Chapter VI

ĀTMAN and MOKṢA in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Systems

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems of Indian Philosophy are known as theistic systems (āstika) as against the atheistic schools of Cārvākism, Buddhism, Jainism and Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. They believe in the Vedas, but at the same time give a new cosmology. They believe that the world is created by God out of the eternally existing atoms. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems are ancient systems, at least as old as Buddhism. S. Dasgupta holds that they are by all means pre-Buddhistic. The two systems had been originated by two different philosophers. The Nyāya system has been associated with Gotama and the Vaiśeṣika with Kaṇāda. The first and the original work on the Nyāya is traced to Gotama and he is taken to be the first propounder and the originator of this system. Later on various commentators like Vāsyāyana, Udyotakara, Praśastapāda, Visvanātha, Gangeśa etc. wrote commentaries on the original Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Sūtras. These two systems are thought of together and are taken as very similar because they believe in the eternity of the atoms which are the constituent cause
of the universe. They believe that there are many ultimate principles as the atoms instead of only one principle. These systems are known as "Pluralistic Realism".

The Nyāya system is essentially known not for its metaphysics as for the elaborate science of knowledge that it has developed. It has made a very important contribution to the science of correct reasoning. It is known as the science of Tarka or reasoned argument, as it has discovered the laws of correct and valid thinking. The Nyāya system means Logic which is the prerequisite of all philosophical thinking. The purpose of knowledge is attainment of liberation from all the pains and sufferings of life. The Naiyāyikas hold that unless the nature of pain and its root cause are properly apprehended, it is not possible to free ourselves from the pain and sufferings of life, forever. The aim of knowing is thus the attainment of knowledge, which is instrumental to the attainment of liberation. The purpose (prayojana) of knowledge is attainment of liberation known technically as the Apavarga in the Nyāya and Nissreyas in the Vaiśeṣika systems. It is said in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha — "Liberation or Nissreyas is attained by philosophical knowledge."¹ It is said by Gotama in

¹ Sarvadarśanasamgraha. p.245.
his Nyāya Sūtras -- "The soul, body, senses, objects of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain and release -- are the objects of knowledge."¹ Thus misapprehension of these objects i.e. the soul, body, senses, mind, works and pain causes bondage and, its consequent suffering, in human life. The Naiyāyikas lay emphasis first upon the need of properly grasping the logical interrelations of these objects and thus by going to the root cause of pain. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems do not lay stress on performance of rites and rituals, nor on idol worship they emphasise much the pure understanding of the reality. They believe like the Advaita Vedānta that liberation can be attained by right knowledge and not by other methods.

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems are called realistic for they recognise the independent existence of the objects of knowledge. They do not hold that the external world or the objects of knowledge have ideal existence; they do not reduce them to ideas as Berkeley did, nor do they deprive them of their own independent existence by making them mind-dependent. They hold that objects of

¹. Vidyabhūṣāṇa S.S.(Tr.) -- The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama
knowledge exist outside knowledge and, that they have their own existence independent of knowledge and, that they are independent of each other. They reduce all the multiferious things of the world to a few elements or 'substances' which they call Dravyas. The Dravyas are those substances to which the various things with their qualities can be reduced and which are further irreducible to any other thing. The Dravyas are the final eternally existing independent existences and acts as the possessors of attributes. The world is a manifestation of such dravyas in various forms. They recognise nine final and eternal realities which are mutually irreducible and explain the infinite varieties of the universe by their properties and relations. The nine Dravyas are -- (1) earth (pṛthivī), (2) water (āp), (3) fire (tejas), (4) air (vāyu), (5) space (ākāśa), (6) time (kāla), (7) direction (dīk), (8) the self (ātman) and (9) manas (mind). All these substances are not material but each of them has quite a distinct characteristic which is not possessed by any other substance. The Dravyas exist in the form of their infinitesimal parts, known as the anus or atoms. Both these systems believe that the ultimate reality consists of the minute particles or atoms. The concrete things of the world are infinitely divisible. On a thoroughgoing analysis of the things of the world, we
arrive at same existence which becomes final and which remains further indivisible. Thus, according to these schools these final indivisible and indestructible things to which we can reduce: the gross and concrete things of the world are the atoms. They form the points of termination. They are uncaused things and, act as the constituent causes of all the material things of the universe, having different magnitudes. They are simple and partless and, are perceptible to our sense organs. They are extremely subtle and, infinitesimal in size and, hence, their presence in ākāśa does not interfere with its all-pervading nature. They have to be understood by inference and imagination as they cannot be the objects of our perception or direct knowledge. They are the fundamental metaphysical points with their special peculiarities. They do not possess magnitudes, still they produce things by forming aggregates in the form of binary and triad compounds. They form the ultimate constituent elements of the things of nature. It is difficult to conceive how these metaphysical and magnitudeless points or atoms form concrete things of the world by forming aggregates.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of 'substances' seems from the conceptual point, a reaction to the Buddhist
universal impermanence of things. The Buddhists had reduced the whole world to a continuous series of momentary existences and had denied the existence of a permanent substance behind the momentary qualities. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of substance appears to be an antithetical and powerful reaction to the Buddhistic impermanence.¹ Thus, it is difficult to conceive how the fleeting and momentary attributes can form a congeries and how they simultaneously give the appearance of one thing. The substance of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas is the sustainer (ādhāra) of the various properties of things. The substance is the underlying principle in which the relevant properties of things are unified. It is that which acts as the possessor of attributes and it is that which remains identical, inspite of the changes that take place in its surfacial nature. It remains as one and the same inspite of the changes which occur in it. It acts as the unity and identity amidst all the changes that appear to take place in it. It always appears by some attributes; it can be known only by the attributes which reveal it. It is difficult to conceive it apart from its attributes.

The substance is that which exists independently by itself while other things like quality (guṇa), action (karma), sameness or generality (sāmānya), speciality or peculiarity of individuals (viśeṣa) and the relation of inherence (samavāya) cannot exist without the substance. Dravya thus acts as the resting place (āśraya) of these things. Dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa and samavāya are the six original entities (padārthas) of which all things in the world are made up. The six padārthas are the objects which can be thought (artha) and named (pada). The Naiyāyikas recognise sixteen such padārthas out of which nine are the dravyas or substances. In a similar way, in the Vaiśeṣika system a sixfold classification of padārthas i.e. substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), activity (karma), generality (sāmānya), particularity (viśeṣa) and inherence (samavāya) is obtained. Later Vaiśeṣikas like Śivāditya add to them a seventh padārtha -- non-existence (abhāva).

The attributes by which the substances are characterised are found to exist in them by the relation of 'inherence' or samavāya. It appears as if the substance stands to the attributes as a container to the contained. The attributes are bound to the substance by way of samavāya or inherence. The relation of samavāya or inherence is
peculiar with the Vaiśeṣikas. Qualities exist in substance not as external things to it but as its inseparable attributes. It is not an external connection of two separate things which may be termed saṁyoga. Śrādhākṛṣṇan distinguishes them in the following manner -- "While objects conjoined have a separate existence prior to conjunction, the members related by saṁvāya are inseparably connected. The relationship of saṁvāya is not caused by the action of one of the members related. Conjunction terminates as soon as there is a disjunction of the members conjoined, while connection is indestructible. Again, conjunction takes place between two independent substances, while the members related by way of inherence, stand in relation of the container and the contained. Two things in the relation of saṁvāya cannot be separated without at least one of them being destroyed. Saṁyoga takes place between two things of the same nature which exist disconnectedly and are for a time brought into conjunction. It is external relation, while saṁvāya is internal relation. In saṁyoga two differents are joined together without forming a real whole which enters into each. Saṁvāya is a real coherence."¹

At the root of the varying nature of things, there is a ----------------------------------------

¹ Radhakrishnan S. -- Indian Philosophy. Vol.II. p.217.
permanent and enduring substance which has its own pecu-
liarity or speciality (viśeṣa) and the various qualities 
by which it becomes manifest are connected to it by way 
of inherence. These qualities may be both physical and 
non-physical i.e. mental.

According to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, there 
are certain things which are immaterial or incorporeal. 
Knowledge, desire, will, pleasure and pain are not corpo­
real things. However, they have only transitory or moment­
ary existence. They are passing phases of our mental 
experiences. They cannot belong to material things as 
their attributes. As earth has fragrance as its special 
attribute so, analogically these attributes are imagined 
to belong to a separate substance and that substance is 
recognised by these systems as the 'soul'. It is said in 
the Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama -- "Desire, aversion, volition, 
pleasure, pain and intelligence are the masks of the soul."¹ 
As colour belongs to fire, taste to water, touch to air, 
odour to earth and sound to ākāśa, as the attribute of each 
separately, so do these attributes like knowledge, desire, 
hatred, volition, pleasure and pain belong to a separate

¹ Vidyabhūṣaṇa S.C. -- Nyaya Sūtras of Gotama.1.1.10. 
(Tr.)

Icchādveṣa prayatna sukha duḥkhajñānāni, ātmano lingam iti.
substance -- called the soul. The Soul is regarded as a substance which acts as the possessor of the mental attributes. These qualities are not found in other beings except human beings and hence, it is natural to infer the existence of such an enduring entity, which supports these qualities. The mental qualities inhere in the soul as does odour in earth and colour in fire. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika soul is a substantive being which exists by itself and supports the mental qualities like will, desire and intelligence. Material things like stones, trees, water, mountains do not possess desire, will, pleasure, pain and knowledge. The soul is a special kind of substance imagined by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems, to explain the existence of such qualities, which cannot belong to material things. Kaṇāda recognises these qualities as the signs of the soul.¹

The soul cannot be identified with these modes of consciousness like desire, volition, knowledge for, in that case the soul will have only mementary existence as the former ones; and moreover, there will be no consistency because of the contradictory nature of these various psychical attributes. The soul will be then reduced to floating states of consciousness without a ground or resting place underneath.

¹. Praśastapāda (Com.) -- Vaiśeṣika Darśanām. (Kaṇāda Śūtras). p.7.
The soul is not therefore, one with any of these attributes separately nor collectively; but it acts as their permanent dwelling place and an enduring support.

Even though, in the soul inhere all these qualities, the soul does not possess any of the psychical attributes as its permanent quality. Even consciousness is not an essential and hence permanent attribute of the soul. The Naiyāyikas hold that knowledge and the other psychical attributes arise in the soul when it comes into contact with the manas and body. In itself it is not constituted of eternal consciousness as the Advaita Vedānta holds. Consciousness is its quality which sometimes arises in it and sometimes is absent from it. Gotama in his Sūtra says -- "Knowledge is a natural quality of the body like colour which as natural qualities of the body exist as long as the body continues." Consciousness does not exist in dead corpse.¹ As it is not always possessed of consciousness, consciousness cannot be in its essential nature or it is not constituted of consciousness. Thus consciousness is only an adventitious characteristic of the soul.

S. Radhakrishnan remarks -- "Consciousness is not an essential

¹ Vidyābhūṣaṇa S.C. -- The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama.3.2.51.
property of the soul." He further says -- "It follows that the soul which is the substratum of consciousness need not always be conscious. As a matter of fact, it is an unconscious (jada) principle capable of being qualified by states of consciousness. Consciousness cannot exist apart from self, even as the brilliance of the flame cannot live apart from the flame; but the soul itself is not necessarily conscious." Consciousness is regarded as a quality of the soul produced in the waking state by the conjunction of the soul with manas. It is an intermittent quality of the self."

The soul not being inherently sentient, it possesses consciousness as its quality. Consciousness is produced in the soul when it gets connected to the body through the manas. The soul has simply the potency of knowledge. Annambhaṭṭa says that knowledge arises by the contact of the sense organs with the external objects of experience. Thus, according to the Nyāya system body is indispensable for knowledge. It may appear from this as if body itself is the cause of consciousness. If it were so there will be some absurdities which S. Radhakrishnan presents as follows --

1. Radhakrishnan S. -- Indian Philosophy. Vol.II.p.149.
"If it were a property of the body, it would exist in the various parts of the body and its material constituents. If the latter were also conscious, then we have to regard the individual consciousness as the combination of several consciousnesses produced by the different constituents. If the body has consciousness then all matter must have it, since it is of the same nature as body."¹ But it is not proper to argue that if consciousness is a property of the body it must dwell in every part of the body; for in that case it will mean arguing that the every part of a rose-plant must be fragrant because the rose flower that it bears possesses fragrance as its property. The body may possess consciousness though it is not conscious in itself. But Gotama says in his aphorism "Knowledge does not pervade the whole body as it is not found in the hair, nails etc."²

According to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika systems matter and spirit are two entirely different categories and there can be nothing common between them. They are exclusive of each other and there is a complete antagonism between them. Body and soul are peculiar by themselves and, hence, consciousness which is a characteristic of the soul cannot be a

¹. Radhakrishnan S. -- Indian Philosophy. Vol.II. p.146.
property of the body. Had consciousness been an essential nature of the body it would have been permanently in all bodies; but it is a fact of experience that dead bodies are devoid of consciousness. So also consciousness is absent in the states of deep or dreamless sleep. As consciousness does not exist in some bodies, it cannot be called its essential nature. Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his commentary on the above Sūtra writes -- "It is not true that a substance should be entirely pervaded by its natural qualities ... colour does not pervade hair, nails etc.¹ Consciousness does not change correspondingly along with the changes in the body. With the deformities of the body there do not occur deformities in the consciousness. Consciousness acts independently of the bodily changes.

A similar argument from recollection has been given in the Sūtras by Gotama. It is said in the Sūtra -- "(The soul is to be admitted) on account of joy, fear and grief arising in a child from the memory of things previously experienced."² In the case of an infant there is no span of time when the first actions can be taught, hence they

² Ibid. p.68.
cannot be shown to be the results of external teaching; as they are performed in an unlearnt condition and, as they possess the form of an intelligent action, the Nyāya system naturally interprets that they must be due to the recollections of similar actions in the past birth. Vidyābhūṣaṇa says in his commentary on the above mentioned sūtra "A newborn child manifests marks of joy, fear and grief. This is inexplicable unless we suppose that the child perceiving certain things in this life remembers the corresponding things of the past life. The things which used to excite joy, fear and grief in the past life continue to do so in this life. The memory of the past proves the previous birth as well as the existence of the soul."¹ This is one of the arguments forwarded to prove that the soul is enduring and persists in numerous births or survives the deaths of the body. The untaught actions of the children are explained by the present psychologists and biologists as 'instinctive' actions.

The endurance or persistence of the soul is proved also on the moral basis. Gotama says in the Nyāya Sūtras -- "If the body were soul, there should be release from sins,

¹ Vidyābhūṣaṇa S.C. -- The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama Sūtras No.3.p.68.
as soon as the body was burnt."\(^1\)

In the commentary Vidyā-

bhūṣaṇa says -- "If a person has no soul beyond his body he should be freed from sins when the body is destroyed. But in reality sins pursue him in his subsequent lives. Hence the body is not soul."\(^2\)

The moral law of retribution demands the endurance of the soul who is the doer of actions. The soul that does the action must be the same who should reap the fruits of those actions. The doctrine of Karma implies that the good actions get the good reward of them and the bad ones are followed by sufferings. It is said in the Bhāṣā Pariccheda that the soul is the substratum of merit and demerit in virtue of which it undergoes trans-migration by assuming different births for which it is suited. 

"(The soul is) the substratum of merit and demerit. It is perceived on account of possessing special qualities. The substratum of merit and demerit. The word 'soul' is to be supplied. (It is the substratum), because if the body be the substratum of these, then the results of actions done by a particular body cannot be experienced by another body."\(^3\)


2. Ibid.

The results of good and bad actions come to be attached to the soul and, in order to reap their fruits by experiencing them the soul has to pass from one physical body to another physical body, after the former is destroyed. The cause of transmigration is the adṛṣṭa or the unseen Karma force and it becomes possible because of the soul that endures through many such births. The existence of an imperishable and permanent soul has to be admitted on the moral grounds. The continuity of births cannot be explained in the absence of such a transmigrating soul. If the experiencer of the consequences of the actions is not the same as the doer, there will occur the fallacy of kṛtapraṇāśa and akṛtābhyaṅgama. There will be complete absence of the connection between the good actions and good results; bad actions and bad results. Goodness and badness of actions will lose their value because good or bad consequences may follow indiscriminately. There will remain, thus, no consistency between actions and their consequences and the law of causality in the moral field will be seriously challenged. It is likely to create anarchy in the moral sphere. It is said in the Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama — "This is, we reply, not so because it would lead us to acknowledge the consequences of actions not done by us."¹

Moral life will become bankrupt in the absence of the doctrine of Karma which has to be accepted only by inference and not on any actual verification as it is impossible.¹

The individual soul is thus a mere phase in the life of the eternal soul. The cycle of births or the phenomenon of transmigration implies the permanent or eternal existence of the soul. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas believe that the soul is eternal. The body is perishable and is destroyed at the death of the individual, but the soul migrates from the previous birth to the subsequent carrying with it its stock of the merit and demerit accumulated in its previous existence. KeśavaMiśra describes in the Tarkabhaṣā, the soul in the following way -- "He is different from the body and the senses, is different for each individual body, is all pervasive and eternal."² H.T.Colebrooke describes the soul in these systems in the following words -- "The individual soul is infinite; for whithersoever the body goes there the soul too is present. It experiences the fruits of its deeds; pain or pleasure. It is eternal because it is infinite;

for whatever is infinite is likewise eternal; as the ethereal element (ākaśa)."¹ KesavaMiśra also states in his Tarkabhāṣā -- "The soul (atman) is all-pervasive because of his activities everywhere; it means that he has the highest magnitude. Because of his all-pervasiveness he is eternal (nitya) like the ether (vyoma). He is different in each individual body because the differences of experiences of pleasure etc. ... The place of his enjoyment is body..."² Annambhaṭṭa in his Tarkasaṁgraha characterises jīva or the soul as "that which is the resort of the experiences like pleasure".³ The Nyāya system finds it necessary to imagine some such substance to which mental experiences are possible. No other thing, devoid of the soul can entertain experiences of pleasure, pain, willing etc. ... It is a special possession of human beings and is unique only with the human beings. Other inanimate things or the animate things like animals of the subhuman species cannot have such experiences. This capacity is a special possession of human beings and hence the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas deem it absolutely necessary to make a supposition of the existence of the soul as an

independent substance, unique in itself and different from others. Such a soul is no doubt all-pervasive and eternal. They believe in the two kinds of ātman. The supreme Self (Paramātman) and the individual soul (Jīvatman). The Supreme Self or the Paramātman is not only all-pervading and eternal but his knowledge is all-pervading. He is omniscient; while the individual soul is all-pervading and eternal but is one separately for each body. The self is that which has knowledge. The supreme self is devoid of pleasure and pain which are characteristic features of the lower soul or the individual soul (the Jīvatman).

The soul is the real doer of the actions and not the sense organs or the body, according to these systems. It is said in the Bhāṣā Pariccheda about the soul "The soul is the inspirer of the organs etc., for an instrument requires an agent." Viśvanātha Nyāya Pañcānan says in his commentary on the above Sūtra -- "The generic attribute of soulhood is inferred as the determinant of the inherent causality of pleasure pain etc..." "It is observed that cutting instruments such as an axe cannot produce any result without an agent.... Hence an agent over and above

1. Annāmbhaṭṭa -- Tarkasamgraha. p.17.
them is inferred.\textsuperscript{1} Thus, it is made clear here that the ultimate doer of all actions is the soul. The soul is the final source of energy that is absolutely necessary for an action. Moreover the material objects, though appear to be moving, do not move by themselves; they are not automovers. They do not possess the energy to move themselves spontaneously. They move due to some external force that is applied to them. All objects except the soul are passive or inert in themselves. Movement has to be caused in them from without. It is stated in the Nyāya Sūtras -- "The regularity and irregularity of possession demarcate the soul and matter."\textsuperscript{2} The sense of 'I' and 'my' is possessed only by intelligent beings and, never by any thing which is material and unintelligent. The power to voluntary action is possessed only by the immaterial or spiritual substance. Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his commentary upon the above mentioned Sūtra says -- "A material thing is by nature inactive but becomes endowed with activity when it is moved by a conscious agent."\textsuperscript{3} It is also said in the commentary of the Nyāya Sūtras which is commented by Vātsyāyana that "the mind

\begin{enumerate}
\item Madhavananda (Swami) -- Bhaṣa Pariccheda. Sūtra 47.pp.65,66.
\item Vidyābhūṣaṇa S.C. (Tr.) -- The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama. Sūtra 115.p.95.
\item Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
is not independent but it is governed by the conscious agent; hence attributes like desires etc. do not belong to it. As it is governed by other agent it does not possess any independence."¹ Thus it is the contention of the Nyāya system that the soul acts as the universal agent of all the actions and it uses all the material things as instrumental to it. It is also stated in the Bhāṣā Pariccheda -- "The soul is the inspirer of the organs etc...., for an instrument requires an agent."²

There are two ways of knowing the soul. One way is of knowing it by means of introspection or by the sense of 'Ihood', and the other is, by inference. The souls of others can be known by inference from their activities which are similar to ours and, which can be performed only by some such principle as we have in our soul. The Bhāṣā Pariccheda further contains the following passage regarding it. "It is to be inferred from its voluntary movements etc...., as a charioteer is from the motion of a chariot. It is the substratum of egoism, and is known only through the mind."³ The same point is made more elaborate in its commentary in the following way. "The existence of this

---

¹ Vātsyāyana (Com.) (Edited by Viśvanātha) -- The Nyāya Sūtras. p.256.
² Madhavananda (Swāmi) -- Bhāṣā Pariccheda. Sūtra 47.
³ Ibid. Sūtra 50. p.79.
soul in anothers body and the like is inferred from its voluntary movements etc. Pravṛtti (inclination) here means voluntary movement (ceṣṭā). Since it has in a way been already stated that knowledge, desire, effort (Prayatna), etc. do not abide in the body, and since voluntary movement is the outcome of effort, the soul which is possessed of effort, is inferred from its voluntary movements. .... As a charioteer etc. That is to say, although the motion of a chariot is not voluntary movement, yet the presence of a charioteer is inferred from it; similarly the soul of another is inferred from actions of the nature of voluntary movement.... Egoism is the feeling of 'I'. Its substratum or object is the soul, not the body etc. .... it is incapable of being perceived by any other organ."¹

"The body acts as the place or instrument of experiencing of the soul. It is said in the Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama -- "Body is the site of gesture, senses and sentiments."² Vidyābhūṣaṇa makes the place of the body clear in his commentary on the above Sūtra -- He writes -- "Body is

¹ Madhavananda (Swamī) -- Bhaṣā Pariccheda. Sūtra 50 (Com.) p.79.
² Vidyābhūṣaṇa S.C. (Tr.) -- The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama. Sūtra 1.1.11.
the site of gesture inasmuch as it strives to reach what is desirable and avoid what is hateful. It is also the site of senses for the latter act well or ill, according as the former is in good or bad order. Sentiments which comprise pleasure and pain are also located in the body which experiences them.\(^1\) The body serves as an indispensable means for the various experiences of the soul. It would be impossible for the soul to get any kind of psychical experience without a physical body. Body serves as an inevitable link in the process of enjoyment of pleasure because the organs with which we enjoy objects of the external world, are studded in the body. Frequently body is condemned to be vile by the lovers of the spirit but it is a real and hard fact which the Nyāya system recognises, that, without a physical body no mental or spiritual experiences become possible. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa summarises in brief in the following way. He writes -- "The ground or place of the experiences (Bhoga) of the soul is the body; the instruments of experience are the sense organs, the objects of experiences are the objects of sense organs and the experiences belong to the intellect or understanding (Buddhi) and the cause of experiences is the condition or

\(^1\) Vidyābhūṣaṇa S.C.(Tr.) -- The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama p.5.
tendency of the mind; it is either good or bad (pāpa puṇyātmika) and the defects in it like attachment etc. ... cause the origination of the body...."¹ It becomes thus clear that the ultimate source of energy and the ultimate substratum of all kinds of psychical experiences is the soul. It is the source of energy and acts as the final agent of actions and enjoyers of experiences, pleasurable or painful locating them in the intellect; as he is the doer of actions merit and demerit (dharma and adharma) belong to it and it revolves on the cycle of life by transmigrating from one body to another according to its moral desert; it acts as the permanent sustainer of psychical experiences and hence remembrances of the experiences of the past life become possible. It is infinite, unborn and undying, all-pervasive, but one for each separate body; it is at the root of all the mental experiences and uses the mind as his instrument of receiving experiences though in him the consciousness does not reside for ever because if he develops consciousness only when it comes to be associated with the external world through the senses with the help of the mind (manas).

How is the soul known by oneself? Is it known by us as we know the objects of the world in the form of 'this' or 'it'? The Naiyāyikas hold that the soul reveals itself to us in the form of our ego. It reveals itself to us as our 'I' or by our experience of 'Ihood'. (Ahampratyaya).

As Jayanta Bhaṭṭa remarks -- "The soul does not shine like a vessel (ghaṭa) by the knowledge of it generated in us; it shines by itself; it is self-luminous (svayaṃprakāśate). Consciousness is its natural property it is not produced in it by any other instrument...."¹ Thus the soul reveals itself to us as 'I' or the object of first person. We cannot know our soul as 'this' or 'that' object of the world, which reveals to us always in the third person. These two experiences are entirely different from each other and are also exclusive of each other. No other object except our own inner soul can reveal itself to us as 'I'. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa more elaborately describes it in his following verse. -- "Just like the vessel (ghaṭa) etc... the knowledge of happiness as this happiness (idam sukham) does not reveal to us; the awareness or experience

that 'I am happy' reveals in it our soul."\(^1\) The Bhāṣā Pariccheda also presents the same argument to establish the existence of one's soul. It states -- "It (the soul) is the substratum of egoism, and is known only through the mind."\(^2\) The soul serves as the abode of our sense of 'Ihood' or 'ego hood'. The soul is thus, revealed to the knower himself as his 'I' and as explained above the souls of others can be known by inference of it from their activities that are similar to our's. The existence of the soul can be inferred from its activities indirectly. It is true that no other state of consciousness in our mind can ever assume the status of ego-consciousness -- self consciousness. It is unique. The 'I' consciousness in us is a persistent principle. Without this 'I-sense' no knowledge of objects by memory will be possible. For remembering things I who remember must be the same who has perceived the same thing formerly sometime in the past. The I, therefore, must be the same identical entity in these varying experiences occurring even after considerably long intervals of time. Radhakrishnan remarks in

---


this respect as follows—"As a mere complex of sensational and affectional elements, no state of consciousness can be distinguished as mine or another's. The experience of another is not my experience, for my self is different from his self. — All our mental states, such as remembrance, recognition, awareness of the relative persistence of the self sympathy or consciousness of relation to other selves all these imply the reality of the self."¹ The Nyāya system recognises two ways of knowing the soul; the direct (pratyakṣa) and the indirect i.e. inference (aprtyakṣa). But a slight difference in regard to this can be pointed out in the case of the Vaiṣeṣikas. The Vaiṣeṣikas do not seem to recognise the direct knowledge (pratya­kṣa) of the self. Radhakrishnan refers to the Vaiṣeṣika Sūtras in the following passage which states that the Vaiṣeṣikas do not admit the Nyāya theory of the direct knowledge of the soul (ahaṁpratyayya) — "The Vaiṣeṣika theory of the soul is practically identical with that of the Nyāya, though a direct perception of the self where the self is both the perceiver and the perceived is not admitted (V.S.iii.2.6)."²

A clarification of the issue of the possibility of the

¹ Radhakrishnan S. — Indian Philosophy. Vol.II. pp.145,146.
² Annambhatta. (See Notes by Athalye and Bodas). p.144.
² Ibid. p.144.
knowledge of the soul by direct perception is given beyond
doubt by Messrs Athavale and Bodas in the notes attached
to Tarkasamgraha of Annambhatta. They state -- "The follow-
ers of Gotama hold that Jīva is perceptible by the mind,
because it is the object of such mental cognitions as "I
am happy" or "I am unhappy". The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that
jīva is not perceptible even mentally, because the cognition
'I am happy' refers not to the pure Ego, but to the quality
of pleasure and pain which thus, becomes the sign of the
existence of jīva. A still greater objection to the
perceptibility of soul is that he being the perceiver of
everything cannot perceive himself, the knower and the
known being always different. Jīva is only inferable.
Jīva may also be inferred from the existence of organs of
sense, or of qualities such as Buddhi which can reside in
soul alone."¹

From the realistic nature of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika
systems it seems more probable that these systems did not
take resort to God as the final cause of the world. The
system is constructed in such way that the whole world can
work without an external powerful authority. Moreover

¹. Annambhatta. (See Notes by Athalye and Bodas). p.144.
these systems postulate some eternal substances which are responsible for the creation of the world. These systems tried to explain the systematic and coherent working of the world and the cycle of birth, death and rebirth with the help of the unseen (adrṣṭa), the karma force which determines the nature of successive births in accordance with the accumulated merit and demerit of the individual souls in their previous lives. The desert or (adrṣṭa) thus tried to give system and coherence to the workings of the world and God’s existence was made to a very great extent unnecessary. So long these realistic systems tried to explain the working of the world in terms of atoms of the eternal substances in which movement is inherent. They tried to give a mechanical form to the operations of the world with the effect that an external agency in the form of God was made unnecessary and superfluous. It is disputable whether the Nyāya system admitted the existence of God right from the beginning or it was a result of interpolation by the later Naiyāyikas. However, a direct reference to the divine causality is obtained in the Nyāya Sūtra.\textsuperscript{1} S.Radhakrishnan says -- "While Vātsyāyana, 

\textsuperscript{1} Nyāya Sūtra. IV.1.19-21.
Uddyotakarma and Viśvanātha regard it as the Nyāya view, Ķācaspati, Udayana and Vardhamāna interpret it as a criticism of the Vedānta view, that God is the constituent cause of the universe.¹ Udayana thinks that the adṛṣṭa is not sufficient to explain the world; if God is not the creator of the souls and the substances, he thinks God is not the creator of the souls and the substances, he thinks God is necessary to regulate and control the operation of the adṛṣṭa and thus to supervise its working. The Vaiśeṣikas and the later Naiyāyikas do not dispute the existence of God, but seek to know His nature.

God is described as a self, as the 'supreme self' of a different category by Annambhaṭṭa. In Tarkasamgraha he distinguishes the two in the following way -- "The soul is the substratum of knowledge. He is twofold, Human and Supreme. Of these the Supreme Soul is the all powerful, omniscient God, devoid of pleasure and pain for He can see all the subtle atoms."² The supreme soul is omniscient. Knowledge is eternal with God.³ God is not perceptible as He does not possess any physical quality (rūpa) like colour etc. The Human soul and the Supreme soul have knowledge

¹. Radhakrishnan S.-- Indian Philosophy. Vol.II. p.165.
². Annambhaṭṭa -- Tarkasamgraha. p.12.
³. Ibid. p.12 -- Nityajñānadhitkaraṇatvamīśvaratvam.
in common. The working of the world cannot be explained in terms of the movements of the atoms and the adṛṣṭa which are unintelligent. The atoms and the adṛṣṭa being unintelligent cannot work out intelligent patterns of movements in the world. God works as the organiser of the world with the help of the eternally existing atoms and the desert. He combines them and actually carries on the affairs of the world.

God has personality but no body because he is not governed by the desert or Karma power which alone is the cause of the production of body. God possesses neither merit and nor demerit. He is free from misapprehension (mithyā jñāna). He is completely self-satisfied; all his desires are already fulfilled. Nothing remains for him to acquire; therefore, he is perfect. God is completely free from pleasure and pain. He has not created the world for his own pleasure for he is free from pleasure. The world is created by him out of his compassion for his people of the world who are like children to him. In fact the eternality of the atoms and the souls is incompatible with the creatorship of God. God acts as the final agent who uses the things of the world and the sense organs of the individuals as instruments. As God does not possess
a visible body of determined magnitudes, he is imperceptible
and he can be known by inference by cause and effect
relation. As a jar or a sprout which is an effect cannot
be come into existence without a cause that produces them,
so also the world, though extremely huge in form and
permanent because of the atoms which form it, must have
some cause who must have created it out of the already
existing eternal atoms and joined it to the souls. God
has the direct and close knowledge of the world as he
possesses omniscience and eternal intelligence and hence,
he does not need memory and inferential knowledge. The
Nyāya God or the Supreme Soul is not the all-pervading
spiritual reality of which we are only imperfect
manifestations, but he is outside men and outside the world
and acts only as moral governor and administrator of the
world whose omnipotence is limited by other eternal entities.

The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika systems recognise mind (manas)
as not only an independent entity but also as the ninth
substance. According to them for the unification of the
diverse states of mind some central agency is necessary and
thus the manas forms a link between the senses and the
soul. H.T. Colebrooke describes the manas or mind briefly
as follows — "Mind is single. It is the instrument which
effects the apprehension of pain, pleasure or interior sensations; and by its union with external senses, produces knowledge of exterior objects apprehended through them..."\(^1\)

In these systems the soul does not possess knowledge eternally. It is no doubt a substratum of consciousness but consciousness does not constitute its essential nature. Consciousness develops in it as a guṇa or quality when it comes to be associated with the external world through the manas and the body. Manas acts as an intermediary link between the soul and the sense organs. Radhakrishnan describes it in the following words -- "In its natural state the self is devoid of intelligence as in pralaya. It has cognitions of things when it is connected with body. Consciousness is sustained by the ātman, though it is not an essential or inalienable characteristic of it. By means of manas the soul knows not only external things but also its own qualities. Though the soul is all-pervading, its life of knowing, feeling and activity resides only where the body is."\(^2\) The mind is extremely subtle and hence, it is imperceptible. Every soul has its own manas. It is called the internal organ (antarindriyam). It is atomic

\^2 Radhakrishnan S. -- Indian Philosophy. Vol.II. p.190.
in size and it is a substance. It is also eternal but it is not pervasive for in that case one's emotions and thoughts will be experienced by all people as the mind will be a common possession of all. The mind is particular and specific for each individual person to experience pleasure, pain, volition, thoughts only for oneself privately. Annambhaṭṭa says -- "Mind is the instrumental organ for the attainment of pleasure etc.... It is one for each individual soul, eternal and of the atomic size."¹

Further it is stated in the commentary on it that, there are infinite minds as there are infinite number of souls, because each soul has one mind with it.² It cannot be all-pervasive like the soul, for in that case the manas cannot be conjoined to the soul by way of samavāya or coherence and hence an absurd condition of the rise of knowledge would arise, for two all-pervasive substances cannot be conjoined. Moreover if they are conjoined then it will be an eternal combination and, then knowledge will be always present, so that there will be no possibility of deep or dreamless sleep as knowledge will be eternal. If the mind has some intermediate magnitude or size (Madhyama


Ekasmin śarīre ekaikameva manāḥ.
parimāṇa) the mind or manas will face the difficulty of being non-eternal (anitya) for the fear of being destroyed sometime. Hence, the only possible size will be atomic. The absence of knowledge in deep dreamless sleep can be explained if the manas is atomic, for during the deep sleep the mind being atomic or minute enters the vein purītati and thus, all knowledge ceases to exist for that interval; when again the mind comes out of that vein, knowledge begins to operate."

Gotama says in his Nyāya Sūtras that "The mind is one on account of the non-simultaneousness of cognitions." Every one has his own mind because his knowledge is limited only for himself and also for the reason that all the knowledge does not make appearance simultaneously at one at the same time. In one following sūtras it is stated that -- "The appearance of simultaneousness is, due to the mind coming in contact with different senses in rapid succession like the appearance of a circle of firebrand." Thus simultaneity is mistaken for continuous succession of the states of consciousness. The Tarkabhaṣā says -- "That

3. Ibid. Sūtra 137.
which is an instrument of the soul for the acquisition of knowledge is the mind.... It is the cause of attaining pleasure etc. Due to its contact with the external object knowledge is acquired."¹ The manas has a peculiar function to perform. The main function of the manas is to attend to objects which are perceived by the sense organs. Even though the sense organs come to be connected to the external objects and they receive impressions of the external objects, their awareness does not arise in the perceiver if proper attention is not given to them. If the mind which takes the cognisance of objects by attending to them is absent, then though the senses are working and receive impressions from the external objects, the knowledge of those objects does not arise in the perceiver. Thus, the mind is that which attends to the objects of knowledge and, it is the real instrument of knowledge though senses are indispensable as the manas of acquiring knowledge of the external world. The mind as a separate entity has to be admitted to explain the memory of certain things which are not actually experienced by direct contact with them by the sense organs at a particular moment; but still their

¹. Miśrava Keśava -- Tarkabhaṣā. p.78.
remembrance can occur to us. Sometimes we actually do not hear or see certain sounds or colours, still we have lively mental experience or memory of them to such an extent as if we actually experience them. This leads to the inference of the existence of the mind. Another argument to prove the existence of mind and which is forwarded in the Vaiśeṣika system is the incapacity of the external sense organs to experience pleasure and pain. The sense organs act as the receivers of impressions of the objects of the external world. They convey impressions of objects to the mind but they do not themselves experience pleasure and pain. It is argued that if the external organs of sense like ear etc. experienced pleasure etc. it would mean that the blind and deaf can never acquire it. Mind is regarded as an independent substratum of the various mental states and acts as an independent entity by itself, enjoying a unique position. It can be reduced neither to the senses, nor to the buddhi nor to the soul.

Max Müller describes the role of the manas in the process of knowing in the following words -- "The Self is

-------------------------------
Śrotradyavyapare śṛtyutpattih
2. Ibid. See (Com.) p.154.
the knower, while the mind or Manas is only the instrument, (Karaṇa) of knowledge by which attention is fixed on one thing at a time .... Though there are many manifestations of Manas, such as memory, inference, verbal testimony, doubt, imagination, dreaming, cognition, guessing, feeling of pleasure, desire and all the rest, yet its distinguishing feature, we are told, is what we should call attention, or as Gotama explains it, 'the preventing of knowledge arising altogether'. Manas is therefore called the doorkeeper, preventing sensations from rushing in promiscuously and all at once."\(^1\) Thus manas is that which attends to objects and uses senses for knowing the external world. Every individual has his own manas. Manas cannot be all-pervading or vibhu, in that case one's experiences will be remembered by another person. It is said by Praśastapāda in his commentary on the Kaṇḍāda Sūtras -- "On the occasion of Devadatta's remembering he does not remember the memory (Smṛti) of Yajñadatta who has retained it from impressions."\(^2\)

The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika systems recognise 'Buddhi' or 'intellect' as a separate entity which is different from the manas. Buddhi or intellect, according to them, which

\(^{1}\) Max Müller -- The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. p.548.
\(^{2}\) Praśastapāda (Com.) -- Vaiśeṣika Darśanaṁ. (Kaṇḍāda Sūtrās). p.149.
reveals the objects perceived in the clearest possible forms. Swāmī Mādhavananda understands by Buddhi -- knowledge. He translates the 51st Sūtra in his Bhāṣā Pariccheda in the following way. -- "It is all-pervading and possesses knowledge and other qualities. Knowledge has two forms -- experience and recollection ...."\(^1\) The Buddhi according to these systems makes the objects of knowledge clear and weleat so that their meaning becomes clear. Max Müller describes the Buddhi as follows -- "If therefore, we translate Manas (mind), we must always remember its technical meaning in Indian Philosophy, and its being originally different from Buddhi, understanding, which might often be rendered by light or the internal light that changes dark and dull impressions into clear and bright sensations, perceptions, and knowledge in general, or by understanding at least so far as it enables us to transform and understand the dull impressions of the senses."\(^2\) From the above description it becomes evident that the buddhi in the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika systems is not an independent principle, a substance like the 'mind', but is subordinate to it. The mind can best be understood as the 'attention' or that

\(^1\) Madhavananda (Swāmī) (Tr.) -- Bhāṣā Pariccheda. Sūtra 51. p.79.

\(^2\) Max Müller -- Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. p.548.
which actively attends to the objects of knowledge systematically; and the mind finally understands the nature of things clearly by means of the buddhi or intellect or understanding. The buddhi acts as an instrument of the mind for clearcut understanding of the objects of experience. The buddhi thus may be useful to formulate clear images or concepts of things and relates them in such ways which adequately explain the functioning of the actual facts. It makes the acquired perceptions more articulate, elaborate or visible; it discovers the obscure meaning of the objects of knowledge by making the dull perceptions more manifest and meaningful. Max Müller compares the Śāmkhya-Buddhi with the Nyāya-Buddhi in the following passage -- "The Buddhi of the Śāmkhya is a cosmic principle independent of the self, and meant to account for the existence of the light of reason in the whole universe; while in the Nyāya philosophy it signifies the subjective activity of thought in the acquisition of knowledge, or in the lighting up and appropriating of the inert impressions received by the senses."¹

Manas is indispensable for the generation of knowledge

¹ Max Müller -- Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. p.549.
in the soul. From the role that manas plays in the act of knowing it may appear that knowledge therefore, resides in the manas. But it is not so. Gotama makes it clear beyond doubt, that knowledge ultimately resides in the soul and not in the manas. Manas may be an indispensable agent for the origination of knowledge, but, for that reason it should not be supposed that mind is the place in which the generated knowledge is located. Gotama writes -- "The mind is not the seat of knowledge ... on account of its being subject to an agent and owing to its incapacity to reap the fruits of another's deeds."\(^1\) The mind (manas) is not the seat of knowledge, desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain.\(^2\) The impressions of actions of an individual are left behind in the form of merit and demerit in accordance with which the nature of the body in the succeeding birth is determined. But in transmigration what passes on from one birth to the subsequent is not the manas but it is the soul. Hence knowledge, its effects in the forms of merit and demerit, recollection have to be located in the soul and not in the mind nor in the body.

\(^1\) Vidyābhūṣaṇa -- Nyaya Sūtras of Gotama. Sūtra 116. p.95.
\(^2\) Ibid. p.95.
Vidyābhūṣaṇa conclusively states the whole position regarding knowledge and its location, in his commentary on the next sūtra of Gotama. He says that though knowledge is not an inseparable property of the soul it does reside in the soul and not in any other psychical apparatus like the mind, intellect etc.... He writes -- "Knowledge is a quality which inheres in a substance. That substance is neither the body nor the sense nor the mind. It must therefore, be the soul. The body cannot be the abode of knowledge because it is a material substance like a pot, cloth etc. Knowledge cannot belong to the sense as the latter is an instrument like an axe. Had the sense been the abode of knowledge there could not be any recollection of things which were experienced by the sense before it was destroyed. If knowledge were a quality of the mind many perceptions could be simultaneous. But this is impossible. Hence, the abode of knowledge is not the mind, but it is the soul which is permanent so that it can perceive a thing now as well as remember one perceived in the past."¹ Thus if knowledge belonged to the sense organs knowledge will be transient and it would cease to exist when the sense organs would stop working and recollection

---

¹ Vidyābhūṣaṇa S.C. (Tr.) → Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama.

See Com. on Sūtra 117.
of past things would be impossible and in that case knowledge would not be acquired by those who are deficient in the powers of sense organs, so that deaf and blind persons would not understand anything. But it is contrary to facts. Knowledge would suffer from deformities in the events of deformities of the senses. Moreover sense perceptions are momentary and fleeting; knowledge also would not be permanent if it resided in the sense organs. For such reasons it has to be admitted that knowledge cannot be located even in the sense organs though they act as the most essential and indispensable instruments for the acquisition of knowledge by directly fetching impressions of the objects of the external world.

Mokṣa

In the beginning it is said that the inquiry is undertaken for the right understanding of the world and life. The very purpose of the study of the world is the attainment of liberation. The philosophical inquiry is guided by the desire to attain liberation. It is said that the motive and end of philosophical understanding of the world is liberation. It is said in the Sarvadarśana-samgraha "Indeed, liberation (Nīhīresyas) occurs because
of philosophical thinking."¹ It is believed by these systems that the miseries of the present life are caused by false knowledge of the world and the remedy to become free from the sufferings of this life lies in wiping away the false knowledge by the right knowledge of the world. Gotama says in his famous aphorism -- "Pain, birth, activity, faults and misapprehension, on the successive annihilation of these in the reverse order, there follows release." It clearly traces misapprehension or false knowledge as the root cause of all the sufferings. Misapprehension is the final cause of suffering and not its immediate cause. There is a long causal chain in which misapprehension acts as the final or the first cause and, at the end comes pain or suffering. In between the two there are many intermediate causes in the series. Vidyābhūṣāṇa says in his commentary on the above sūtra -- "Misapprehension, faults, activity, birth and pain, these in their uninterrupted course constitute the 'world'.² Release, which consists in the soul's getting rid of the world, is the condition of supreme felicity, marked by perfect tranquillity and not tainted by any defilement.

A person, by the true knowledge of the sixteen categories, is able to remove his misapprehensions. When this is done, his faults, viz. affection, aversion and stupidity, disappear. He is then no longer subject to any activity and, is consequently freed from transmigration and pains. This is the way in which his release is effected and supreme felicity secured.

1. The Nyāya system agrees with the Vedānta in holding misapprehension or ignorance as the root cause of all evil in the world.

Vātsyāyana in his commentary on the aphorisms of Gotama says -- that there are various kinds of misapprehension, like seeing the self in the non-selfish object, seeing happiness in pain, eternal in temporary etc.

Thus misapprehension consists in regarding the nature of things what it is not in actuality. It consists in attributing false qualities to things which do not possess them as their original qualities. It means some kind of distortion of the knowledge of things. Vātsyāyana in his commentary on the śūtras of Gotama further describes misapprehension or mithyā jñāna not simply as the absence of right philosophical knowledge but something positive

-------------------
something like infatuation out of which the world is generated. He writes -- "The infatuation of the sense of 'I' or 'Ego' is to feel the sense of Ihood in objects which are devoid of self. Egoism (ahaṁkāra) consists in seeing in the selfless or material things our ego." The misapprehension consists in ascribing the non-spiritual or material things (anātma) the sense of egohood. Those things which are not a part of our inner self are wrongly supposed to be a part of our self. We falsely identify ourselves with body, senses, manas, buddhi and regard that their sufferings also are our sufferings. We attach ourselves inseparably to them and feel pleased or pained by the satisfaction and dissatisfaction of them. We confuse our soul with the non-spiritual objects. The two are entirely different from each other. The soul can never be like the soulless or material object. They are categorically different from each other. When we include our body or mind in the idea of our 'soul' naturally, we identify ourselves with them and, as they are liable to frequent disappointments and sufferings we also suffer. Here the suffering is mistaken. In fact suffering cannot

1. Vātsyayana (Com.) Nyāya Sūtras -- by Gotama. (Sanskrit)

Mithyajñānam vai khalu moho.
belong to our innermost self.

Kesāvamiśra says that misapprehension means infatuation or delusion; it consists in the distortion of things i.e. in taking things to be what they are not in actuality; or to take things otherwise what they are.¹ Our attachment to body and the sense organs leads us to infatuation. It is also stated in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha that our attachment to the body is a result of our misapprehension of the real nature of it and from it all evils are generated.²

That individual who regards his body his soul and, thinks that his life comes to an end with the destruction of his body always remains replete with desires and is prompted to undertake activities by them. Those activities generate good or bad Karma or effects which ultimately decide the type of body that he will be having in the succeeding birth. Thus, the very generation of the physical organism becomes the root cause of all suffering. A man performs various activities so long as he is under the spell of his misapprehension that he is the body which enjoys pleasures and suffers the pains. But the moment he discriminates himself from his body he apprehends the real

¹. Misra Kesāvan -- Tarkabhāṣā. p.92.
². Sarvadarśanasamgraha. p.246.
nature of suffering and its cause. Gotama says in his Sūtra that "The body is produced as the fruit of our previous deeds (deserts)."¹ The union of the parents is only accessory or auxiliary to the production of the body. The real cause of the production of the body, therefore, lies in the effects of the acts of the past life of an individual. As are the acts so is the nature of the begotten body. Gotama holds the desert responsible for the production of the body. He says -- "Desert is the cause not only of the production of the body but also of its conjunction with a soul."² A mere body without its soul is never generated; a body without a soul is only a corpse. The moment a living body comes to birth it means it is associated with soul. The association of a soul with a particular body is thus caused by one's deeds in the past life; and the dissociation of the two also takes place when the Karma or the effect for the experience of which the body is created gets exhausted. Gotama further states that the soul and the body get dissociated with the exhaustion of the Karma. "And the separation between the soul and the body is effected by the termination of the deserts."³ The whole cycle of birth and death and the

¹ Vidyābhūṣaṇa S.C. -- The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama. Sūtra 3.2.64.
² Ibid. Sūtra 3.2.70. p.105.
³ Ibid. Sūtra 3.2.72. p.105.
continuity of it with the successive births is guided and regulated by the doctrine/Karma or by the desert of individuals. It is responsible also for maintaining the consistency of relation between the deeds and their effects. But for the idea of desert the correspondance between the acts and their results cannot be satisfactorily explained.

It is again a fact of our experience that we never have pure pleasure which is entirely free from the slightest tinge of pain. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika systems hold that pure pleasure cannot exist absolutely. Pleasure howsoever pure, is to some extent mixed with pain. The two are inseparable. One cannot enjoy only pleasure and pleasure throughout his life by keeping off from pain and, thus, cannot make his life worth living by making it happy through and through. Pleasure and pain are inseparable. One who seeks pleasure which is completely free from some pain which is usually associated to it, in this imperfect earthly life, he would come to complete grief and disappointment, for nowhere on the earth can there exist pleasure without pain. The earthly life (Samsāra) can never give us the absolute happiness; for the attainment of happiness (Sukha) itself requires a lot of work and labour, trouble and exhaustion which causes fatigue, worry
and physical and mental uneasiness. Thus, the acquisition of happiness involves much of pain and suffering and, moreover as we live in the space-time dimensions every event that we have here on this earth is transient. Every pleasurable experience that we have here, is bound to come to an end resulting into the loss of it. Thus after the particular pleasurable experiences are over, at the end we reach a non-pleasurable event. The body also is not capable of enjoying sermons and intellectual pleasures illimitably because of its physical limitations. However pleasant an experience may be, the body feels saturated with it at some time and it can no more derive pleasure from an object or situation which can still objectively yield happiness. After enjoying physical and mental pleasures because of its limited capacities the body feels exhausted and hence, it experiences fatigue and it no more wants the continuation of the pleasurable experience but it becomes eager to stop the pleasurable experience. An individual thus, can never enjoy continuous and unending happiness with his limited capacities. All pleasurable experiences are bound to lead ultimately to non-pleasurable experience which either is a void or sometimes painful due to excess of pleasures. Such pleasures cannot bring to
man the everlasting happiness and satisfaction. S. Radhakrishnan writes regarding this -- "Pain, the cause of uneasiness, is the sign that the soul is not at rest with itself. The highest good is deliverance from pain and not the enjoyment of pleasure, for pleasure is always mixed up with pain." ¹

All pain or suffering arises out of activity which becomes possible only when body exists. Thus suffering is inevitably related to the birth of the physical body of an individual. S. Radhakrishnan expresses the relation of pain with activity and body in the following passage -- "Pain (duḥkha) is the result of birth (janma), which is the result of activity (pravṛtti). All activity, good or bad, binds us to the chain of Samsāra and leads to some kind of birth, high or low .... The activity is due to the defects of aversion (dveṣa), attachment (rāga) and stupidity (moha). Aversion includes anger, envy, malignity, hatred and implacability. Attachment includes lust, avarice, avidity and covetousness. Stupidity includes misapprehension, suspicion, conceit and carelessness. Stupidity is the worst since it breeds aversion and attachment. Through

these defects, we forget that there is nothing agreeable
or disagreeable to the soul and come to like and dislike
objects. The cause of these defects is false knowledge
(mithyājñāna) about the nature of the soul, pain, pleasure
etc... So long as we act, we are under the sway of attach-
ment and aversion and cannot attain the highest good."¹
The nature of activity and attachment and pain remains the
same inspite of the nature of objects with which they
develop their reactions. S.Radhakrishnan says -- "The
hatred of pain is still hatred and the attachment to
pleasure is still attachment and, so long as these are
operative, the highest good is beyond our reach."² It
becomes evident from this passage that root cause of all
evil is the existence of the physical body of an indivi-
dual which itself is generated as a result of one's activ-
ities in the past birth. The body and activities are
thus the mutual causes of each other and they form a
vicious circle. Gotama Sūtra itself states -- "Birth is
a pain because it is connected with various distresses."³
In his commentary on the above Sūtra, S.C.Vidyābhūṣaṇa
writes -- "Birth is stated to be a pain because it signifies

¹ Radhakrishnan S. -- Indian Philosophy. Vol.II.p.162.
² Ibid. pp.162,163.
³ Vidyābhūṣaṇa S.C. (Tr.) The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama.
our connections with the body, the senses and the intellect which bring us various distresses. The body is the abode in which pain resides, the senses are the instruments by which pain is experienced and the intellect is the agent which produces in us the feeling of pain. Our birth as connected with the body, the senses and the intellect is necessarily a source of pain.\(^1\)

To live means to act in some way because life itself means the capacity to act. The continuous cycle of birth, activities, acquisition of Karma, death, next birth and death forms the ever revolving wheel of the Sāṁsāra. And liberation means getting oneself freed from such ever revolving wheel of life. It consists in stopping for ever the wheel by eliminating the changes of the formation of a new body by exhausting the previous Karma (Saṅcita Karma) and by not accumulating any new Karma that would lead to a further birth. It mainly consists in freeing oneself from pain. Gotama says in his Sūtra that liberation means complete freedom from pain and suffering.\(^2\) Gotama says further in his next Sūtra that the state of release is absolutely free from distress as that of dreamless sleep.

The Sūtra runs as follows — "As there is no distress in a person who is sound asleep and sees no dream, so there is no association of troubles in one who attains release." ¹

Here the term distress or Kleśa is used in the sense of moral depravity according to Nyāya.

Commenting upon the Sūtra of Gotama that states that there is absence of a body in our release Vidyābhūṣaṇa says — "Our merits and demerits having already been exhausted, we cannot get a body after we have attained release. Release is the perfect freedom from all sufferings; it consists in a complete destruction of all the seeds and seats of suffering." ²

Liberation or mokṣa is known as Apavarga in the Nyāya system. Colebrooke describes the Nyāya liberation thus — "Deliverance from pain is beatitude; it is absolute prevention of every sort of evil; reckoned, in this system of philosophy, to comprehend twenty-one varieties of evil, primary or secondary; viz. one body (śarīram), the six organs of sense (śaḍindriyaṇi), six objects (viṣaya) of sensation, six sorts of apprehension and intelligence

2. Ibid. Sūtra 45. p.138.
(ṣadbuddhayāḥ), one pain or anguish and the last one is pleasure."¹ All those agents who are directly and indirectly connected with activity and pleasure and pain completely disappear in the state of liberation. The very absence of the body makes every movement which leads to activity and when no activity good or bad is possible, naturally it bears no results which result into pain and pleasure, adharma and dharma and thus leads to the cessation of rebirth and pain in the future. It thus leads to a state of utter painlessness in the future also. Kesāvamīśra mentions in his Tarkabhāṣā the twenty-one primary and secondary varieties of evil, and states that liberation consists in the absolute negation of all of them.² It is frequently imagined that liberation is a state of perfect happiness and joy. The happiness and joy which we obtain here in the earthly life is imperfect as it is usually eclipsed by pain and sufferings; therefore, people cherish a fond hope that in the state of liberation happiness would be completely free from pain, joy from disappointment. The happiness that would be obtained is completely pure and everlasting. But the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas

do not support this idea of liberation. In the Nyāya-liberation there will be utter absence of pain and suffering and so also that of happiness and pleasure. They cannot abstract pleasure from pain and hence cannot imagine pure pleasure devoid of all pain and hence do not hold that in liberation pleasure or happiness of any sort exists. Liberation here means a state of painlessness as well as pleasurelessness. Kesava Miśra says -- "Pleasure being associated with pain is equivalent to pain. Their association means their inseparability. Just as honey mixed with poison becomes poison so becomes pleasure pain when mixed with the latter."¹ Liberation is a state of neither pleasure, nor pain and all kinds of hopes, and even vague expectations completely disappear. It is a state of indifference and neutrality. Max Muller describes it in the following passage -- "This summum bonum is called by Gotama Nihsreyasa, literally that which has nothing better, the nonplus ultra of blessedness. This blessedness, according to the ancient commentator Vātsyāyana, is described as consisting in renunciation with regard to all the pleasures of this life, and in the non-acceptance of, or indifference to any rewards in the life to come..."² It is free from every kind of desire and

¹. Miśra Kesava—Tarkasamgraha. p.92.
². Max Muller -- The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. p.484.
craving, for it produces bondage and thus one's freedom is lost by being entangled in their meshes. No passion can exist in the state of liberation as it leads astray the soul from its real state of peace. The liberated person is said to have fulfilled all his desires. But the Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha says "the 'fulfilment of desires' here means 'absence of all the desires.'" In liberation when there cannot be the desire of the person who is devoid of the body and senses, how can there be the fulfilment of desire?"\(^1\)

Vātsyāyana in his commentary states -- "In liberation the seed of all pain and the resort or dwelling place of pain is destroyed, hence there is complete emancipation of pain; pain cannot originate without a seed and cannot exist without a resort."\(^2\)

Thus the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas advocate the uprooting of the first and ultimate cause or seed of suffering. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa states in his Nyāya Mañjarī "The pain as effect is destroyed when its cause that produces it is destroyed. If its cause exists in the successive births, pain always exists. Therefore the tendency (pravṛtti) which produces the pain in many births deserves to be destroyed."\(^3\)

After making a thorough analysis of the occurrence of pain, its root cause is traced to misapprehension or false notions about the nature of the soul and the reality. In the removal of such misapprehension lies the hope of the attainment of liberation.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa states in his Nyāya Mañjarī that liberation is to be achieved by the complete eradication of all the nine qualities of the self, i.e. intelligence (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), desire (icchā), hatred (dveṣa), effort (prayatna), the impressions of merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma).¹ In a verse, further he clearly states that so long as the qualities like passions etc. of the self are not eradicated, the entire destruction of pain cannot be imagined.² Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is justified in emphasizing the need of the eradication of the qualities of the self which are psychological and bondage consists essentially in the experience of them. If bondage is not felt or experienced, then all the external material powerful chains and restrictions will be incapable to put a person into bondage. Bondage implies the mental experience

---

¹ Jayanta Bhaṭṭa -- Nyaya Manjari. p.508.
² Ibid. p.508. Yavadätmaguṇaḥ sarvē nocchinnā vāsanādayaḥ, tavadātyantikī duḥkha vyāvṛttirnāvakalpatē.
or the sense of being bound in certain limitations. The qualities of the self are essentially psychological, and unless the experience of bondage is completely wiped off from the mind, liberation or emancipation will not be felt and if it be not felt it is as good as bondage. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa thus, gives quite an appropriate description of the state of liberation. These mental ties or bondage can be broken entirely only by enlightenment, or by proper apprehension of the nature of the soul and the reality. The path to liberation lies through philosophical understanding of the self and the world. Proper philosophical apprehension of the self and nature acts as an antidote against misconception (mithyājñāna) which is the root cause of all evil and pain. H.T.Colebrooke describes the process of the attainment of liberation in his following passage -- "This liberation from ill is attained by soul, acquainted with truth (tatva), by means of holy science, diverted of passion through knowledge of the evil incident to objects; meditating on itself; and, by the maturity of self-knowledge, making its own essence present; relieved from impediments; not earning fresh merit or demerit by deed done with desire; discerning the previous burden of merit or demerit, by devout contemplation; and acquitting it through compressed endurance of its fruits; and thus (previous acts being
annulled, and present body departed and no future body accruing), there is no further connexion with the various sorts of ill, since there is no cause for them. This, then, is prevention of pain of every sort; it is deliverance and beatitude.¹ This is in general the broad idea of the way proposed by the Nyāya System for the attainment of liberation.

Vātsyāyana also describes in his commentary the stages of the attainment of liberation and, shows the causal link of the various factors that lead to final liberation. He writes -- "When the misapprehension (mithyājñāna) disappears, because of its disappearance faults (doṣa) also disappear, with the disappearance of the faults disappear the tendencies to activities (pravṛtti), with the disappearance of the tendency disappears birth (janma) and with birth (janma) disappear pain and in the disappearance of pain lies the absolute liberation (apavarga) or final beatitude (niḥśreyas)."² Thus the propounders of these systems hold misapprehension (mithyājñāna) responsible for causing in us wrong ideas about our soul and the reality and, they advocate the removal of the misapprehension to achieve complete

freedom from pain and suffering by removing the intermediary proximate causes -- The Advaita Vedānta also advocates the removal (nescience) under the spell of which we think wrongly, act wrongly and suffer due to mistaken identification with those things which do not form a part of our real innermost self.

Max Müller says regarding the attainment of liberation -- "... the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems though they also aim at salvation, are satisfied with pointing out the means of it as consisting in correct knowledge, such as can only be obtained from a clear apprehension of the sixteen topics treated by Gotama, or the six or seven categories put forward by Kaṇāda. These two philosophies, agreeing as they do among themselves, seem to me to differ very characteristically from all the others in so far as they admit of nothing invisible or transcendent (Avyakta) whether corresponding Brahman or to Prakriti. They are satisfied with teaching that the soul is different from the body, and they think that, if this belief in the body as our own is once surrendered, our sufferings, which always reach us through the body, will cease by themselves."¹ Thus

¹ Max Müller -- The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. p.487.
according to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika systems the knowledge of the fundamental categories of existence and the basical elements of the world is necessary for the attainment of liberation. The real understanding of the nature and origin of the things with which we falsely identify ourselves and by the sufferings of which we suffer, removes from our mind the uncalled for grief and the sense of deprivity which make life miserable and unbearable.

It is not sufficient according to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika systems to break contact with an existing body. The physical body disappears also with the destruction of the world (Pralaya) also, but therefore, it does not become equivalent to the state of liberation; for the very simple reason that there is every possibility of its retracing to the original condition of the worldly life from the state of Pralaya. The possibilities of returning back of the soul to the worldly life have not completely exhausted themselves, but they remain dormant, ready to actualise at any opportune moment; while liberation means complete negation and exhaustion of such possibilities of returning of the soul to the life of the world. The liberated soul becomes free eternally not to relapse into its original state. It is liberated for ever as it has exhausted all
his accumulated Karma (sañcit karma), remains exhausting the Karma that has already begun its operation in the present life (the prārabdha karma) and due to complete psychological detachment to the objects of experience it no more accumulates new Karma and hence, the possibilities of his future birth are nullified. One revolves and continues to revolve on the wheel of birth and death in the worldly life as long as one's Karma does not cease to operate. The desert is the cause of rebirth.¹ When the original stock of the accumulated Karma is exhausted and when no new Karma is accumulated by practising detachment and aversion towards the objects of experience, one need not continue his worldly existence for ever. His chances of assuming future birth get nullified and he has to lead his present life in order to exhaust the Karma whose fruition is already begun. He has to wait for its exhaustion in its normal course. Thus liberation comes in its final form when the past, present and future Karma is exhausted for ever, by practising the Yoga also.

Frequently, the state of liberation is depicted to be one of positive immense, pure, unadulterated and unending

¹. Vidyābhūṣaṇa S.C. -- The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama. Sūtra 3.2.64. p.103.
happiness. But the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika systems do not support this view. They describe liberation, on the contrary, negatively as a state of utter painlessness. Max Müller writes -- "Lastly, the Apavarga (bliss) of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems seems entirely negative, and produced simply by the removal of false knowledge. Even the different names given to the supreme bliss promised by each philosophy tell us very little. Mukti and Mokṣa mean deliverance, Kaivalya, isolation or detachment, Nihsreyas, non plus ultra, Amrita, immortality, Apavarga, delivery. Nor does the well known Buddhist term Nirvāṇa help us much."¹

Liberation according to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas seems to be completely free from any element of positivity. It is devoid of merit as well as demerit (adharma). As it is entirely free from sin at the same time it is also free from puṇya or good works. It is negative in its character in so far as nothing remains in that state. The Nyāya soul does not intrinsically possess consciousness as a part of its basic nature. It is free from sentience and even consciousness. The soul in its original and natural state, is therefore, devoid of consciousness knowledge. Udanjanācārya says in his Lakṣaṇāvali "The soul is absolutely

¹ Max Müller -- The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. p. 488.
devoid of knowledge. Knowledge takes its resort only as its attribute."¹ The Nyāya system thus, clearly holds that in the state of liberation there cannot exist any trace of any psychical character either in the form of knowledge or sentience, desire or effort, pleasure or pain if it is a state of the realisation of the soul in its natural and real form since all such psychical attributes arise in the soul only after it is connected to the physical body. Max Muller brings out its negative character in his following remarks -- "If, therefore, good works continue, there will be rewards for them, in fact there will be paradise, though even this would really have to be looked upon as an obstacle to real emancipation. Nothing remains but a complete extinction of all desires, and this can be effected by knowledge of the truth only. Therefore, knowledge of the truth or removal of all false notions, is the beginning and end of all philosophy, and of the Nyāya philosophy in particular. The first step towards this is the cessation of Ahamkāra, here used in the sense of personal feelings, such as desire for a beautiful and aversion to a deformed object. Desire therefore has to be eradicated and aversion also."² But though it is a negative state from which all

¹ Udayanacārya -- Lākṣaṇavālī. p.7.
² Max Müller -- The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. p.558.
sentience and psychical experiences remain absent, the Nyāya philosopher does not make liberation equivalent to the Buddhist state of Nirvāṇa which is void or negation of every possible existence. There is a difference between the two. The Buddhist negation is thorough-going and they negate every existence in the final state of Nirvāṇa in which nothing but nothingness remains. But as Max Müller says in the final state of liberation in the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika systems the eternal particles of the eternal substances (dravyas) exist. Max Muller writes -- "There cannot be annihilation because Aṇus or smallest parts are realities."¹

The state of liberation in the Nyāya System is conveniently likened to the state of a stone (pāśāṇa kalpa) due to the absence of knowledge from it.² It is but natural to regard such a lifeless and unconscious state equivalent to the lifeless state of a stone. But in the stone can never occur the various psychical attributes like knowledge, desire, pain, pleasure, effort and volition of the soul. The soul possesses the unique capacity or potentiality to possess or develop in suitable circumstances the above characteristics. The soul is therefore, entirely different

¹ Max Müller -- The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. p.558.
in kind and power from the stone. The simile of stone is too inadequate to express the real condition of the soul in the state of liberation. Th. Stcherbatsky quotes from Nyāyasāra (p.40) the following passage in reply to the above objection raised against the Nyāya liberation -- "But", says the author, "Wise men do not exert themselves for bliss alone. Experience shows that they also exert themselves to escape pain, like even they, e.g. "avoid being stung by thorns." -- Phenomenal life being here comparable to pain, the result is that the annihilation of it alone is the ultimate aim of man on earth. This ultimate annihilation and this lifeless substance receive the epithet of the place of Immortality (amṛtyu-padam), the same epithet which final annihilation receives in early Buddhism." ¹ Though the Nyāya liberation is negativistic, it is noteworthy that the Nyāya system ultimately leaves at least some state of existence, though stone like, to the soul, which is not found even so much in the Buddhist passion for universal annihilation of every thing in the state of their Nirvāṇa as it is pointed out by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his Nyāya Mañjarī.²

¹ Stcherbatsky -- The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa. p.59.
What ceases to exist in the state of liberation, according to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas is pain and the various states of consciousness and not the soul itself nor in the least the eternal particles of the ultimate substances, which enjoy everlasting existence.