned, full Publicity by the UN and by all governments of the destructive power and the known effects of these weapons and also of their unknown and probable effects; immediate and continuing private meeting of the sub-committee of the Disarmament commission to consider a standstill agreement and "active steps by states and peoples of the world, who though not only directly concerned with the production of these weapons are very much concerned with the possible use of them." Nehru said; “they would I venture to hope, express their concern and add their voices and influence in an effective a manner as possible to arrest the progress of this destructive potential which menaces all alike". And a little later he added; "It is of great concern to us that Asia and her peonies appear to be always nearer these occurrences and experiments and their fearsome consequences actual and potential."

The Indian initiative made little impact on the super-powers. The UN General Assembly in November 1954 referred the Indian proposals made by Nehru for appropriate consideration. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly on disarmament in 1954 carried no imprint on the Indian suggestions"50. Asked the disarmament commission to make efforts to reach agreement on comprehensive and co-ordinate proposals for the regulation, limitation and major reduction of all armed forces and conventional armaments for total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and
weapons of mass destruction of every type and for the establishment of effective international control. Thus the American perspective of disarmament trampled over the Soviet Union as well as non-aligned perspectives. The resolution also referred to the disarmament commission, a draft resolution submitted by Australia and Philippines. But however, it was perhaps the first such initiative of the non-aligned countries, taken by Nehru towards an immediate suspension of nuclear weapon tests. India believed firmly in disarmament commission and its sub-committee as the forum of disarmament negotiations, as a result of the lead taken by Nehru. India taking the lead in the non-aligned countries to intervene in disarmament negotiations. Nehru repeatedly had called for active steps to be taken by the nations of the world to bring about a halt to the nuclear arm race. "Nehru's government brought about a publication narrating the vivid authenticity the destructive power and potential of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction". Though Nehru did not initiate to mobilize world public opinion, but at the behest of him, in 1957, the Loksabha adopted a resolution calling for an immediate agreement banning all nuclear weapon tests.

Nehru was interested in peace and he never wanted that such a resolution could harm any particular power. He never wanted that India could involve in cold war and power-politics of great powers and he was always anxious to work with the nuclear powers through the UN. Therefore regarding Nehru's approach and style in international affairs, it has been remarked by Bhabani Sen Gupta. Nehru's political style was not populist, but elitists and his approach to international politics was essentially Gratian. He believed in the existence and potential of common interests among the states of the world and he looked for patterns of accord, by harmonization of the forces and interests which he considered to be actually at play in international politics.
Hence, the thrust of his non-alignment policy was to build bridges, to bring the opposing forces together, to work for consensus to avoid confrontation. He was convinced that despite differences in social system and ideologies and with all their rivalries and competitiveness, the great powers had a common interest in protecting the world and themselves from nuclear annihilation". Nehru, instead of building people's campaign against nuclear weapon tests in Asia, Africa and Latin America, made a fervent and convincing appeal to the two superpowers to stop all such types of nuclear tests. The two super powers were appealed to solve the crisis and save humanity from the scourge of nuclear war, he said: "Millions of people believe in what is called western capitalism, millions also believe in communism. But there are many millions who are not committed to either of these ideologies and yet seek in friendship with others, a better life and more hopeful future. I speak for myself but I believe that I teach the thought of vast number of people in my country and as well as in other countries of the world. I venture, therefore to make this appeal to the great powers, more especially the leaders of America and Russia, in whose hands fate and destiny have placed such tremendous power today to mould this world and either to raise it to undergarment of heights or hurl it into the pit of disaster.

I appeal to them to stop all nuclear test explosion and thus to show to the world that they are determined to end this menace and to proved also to bring about effective disarmament". Such an appeal convinced the two super powers, marking new era in the disarmament efforts between 1955 and 1957, The soviet Union came forward with a detailed programme of disarmament and disarmament negotiations figured at the Geneva summit conference and in 1955, the General Assembly of the UN, adopted disarmament resolution directing Disarmament sub-committee to give priority to measures like "Open
skies" Proposal of Eishenhour of America and to continue to work for comprehensive disarmament. In 1956, the western powers put the proposal to create special international disarmament outside the UN and the USA, divided to advocate concepts of arms control and partial disarmament. In 1957, such initiative of the USA was accepted by the Soviet Union. In the same year the General Assembly of the UN adopted number of disarmament resolutions. The non aligned countries were also very happy about such turning trend of the super powers towards disarmament negotiations. Regarding such conductive atmosphere for disarmament Arthur Lall reported: "By 1957, this posture had gained so many adherents that the non-aligned countries and their friends could stop any other single group in the UN from getting its way - from ministering the requisite two-thirds vote for adopting a resolution. From this time on, there has been at the UN, the floating uncommitted vote on which neither side could count. The debates on disarmament have ceased to be a dialogue between the political west and East and have become the world debates in which the two sides have increasingly under pressure justify their proposals and attitudes to the third world". Nehru's efforts and initiatives towards did not do wasted. He was perhaps 'the most outstanding supporters of the emerging detents between USA & USSR. Making, a departure from cold war by 1961, Both USA and USSR issued the statements in co-operating the agreed principles of disarmament to form the basis for further negotiations.

The non-aligned countries and other countries, sincerely worked for such disarmament negotiations, in line with the resolution of UN's General Assembly, and also in negotiations at the Geneva confluence. But however, and unfortunately, in 1962 the reports that the nuclear powers remarked upon a new series of tests, hurt Pandit Nehru, worried about such moves of the super powers he said he welcomed the super power's positive reaction to the eight-
nation proposals on disarmament, but he expressed that he was not happy about the prospects of resumption of tests because, if the USA resumed so, the Soviet Union would also do so and once again, he requested and appealed to the super-powers to refrain from such moves of tests. But USA turned a deaf ear to the appeal of Nehru, and President Kennedy authorized that the country should resume the tests. About such ill-healthy atmosphere, created by USA, Arthur Lall observed; "We meet under the unwelcome shadow (of the tests) It is a strange irony that these tests should take place which is called Christians Island, a name which raises associations in our minds of a message of peace and good will". The year 1962, saw the gloomy picture of the world where the countries like France started effecting thermo nuclear explosion in Sahara and America going for inspection, to identify nuclear blasts. The Urban crises of 1962 also worsened the situation. Krishna Menon expressed his great at the Soviet tests. The attitude of indifference of the two super powers upset the non-aligned countries. The Soviet Union stood for a partial test ban treaty and would not prevent proliferation of independent nuclear capability. The General Assembly of the UN made its disarmament resolution, to reach an interim partial test ban treaty, acceptable to the two superpowers.

The compromises went on between Kennedy and Knischev regarding such negotiations on disarmament. However in 1963, the Moscow Treaty marked the first step towards the discontinuance of all the tests by the two super-powers. The non-aligned countries also hoped for further reduction of qualitative development of nuclear weapons. But Mrs. Myrdal added that the super-powers never intend deed towards disararmaments.

The efforts disarmament by the two-super-powers gave rise to some about. What Nehru actually wanted was entirely different. He firmly believed in substantial nuclear disarmament by the super-powers and also in non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons capability. When China attacked India in 1962, Nehru announced that Chinese bomb would not push India to nuclear explosion. In a television interview screened in New York on May 18, 1964, Nehru declared: "We are determined not to use (nuclear) weapons for war purposes. We do not make atom bombs. I do not think we will".

NEHRU-COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS AND UNO:

Historical Survey:

It was again Nehru's major decision to establish and continue India's link with the Commonwealth of Nations. India's decision to remain a member of the British Commonwealth in 1949, at the initial stage, came as a surprise to Indians and people abroad. Because Nehru, since late 1920s was opposed to idea of Dominion Status and stood for complete independence for India. So in the 1920s and 1930s he considered the idea of Dominion status of India as the most ridiculous. The very idea and designation i.e. the British Commonwealth seemed to Nehru, not as a true international co-operation. According to him "a true Commonwealth of Nations could not grow out of the British empire". Nehru, in 1920s and 1930s dubbed Britani as the greatest enemy of national freedom, peace and disarmament as it pursued a policy, dealing with the countries of Middle East, China, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Britain's imperialism also aimed at subjugating other parts of Asia and Africa. So he considered "the independence of India as a death blow to British imperialism and the signal for the liberation of their oppressed nations".

According to Nehru, Swaraj meant complete independence as the Indian National Congress defined, it at Lahore session on Dec. 21, 1929. In January 26, 1930, Nehru said; "The British Gove in India has not only deprived
the Indian people of their freedom but has based itself on the exploitation of the masses, and has ruined India economically, politically, culturally and spiritually. We believe therefore that India must sever the British connection and attain Purna Swaraj or complete independence⁶⁰. Referring to Anglo-Irish treaty 1921, Nehru, said that the treaty spoke of a great measure of independence. The idea of Dominion status underwent change. Irish strong republican movement pulled it towards complete independence; it represented a progressive growth towards an equal political status. But the economic forces were responsible for separating the Dominions from England, and it resulted in the decline of England in the same way. India was never interested to subordinate its economic policy to Britain. Always opposing the idea of Dominions status of the British Empire to exploit dominions, Nehru, always strongly emphasized that the Indian nationalist movement was not directed against the British people, as he said; "Our quarrel is not with the people of England but with the people of England but with the imperialism of England. The day England sheds imperialism we shall gladly co-operate with her. India could have no truck with British imperialism. Nor could she have a real measure of freedom within the limits of British Empire", Before a new bridge is built, on the basis of friendship and cooperation, the present chains which tie us to England must be severed. Only them the real co-operation takes place⁶¹.

At the Lahore session of the Congress, in 1929, Nehru repeatedly a made a demand for complete independence but not a dominion status. As an internationalist have not as narrow nationalist. Nehru had an extreme opposition to British imperialism and its domination. What India wanted was fresh air. British imperialism and Indian nationalism never went together. Nehru also opposed British policy of appeasing Fascism and Nazism. After such a reaction from Nehru and Congress, Lord Attlee and his colleagues
started applying their test of translating into reality the policy of giving independence to India in 1945.

Then we notice some changes in the thinking towards maintenance of friendly relations with Britain and commonwealth, when India achieved its independence on 15th of August 1947. In this way the riddle got revolved, after the transfer of power to India by the Britain. It created a favorable impression on the minds of Nehru and his associates, and reinforced this desire to let India remain in the commonwealth. Already in late 1946 and early 1947, Nehru's thoughts reflected the direction of maintaining India's relations with Britain and commonwealth. But some of the Indians objected to India as republic could not remain the commonwealth. However Nehru repeatedly that" This business of our being republic had nothing to do with what relations, We should have with other countries, notably with the UK or the commonwealth and that India's membership of the commonwealth was something part from and in a sense independent of the constitution that she adopted"62. Nehru quoted the example of Irish constitution, which was republic even there since 1937, it had continued as a member of the commonwealth.

REASONS PROMPTING INDIA TQ REMAIN IN THE COMMONWEALTH:

Prof Nicholas Mansergh pointed out that when Pakistan committed itself to commonwealth membership, the result was that a feeling arose in the Indian leaders that Muslim League pass politicians should not be allowed to make political capital out of their loudly proclaimed intention to stay in the commonwealth. In the course of time, Pakistan might become a base of British imperialism to exploit India, if India remained out of the commonwealth.
India's membership was like a counterpoise to Pakistan. The other factors which motivated India's decision to join or remain in the commonwealth were;

a) The advantage of sterling Area in which India's large foreign exchange reserves were tied-up and possibility of easier access to the British market and capital (in 1947-48 the British marked accounted for more than half of India's foreign exchange earnings).

b) The desire to facilitate negotiations with the princely state.

c) India's dependence on Britain for military hardware and training.

d) Commonwealth membership was advantageous, in the bipolar world of forties and fifties at a time, when India aspired to play an international, role, without committing herself to any power bloc.

e) The commonwealth gave India a prestige and influence which she could not have otherwise possessed (K.M. Panikkar)

f) The membership meant a flying start for Indian initiative and Indo-British collaboration over global issues (This became true when mediation efforts were made by India in Korean War and the first Indo-China war)

g) The membership was a landmark in India's foreign policy and India started influencing other nations in the world about the importance of the commonwealth. India's membership with the commonwealth, attracted many Asian Afro nations, to be the members of it.

h) Moreover, Nehru's and Krishnamenon, personal attachment to the commonwealth was the most decisive.

i) It prevented India from becoming completely isolated and widened Indian scope for its wider role to play in international relations.
In this way, the commonwealth constituted one of the initial cornerstones upon which India's foreign relations were strongly built. So, the determination or the decision to retain commonwealth, membership taken in 1947, and reaffirmed in 1949, constituted major watershed in the evolution of the commonwealth. Nehru attended the first meeting of the commonwealth Prime-Ministers in London in 1948 and realized the value of it and spoke "of the old colonial empire of Britain gradually changing into a combination of free Dominions and non self governing countries And this change over will be complete soon so that the commonwealth of nations will become a real commonwealth of the nations". He referred to the importance of the spirit of mutual understanding resulting from the meeting and said; “We may not agree about everything but it was surprising what a large measure of unanimity, there was, not only in the objectives to be aimed at, but in the methods to be pursued'. This meeting has shown me that there is great scope for the commonwealth to function in this way, and not only to help herself but to help others also on his return from London on Nov, 8, 1948, Speaking in the Indian constituent Assembly Nehru made it clear that “India desired to be associated in friendly relationship with other countries, with the UK and the commonwealth, even after becoming a republic, but how this could be done, was a matter for careful consideration by all concerned". The Congress party also endorsed Nehru's stand and parsed resolution on 18 Dec, 1948 and said; "In view of the attainment of complete independence and the establishment of the Republic of India, which will symbolize that independence and give to India the status among the nations of the world that is her rightful due, her present association with the UK and the commonwealth of nations, will necessarily have to change.
India, however, desires to maintain all such links with other countries, as do not come in the way of her freedom of action and independence and the congress would welcome her free association with the independent nations of the commonwealth for their common weal and the promotion of world peace. In due course of time, a formula was evolved, according to which it was declared that the future Indian republic would owe no allegiance to the crown, nor would the monarchs have any place in her Government. India would remain a full member of the commonwealth and would acknowledge the king as a symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such the Heads of the commonwealth' the formula was accepted by commonwealth Prime Ministers in late April, 1949 and it was approved both by the constituent Assembly and the Congress in May 1949. That encouraged and inspired the majority of the Asian and African commonwealth states to join the commonwealth. It was the voluntary choice of the nations to remain in the commonwealth or come out of it as Burma did to stay out of it soon after independence. Therefore regarding India's membership with commonwealth said; "It was a free association of equal nations, in no way subordinate to one another and membership in commonwealth meant independence plus, not independence minus. According to Nehru, the commonwealth had changed and was changing and that it was no longer a western or Anglo-Saxon Club. Nehru never wanted that India should lead the life of frog in the well. India, according to him, was really interested to make her contributions to solve international problems. The independent India, facing many problems like, the ill effects of partition, problem of Hyderabad and Kashmir, weak defense forces, having friends in Asia, fresh to international community, unfriendly relation with Pakistan etc, compelled India to associate herself with the commonwealth, Regarding the evil consequences resulting from dissociation
of India from the commonwealth, Nehru in 1949 said; "If we dissociate ourselves completely from the commonwealth, then for the moment, we are completely isolated. We cannot remain completely isolated and so inevitably by stress of circumstances we have to incline in some direction or other.

But that inclination in some direction or other will necessarily be on the basis of give and take. It may be in the nature of alliances; you give something yourself and get something in return. In other words, it may involve commitment far more than at present. There are no commitments today"66. Membership of the commonwealth provided her many friends and a sense of security and stability in the event of crises. Nehru, basically, wished to advance the causes like peace, freedom for colonial people, the fight against racialism, international co-operation in Asian and African countries, raising the living standards of the under-developed countries it for which the commonwealth was tied by India. He reinterpreted the idea of the Commonwealth of Nations to fit his own philosophy of international relations. He viewed the commonwealth "as an association of government and people brought together by history and maintained for the promotion of certain common interest and ideals. It was a bridge between the East and the West, between various continents, races and cultures, a grouping of friendly nations making widely differing responses to cold war and thus cutting across the frozen configuration of international policies. It was an instrument of peace. It had brought a "touch of healing"67. To all embittered world, it was an example to the world of the Gandhian principles applied to relations between nations. Speaking in the Indian constituent Assembly on May, 17-1949, Nehru claimed that his decision to keep India in the commonwealth" has met with the approval of Gandhiji. According to Nehru, the Commonwealth of Nations was neither a super-state nor even the embryo of such a state, but it was a free association of sovereign
states and that it could survive only as such. He was not in favor of giving it a supra national authority. Even he did not consider it a forum to deal with the domestic affairs of a nation. That is why; he considered the South African policy of apartheid as matter coming outside its purview.

But at the most, such matters could be discussed in a friendly way. Even Indo-part war over Kashmir did not figure in the commonwealth (1951) as Nehru insisted so. Nehru also did not view commonwealth as a separate political bloc but it was a free and voluntary association to promote greater understanding co-operation and agreement among its members. It did not have common commonwealth foreign policy. Because different nations. Who were the members of it had different geographical and historical compulsions. So consult and cooperate with each other was more important than to have an artificial common policy. Nehru, also viewed and valued the commonwealth as a friendly association which neither came in the circumscribed India's political and constitutional independence nor came in the way of India's pursuing her own independent policies in international affairs as he said in 1950. "Presumable, some people imaging that our association with commonwealth imposes some kind of restricting limiting factor upon our activities, be they political, economic, foreign, domestic or anything else. In the case of the UN or the IMF, some limiting factors certainly come in as they must. If we join an international organization of that type, but in our association with the commonwealth, there is not the least vestige of such a limiting factor. We may carry out any policy we like regardless of whether we are in the commonwealth or not." Nehru considered commonwealth stronger than alliances or treaties. It represented a form of international co-operation, which suited India best, being intimate, informal, beneficial but not binding.
NEHRU AND THE UN:

The UN, as the second systematic International organization was established after the Second World War, to maintain International peace and security. It succeeded the League of Nations, the first International organization, established after the 1st World war. The UN representing all the independent states of the world provides a unique opportunity for all the newly independent and militarily weak and small states, to play their decisive role in International politics without being directly involved in power-politics of the two super-powers. The UN, perhaps is the only International forum, which the states utilise it for defending their territorial integrity, sovereignty and also securing economic and technical assistance, fighting against imperialism, racialism and controlling International conflict situations and promoting world peace, security and order. So, it would be quite logical for the newly independent state like India to attach greater importance to the UN in her foreign policy calculations and to utilize the same to promote her national and International objectives. The UN promotes the growth of an available world order. It provided an International environment, conditioning or determining the foreign policy of India. India's national interests demanded that every effort must be made to develop an effective system of collective security through the UN. The emergence of Third World countries made the influence of the super-powers substantially very less. There has been an attitude of indifference of the super-powers to the world organization. The veto in the Security Council has paralyzed the effective working of the UN. Such structural loopholes of the UN have been the main obstacles to its effective functioning. On number of occasions, the US and USSR, made of veto-power in the Security Council, so as to achieve their own selfish national interests. The two superpowers carried on all their arms control negotiations outside the UN. India's political
tradition and her national interest dictated that she should identify herself with other third world states, in the struggle to create a new International political order. Therefore it emerging as independent sovereign state undertook a common approach with the leadership of Nehru, with the UN, in the solution of issues that confronted the world after the Second World War.

India as an original member of the UN placed her firm faith and belief in the principles and purposes of the UN charter. In September 1946, when India for the first time had decided to take an active participation in the affairs of country, Pandit Nehru, the first Prime Minister and the first foreign minister declared that India's attitude towards the UN would be that of; "Whole hearted co-operation and unreserved adherence, both in spirit and letter, to the charter governing it."71. India, under the dynamic leadership of Nehru, had been striving for becoming a member of the UN, ever since of late twenties of the this century, as the Indian National Congress passed series of resolutions to that effect. India went to accept the provisions of the UN charter with no reservation firmly believing in the annals of International law, for the cause of humanity. India was on the threshold of developing its focus on the structure of the International organization. India also experienced the same about the League of Nations. In October 1946, India led by Mrs. Vijayalaxmi Pandit, at the first session of the General Assembly of the UN, regarded imperialism as inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the UN charter. India fought against imperialism or racialism as a matter of policy according to the principles of the UN charter. India under the leadership of Nehru always went to the extent of creating a healthy International atmosphere that was responsible for progressive functioning of the UN. If anti-colonialism was the pillar of Indian policy, decolonization was a pilot programme of the UN. So, "The dominant notes in Indian foreign policy during the period (Nehru) were a
vigorous vocal stand against colonialism and racial discrimination and apathy towards and criticism of the great powers for dividing the world into hostile blocs which were endangering world peace.\textsuperscript{72}

Regarding the problem of Indonesia, Pandit Nehru, inaugurating the 18 Nation conferences on Indonesia (on January, 1949) firmly believing in the UN, said; "Believing as we do that the UN must be strengthened as a symbol of the new order; we were reluctant to take up any steps which might appear to weaken its authority. But when the will of the Security Council itself was flouted, then it became clear to us that we must confer together to strengthen the UN and to prevent further deterioration of dangerous situation. We meet, therefore within the framework of the UN and with the noble words of the charter before us.

That charter itself recognizes regional arrangements as a means of furthering International peace and security our primary purpose is to consider how best we can help the security council to bring about a rapid and peaceful solution of the Indonesian problem. We meet to supplement the efforts of the Security Council, not to supplant that body\textsuperscript{73}. So, Nehru always believed in referring every issue to the forum of the UN. Like that Kashmir issue was also referred to the UN, at the initiative of Nehru. So, while making a statement in the constituent Assembly (legislative) on Kashmir, on March 5, 1948, Nehru said; "Our making a reference on this issue to the security council of the UN was an act of faith because we believe in the progressive realization of a world order and a world government. In spite of many shocks, we have adhered to the ideals represented by the UN and its charter. But those very ideals teach us also certain duties and responsibilities to our own people and to those who put their trust in us. To betray these people would be to betray the basic ideals for which the UN stand or should stand\textsuperscript{74}. India expected more from the Security
Council to take appropriate action to resolve the issue, thereby restore International peace and security. India, at the lead of Nehru, intervened in the Korean crisis of 1950. The policy of non-alignment of Nehru received a new dynamism in the world. India’s considered armed attack on South Korea (supported by us), a clear case of aggression and favored action to repel the attack. India the persuaded the UN to condemn the act of aggression. It believed in the peaceful settlement of the issue.

So, India's aim was to preserve and promote broad-based and universal character of the UN. Even to achieve internal economic development, Nehru favored peaceful world, but not a third world war. This aspect of the domestic background upon which India had to function in adequately summarized by Prof. M.Chael Brecher as; "India's economic weakness and the basic goal of development alone provide powerful inducements to the policy of non-alignment. The doors must be kept open to all possible sources of aid. Western and Soviet, if the desired economic revolution is to be achieved. For these reasons too, peace or war is an issue of par-amount importance for India. The outbreak of war between the super-powers would wreck the ambitious program set in motion by Nehru and his colleagues and would make a mockery of the pledges for a better way of life which figured so largely in congress propaganda during the freedom struggle. It is only in these terms that Nehru's efforts to mediate international disputes and localize conflict as in Korea and Indo-China can be properly understood. Indeed, all other factors which shape India's view of the world are sub-ordinate to this overriding consideration, as Nehru had candidly stated on numerous occasions”75. Nehru stressed his attention more too economic issues of Asia and drew the attention of the UN, to solve the same. It is clear, as already mentioned that India with Nehru pledged India's wholehearted co-operation and adherence to the UN. India's
participation in UN was facilitated by geography and history. India stood for the independence of all colonial and dependent people and their full right to self-determination to be achieved and realized through the ages of the UN. Such firm belief of India in the UN is better expressed by Chester Bowles as follows; "In the UN, she has stood out as a militant and uncompromising foe of colonialism and champion of the right of still subject peoples to independence.

This position has brought her in conflict on occasion with American views that the principle of self-determination must give way to the pressures of contemporary Real Politic, on the whole however? There, it has been to our advantage to have another democratic nation stating the case for freedom, on those occasions when rightly or wrongly, we have felt, we could not rather than to leave this field to the communists". Nehru, firmly repeatedly believed in the purposes and principles of the UN. He emphasized the importance of adhering firmly to the objectives of the UN. Speaking at the General Assembly, Nehru said that the Assembly represented the world community, believing in the principle of equality. According to him, the Assembly of the UN came into existence after the consequences of World War-II. About the same Nehru said; “This Assembly took shape after two mighty wars and as a consequence of those wars. What has been the lesson of those wars? Surely the lesson of those wars has been that out of hatred and violence, you will not build peace. It is contradiction in terms. The lesson of history, the long course of history, and more especially the lesson of last great wars which have devastated humanity, has been that out of hatred and violence only hatred and violence will come. We have got into a cycle of hatred and violence and not the most brilliant debate will get us out of it, unless we look some other way and find some other means. It is obvious that if we continue in this cycle and have wars which this Assembly was especially meant to avoid and prevent, the
result will not only be tremendous devastation all over the world, but non-achievement by any individual power or group of its objective."77 As a representative from Asia, Nehru remarked that the world was bigger than Europe. It was not wise to concentrate only on European or Asian but world problems at large. There was no any problem, which could be isolated from the world. Any problem could be better judged and understood in a world perspective. But Nehru gave utmost importance to Asia's role and its problem in the world.

He made a strong plea for the ending of the problem of colonialism in Asia and Africa. He reminded of many suffering of the people of Asia from the evils of colonialism and imperial domination. So India stood with sympathy for those who waged their war against colonialism and imperialism and struggle for independence. Nehru, also equally felt very mind considered about the grave situation emerging from racial discrimination. Which was contrary to the provisions of the UN charter; "Racial inequality according to Nehru, if practiced is a menace to world peace and if it violates the principles of the UN charter, to tolerate it is obviously to sow the seeds of conflict."78 About the importance and presence of the UN to prevent fear and sow the seeds of peace Nehru observed; "I feel that today the world is tied up in fears and apprehensions, some of them justified no doubt. But where a person feels fear, bad consequences and evil consequences will follow. Fear is not a good companion. It is surprising to see that this sense of fear is pervading great countries-fear and grave fear of war and fear of many things. Let us prepare ourselves against any possible aggression. The UN is here to prevent any fear or hurt but at the same time. Let us banish all thought of an aggressive attitude whether by word or deed. I ask this Assembly to remember that such great problems cannot be solved if our eyes are bloodshot and our minds are
obscured by passion. Believing in the UN, to remove fear of war, Nehru made it clear that he was not afraid of the bigness of great powers, of their armies their fleets, their weapons, but was greatly inspired and influenced by Gandhian principles of truth, peace and non-violence, through which India attained her independence. Further, he outlined that the problems of the world could not be solved by thinking in terms of aggression or violence.

He stated in the General Assembly that India adhered completely and absolutely to the principles and purposes of the UN charter and solves the problems in accordance with those principles. Nehru viewed the UN as a symbol of hope for mankind. Only the UN could represent the idea of one world. One world or no hope was the choice left to the humanity. Though, the UN could not realize its aims and stand according to hopes and expectations, but the very fact of its existence had saved the nations from many dangers and conflicts.

Therefore, Nehru, opposing the super-powers with its military alliances, resulting from cold war after II world war, did not accept any proposal to exclude any independent country from the UN. He favored the membership of all the independent nations to the UN. The UN believed in the principle of universality. It represented according to Nehru, timeless urge of humanity for peace. The leaguer Nations also came into existence with the same universal background. But unfortunately war-manger nations kept out of it. But about the UN Nehru said; "The UN was based on a presumption of universality because, it symbolized the longing among all peoples for the return of peace. Countries differing from one another in the structure of government economic and political policy and in a great many other respects were able to come together under the huge umbrella of the UN. The other attribute was the main objective, namely the maintenance of peace, the growth of co-operative effort
among nations and the solution of disputes by peaceful means as far as possible. Nehru was opposed to veto power given to the big powers in the Security Council. Due to such provision the UN could not adopt sanctions against any of the great powers. So, the very objective of the UN as the collective security was defeated. There was a departure from the principle of universality as Nehru pointed out. The basic principle of universality was also violated when China was not given recognition in the UN; the very principle of universality got violated.

When the meeting of the General conference of the UNESCO was held in Delhi, Nehru, said, UNESCO was not only concerned with political questions but it was intimately connected with the dignity of man and the vital importance of freedom. According to Nehru the UN, was a step towards a world community. In spite of many difficulties and conflicts, the UN, gradually was marching towards a world community, conferring together through its elected representatives Nehru outlined the importance of developing a sense of facing the problems from the larger point of view of the world and in accordance with the principles laid down in the UN charter. One should take a short-term view but to look ahead for some kind of a world order. According to Nehru, the very idea of cold war was the very negation of what the UN stood for as he remarked; unfortunately, we have had what is cold war. The cold war is better than hot war or shooting war. But the idea of cold war is the very negation of what the UN stands far. It is a negation of what the constitution of UNESCO says that wars begin in the minds of men. Cold war means nourishing the idea of war in the minds of men. Gandhiji was devoted to non-violence and preached this principle all through his life and yet he said; "If you have a sword in your mind, it is better to use it than to nurse and nourish it in your mind all the time. Take it out, use it and throw it away instead of being
frustrated in yourselves and always thinking of the sword or the use of the sword and yet superficially trying to avoid it"81. So cold war, according to Nehru meant opposition to peace and co-operation. Even establishment of "military alliances meant severe consequences, threatening the very existence of the UN. So the alternative to cold war, according to Nehru was disarmament through the UN efforts.

Therefore according to Nehru, what was essential was the adopt right means to solve the problems only peaceful means could ensure the survival and security of the people and nations. Nehru found out certain structural deficiencies in the UN. The structure according to Nehru was not fair either to Asia or Africa. The structure was not in tune with the present world situation. There lacked a considerable measure of agreement. The veto power of the Security Council was misused by the great powers for their selfish interests. UN according to Nehru was not merely a debating body but it had assumed greater responsibility to avoid wars on several occasions. But the most unfortunate part of the UN was with regard to the idea of unanimity in the Security Council in respect of five permanent members. So 'Veto according to Nehru was undemocratic, illogical.
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