Chapter - 2

PADA & PADĀRTHA - THE SOUL OF THE SPEAKER

2:1 - Importance of pada & padārtha

The philosophers' conception of the world and its status often determines how the word should relate itself to the world of objects and events. It should be kept in mind that the words themselves are not meaning; but they express the meaning. In Bhartṛhari's language, the form of word is the conveyor or the expression ie vācaka and that which is conveyed or expressed is the meaning ie vācya.

When a speaker intends to say something, he has to take care of two aspects of language viz. to express in appropriate form of words and the exact meaning that he wants to convey. Before translating his thoughts into audible form, both the elements, the form of words and meaning ie pada & padārtha are present in potential form in his buddhi. The particular vācya (the contents of meaning) and vācaka (the word - forms) are grasped by the speaker before he starts making utterance.

Similarly the hearer also grasps these two elements word and meaning, before deciphering what the speaker intends by his utterance. So in linguistic communication, like the speaker and hearer, both the vācya and vācaka play equally
prominent roles. Bhartṛhari, in broad sense, calls the vācya as artha (meaning) and the vācaka as śabda (words)\(^1\).

From these words of Bhartṛhari, we can say that for the fruitfulness of a linguistic communication, pada & padārtha-both are very necessary; and without these, a communication should never happen. Hence we can address these two elements pada & padārtha as the soul of the speaker;

2:2 - Analysis of pada & padārtha

Viśvanātha, the author of Nyāya Siddhānta Muktāvali has made a deep analysis of the two terms - pada and padartha; or he gives a general description of śābdabodha in this manner.

"Padajñānam tu karaṇam dvāram tatra padārthadhīḥ
śābdabodhaḥ phalam tatra śaktidhīḥ sahakāriṇī"\(^2\).

In his opinion, the first step of verbal knowledge (śābdabodhā) is the knowledge of words or cognition of sound or word (padajñānam). This cognition of word is the instrumental cause (karaṇa) of verbal knowledge and this cognition may be through hearing the sounds or through seeing the words (in written forms). By stating the cognition of words as the instrumental cause of verbal knowledge, Viśvanātha establishes that hearing the words only is not the instrumental cause of verbal knowledge. Because even in the absence of the cognition of uttered sound, there arose verbal knowledge from the written form also.

Knowledge of the meanings of the words (padārthadhīḥ) is the operation (dvāra) (vyāpāra) of verbal knowledge. In this process, the knowledge of denotative function (śakti) is the auxiliary cause (sahakāri karaṇa). Without the knowledge
of denotative function, it is impossible to have the recollection of the meanings of words. Denotative function is the relation of the meaning of a word with that word and this recollection should be produced by words with the help of the signifiatory function (vr̥tti). Otherwise when some one hear the sound of 'ghaṭa', he will have the recollection of 'ether' through the relation ship of inherence (samavāya) and by which he will also have the verbal knowledge of ether. On the other hand, if significatory function is accepted as the relation between the word and its meaning, then the above said problem will not happen. Without having the knowledge of this śakti, one cannot recollect the meaning of a word. So the knowledge of śakti is very essential in verbal knowledge.

Final result of this process is verbal knowledge (śābdabodha) which is the knowledge of the relation of the meanings of words. Thus the verbal cognition resulting from the words that are being heard ie uttered.

ie. śabdācchrutājyaṁ no bodhāḥ śābdabodhāḥ

So we can say that the process of śābdabodha ends only after the recollection of meanings of words in that particular sentence. The above mentioned karika of Nyāya Sidhanta Muktāvali helps us very much for the correct understanding of śābdabodha. In this karika, we can see the technical terms 'pada' 'padārtha' 'śakti' and 'śābdabodha'. After the complete study of these terms, we should get a clear picture about the concept of śabda, śabda vyāpāra and śābdabodha. Among these technical terms, 'pada' is first. Hence firstly illustrate this 'pada' and then the connected topics related with pada. Then after 'padārtha', the relation between pada & padarthā ie śakti śaktigrahopāyas etc.- have all been taken up for thorough investigation in this chapter.
2:3 - Pada (word) - Its Nature & Definition

Collection of letters is called pada or word. We usually believe that the words always mean a particular object or fact. This word is a symbol of some ideas or that which is communicable by the speaker makes an understanding in the mind of the hearer is known as word. The scholars of different systems of thought have no different opinion amongst themselves that the basic constitution of pada or word by varṇa or varṇas (letters). But these scholars took into consideration an important point regarding the nature of pada (word) that 'whether this word is a meaningful unit or only the collection of letters'? Based on this view, different epistemologists define pada (word) in different ways.

2:3:1 - Grammarians' View

Some grammarians, Pāṇini etc. have adopted grammatical criterion and defines pada as that which contains as its end either an inflectional (sup) or a conjugational (tiṅ) suffix (vibhakti)³

For instance, in 'gāṇānaya'; where gāṇi (cow) occurs in declensional ending and ānaya (bring) occurs in conjugational ending, and hence are words.

Others, Bhartṛhari etc. have adopted a metalinguistic criterion and defined word as a meaningful linguistic symbol or an eternal verbal essence (sphoṭa) from which meaning bursts forth. So according to him, a metalinguistic symbol such as 'cow' (go), from which the meaning cow, bursts forth, after utterance, is a word. In his opinion, the eternal verbal essence (sphoṭa) is meaning bearing vehicle, from which meaning is burst forth.

i.e. 'sphuṭyate anena iti sphoṭah' and the meaning, which is burstforth i.e. 'sphuṭate iti sphoṭah'
This sphoṭa is derived from the root 'sphuṭ' which means 'to burst forth'. In its linguistic sense, it can be defined as that which burst forth the meaning. Then it is the bearer of meaning.

i.e. 'vācakaḥ śabdaḥ'.

Secondly it is defined as an entity which is manifested by the letters. Explaining these two aspects of words, Bhartṛhari begins his discussion about this topic. Hence the words are two kinds- one being used as the bare words for the grammatical construction and the other being invariably used to convey a definite sense or meaning.

In the opinion of later grammarians, influenced by Bhartṛhari, words in reality are nothing, but the eternal letters or phonemes assume the forms or manifestation of different words due to the reflections of different word - forms created by the mental impressions of different phonemic segments. (i.e tattad varṇa samskāraḥ pratibimbita tattad rūpo ananta rūpatām iva āpannah)

From all these we can conclude that Indian Grammarians such as Pāṇini and Bhartṛhari, perceived word mainly as linguistic and metalinguistic entity and therefore analysed the same linguistically and metalinguistically (metaphysically) as the linguistic form that ends in inflectional affixes and as the eternal verbal essence that bursts forth meanings.

2:3:2 - Naiyāyikas' View

Naiyāyikas have adopted both epistemological and semantical criteria to analyse word. In their opinion, word as a means of valid knowledge of word - meaning and therefore, analyse the same as the means of sentence - meaning
(vākyārtha bodha) or verbal cognition (śābdabodha) How ever, they have held that such a word must be uttered by a reliable (trust worthy) speaker to become valid means of knowledge.

We can see the first definition of pada in the Gautama's Nyāya sutra that - 'the letters ending with an affix form a word'. In his opinion, letters constitute the word and any letter which is not ended into suffix cannot be a word.

Vātsyāyana gives another definition of pada that the letters which are not deformed (vikṛta) and ended with an affix form a word. Then he classifies the affixes into two classes viz 'sup' and 'tiṇ' affix. Thus words are also of two types - nouns and verbs. The word which ends in 'sup' suffix is 'noun' and the word which ends in 'tiṇ' suffix is known as a 'verb'.

Vātsyāyana's definition of pada is further explained by Vācaspati miśra that letters can be deformed by 'guṇa sandhi etc'; but deformation in the 'prakṛti' is not possible.

In the opinion of Uddyotakara, the definition of pada is- 'te varṇā yathādarśānam vikṛta vibhaktyantāḥ padasamjñākāḥ bhavanti'. Instead of affixes, he classified the words into two- nāma and ākhyāta.

In his opinion, 'Upasargas or prefixes' and 'nipātas' can be submerged in the nouns and verbs only. Viśvanātha defined word and which is similar to that of the definition of word presented by Gautama. He explained affix (vibhakti) into vṛttī and the letters which have vṛttī should also have wordness (padatva). Hence he agreed the two types of affixes viz- 'sup' and 'tiṇ'.

Śankara miśra in his vaiśeṣikopaskāra holds that word is a collection of syllables possessing convention conducive to verbal cognition. i.e. 'sanketavad varṇatvam padam'.
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the author of Nyāya-Mañjari and Bhāsarvanjña, the author of Nyāyasāra has not given any definition of pada.

Later in Tarkabhāṣa, Keśava Miśra defined pada as a collection of letters, which constitute a single conception\(^\text{11}\).

Annambhaṭṭa holds that 'pada' is that which is endowed with the power of functional relation such as denotation etc.

i.e śaktam padam\(^\text{12}\) which means that possessed of śakti is word. Viśvanātha\(^\text{13}\) also puts forth the same idea of the word.

From all these we can conclude that the tradition of Old Naiyāyikas regarding the word that which ends in an affix is called a word. This similar idea can be seen in the commentary of N.S by Amarendra Mohan Tarkatīrtha.

Among the Navya Naiyāyikas, Gangeśa defined pada as a collection of letters\(^\text{14}\). Later in a commentary of Tattvacintāmaṇi, we can see that padatva (wordness) lies in the 'varṇasumūhatva' (the collection of letters)\(^\text{15}\).

According to Laugākṣi Bhäskara, which signifies a sense is called a word.

i.e. artha vācakam padam\(^\text{16}\). In his opinion, only the meaningful words as pada, not the meaningless.

Later on, Jagadīśa stated that word should be meaningful and this meaningfulness can be a kind of 'śakti' because Logicians' pada is endowed with the power of denotation. Otherwise, how could be a compounded word considered as a pada\(^\text{17}\).

His another definition of pada is that which ends in a termination, is called a word\(^\text{18}\).
So in ancient period, the Naiyāyikas' definition of word was based on the form; where as in the modern period it was based on the meaning. Prof. V.N. Jha says that we can compare this concept of pada of Modern Naiyāyikas to that of morpheme or bound morpheme to be more precise, in Modern Linguistics. Thus in Nyāya system, pada or word is the minimum meaningful unit of a sentence.

2:3:3 - Mīmāṃsakas' View

Mīmāṃsakas, especially Prabhākaras, unlike Grammarians, have defined word Syntactico-Semantically. They were greatly influenced by their anvitābhidhāna theory, and therefore, have held that words are the collection of letters that are capable of producing the word-meanings as Syntactico-Semantically related to action.

'i.e. Varnāḥ padam prayogārha anvitaikārthabodhakāḥ'

Like Rhetoricians and Logicians, Mīmāṃsakas adopt basically a semantical criterion to analyse and define word. They can be admitted to have held that words are those that have inherent (natural) power to convey their meanings, and therefore, are conducive to the recollection of word-meanings. They were greatly influenced by Anvitaśrādāna theory. Thus, they define word as a collection of syllables that are competent to be used in language and convey a singularity of meaning syntactico-semantically related to other word-meanings such as action.

Conclusion

It can be observed that word (śabda) has been viewed variously by the scholars belonging to the three different branches of Indian epistemology:- Logicians have defined word mainly from the view point of verbal cognition i.e. that word (or
knowledge of word depending upon whether Prācyas or Navyas are speaking) is the unique cause of verbal cognition since the verbal cognition is the ultimate goal of human utterance.

While the Grammarians, mainly Bhartṛhari and his followers, have defined the same (word) from the viewpoint of production of meaning i.e. that word is an eternal entity that can burst forth the meaning to its listener since nothing but an eternal entity (nitya varṇas) that is distinct from the instantly perishing syllables, can produce the meaning.

On the other hand, Mīmāṃsakas have defined the word from the viewpoint of impersonal and eternal syllables which assume the form of the word through the efforts of the speaker with the help of the manifesting wind since only the impersonal vedas can be authoritative in impelling the people to undertake various rituals etc.

It should be noted that Indian epistemologists hold the unanimous view that the term 'pada' is used in the sense of only the 'finished word' with inflectional endings etc. whereas 'śabda' can be used in the sense of base as well. Hence Grammarians approached the problem of 'pada' from the viewpoint of only the syntactical entity and hence stated that the same is what ends in either declensional or conjugational affixes.

i.e. 'suptiñantam padaṃ'.

While the Logicians approached the problem of 'pada' from the viewpoint of a semantical entity as well and hence stated that the same is what is endowed with the functional relation such as denotation. i.e. śaktam padam'.
So among the Logicians, only the scholars belonging to the early school of thought or Prācyas regard the words to be the means of verbal cognition; whereas the scholars belonging to the new school of thought or Navyas, regard the knowledge of words to be the means of verbal cognition. They disagree with the view of the Prācyas and propose that it is knowledge of words and not words themselves as such, which is the means of producing verbal cognition.

According to them, Verbal cognition is possible through even the verse of silent person (mauniśloka) or hand-gesture (hastaceṣta) provided that one is able to recollect the words alone be considered as the unique cause of verbal cognition. Thus, Navyas such as Gangeśa define words as those which are produced from the correct understanding i.e. knowledge of the exact nature of the referents which, in turn, produce the utterance 'ie prayoga hetu bhūta artha tattva jñāna janyāḥ śabdaḥ.'

Finally we can reach a conclusion that the Grammarians and Logicians approach the problem of word from two different angles, but arrive at almost an identical conclusion. While Grammarians approach the problem of word from the view point of a syntactical entity and hence conclude that only pada i.e. word which has inflectional or conjugational endings, can be used in the language as it can refer to syntactical relations, the Logicians approach the same problem from the view point of a semantical entity and there fore conclude that only, pada, i.e. the word which refers to meaning, can be considered to be the cause of verbal cognition.

2:4 - Classification of Pada

Yāska, the author of Nirukta, classifies pada (word) into four groups:- Nāma (Noun), ākhyāta (verb), upasarga (preverb), and nipāta (particle) (prepositions).
He defined nāma (name) as a meaning of 'static referend'²¹ By matter (sattva)
is meant that entity which agrees with gender and number unlike action (bhāva)
Such as cow (go), Rama (Rāmaḥ) etc. Substances which can be expressed by
means of pronouns eg: this is that (idam tat) fall under the category of nouns. This
is a meaningful division of speech which stands for the uniqueness of referend
in space.²²

According to Yāska, the verb is 'bhāvapradhāna'²³. He defines a verb- word
as one wherein the activity is prominent such as ānaya (bring) etc. which is
used in the sense of the result of action. This type of classification firstly done
by Yāska and later it is accepted by all the Grammarians and other Indian
scholars. Hence Yāska is considered as the founder of the logical syntax of
language as well as the analysis of it. According to Yāska, upasarga (preverb)
such as 'pari, upa' etc and nipāta (prepositions) such as 'ca' (and) etc. comes
under this classification.

Yaska's classification of words into four groups was mainly due to the analysis
of saṃhitas into its constituent parts (padas) In this classification, Nāma (noun)
(substantive) can be taken to represent sattva (thing or entity) - such as kārakas
where as verb(ākhyāta) can be taken to represent bhāva (the process of action)
such as making or being, the center piece of any sentence. Also the preverbs
(upasargas) such as 'pari' etc. are mainly those that change the meaning of verbs and do not have independent existence as such, and the nipātas (particles) such as 'ca' constitute a large number of words whose meanings are determined by the context. So we can say that this classification represents the very core of language.

Nāgeśa, the famous Grammarian classifies Abhidhā into three varieties. In Nageśa's classification, the yaugikarūḍha variety of the Naiyāyikas is left out. He says that yaugikarūḍha padas are actually homonymous words. So he excluded this variety from his classification.

Among the Old Naiyāyikas, Vātsyāyana appears to have accepted the Grammarian's division of the words into 'subanta' and 'tiṇanta' varieties by way of classifying and illustrating affix (vibhakti) as Nāmikī and Ākhyātikī. Thus according to him, words are of two types-nouns and verbs. The word which ends in 'sup' suffix is noun, opposite to it, the word which ends in 'tiṇ' suffix is called a verb.

Uddyotakara classified the words into 'nāma' and 'ākhyāta' instead of affixes as already done by Vātsyāyana. In his view, upasarga (prefixes) and nipātas can be submerged in the nouns and verbs only. Viśvanātha also agreed the two types of affixes viz 'sup' and 'tiṇ'.

Among the Navya Naiyāyikas, Gaṅgeśopādhyā classified pada into two - primary and secondary (mukhya and gauṇa) The word which is rooted in
convention (sañketa) is called the primary word. It is the direct meaning of a word\textsuperscript{30}. While, in secondary words, primary meaning of the word is not applicable e.g.: gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣah'.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzcd}
mukhya \arrow{d} \& gaṇa \arrow{d} \\
(Primary) \& (Secondary)
\end{tikzcd}
\end{center}

e.g. go - ghaṭādi e.g. 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣah'

Jagadīśā classified paddas into five varieties:\textsuperscript{31} Ruḍha, Lakṣaka, yaugika, yogarūḍha and Ruḍhayaugika. Of these only the first four varieties are recognised by Jagadīśa as genuine and the fifth variety, namely, Ruḍhayaugika is mentioned only as something recognised by others. Annambhaṭṭa mentions only three kinds of śaktis as yogarūḍhi, yoga and Ruḍhi.

On the basis of nature of the primary meanings signified by them, Viśvanātha classifies the words into four groups\textsuperscript{32}

1. Yaugika (derivative) (etymological)
2. Ruḍha (conventional)
3. Yogarūḍha (derivatively conventional) (etymologo- conventional)
4. Yaugikarūḍha (derivative and conventional) (etymological cum conventional)

This is the four-fold classification of the denotative (śakta) words. This classification good only in respect of Nāmapada (Nouns)
2:4:1 - Yaugika

A word is named 'yaugika' when only the meaning of the 'avayava' or its component parts comes to be understood. Here the stem or the base, the prefixes and the suffixes are known as 'avayava'.

For e.g.: The word 'páçaka' (cook). This word is derived from the root 'pac' with the help of the suffix 'aka'. Here the root 'pac' means pákakriya (act of cooking) and the suffix 'aka' means karta (agent). Then 'a' in 'pac' comes to be 'ā' by the rule 'taddhiteśvacāmādeḥ'. Thus we get 'pācaka' and the meaning of this word is 'the person who cooks' by the denotative functions of its parts (avayavaśaktya) or by its derivatives.

From this example we can say that a 'yaugika' word conveys the meaning of only the 'avayava' or component parts, nothing more or nothing less.

2:4:2 - Rūḍha

When its meaning is conveyed by the denotative capacity of the word as a whole (samudāyaśakti) without any care to the denotative capacity of its component parts, (avayavaśaktinirapekṣayā) that word is called a rūḍha. e.g. 'go mandala'. The word gauḥ' comes to be formed according to the 'uṇādi sūtra' 'gamerdo' etc. and comprises of the component parts, the root 'gaṃ' and the suffix 'das' which should give the meaning as 'something that goes'. But the primary meaning of the word is 'a cow' in general irrespective of the fact of its moving or sitting idle and this primary meaning is derived irrespective of the component parts of the word.

This Rūḍha word which conveys an idea as a whole. In this type, the total capacity of the word serves the purpose and the etymology of word is not at all
taken into consideration. Thus we can say that where, irrespective of the denotative function of the component parts, it is understood only through its collective denotative function, it is called conventional.

2:4:3 - Yogarūḍha

Derivatively- conventional (yoga- rūḍha) word is that which conveys an identical meaning through both derivatively and conventional significations or where both etymological and conventional meanings come together as only one item, the word conveying such a meaning is considered to be yoga - rūḍha36.

The word 'paṇkaja' (lotus) is an example of this variety of words. The etymology of the word 'paṇkaja' is 'paṇke jāyata iti' 'paṇka + jan + ḍa'. Hence the etymological meaning of 'paṇkaja' is an object which grows in the mud, and conventionally it means a 'lotus' and thus signifies the same. Here we can say that the word 'paṇkaja' by means of the denotative function of the word as a whole (samudāyaśakti) conveys the meaning of lotus and this is connected by the relation of non - difference, with that which has origin from mud (paṇkajanikartṛ) which is the meaning of the same word by the denotative function of its parts.

2:4:4 - Yaugika rūḍha

A word is called 'yaugikarūḍha' or etymological cum conventional when its meaning is determined either by the derivation i.e. its component parts or by a convention concerning the whole word irrespective of any derivation37. In other words, in case of a yaugikarūḍha word, the etymological and conventional meanings comes to be independently understood.
For e.g.- The word 'udbhid' etymologically means which grow up perforating the ground (ie tree, plant, creeper etc.) and again conventionally it means a sacrifice of this name

From this classification of pada, we can see that conventional meaning is stronger than the etymological meaning.

i.e. yogad rudihr baliyasi'

Some later Mīmāṃsakas have come to admit this entire four fold classification of padas into Rudha, yaugika, yogarudha and yaugikarudha.

2.5 - Concept of Padārtha (Word- Meaning)

'Padasya artha≈ padārtha≈'. The term 'padārtha' stands for the meaning of a word and it is a compound word consists of two elements:- pada and artha. Padārtha might have been first discussed in grammatical treatises. When we compare a sentence to our body, in which words are different parts of that body and the soul - its meaning only.

It is place, time and context which determine the meaning of a word. A slight phonetic change can not only change the meaning of it but also impart an opposite meaning to it. From this we can see that only meaningful words are inevitable for communication; and in this process both the speaker and listener take part. By the term 'meaning' the response created in the listener's mind when the speaker utters a word is implied.

Both in Vedic and Classic literature- the use of word is for knowing the meaning "Real knowledge is clarity of meaning". Without the full exposition of meaning, knowledge cannot be attained. Even a long time study of vedas is useless
unless the meaning is properly understood. This view has been expressed by Yāska in his Nirukta. This means that the chanting of Vedas without knowing the meaning is simply bubbling. Similarly words, uttered without knowing meaning is akin to a hearth filled with dry wood having no access to fire. He who has "learned" Vedas without knowing meaning is just like a pillar carrying a useless burden. On the contrary, the one who has mastered the meaning will wash away all his sins and will attain the heaven of bliss.

Person to person relation is dependent on the exchange of meaningful word. This meaningful word helps the survival of the world. Man's relation, not only with man but with the entire universe is based on meaningful word. Such an ocean of word is limitless; otherside of it, i.e. meaning also is infinite.

In the opinion of Ogden and Richards, meaning is the central problem of language because the sole purpose of a sentence is to convey a complete idea towards something to the hearer and that idea is the meaning only, which previously exists in the mind of the speaker and by utterance, that image take place in the mind of the hearer. Clearly speaking, the place of meaning in a sentence is same, as the place of thread in a garland. Because a thread combine all the flowers in it, same is the case with meaning because where there may be the set of words like 'gauḥ as'vaḥ brāhmaṇaḥ hasti etc.; yet they do not convey any meaning and therefore cannot be the sentence. If 'S'denotes the speaker and 'H' the hearer. Between S and 'H' meaning plays an important role. In this process utterance 'U' sentence 's' and language 'L' also take part. It can be shown as
In our earliest record, Vedas, we can see the importance of meaning. After this, Upaniṣads also expounded the importance of meaning. From the time of Yāska, the study of language began in India. Later on, the various schools of Philosophy and Grammar have paid much attention to the study of linguistics and the problem of meaning has been taken into account.

The term 'padārtha' is also used as synonyms with abhidheya, prameya, jñeya etc. In Sanskrit, the word 'artha' is used for meaning and Macdonell translated the term 'artha' as 'the sense of the word'.41

The term 'pada' is defined by the Grammarians as that which contains as its and either an inflectional (sup) or a conjugational (tiṅ) suffix. The term 'artha' connotes 'meaning'. Thus the word pada, together with artha, constitutes padārtha. It literally means a nameable or denotable thing or a thing which corresponds to a word. To Udayana, a padārtha is that which is denotable by a word. According to Anāṁbhaṭṭa, it as the object which is characterised by name ability. Knowability is the definition of padārtha, given by Viśvanātha. He further says that abhidheyatva and prameyatva are the other terms acceptable for the definition of padārtha. According to Gautama, a padārtha means indivisibility, form and genus. For instance, in the usage 'ghaṭamāṇaya' (bring a jar), the term 'ghaṭa' means the object which is distinguished by the individuality of the jar, its shape and genus.
Puṇyarāja, a commentator of Vākyapadīya discussed the meaning in detail and gave eighteen definitions of meaning. By giving the sixteen definitions of meaning, Ogden and Richards defined it.

It can be shown as:

1) An intrinsic property
2) A unique analyzable relation to other things
3) The other words annexed to a word in the Dictionary
4) The connotation of a word
5) An essence
6) An activity projected into an object
7) i) An event intended and
   ii) A volition
8) The place of anything in a system
9) The practical consequenceness of a thing in our future experience
10) The theoretical consequences involved in or simplified by a statement.
11) Emotion aroused by anything
12) That which is actually related to a sign by a chosen relation
13) i) The Mnemic effects of a stimulus Associations acquired
   ii) Some other occurrence to which the Mnemic effects of any occurrence are Appropriate
   iii) That which a sign is interpreted as being of
iv) What anything suggests In case of symbols

That to which the User of a symbol actually refers.

14) That to which the user of a symbol ought to be refering

15) That to which the user of a symbol believes himself to be refering

16) That to which the interpreter of a symbol-

   i) Refers

   ii) Believes himself to be refering

   iii) Believes the user to be refering.

According to Siddheshwara Varma, meaning has been defined in terms of a relation in the philosophy of language. In the view of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, the particular relations between the word and the object is known as meaning. This relation is the power which exists in the object. Buddhists defined meaning in terms of negation. Prof. R.C. Pandey considered the meaning as product of convention. It is a relation from word to an object, i.e. the power of word, it is from a definite word to a definite thing or referent. The power of word is called vṛtti.

In the view of Naiyāyikas, power which is concentrated in words denotes the meanings of those words. This power is stated as the wish or desire of God that, 'a certain word would denote a certain fixed meaning. The power is eternally associated with a word to its usually direct meaning. Thus, the meaning of words depends upon the permanent and eternal will of God. According to the Navya-Naiyāyikas, not only the will of God determines the meaning of word, but also the will of an ordinary person also.
Meaning can be classified as either word-meaning (padaṛtha) or sentence-meaning (vākyārtha). The main difference between these two are - padaṛtha stands isolated i.e. unrelated with respect to other items and hence does not convey a complete idea; while vākyārtha, is related to other items and hence conveys a syntactical relation and also a complete idea.

From all these we can conclude that the essential nature of a word lies in its meaning. A word is that which has a fixed relation to some object, so as to recall it whenever it is heard or read; i.e. it means an object. In the opinion of Mīmāṃśakas, word has natural capacity to express the meaning it does: but according to Naiyāyikas, a word comes to have a meaning which has been assigned to it by convention.

2:6 - Relation between Pada & Padārtha (Word & Meaning) OR

Concept of śākti

The Scholars from East and West together agree that word as a thing, having power or significance in it. But what is this power? or śakti? In their opinion, all words have a certain power; and this power is a unique existence in things like a seed. Seeds are the cause of plants; and these seeds have the power to produce plants. But when some insect has bitten the seed, it is incapable of growing plants. They say that there is some hidden power in the seed, which is not sensed yet, and it can produces the plant. But an insect can take away this power of seed to grow the plant. From this example⁵⁴ we can say that words have power to mean and this power of meaning is inherent in them. It cannot be shaken by any external force. These words are meaningful by their very nature⁵⁵; and there is no word which is not meaningful.
In India, speculations about the nature of this relation subsisting between word and meaning has been a controversy among the Philosophers, Grammarians and Rhetoricians. These scholars have assumed a direct relationship between word & meaning (śabda & artha) and they have made a deeper and more thorough analysis of this relation than the Western scholars.

In Indian philosophy, there are two main schools, Mīmāṃsa and Nyāya school support to the origin of this śabdārthā relation. Of these two main views - one is natural (nitya) and the other is conventional (sāmayika or saṅkātika). The first view is propounded by the Mīmāṃsakas and the second by the Naiyāyikas.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the significative power is inherent in the words themselves. In their opinion, the relationship between a word and its meaning is eternal in the sense that it stands ever fixed by nature without a beginning or end. They believe in the perennial continuity (pravāhanityatā) of the word and meaning. They also assert that we learn language from our elders, who in their turn learn it from their elders and so on. Thus it could be traced back to any conceivable period of human society and it is not possible to trace the origin of the relationship to a person. So the Mīmāṃsakas conceive that language and for that reason the relation between the word and its meaning is anādi or eternal, and the signifying power is inherent in the words themselves. So they call this power as 'śakti' and maintain it as an independent reality.

The Grammarians also agree with the Mīmāṃsakas that the permanent nature of the relation between word and meaning is to be understood from popular usage itself. They also say that this relation is fixed and permanent. Right from Vyādi upto Nāgeśa, all of them have given a serious thought to it. Bhartrhari
propounds the theory of identity-in-difference between the word' and its meaning and he also agree with this natural relationship between word and meaning. This natural relation between word and meaning has also been explained in terms of yogyatā or the innate capacity of the words. Bhartṛhari suggest that just as the indriyas or the organs of perception have a natural power to perceive what comes into their purview, so also words have a natural capacity for conveying words. Kātyāyana has admitted the relation of the word and meaning as eternal and Patanjali has given a long discussion on it in his Mahābhāṣya. According to the Grammarians, not only the relation between word and meaning is eternal, but the word and its meaning are inseparable also. As soon as a word is pronounced, the referent, it stands for, is denoted; and as soon as we think of a referent, it makes us pronounce the word. That is why Kalidasa says that word and its sense are in close union (sampṛktau).

In the opinion of Navya-Naiyāyikas, śakti is an important factor because without this śakti, they cannot explain the connection between a word and its meaning. Generally speaks that 'śakti means Sāmarthya. They do not accept śakti as a category. But in the context of a sentence, it is a type of power which conveys the meaning of a word. According to the Naiyāyikas, 'śakti or 'power' is the convention made by God, that a certain word has certain meaning. Laugākṣi Bhāskara opinions that convention (saṃketa) is existing from eternity, such and such a thing is to be understood from such and such a word. So they concluded here that language is the creation of God, and each word is capable of conveying a particular sense because God has no will in it.
In the opinion of Navya Naiyāyikas, the meaning of a word is determined not only by the will of God, but also by a simple will of the person, who names it. e.g:- On the eleventh day of the birth of a child, the father names him and henceforth the child is known by that name. So they essentially propounded the name theory of meaning so far as single words are concerned.

The Prācyā logicians deny this later types of śakti; but they named them simply conventional (pāribhāṣika) and on the other hand those words derived from God are śakta.

According to them, a word can have both the origins- ie human as well as divine. Because of this reason the author of Tarka- prakāśa defends the old-Naiyāyikas view. Athalye and Bodas were accepted the Navya- Naiyāyikas view and they deny the divinity of language origin. Annaṁbhaṭṭa, the author of Tarka-dīpikā' defined this śakti in another way. According to him, power is the relation of a word and object that always serves to revive the memory of that object, whenever the word is spoken. Viśvanātha also agree with him.

The Naiyāyikas do not agree to the view of the eternal relationship between word and meaning. If there were an eternal relation between word and meaning, a word would have expressed the same meaning at all places and at all times. More over, by accepting this theory, different words should not be used to express a single meaning. So they considered it as conventional and is based on the will of God or mere will.

So we can conclude that this is a common experience that everyone firstly hears a word, then they understand its meaning. The meaning which is manifested by a listener is only due to the śakti and this śakti, which lies in that specific word. This relation between word and meaning i.e śakti, which give rise to śābdabodha.
In short, there are different views on the relation between word and meaning. Some of these are given below:

1. The older Naiyāyikas hold that the relation is dependent on the will of God (Īśvarecchā)\(^\text{73}\)

2. The Neo-Naiyāyikas are of the view that this relation depends on mere will (whether divine or human (icchāmātra)\(^\text{74}\)

3. The old Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that the śakti (primary denotative capacity) does not lie in ādhunika saṅketa

   eg:- Such proper names as 'Deva Datta' are non-connotative\(^\text{75}\).

4. The Neo-Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that even such words possess śakti\(^\text{76}\)

5. The Vaiyākaraṇas regard the relation between word and meaning as one of revealer (vācaka) and revealed (vācyā) as determined by the potency (śakti) of the word\(^\text{77}\).

6. Some older Naiyāyikas take the relation between word and meaning as avinābhāva (i.e. non-existence of the one without the other)\(^\text{78}\)

7. Patanjali is of the view that the relation between word and meaning is one of identity (tādātmya). That which is the word is also the meaning and vice versa\(^\text{79}\).

8. Some Mīmāṁsakas regard the denotative capacity (abidhā śakti) of a word as a separate entity\(^\text{80}\).
9. According to Kumarila, the relation between word and meaning is neither one of difference (bheda) nor one of identity (abheda) but one of identity in difference (bhedabheda).^

10. According to Prabhakaras and his followers, the potency (śakti) of a word is of two kinds viz.
   (i) Ānubhāvikā i.e. that which gives the meaning of word
   (ii) Smārikā i.e. that which arouses the memory of objects signified

11. According to Buddhist Logicians, the śakti of a word lies in what they call Apoha. They do not recognise any eternal universal (nitya jāti) like gotva (cowness) or ghaṭatva (potness). According to the Apohavādins, when we call a number of objects by the same name, eg:- ghaṭa (pot) what happens is the cognizance of likeness with and unlikeness from other objects.

   For example, the word blue (nīla) means that which is different from non-blue (anīla). Thus what we call by the name of blue colour is nothing but that which is different from what is different is known as atadvyāvṛtti or tadbhinna bhinnatva. It is this that constitutes the real meaning of the word. The Buddhist Logicians call this power (śakti) of word by the name of apoha.

   It is a negative concept as it explains the meaning in negative terms.

2:7 - Locus of śakti

   There is a great controversy among the different philosophical systems regarding the locus of śakti i.e. 'Where this sanketarūpā śakti is apprehended'? The problem here is that whether a word through śakti signifies a certain generic
meaning (Jati) or the idea of a particular object (vyakti) or a form (Ākṛti) or more than one of these entities. In other words, the issue is what does a word like 'gauḥ' or 'ghataḥ' exactly denote? Here the śakti with regard to the form 'cow' constituted by dewlap, tail, horn etc. or to the particular object 'cow' or the common property 'cowness' or all the two or three of these meanings together?

Based on this point, numerous opinions have come into discussion among these scholars who can be broadly divided into seven groups in this context

1) Akṛtivādīnāḥ  2) Jātivādīnāḥ
3) Vyaktivādīnāḥ  4) Jātyākṛtivyaktivādīnāḥ
5) Jātiviśiṣṭa vyaktivādīnāḥ and Jatyā - kṛtiviśiṣṭa - vyakti - vādīnāḥ
6) Apohavādīnāḥ and  7) Jātīdivādīnāḥ

2:7:1 - Akṛtivādīnāḥ

Among the scholars, the Jainas may be identified as Akṛti vādins. They believe that akṛti i.e. generic shape or form is the meaning of word. According to them, the word 'gauḥ' or 'cow' does not denote a particular cow, but all the cattle of the form of cow. They say that this ākṛti is nothing but 'avayava' that every object (vyakti) must have. Obviously then as ākṛti gives the idea of a vyakti. This theory holds good in case of specific kinds of the animal and Botanic kingdom i.e. flora and fauna, but it is not applicable in the case of things whose generic shape or form are not fixed.

2:7:2 - Jātivādīnāḥ

Patanjali informs us that it was Vājapyāyana, who first initiated the view of Kevalajātīvāda. Vedāntins as well as the Mīmāṃsakas, both the Bhāṭṭas and
prābhākaras can be identified as kevalajñātivādīnāḥ. They hold that only the jāti or the universal is the import or denoted sense of a word. Consider a word 'gauḥ' or 'cow'. They opine that if we take the particular as the primary sense of word there are millions of cows in this world itself, the cows as individuals vary widely amongst themselves in respect of age, configuration, colour and the like. On the contrary, there we take the universal as the primary sense of word and not the particular. They emphasized that the denotative force acts primarily on the universal, because that is the only vitalizing element in any substance. Hence in their opinion, the word 'go' in a sentence 'gām ānaya' denote gotva only. Jagadīśa mentions this view of Bhāṭṭas that the word 'gauḥ' in a sentence 'gām ānaya' denotes gotva and it is through the svāśraya vṛttitva saṃbandha. This view was accepted by Grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas and Rhetoricians also.

2:7:3 - Vyaktivādīnāḥ

Sāmkhyas and a section of Naiyāyikas who can be described as Vyaktivādins. The Vyaktivādins opine that it is the individuals and not the abstract universal which form the context of perceptual knowledge. They say that in a sentence 'gām ānaya', only the particular cow is brought and not the universal of all the cows of past, present and future. Therefore they maintain that śakti is to be admitted only in Vyakti and not in Jāti which remains only as the śakyatāvacchedaka of the former. More over, if we take the universal as the primary sense of the word even then the particular is taken account of, because the particular is a part of the universal.

Modern Naiyāyikas opine that the word 'ghaṭa' primarily denotes the 'ghaṭa vyakti'. For e.g.: when a sentence like 'ghaṭam ānaya,' or 'gām badhāna' is uttered, the intention is the particular entity jar (ghaṭa -vyakti) or cow is to be
brought or tethered here, not the universal (jāti). In their opinion, the capacity of being the subject of any act i.e. artha kriyākāritva resides in the concrete object i.e. in vyakti alone.

2:7:4 - Jātyākṛtivyaktivādīnāḥ

According to the old Naiyāyikas, the particular, the form and the universal, all the three are the primary meaning of word. Of these, Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya school of thought who initiates the Jātyākṛtivyaktivāda. He says that any one of the three entities, namely Ākṛti (configuration), vyakti (individual) and Jāti (universal) cannot by itself be the denoted sense of a word. In his opinion, all the three entities, namely Vyakti, Ākṛti and Jāti get combined to be the import of a word, and hence the word 'tu' in the sūtra 'vyaktyākṛti jātayastu padārthaḥ' is significant. Vācaspati miśra, the author of Tātparyatīkā says that the word 'go' having been pronounced, any person who comes to know the animal denoted by the word 'go' will comprehend the particular, the universal and the form simultaneously. In the sense of a word all the three factors are present, but in a given context only one factor becomes predominant while the other two remain subordinate.

2:7:5 - Jātivīśiṣṭavyaktivādiṇāḥ

In the context of the issue under discussion, the Navya Naiyāyikas can be divided into two groups identified as jātivīśiṣṭavyaktivādins and Jātyākṛtivīśiṣṭavyaktivādins.

The scholars of the first group do not seem to pay any heed to the view that Ākṛti is the import or a part of the import of a word. Regarding Jāti and Vyakti,
they take a balanced view and thereby make a fresh contribution on the subject. In their view, a Jāti (the universal) alone can never be the denoted sense of a word. A word consists of two elements, a base, nominal or verbal and a suffix. The import of a suffix is case, gender and number. But the individuals are innumerable and hence it should be restricted only through a reference to the universal which underlies all these individuals. So they contend that the individuals as determined by an universal (Jātivīśiṣṭavyakti) be the import of the word.91

The other group including Viśvanātha are 'Jātyākṛtivīśiṣṭavādins' in the sense that they include the concept of Ākṛti also along with Jāti as qualifying the denoted vyakti92. Really speaking, this is the development of the old view.

2:7:6 - Apohavādiṇaḥ

Among the scholars, The Buddhists are called Apohavāδins and they believe that the import of all words is 'apoha' or 'atadvyāvṛti' (distinction from all other different objects). They refuted both the opinion of Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas in this context and traced a new path that the primary import of word is 'apoha' or 'atadvyāvṛti' ie 'differentia from all things'. The Baudhā scholars maintain that anything understood is momentary (kṣaṇika) and a word denotes a particular object as belonging to a particular moment only. In their opinion, an object of today being completely different from another of tomorrow. As all things or 'kṣanika,' a jāti is impossible in view of its own nature. Therefore, what do we understand by the ghaṭa, neither the external object (vyakti), as we do never know the external objects in their real form, nor the jāti, for jāti is nothing more than a mere conception formed by our mind and imposed upon what we call external objects. According to them, we never know what ghaṭa or what ghaṭatva is; but we know only what it
is not viz. it is not 'pata' or kudya or anything else. This is a negative approach and else. P.V Kane also explains this position.\(^93\)

2:7:7 - Jātyādīvādinaḥ

The Vaiyākaraṇas and the Ālāmkārikas may be identified as Jātyādivādins. They hold that the import of a word is either a Jāti or guṇa or a dravya or again a kriya. Thus they believe in four sets of words. Grammarians first come to believe in words signifying these four entities and hence there are Jātiśabdās, Guṇaśabdās, Dravyaśabdās and kriyāśabdās\(^94\). These four kinds of words denote the attributes (upādhis) belonging to the Vyaktis (individuals). The words do not directly signify the Vyakti.

Like Vaiyākaraṇas, Ālāmkārikas also believe in words signifying four entities viz. Jātiśabdās, Guṇaśabdās etc. Thus we can say that Ālāmkārikas follow the Vaiyākaraṇas even in the matter of bringing out the relative difference between the four entities of words; and they do not differ from the Vaiyākaraṇas to the problem of the import of words.

2:8 - Śaktigrahopayas (Means of knowing the Meaning of Words)

Śaktigraha (the apprehension of meaning) can be had in various ways. The number of ways prescribed for learning the meaning of a new word ie for obtaining the knowledge of Śakti in particular context is not always the same with all scholars.

Among the Naiyāyikas, Viśvanātha, the author of N.S.M. explains eight means for knowing the denotative function.\(^95\) But Annaṃbhaṭṭa recognises only Vṛddhavyavahāra as the Śaktigrahaḥ. In his opinion, only usages of elders is the way in this regard\(^96\). Gangeśa, a predecessor of Viśvanātha\(^97\) comes to admit that the
knowledge of all words primarily results from the observations of the usage of elderly persons ie Vṛddhavyavahāra. In the opinion of Jagadīśa, the knowledge of saṃketa first takes place in all cases through vṛddha vyavahāra and only thereafter, scope arises for the knowledge of śakti through other factors like Upamāna. From this we can see that according to the Naiyāyikas, Vṛddhavyavahāra gets more recognition.

Among the Ālaṃkārikas, Vāmana recognises only kośa (Lexicon) (dictionary) in this context. But after this period, Viśvanātha kavirāja, a modern Ālaṃkārika have come to admit more than one way in this regard. According to him, Vṛddhavyavahāra or usages of elders is the most important way and he adds two others like 'Prasiddha padasamabhivyāhāra' and 'Āptopadeśa'.

Of the Grammarians, Nāgeśa admitted all the eight fold means for obtaining the meaning of a word. But he considers Vṛddhavyavahāra as Śaktigrāhakaśiromaṇi ie the chief of the factors determining the denotative power of words.

Kātyāyana begins his Vārttikas with the statement that the relation between words and their meanings is got from worldly usage.

Sāṃkhya admitted only three ways for learning the meaning of words. They are :- Āptopadeśa, Vṛddhavyavahāra and prasiddhapadasannidhi.

From the above, we can see that though the number of ways suggested for acquiring the knowledge of new words varies in different treatises, it is interesting to find that Vṛddhavyavahāra is invariably recognised by almost all the scholars of various schools including Mīmāṃsa also. In the view of the Prābhākaras also, the most important method of learning the words is the Vṛddhavyavahāra or usage of elderly persons.
A brief explanation of eight well-known methods used for obtaining the knowledge of sakti is given below :-

2:8:1 - Vyākaraṇa or grammar - It is with the help of grammar that one can understand the significance of a word. We learn the meanings of the roots, suffixes and derivatives from grammar. We all knew that the most important use of grammar is to help people to learn a language quickly and correctly. For eg:- 'Mitraḥ bhāti' and 'Mitranḥ bhāti'. Here the same word 'Mitra' when used in the masculine gender, we get the meaning as 'Sun' and when we used the same word 'Mitra' in neuter gender, we get the meaning as 'friend'.

2:8:2 - Upamāna or analogy - One can know the denotative function from comparison also. A man who does not know what a gavaya, a particular species of animal looking like a cow can identify it through perception aided by the description of the animal heard previously. He is told that a gavaya is like a cow, and then, if he actually meets a gavaya in the forest, he is able to identify it at once. This method of knowing is considered by the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Naiyāyika-s as a pramāṇa or means of knowledge different from perception and inference. By using this method, we can identify any herbs and plants.

2:8:3 - Kośa or lexicon (dictionary) - Third means of knowing denotative function is kośa or dictionary. Dictionary gives us the knowledge of the equivalent word - meanings with regard to a particular word. We know that Amarakośa etc. gives the knowledge of the synonyms like svargaḥ, nākaḥ etc.
2:8:4 - Āptavākya or the direct statement of a trustworthy person is another way by which we may learn the meanings of words. When a trustworthy person says that the word 'pikā' means 'Kokila' ie 'Cuckoo'. The listener who does not know the meaning of the word pika, understands the denotative function of the word 'pika' as in Kokila. ie 'Kokilaḥ pikapada vācyah'.

2:8:5 - Vṛddhavyavahāra or the usage of words by elders is the most important way among all the eight methods. In actual life, this is the natural way of observation. For example:- when the elder person directs another person 'Bring a cow' or 'Bring a jar'. On hearing these words a jar is brought by the latter. Seeing this, a boy who is standing near by understands that the action of bringing the jar is brought about by the sentence 'bring a jar'. Afterwards by means of sentences like 'take away the jar', 'bring the cow' and so on by inclusion and exclusion of respective words, the boy grasps the denotative function of words like jar and so on.

2:8:6 - Vākyāṣeṣa or the rest of the passage in the context or the remainder of the sentence is the sixth means of determining the śakti of a word. We know that certain words have two or more primary meanings. Such words may have ascertained on the strength of Vākyāṣeṣa ie the rest of the passage. As for example, in the Vedic passage 'yavamayaścarurbhavati'. Here a doubt arises with regard to the meaning of the word 'yava'. The word 'yava' is used in the sense of 'barley' by the cultured people or Āryas; and in the sense of 'Kaṅgu' (panic seed) by the uncultured men or Mlecchas. When we have to consult the rest of the passage like 'yatrānya' etc. which describes the yavas flourishing with green leaves at a time
when other plants are found withering away. Or we may have recourse to another passage read together with 'yavamayaścarurbhavati'. This passage, namely 'Vasante Sarvasasyānāṁ'\textsuperscript{104} etc. also describes the longawned yava's rejoining in the season of spring, when generally all herbs and plants come to be devoid of leaves. On the strength of either of these two passages, we come to be confirmed in the notion that 'yava' in 'yavamayaścarurbhavati' means the Barley.

2:8:7 - **Vivṛti or explanation** - Viśvanātha observes that even on the strength of Vivaraṇa, one can ascertain the Šakti of a word with regard to a particular meaning. Vivaraṇa or Vivṛti is the statement of the meaning of a particular word by means of another synonyms or a word having a similar meaning. For example :- The sentence 'ghato'sti' is explained by putting the sentence 'Kalaśo'sti' and as a result, one can understand the meaning of the word 'ghaṭa' as 'Kalaśa'. Here we actually come to know the meaning of an unknown word through a commentary describing the meaning. Similarly 'pacati' means 'pākam karoti'.

2:8:8 - **Siddhapadasānnidhya (prasiddha padasānnidhya) or the syntactic connection with words already known** is the eighth means of knowing denotative function. Viśvanātha explains in N.S.M., that Sānnidhya (Proximity) to prasiddhapada (a well-known word) helps us to ascertain the Šakti of a word so long unfamiliar or aprasiddha.

For example :- From the sentence 'iha sahakārataru madhuram piko rauti' which means that 'A pika singing sweetly on the mango tree'. Here the word 'pika' is unfamiliar, while the words 'Sahakārataru', 'madhura'
and 'rauti' are already familiar. But the unfamiliar word 'pika' having physical proximity with the familiar words comes to convey the idea of Kokila as its śaktyartha.

So we come to a conclusion that the śakti of the word 'pika' is ascertained on such a ground with regard to a cuckoo (Kokila).

2:9 - Concept of Vākya (sentence)

In Sanskrit, vākya or sentence is a cluster (combination) of words (padas). But a mere collection of words without a mutual relation among the concepts (padārtha saṁsarga) does not constitute a vākya. For example, a jumble of such unrelated words as 'pot', 'cow', 'Devadatta' etc. does not make a sentence. In order to convey the collective meaning of a sentence, the words require the aid of some accessory properties or a sentence in order to be a sentence must fulfill the following conditions:-

1. Ākānkṣā (expectancy of words)
2. Āsatti (juxtaposition of words (sannidhi)
3. Yogyatā (compatibility of words)

The ancient and the modern philosophers together accepted these three properties. In their opinion, sentence is a group of words having the three above stated qualities. Hence Keśavamīśra, the author of Tarkabhāṣa has given the definition of the sentence is 'Vākyam tu ākānkṣā yogyatāsannidhi-matam padānāṃ Samūhaḥ. According to this definition, mere collection of words cannot be considered as a vākya or sentence. But there should be Ākānkṣa, Yogyatā and Sannidhi among the words. For this reason, a collection of words like 'cow, horse,
man, elephant', etc. is not a sentence because it has no expectancy (ākāṅkṣa). Similarly 'Spray with fire' is not a meaningful sentence, as the two words are lacking in congruity (yogyatā) but 'Spray with water' becomes a sentence. Similarly if the words 'gāṃ' and 'ānaya' are uttered one by one with an interval of an hour between them and not together, the two will not become a sentence, because these two words lack proximity (Sannidhi). Thus, the words collectively denote a sentence and hence in Tarkabhāṣa, we can see the definition of 'pada' as the collection of letters and that collection of letters constitutes a simple conception.

In the opinion of Keśava Miśra, a sentence is a collection of words and through the denotation of their meanings, they produce in the mind of the hearer; they convey meanings that are capable of being construed without incompatibility or contradiction and they are close enough to produce the desired meaning without undue delay.

The most common definition of a sentence which is found in the Navya-nyāya texts is simply a group of words is called a sentence. Annaṃbhatta defines sentence as 'padasamuho vākyam'. ie collection of padas is a Vākyya; 'Vākyatvam ca Viśiṣṭārthaparasabdatvam' is the definition of Vākyya found in Nyāyakośa. Which means that statement which causes a qualified knowledge is a sentence.

Amarasimha defines a sentence as a group of words ending in verbal suffix and case affix or as a verb, related to the Kāraka. Jagadiśa defines sentence as that having an arrangement of words which have mutual expectancy. The definition of sentence given by Veṅkaṭa Subrahmaṇya Iyer is completely identical with Śabdaśaktiprakāśika. According to him, words which are expectant, congruent etc. denote their meanings.
Notes and References:

1. ātmaraṇam yathājñāno jñeyaraṇam ca dṛṣyate/
   arthaaraṇam tathā śabde svarūpam ca prakāśate - VP I. 50

2. NSM Kārika. 81

3. Suptiṇantam padam - As - 1.4.14

4. Te vibhaktyantāḥ padam - NS.2.2.58

5. yathādārśānaṁ vikṛtā varṇā vibhaktyantāḥ pada samjñā bhavanti
   - N. Bhā. p.656

6. C.S.A.I.N.P - p. 38

7. N.Vār. p.656

8. te varṇāḥ vibhaktyantāḥ padam -VV. p.656

9. athavā 'vibhaktiḥ' 'vṛttiḥ' 'antaḥ' saṃbandhaḥ tena vṛttimatvam
   padatvamiti - ibid 659

10. V.U.P. 156

11. padam ca varṇa samāhaḥ/samāhaścātra ekajñāna viṣayā bhāvaḥ - TB
    p.126

12. TS. p. 40

13. śaktam padam - NSM p. 119

14. varṇa samūhaḥ padam - TC.p. 482

15. Varṇa - Samūhaḥ padamiti, varṇa samūhatva rūpam padatvamityarthaḥ-
    Comm.on. TC p. 482
16. TK. p. 44

17. nanu padatvaṁ yadi śaktimatvam, tadā samāsasya atha thāvat
   vibhakti sahakāreṇāpi katham tat prayogaḥ - krṣnakānti on SSP. p.70

18. Padaṁ vibhaktyantam - ibid

19. Prof. V.N. Jha; studies in Language, logic and epistemology

20. tad yānyetāni catvāri padajātāni.....nāmākhyātecopasarganipātaśca
   - Nir 1.1

21. Sattvapradhānāni nāmāni - ibid

22. As - 1.2.43

23. bhava-pradhānam ākhyātam - Nir.1.1

24. V.P. Bhatta; Gadādhara's śaktivāda; p.2

25. Śaktistridhā rūḍhhir yogo yoga- rūḍhīśca - LM p. 105

26. Vibhaktiḥ dvayī - nāmikyākhyātiki ca, brāhmaṇaḥ pacati udāharaṇam -
   N. Bha. p. 656

27. yadi dvayī vibhakti - rupasarganipātāstarhi na padasaṃjñākaḥ? na nāmnī-
   antharbhāvāt- upasarga nipāta nāmnā saṃgrḥītāḥ, yasmādāha avyayād
   lopa iti, te subantatvāt tenaiva saṃgrḥītā iti/ N. vār.pp. 656-57

28. vibhaktiśca sup-tiṅ-rupā- VV.p. 656

29. tad-dvidhāmaḥ mukhya - ganuṣa bhedāt - TK. p. 44

30. Yat śakti - vṛttyā yamartham upasthāpayati, tat tasmin arthe mukhyam/
   yathā go- ghatādi vyaktyupasthāpakaṁ go-ghaṭādipadam / ibid.
31. rūḍḥaṅca lakṣaṅcaiva yoga- rūḍḥaṅca yaugikam taccaturdha, parai rūḍḥhayaugikam manyate'- dhikam- SSP p. 72

32. taccaturvidham- kvacid yaugikaṃ kvacid rūḍḥaṃ kvacid yogarūḍhaṃ kvacid yaugikarūḍhaṃ - NSM.p.119

33. ibid

34. A critique on śabda - p. 146

35. yatrāvavaśakti - nirapekṣayā samudāyāśktyā gṛhyate tad rūḍham - NSM.p.119.

36. yatra tvavayaśakti - viśaye samudāyaśaktirapyasti tad yogarūḍham - ibid

37. yatra tu yaugikārtha - rūḍḥhyarthayoh svātantryeṇa bodhastad yaugikarūḍham - ibid

38. Udbhidā yajeta pasukāma - TBR 19.7.3 JNV 1.4.1

39. tacca padam caturvidham. rūḍham, yaugikaṃ yogarūḍham yaugikarūḍham ca..... etc. Tp. vide BHC. p.59

40. Ogden and Richards; The meaning of meaning - p.1

41. Quoted by Raja K.Kunjunni in ITM; p.49

42. artho'śṭādaśadhā/ tatra vastumātram-abhidheyaśca/ abhidheyo'pi dvidha - Śāstrīyo laukikaśca ................ kriyāntara- iti V.P. Puṇyārāja; a commentary of V.P. 2.79; pp. 152-55

43. Ogden and Richards- op.cit pp. 186 - 187
44. Varma, Siddheśwara - 'Analysis of meaning in the Indian philosophy of language', JRASGBI, 1925; p.21

45. i) LM. p.28
   ii) TC. Vol (iv), part(ii), p.627

46. LM, ibid

47. Pandey. R.C. op.cit; p.187


49. śaktam padam - TS. p.50

50. Iśvara - saṅketaḥ śaktiḥ- V.P. Bhaṭṭa; op.cit; p.6

51. atreśvarapadasya nityatvaparicāyakatayā nityasaṅketaḥ śaktiriti evārtho bodhyaḥ - Haridasī comm.on. śaktivāda.

52. tayā cārthabodhakaṁ padaṇī vācakaṁ yathā gotvādiviśṣṭa bodhakaṁ gavādipadaṇī tad-bodhyo'rtho gavādirvācyah, sa eva mukhyārtha iti ucyate - Śak. V; p.6

53. i) navyāstu īśvarecchā na śaktiḥ, kintu icchaiva tena - ādhunika-samketi'te' pi śaktiḥ astyeva ityāhuḥ - NSM.p.115
   ii) navyāstu īśvarecchāya na śaktiḥ/ kintu icchaiva/ tena ādhunika - saṅketite' pi sāsti iti vadanti/ NK.p. 854
   iii) ekādaśe ahani pitā'- ityādi śruti vacanena..........navyaiḥ ucyate - īśvarecchā na śaktiḥ, api-tu icchaiva/ tena asmāt padād-ayam- arthro boddhavya iti asmadādīnm ācchā api śaktiḥ/ Singh; Kāliprasād - NDV. - p. 185
54. U.S. Bist; The concept of Language; p.137

55. Pandey. R.C; Problem of meaning in Indian philosophy; p. 183

56. U.S. Bist; The concept of language; p.137

57. This is called pravāha- nityatā, W.S. Allen, The origin and development of Language; This is different from the natural theory of the Greek scholars who believed that 'in giving names to objects the primitive man was inspired by some innate quality or psychological; effect of the thing itself'

58. V.P. Bhāṭṭa; op.cit; p. 7

59. Kātyāyana's vārttika begins:-
Siddhe śabdārthha saṁbandhe lokataḥ..........; see also Patanjali's bhāṣya on that Bhartṛhari says (VP; I 23): nityāḥ śabdārthasaṁbandhāḥ.

60. Nityāḥ śabdārthasaṁbandhāḥ - VP. I. 23

61. Indriyānāṁ svaviṣayeṣu anādiryogyatā yathā/
anādir arthaiḥ śabdānāṁ saṁbandho yogyata yathā. VP. p. 70

62. A critique on śabda - p. 85

63. tadapi nityam yasmin tatvam na vihanyate - MBH vol . I.p.64

64. RV - I. 1

65. śaktiḥ nāma sāmarthyam - Siṅgh, kāliprasad; op.cit. p.183

66. i) asmāt padādayam - artho boddhavya itīśvara - Saṅketaḥ śaktiḥ - TS; p.50

ii) NSM; p.115

iii) Śak. V; p.6
67. asmāt śabdādayam - artho bodhavya ityākarako' nādi saṅketaḥ śaktiḥ-
   TK. p.44

68. ekādase ahani..... NDV. p. 185

69. 'dvādaśe ahani pitā nāma kuryāt' - iti śrutīḥ/ tathā ca dvādasahāḥ kālā - pitrādi-
   Uccārita nāmatvādinā nāmavācyah śīśuḥ ityā kāraka- icchayā- iśvareṇa
   tāḍṛśa- śruti praṇa yanād - ādhunika saṅketo' styeva quoted in N.K.; p.854

70. TS. p.333

71. i) artha- smṛtyanukūlaḥ pada- padārtha- saṁbandhaḥ śaktiḥ - TD p. 50
   ii) pada- padārthayoh vācyavācaka -bhāvaniyaāmakāṃ
   saṁbandḥāntaraṃsaṅtikī iti śābdikāvadanti - NK; p. 855

72. saṅtīśca padena saha padārthasya saṁbandhaḥ/ NSM p.115

73. idam padaṇī amunārthanbodhayatu iti iśavaraśaṅketaḥ- ibid

74. icchāmātraṇī śaktīḥ iti navyāḥāhuḥ - ibid.

75. ādhunike tu saṅketite na śaktīḥ -ibid

76. ādhunike saṅketite'pi sāśaktīḥ iti navyāḥ- ibid

77. padapadārthhayoh vācyavācaka bhāvaniyāmakam saṁbandhāntaraṃ śaktiḥ
   iti śābdikā - vadanti - NK,p.855

78. avinābhava eva śaktiḥ iti prāṇcāḥ - TP

79. Yo'yaṃ śabdāḥ saḥ eva arthaḥ
Yo' yam arthaḥ saheva śabdāḥ
śaktīḥ iti āhuḥ
81. kaumārilamate padād bhinnamabhinnaṃ vākyam - TP

82. padaśaktiḥ dvividhā ānubhāvikā
   Smārikā ca, ādyā śabdānubha -
   vajanikā smārikā tu padārtha
   smṛti janikā - ibid.

83. apohārthe śaktiḥ iti bauddhāḥ manyante - ibid.

84. VBS. p. 181
   NS. II. 2.62

85 PWM. p. 138

86. Subartha- karmatvādau svā-śraya vr̥ttitvasaṃbandhenaiva prakṛtyarthasya
gotvādeḥ sākāṅkṣātvat - SSP.p.81

87. BPS. p. 438

88. Vyaktāveva śaktiḥ natu gotvādi jātavapi iti navyāḥ āhuḥ NK. P.855

89. Vyaktyākṛti jātayastu padārthaḥ - NS. 2.2.68

90. ibid

91. TS pp. 317-18
   PWM p.142

92. Ashokkumar Goswami; op cit; p. 129

93. SDK . p. 42

94. SSP. 77, K.18
95. Śaktigraham vyākaraṇopamāṇakośāptavākyāt vyavahārataḥ
   Vākyasya  śro̱d - vivṛteḥ vadanti sānnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya vṛddhāḥ-
   NSM. p.115

96. śaktigrahaśca ............. madhukarādi
   vyutpattidarśanācca- TD vide TS .pp. 319-23

97. vṛddhavyavahārādeva........... 
   śabdavyutpatyadhīnatvāt. TC.pp. 460-63

98. SSP. pp. 103-04

99. abhidhānakośataḥ padārthaniś- cayaḥ - KLSV. 1.3.5

100. SD p. 32-33

101. PLM. p.27

102. tribhīḥ sambandhasiddhiḥ - SS 38.

103. vṛddhavyavahārāpūrvikaiva sarvā vyutpattiḥ - VM.p.2

104. vasante sarvasasyānām jāyate patraśātanaṃ
   modamānāśca tiṣṭhanti yavāḥ
   kaṇiśasālīnaḥ SB - 3.6.1, JNV - 1.3.5

105. i) TB p.121
   ii) TS p.52
   iii) TK.p.45
   iv) N.kus- p.390
   v) kār.kārika. 82
vi) SSP. p.3

vii) VM 1-8

viii) VMV  p.37

106. TB p.121

107. padam ca varṇa - samūhaḥ - TB p.126

108. samūhaścātra ekajñāna- viṣayībhāvaḥ - ibid.

109. ibid. p.125

110. i)  TC. p. 482
   ii)  NK. p. 730
   iii) TS. p. 50
   iv)  TK. p. 44

111. TS. p. 50

112. tīṇ - subanta- cayo vākyamā kriyā vā kārakānvitā - AK. Kārika; 1.6.2

113. i)  mithaḥ sākāṅkṣa  śabdāsya vyūho vākyam- SSP kārika. 13.
   ii)  yādṛśa - śabdānāṁ yādṛśārtha- viṣayitākānvayabodhaṁ pratyanukūla parasparākāṅkṣā tādṛśa-śabda- stoma eva tathāvidhārthāḥ vākyam-
       ibid p.64

114. Padāṇyākāṅkṣītāsannayogārthān tara- saṅgatān |
    svārthānabhi- dadhantīha vākyam...|| Śāb. Tar. p. 2