In the preceding chapters, I have explained some major topics connected with śabda which have attracted the attention of various scholars. The last chapter sums up the important conclusions arrived at by making a comparative study of the major issues connected with śabda.

In Indian Philosophy, except the Vaiśeṣika and cārvāka, all the systems give an independent status to śabda and its validity. Śabda has a very important place in the universe. It is the unfailing valid means of knowledge. It is the utterance of infalliable and absolutely truthful persons. All other forms of knowledge are subordinate to it. Hence the acceptance of śabda as a pramāṇa has a unique place in the linguistic speculation in India.

The purpose of all philosophical systems in India is to prepare ourselves for the inquiry into the goals of life. Language has been one of the major tools for philosophers. Though Indian philosophers are aware of the relation between philosophy and language, even from the vedic period; later śabda emerges as a separate means of valid knowledge. Right from the vedic seers down to the present
age, Indian mind has pondered over the problems related to śabda examining all aspects of language.

Various scholars especially the great thinkers of India, deeply thought about the śakti or power of the sound uttered. Indian scholars scrutinize many details of language, sound, word, sentence, meaning, suggestive sense, correct and incorrect words, the purpose of sound and they establish many theories. Western scholars also accepted and appreciate these theories. Those who live in an atmosphere where there is no freedom of speech began to understand the value of freedom of expression and the strength of words.

In our country, śabda and śabda - vyāpāra dealt with according to different systems demand a critical study. It provides great scope for further studies in this field. Epistemological systems like Nyāya, Mīmāṃsa and Vaiśkaraṇa have analysed śabda and śabdārtha in a methodical and scientific way. Newer versions of these systems, Navyas, have contributed many significant theories comparable to many modern scientific theories of linguistics and philosophy.

The śabdakhaṇḍa of Muktāvali reviews several problems related to śabda. Viśvanatha - pañcānana's contribution in this direction is solid and profound. After a complete study of the śabdakhaṇḍa, we arrive at clear conclusions about the importance of śabda. Many concepts and theories like sphoṭa and anvitābhidhāna etc. can be compared with similar ideas in western philosophy.

5:1 - Distinction between Eastern & Western concept of philosophy

Philosophy means discovering the true nature of a thing. In a broad manner we may say 'to know a pot as pot and to call a pot, a pot', is philosophy. Indian
philosophy is basically a continuous tradition of mostly impersonal ideas leading to the ideal of life while Western philosophy deals primarily with the personal ideas of individual philosophers. According to Indian philosophical tradition, empirical knowledge is to be acquired from sense-organs while in Western conception, knowledge is to be obtained by pure intellect.\(^1\) Philosophy in India is not only theory, but also practice. It is not only a view of life, but also a way of life. Hence all philosophical systems in India are committed to the view that there is unity of theory and practice. Also philosophy in the Indian tradition is value-oriented. Excepting the Cārvāka school, all other philosophical systems consider liberation (mokṣa) as the highest value.

Besides the above, there is also a clearly visible difference in the methods adopted by philosophers in the East and the West. The Indian dārśanikas however innovative they may be, never claim that they themselves have propounded anything; rather they will always endeavour to show their allegiance to the tradition in the form of veda, āgama, former ṛṣis, ācāryas or sages. According to Indian philosophical tradition, mere reasoning cannot lead one to the accomplishment of goal, it has to be supported by faith in the faculty of others.\(^2\) But, Western philosophers tend to claim that they are pioneers of new ideas, theories or doctrines.

From the above mentioned views of East & West, we can say that darśana in Indian tradition is a continuous flow of concepts towards the final aim where in various strands are joined, inter related and inter twined. But the Western philosophical tenets are like a variety of flowers, albeit in one garden, each offering its beauty and fragrance to the other; but claiming to be separate and independent. This is the basic distinction of tendency in mind of Eastern and Western philosophers.
It must also be noted that the Indian philosophical tradition has always been directly related with life and living practices while philosophy in the Western tradition has mainly been intellectually oriented in the sense that it is held to be the 'love of wisdom'. Therefore even though some philosophers in the West have been high intellectuals who propounded great theories, these could not continue for long and came to be contradicted and forgotten in due course of time. Also Indian philosophers have realized the truth, while the Western philosophers have only spoken about the truth. This is very clear from the book 'Paśčātyatattvaśāstretīḥāśaḥ'. In India, though the philosophical traditions are as old as the vedas, it appears as if these traditions are in the prime of youth with their doctrines and arguments which are as relevant today as they were in the past. So we can conclude that the new trends in philosophy which we notice in the West are to be found in the philosophical traditions of this country with the result that we can claim that the new is in the old and that the old can sit comfortably with the new.

5:2 - Concepts of East & West - Similarities & Dissimilarities

India has been a centre of linguistic activity and hence in the East, the evolution of linguistic analysis was not the same as in the West. Both the two, East and West have grown and developed independently of each other. They have different orientations of their own. They pose different questions propound different theories. There are many concepts in Indian philosophy of language which are unknown to Western analysts like the concepts of sphaṭa, apoha, anvētābhidhāna, avacchedakata etc. These concepts do not fall within the field of modern analysis and have no exact synonyms in English. These concepts
cannot be made easily accessible to the English readers because they have lack of knowledge in this field.

We can see that together with the development of the science of Linguistics, Logic and Epistemology not only the Eastern philosophers but also Western Philosophers like Urban, Ayer, Russell, Cassirer and Wittgenstein; Linguists like De Saussure, Ogden and Ullmann; Rhetoricians like Richards and Empson; other Psychologists and Anthropologists came to have face various problems in connection with sentence and its meaning. Among these the following are the main problems - ie the function of words in conveying the meanings, the meaning of meaning, the syntactico - semantical relation between the individual word meanings, the nature of the total sentence meaning and its constituent parts etc.

5:2:1 - Concept of Language

In the East, the 'language' as a concept is as old as Indian culture itself; but in Western thought, the concept of language and meaning was not discussed at all prior to the twentieth century 'linguistic turn'.

Through his theory of 'Ideas', Plato made significant contribution to the analysis of 'meaning'. J.F. Staal, while writing on 'Sanskrit philosophy of Language' very aptly observes that "at times almost excessive preoccupation with language on the one hand and with philosophy on the other, may indeed be regarded as a characteristic of Indian civilization"4

In the view of the Philosophers in the East and West, 'language' is an important concept for philosophical speculation. Bhartṛhari, the author of Vākyapadīya would have liked to define man as a 'languageing' animal.5
Similarly Aristotle defined man as a 'Social' animal. Because man cannot live without a society; and hence society is no society without the bond of linguistic communication. Therefore language is the anchor - sheet of man's individual and social existence.

5:2:2 - Important aspects of language (śabda or word)

Many examples⁶ represent extreme importance of language given by Indian Grammarians and Philosophers. Over and above it, the scholars from West are of a piece with the orientalists, regarding the divinity of language (word).

Coward quotes the opening verse from St. John's Gospel Biblical saying - 'In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God and the word was God'. K.K. Raja pointed out that to explain the manifold aspects of language behaviour, Sanskrit Grammarians and the Rhetoricians devoted much thought to the problem of linguistic philosophy and general linguistics and evolved different theories.

But the writers in the West, while recognizing the importance of Paṇini's method in the formal analysis of Sanskrit language into a system of roots, stems and suffixes and acknowledging their indebtedness to Paṇini in the matter of formal analysis have not yet paid enough attention to the Indian theories about the various aspects of meaning.

5:2:3 - Relation between word and meaning

All the Indian Grammarians, Philosophers and Naiyāyikas accept the direct relationship between word and its meaning.
The same idea is accepted by Western Linguists that there is a direct relationship between significant and signifie.

Regarding the representation of this relationship Ogden and Richards have shown it through a semiotic triangle⁸ which is as follows.

![Semiotic Triangle Diagram]

Ullmann, in about 1950, made an inventory of this evolution in an excellent synthesis and centered on the triangle of name concept thing.⁹

![Sense Triangle Diagram]

According to the Ullmann's view, the problem of meaning will be as follows :-

Suppose a person 'x' wants to know the meaning of 'gauḫ' (cow) then the process will be :-
The indication of hands show that there is nothing before or after or in other words there is no specific order. Word, Sense and Object are interlinked by a very close relationship.

According to the Indian grammarians, the former is the 'prākṛta - dhvani' and the latter is the 'Vaikṛta - dhvani'. The Mīmāṁśakas call the former a pattern of the permanent 'Varṇas' and the latter is called 'dhvani'.

The Naiyāyikas consider the former as a 'class (jati') of which the latter is an 'instance'. Thus, the speech situation can be represented as a rectangle rather than the usual triangle.
In this diagram, Direct relation is only between A and B. Relations between C and D, C and B, A and D - these are all indirect and imputed.

Here we can see that '-' line shows the direct relation and '...' line shows the indirect relation.

In the above diagram, the upper portion give De Saussure's analysis, and the portion ABD refers to the Ogden - Richards triangle.

Thus in the opinion of Ogden and Richards, as soon as the word (symbol) is uttered, the mental form of the thing meant, which they call thought or reference, is perceived and not the thing meant (referent) itself.

Therefore, the direct relation is between the word and the mental form (thought or reference) and not between the word and the referent.

With the help of the above mentioned rectangle, Dr. K. Kunjunni Rāja has made clear that De Saussure and the ancient Indian Scholars also held the same view.

5:2:4 - Power of words

Indian Aestheticians hold that words have three meanings : - namely,

Abhidhā (the primary meaning)

Lakṣanā (the secondary meaning)

Vyañjanā (the tertiary meaning)

Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa are of the opinion that the greatness of poetry varies directly in proportion to the quantum of suggestiveness found in it.
In the West, the chief distinction established is between the denotative and the connotative powers of words.

In their opinion, the dictionary meaning is not enough to interpret great works of literature or to write really well. The poet has to make up for deficiencies of language by violating the lexical meaning of words, by exploiting their connotative powers in addition to their denotative ones.

Empson calls it 'ambiguity', Cleanth Brooks 'Paradox' and Abercrombie 'Value'.

The Indian Aestheticians have made a deeper, subtler and more thorough analysis of the relationship between words and their meanings, than the Western Aestheticians.

The latter are aware of the problem and have used practically all kinds of Lakṣana; but their discussion is not exhaustive.

Similarly concept of Vyañjanā as adumbrated by Ānandavardhana has been richly explored by theoreticians and practising poets in the West; where as the concepts of Abhidhā and Lakṣanā have been more fully explored in India not only by Aestheticians but by Logicians as well.

I.A. Richards in his 'practical criticism' says that there are four kinds of meaning and each of them contribute to the 'Total meaning'.

One of them is 'sense - which is equivalent to Abhidhā (the primary meaning).

The categories of meaning enunciated by I.A. Richards namely - sense, feeling, tone and intention may not be equivalent to the categories evolved by Indian aestheticians; but the move seems to be in the right direction.
Intention, as a category set up by Richards, has relevance in the context of Lakṣanā as defined by Indian Aestheticians. But Richard's concept of intention is wide enough to cover even suggestiveness.

According to Indian aestheticians, a metaphor corresponds to the concept of gauṇi lakṣanā.

Aristotle uses the term in a wider sense so as to include all kinds of Lakṣana, not merely those which are based on identity.

Aristotle, like Indian aestheticians, thinks of the extension of meaning as the first condition under which Lakṣanā operates. According to him, the second meaning must draw its sustenance from the primary meaning. If they are not connected, they will cease to be effective and almost certainly appear meaning less.

5:2:5 - Understanding the meaning

Many European and American scholars like Bloomfield, Malinowsky, Sinclair etc. recognise the importance of context in understanding the meaning of a word.

E.D. Seliniourt confirms this view in his Oxford Lectures on Poetry, says "words are intellectual symbols, and they are indeed nothing else, so long as they are imprisoned in the dictionary, but as soon as they escape into a living sentence they gain individuality from the speaker's voice and the expression upon his face, and catch subtle shades of meaning; which no dictionary can define, a meaning not purely intellectual, and capable of infinite variation according to the genius of him that uses them. We say that such language suggests more than it expresses".

From all of these we can see that there are certain similarities and dissimilarities among the concepts of East and West.
5:3 - Major issues connected with śabda - An analytical survey

There are certain issues connected with śabda which have absorbed the interest of Indian thinkers since as early as the vedic times.

To analyse and to compare their theories, here provide a comprehensive account of śabda, artha, śabda vyāpāra and śabda bodha according to the three different systems viz- grammar, logic and ritualism.

5:3:1 - śabda (word)

In sanskrit language, there are two terms namely 'śabda' and 'pada' which represent words in two distinct stages of linguistic development. Indian epistemologists have presented a rich and sophisticated analysis of śabda and pada.

5:3:1:1 - Among the Vaiyākaraṇas Pāṇini defines pada as that which ends in either declensional or conjugational affix ie 'suptiñantam padam'.

According to Vātsyāyana, a non-inflected word (apada) should never be used in language 'apadam na prayuñcīta.' That is to say that only an inflected word (pada) and never simply a nominal base-word (śabda) should be used in language. Therefore a mere base-word, unless accompanied by inflections, has no standing at the syntactical level and therefore cannot be used in the language as a syntactical unit.

We can see that Pāṇini and Vātsyāyana have clearly distinguished 'pada' in the sense of only an inflected word that is competent to be used in language as a syntactical unit expressing such syntactical relations as subject, object etc. Thus in their opinion the use of the term 'śabda' for expressing the base which may either be conjugational or declensional. But the use of the term 'pada' for expressing the inflected word.
Among the Logicians, Gautama defines pada as the sequence of phonemes, that ends in an inflectional suffix ie 'vibhaktyantāḥ padam'.

According to Vātsyāyana, a finished form ends either in a case affix or in a personal ending is word. 'Yathā darśānāṃ vikṛtāḥ varṇa vibhaktyantāḥ padasamjñā bhavanti'.

Annambhaṭṭa holds that 'pada' is that which is endowed with the power of functional relation such as denotation etc., or which means possessed of śakti is word.

ie śaktam padam'.

Viśvanātha also puts forth the same idea of the word

In the opinion of Mīmāṃsakas, words are the collection of letters that are capable of producing the word meanings as syntactico - semantically related to action.

(ie varnāḥ padam prayogārha anvitaikārthabodhakāḥ)

**Conclusion**

Some ancient classical Sanskrit grammarians, Paṇini etc. have adopted a linguistic or grammatical criterion to analyse word (śabda) as a linguistic form which ends in inflectional (declensional or conjugational) affixes.

Thus for the ancient grammarians, word is a correct linguistic form which is possible to be used in language to convey some idea.

Later grammarians, Bhartṛhari etc. analyses word adopting metalinguistic or metaphysical criterion. They defined the word from the view point of production
of meaning ie that word is an eternal entity that can burst forth the meaning to its listener since nothing but an eternal entity that is distinct from the instantly perishing syllables, can produce the meaning.

Logicians have adopted both epistemological and semantical criteria to analyse word. They have recognized word as a means of valid knowledge of word - meaning and therefore analyse the same as the means of sentence-meaning or śābdabodha.

Among the logicians, only the scholars belonging to the early school of thought or prācyas regard the words of trust worthy people when understood correctly, become directly responsible for the generation of verbal cognition; and thus assume the status of a peculiar or unique cause (asādhāraṇa kāraṇa); whereas the scholars belonging to the new school of thought or Navyas, regard the knowledge of words and not words themselves as such which is the means of producing verbal cognition.

From the definition of pada, we can see that in ancient period, it was based on the form, whereas in modern period, it was based on the meaning.

Mīmāṃsakas especially Prābhākaras, have defined the word from the viewpoint of impersonal and eternal syllables which assume the form of the word through the efforts of the speaker with the help of the manifesting wind since only the impersonal Vedas can be authoritative in impelling the people to undertake various rituals etc.

They have defined word syntactio - semantically. They were greatly influenced by their anvitābhidhāna theory, and therefore, have held that words are
the collection of letters that are capable of producing the word- meanings as syntactico - semantically related to action.

**5:3:2 - Nature of śabda (word)**

We all knew that speech (vāk) or śabda (word) which is accepted as a means of communication. This śabda is one of the four valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and it has been recognized to be the means of śabdabodha.

In India, Major epistemological systems like logic (Nyāya), ritualism (Mīmāṃsā) and grammar (Vyākaraṇa) have hold contrasting views regarding the nature of speech (śabda). whether it is eternal (nitya) or non- eternal (anitya)? This is one of the fundamental problems of the linguistic science - that has been taken up by all the systems of Indian philosophy.

**5:3:2:1** - In the opinion of Naiyāyikas, śabda is non - eternal. Gautama, the author of Nyāyasūtra has given a number of arguments to establish the non-eternity of śabda.

Naiyāyikas are known as śabdānityavādins and they say that when we pronounce any letter, it is due to the contact of air with the vocal organ. Thus all words are produced by some kind of contact and hence have a beginning and therefore they are not eternal or nitya; but transcendent or anitya.

**5:3:2:2** - The Mīmāṃsakas are known as śabdānityatvavādins. According to them, the Vedas are eternal and impersonal ie without any author. They were very much careful in asserting the eternity (nityatva) of śabda.

**5:3:2:3** - According to the Vaiyākaraṇas, a word is a series of successive sounds called letters. A series of such letter- sound manifests one inarticulate
sound essence called sphoṭa. This sphoṭa is an eternal essence that exists corresponding to every word.

Conclusion

Naiyāyikas oppose the view that the words are eternal. In their opinion, śabda is a quality of ākāśa and is non eternal. It is liable to production and destruction. If śabda was eternal, it could not account for the facts of our auditory experience; and in that case no satisfactory explanation could be given on the so-called manifestation. If śabda is beginning less (anādi) or endless (ananta), they would have been always audible inherent in the ear. In this way Naiyāyikas reject the theory of eternity of śabda and the concept of an eternal sphoṭa of Vaiyākaraṇas.

The word- essence (śabda - tattva) has been described by Bhartṛhari as Śabda - Brahman which is beginning less and endless. Vaiyākaraṇas call this eternal (nitya), indivisible (ñiravayava) Śabda - Brahman, which is the ultimate cause of the world by the name of sphoṭa. There fore Grammarians hold speech to be eternal.

Ritualists, proposed the theory that words are eternal. According to them, no place or time can be found where in the words are totally absent. Speech is established as eternal by inference as well as pratyabhijña (recognition).

In their opinion, Vedas are not produced by any human agency (apauruṣeya) and there fore words cannot held to be anything; but eternal.

5:3:3 - Unit of Language (Speech)

Among the different systems of thought, unit of language is an important issue. 'What is the unit of language? Is it a varṇa, or a pada, or a vakya? connected with this question, there are three views propounded by the epistemologists.
5:3:3:1 - Of these, the first view is held by the Mīmāṃsakas. In their opinion, a sentence has no separate entity of its own apart from words and words have no separate entity of their own apart from letters. While sentences and words consists of parts, the individual letters are 'niravayava' or partless and 'akhaṇḍa' or indivisible. Hence in their view the ultimate units are letters and not words or sentences.

5:3:3:2 - The second view is held by the Naiyāyikas. They refute the Varṇavāda of Mīmāṃsakas and Vākyavāda of Vaiyākaraṇas. They opinion that isolate letters cannot be regarded meaningful; and thus meaningful word is the unit of language. In their view, the concept of an indivisible sentence or akhaṇḍa vākyya is a mere fiction.

5:3:3:3 - The third view is propounded by the Vaiyākaraṇas. According to them, the real unit of language is a sentence (vākyya) and not words or letters. In their opinion, there is no separate existence of letters or words, but sentence which alone is the real unit. Vaiyākaraṇas believe in the indivisibility of the proposition while the others admit its divisibility.

Conclusion

In the opinion of Mīmāṃsakas, Varṇas or the letters constitute the unit of language and hence they are known as Varṇavādins. The Naiyāyikas are known as padavādins because in their opinion, pada (word) constitutes the unit of language. Similarly in the opinion of Vaiyākaraṇas, Vākya or sentence constitute the unit of language and hence they are known as Vākyavādins.
The problem of meaning has attracted the attention of the philosophers throughout the ages. We can say that a sentence is like a body, in which words are different parts of body and its meaning is the soul. From this we know the importance of meaning.

Words are accepted as means of communication. In this process, words impart or transmit the knowledge or idea of certain objects to our mind. When these objects conveyed an idea to our mind, then they are called meanings. These word-meanings can be stated in general to be what are conveyed by words or padābhideya.

Different epistemologists differed amongst themselves as to what the words exactly convey. The problem is whether a word through ūakti signifies a certain generic meaning (jāti) or the idea of a particular object (vyakti) or a form (ākṛti) or more than one of these entities.

In other words, the issue is what does a word like 'cow' (go) in 'bring the cow'. (gām ānaya) Here the word 'cow', when uttered, can convey -

(i) the generic notion of a cow (gotvā) ie jāti

(ii) the form characterized by the dewlap etc. (saśnādimatva) ie ākṛti

and

(iii) the individual consisting of four legs etc ie Vyakti

That is to say that the word 'cow' conveys an object which possesses the generic property of cowness and which has a form characterized by dewlap etc. and also which is an individual consisting of four legs etc.
Do we understand the šakti with regard to the form 'cow' constituted by
dewlap, tail, horn etc. or to the object 'cow' or the common property 'cowness' or
all the two or three of these meanings together? The issue has given rise to a great
controversy amongst the scholars who can be broadly divided into seven groups :-

(1) Ākṛti vādinaḥ
(2) Jāti vādinaḥ
(3) Vyakti vādinaḥ
(4) Jātyākṛti vyakti vādinaḥ
(5) Jātivīśiṣṭa vyakti vādinaḥ
(6) Jātyākṛtivīśiṣṭa vyakti vādinaḥ
(7) Apohavādinaḥ and
(8) Jātyādi vādinaḥ

5:3:4:1 - Among the Naiyāyikas, old Naiyāyikas opinion that the particular,
the form and the universal, all the three are the primary meaning of a word. In
their opinion, the word 'go' have been pronounced, any person who comes to
know the animal denoted by the word 'go', will comprehend the particular, the
universal and the form simultaneously.

Navya Naiyāyikas hold that primary sense of word is the particular as
characterised by both the universal and the form.

5:3:4:2 - In the opinion of Vaiyākaraṇas, general property, form and
individual are the word meanings. However, they use, only two terms namely
'ākṛti' and 'dravya' to cover the generic property, form and individual. Here, the
term 'ākṛti' can be taken to cover both the generic property and form where as the term 'dravya' stands for individual.

According to them, the term 'ākṛti' actually means the aggregate of parts (avayavasamsthāna) which consists of form, action etc. And such an aggregate of parts, is further viewed as the inferential cause of generic property (jātilinga) since generic property occurs invariably in an individual with the aggregate of parts etc. Thus, the term ākṛti in grammar can be taken to cover both the generic property and form. Because the generic property is found in individuals and the individuals are invariably an aggregate of parts consisting of form, action etc.

5:3:4:3 - Ritualists (Mīmāṃsākās) hold quite a different view. According to them, words should express only those entities that are permanent and economical compared to the many individuals.

For example, the word 'cow' (go) should express only the entity which is permanently present in all the cows and economical compared to many individual cows. Such an entity is only the generic property of the cowness. Thus, the ritualists hold that words refer to the generic property which ever present in the objects such as cow. This view is based on the conviction that generic property is one i.e. common to all the instances of individuals. Therefore, according to ritualists, individuals, which are, identical with form, are obtained through presumption (arthāpatti) or indication (lakṣanā).

Conclusion

According to the old Naiyāyikas, the particular, the form and the universal, all the three are the primary meaning of a word. i.e 'vyaktyākṛtijātayastu padārthāḥ'.
Navya Naiyāyikas claim that while the generic property and the individual constitute one word meaning, the form constitutes the other word meaning which represents the aggregate of parts or whole. ie. 'jātyākṛtiśiṣṭavyaktayaḥ padārthāḥ'.

The Grammarians stated that the words can convey only the form and individuals and the generic property can be merely inferred through the aggregate of parts.

Ritualists confirm to the view that only abstract notion ie the generic property of cowness etc. should be accepted as the word-meaning since the same alone is eternal and common to all similar individual instances.

5:3:5  - Relation between word and meaning

The problem of the relation between word and its meaning has also been quite controversial. It has been mainly debated by the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas.

5:3:5:1 - Mīmāṃsakas believe in the pravāhanityatā (perennial continuity) of the word and meaning. They uphold the supremacy of the vedas on the ground of the vedic knowledge being infallible. If the infallibility of vedic knowledge is to be maintained, the language in which that knowledge is to be embodied, should also be regarded as impersonal, because all personal creations are liable to be fallible. Because of this consideration, the Mīmāṃsakas insist on the eternality of language and they regard the relation between word and its meaning to be natural and eternal.

In their opinion, we learn language from our elders, who in their turn learn it from their elders and so on. But it is impossible to trace the first elder. So they conceive that language and, for that reason, the relation between the word and its meaning, is anādi or eternal.
5:3:5:2 - The Naiyāyikas accept the role of the elders in language like the Mīmāṃsakas but they reject the theory of natural relationship and advocate that the relation has a conventional origin. They maintain that the relation between the word and its meaning is created by God and thus contrary to the Mīmāṃsakas standpoint.

5:3:5:3 - According to the Grammarians, not only the relation between word and meaning is eternal, but the word and its meaning are inseparable also. As soon as a word is pronounced, the referent, it stands for, is denoted, and as soon as we think of a referent, it makes us pronounce the word.

**Conclusion**

The older Naiyāyikas hold that the relation between word and meaning is dependent on the will of God\(^{13}\) (Īśvarecchā) and it is permanent and is called abhidhā or śakti.

The Neo-Naiyāyikas are of the view that this relation depends on mere will [whether divine or human (icchāmātra)]\(^{14}\) and it is not permanent and is called paribhāṣa.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the relation of word with meaning is inherent or eternal.

According to the Grammarians, not only the relation between word and meaning is eternal, but they are inseparable also. They regard the relation between word and meaning as one of revealer (vācaka) and revealed (vācya) as determined by the potency (śakti) of the word.
The study of Vākyya (sentence) became the most important concept for linguists, grammarians, philosophers and logicians. Because any communication takes place only through the sentences and not through individual word.

This is the general view about a sentence that 'a group of words which make a complete sense as the expression of thought is called a sentence.' But this definition of sentence can neither satisfies the curiosity of scholars. We can see that a sentence was defined by many scholars in manifold ways, in different branches of knowledge from diverse points of views. All of them agree on one point that sentence (Vākyya) is a cluster of meaningful words (padasamūha). But the great controversy is that what kind of cluster constitutes a sentence (Vākyya)? However, different epistemologists define sentence variously by highlighting different aspects of a given sentence.

**Conclusion**

Grammarians insist that a sentence must contain only ekatiṇ (a single predicate) otherwise vākyabheda (split of sentence) would become a necessity. Therefore they attach greater importance to the action expressed by a predicate, and define sentence as a syntactical unit consisting of a single predicate.

Mīmāṃsakas consider the sentence to be connected utterance of words or samabhivyāhāra which is nothing but enunciation together of two things which are principal and subsidiary to each other (śeṣaśeṣinoḥ sahoccāraṇam). In their opinion, enunciation of two things together itself conveys the principal and subsidiary nature of things without even accusative and other case endings. Hence
sentence must be admitted to have an inherent capacity to convey such nature of things ie syntactico - semantical relations.

In the opinion of logicians, sentence is only a statement consisting of words which produce verbal cognition ie comprehension of syntactico - semantical relations between word - meanings. They hold so because they have approached the sentence from the view point of only a means to verbal cognition.

5:3:7 - Šabda - Vyāpāra (Śabdavṛtti)

Śabda vyāpāra or word relation is held to be relation of words. Every word has a particular capacity or power of expression which means that the word is related to its meaning and it conveys only through the relation of expression. This power of expression serves as the link between the word and meaning.

In India, Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas, Vaiyākaraṇas and Ālaṃkārikas have analysed functions of words in conveying their meanings. In their opinion, words, to convey their objects must function or reach out to their objects, and hence they must possess concrete relationships with their objects. In this way, the words, which possess such relationships with their objects become the means capable of conveying their objects to the competent listener.

The terms used in Sanskrit to denote such a word - function or word - relation are - vṛtti, samaya (convention), śakti (ability) Saṅgati (connection), Saṅketa (signification), icchā (wish).

Conclusion

According to the Vaiyākaraṇas, word - relation is a property of words conditioned by particular word - meaning (tattadartha nirūpitaḥ śabda dharmāḥ)
and such a word relation produces a mental impression about words which is conducive to verbal cognition.

According to the Naiyāyikas, word - relation is the relation of words to their meanings conducive to the reference to the word - meanings which in turn are the causes of verbal cognition.

[Śābdabodha hetu padārthopasthyanukūlah]

Among the Logicians, Prācyas have maintained conventional origin of the word - relations on the ground that the desire (will) of God (Īśvarecchā) establishes word - relations with objects signified. But Navyas have maintained conventional origin of the word - relations on the ground that both desire (will) of God and that of trust worthy persons.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, word - relation or power of words is the object of the knowledge of signification which is the associate cause conducive to the verbal cognition by facilitating the word reference.

The Naiyāyikas call the śabda vyāpāra as significative power (vṛtti).

TheĀlaṃkārikas use the terms sakti, vṛtti and vyāpāra to mean any one of the three powers of a word.

The Vaiyākaraṇas also use the term vṛtti only to mean all the three kinds of powers admitted by them.

Some of the Naiyāyikas using the term saṃketa along with sakti.
Sabda vyāpāra is the function of a word to convey the sense. The different systems have admitted different functions of a word to convey a meaning.

Among the different sabda - vyāpāras, Abhidhā (śakti) is the primary meaning. This meaning is directly related to the word and its bearer. The secondary meaning (Lakṣana) is the implied relation with that word. This meaning does not denote an object directly, but we can get the meaning of the word by applying any implied sense, either by analogy or through usages etc. or when the primary meaning of a word is not compatible to the context, then there requires a secondary function and that is Lakṣanā. Here the relation between the word and the meaning is indirect.

Vyañjanā (the tertiary meaning) or suggestion is the third type of word - relation. This function facilitates the reference to a distinct sense when the other word relations namely, denotation and indication, fail to do so.

Tātparya is another function which have come to recognise by some Ālaṃkārikās.

**Conclusion**

The Naiyāyikas have admitted two functions of a word to convey a meaning -

(1) Śakti, the power of primary signification
(2) Lakṣanā

The Mīmāṃsakas have admitted two functions of a word :

(1) Abhidhā which is the name for the primary function
(2) Lakṣanā is that for the secondary one.

The Vaiyākaraṇas have admitted three functions, namely,
The Ālāṃkārikas have generally recognised three functions

(i) Abhidhā (Primary meaning)
(ii) Lakṣanā (Secondary meaning)
(iii) Vyañjanā (Tertiary meaning)

Some Ālāṃkārikas have come to recognise Tatparya as another function. If this Tatparya vṛtti is admitted as a function pertaining to a word, the number of functions of a word for conveying meanings to be four in the scheme of certain Ālāṃkārikas.

The approach of Ālāṃkārikas to these four word-functions was an aesthetic one; while the approach of philosophical systems like Grammar, Nyāya etc. was practical, utilitarian and non-aesthetic. The Ālāṃkārikas contributed these four word-functions to the enhancement of the poetic beauty.

5:3:8 - Analysis of Sentence meaning

We know that śabdā bodha (verbal cognition) can be explained as the cognition resulting from the words that are being heared.

ie 'śabdāc chrutāj jāyamāno bodhāḥ'

In India, the epistemology, logic and grammar- all these have contributed to the development of the analysis of sentence meaning or śabdabodha. They form the integral part of the analysis of sentence meaning, since the epistemological
theories, the logical analysis of syntactico- semantical relations and grammatical categories constitute the very basis of sentence meaning. But they differ from one another in respect of their idea regarding what generates or gives rise to a vākyārtha.

Indian analysis of sentence is based on the notion of what is already accomplished (siddha) or static and what is yet to be accomplished (sādhya) or non-static (continuous)

There are two divisions of sentence analysis- The first one is the things (factors) which are already accomplished and function as instruments towards the accomplishment of action. The second is the action which is to be accomplished through the instrumentality of others.

The factors that contribute towards the accomplishment of the action are called 'Kārakas' and the action which is to be accomplished is called 'kriyā'.

5:3:8:1 - According to the Vaiyākaraṇas, the substances (dravya) are static or accomplished while the action (kriyā) are non-static or to be accomplished.

For eg: 'Saḥ ghaṭam ānayati’ (He brings the pot)

Here the words, 'saḥ' and 'ghaṭam' are nouns and they convey the static substances namely an individual like Caitra and the pot; where as the word 'ānayati’ is a verb and therefore conveys the non-static thing namely the action of bringing. The substance such as pot does not change and therefore is static where as the action such as bringing is continuously changing and therefore is non-static.

Thus, kārakas and kriyas which are comparable to noun and verbs constitute the most basic part of speech in the Indian analysis of meaning.
In the opinion of Mīmāṃsakas, in a statement 'ghataṃ ānaya' (bring the pot) the cognition produced is that the activity is conducive to the action of bringing which in turn is conditioning the objecthood of the pot. According to them, the word such as 'ghaṭa' refers to the pot as the abode of the objecthood through the knowledge of the denotation such as the pot, as related with the object hood referred to by the accusative case ending (am), is the meaning of the word 'pot' (ghaṭa). Similarly, the verbal stem 'ānī' too refers to the action of bringing as related with the activity through the knowledge of the denotation that the action of bringing, as related with the activity referred to by the verbal ending 'a'; is the meaning of the verbal stem 'ānī'.

Hence they opine that besides the word meanings even by the syntactico-semantical relations, which relate various word meanings together and therefore present the sentence-meaning conveyed by words.

They have proposed that agents (object) etc. could be analysed as the possessors of the actions etc.

In the opinion of Logicians, in a statement 'grāmam gacchati' (He goes to the village), the cognition produced is that the person is the abode of the effort conducive to the action of going which produces the contact in the village.

Here, the accusative, enjoined in the sense of the object hood, refers to the super statumness (ādheyatā) since the other constituents of the object hood of the village, ie the 'village' and the effect 'contact' are referred to by the accusative base grāma (village) and the verbal base 'gam' (to go) respectively.

They have proposed that all word meanings are to be decided on the basis of whether or not the same are referred to by any other word.
Conclusion

Grammarians analyse sentence meaning as the cognition of the mutual relation of individual word - meanings such as the form of the relation of qualifier (modifier) and also the qualificand (modificand)

ie ‘padarthanam mithonvayarupah Uddeśya vidheya bhava sambandhaḥ’

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, only those entities which are referred to by words could be the constituents of verbal cognition; and therefore, nothing which is not referred to by words could be considered as part of verbal cognition.

In the opinion of Naiyāyikas, syntactico- semantical relations (Samsargas) are mere relations ie they are not referent qualifiers (prakāras). They have proposed that while individual words convey the individual word meanings with the help of ākāṅkṣā etc. through word relations, the relations that relate them together need something else to obtain them since no word relation is ever established in any of the relations.

According to them, the syntactico - semantical relations such as superstratumness (adheyatā) are understood between the two word meanings through the principle or force of relations (samsarga maryādā). And once the syntactico- semantical relations are understood, the independent words such as 'ghataḥ' (pot) which are perceived to have word relations in the 'pot' etc, will lead to the cognition of total sentence meaning with the help of 'ākāṅkṣā' etc. Besides word relation, no need to accept a sentence relation to cognize sentence meaning.

5:3:9 - Principal or Chief qualificand in śābdabodha

Indian epistemological systems together agree on one point that every body using language for communication, experiences the process of śābdabodha, when
he hears or reads a sentence. But on the basis of the difference in the basic assumptions of these schools, there is difference in the same Sanskrit sentence or expression has different śābdabodha according to different schools- Nyāya, Mīmāṃsa and Vyākaraṇa.

These schools differ very much on the question as to which element in a sentence should be regarded as predominant. On the basis of this view, Grammarians, Ritualists and Logicians have proposed three main linguistic theories regarding the principal or chief qualificand ie nucleus (mukhya višeṣya) in śābdabodha.

Consider a sentence 'Caitro grāmam gacchati' (Caitra goes to the village). Based on this example-

5:3:9:1 - Logicians opinion that the cognition from the above sentence is that Caitra, the agent is the substratum of the activity conducive to the action of 'going' which in turn, is conditioning the objectness occurring in the object 'village'.

ie grāmaniṣṭa karmatā nirūpaka gamanānukūla vyāpārāśrayaḥ Caitraḥ

5:3:9:2 - In the opinion of Vaiyākaraṇas, the cognition from the sentence "Caitro grāmam gacchati' is that the action 'going', which produces the contact, occurring in the object 'village' has Caitra, the agent, as its abode-

ie grāmābhinnaśraya vṛttisamyoga janaka vyāpāraḥ eka Caitrābhinna kartṛvṛttiḥ

5:3:9:3 - According to the Ritualists, the cognition from the statement 'Caitro grāmam gacchati' is that the nominal base (grāma) refers to the village; however, the accusative case - ending (am) refers to the power called objectness (karmatva
śakti) which is an undivisible property. And the other nominal base, namely 'Caitra' refers to the agent Caitra and the nominative case-ending refers to the number (singularity etc.) The syntactico-semantical relations involved in the referents can be described as follows:-

The meaning of the accusative base, the village, is related directly to the objectness through the relation of occurrence and indirectly through the objectness to the activity.

Here the meaning of the nominative base, ie Caitra, is directly related to the activity through the conditioning of agentness occurring in him.

Thus, the cognition produced from the statement is that the impellent force or productive activity is conductive to the action 'going'; which is conditioning both the objectness occurring in the single Caitra.

ie 'ekābhinnā Caitravṛtti kartṛtā nirūpikāgrāmaniṣṭa karmatā nirūpikā cayā kriyā tadanakūlā bhāvanā'

**Conclusion**

According to Grammarians, chief qualificand (mukhya viśeṣya) in śābdabodha is always the meaning referred to by the verbal root. This theory is based on the fact that verbs are held to refer to root meanings as the principal element ie 'bhāva pradhānam ākhyātam.' Hence they accepted verb as the main substantive.

ie Dhātvarthamukhya višeṣyatayā śābdabodho bhavati.

According to Logicians, agent (kartā) is the most important element in the analysis of sentence-meaning as the same is the only independent (svatantra) Kāraka with respect to action and others.
In the opinion of Mīmāṃsakas, productive activity is the central point or chief qualifying in śabdabodha produced from sentences as well. And all other meanings referred to by the words in a sentence are directly or indirectly related to the productive activity.

Therefore in the view of Mīmāṃsakas, meaning of the finite verb (ākhyātartha) is the most important word.

Thinkers of different systems of thought differ from their views regarding the admission of cause of verbal comprehension (śabdabodha kāraṇa).

Conclusion

In the opinion of Vaiyākaraṇas, sentence or vākya is the cause of verbal comprehension. Because they are vākya vādins and they accept the sentence as an indivisible unit.

According to Naiyāyikas, the last letter (carama varṇa) along with the impressions of each of the preceeding varṇas is the cause of verbal comprehension.

Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas also agree with this view. According to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the meaning of the words or padārthas are the cause of verbal comprehension.

The process of comprehending the meaning of a sentence has been understood differently by different schools.
When ever any communication through sentence is apprehended, the different parts of a sentence are apprehended one by one. But the meaning of the sentence depends upon its totality.

The sentence is an ordered succession of words and the process of its apprehension is, therefore, that of succession but the meaning of a sentence depends upon the total sentence and not upon any individual words which constitute a sentence. Here it is the problem that of reconciliation between the process of understanding, the meaning which demands the simultaneity of the total sentence. The answer to this problem has been given differently by different schools.

All the schools agree that different parts of a sentence are not received together and they are only given in a succession one by one.

Consider a sentence namely 'this is a book'. When we hear or to read this sentence, there is a necessary succession involved. Firstly we hear or read 'this' then 'is', then 'a' and lastly 'book'. But the meaning of this sentence depends on the simultaneity only. For reaching to simultaneity the different systems put forward different opinions.

5:3:11:1 - According to Naïyāyikas, when ever different parts of a sentence are received in a succession, they are retained in memory till the apprehension of the last part of a sentence and when the last part of the sentence is apprehended, the memory of the distinct parts which were apprehended earlier is revived and added on to that apprehension of the last part of the sentence. But when we come to the last word of a sentence, we remember the meanings of all the preceeding
words. So we can say that the meaning of the last word being combined with those of the preceding words by means of memory, we have an understanding of the meaning of the sentence as a whole.

5:3:11:2 - The Grammarians differ from the Naiyāyikas and put forth the theory of sphaṭa. According to them every successive apprehension of the different parts of a sentence or a word becomes instrumental in the revelation of a corresponding sphaṭa which is present in the mind of the receiver of communication.

Thus, the process of apprehension lies in succession but with the complete revelation of a sphaṭa, there is the availability of simultaneity in the form of that sphaṭa. Thus though the intermediation of sphaṭa, a word or a sentence is related to its meaning; the Grammarian theory of sphaṭa seems to be quite convincing as it is supported by our own experience in the form of phenomenological reflection upon language and also by the psychological investigations.

5:3:11:3 - According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the words convey both their separate meanings and the constructed meaning of the sentence. Just as in a machine the parts perform their respective functions and at the whole, Similarly the word in a sentence presents their individual meanings till these are construed into the unitary meaning of the sentence. Hence according to them, the meaning of a sentence is neither the aggregate meaning of the words not is it quite independent of their separate meanings. Rather, the sentence is a new combination of the individual meanings of the words and, therefore, conveys a new meaning.

Conclusion

According to the Naiyāyikas, the meaning of a word is presented to the mind of the listener by the last sound aided by the memory impressions of the
preceeding sounds. Since the isolated sound of a word cannot individually present its meaning, they must do so jointly. Since they come one after another into the mind, they are not perceived together as a whole. Each sound perceived leaves its impression behind and the apprehension of the last sound, aided by the accumulated impressions of the preceeding sounds present the meaning of the word.

The Mīmāṃsakas, who defined a word as the aggregate of letters which make it up are forced to accept a theory similar to that of the Naiyāyikas. They say that the meaning is conveyed by the last letter aided by the impressions produced in the mind by the preceeding letters.

The main difference between the views held by the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas is that the former considered the letters to be ephemeral, whereas the latter believed that the letters are permanent.

Again, the order in which the letters are uttered is only for the act of utterance and not for the letters themselves, which, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, are permanent. But unless we assume the order of sequence to these impressions: the process of understanding the meaning cannot be explained.

According to the Grammarians, the constituent words have no separate meanings of their own. They convey only the integral meaning of the sentence in different ways and degrees. Hence the words lose their individual meanings in the total meaning of the sentence. In their opinion, every successive apprehension of the different parts of a sentence or a word becomes instrumental in the revelation of a corresponding sphoṭa in the mind of the receiver of communication.

Thus, according to Vaiyākaraṇas, the process of apprehension lies in succession, but on the complete revelation of sphoṭa, there emerges simultaneity in sphoṭa.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Analysis of Śabda strengthens different systems of thought in different ways. Nyāya provide Indian mind a powerful tool to examine what is wrong and what is right to solve many basic philosophico - logical problems concerning the nature of knowledge, form of knowledge and the philosophy of language.

While Prācina Nyāya trains the Indian mind to tackle philosophical issues; Navya Nyāya provides and develops powerful tools to develop ambiguity - free discourse.

In the opinion of V.N. Jha, the system of Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika should be viewed and studied as an analytic system of human behaviour, because its prime concern has been analysis of human behaviour. Nyaya school of philosophy opines that 'nihśreyasa' or 'apavarga' can be attained through knowledge only. This knowledge is based on language or sentence. Therefore by analysing the sentence and exactly pointing out the meaning of a sentence, one can be lead towards the path of truth.

The greatest contribution that the Nyāya system has made is in teaching that nothing is to be taken for granted by closing one's eyes but everything should be accepted with open eyes. No authority is higher than logic. Nyāya system teaches us how to organize our thoughts into a structured whole and it helps us how to overcome emotion and how to give a logical foundation to our thinking.
In the opinion of Jayantabhaṭṭa, the origin of Nyāyaśāstra is to clarify the confusions created by those who did not have faith in the vedic wisdom.

Right from the beginning, the system of Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika has provided a perspective to think rationally. The origin and growth of Nyaya- Vaiśeṣika system is through its logical frame-work.

The greatest contribution of Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika is its development of a frame-work for argument. It presents a tool which is used by almost all systems - Mīmāṃsa, Vedānta, sāṃkhya, Vyākaraṇa, Alankāra śāstra etc.

In other words it trains us to think rationally. Nyāya deals with neither unknown things nor with definitely known things, but only with those that are doubtful.

It is very much useful in developing the powers of logical thinking for the scholars. It finally avers that all knowledge of which one can be conscious is determinate and indeterminate knowledge is only a logical presupposition.

Like wise the treatment of śabda in Mīmāṃsa makes solid contribution to the Indian theory of meaning. This is the first system to undertake the analysis of sentence and its meaning systematically. It has contributed much to the development of linguistics, especially semantics by proposing various theories of verbal cognition.

The theories of the correlation of the expressed or Abhihitānaya vāda and the expression of the correlated or Anvitābhidhāna vāda have drawn the attention of Western scholars to a great extent. This view is accepted by the Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntins as well.
The term 'Mīmāṃsa' which occurs in the Taittirīya-Saṃhitā, Chandogya upaniṣad etc. means arriving at a certain decision after considering all the pros and cons about something in question. The aim of the Mīmāṃsa system is to show each and every sentence, each and every word and each and every syllable of the veda is meaningful and purposeful by interpreting the vedas each and every sentences if meaningfully. This is the reason why Mīmāṃsa is basically a science of sentence interpretation and bears the names like Vākyāśāstra, Vākyārthaśāstra quite significantly.

In Western Philosophy, 'Philosophy of Language' becomes a point of discussion only after Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein i.e during the last 100 - 125 years or so. But Mīmāṃsa system has been dealing with this topic for not less than 2000 years!

Main contribution of Mīmāṃsa in the field of verbal understanding can be stated in just two words: 'ananyalabhyaḥ śabdārthaḥ' i.e the meaning of the word is not obtainable from anything else than the word.

Similarly the main aim of the philosophy of grammar is to know the reality, the base of the universe or the śabda- Brahman. The sphoṭa doctrine of Bhartṛhari is quite a significant contribution which is both solid and fundamental at once.

It is only on the basis of the theories of Bhartṛhari, Ānandavardhama developed the theory of suggestion or Dhvani- Siddhānta. Bhartṛhari maintains that it is through Vyākaraṇa that śabda - Brahman is known and therefore Mokṣa is attained.
According to the philosophy of grammar, śabda is the most significant tattva. What Bhartṛhari says in this regard is very significant-

"Just as the light which is in the fire stick acts as the cause of further lights, the word which is in the mind is the cause of the uttered sound."

It is Indian grammar especially paṇinian grammar that lays the solid foundation for the analysis of sentence and its meaning.
Notes and References:


2. Shashiprabha Kumar, 'Śabda as pramāṇa in Vaiśeṣika in śabda' - Text and Interpretation in Indian Thought, pp 103 - 104.

3. Paurāṇyā vā'tha pāścātyāḥ pūjyā nastattvavedinaḥ
   Te hiśvarāṁśa sambhūtāḥ na punastatta vādinaḥ -
   P. Sri Rama Chandrādu, Pāścātyatattvāstṛtihāsaḥ - p XXIII


6. i) Uta tvāḥ paśyan na dadarśa vācam
       Uta tvāḥ śṛṇvan na śṛṇtoyenōm |
       Uto tvasmāi tanvaṃ visasre
       jāyeva patyā usati suvāsāḥ || Rg. 10.71.4

   ii) Vāg vā va nāmno bhūyasī vāg
       vā ṛgvedaṃ vijñāpayati - Chan. Up. 7.2.1.


8. Ogden and Richards; The meaning of meaning; p.11.


13. idam padaṃ amuṃ artham bodhayatu iti iśvarasaṅketaḥ - N.SM. p.115.

14. icchāmātraṃ śaktiḥ iti navyāḥ āhuḥ - ibid.

15. Prof. V.N. Jha, Contribution of Nyāya system to Indian thought structure; p.80.

16. tatra nānupalabdheṣthe na nirṣīte pravartate
   kintu Samśayite nyāyasthataṁgaṇaḥ tena saṁśayaḥ - NM-1-1.

17. "Araniṣṭham yathā jyotih prakāśāntara kāraṇam |
    Tadvacchabdo'pi buddhistah śrutināṁ kāraṇaṁ pṛdhak ||
   - Bhartṛhari, VP. I.46.