3:1 - Concept of Šabda - Vyāpāra

We use words to share our ideas with other people. This word has a fixed relation to some object, so as to recall it when ever it is heard or read. So we may say that words are significant symbols; and to convey the meanings the listener of the words must recognise the words which he listens, as linguistic expressions of the objects or notions which the speaker wants to convey. When the listener understands the ideas of the speaker, then we can say that words become the means of communication.

Indian epistemologists have traditionally explained this linguistic expression of words as the relation or function of words ie 'śabdavṛtti' or 'śabdavyāpāras'.

This relation between a word and the substance which is responsible for the recalling of substances is the basis of verbal import¹.

This relation functions as the root of the use of languages which is the means of thought communication.
In the opinion of epistemologists, each word has a certain inherent power or capacity to express certain meaning or ideas. This power of expression (capacity) is the relation of words known as śabda vyāpāra or śabda śakti. This vyāpāra serves as the link between the words and the meanings.

3:2 - Word Relations - Different Opinions

Among the epistemologists, Naiyāyikas hold that word - relation is the relation of words to their meanings conducive to the reference to the word-meanings which in turn are the cause of verbal cognition.

In full agreement with his predecessors Viśvanātha recognises the knowledge of vṛtti or vṛttidhiḥ is responsible in the matter of a 'padajñāna' giving rise to corresponding 'padārtha-jñāna' which leads to the corresponding śabdabodha.

Grammarians hold that word relation (vṛtti) is a property of words conditioned by particular word- meanings (tattadartha nirūpitaḥ śabdadharmah) According to them, the relation existing between a word and the object which controls or decides the signifier and the signified. Such a word- relation produces a mental impression about words which is conducive to verbal cognition.

Mīmāṃsakas opine that every word has its own natural relation to the object which it signifies. Like fire possesses the power of burning, words possess a natural potency to mean certain things independently of the will of any person.

From this we can say that the essential nature of śabda (word) lies in possessing śakti or function by which meaning is communicable to the hearer. The recollection of meaning is necessary only to presuppose the relational function of a word without which the knowledge of śabdabodha would be impossible.
In general, word relation is held to be relation of words. A word is a combination of letters. But every combination of letters is not a word in the real sense of the term. For example - while 'gauḥ' (cow) is a word, but 'tauḥ' is not a word. So it is said that it is only a meaningful combination of letters, which constitutes a word. Therefore Naiyāyikas opine that power which is concentrated in words denote the meanings of those words.

Thus, we can conclude from the above that words have a power to mean and this power of meaning is inherent in them. It cannot be not shaken by any external force. There is no word which is not meaningful. This word may have different meanings according to the different ways in which it may be related to an object.

Hence, different epistemologists opine that when we use language for communicating our ideas to others we may use different word functions or śabda vyāpāras. The Naiyāyikas call it significative power (vṛtti). This vṛtti is the potency of a word to denote or mean something. Thus a pada is that which possesses the denotative capacity ie vṛtti³. It is this vṛtti, ie the relation between word and meaning which gives rise to verbal cognition or śābdabodha⁴

3:3 - Different Śabda - Vyāpāras

To convey a meaning, different epistemologists have admitted different functions of a word. (śabda vyāpāra). According to them, each word has a certain inherent capacity or power to convey certain meaning. Among the different systems of thought, the Naiyāyikas have admitted two functions of a word to convey a meaning:-

(i) Śakti, the power of primary signification (denotation)

(ii) Lakṣanā(Implication) ( the power of secondary signification)
The Māṁṣakas have admitted two functions of a word:-

(i) Abhidhā
(ii) Lakṣanā

The Viyākaraṇas have admitted three functions, namely,

i) Abhidhā or śakti
ii) Lakṣanā
iii) Vyañjanā

The Ālaṃkārikas have generally recognised three functions:-

(i) Abhidhā (primary meaning)
(ii) Lakṣanā (secondary meaning)
(iii) Vyañjanā (Terting meaning)

Some Ālaṃkārikas have come to recognise another function, namely

(iv) Tātparya

3:4 - Primary Signification (denotation) śakti (Abhidhā)

Naiyāyikas have generally used the term śakti to mean abhidhā. This śakti is termed by Logicians as saṅketa (desired intention) iccha (wish) or samaya (the relation of one occasioning the other.) Śakti or denotative power is defined as the relation between word and sense by which meaning is cognized, when ever a word is heard. Therefore it is the direct relation of word to its meaning. It is called conventional because a word directly means an object due to its conventional image.
This convention may be established by the will of God or by the will of man (speaker) (icchā) And the desire of the speaker is either of the form that such and such a word should convey (denote) such and such a meaning (thing referred to) (idam padam amum artham bodhayatu); or the form that such and such a meaning (thing referred to) should be conveyed (denoted) by such and such a word (asmāt padāt ayaṇaḥ artho bodhavyaḥ). For instance, the desire that the word pot (ghaṭa) should refer to the sense of pot is the signification. Here the signification means the power or capacity of words (śakti) convey a particular meaning.

Among the Logicians, the Prācyas hold that primary signification (denotation) is conventional expressive power which has the form of only desire (will) of God (Īśvarasaṅketa); and therefore, primary signification is found to occur only in conventionally expressive words such as 'cow' (go).

However, the Navyas, hold that primary signification (denotation) is two fold: namely, desire (will) of God (Īśvarasaṅketa) and that of modern authors of scientific works such as Paṇini (ādhunika saṅketa); And therefore primary signification or denotation is found to occur in both conventionally expressive words such as 'cow' (go) and technically expressive words such as 'nadi' 'ṛddhi' etc.

Thus the words, which express (denote) their objects through such a conventional expressive power or denotation are conventionally expressive words. For instance, the words 'cow' (go) etc. which express (denote) their objects such as cow through such an expressive power (desire or will of God) are conventionally expressive words.
Therefore according to Logicians, the primary signification is of two kinds: the technical expressive power (paribhāṣa) and the conventional expressive power (šakti). Here, the technical expressive power (paribhāṣa) is the primary signification (desire) of modern (recent) authors. The word, which conveys (denotes) the meaning through such a technical expressive power (desire of modern authors) is considered to be the technical word (pāribhāṣīka pada). For instance, the meta-linguistic words such as 'nadī' and vrddhi' which convey (denote) the sense of the feminine stems ending in 'ī' 'ū' and second modification or increase of vowels respectively through the technical expressive power or desire of the modern authors of science (such as Pāṇini etc) are technical words (pāribhāṣīka - pada).

It should be noted here that, according to the Prācyā' Logicians, only the conventionally expressed meaning, and neither the indicated meaning nor even the technically expressed meaning is the primary meaning.

Similarly the Navyas divide the primary signification or denotation (saṅketa) as technical expressive power (paribhāṣa) and conventional expressive power (šakti). Thus, the Navyas hold that the primary signification is the desire (will) of the speaker, which covers both the technical expressive power of technical words used by modern authors and the conventional expressive power of conventional words used by God and other trust worthy persons.

But Mīmāṃsakas are not specified the primary signification as the will of God, and the same is held to be the will of speaker in general. Then the will of any speaker to express any meaning from any word could become the associate cause of any cognition. And therefore, they reject such a theory of Logicians and establish
that an innate capacity of words to express the meanings is the expressive power i.e. primary signification.

Also, the Prabhakara Mimamsakas, who hold the twin theories that word express only the universals (generic properties) such as the cowness and also that words are conducive to the cognition of individuals as associated with other word-meanings such as action, i.e. Karya, have proposed that expressive power is basically two fold: - that which is conducive to the recollection of word meanings (universals) (smarika), and that which is conducive to the verbal condition of individuals as related to other word meaning, action or karya (anubhavik). It should be noted that a separate entity such as denotation (abhidha) which is to be perceived by the signification of the speaker is the power or capacity of words. According to them, the power or capacity of words i.e. denotation is a distinct entity from the word relation, and is the object of the knowledge of signification which is the associate cause conducive to the verbal cognition by facilitating the word reference.

But Grammarians maintain that a distinct relation of words which regulates the denotation of words in meanings is the power of words. According to them, the denotation is not itself the power of words; but rather, the relation perceived between the word and meaning which can regulate the denotation that such and such word refers to such and such meaning is the power of words. Thus, they have distinguished the power of words from the denotation of words.

Here it is concluded that while the Logicians consider the same as the signification or the desire of the speaker, the Ritualists maintain the same as a
distinct entity known as denotation. And the Grammarians' view is that the power
of words to be the relation that regulates the denotation of words in distinct senses.
They are guided by the fact that a regulating factor is necessary to regulate the
denotation of a word in a specific sense.

On the other hand, Álamaṅkārikas have generally accept the term 'Abhidhā' to
denote primary signification

This 'Abhidhā' is the 'śakti' of Naiyāyikas.

Abhidhā conveys the primary meaning by a power or śakti and this śakti is
the convention made by God that such and such a meaning should be understood
from such and such a word. The power by which the conventional meaning
expressed is called Abhidhā and the word to which this power belongs is called
vācaka. It is the direct relation of word to its meaning.

According to Mammaṭa, that which denotes the direct and conventional
meaning is called vācaka, Vīśvanātha says that since Abhidhā conveys the conventional meaning to
our understanding, it is the primary power of a word.

The definition of Vīśvanātha implies that the two adjectives sākṣāt (direct)
and saṅketita (conventional) as given by Mammaṭa are not germane to the definition
of Abhidhā. He retains only one adjective ie saṅketita.

But according to Mammaṭa, not only what is conventional; but what is also
direct is the import of the vācaka words. In his opinion, there are certain polysemous
words and the meanings of these words are determined by the context in which
they occur. He says that a polysemous word can be restricted to one meaning by certain contextual factors\textsuperscript{13}.

Thus for \textit{Ālaṃkārikas}, convention is the basis for the primary relation between the word and its meaning. According to them, a word is 'vācaka', (expressive) only when it conveys a meaning through direct convention. But they treat Abhidhā as different from the conventional relation. Jagannātha, author of the Rasagaṅgādhara follows the Naiyāyikas fully in this regard. In his opinion, abhidhā is same with the conventional relation\textsuperscript{14}.

So we can see that according to Mammaṭa, Abhidhā is the power of words by which conventional meanings are conveyed\textsuperscript{15}. He says that the sense of a word cannot be comprehended without convention. That sense get from the word is called its direct meaning which is otherwise known as abhidheya.

According to \textit{Ālaṃkārikas}, this sense may be of four kinds- Jāti, guṇa, kriyā or yadṛcchā. They hold that the import of a word is either Jati, or a guṇa, or a dravya or again a kriyā. Thus they believe in four sets of words and they may be identified as Jatyādivādins. Hence to the \textit{Ālaṃkārikas}, there are jatiśabdās, guṇaśabdās, dravyā śabdās and Kriyāśabdās\textsuperscript{16}.

In the opinion of \textit{Ālaṃkārikas}, the signifying power of a word (saṅketa) applies not to the individual (vyakti), but to the upādhis which reside in the individual. Upādhis are of two kinds, viz-

(i) Vastudharma ie the essential property residing in the thing.

(ii) Yadṛcchā ie a name or epithet attributed to a thing according to the wish of the speaker.
Vastudharma (natural property) is of two kinds, viz-

(i) Siddharūpa

(ii) Sādhyarūpa

The former includes (i) jati (universal) and (ii) guṇa (quality) The latter (ie Sādhyā rūpa) is in the form of kriyā (action)

E.g.: - cooks

Mammaṭa describes that even though 'jāti' etc are associated with the individual (vyakti), sanketa cannot be accepted in the individual because individuals are innumerable and live in all the three times. If we refer to one individual, it would not apply to the other. So he accepts upādhi saṅketa, ie the word refers to upādhi and not to vyakti, Yadṛcchā is Samjñā or proper names. The speaker uses such words according to his own will. Viśvasnātha also maintains that saṅketa is four fold consisting of class, quality, substance and action. He includes samjñā under substance.

So we can say that a vācaka word expresses a sense established by convention; and this sense of a word cannot be comprehended without convention. It should also be noted here that the word by means of which one understands the denoted meaning, is called the 'denotative' (vācaka) For e.g.: - Cow (go) is the denotative vācaka of the 'cow' in 'gām ānaya' and the meanings such as 'cow', which are denoted, are called primary meanings (mukhyārtha). This is so because, the word 'cow'denotes the cow as the cowness delimited etc. through the primary word relation (vṛtti) called signification (saṅketa)

Similarly in the example 'Gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣah (the village is on the Ganges) the primary meaning of the word 'Gaṅgā' is the river 'Ganges' only, and the meanings
such as 'bank' and 'purity' which are indicated and suggested respectively are secondary or non-primary meanings.

3:5 - Secondary Signification (Lakṣanā)

3:5:1 - Concept of Lakṣanā

In any language, in addition to express their primary meanings, words may be used to indicate or suggest some secondary meaning also. This meaning is always different from the primary meaning. In the opinion of Dr. K. Kunjunni Rāja, "If we take the word as denoting its normal primary meanings, the sentence may become non-sensical in the context. This produces a 'psychic resistance' in the listener, and there is a sort of break in the flow. It excites attention and requires interpretation for understanding the purport. The actual referent of the word has to be taken as different from its normal one, but in some way connected with it, either through similarity or through some other relation. This function of the word, denoting a referent different from its normal and primary one, but some how related to it, is called Lakṣanā or upacāra."

From this we can say that with the help of the primary signification or expressive power (śakti), words can express primary meanings. V.P. Bhaṭṭa opine that when a speaker may intend to indicate or suggest a secondary meaning which is different from the primary meaning, but at the same time, related in someway or other to the primary meaning on the general that the primary meaning may not fit into context or that secondary meaning may point out some qualities of the referent or being about some poetical charm or excellence to the usage.
Besides Lakṣanā, the terms like upacāra, gauṇī, vṛtti, bhakti etc. are also used to refer to this secondary meaning. In English, the word metaphor is popularly used instead of this Lakṣanā.

To make a brief study about Lakṣanā, we are to mention Yāska first. Because various examples of Luptopama is 'sīṃhaḥ' 'vyāghraḥ' etc. can be seen in Yaska's works and it should later becomes the stock example of Lakṣanā like 'simhomāṇavakaḥ' etc. Thus many examples of Lakṣanā without being named as such occur in Yāska's work. Of the Grammarians, Patanjali is the earliest to recognise the phenomenon of the transference of epithet which is nothing other than what we call a Lakṣanā. Though he does not mention the terms 'Lakṣanā' or 'guṇavṛtti,' he comes to refer to the practice of using a certain word for something other than what it usually stands for. Bhartṛhari comes to use the term Guṇa alone for the secondarily signified meaning; and no where in his work he has mentioned the term Lakṣanā. In later works, we can see that 'kākēbhyo dadhi rakṣyatāṃ' is an example of 'upalakṣaṇa' ('ajahatsvārthā') or of an upādānalakṣaṇa may be said to have originated from Bhartṛhari's kākēbhyo rakṣyatām sarpiḥ. In Parama Laghu Maṇjuśā, we can see the approach of Nāgeśa to lakṣanā is that he is in favour of Tātparyāṇupapatti which is the Lakṣanā bija.

Coming to the Ālaṃkārikas, we find that the secondary function does not come in use till Ānandavardhana's time. Bhāmaha shall have to be admitted as the first Ālaṃkārika to have recognised the transference of epithet i.e. Gauṇī vṛtti. An observation of Abhinavagupta also confirms our idea in the matter. According to Daṇḍin, Guṇavṛtti as the cause of certain Ālaṃkāras and he recommends its acceptance for the purpose of removing Grāmyatādoṣa in poetry.
Vāmana comes to use the term lakṣanā in the sense of secondary signification in general. Ānandavardhana uses the term Guṇavṛtti in a wider sense so as to cover all possible varieties of secondary signification. To describe this Guṇavṛtti, he uses the term 'amukhyavṛtti'. By them term Guṇavṛtti, Abhinavagupta covers both the Gauṇī and suddhā varieties of lakṣanā. Bhojarāja maintain a line of demarcation between Guṇa vṛtti and Lakṣanā. Later Ālaṃkārikas like Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and Hemacandra gives an elaborate discussion about lakṣanā and from Mammaṭa, lakṣanā came to be a generic name for all the varieties of secondary signification.

Among the Mīmāṃsakas, Jaimini used the term 'Bhakti' in the sense of secondary signification. Bādarāyaṇa, the author of Brahmasūtra use the term 'Bhakti' and Śabara-Swāmin use the term Gunavṛtti to denote the secondary signification. Kumarila is the first scholar who point out that it is the Lakṣanā function which operates to convey the sentence meaning in each and every sentence. Pārthasārathī Miśra and Nārāyana Bhaṭṭa, the followers of Kumarila give support to Kumarila.

Coming to the Prabhākara school, Prabhākara Miśra uses the terms Upacāra, Guṇa and Bhakti for secondary signification under various contexts. His illustration of Guṇavṛtti is 'gaurvāhikāḥ'. Śālikanātha, the follower of Prabhākara, presents the view of Kumarila and asserts that lakṣanā cannot be resorted to in each and every sentence; but it can be resorted to only when the primary meaning of a word comes to be discarded as in 'gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ'.

Of the Naiyāyikas, Gautama has used the term bhakti (bhākta) or upacāra to refer to the secondary signification of words. But Jayantabhaṭṭa has used the
term lakṣanā⁴⁰ for the first time in his Nyāya mañjari and later epistemologists such as Gadādhara adopted the term lakṣanā for the main secondary significative function of indicative power or transfer⁴¹. Gangeśa defines lakṣanā as a separate vṛtti of words to bring forth a secondary meaning for getting involved in a syntactical relation with a primary meaning of other words where the primary meaning of a word fails to do so⁴².

3:5:2 - Definition of Lakṣanā

Among the Ālaṃkārikas, Mammaṭa has defined lakṣanā as follows:- when the primary meaning of a word is not compatible with the meaning of a sentence, the power of a word by which another meaning connected with the primary meaning of the word is conveyed through usage or motive is called Lakṣana⁴³. He opinions that the three conditions under which lakṣanā operates are:-

1. mukhyārthabādha (obstruction or incompatibility of primary meaning)
2. Tadyoga (recognisable connection between the primary and secondary meanings)
3. ruḍhi (usage) and prayojana (motive)

Another Ālaṃkārika, Viśvanātha has defined lakṣanā⁴⁴ in a slightly different language. He opinions that Lakṣanā (secondary sense) is taken recourse to when Abhidhā (primary sense) is not applicable i.e. when the chief meaning (mukhyārtha or vācyārtha) is obstructed or hampered (badhita) in some way. It gives an occasion for figurative interpretation (Lakṣyārtha). In other words we can say that in their view, when the primary meaning of a word is logically incompatible with rest of
the sentence, Lakṣanā function is resorted to for bringing into comprehension a new meaning connected with the failing primary meaning of the word.

Logicians defined lakṣanā in general to be the relation between the primary meaning and the secondary indicated meaning. In Padārtha candrika, we can see that the occasion for lakṣanā arises only when there is an obstruction to primary meaning. In other words, if some syntactical incompatibility or a hindrance to the intended meaning that necessitates lakṣanā. Another definition of lakṣanā similar to that of Ālaṃkārikas is given by some Naiyāyikas also. Later Naiyāyikas described lakṣanā as a Śakya Sambandha or Svaśakyasambandha. In their opinion, implication is the relation with that meaning which is denoted by the denotative function. In kārikāvali, we can see that implication is the relation with that meaning which is denoted by the denotative function, because of the incompatibility of the intention of the speaker. Gangeśopadhyaya defines lakṣanā as a separate vṛtti of words to bring forth a secondary meaning for getting involved in a syntactical relation with a primary meaning of other words where the primary meaning of a word fails to do so.

Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas admitted Lakṣanā and it is brought into separation by a relation of the primary meaning (the relation being with regard to another meaning which comes to be designated as the Lakṣyārtha). In the opinion of Bhāṭṭas lakṣana as being based on a relation of the denoted sense of the word that signifies a secondary sense. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the primary meaning (the relation of which with a newer meaning, i.e. lakṣyārtha, is stated to be the basis for a lakṣanā) is described as 'Svabodhya' 'Svajñāpya' and sometimes 'svaśakya' also. These terms, in the sense of the primary meaning are applicable
not only to a padārtha, but also to a vākyārtha. While in the Bhāṭṭa school, the primary meaning is the meaning of an individual word, in the school of the Prābhākaras, it may be the total meaning of a sentence.

According to the Grammarians, Lakṣanā is the attribution or super imposition of the denotation on a secondary sense. i.e. śakyatāvachedakāropa.

For example:- When the word 'Ganges' indicates the bank in 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣah'; the indication of the same bank can be stated to be the super imposition of the denotation of word 'Ganges' on the secondary sense 'bank'. Thus, this theory views the indication as an erroneous perception of the denotation. From this we can see that Grammarians also hold the same view with the Navya Naiyāyikas. According to them, lakṣanā comes for operation because of a Tātparyānupapatti' be not accepted as the determining factor for the operation of a Lakṣana, in the expression 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ' the word' ghoṣa' may mean an aquatic creature by lakṣanā. In his opinion śakyasambandhaḥ Lakṣanā

3:5:3 - Essential condition for Lakṣanā

This is generally accepted that the operation of Lakṣanā is possible where there is some incompatibility of the primary meaning or mukhyārtha bādha; and this word- relation is specially assumed with a purpose. Hence Indian epistemologists together agree on one point that there must exist certain essential conditions (bīja) to assume this relation Lakṣanā. They differ amongst themselves as to what constitute the essential condition of Lakṣanā; or whether this incompatibility is due to the failure of a syntactical relation among the words in a sentence i.e. anvayānupapatti or the failure of the intention of the speaker i.e. Tātparyānupapatti.
Among the Mīmāṃsakas, Prābhākaras hold that the operation of Lakṣanā is caused by the Anvāyānupapatti. Some earlier Bhāttā Mīmāṃsakas who admit Lakṣanā for understanding every sentence-meaning do not subscribe to either of the aforesaid views. But some later Bhāttā Mīmāṃsakas have come to accept the necessity of a Lakṣanābijā and hence they admit sākyārthānvāyānupapatti as the determining factor for the operation of a Lakṣanā. Tātparyānupapatti is not obviously accepted by the Bhāttas as it is not possible in the context of vedic statements. Old Naiyāyikas also hold that the essential condition for assuming Lakṣanā is the untenability or incompatibility of the syntactico- semantical relation of the primary meaning with the meanings of the rest of words in a sentence i.e. anvāyānupapatti.

For eg:- Consider the sentence 'gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣāḥ' Here, the untenability or incompatibility of the syntactico- semantical relation of the 'Ganges', the primary meaning of the word 'ganga, with the village, the meaning of the word 'ghoṣāḥ' is the essential condition for assuming the indicative power of the word 'gaṅga' in the secondary meaning of the banks of the Ganges which is quite tenable to be construed with the village.

But according to Navya Naiyāyikas, the untenability of the speaker's intention to convey primary meaning (tātparyānupapatti) is the essential condition for assuming indicative power of the word in the secondary meaning. In their opinion, in a sentence 'gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣāḥ', the speaker cannot be held to intend to convey the primary meaning 'Ganges' from the word 'gaṅgā' since the same is not tenable to be construed with the village, and hence, the same untenability is the essential condition for assuming the indicative power of the word 'gaṅgā' in the secondary meaning of the
banks of the Ganges. Here the indicative power is assumed in the secondary meaning which is intended by the speaker to be conveyed for certain specific reasons such as the logicality or beauty of the sentence-meaning\(^{59}\). Thus, we can see that according to Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, untenability (incompatibility) of the syntactico-semantic relation and also that of the speaker's intention to convey primary meaning are the two essential conditions for assuming Lakṣaṇā.

Similarly, the Vaiyākaraṇas also hold the same view of the Navya Naiyāyikas. According to them, Lakṣaṇa comes for operation because of a Tātparyānupapatti. If this Tātparyānupapatti be not accepted as the determining factor for the operation of Lakṣaṇa, in the example 'gaṅgāyaṁ ghoṣaḥ' the word 'ghoṣa' may mean an aquatic creature by Lakṣaṇā\(^{60}\).

According to Mammaṭa and other Ālaṃkārikas, three essential conditions are necessary for the operation of Lakṣaṇa\(^{61}\). In his opinion, obstruction of primary meaning, tadyoga (substitution of another meaning associated with the primary meaning) and some convention (rūḍhi) or purpose (prayojana) are the three essential characteristics of Lakṣaṇā\(^{61}\). He says that in addition to incompatibility or untenability of the primary meaning, and the untenability of speaker's intention to convey primary meaning, the sanction for the secondary meaning by the popular usage for a definite purpose is also necessary, since the same enriches the content of the literature by facilitating new ideas. Of these three conditions, the first two are accepted by all writers; but the last definite purpose is not admitted by all especially by logicians and Mīmāṃsakas. It is only the literary critics who give great prominence to it\(^{62}\). Viṣvaṇātha confirms his view in a slightly different language\(^{63}\).
In the well-known example of lakṣanā -‘gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ ’ (The village is on the Ganges) - the primary meaning of the word 'gaṅgāyāṃ' is 'on the river Ganges'; This is not suitable to the context, since the village cannot actually be on the stream itself; hence the actual meaning of the word Gaṅgā is taken to be 'gaṅgātaṇa' 'the bank of the river Ganges'; the relation between the normal meaning of the word and its actual meaning here is one of proximity (sāmīpya) This secondary meaning of the word is not understood directly from the word, but only indirectly through its primary and normal meaning. This normal meaning that occurs to our mind immediately on hearing a word; when this is found to be incompatible with the context, we resort to lakṣaṇā and get the actual sense which is related to the normal one and which removes the incompatibility; and in this present case it may be indicate that the village has the qualities of sanctity and coolness associated with the sacred river.

3:5:4 - Different Views on Lakṣanā

There is a problem among the scholars of different systems that whether there is Lakṣanā in vākyā or not.

Among the Mīmāṃsakas, Bhāttas maintain that any vākyārtha (sentence-meaning) must come to us in the form of a Lakṣyārtha (secondary meaning). According to them, the function of Lakṣaṇā belongs to a sentence. Whenever any difficult arises in explaining a veda text, they have to take the help of Lakṣaṇā. They regard Lakṣaṇā as a vākyā vyāpāra; and also hold that the primary meanings conveyed by the words through Śakti or Abhidhā lead up to a sentence-meaning to be conveyed by Lakṣaṇā! Abhidhā ceases to operate after conveying the primary meaning of each word. These primary or expressed meanings conveyed by śakti
constitute a sentence-meaning. This sentence-meaning is conveyed by Lakṣaṇā. Thus in the opinion of Bhāṭṭas, every vākyārtha is a Lakṣyārtha as because every vākya invariably requires the operation of Lakṣaṇā to get its meaning conveyed.

But according to Prābhākaras, Lakṣaṇā comes to operate in a sentence only when it reveals some hindrance for individual word-meanings to be involved in a syntactical relation in order to give the sentence-meaning. In this way Prābhākaras reject the notion of Bhāṭṭas. So we can see that while the Bhāṭṭas accept Lakṣaṇā in all sentences, not only in vaidika but also in laukika ones, the Prābhākaras find the scope of Lakṣaṇā only in sentences which involve anvayānupapatti. For example: 'gabhīrāyāṃ nadyāṃ ghoṣāḥ'. According to them this is a case of Lakṣaṇā because they admit Lakṣaṇā with reference to a whole sentence. They propose that the intended sense, 'the bank of a deep river' is conveyed neither by the term 'gabhīra' alone nor by the word 'nadī' alone. If the word 'gabhīra' conveys the Lakṣyārtha (the bank) and the word nadī retains its primary sense, a syntactical relation between the two words cannot be thought of. Because there is an impossibility of identification between a bank and a river. Again if the word 'nadī' again is taken to convey the secondary sense (the bank) and the word 'gabhīra' is allowed to retain its primary meaning, a mutual relation between the two words is not possible; because the bank of a river cannot be deep. Hence they suggest that the syntactical relation between the two primary meanings i.e. 'deep' and 'river' is first effected and thereafter, the sentence as a whole, conveys the secondary sense, 'the bank of the deep river' by means of Lakṣaṇā.

But the Naiyāyikas hold that lakṣaṇā belong only to a pada (word) and not to a vākya (sentence) In their opinion, śakti belongs to the word and hence lakṣaṇā
also belongs to the word only. Hence there can be no possibility of Lakṣaṇā as belonging to a whole sentence\textsuperscript{69}. The accepted position of the Naiyāyikas is that as there is no śakyārtha also in it. And consequently there is no Lakṣaṇā (śakyasambandha) in a vākya. In Muktāvali, 'vākye tu'\textsuperscript{70} etc. confirms Viśvanātha's position in this regard. Gangeśa, the author of Tattvacintāmaṇi opinions that the individual word itself conveys the idea of 'anvaya' of its own meaning. The group cannot convey the idea of an 'anvaya' of the meanings of words belonging to it. It is because a group cannot have a definite primary meaning of its own. The śakyārtha, therefore, belongs only to the individual word and never a group. Consequently Lakṣaṇā as śakyasambandha can belong to the pada (word) and never to a vākya (sentence)\textsuperscript{71}.

For eg:- In 'gabhīrāyāṃ nadyāṃ ghoṣah' the words 'gabhīra' and 'nadi', first get involved in an 'anvaya' and present the idea of 'a deep river'; Then either of the two words comes to convey the idea of 'the bank of a deep river' as a Lakṣyārtha. This Lakṣyārtha is related to the śakyārtha of the word which is taken to have conveyed the Lakṣyārtha in the context\textsuperscript{72}.Thus it is not the sentence but a single word, either 'gabhīra' or 'nadi' which conveys the Lakṣyārtha.

Similarly, the Mīmāṃsakas admit Lakṣaṇā in certain samāsas\textsuperscript{73} like Tatpuruṣa while in Karmadhāraya they take the meaning of the samāsa only as a śakyārtha. They admit it in the entire samāsa and not merely in a constituent word of it. To the contrary, the Naiyāyikas including Viśvanātha admit Lakṣaṇā not in an entire samāsas but in one of the component parts of it. It is obvious that they do not come to recognise a Lakṣaṇā also in a samāsa as a whole. It is because a samāsa is for them a compressed sentence only. They feel that to recognise a Lakṣaṇā in a
samāsa will virtually amount to recognising a Lakṣaṇā in a vākya or in a full sentence. So to avoid recognising Lakṣaṇā in a Samāsa, the Naiyāyikas assert that when ever a Lakṣyārtha is to be conveyed in a samāsa, the corresponding Lakṣaṇā operates as belonging to anyone of the component words of the compound.

Vaiyākaraṇas regard Lakṣaṇa as a vākyavyāpara. They do not find any scope of admitting Lakṣaṇā either in the whole or any part of a compounded word. They find the purpose served by the śakti itself. In the opinion of Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas, there is no śakti in a vākya as well as in a samasa which is nothing but a condensed sentence (vākya). But unlike the thinkers of these two schools, Vaiyākaraṇas understand śakti as belonging to a samāsa as a whole. They want a samāsa to be recognised as a single word endowed with śakti and śakyārtha. It is because they are anxious to maintain the status of samāsa as a prātipadika. Their opinion is that if a samāsa is supposed to be 'śabdasamudāya' (a cluster of words) and not as an 'ekapada' (a single word), it will not be possible to apply the definition of prātipadika to it. Hence according to Vaiyākaraṇas, a samāsa is a single word, a prātipadika and the meaning conveyed by it is a śakyārtha.

For eg:- In a samāsa like 'citragu', the entire samāsa comes to convey the meaning, 'the master of spotted cows (gosvāmin). This meaning is obviously different from what should have been the direct meanings of the component parts of the compound, namely, 'citra' and 'go'. Here according to Vaiyākaraṇas, 'the master of spotted cows' as the immediate direct meaning (śakyārtha) of the samāsa itself without any reference to what could have been the direct meaning of the word 'citra' and 'go'. Thus in the view of the Grammārians, samāsārtha is a variety of śakyārtha. Therefore Vaiyākaraṇas assign the power of expressing
such additional senses to the compounds, taking the whole as an indivisible unit of speech.

Among the Ālaṃkārikas, Mammaṭa opinions that the secondary meaning (Lakṣaṇa) belongs to meaning, but it is imposed on the word by attribution.⁷⁵

Viśvanātha partly agrees with Mammaṭa; but instead of regarding Lakṣaṇā as āropitā, he regards it as arpitā⁷⁶.

3:5:5 - Classification of Lakṣaṇā

Among the Naiyāyikas, Prācyas hold that Lakṣaṇā is of four types

a) Jahatsvārthā lakṣaṇā (Jahallakṣaṇā)

In this type of lakṣaṇā, the primary sense has to be rejected to a great extent or losing out denoted meaning ie jahat svārthā. And another sense connected with it has to be taken to suit the context. Mammaṭa calls it lakṣana lakṣaṇā⁷⁷.

For eg:- 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ (The village is on the Ganges) Here the primary sense of the term Gaṅgā (Ganges) is abandoned and the secondary meaning 'the bank of the Ganges' is taken.

b) Ajahat svārthā lakṣaṇā (Ajahallakṣaṇā)

In some cases the secondary sense includes the primary sense also or the indication without losing denoted meaning is known as Ajahat svārthā lakṣaṇā. It is not necessary that the primary sense should be completely excluded in all cases of transfers⁷⁸. Some times the primary sense is not substantially modified, but only specified by context, or restricted by its syntactic function, or extended by the inclusion of another sense. Mammaṭa calls it upādāna lakṣaṇa⁷⁹.
For example:- 'kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām (protect curd from the cows). Here the implied meaning of crow is the objects which make disturbance to the ghee; at the same time without losing out the denoted meaning ie crow.

c) Jabadajahallakṣanā

The third is the indication losing and not losing denoted meaning. In this case, only a part or an aspect of the primary meaning is preserved, while the rest is rejected. In a sentence 'So' yaṁ Devadattaḥ' (This is that Devadatta) Here the term saḥ ( that) refers to Devadatta as determined by the past time and space and the term ayaṁ (this) refers to the same Devadatta as determined by the present time and space. Here indication is assumed in Devadatta losing out 'thatness'; but not losing out 'thisness'.

d) Lakṣītalakṣanā

This type of lakṣanā occurs when the relation between the primary and the actual referents is not direct, but indirect through some other word is known as Lakṣita lakṣanā or the indication of the indicated word.

Consider the word 'dvirepha'. Here the literal meaning of the word is 'a word having two 'r''s' and it indicates the word bhramara, and through that word it means the 'bee' or the indication is assumed in the sense of black bee by assuming another indication for the word 'dvirepha' in the sense of the word 'bhramara'.

The Navya Nayāyāyikas accepted the above mentioned three categories of Lakṣana. The fourth category is not acceptable to them and according to them, it can be included under jahallakṣanā itself.
Among the Naiyāyikas, Annāmbhaṭṭa divides lakṣaṇā into three types as Jahallakṣaṇā. Ajahallakṣana and Jahadajahallakṣaṇā. It should be noted that according to him 'Tattvamasi', the famous upaniṣad vākya is an example of Jahadajahallakṣaṇa. Viśvanātha classifies Lakṣaṇā into two types namely Jahatsvārthā and Ajahatsvārthā. According to him, Lakṣita lakṣaṇā is a division of Jahatsvārthā lakṣaṇā. Another Naiyāyika, Jagadīśa divides lakṣaṇā into five types namely Jahatsvārthā, Ajahatsvārthā, Nirūḍhā, Ādhunikā and Gauṇī.

In the circle of Mīmāṃsakas, in the Bhāṣya of Śabarasvāmi, we can see that two different types of secondary signification in the form of Lakṣaṇā and Gauṇī. Another division of Lakṣaṇā into Jahatsvārthā and Ajahatsvārthā is revealed in its treatment by Śabarasvāmi. So we can say that the Mīmāṃsakas, as a whole, classify lakṣaṇā into Jahatsvārthā and Ajahatsvārthā.

For example:- 'gāṅgayām ghoṣāḥ' Here the primary meaning comes to be virtually dead, leading to an additional meaning i.e. the secondary meaning. Similarly 'Yaśīḥ pravesaya' is given as an illustration of Ajahatsvārthā, where in the primary sense retains a part of itself as a participant in the desired syntactical relation in a sentence. They include Lakṣita-lakṣaṇā under the jahatsvārthā group.

Lakṣaṇā can be classified fundamentally into two types; conventional (nirūḍha) and natural (svārasika).

Indication or lakṣaṇā is conventional (nirūḍha) if the same indication is established on the basis of earlier conventions (nirūḍhīmula) and indication is natural (svārasikā lakṣaṇā) if the same indication is established on the basis of some purpose (prayojana mūlā). The first one is nirūḍha.
For example: 'ratho gacchati' (chariot moves)

Here the indication of the conjugational ending 'ti' in the sense of the substratum of the movement is the nirūḍha lakṣāna; since the same is established by the convention of speakers. The second type is prayojana mūlā.

For example: 'gāvaḥ vaṭe ĥerate (cows lie down at the vicinity of the vaṭa tree)

Here the indication of the word 'vaṭe' in the sense of the vicinity of the vaṭa tree is the natural indication, since the same is established on the basis of the purpose of explaining the vicinity of the tree.

Thus, while the former classification (four-fold) of lakṣāna as Jahallakṣāna etc. is based on the degree of the intimacy of relation or the relation of the primary meaning. But the present classification (two-fold) of lakṣāna as nirūḍha etc. is based on the distinction between convention and the purpose (motif) which makes the same unintentional (not intended for some purpose) and intentional (intended for some purpose).

According to some Vaiyākaraṇas, lakṣāna should be classified also as suddha and gauṇi i.e. direct or pure and indirect or qualitative. Of these, the first one, suddhā means the indication assumed directly in the secondary meaning due to untenability or incompatibility of the primary meaning.

For example - āyur ghṛtam. (clarified butter is indeed life)

Here the indication is direct or pure since the indication of the word 'āyur' is assumed directly in the cause or the means of long life due to the incompatibility of the primary meaning i.e. the life, for being related to the clarified butter.
The second is 'gaṇī'. Here the indication assumed indirectly in the secondary meaning due to the similarity or sharing of the same qualities between two meanings.

For example:- 'agnir māṇavakaḥ' (Boy is fire)

Here indication is indirect or qualitative, since the indication of the word agni (fire) is assumed indirectly in the sense of the fiery qualities of the boy due to the similarity of the qualities between fire and the boy.

From this classification of lakṣaṇā, we can see that this classification is mainly due to the incompatibility of the primary meaning and the similarity of the qualities between the objects.

Among the Ālaṃkārikas, Mammaṭa classifies lakṣaṇā into six varieties. He first divides lakṣaṇā into two-upādānalakṣaṇā and lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā. These two are suddhā as they do not consist of a relationship based on simily. These are called ajahatsvārthā and jāhatsvārtha by the Naiyāyikas. Both suddhā and gaṇī are further divided into sāropā and sādhyavasāna. These four are added to the first two divisions of lakṣaṇā viz upādānalakṣaṇā and lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā, get six varieties of lakṣaṇā.

According to Viśvanātha, lakṣana can be divided into eighty types. He broadly classified Lakṣaṇā into two - Rūḍhi mūla and prayojanamūla. Each again came to be divided into upādāna lakṣaṇā and Lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā which stand for Ajahatsvārthā and Jahatsvārthā respectively. Again this divided into sāropā and sādhyavasāna. Each of these lakṣaṇās came to be shown either as suddhā or as Gaṇī. The prayojanamūla lakṣaṇā again came to have another division because of the suggested motive involved therein (i.e. prayojanarūpavyaṅgya) The suggested
motive again sometimes pertains to an attribute (dharma) and sometimes to one possessed of some attribute (dharma). Hence there comes another classification of the prayojanamūla lakṣaṇa. All lakṣaṇas are again shown as pertaining to either a word (pada) or a sentence (vākya).

Mukulabhaṭṭa, the author of Abhidhāvṛttimatṛkā classified lakṣaṇa into three:- Sudhā, Sāropā and sādhyavasāṇā. In his opinion, when the actual referent appears to be aloof and clearly distinct from the primary referent, it is the śuddhā or pure type. Similarly when the difference between the two referents is not clear and there is superimposition of the one on the other, it is called the sāropā (super-imponent) type. And when the apparent closeness of the two referents is so great that there is no apprehension of the difference at all, it is the sādhyavasāṇā type of lakṣaṇa. The third one is the object of superimposition is completely eclipsed or swallowed by the thing superimposed; the former is not expressed by a word, only the latter is expressed instead. When the sāropā and the sādhyavasāṇā types of lakṣaṇa-s based on similarity, they play a great part in the literary figures of speech. Of these, the sāropā type is the basis of the figure of speech rūpaka as in 'mukha candra' or 'the face is the moon'; and the sādhyavasāṇā type is the basis of the figure of speech 'rūpakātiśayokti' as in 'ayaṃ candraḥ' (This is the moon) referring to the face.

In Mahābhāṣya, Patanjali too mentions such figurative usage. Jaimini, the founder of Mīmāṃsa enumerates six bases for figurative usage. Gautama in his Nyāyaśāstra enumerates ten relations between the primary and actual meaning with examples. He also says that, the great Mīmāṃsaka, Bhartṛmitrā has shown five relationship that generally exist between the primary and the secondary meanings - viz-
"Abhidheyena saṁbandhat sadṛṣyāt samavāyataḥ
Vaiparītyāt kriyāyogāt lakṣanā pancadhā mata"

Similarly Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, and Hemachandra also give a list of relations. In short, relations between primary and secondary meaning can be arranged in two classes - similarity and relating other than similarity.

It is obvious that the various schools of thought accept that there must be some sort of relation between the primary and the secondary meaning. This secondary meaning is not converged immediately and directly. It can be known only through the primary meaning. In other words we have to understand primary meaning of the word first and only then does arrives the second one.

3:6 - Vyañjana (Suggestion)

3:6:1 - Concept of Vyañjana

Among the different śabda - vyāpāras or the functions of a word to convey the sense, vyañjana is the third category of relation of word and meaning.

This tertiary power of word is also known as suggestion.

Writers on poetics (Rhetoricians) and Grammarians accept this third type of word relation in the form of Vyañjana (suggestion); and it is entirely different from Śakti (abhidhā) and Lakṣana.

Among the Ālaṃkārikas, Ānandavardhana was the first who shed light on the existence and importance of this suggested sense. In poetic world, before Ānandavardhana, the earlier poeticians like Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin were although aware of a meaning other than the primary; but they did not try to explain about this suggestion or how it differs from the primary and secondary meanings.
In the opinion of Ànandavardhana, this unexpressed or suggestive meaning is the essence of poetic language and to show this meaning, he established the doctrine of Dhvani. In his opinion, Suggestion (Vyañjana) as a type of word-relation which facilitates the reference to a distinct sense when the other word-relations namely, denotation and indication fail to do so.

Vyañjana (suggestion) as a type of word-relation stands for such meanings of words as are neither directly nor indirectly related to them. It differs from abhidhā, because abhidhā is incapable of causing another comprehension which is unconventional. The sentence 'Ganagāyāṁ ghoṣah' can express only its primary meaning i.e. 'a hamlet in the Ganges'. As a hamlet cannot exist in the stream lakṣaṇāvṛtti comes in - 'Gaṅgātaτe ghoṣah'. This extension of the meaning enables one to feel the qualities of coolness and holiness of Ganges. This is the motive (prayojana) of the speaker. This motive is not comprehended through abhidhā due to the absence of convention. So here a third vyāpāra ie Vyañjanā has to be accepted.

3:6:2 - Importance of Vyañjana

In the famous example "If you have to go, O dear, do go, may your ways be auspicious. My birth too would occur in the place where you go". Here the death of the beloved is conveyed only through the suggestion and other word relations such as denotation (abhidhā) and indication (Lakṣana) fail to convey the same.

From the above example, we can see that the intended sense 'You should not go leaving me behind since in your going my death would occur' cannot be conveyed by the other relations.
In this way the Rhetoricians pointed out the importance of suggestive meaning.

Vyañjana has the capacity of suggestiveness which differs both from abhidhā and lakṣana. This is the another importance of vyañjana that it can carry different suggestions in different situations.

For eg:- The sun has set

The primary meaning of this sentence, is quite clear and it means sunset pure and simple.

If this sentence is intended to carry a figurative meaning, it may mean' a glorious man has died' - This is the secondary meaning (lakṣyārtha)

But here it is possible that the same example has a third kind of meaning viz - 'The sun has set'. This proposition may carry different suggestions to different persons in different contexts.

To a student, this sentence may mean that it is high time to close up the studies. But to a herdsman, it may mean that it is time to drive cattle home. Such kind of meaning as suggested by a sentence is known as vyaṅgyārtha or vyaṅgya and the function of the word involved in the language is said as vyaṅjanā.

Vyaṅjanā is associated with a richness and complexity which is far beyond the reach of Abhidhā or Lakṣanā. This, there fore, may be regarded as the reason for accepting 'dhvani' as the yardstick for judging the genuine from the fake and the best from the lowest forms of poetry.

According to Mammaṭa, the best poetry is that in which the suggested sense dominates the expressed sense; in the poetry of the second category, the
suggested sense balances the expressed sense and in the poetry of the third category, there is no suggested sense at all. So he calls the best poetry as dhvani kāvya, the Kāvya of the second category is called guṇībhūta vyaṅgya and the lowest kavya is citra- kāvya.

Mammaṭabhaṭṭa also establishes the existence and importance of vyaṅjanā vyāpāra in poetry. According to Mammaṭa, the more suggestive work of art is the greater it is. In other words, the greatness of a work of art varies directly with the quantum, of suggestiveness in it.

According to Ānandavardhana, the suggested sense or the implied sense which resides in the words of great poets is like the grace of a beautiful lady and this grace is quite different from the beauty of individual limbs or external charm.

The writers on poetics were interested in this third type of word-relation viz- vyaṅjana as they contributed to the enhancement of the poetic beauty. They also hold that this to be the most important aspect in the experience of aesthetic enjoyment; and they have a special regard for the suggestive functions as a unique characteristic of all great poetry and called it the essence of poetry.

Ācāryas from Ānandavardhana down wards made out strong case for the recognitions of suggested sense and the suggestive function as fulfillment of the literal sense and the denotative function; which they regarded as the starting point of all poetry. This suggested sense along with Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas become vivid and aesthetically satisfying. An emotional situation is an extremely delicate matter and it requires an equally delicate medium for conveying it and suggestion is undoubtedly such a delicate medium.
In the opinion of Viśvanātha, when the abhidhā (ie the primary potency of a word) has performed its function and the vācyārtha (literal meaning) is known; it gives rise to an implication which is known as Vyañjana or the verbal function which comes into play over and above the other two functions, Abhidhā and Lakṣanā, is Vyañjanā with a new meaning and it belongs to both word and meaning and other allied facts”.

ie Viratāsvabhidhādyāsu
yayārtho bodhyate paraḥ
Sā vr̥ttir Vyañjanā nāma
śabdasyarthaḥdikasya ca¹⁰⁰ !

Like Ānandavardhana,¹⁰¹ he holds this power to reside not only in words, but in their meanings as well. Mammaṭa, does not define Vyañjanā directly. He says in Kāvya prakāśa-

Yasya pratītimādhātum Lakṣanā samupāsyate
phale śabdāṅkagamy, tra Vyañjanāṅparā kriyā¹⁰²

Which means that-"In regard to that intended idea for bringing about the cognition where of one has recourse to Lakṣana, and which is cognisable through the word only, the function of the word can be none other than suggestion.

Ānandavardhana's definition is implied in this verse¹⁰³

So, rathastadvyaktisāmarthya yogi śabdaśca kaścana
yathataḥ pratyabhijñē yau tau
śabdārthay mahākaveḥ
Which means that - "The meaning and the words which possess the power to convey the meaning which is not easy to discover are suggestors (vyañjana) and the power which operates in conveying the meaning is called the tertiary power of the word.

According to Nageśa and Appayadikṣita that power is called vyañjana which can impartially deal with primary meaning and that which goes beyond.  

Grammarians hold that suggestion is an impression originated from the imagination and also the knowledge of poetic cleverness etc.

\[
\text{vakrādivaiśitya jñāna} \quad \text{pratibhādyudbhūdaḥ samskāraviśeṣaḥ}^{105}
\]

Thus, whether the suggestion is to be included under denotation etc. or not, the same is a powerful word relation or function which facilitates the conveying of an exceptionally charming and poetic sense.

3:6:4 - Classification of Vyañjana

Vyañjana (suggestion) can occur either in words or in meaning. Therefore Rhetoricians recognize two varieties of vyañjana - viz -

1) śabdī vyañjana

2) Ārthī vyañjana

The Vyañjana is called śabdī, if the implication arises from some specific word (śabdaviśeṣa). It is called ārthī, if the implication arises from the meaning of the sentence as a whole, and not from any specific word.
Some words are such as carry more than one meaning. The use of such an ambiguous word (anekārthaka sabda) which gives rise to sleṣa (pun). This ambiguity of meaning caused by an equivocal expression which lies at the root of śabdī vyañjana.

For example:- If some one says 'Dūrataḥ bhūdharāḥ ramyāḥ'. Here the Sanskrit word 'bhūdharā' means a mountain as well as a king. Bhūdharas are pleasant only from a distance - This sentence has a double meaning. The explicit meaning is - "It is a difficult task to climb mountain'.

But the implicit suggestion is "Live at a respectable distance from the kings".

Such a suggestion would not have been possible, had the word 'bhudharā' been substituted by any synonym such as 'parvata' which lacks the other meaning.

So we can say that the suggestive force lies in the equivocal word 'bhūdharā' and hence it is known as śabdī vyañjana.

śabdī vyañjana is of two kinds\textsuperscript{107}, (1) viz-

1) Abhidhāmūlā (ie dependent on primary meaning)

2) Lakṣanāmūla (dependent on secondary meaning)

In the above example, the suggestiveness depends on the literal meaning (vacyārtha) of the word 'bhūdharā'. Hence it is called abhidhamulā vyañjana.\textsuperscript{108}

When the suggestiveness depends upon the figurative meaning (lakṣyārtha). It is called lakṣanāmūlā. (The village is on the Ganges) Here the lakṣyārtha is 'the village lies on the bank of the Ganges' and the vyañgyārtha is "The village is cool
and pure\textsuperscript{109}. This kind of \textit{Vyañjanā} which depends on Lakṣanā is known as lakṣanāmūlā vyañjanā\textsuperscript{110}. Such as 'to a student and to a herds man' in different contexts. These senses emanates from the meaning of the sentence as a whole and hence it is known as ārthī vyañjanā.

In the opinion of Ālaṅkārikas like Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha etc., there are various factors or conditions that determine the ārthī vyañjanā.\textsuperscript{111} They are -

- the nature of the speaker (Vaktṛ - Vaiśīṣṭya)
- the nature of the bearer (boddhavya vaiśīṣṭya)
- the proximity of some other sentence (anya vākya sannidhi)
- the place (deśa)
- time (kāla)
- the intonations and gesticulations (kāku ceṣṭā etc.) of the speaker - are the determinants of ārthī Vyañjanā. Eg :- 'Gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ'. (The village is on the Ganges) Here the lakṣyārtha is 'the village lies on the bank of the Ganges' and the Vyañgyārtha is 'the village is cool and pure'. This kind of Vyañjanā which depends on Lakṣanā is known as Lakṣanāmūla Vyañjanā.

\textbf{3:6:4:2 - Ārthī Vyañjanā}

When the suggested meaning depends not on any particular word used literally or figuratively but on the sense of the entire sentence taken as a whole, the vyañjanā is called ārthī.

For example:- Gatośtamarkaḥ (The sun has set) Here the denoted meaning is that the day is over. This proposition may carry different suggestions such as 'to close up the studies' 'to drive cattle home' to different persons.
It should be noted here that Logicians do not accept vyañjanā (suggestion) as a separate word relation. But include it within śakti and Lakṣanā or the primary and secondary meanings.

Bhartṛhari has openly recognized the fact that words can convey more than literal meanings by establishing his doctrine of sphoṭa or meaningful linguistic unit that conveys a distinct sentence-meaning. But Grammarians and Ālaṃkārikas have established suggested meanings or suggestion (dhvani) as a third category of meanings apart from expressed and indicatory meanings.

3:7 - Tātparya

3:7:1 - Concept of Tātparya

Among the Ālaṃkārikas, it is Abhinavagupta who for the first time refers to tātparya as a separate vṛtti or function of words to explain the syntactic unity of a sentence. This function accepted by the abhihitānvaya theory of verbal comprehension. According to Abhinavagupta, there are four distinct functions of words :- abhidhā, tātparya, lakṣana and vyañjanā. He arranges them under four separate classes.

In the opinion of Abhinavagupta, abhidhā is the power of the words to signify the primary meaning and it refers only to the universal and not to the particular. In a sentence, the individual words by their primary function of abhidhā refer only to the isolated word-meanings. The syntactic relation of these is conveyed by the tātparya śakti of the words. The general purport of the utterance or the intention of the speaker is obviously to give a unified purposeful sentence-meaning. Hence the words are considered to have a power to convey the syntactic relation among the various isolated word-meanings. This power is called tātparya śakti.
Followers of Abhinavagupta such as Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha have proposed that speaker's intention (tātparya vṛtti) facilitates the comprehension of syntactico-semantical relations between various word-meanings according to the abhihitānvaya theory. These referents (word-meanings) are obtained from words through the primary signification of words or denotation (abhidhā) and hence, the same is a sentence-function (vākyā vṛtti). Mammaṭa in the kāvyaprakāśa gives references to tātparya as a separate vṛtti and there explained its function also.\textsuperscript{114}

In the Sāhityadarpaṇa, Viśvanātha repeats the same idea and refers to the tātparya vṛtti as a separate function as being accepted by the abhihitānvaya theory.\textsuperscript{115} In his opinion, it is the sentence as a whole that conveys the tātparyārtha and hence the power of tātparya must rest with the sentence as a whole. On the basis of the statements of Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa, many of the later Ālaṃkārika-s have also referred to this function - tātparya.

It is also notable that among the Ālaṃkārika-s, Ānandavardhana refutes tātparya as an anti-dhvani theory. Even though he refers to the importance of the speaker's intention in conveying the meaning of a passage, he never refers to tātparya as a separate vṛtti or śakti of words. He says that in linguistic discourse, there are only three functions of words to be accepted:- the primary, the secondary and the suggestive.\textsuperscript{116}

Bhoja, another Ālaṃkārika, has a unique way of treating tātparya.\textsuperscript{117} He divides tātparya into three types namely;

expressed (vācyā or abhidhīyamāna)

implied (pratīyamāna) and

suggested (dhvanirupa)
From the verses of Sṛṅgāra prakāśa, we can see that Bhoja hold 'Tātparya' is arthadharma and dhvani is śabda dharma. Also according to him, tātparya is internal, is the saubhāgya of vāk or speech and dhvani is external hit īhāvaṇya of vāk.

Bhoja rejects both abhihitānvaya and anvitābhidhānāvāda and accepts the position of the anubhayavādins. He prefers a third view according to which words convey the sentence-meaning by their cumulative effect or saṃhatyakāritā to the tātparya śakti of words. Jayanta, the famous Naiyāyika Scholar attributes this saṃhatyakāritā to the tātparya śakti of words.

Dhanika, the commentator of Daśarūpaka advocates the theory that dhvani is included in tātparya. According to him, it is not necessary to recognize a new function called dhvani and there is no limitation of the term tātparya to the expressed sense. But it can cover the whole range of the speaker's intention and cover all implications coming up in the train of the expressed sense.

It may be noted that Jayanta bhaṭṭa, the author of Nyāyamañjarī, was the first to bring forward the theory about tātparya being a separate vr̥tti. After discussing the various theories about verbal comprehension held by various schools, Jayanta advocates a modified form of abhihitānvaya theory. In his opinion, words express their isolated word-meanings by the power of abhidhā, and they have another power, the tātparya śakti, which indicates the mutual relationship among the word-meanings. The function of this power is to reveal the meanings of the words obtained in a sentence as being mutually related. This power belongs to all the words in common and lasts till the independent judgement is produced.
This should be very clear that this tātparya Śakti is the same as the samsargamaryādā accepted by the later Navya Nyāya School.\textsuperscript{123} Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri says\textsuperscript{124} that the additional element conveyed by a sentence, over and above the separate concepts conveyed by separate words, is the intended relation of the concepts (padārthasaṃsarga) and this additional element, which is the distinctive feature of verbal judgement (vākyārtha) is conveyed through the particular juxta-position of words (saṃsargamaryāda), and not through a primary or secondary significative power of words (Abidhā or Lakṣana).

He also says that tātparya has to be accepted as a motivating factor in verbal comprehension; but there is no need to assume a separate function of words called tātparya vṛtti. That is why it has not been accepted as such by later writers.

According to the Prābhākara-s tātparya makes the primary significatory power itself capable of conveying not only the individual word-meanings, but their mutual connection as well. Thus even when tātparya is not taken as a separate vṛtti, it could be referred to as the motive force conveying the syntactic relation; infact Parthasārathi Miśra himself refers to the function of tātparya\textsuperscript{125} and Jayanta quotes Kumarilabhaṭṭa in support of his theory that tātparya is a separate vṛtti of the words which conveys the syntactic relation of the word-meanings.\textsuperscript{126}

Mīmāṃsakas, as reported by Rhetoricians, formally recognized tātparya as a distinct sentence function (vākyā vṛtti) that conveys the syntactico-semantic relations.
Among the Mīmāṃsakas, Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa, the great authoritative writer on Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsa says that tātparya is not a separate factor in conveying the syntactic relationship of the word-meanings. But some of the ancient commentators and modern scholars following Bhāṭṭa school, have thus associated tātparya vṛtti with the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsa.

Among the Logicians, while the Prācyas considered tātparya to be a capacity or power (śakti) of sentence, Navyas considered the same to be merely the fourth essential factor that facilitates the sentence - meaning along with ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and āsatti. They have held so mainly on the ground that sentence - meaning or syntactico-semantical relations between word-meanings, being merely relations, and not being any meanings (referents), do not require any separate power or function of sentence to convey them. Hence according to the Navyas, tātparya is the fourth essential condition of śābdabodha.

But in later times, Navya logicians like Gadādhara replaced the concept of tātparya as a fourth necessary condition that facilitates the comprehension of the syntactico - semantical relations between word-meanings with their theory of samsarga maryāda (unifying force of relations).

ie Śābdabodhe caika padārthe aparapārthasya samsargaḥ samsargamaryādayā bhāsate.

So we can conclude that Indian philosophers and epistemologists, especially Logicians, Mīmāṃsakas and Rhetoricians too have recognized the fact that tātparya or speaker's intention plays a very significant role in determining the exact meanings of words.
In their opinion, words, despite being grammatically correct and semantically competent, may fail to convey any meaning in the doubt or in the absence of the knowledge regarding the exact intention of the speaker to convey a particular meaning. This opinion is very clear from the famous example 'saindhavam ānaya'. Thus, they have admitted that the ascertainment of speaker's intention (tātparya) plays a significant role in the determination of the exact meaning to be conveyed and hence it is an associate cause of śābdabodha.
Notes and References:

1. Šābdabodhahetu padārthopasthityanukūlaḥ padapadārthayoh saṃbandhaḥ
   - LM - p.28.

2. Padajñānaṃ tu karaṇam dvāram tatra padārthadhīḥ
   śābdabodhaḥ phalaḥ tatra śakti-dhīḥ-sahakāriṇī - NSM- Kārika .81

3. padatvam ca vṛttimatvam -GSV - 2.2.60

4. Śābdabodha janaka padapadārtha- Sambandhatvam vṛttitvaṃ
   - LM - p.28.

5. TS p.66

6. ibid

7. tatradhunika samketaḥ mukhyārtha ityucyate :- Śak.V. pp 5-6

8. NSM - p.266


10. asmātpadādayamartho boddhavya itiśvarecchā samketaḥ śaktiḥ
    - Quoted by Kane in his notes on Sāhityadarpaṇa.


12. SD - 2.7

13. Saṃyogo viprayogaśca sāhacaryaṃ virodhitā
    arthaḥ prakaraṇam lingaṃ
    śabdasyanyasya sannidhiḥ
    sāmarthyam aucitī deśaḥ kālo
    vyaktīḥ svarādayaḥ
śabdārthasyānāvaccine
dviṣeṣaṃṛti hetavaḥ - KP.2.20

14. śaktyākhyo'r thasya......
sambandha viṣeṣo bhidha
- RG II p.134

15. Sa mukhyo'r thastatra mukhyo
vyāpāro'syābhidhocyate-
- KP.2.8

16. Saṅketo gṛhyate jātau guṇadravya-
kriyāsu ca - SD.II.4.

17. Upādhiḥ dvividhaḥ vastu dharmaḥ vakṛtyadṛḍchayā sanniveśitaśca.
Vastudharmopi dvividhaḥ, siddharūpaḥ sādhyarūpaśca. Siddhopi dvividaḥ
tatrādyā jātiḥ dvitīyo guṇaḥ. Sādhyarūpaḥ kriyārūpaḥ - NK.

18. ITM - p.No. 231

19. V.P. Bhaṭṭa; Gadadhara's śakti vāda -vol-I.p.No. 54

20. ITM - title page for the chapter on metaphor (Lakṣana)

21. atha..... kutsāyāṁ kāka iti- NIR 3.18

22. 'Siddham tu striyāḥ pumśabdenābhidhānāt. On 'pumyogādkāhyāyām' - MBH
under vārtika 3. p. 4.1.48

23. Kākebhyo rakṣyatāṁ sarpiriti bālopi coditaḥ / upagḥatapare vākye na
svādibhyo na rakṣati - VP: 2.312

24. Vastutastu tātparyaśnupapatti sandhānameva tadbījām - PLM. p.45
25. Bhāmahenoktam - śabdāschando....gunaṇvṛttiśca iti. Locana, vide DL p.34

26. niṣṭhyūtōgirṇavāntādi guṇavṛttiavāśrayam |
    ati sundaramanyatra grāmyakākṣāṃ vigāhate ||
    KD 1.95

27. Locana, vide DL. p. 157

28. tatra sākṣādavyavahitārthābhidhāyikā mukhyā. - SRP. p. 223.

29. KP II .9.12

30. SD.II. 5.11

31. KS - p. 24f

32. Sarveṣām vaikamantryamaitiśāyanasya bhaktipāvatvāt savanādhikyato hi
   - MS. 3.2.43

33. tadetat grahādilakṣayitvā.....
    sammārgādisambandhāḥ ..... iti etc. SB under MS. 3.1.14

34. Vākyārtho lakṣayamāṇo hi sarvatraiva naḥ sthitih - SV.p.229

35. itaresām tu..... Mīmāṁsakāḥ - NRM - pp 101-102

36. nanu ca..... śakyate vaktum - VR. pp 41- 42

37. nanu..... gaurvāhīka iti - VR. p. 147

38. Vākyārtho lakṣamāṇo hi sarvatraiva hi lakṣyate iti; VM. p. 13.

39. N.S. ii. 1.15

40. Satyaṁ gośabdaḥ ....... ghoṣaḥ prati vasatiḥ. NM part II. p.171

41. V.P. Bhaṭṭa; op.cit; p.54.
42. lakṣanā ca ...... vākyārthānvayaḥ - TC. p.660

43. Mukhyārtha bādhē tadyoge rūḍhito' tha prayojanāt |
   Anyortho lakṣyate yatsā lakṣaṇāropitā kriyā ||
   - KP. II Ullasa; Kārika 9

44. Mukhyārtha bādhē tadyukto
   yayāṇyorthaḥ pratīyate |
   Rūḍheḥ prayojanādvāsau lakṣanā
   śaktirarpita || - SD 2.5

45. Svaśakyasambandhaḥ. BP.183

46. Mukhyārthānupapattiḥ
   lakṣaṇābījam - PC

47. anvayānupapattiḥ lakṣaṇābījam - SSP. p.146-47

48. tātparyānupapattiḥ lakṣaṇābījam - TD, Vide TS. p. 330

49. Mukhyārtha bādhē tadyogo
   rūḍhito' tha prayojanāt
   anyorthaḥ lakṣyate yat sā
   lakṣaṇāropitākriyā - TR

50. śakyasambandho lakṣaṇā -TD vide TS. p. 323
   svaśakyasambandho lakṣaṇā NSMR p. 173

51. Lakṣaṇā śakyasambandhastātparyānupattītaḥ - NSM. p. 285

52. lakṣaṇā ca..... Vākyārthānvayaḥ TC. p. 660

53. VM. P - 13.
54. Svaśakyasambandhavattvam lakṣaṇā - TP vide BHC. p.57

55. Dr. V.P. Bhaṭṭa; Epistemology, Logic and Grammer in the analysis of sentence meaning; vol. I. XXV.

56. Vayam tu padārthā lakṣaṇayaiva vākyārtham bodhayantītī brumāḥ - MM p. 94

57. Lakṣaṇābijam śakyārthānvayānupapattiḥ; TP vide BHC.p.58.

58. V.P. Bhaṭṭa; Gādādhara's śaktivāda - p.59

59. V.P Bhaṭṭa ; op cit. 60

60. A critique on śabda - p.173

61. KP. II.9

62. ITM. p.232

63. SD. 2.5

64. ITM. p. 233

65. MM. p. 94

NRM. pp. 101-120

66. NRM. p.102

67. VM pp.12-13

68. SSP. p. 140

69. TC. p. 718

70. NSM - p. 290

71. TC. p.721
72. ibid p. 722
73. A critique on śabda - p. 208
74. ibid, p. 212
75. KP. II Kārikā 9
76. SD 2.5
77. ITM p.250
78. Tbi - p. 155.
79. ITM. p.250
80. VPB- IV. 26
81. avācyam iti yad vācyam tad avācyatayā yadā
   vācyam ity avasīyeta vācyam eva tadā bhavet - VP. 3.20
82. Lakṣanā trividhā Jahallakṣanā,
   Ajahallakṣanā..... tatra jahadaja-
   haditi. yathā tattvasāti
   TD. vide TS. pp.325-26
83. Lakṣanā dvividhā- Sahatsvārthājahatsvārtā ca. tatrādyam pradarśayati
   gaṅgāyāmiti - DK, vide NSM p.285
84. SSP. K. 25 p. 154
85. Sā ca lakṣanā dvedhā jahatsvārtha, ajahatsvārthā ca. jahatsvarthā
   gaṅgāyām ghoṣa ityādau - BHC. p.57
86. ibid - p. 57 - 58
87. V.P. Bhaṭṭa; Gadādhara's śāktivāda; p.62

88. ibid p.63

89. svasiddhaye parākṣepaḥ parārtham svasamarpāṇam
   Upādānam laksṇaṃ camyuktā
   suddhaiva sā dvīdhā -
   KP. Ullasa II Kārika - 10

90. SD. II K. 5-12a and the vṛttī under it.

91. abhidheyena saṁbandhāt sādṛṣyāt samavāyataḥ
   Vaiparītyāt kriyāyogāt laksāṇa
   pañcadhā matā - AVM. p. 17

92. KP. II 9-12
   SD. II 5-11

93. Kāvyasyātma dhvāṇīḥ- DL. p.2

94. yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā tamartham upasaranīkṛta svārthau
   vyaṅktaḥ kāvyaviśeṣaḥ sa dhvanir - iti Sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ - DL. p.33

95. viratasvabhīdhyāṣu yayārtho bodhyate paraḥ
   sā vṛttīr vyaṇjanā nāma śabdasyār thādikasya ca - SD. 2.12

96. Prof. Hari Mohan Jha; op cit; p.117

97. Prof. Angraj chaudhary; op.cit p.133

98. Idamuttamamatiśāyini vyaṅgye vācyāddhvanir budhailḥ kathitaḥ
   Atāḍrīśī guṇābhūta vyaṅgyam vyaṅgye tu madhyamaṃ
   Śabdacitraṃ vācyacitramavyangyam tvaṃ varam śmṛtam
   - KP. Ullasa I Kārika 4 to 5
99. Pratīyamānaṃ punaranyadeva
   vastvasti vāṇīṣu mahākavināṃ
yattatprasiddhāvayavātiriktam
   vibhātilāvanāmyamivāṅganēṣu - DL. p.14

100. SD. 2.12

101. DL; Locana; p.27

102. KP 2.14.

103. DL - 1.8

104. Prof. Angraj chaudhary; op.cit; p.135

105. LM; p.133

106. abhidhā lakṣanāmula śabdasya
   vyañjanā dvidhā... SD 2.13

107. ibid

108. anekārthasya śabdasya..... SD 2.14

109. KP. p. No. 175

110. Lakṣaṇopāsyate yasya
   krte ta ttu prayojanam
   yayā pratyāyate sā syāt
   vyañjanā lakṣaṇāśrayā - SD. 2.15

111. Vakṛ boddhavya vākyānāṃ
   anyasannidhi vācyayoḥ
   ..... sārthasaṃbhava - SD. 2.16
112. Abhinavagupta; Locana p.16.

drayo hy atra vyāpārāḥ sanśāvedyante - padārtheṣu sāmānyātmasu
abhidhāvyāpāraḥ, Sāmānyāpekṣayā arthāvagamanāśaktir hy abhidhā.
Samayaś ca tāvaty eva, na viśeṣāṁśe, ānanyād vyabhicārāc caikasya. Tato
viśeṣārūpe vākyārthe tātparyaśaktiḥ parasparānvite, 'sāmānyāny
anyathāśiddher viśeṣam gamayanti hi' iti nyāyāt... bhaktir hi lakṣaṇāvyāpāras-
tṛtiyakṣyāniveśī. Caturthyāṃ tu kākṣyāyāṃ dhvananavyāpāraḥ.

113. ITM - p.No. 214

114. KP. II.6.

'tatparyārthro' 'pi keśucit'. ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsāṃśnidhivaśād vakṣyamāṇasvarūpāṇām
padārthānāṃ parasparasamanvaye tātparyaśthro viśeṣavapur apadārtho' pi
vākyārthāḥ samullasatīty abhihitānvyāvādināṃ matam.

115. SD. II. 20.

tātparyaśkhyāṃ vṛttim āhuḥ padārthānvyāvabodhane
tātparyaśrthe tadarthaḥ ca vākyāṃ tadbodhakaṃ pare

116. DL. p. 194

tad evaṃ śabde vyavahāre trayāḥ prakārāḥ - vācakatvaṃ guṇavṛttir
vyāṇjakatvaṃ ca. tatra vyajakatve yadā vyāṇgyaprādhānyāṃ tadā dhvaniḥ

117. Dr. V. Raghavan, Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra prakāśa, Second ed; p. 19.

118. ibid - pp - 161 - 8

tātparyameva vacasi vacasi dhvanireva kāvye
svabhagyameva guṇasampati vallabhasya |
lāvaṇyameva vapaṣi svadātēgaṇāyaḥ

Śṛṅgara eva ह्रदि manavato janasya ||


120. Dr. V. Raghavan, Op.cit, first ed; p 155, Dhanika, Avaloka on Daśārūpaka, p 156.f.

121. ibid -

etāvaty eva viśrāntistātparyasyeti kiṃkṛtam

yāvatkāryaprasaritvāt tātparyāṇaḥ na tulādhīṛtam


Padāny anvītaḥ pratyāyayanti, nānvitaḥ abhidadhāti nābhidhātri śaktir anvitaviśayā, kiṃ tu anvayavyatirekāvagatanishkrṣṭasvārthaviśayaiva, tātparyaśaktis tu teṣām anvitāvagamaparyantā...

abhidhātrī matā śaktiḥ padānāṇi svārthaniśṭhatā
teṣāṁ tatparyaśaktis tu saṃsargāvagamāvadhīḥ


Śābdabodhecaikapadārthaparaspadārtha - Saṃsargaḥ saṃsargamaryādayā bhāsate

124. S. Kuppuswami Śāstri, A Primer of Indian Logic, p. 258.


Yadyapi abhidhāvyāpāraḥ padārtheṣu eva paryavasitaḥ, tathāpi tātparyāvyāpṛṭer aparya vasitayāḥ...

He quotes the verse from ślokavārttika giving the analogy that just as fuel effects cooking through the flame, words effect the unified sentence - meaning through their individual meanings.


tasmād anvayasiddhau tātparyāṇaḥ na kvacit svayaṃ hetuḥ

128. (i) Commentary on kāvyapraκaśa. II. 6. by Māniκyacandra

Keśucid abhihitānvayādibhāṭṭeṣu ityarthaḥ

(ii) P.V. Kane, Sāhitya darpaṇa, Notes, p. 86. 'This view is held by that school of the Pūrvamāṃśa which is called Abhihitānvayavādin'.


'The followers of the Nyāya Philosophy and Bhāṭṭa Māṃśaka-s maintain the additional power of the word, namely the tātparyaśakti.'