Chapter - VIII

ETHICS

Carakasaṃhitā is totally predestined to be a treatise for the whole of humanity. In that sense its moral obligation is unquestionable. But the problem is to find out what sort of moral convictions Carakasaṃhitā upholds and how it undertakes its dissemination.

Beyond our expectations Caraka depicts its moral outlook. It is not a stereotyped description of morality or code of conduct that is to be followed in the medical domain only. But it presents a comprehensive vision of an integrated ethics for the accomplishment of the supreme good of life, taking into consideration human nature and the real nature of the world. Perhaps there may be no other medical treatise in the world which describes moral values and code of conducts in such an all-embracing manner.

General outlook of morality

First of all, let us have a brief description of the conception of ethics in general and in Indian tradition in particular before going into the details of the ethical conceptions of Caraka. It would be helpful to understand the relevance and importance of Caraka in this respect.

“Morality means conscious living within the frame of certain principles of conduct laid down by those regarded as authorities.
In general, therefore, the moral institution of life or moral point of view consists in the awareness of an important distinction between what is and what ought to be. For man should live not merely in the light of what is but also what ought to be. To be more specific it is the awareness of living based on a distinction between our animal demands and the demands of the higher faculties of human worthy of the distinctive nature of man”.¹

Morality has mainly got two facets; one is subjective and the other is objective.² The subjective dimension refers to the individual ethics or the ethics in relation to oneself and the objective refers to the social ethics or the ethics in relation to others. The social ethics prescribes certain responsibilities and obligations and code of conduct based on which the individuals ought to behave in a group or society.³ The most significant aspect of the social ethics is that it emphasizes one’s concern for others. Love, compassion, and brotherhood are some of its identifying features. On the other hand, individual morality is purely personal. “It is more a repository of prudence than morality”.⁴ It implies the procedure of adopting ways and methods like the control of senses and the purification of mind so as to subdue one’s lower instincts and to develop the higher values through proper understanding of one’s own inner nature in such a way that the optimum of life can be attained. The domain of morality precisely consists of both the behaviour of a person to others and also his character and conduct to himself as a man. Thus, while judging a moral point of view or moral institution these two aspects deserve due attention.
In the West, generally speaking, morality is understood mainly in the sense of social reference. “Outside a society there is no question of morality. The question of morality involves a necessary reference to some others in respect of whom one has to adopt a moral point of view or has to behave either morally in a good manner or bad manner”. Frankena, emphasizing the social reference, says that morality is a social enterprise. It is an instrument of society as a whole for the guidance of individuals and smaller groups because morality is sometimes defined as an instrument of society as a whole. As for as the Westerners are concerned, moral principles are social rules and they are not spun by an individual.

The Indian moral conceptions are referred to by the word dharma. Dharma combines in it the two distinct concepts of duty and virtue in general and is connected with a series of notions frequently called “the aims of life”. With the exception of the Cārvākas, it is basically spiritualistic and is considered as rooted in the Vedas. The word dharma is derived from the root “dhr” which means to uphold or support. So dharma is that which upholds the universe from within. Probably dharma is the single most important concept of understanding “Indian Religion” and ethics. Even then, a critical evaluation of the moral teaching of Caraka in terms of general ethical ideas in Indian religio-culture represented by the word dharma has got its own limitations because Indian religio-culture is not a unified creed as we see in Semitic religions.

From the point of human morality, it is a complex whole comprising several religious philosophical beliefs, values, and practices which are often
mutually incompatible. *Dharma* when prefixed by some such proper noun as *sanātana* (Vedic) or *bauddha* (non-Vedic or *śramanic*), means the whole of religion and philosophy and moral code of a given people or community. Thus, broadly speaking, the Vedic *dharma* and *śramaṇic dharma* or the *Bauddha-dharma* represent the two major streams of thought. Even though both of them uphold *dharma* as the cardinal principle of their teachings, they fundamentally differ in their outlook.

The Vedic *dharma* combines in it the two facets that we tend to keep distinct. They are the facets of “is” and “ought” -- the dimensions of “how things actually are” and “how things ought to be”. On the one hand it is righteousness and duty essentially ordained in the Vedic scriptures and the objective order of the universe. It combines in one concept the description of the ordering of things and at the same time the prescription for how one should live to attain the optimum of life. Another aspect of morality that this single term *dharma* upholds is that it carries with it the sense of both objective or socio-centric as well as subjective or self-centric ethical values. Most often the latter is accentuated.

One of the most important things to be remembered in this connection is that there came in the *Śṛtimśis*, the Upaniṣads, and finally the Vedic philosophical system as continuation of the Vedas as sources of *dharma*. Of them, the *Śṛtimśis* provide us with the most important religious beliefs and practices. The *Śṛtimśis* disseminate external and ritualistic socio-centric morality. The *Śṛti* literature is generally taken to include the Dharmasastras, the Purāṇas and the two Epics. Thus, the Vedas and the
Smṛtis taken together have been regarded as the source of morality in the Vedic stream. The main concern of the law givers (smṛtikāras) was often the stability of the social organization and the advocacy of social morality conductive to ritualism. Their chief moral concern was social stability. They seek to protect the various customs and practices of people belonging to different castes, communities, and professions. They also advocated a scheme of life with detailed instructions of duties at every stage of life.

According to the Vedic belief, another significant thing is that dharma is divine. Dharma is not created but discovered by the Ṛṣis. It is not a subject for disagreement or debate. A person should behave in accordance with class (āśrama), whether he/she is a student (brahmaṇārīn), a householder (gṛhaustha), a forest-dweller (vānaprasṭha), or renouncer (sanyāsin). Thus, one behaves as one should behave as laid down in the Dharmaśāstras. Dharma is a cosmic principle and one has to follow it without violating or questioning it. It is one’s duty (karma). Reasoning or logic, however, seems to be hardly given any recognizable place in the Vedic ethical tradition. There are rather clear statements of Manu denouncing those who try to assess the opinions of the Vedas and the Smṛtis on the touchstone of logic and reasoning. He says that such people are to be despised and even excommunicated. Kumārila, while emphasizing the place of the śāstra in matters of morality, denounces the intrusion of logical reasoning. He says, “For the comprehension of dharma and adharma there is no other means save the fact of their being enjoined and prohibited. Hence the introduction of inferential argument is not proper” Śukraṇīti says that theory of
religion and morality is very complicated, and hence people should practice the rules of Śrutī, Smṛti, and Purāṇas. It is difficult to find out the reasons on which duties stand.

The Upaniṣhads and the philosophic schools promulgated liberation directed self-centric morality. Accordingly, dharma serves the route to superior control, to the mastering of attitudes of greater and greater concern coupled with less and less attachment. The purification of mind and the control of sense organs are indispensable for the attainment of mokṣa. One has to subordinate lower impulses to the higher ones through the proper understanding of one's inner nature and through the observance of some practical discipline. Subjective process constitutes the moral life of man.

Buddhism and Jainism, which represent the main stream of śramanic ethics, also preach both subjective and objective moralities. But the points in which they differ from Hinduism are: (1) the rejection of an eternal ultimate reality as the essence of the universe, (2) the firm rejection of the Vedic ritualism, and (3) the rejection of the classification of varṇavyavasthā. In the teachings of the Buddha, karma was ethicized. For the Buddha, karma was essentially volition (intention) that leads to the actions of body, mind, and speech. If the Vedic karma refers to ritualistic action which calls for external purification, it was a mental event for the Buddha and so he emphasized internal purification.

The Sāṃkhyaś believe in three kinds of ethically significant actions: (1) sāttvika actions which consist in kindness, restraints of sense organs,
and freedom from hatred. (2) rājasika actions which consist in passion, anger, greed, violence, discontent, faultfinding, and rudeness. (3) tāmasika actions which consist in madness, intoxication, lassitude, drowsiness, lust, worthlessness, and impurity. Of them, virtues are the first kind of actions since they lead to liberation. 22

Similarly, in the philosophy, merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) are the qualities of the self and they are not the objective act which is prompted by the self. There is no merit or demerit in the action itself. It is always the intention which causes merit and demerit.23 The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas say that actions are caused by volition (prayatna). Śaṅkaramiśra defines karma as action (pravṛtti) and inaction (nivṛtti) for acquiring the beneficial and avoiding the non-beneficial and that such actions and inactions are produced by peculiar type of volitions springing from the mental dispositions of desire and aversion.24 So, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it is the intention that determines whether an action is right or wrong.

Thus, we see a transition in the concept of ethics in the philosophical systems. Karma was given a new interpretation. In spite of the differences in their world outlook, they were more or less unanimous in reinterpreting karma. If karma formerly stood for ritual action and social duties, the new meaning it acquired was action prompted by intention. Thus, intention became absolutely essential for constituting rightness and wrongness, and naturally the purification of mind attained prime position in ethical conceptions. In spite of the differences, all are unanimous in the basic
postulation of ultimate values. All of them accept the ethical values of exclusion of envy, hatred, covetousness, wickedness, and the practice of humility, charity, love, greatfulness, sympathy, and self sacrifice.

**Moral outlook of Caraka**

If we analyze the moral outlook of Caraka on the basis of the above criterion, we can see that the scheme of moral life promulgated by Caraka is basically Vedic and predominantly philosophical. But this does not mean that he discards the non-Vedic moral values. On the other hand, it follows a balancing attitude, for the main focus is human happiness. It upholds all the above mentioned values which are universally acclaimed as the “right way of life”.

Caraka adopts a rational attitude. Through the words of Ātreya he declares that Veda is credible knowledge. Meanwhile the assertions of eminent persons based on their investigation and substantiation in any field of knowledge which are not in contradiction with the Veda and which are approved by virtuous persons and are conductive to human welfare should be considered authoritative. This shows that the moral conceptions are not merely dogmatic but also rational.

If “social morality” is predominantly the morality of doing, and individual morality is the morality of “being”, we see the culmination of both in the moral conceptions of Caraka. He pays equal importance to worldly life and liberation. Mundane life is construed as a way to attain the spiritual optimum. In other words, it is a synthesis of the world- and- life-affirming moral conceptions of Vedic- tradition.
**Spiritual basis of moral conception**

In consonance with the Vedic thought, Caraka believes that the ultimate reality is the very essence of the universe as well as an inner self of man and it sets for him a spiritual goal of “complete freedom” from all forms of suffering as higher than any other goal to which his mundane inclinations lead to. The moral conception underpinned is based on the belief of the unity of everything at the transcendent level. The basic postulates of the mortality of the self, the law of action (*karma*), rebirth or transmigration, and liberation are being discussed with due importance in Caraka. In this sense, its moral conceptions are directed towards the attainment of individual liberation (*mokṣa*). But it cannot be interpreted as self-centric for the reason that it never tolerated the idea of pessimistic sentiments denouncing the world and exalting world renunciation as a way of getting liberated from transmigratory existence by following the way of mendicants.  

Caraka believes in the world of suffering. But he does not ask to reject the socio-moral obligations for the sake of liberation. His ethical outlook is not life-negating. On the other hand, he puts forth a moral outlook which is fully world-and-life affirming. Caraka was circumspect of the reality that all activities of human-beings are directed towards the achievement of happiness. Even though Caraka speaks of the four “aims of life”, namely righteousness (*dharma*), material prosperity (*artha*), desires (*kāma*), and liberation (*mokṣa*), he emphasizes the first three which can be construed more subtly perhaps as attitudes or orientations than the final aim of life
-- liberation (mokṣa). He says that one should discard unwholesome attitudes and adopt wholesome ones in regard to righteousness (dharma), material prosperity (artha), and desire (kāma), for no happiness or pain can occur without these three factors.\textsuperscript{30} It vindicates that his prime concern is mundane life and happiness. A happy man is one who is free from all vices such as physical violence, adultery, theft, and persecution. Such a person can only relish the fruits of dharma, artha, and kāma.\textsuperscript{31}

**Theory of karma**

Caraka did not simply take over a pre-existing Vedic doctrine of ritualistic karma. He interprets karma in a different sense which is more or less similar to the one in the philosophical systems. His total ethical conceptions hinges on the doctrine of karma. For Caraka, karma is essentially the action of the body, the mind, and the speech prompted by volition or intention (prayatna).\textsuperscript{32} So, according to Caraka, every act is intentional.\textsuperscript{33} It is the intention that decides whether the action is good or bad. The root of every action lies in the mind. Actions spring from erroneous knowledge (moha) and the mental dispositions of desire (icchā) and aversion (dveṣa).\textsuperscript{34} Elsewhere he states that desire and aversion are the two kinds of craving (tṛṣṇa)\textsuperscript{35} and declares that the ultimate healing of all sorts of sufferings consists in the elimination of upadhā\textsuperscript{36} which is synonymous with tṛṣṇa.\textsuperscript{37}

It may be relevant to note in this context that the basic conception of karma is found reflected in the various classical philosophical systems. The
Buddha regards craving (trṣṇa) as the cause of suffering. The Nyāya-sūtra also gives the very same idea. There it is stated that defects (doṣas) which proceed from ignorance are the cause of actions leading to bondage. Doṣa refers to more or less the same concept of trṣṇa in the Carakasaṃhitā because erroneous knowledge (moha), desire (icchā), and aversion (dveṣa) are regarded as the ramifications of doṣa. Vaiṣeṣika - sūtra regards upadhā as the cause of actions leading to adharma and anupadhā as the origin of dharma. By upadhā what he means is the impurity of all mental dispositions as well as external impurity. Similarly, anupadhā refers to both internal and external purity. According to Praṣatapāda, volition that impels action is of two types: (1) that which proceeds from being lively (jīvanapurva) and (2) that which proceeds from desire and aversion (icchādveṣapurva).

Whatever one does or whatever one refrains from doing is an action, and unless it is an act of renunciation, it is bound to breed bondage and frustration. Wholesome or unwholesome kārmic intentions bring about in this life or in the future life happy or painful experiences. For instance, an action taking place from hatred or greed as response to what is unpleasant is morally wrong and is not conductive to liberation. In particular, karma refers to a morally relevant action rather than mere ritual action.

The diversity of the initial circumstances as well as the equipment with which men are brought into this life is accountable only in terms of the diversity of the causal actions and tendencies. Caraka calls the actions of the previous life which lead to rebirth as destiny (daiva) and the fresh acts initiated in the present life as puruṣakāra. If karma is strong and
dominant, it will certainly wield its effect (death) on time (kālaniyata) and if it is weak, it doesn’t produce its result on time (akālaniyata). Transmigration is also according to one’s accrued fruits of actions. The subtle body, after death, carries with it the merit and demerit of what is done in the previous life, and it determines the mental traits and thereby the next life. One takes a new birth according to the potential of one’s actions of previous life. The good and bad experiences of this life or future life are, therefore, brought about not by others but by oneself.

Actions are not accidental. But they are underpinned by certain fundamental motives or instincts. The three basic instincts from which all our actions originate are (1) desire for life preservation (praṇaiśaṇa), (2) desire for material wealth (arthaiśaṇa) and (3) desire for afterlife (paralokaiśaṇa). Thus, Caraka construes the three sorts of biological instincts as the fundamental motives which serve as the spring of all our actions and envisages a scheme of well balanced life by harmonizing the interplay of all the three basic instincts. The harmonization in turn is determined by knowledge because, for Caraka, action denotes action impelled by volition. That is, even though the aforesaid three biological instincts are at the root of every action, all actions are essentially and immediately initiated by volition. Again, volition (prayatna) is oriented by apprehension (dhī), fortitude (dhṛtī), and memory (smṛti). Thus, in accordance with the nature of these three factors the basic instincts get manifested in the form of desire or aversion which gives rise to volition. Volition finally ends in action.
Craving arises from erroneous knowledge of objects in the pursuit of happiness. So the ignorant people indulge in unwholesome gratification of the five senses and subject themselves to strain beyond their capacity and get adapted to unpleasant regimes. They subject themselves to excessive utilization (atiyoga), non-utilization (ayoga), and wrong utilization (mithyāyoga) of the physical, mental, and oral actions and thus yield to all kinds of sufferings.

It is one’s knowledge that determines the way of life. One is able to retain one’s identity as long as one retains one’s power of discrimination between right and wrong. The discriminative and judgmental capacity of a person depends on wisdom (prajñā) which consists in apprehension (dhī), fortitude (dhṛti), and memory (smṛti). If the instruments of knowledge, most particularly the inner instruments, are disciplined and integrated, there comes in wisdom, the cause of wholesome volitional acts, that gives rise to happiness. So Caraka construes volitional transgression (prajñāparādha) due to the degeneration or derangement of intelligence (dhī), fortitude (dhṛti), and memory (smṛti) as one of the root causes of all sufferings. All the mental defects such as malice, despair, fear, anger, vanity, and hatred are also considered as volitional transgression. So, annihilation of volitional transgression, control of sense organs, precise memory and accurate knowledge of place and time, self awareness, and good conduct will promote wholesome actions.

The conceptions of these three fundamental motives as the basic instincts of all actions and the classification of karma into daiva and pauruṣa
are something peculiar to Caraka and it differentiates Carakasaṃhitā from all other systems of Indian philosophy. Probably it is the daiva that determines one’s basic instincts and so it can be equated with the unseen (adṛśta / dharma and adharma) in the Vaiṣeṣika - sūtra.

**Moral prescriptions for healthy and happy life**

As far as Caraka is concerned, an ethically virtuous life will be a healthy and a happy one. So he gives elaborate moral prescriptions which are conductive to good health and happiness. From the point of view of one’s mundane and spiritual well-being, he advocates to hold back from urges relating to evil deeds. A wise person should refrain from greed, grief, fear, anger, vanity, shamelessness, jealousy, extreme attachment, and malice. One should not use harsh and untimely words. One should not engage in violence or immoral contact with women, theft, and persecution. Injury to living beings (hiṃsā) is a sin and so it will affect one’s longevity. So non-injury (ahiṃsā) is prescribed as a way of increasing one’s life (ahimsā prāṇavardhanaṁ).

One should avoid such sinful persons in character, speech, and mind as well as those who are quarrelsome and those who make vicious remarks about others. The greedy, the envious, the cruel, the fickle minded as well as those who indulge in defaming others, those who associate with the enemies, those who are devoid of compassion, and those who do not follow the virtuous course of life are also to be avoided. Caraka further advises to associate with wise, learned, and matured persons as well as with men of
character, fortitude, and self concentration. So also one should make association with those who know the real nature of things and are full of equanimity, who direct us in the right path, who are good to all beings, and who are peaceful and content. The better way is to give up the unwholesome habits and to develop wholesome habits steadily and gradually. He must improve himself by a series of ideological and behavioural self identifications.

It is essential to maintain the balance of both mind and sense organs. For this one has to perform one’s noble acts with utmost care. Caraka says that one should respect gods, cows, brahmins, preceptors (gurus), and elderly. One ought to help other persons, saints, and great teachers (acāryas). One should offer auspicious amulets, wear good herbs, bath twice, and clean all the pores of the body and feet, and cut hair, beard, and nail three times in a fortnight. One should wear good apparel, should be pleasant, apply scent, comb the hair, oil the head, ears, nose, and feet and smoke. One should perform sacrifices, and pay offerings to the departed ancestors. One should be self controlled and virtuous. One should be envious of another person’s efficiency, but should not be jealous of the fruits of such efficiency. One should be firm in decision, fearless, susceptible to the feelings of shame, be intelligent, energetic, skilful, merciful, virtuous, and a believer (āstika). One should devote oneself to teachers who are modest, intelligent, learned, noble, aged, and spiritually perfect. One should acquit oneself as well as display good manners. One should avoid going to impure and untidy places. One should be compassionate to all beings and should root out attachment and antipathy.
It may not be improper to refer to Caraka’s opinion of social hierarchy. In connection with the description of practices that is to be followed for the procreation of the desired child he describes the due rites that should be performed by women belonging to each varṇa, namely brāhmin, kṣatriya and vaiśya. He also reminds us that a śūdra woman should offer only obeiscence to the gods, fire, brāhmins, preceptors, and those who have attained perfection. This shows that Caraka did not dishonour the social hierarchy. But it does not in any way harm his humanitarian conceptions. It is not because of sectarian thoughts that he refers to such customs, but because he believed in the potency of one’s karma to ordain for him pleasure and pain according to the good or bad actions one does. So the assumption of inequality of men is sought to be justified on the basis of the law of karma which traces these inequalities of the present life to the actions of different selves in their past lives.

Medical ethics

The most striking aspect of Caraka’s ethics is that he was highly conscious of the moral obligations of medical professionals to society. He cautions them to keep the moral standards intact. He says that a physician should always be a great humanist. He must primarily possess knowledge, imagination, comprehension, memory, resourcefulness and promptness; must be prudent, must have self-restraint, and must be endowed with presence of mind. A physician must also have a clear knowledge of drugs and their applications. Even a deadly poison can become an excellent drug if
properly administered and, on the contrary, if it is not properly administered, it will be a deadly poison. So, if the physician is not competent in these aspects, his prescription would be nothing but poison, a weapon, fire or a thunderbolt to his patient, for it kills him.\textsuperscript{59} He also warns that even a talk with a physician who is an impostor devoid of vitruous acts will be the messenger of death.\textsuperscript{60}

He repeatedly insists on the quality of the head and the heart and the need to be careful about giving quarter to quacks, imposters and charlatans. It is better to die rather than to be treated by a quack physician.\textsuperscript{61} Such physicians who take away the life instead of diseases are called rogābhīsāras.\textsuperscript{62} The physician should show compassion towards the ailing, should have devotion to patients who can be cured, but be detached from the dying patients.\textsuperscript{63} Genuine physicians are saviours of life (prāṇābhīsāras).\textsuperscript{64}

**Compassion as the crowning principle of morality**

The greatness of the ethical conceptions of Caraka lies in the fact that it is dedicated to the well-being of the fellow beings and the world at large. Caraka dictates to act according to what one’s inner conscience says right (manḍhpūtaṁ samācaret). Perhaps, it may be argued that, Āyurveda is ultimately a healing science which is primarily concerned with human happiness in the objective world and so naturally be socio-centric. But beyond our expectations it surpasses the limits of social responsibilities and obligations to reach the heights of universal love and compassion for all. The Rṣis were actually incarnates of love and compassion. Caraka, at
the opening part itself, affirms that the science is the most sacred among the Vedas because it is beneficial to mankind in this world and the world beyond. He declares that positive health stands at the very root of accomplishing the four ends of man: dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. Diseases are the destroyers of health. So the great loving sage, grasping everything, engaged in prescribing the Āyurveda to his disciples out of compassion for all beings. Again, it is also said that the disciples, after acquiring accomplishment, understanding, patience, fame, forbearance, and pity for the good of all creatures, should dedicate themselves to the well being of all. Finally, Caraka says that scriptures are intended to bring about happiness to the whole world (lokānugrahaprayṛttataḥ sāstravādaḥ). In the moral prescriptions also he repeatedly insists upon compassion and non injury.

The modern conception of ethical man in Albert Swhweitzer is more or less the same. He says that man must stress not only men’s relations with his own species but also must learn to establish an ever-living contact with all other cereatures. The novelty of the humanism envisaged in Caraka is not only because it is spun by compassion and love, which may be said as quite natural to any curative science and other systems of thought and religion, but also because it has a sound spiritualistic metaphysical basis. The depth as well as significance of this metaphysical basis is an automatic offspring from the realization of the micro-macro relationship between man and the universe as was outlined formerly. He whose self is integrated and harmonized by such a vision of oneness or equality in life with all sentient
creatures on the moral plane experiences a profound joy and absolute compassion.

So, if we look at the whole picture, the ethical conceptions of Caraka have got its own brevity, elegance, serenity, reasonableness, and catholicity. The moral conceptions of Caraka are not merely a repository of prudence. Caraka harmonizes the two types of standards (both social and personal) mentioned above which, being of opposite nature, should have drifted apart.

The institution of morality has for its basic concern the regulation of man’s lower inclinations and the promotion of the higher ones in realization of his aspiration as a man. It is in such a concern that the transition of “is” to “ought” is involved. Not only is the conduct to other members of the society emphasized, but his behaviour to himself is stressed with equal importance. Purification of mind and control of sense organs and subordination of lower impulses to the higher ones through a proper understanding of his inner nature and through the observance of some practical discipline which are indispensable for the attainment of higher values of life are repeatedly reminded of.

Even though Caraka gives lengthy moral prescriptions, he does not consider ethics as a mere study of morals. On the contrary, it is the acknowledgement of human responsibility to the sentient beings of the world. Caraka’s ethical system conceives man as an all comprehensive concept. Man is not considered as a limited being. On the contrary, he is regarded as the universal link between all humans and non-human animals.
His ethical system is allied to the affirmation of both man and the world as natural. It combines in it both the “world view” and “life view”.

**Liberation (mokṣa) as the ultimate moral end**

In the modern view, the main concern of medical science is about psycho-somatic ailments and their cure. From that perspective Caraka, is expected to look upon man as a biological entity. He is expected to deal with the worldly life of man. But he surpasses such limited assumptions. Caraka not only engaged himself in finding the means to free man from his physiological and psychological tensions but in discovering the path that delivers him from the subtle challenges that arise from the habits themselves and that cannot so easily be met by the techniques of science. He is a true philosopher and thereby a “great doctor” who diagnosed and prescribed cure for the total human sufferings. For him, a human being is not a mere biological product of the evolution controlled by biological drives, motives and instincts and reflexes. On the other hand, he is a spiritual being. He is an altruistic humanistic being and a seeker of supreme good. He diagnosed that contemplation is the highest aspiration of man. A contemplative life is rich in its import, manifestation, and realization. A life of contemplation is exalted. So, in coherence with the philosophical systems, he places liberation (mokṣa) as the highest ideal of life and the final end of man. 70

Caraka calls death which terminates the limited life span by the epithets *svabhāva* (return to the former state), *pravṛttēruparama* (cessation of activities), *marāṇa* (death), *anitya* (ephemeral) and *nirodha* (obstruction to
the continuity of life).\textsuperscript{71} The liberated state which ends the transmigratory existence is being designated as *vipāpa* (freed from sinful acts), *viraja* (free from attachments), *śānta* (quiescence), *parā* (absolute), *akṣara* (indistuctible), *avyaya* (immutable), *amṛta* (immortal), the Brahman (God), and *nirvāṇa* (the state of extinction of all sufferings).\textsuperscript{72} This shows that Caraka constructs his theory of liberation in terms of the Brahman.

Change is the nature of the phenomenal world. Cause (*hetu*), origin (*utpatti*), growth (*vṛddhi*), decay (*upaplava*), and death (*viyoga*) are the five different stages of change and they constitute suffering.\textsuperscript{73} This is actually the radical unremitting impermanence, the essential ontological dimension of one’s unenlightened state of suffering.

The phenomenal self is never freed from ego, intellect, mind, volitions, and other defects. Since the mind is enveloped by *rajas* and *tamas*, all kinds of evils follow the individual until true knowledge occurs. The tainted mind and volitions engender powerful positive actions (*pravrītti*)\textsuperscript{74} and, thereby, transmigratory existence.\textsuperscript{75} Thus, the phenomenal self in bondage undergoes all kinds of sufferings.

Experiences are in the form of happiness and pain. They are all sufferings, for they originate from cravings on the one hand and they give rise to cravings on the other hand. Craving in turn consists of ignorance, desire, and aversion.\textsuperscript{76}

All kinds of positive actions are sinful.\textsuperscript{77} The positive actions originate from *prjñāparādha* which springs from desire and aversion engendered by
erroneous knowledge and such a person is engulfed in egoistic feelings (ahaṃkāra), vocal, mental, and physical actions (saṅga), doubt (saṃśaya), vanity (abhīsaṃplava), selfish dispositions (abhyavapāta), erroneous knowledge in the form of a beneficial thing as harmful (vipratyaya), lack of distinction between conscious and unconscious elements, nature and its modification, attachment and detachment (avīśeṣa), and performance of rituals, priesthood and begging. (anupāya).  

Again, volitional transgression (prjñāparādha) is due to the derangement of apprehension (dhiḥ), fortitude (dhṛti), and memory (smṛti).  

The derangement of intellect (dhiḥbrahmaṇśa) means wrong apprehension like the apprehension of an eternal entity as ephemeral, a beneficial thing as non-beneficial. The correct apprehension is the cognition of a thing as it is. The derangement of fortitude (dhṛtibhraṃśa) is the unrestrained mental urge to do harm to worldly objects. The control of mind is called fortitude. Similarly, the derangement of memory (smṛtibhraṃśa) is the erroneous apprehension due to the envelopment of rajas and tamas.  

This vindicates that if ignorance, that is, if the derangement of intellect, fortitude, and memory are totally eradicated, volitional transgression can be eliminated, and if volitional transgression is eliminated positive actions can be relinquished. Then again if positive actions cease, the vicious circle of craving and suffering in the form of experiences can be completely rooted out. So the primary thing is to eradicate ignorance. Caraka says that a person with pure mind and who practices yoga acquires true knowledge and eliminates ignorance. Thus, one is able to see things “the way they really
are”. This insight will help one to renounce everything, thereby all cravings and suffering can be eradicated and ultimate freedom can be attained.\textsuperscript{81}

**Nature of freedom**

Liberation is a transformation from the negative states of unpleasant experiences to a positive state. It is the state of quiescence (\textit{praśānta}) and immutability (\textit{akśara}). It is called the Brahman.\textsuperscript{82} This optimum can be attained only by complete renouncement. In the final stage of renunciation (\textit{caramasanyāsa}) all sense-bound experiences including all determinate and specific cognitions are completely relinquished.\textsuperscript{83} One ultimately identifies oneself with the Brahman. Self awareness ceases and finally the phenomenal existence itself ceases without leaving behind any identifying mark.\textsuperscript{84} In the liberated state, all volitions get destroyed due to the absence of \textit{rajas} and \textit{tamas}. Thus, one is finally and irrecoverably liberated from the ties of the phenomenal world, from rebirth.\textsuperscript{85}

**Means conducive to liberation**

The realization of freedom involves both the knowing process (\textit{jñānamārga}) and the willing process (\textit{yogamārga}). Caraka has emphatically stated that the path of life prescribed is nothing but what has been dictated by the Yogins and the followers of Sāmkhya.\textsuperscript{86}

Unless the impurities like desire aversion and attachment are removed by right efforts, there can be no complete freedom. For this one has to raise from the level of the sense-bound cognition of worldly objects to the level of intuition (\textit{prajñā} or \textit{vidyā})\textsuperscript{87} The intuitional knowledge, according to
Caraka, is one of identity or “knowledge of two in one”. That is if one realizes oneself as the universe and the universe as one it is the transcendental knowledge. 88

Fundamentally speaking, the way to liberation is the acceleration of intelligence, fortitude, and memory of ultimate reality. The continuity of the psychosomatic relation will be destroyed when these three factors engender human perfection. Among these three factors, the memory of transcendent reality occupies the prominent place. The causal factors that lead to memory are apprehension of cause and form, similarity, difference, indulgence of mind, recurrence of cognition, repetitive hearing and recollection of all former experiences. The main factors that catalyze one’s memory capacity are devotion to the nobles, abstinence from the wicked; observance of vows and fasts, apprehension of Dharma śrāstras and performance of duties in accordance with its rules, inclination to live in solitude, detachment from the worldly objects, right apprehension, supreme fortitude, desisting from new activities, annihilation of the past actions, extermination of egoistic dispositions, fear of attachment, serenity of mind and consciousness, and meditation. To be precise, it is the recollection of the ultimate reality that leads one to ultimate liberation from sufferings.

If the ultimate freedom is implicit in the transcendental knowledge, the psychosomatic spiritual endeavour that brings about the condition of quiescence is called Yoga. Yoga is the awakening of a man into the freedom
of the self. *Yoga* is a self impelled and self initiated effort by which man ascents from the lower to the higher existence. Meditative contemplation or the exploration of the deeper reaches of consciousness of a Yogan is marked by the purity of mind that gives rise to the eight kinds of divine strength and powers. Those powers are (1) the capacity of the self to enter the body of others, (2) the capacity for cognition of mental objects, (3) doing things at will, (4) supernatural vision, (5) supernatural audition, (6) miraculous memory, (7) extraordinary brilliance, and (8) the state of unawareness when desired.

**Way of life to liberation**

Living in accordance with, but not quite tied up by the laws of nature, man, through his moral disposition and continuous efforts, is capable of realizing freedom. So Caraka further dictates elaborately the systematic and disciplined life of devotion.

The seeker of liberation who has seen the futility of mundane life should approach a preceptor whose teaching he should put into practice. Thus, he should study the Dharmaśāstras, and mould his conduct and perform duties in compliance with the scriptures. He should be devotional to the noble and refrain from the wicked; should speak that which is conducive to the wellbeing of all living-beings and the speech should be gentle, reasonable, and pertinent. He should regard all living creatures as himself. He should avoid remembering, thinking about, desiring and talking with women. He should relinquish all belongings. He should wear a loin cloth and an ochre-
coloured, garment and a case of needles for mending it. He should also carry a pot of water for cleaning, a mendicant’s staff as a sign of his order of life, and a bowl for collecting alms. He should take food only once a day in order to keep his life and may substitute natural food accessible in the forest for cooked food. He may take rest on a bed improvised with dry leaves and weeds without making it a usual habit. He may keep a wooden arm rest as an aid in meditation. He should live in the forest, but not in a roofed house. He should control desire and aversion and avoid drowsiness, sleep, and laziness. He should treat occasions of honouring, praise, criticism and insult as equal and should endure hunger thirst, fatigue, strain, cold, heat, wind, rain, pleasure, and pain. He should not be stimulated by grief, depression, self conceit, affliction, and arrogance. He should look on ego as the cause of suffering and view the micro-macro relationship of him to the universe. He should never hesitate to practice yoga. He must restrain all sense organs, the mind, and self. He should constantly resolve that the entities that constitute different parts of the body are the dhātus, should realize that anything that has a cause is miserable and ephemeral and all activities tainted with evil. He should regard complete renunciation as real happiness. Eventually, such a disciplined life enables one to weaken and destroy ignorance, desire, and aversion underlying physiological urge to do positive acts and promotes one’s cognitive capacities, fortitude, and memory and thereby free oneself from the ties of the phenomenal world. The way of life as has been suggested is nothing but the life of a monk (sanyāsin), which asks for complete renunciation.
Concept of liberation in other philosophical systems

The Buddhists declare that the ultimate freedom is the cessation of all kinds of knowledge along with impressions, tendencies, and longings.\textsuperscript{98} This complete cessation is nirvāṇa (Pāla - nibbāna).\textsuperscript{99} According to the Sāṃkhya system, lack of discriminative knowledge is the cause of all sufferings. The discriminative knowledge, in the final stage, delivers one from all kinds of pain.\textsuperscript{100} For them liberation is the disassociation of the self (puruṣa) from the psychical states with which it finds itself in association.\textsuperscript{101} It is a state of aloofness (kaivalya). The Yoga school is also of the same view. They say that avidya is the cause of all sufferings\textsuperscript{102} and the discriminative knowledge is the means to attain freedom.\textsuperscript{103} They also suggest the yoga path which consists of eight stages.\textsuperscript{104}

In the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika system the final end of transmigratory existence is called niśreyasa or apavarga. Kanāda says dharma is what accomplishes worldly happiness (abhyudaya) and liberation (niśreyasa).\textsuperscript{105} He also considers that negative actions (nivṛtti) lead to liberation. The elimination of desires, merits, and demerits, and the absolute negation of pain are the ends of nivṛtti and this can be made possible by the true knowledge of the six categories (reality).\textsuperscript{106} According to Śrīdharaścārya, liberation is the total annihilation of all the nine qualities of the self namely, consciousness, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and impression. Thus, liberation is the existence of the self in its essential nature marked by the destruction of all its qualities.\textsuperscript{107} In Nyāya-sūtra
freedom is defined as the absolute deliverance from suffering \( (duḥkha) \).\(^{108}\) It can be attained through the elimination of pain, birth, activity, faults \( (doṣa) \), and false knowledge in the reverse order\(^{109}\) by the acquisition of the true knowledge. Vātsyāyana has conceived the concept of \textit{apavarga} in terms of the Brahman and the bliss and it consists in the absence of pain.\(^{110}\) In conformity with the Vaiśeṣikas, Jayantabhaṭṭa says that liberation is the complete extinction of the nine specific qualities of the self.\(^{111}\) Udayana defines it as a state of aloofness \( (kaivalya) \) to be attained through discursive knowledge and devotional attitude. The bondage and the resulting suffering are due to false knowledge. Rebirth and sorrow disappear when the urges to act dies down.\(^{112}\) Thus, one attains ultimate freedom. However, in spite of the slight differences, the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika thinkers unanimously hold that liberation is neither pure knowledge nor pure bliss; it is purely a painless state and the way to liberation is the elimination of negative states.

In \textit{Pūrva-māṃsa} “Jaimini and Śavara enjoin the performance of duties as a means to attain happiness in heaven. They do not attach much importance to the conception of liberation”.\(^{113}\) Jaimini says that happiness is the only goal of life.\(^{114}\) Kumārila conceives liberation as a negative character, and hence eternal. It is the negation of all experiences of cognition, pleasure pain, desire aversion, impression, merit, and demerit.\(^{115}\) Liberation is because of the absolute irradiation of merits and demerits. According to the Prabhākaras, freedom is the state of the self remaining in its own nature consequent to the destruction of the specific qualities of the self.\(^{116}\) Thus liberation, in \textit{Pūrva-māṃsa}, is a state of complete
extermination of pain\textsuperscript{117}. The peculiarity of freedom in the Pūrvamāṃsa discipline is that it emphasizes \textit{karma} rather than \textit{jñāna}.

Advaita Vedānta recognizes that the individual self (\textit{jīva}) is none other than the Brahman, but identical in nature (\textit{jīvo brahma\textit{va}} nāparaḥ). One is deluded in the world of \textit{māya} due to \textit{avidyā} which has no beginning. Right knowledge at one stroke abolishes the sense of finitude together with the sense of duality.\textsuperscript{118} Ontologically, freedom is the identification of oneself with the transcendental consciousness or the Brahman which is “pure Bliss”.\textsuperscript{119}

Jainism recognizes deliverance as the freedom of the self from \textit{kārmic} matter which covers its inherent qualities.\textsuperscript{120}

If we look at the various view points described above, it can be understood that Caraka agrees with all the philosophical systems on the basic issues regarding freedom. He recognizes the phenomenal life as one of suffering and freedom from suffering as the goal of spiritual endeavour. He is of the opinion that the vision or insight into the reality of things will dispel one’s illusion and ignorance and thus one can be liberated eternally and irrecoverably from all negative aspects of phenomenal existence by psycho-somatic spiritual endeavour.

Liberation has two aspects: (1) the liberating process and (2) the state of being liberated. The liberating process is a negative one which involves the eradication of suffering, and being liberated, by contrast, is a positive state. Emphasizing the negative phase of eradication, Caraka calls it by the epithets \textit{nirvāṇa} and \textit{nivṛtti} which echo the Buddhists, \textit{the Sāṃkhya-Yoga}
and the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika. At the same time, with regard to the final state of freedom he agrees with the Vedāntins who hold that freedom is the attainment of oneness with the Brahman.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 CIET, p. 2.

2 Ibid., p. 6.

3 Ibid., p. 2.

4 Ibid., p. 6.

5 Ibid., p. 2.


7 The Sanskrit terms for the notions are dharma, artha, kāma, and mokṣa. Among them artha usually refer to material prosperity; kāma, refers to sexual relations and incidentally to aesthetic values; Dharma is said to have to do with one’s duty to family, caste, or class, and mokṣa to complete freedom. KHP, p. 6.


9 AHM, p. 2.

10 BT, p. 18.
11 *tadvidāṁ ca smṛtiśīle*, *Gautamadharmaśutta*, I. 1.; *smṛtiśīle ca
tadvidāṁ*, MS, II. 6; dharmaśastraṁ to vai smṛtiḥ, Ibid., II. 10.

12 CIET, p. 51.

13 “śrutismṛtyuditaṁ dharma”, *Laghu Yama Smṛti*, I; ADS, p. 172
śrutismṛtiśca vipraṇāṁ nayane dve prakṛtite, *Atrisamhitā*, 349,
ADS, p. 54.

14 AHM, pp.73-74.

15 BT, p.15

16 MS, II. 10, 11.

17 Kumārilabhaṭṭa, *Ślokavārtika*, Eng., Trans., Ganganath Jha, p.242-

18 dharmatattvaṁ hi gahanamataḥ satsevitaṁ naraḥ śrutismṛtipurā-
ṇānāṁ karma kuryād vicakṣaṇaḥ. *Śukranītisāra* of Śukrācārya,
with elucidative notes by Jīvānandavidyāsāgara Bhāṭṭācārya,
Nārāyaṇa Press, Kalikālatārājagāṇī, 1890, III. 39.


20 CIET, pp. 63-64

21 BT, p.72.

22 CIET, p. 60.

23 Ibid., p. 27.

24 CS, Sa, V. 9 iccādveṣajanite pravṛttinivṛtti prayatnaviśeṣau tābhyaṁ
ciahitāhiprāptiparihārapahale śarīra karmani ca īśālakṣaṇe janyate.
Śaṅkaramiśra on VS, III. I. 19, VU, pp. 231-232.
Caraka speaks of renunciation (sanyāsa) only as the final stage of life.

*sukhārthāḥ sarvabhūtānāṃ matāḥ sarvāḥ pravṛttayaḥ*, CS, Su, XXVIII. 35.

There is no state of artha, of kāma, or of dharma which a man comes to realize and rest in. Rather these terms are to be construed more subtly, perhaps as attitudes or orientations”, KHP, p. 6.

“...dharmārthakāmānāmahitānāmanupasevane hitānāṃ copasevane prayatitavyaḥ.....”. CS, Su, XI. 46.

The conception of action as being prompted by volition is akin to the concepts of karma in Buddhism and Nyāya.

*mohecchādveṣakarmamūlā pravṛthiḥ*, CS, Sa, V. 10.

*icchādveṣātmikā trṣṇā*, CS, Sa, I. 134.

*upadhā hi paro heturduḥkhāduḥkhāśrayapradāḥ*, Ibid., 95.

The word *upadhā* is being interpreted by Cakrapāṇi as trṣṇa. In Buddhist tradition trṣṇa is conceived as the origin of suffering, BT, p. 43.

see BT, p. 43.

*pravartanālakṣaṇā doṣāḥ*, NS, I. i. 18.
40 tatrairāśyaṃ - rāgadveṣamohārthānthatarabhāvat, NS, IV. I. 3.

41 bhāvadoṣo upadhā’doso’nupadhā, VS, VI. II. 4. see also Śaṅkaramiśra on it. VU, p. 350.

42 prayatnaḥ saṃrāmbhaḥ, utsāhaḥ, iti paryāyāḥ. sa dvividhaḥ- jīvanapūrvaṇa, icchādveṣapūrvaṇakaśca, PBNK, p. 638.

43 daivam purā yat kṛtamucyate tat tat pauruṣaṃ yattuviha karma dṛṣṭaṃ, CS, Sa, II. 44, Vi. III. 29-30; Ci. III, 33. pauruṣaṃ karma daivam ca phalavṛttisvabhāvataḥ, MB, Mokṣa, 224.51

44 CS, Sa, VI. 28.

45 Ibid., I. 77.

46 For details see CS, Su, XI. 3-6.

47 Loc. cit., F. Note 32.

48 For details see CS, Su, XI. 39-40.

49 dhīdhṛtismṛtivibhraṣṭaḥ karma yat kurute’ṣubhaṃ prajñāparādhāṃ tāṃ vidyāt sarvadoṣapraṇapāṇaṃ, CS, Sa, I. 102.

50 īrṣyāśokabhayakrodhamānadvēśādayaśca ye manovikārāste’pyu-ktāḥ sarve prajñāparādhajāḥ, CS, Su, VII. 52.

51 tyāgaḥ prajñāparādhānāṃmindriyopaśamaḥ smṛtiḥ deśakālātmavi-jñānaṃ sadvṛttasyānuvartanaṃ, Ibid., 53.

52 CS, Su, VII. 26-29.

53 Ibid., 56-59.
54 Ibid., 38.

55 Ibid., VIII. 18.

56 See, CS, Sa, VIII. 10-14.

57 vidyā vitarko vijñānaṃ smṛtistatparatā kriyā
yasyaite ca śadguṇāṣṭasya na sādhyamatvartate, CS. Su, IX. 21. See also ibid., 5.

58 Ibid., II. 36.

59 Ibid., I. 126-127.

60 Ibid., I. 130.

61 varamātmā huto’jñena na cikitsā pravartitā, Ibid, IX. 15.

62 ato viparītā rogāṇāmabhisarā hantarāḥ prāṇānāṃ, bhiṣakcchadma-
praticchannāḥ..., Ibid., XXIX, 8.

63 maitrī, kāruṇyamārteṣu śakye prītirupekṣaṇaṃ
prakṛtistheṣu bhūteṣu vaidyavṛtiścaturvidheti, Ibid., IX, 26.

64 tasmācchastre’ṛthavijñāne pravṛttau karmadarśane
bhiṣak catuṣṭaye yuktaḥ prāṇābhisaraḥ uchyaṭe, Ibid., IX. 18.

65 Ibid., I. 15-17.

66 atha maitrīparaḥ puṇyamāyurvedaṃ punarvasuḥ
śiṣyebyo dattavān śaḍbhyaḥ sarvabhutānukampayā, Ibid., 30.

67 Ibid., 39-40.

68 CS, Su, XI. 27.
Albert Shweitzer was a contemporary altruist of the West, who decided to make his life fit his thoughts. He preached a humanistic philosophy of “reverence for life and respect for individual”. He believes that desire is the cause of sufferings. EWU, p.162-63

All Indian religions and philosophical systems except the Cārvākas take freedom (mukti) from suffering as the goal of spiritual endeavour.

…….tatra svabhāvaḥ pravṛttruparamo maraṇamanityatā nirodha ityeko’rthaḥ; ityāyuṣāḥ pramāṇaḥ….., CS, Su, XXX. 25.

vipāpaṁ virājaḥ sāntaṁ paramakṣaramavyayaṁ amṛtaṁ brahma nirvāṇaṁ paryāyaiḥ sāntirucyate, CS, Sa, V. 23.


Positive action (pravṛtti) is suffering and negative action (nivṛtti) is happiness. “pravṛtirdukham nivṛttih sukham”, For details see CS, Sa, V. 10-11.

For details see Ibid., II. 37-38.

icchā dveṣātmikā tṛṣṇā sukhaduḥkhat pravartate tṛṣṇā ca sukhaduḥkhānāṁ kāraṇāṁ punarucyate., CS, Sa, I. 134. Happiness is duḥkha because it is liable to change.

sarvapraṇātisvaghasamjñaḥ, ibid, V. 12.

vide supra, p. 157, F. Note, 62.
81 Ibid., V. 16-18.
82 \textit{nivṛttirapavargah, tat param śrāṇātaḥ tattadakśaranaḥ tadbhrāma sa mokṣaḥ.} Ibid., 11.
83 \textit{tasmiṃścaramasanyāse samūlāḥ sarvavedanāḥ}
\textit{sasājinājñāna vijnānānivṛttīṇy yānti aśeṣataḥ.} Ibid., I. 154.
84 Ibid., V. 22.
85 \textit{mokṣo rajastamo’bhāvāt balavatkarmasaṅkṣayāt}
\textit{vīyogāḥ sarvasaṃyogairapunarbhāva ucyate,} Ibid., I. 142.
86 Ibid., 151.
87 Ibid., V, 19.
88 \textit{sarvalokamātmanyātmānaḥ ca sarvaloke samamanupaśyataḥ satyā buddhiḥ samutpadyate. sarvalokaḥ hyātmanī paśyato bhavatyātmaiva sukhaduḥkhayoh kartā nānya iti. karmātmatvāc cca hetvādhīhyu-
ktāḥ sarvaloko’hamiti viditvā jñānaṃ pūrvaṃmutthāpyate’-
pavargāyeti,} Ibid., V. 7; V. 20-21.
89 \textit{tayoravṛttīṇkriyate parābhyaṃ dhṛtisāṃtibhyāṃ parayā dhiyā ca,}
\textit{Ibid., II. 42.}
90 Ibid., I. 150.
91 Ibid., I. 148-149.
92 Ibid., I. 143-146.
93 Ibid., 147.
However, Caraka does not give the scheme of eight fold yoga in a systematic way.

EWU, p.83.

CS, Sa, I. 140-141.

CS, Sa, V.12. Loc. cit., F. Note 89.

savāsanāsamuccedo jñānoparama ityeke, Nyāyakandalī, PBNK, p. 6; NM, Part--II, 81.

The word nirvāṇa litterally means “extinguishing”, as in the extinguishing of a flame and it signifies soteriologically the complete extinguishing of greed, hatred and fundamentally delusion, the forces which power saṃsāra. For details see BT, p. 47 - 48.

KFL, p. 265.

ACJ, p. 4.

tasya heturavidyā, Y. Su, II. 24 viparyayajñāna-saṃskārasa-hitā vidyetī sūtrārthaḥ, Pātañjalarahasya on ibid., YD, p. 233.

vivekakhyātiraviplava hānopāyaḥ, Y. Su, II. 26. sattvapurūṣānayatā-pratyayo vivekakhyātiḥ, Vyāsabhāṣya on ibid, YD, p. 236.

The eight stages are yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhara dhīraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi. Y.Su, II. 29.

VS, I. i. 2.

VS, I. i. 4.
“samastātmaviśeṣaṁguṇaḥpocchedalakṣitāṁ svarūpāpāṭhitireva”, Nyāyakandaṭī, PBNK, p. 692.

tadatyaṁ tāvimaṅkṣo ’pavargah, NS, I. i. 22.

duḥkhaṁ janaṁ pravṛttidonoṁ śamithyājñāṁ uṭtarottarapāye tadanantaṁ pāyadapavrgaṁ, NS, I. i. 2.

tadabhayaṁ jaramamṛtyupadaṁ brahmaṁ pūṣeṣmaprāptirīti, Vātsyāyana on NS, I. i. 22, N. Bh, p. 39.

navānāṁ ātmaguṇānāṁ buddhisukhduḥkheccadeśa-prayatnam dharmadharmaṁskārāṇāṁ nirmūlocchedo ’pavarga ituktaṁ bhavati, NM, Part--II, 77.

KFL, p. 264.


yasmin pritiḥ puruṣasya tasya lipsārthalakṣaṇāṁ vibhaktavat. M. Su, IV. i. 2.


sakalabudhyādiviśeṣaṁguṇavālaye satyāṭmanah svarūpāvaśthānaṁ mokṣa iti prabhākaramataṁ, MM, p. 214.

EIP, p. 149.

ACJ, p. 4.


ACJ, p. 4.