THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES

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CHAPTER - 3

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3.1. The Intentionalist Case for Mental Causation:

For Searle, the claim to work out a full-blooded intentional theory of mental causation would amount an exaggerated claim. Nevertheless, he produces the ‘connectionist’ case for multi-layered model on the one hand, and, on the other hand, he supports it with a claim about lower-order features of brain causing higher-order features of consciousness. There is no evidence for any claim that consciousness has an ontological existence, but there is some claim about its being a ‘fact’ in Searle’s sense. Even granting that there ought to be a point of clarification between what he calls a supervenient causation and mental causation, his theory becomes open to attack. Given his distinction between ‘causal’ and ‘constitutive supervenience’, it would still be difficult to know whether it warrants any sharp distinction so as to take it as an ‘independent assumption’. In fact, as he later frankly admits, his usage vacillates between the constitutive and causal supervenience. ¹ As Kim takes it, his supervenience cannot be anything more than ‘same cause and same effect’. Thus when he places supervenience and same cause and same effect on the table, especially in the context of mental causation, without as much denying it, his theory requires to be evaluated in terms of a full-blooded theory of mental causation like the one
developed by Kim. It becomes an 'acid test' for the hierarchically layered model of consciousness.

The connectionist case for mental causation, must argue for the causal relation involving mental events. ² The crucial questions here are: How is it possible for the mind to cause a change in a material body? Through what mechanism or process does a mental event manage to initiate, or insert itself into, a causal chain of physical events? How is it possible that a chain of physical and biological events and processes terminates in a full-blown conscious experience? How is it possible for sensory experience to arise out of the electrochemical processes in the gray matter of our brain? As we understand it, two master arguments play a role for achieving the explanatory potential. One is the supervenience argument and the other is the overdetermination argument (called the Master Argument). These arguments provide the rallying point between the robust reductionists (e.g. Kim) as well as robust non-reductionists (e.g. Ned Block). The 'supervenience principle' is understood to affirm a relation of dependence or determination between the mental and the physical. In other words, our psychological character is wholly determined by our physical/biological nature. This is often read to imply a dependency thesis of this kind; for it says that once the physical nature of a thing is completely fixed, that fixes its mentality in every detail. The idea is variously used to prove ontological primacy of consciousness (subjectivity), realism about mental states, as well as reducing the mental to the physical. So also the theory of mental causation is worked out within the theory
of intentionality or within a theory of the physical world. J. Kim counters the use of causal supervenience by Searle first, in his so-called simple solution, second, in his variant of 'minimal physicalism', and finally, in his more recent account of physical realizationism. In all these counters, he demonstrates the weakness of the idea by pointing out the dilemma. The dilemma is shown in the following way:

Suppose that an instance of a mental property, \( M \), causes another mental property, \( M^* \), to be instantiated—an instance of 'going left to right from macro to macro' as Searle calls it. According to Searle's biological naturalism, every mental phenomenon is caused by a neurobiological phenomenon. This means that this instance of \( M^* \) is caused by (an instance of) a neural property \( P^* \). Here the questions arise are: where does this instance of \( M^* \) come from? And how does \( M^* \) get instantiated on this occasion? The two answers are: (1) ex hypothesi, \( M^* \) was caused to be instantiated by \( M \), and (2) according to Searle's biological naturalism, \( M^* \) was caused to be instantiated by neural property \( P^* \). It looks as though the instantiation of \( M^* \) is causally overdetermined. This generalizes to all mental phenomena. But Searle argues that the same system admits of different causal descriptions at different levels all of which are consistent and none of which implies either overdetermination or failure of causal closure.

Quite opposed to the above, supervenience is also used as an explicit affirmation of the ontological primacy, or priority of the physical in relation to the mental. Accordingly, this theory opens the possibility of explaining the mental in terms
of the physical. Thus, minimal physicalism can be thought of as the philosophical basis of such explanatory practices. Since this is quite opposed to the kind of dependence thesis of supervenience used by Searle, it becomes an easy target. This is how his idiosyncratic use of 'causal supervenience' has become a target for attack in unambiguous terms. Consequently, it is shown that his solution is fraught with ambiguities and difficulties. Searle's use of supervenience requires type-type identity. Type-identical neuro-physiological causes would have type-identical mentalistic effects. Accordingly, supervenience is assigned the task of inter-level relationship. Mental states are supervenient on physical states means that higher-level properties are explainable in terms of lower-level properties. That is, mental properties are explainable in terms of physical properties. While Searle provides a biological reason for a psychological explanation. The option of reductionism is as much open to him as the option of non-reductionism. For this reason, Searle does not claim to be a non-reductionist nor is he a magical emergentist in the sense in which Lowe claims. There are many characteristics that are common to the approach made by Lowe and Searle. Emergentism is one and the principle 'nothing is uncaused' is yet another. The non-reductionism takes on dualism in Lowe which is still an option for Searle, but levelism rejects dualism without disposing reductionism as a live option. In the final run, it seems that Searle defends a modified form of epiphenomenalism. Reductionism itself is acknowledged to be a failure. No one has reduced mental properties to physical properties. One of the main obstacles is qualia, or what it
is to be in that state, or phenomenal state. Kim's use is rather different. For him, mental states are totally dependent on corresponding neuro-physiological states in the sense that, a difference in mental states would necessarily involve a corresponding difference in neuro-physiological states. For Searle, it may not. For Chalmers, no explanation, given wholly in physical terms, can ever account for the emergence of conscious experience. Supervenience is used here as a relation between two sets of properties: B-properties, the high-level properties and A-properties, low-level properties. He favours the notion of 'logical supervenience' for arriving at a defense of logical and not ontological dualism. We learn that supervenience can be used both by reductionists as well as non-reductionists. Just as supervenience cuts both ways, overdetermination also does so.

Sturgeon gives the Overdetermination Argument. It runs as follows:

(1) Every physical effect has its chance fully determined by physical events alone.

(2) Mental events have physical effects.

(3) The physical effects of mental events are not generally overdetermined.

Therefore,

(4) Mental events are physical events.

Then he considers the appeal of these propositions in order to reject the overdetermination. (1) Completeness-of-physics: Every physical effect has a fully revealing, purely physical history. (2) Impact-of-the-mental: Mental events
have physical effects. (3) No-Overdetermination: The physical effects of the mental events are not generally overdetermined. (4) Dualism: Mental events are not physical events. This is the reason why one should make them as much robust as possible. Within Searle's perspective, supervenience is used not only to provide both the causal relation between intentionality and consciousness, but also, to cut off the relational link. As Kim himself acknowledges, Searle provides no link between brain and consciousness. This seems to generate a paradox about his theory of mental causation. In fact, Searle is willing to agree that same cause, different effects. Searle develops a theory of causation with gaps and constraints and thus his usage is radically different from the one Kim adopts in his account.

This becomes clearly evident in his later discussion on freewill. Even while accepting free will or voluntary action, which he identifies with volitional consciousness, he set out to remark that the acceptance is not possible without gaps. He makes a distinction between seeing my left hand which is a passive act and raising my left hand which has causal antecedents of freewill. He admits a first gap between reason for the decision and the making of the decision and the second gap between the making the decision and the actual onset of the action. Freewill, as it is traditionally known cannot be identified with anything else, according to Searle. In fact, he is much more specific in mentioning three gaps in the structure of normal, voluntary human action. The gap between the reflection on the reasons and the decisions constitutes the prior intention of the action. The
gap between prior intention and the actual initiation of action is the second, and the third is the gap in the execution of action through time. So the psychological antecedents of a human action cannot be said to be causally sufficient for the performance of the action. They function causally, but they do not function by way of causally sufficient. They are causally antecedent but not causally sufficient. This is due to the element of randomness and chance. A contrast between the psychological explanation of action (reason explanation) and a causal explanation of action is imminent. Consequently, Searle’s way of addressing to the problem of causal exclusion is radically different from that of Kim’s. It is this contrast that accounts for the distinction between their respective logical forms. The contrast requires the positing of self in the logical form of reason explanation though the same logical form is shared by causal explanation. The reason explanation is non-deterministic and hence the demand for a non-reducible or irreducible non-Humean self. Such a self is not an element of the unified field, but it rather requires a unified field in order to function.

From this, Searle goes on to hypothesize that libertarianism is compatible with determinism. In other words, compatibilism is a view which holds that freewill and determinism are compatible. Freewill is not without external constraints. Searle’s way of making explicit is that while the neuro-biological underpinnings of a human action are causally sufficient, they are not psychologically sufficient. If both are so causally sufficient, then we have no freewill. We have no freewill
because of psychological constraints, and hence they are not both causally sufficient.

What follows from this, on Searle's understanding, is that the problem of freewill is a neuro-biological problem. This is what lies at the background of his two thought experiments as well as his discussion on aspect seeing or seeing as. Searle argues that there are a number of purely philosophical obstacles to getting a satisfactory neuro-biological solution to the problem of consciousness. The single most important obstacle to getting a solution to the traditional mind-body problem is the persistence of a set of traditional but obsolete categories of mind and body, matter and spirit, mental and physical the inner and outer, subjective and objective, the private and public. He adds that as long as we continue to talk and think as if the mental and the physical were separate metaphysical realms, the relation of brain to consciousness will forever seem mysterious, and we will not have a satisfactory explanation of the relation of neuron firings to consciousness. Thus the first step on the road to philosophical and scientific progress in these areas is to forget about the bifurcated model of Cartesian dualism and replace it with a hierarchically layered model so as to just remind ourselves that mental phenomena are ordinary biological phenomena in the same sense as photosynthesis or digestion.

It is not necessary to worry about how the brain could cause consciousness and begin with the plain fact that it does. The notions of both mental and physical as they are traditionally defined need to be abandoned as we reconcile ourselves to
the fact that we live in world and all the features of the world from quarks and
electrons to nation states and balance of payments problems are, in their different
ways, part of that one world. Many scientists feel that they can only investigate
the ‘physical realm and are reluctant to face consciousness on its own terms
because it seems not to be ‘physical’ but to be ‘mental’, and several prominent
philosophers think it is impossible for us to understand relations of mind and
brain. So we need a similar conceptual change to break the bifurcation of mental
and physical, says, Searle.

Accordingly, he uses causation as a purely analytical tool so as to put forward a
very provocative solution about the mind–body problem. We can assert that the
famous mind-body solution has a semiotical thrust as seen in the wake of his
background work on speech act philosophy of language. The two these, namely
that (1) Brain processes cause mental states and (2) Mental states are higher-level
features of the brain; convey that consciousness is a causally emergent property
of certain systems of neurons in the same way that solidity and liquidity are
emergent features of systems of molecules. The existence of consciousness can be
explained by the causal interactions between elements of the brain at the micro-
level, but consciousness cannot itself be deduced or calculated from the sheer
physical structure of the neurons without some additional account of the causal
relations between them.

Here, the idea is that consciousness gets squirted out by the behavior of neurons
in the brain but once it has been squirted out, it then has a life of its own. But at
the same time, consciousness cannot be causally reducible to the brain process. He cannot however exercise this option. Because a perfect science of the brain would still not lead to an ontological reduction of consciousness in the way that our present science can reduce heat, solidity, colour or sound. The term ‘caused by’, used in a peculiar semiotical sense, has much problem within his framework, but Searle’s way of overcoming this is by developing a version of notation of supervenience along with multi-layered model of the description of the system which is called ‘levelism’ by Searle himself.  

He accepts levelism in order to ensure that the causation is from neuro-physiological process in the brain to the features of mental phenomena. It is in this sense; mental phenomena are also features of the brain. He also adds that once you recognize the existence of bottom up micro-to macro-forms of causation, the notion of supervenience no longer does any work in philosophy. The formal features of the relation are already present in the causal sufficiency of the micro-macro- forms of causation.

But, at the same time, he is against the view that mental phenomena are having an internal connection to behaviour. The mental states are supervenient on neuro-physiological states. In the case of mind-brain supervenience, the neural phenomena cause the mental phenomenon. In order to explain the relationship between consciousness, behaviour and the brain, Searle employs at least two thought-experiments.
Thought experiment 1 asks us to imagine that one is slowly going blind and doctors try to plug silicon chips into his/her visual cortex. Then imagine that it restores the vision to its normal state. Imagine further that for the better result his/her brain is entirely replaced by silicon chips rotating around inside the skull. In such a situation, there would be various possibilities. One logical possibility is the sequence of his mental life remains unaffected. In this case, we are imaging that silicon chips have the power to duplicate the mental phenomena also. But empirically, we cannot prove it.

Another possibility is that he finds his area of consciousness experience is shrinking, but that this shows no effect on the external behaviour. From the outside, it seems to observers that he is just fine, but from the inside, he is gradually dying. In other words, he is becoming unconscious, but his behaviour remains unaffected. In the third case, we imagine that his thoughts feelings, experience, memories etc. remain intact but the observable external behaviour reduces to total paralysis. Thus if the above sketch is acceptable, then the following three propositions are acceptable:

1) Brain causes conscious mental phenomena.

2) There is some sort of conceptual or logical connection between conscious mental phenomena and external behaviour.

But the thought experiments illustrate that these arguments can be held consistently with a third.
3) The capacity of the brain to cause consciousness is conceptually distinct from its capacity to cause motor behaviour. A system could have consciousness without behaviour and behaviour without consciousness. Thus, the first point to be derived from our thought-experiments is what we might call the principle of the independence of consciousness and behaviour, says Searle. Further, behaviour is not a sufficient condition for mental phenomena. Thirdly, behaviour is not a necessary condition for the presence of the mental either.

Similarly, the thought experiment 2 asks us imagine that we are designing robots. Now, imagine also that, we know enough about the electro-chemical features of human consciousness to know how to produce robots that have a rather low level of consciousness, and so we can design and manufacture conscious robots. These conscious robots are able to make discrimination that unconscious robots could not make and so they do a better job on the production line. Suppose that these conscious robots are absolutely miserable and our neurophysiology is sufficient for us to establish that they are extremely unhappy.

We give our robotics research group the following task: Design a robot that will have the capacity to make the same discriminations as the conscious robots, but which will be totally unconscious. Our scientists try to design a robot with a 'hardware' that they know will not cause or sustain consciousness, but that will have the same input-output functions as the robot that has a 'hardware' that does cause and sustain consciousness. We might suppose then that they succeed, that
they build a robot that is totally unconscious, but that has behavioural powers and abilities that are absolutely identical with those of the conscious robot. This experiment shows that, as far as the ontology of consciousness is concerned, behaviour is simply irrelevant. They are irrelevant to the existence of conscious mental phenomena? This is so because, ‘the ontology of the mental is essentially first-person ontology’. It is the very subjectivity of consciousness that makes it invisible in a crucial way. ‘If we try to draw a picture of someone else’s consciousness, we just end up drawing the other person. If we try to draw our own consciousness, we end up drawing whatever it is we are conscious of’. Epistemologically, we learn about other peoples’ conscious mental states in part from their behaviour. Causally, consciousness serves to mediate the causal relation between input stimuli and output behaviour and the conscious mind functions causally to control behaviourism from the evolutionary point of view. In short, that the ontology of consciousness is concerned with behaviour is simply irrelevant. We could have identical behaviour in two different systems, one of which is conscious and the other totally unconscious. But Searle opposes physicalistic reductionism and argues that consciousness is irreducible. He writes: ‘consciousness is a higher-level or emergent property of the brain in which solidity is a higher-level emergent property of H2O molecules....’ He completely neglects the yawning gap between patterns of neuron firings and perceiving a patch of pink. The most important pillar of Searle’s perspective is the Connectionist Principle, for, his main thesis is supported by this principle.
3.2. The Connectionist Support to Consciousness / Unconsciousness:

This connectionist principle has two versions. The first version of this principle is related to consciousness: (a) that no being could have intentionality unless that being was capable of consciousness. The second is related to the relation between unconscious states and conscious states: (b) that all unconscious states are potentially conscious. Obviously, Searle is running two strands of his thinking together. The first is the connection between mind and consciousness, and the second is the connection between consciousness and unconsciousness. In support of his connection principle, firstly, Searle formulates a connection argument and presents it in seven-numbered steps. They are stated as follows:

(1) There is a distinction between intrinsic intentionality and as-if intentionality; only intrinsic intentionality is genuinely mental.

(2) Unconscious mental states are intrinsic.

(3) Intrinsic intentional states, whether conscious or unconscious always have aspectual shape. This aspectual shape is part of its identity. He explains, 'whether we perceive anything or think about anything, we always do so under some aspects and not others'.

(4) The aspectual feature cannot be exhaustively or completely characterized solely in terms of third person, behavioural or even neuro-physiological predicates.
(5) But the ontology of unconscious mental stages, at the time they are unconscious, consist entirely in the existence of purely neuro-physiological phenomena.

(6) The notion of an unconscious intentional state is the notion of a state that is a possible conscious thought or experience, and

(7) The ontology of the unconscious consists in the objective feature of the brain capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts.17

J. Kim and Robert Von Gulick criticize the above principle. Kim may be said to have sponsored a three-stage attack while counterpoising his physicalist case for mental causation with a view to refute multirealismability thesis and to establish a case for disjunctionism. The first part is presented in his account of the distinction between top-down and downward causation. Levelism favours the former and not the latter because the former closes the gap and the latter does not. In his reply, Searle agrees that downward causation exists and questions Kim for saying that if there is no downward another biological cause (B*). So, M* has M as well as B*. In its generalized form it poses causation, then causal closure is impossible. So, a layered model of mental causation meets its fate: it turn out to be idiosyncratic theory of causation. In order to be a viable theory of causation, it must decide on the competition between the following two apparently contradictory theses: mental causation is a species of physical causation and physical causation is a species of mental causation (downward causation). This is exactly where overdetermination is introduced. Consider a
biological property \((B)\) causes a mental property \((M)\). \(M\) has causal powers to instantiate another mental property \((M^*)\). This might have the following question: Does it mean that all mental-to-mental causation has two causal properties? If so, it is overdetermined.

Searle apparently accepts both types of causation and hence thus two sufficient causes, and hence mental-to-mental causation is overdetermined in its effects. This warrants causal closure at the lower level. The conclusion is that it is not a complete theory of lower-level phenomena. So the solution points to the way \(M^*\) inherits a causal principle. This is the first formulation of the causal inheritance principle. The only alternative is emergentism, which is magical and obsolete. In the second formulation, Kim claims that there are three types of causation mental-mental, physical-to-mental and mental-to-physical and the mental-to-mental causation presupposes physical-to-physical causation. In the third part, after clearing the objections to overdetermination, he gives the third formulation of the causal inheritance principle. The origin of this principle is traceable to his critique of the so-called simple solution. The principle is stated as follows: if mental property \(M\) is realized in a system at \(t\) in virtue of physical realization base \(P\), the causal powers of this instance of \(M\) are identical with the causal powers of \(P\).\(^{18}\)

There is an endorsement of this idea in Lowe but differences persist. While Kim denies the premise about overdetermination, Lowe accepts non-overdetermination for deducing a non-Cartesian type of dualism, even while
taking the overdetermination as commonplace. The reason for such a position is causal relation is transitive. The major advantage of this causal inheritance principle is that it can demonstrate the identity of causal powers. The causal inheritance principle no doubt is a direct consequence meandering through the three different types of causation. It is seen that this does not require any confusion between top-down or downward and bottom-up causation. So the multilayered model accepts the bottom-up and neglects the top-down causation. But it is not necessary that Searle should necessarily accept if our above portrayal is correct. We shall discuss this in detail in the next chapter.

For Searle, an essential pre-requisite for successful research in cognitive science is to keep a clear distinction between those processes that are genuinely cognitive, hence mental, from those are not. Here, he put forward a question: what is the criterion that distinguishes unconscious thought process from all the other ‘information processing’ events in the brain and in the rest of nature that have no psychological reality at all? For him, if an unconscious mental state is intrinsically mental then it must be the sort of intentional state that in principle is accessible to consciousness. In short, there is an obvious relation between consciousness, unconsciousness and intentional state. It is only from such a point of view that Searle is called as a property dualist, even though he denies it. The major reasons for emphasizing consciousness in an account of the mind are that it is a central mental notion. All other mental notions, i.e., intentionality, subjectivity, mental causation, intelligence etc. can only are fully understood as
mental by way of their relations to consciousness. Searle tries to locate consciousness within the overall scientific conception of the world. He advocates that consciousness is a biological feature of human and certain animal brains. It consists of inner qualitative, subjective, unified states of sentience, awareness, thoughts and feelings. For every conscious state, there is a certain qualitative aspect of the state. There is something that it is like, or something that it feels like, to be in a state that type. They are furthermore subjective in the sense that they only exist as experienced by a human or animal subject. They have an additional feature that is worth emphasizing: in the normal non-pathological forms of consciousness, conscious states come as part of a unified conscious field. This unified field of conscious, subjective awareness is not reducible to any third person phenomenon. It has first-person ontology, in the sense that it only exists as experienced by some 'I', some human or animal that has the experiences.

At the same time, Searle argues that it is caused by neuro-biological processes and is as much part of natural biological order as any other biological features, such as photosynthesis, digestion, or mitosis. Besides, because consciousness is entirely caused by the behaviour of lower-level biological phenomena, it would in principle be possible to produce it artificially by duplicating the causal powers of the brain in a laboratory situation. In other words, any system capable of causing consciousness must be capable of duplicating the causal powers of the brain.
Searle adheres that all of our states of consciousness are caused by bottom-up neuro-biological processes in the brain. They themselves can cause subsequent conscious states or bodily movements because they are grounded in the neurobiology. Thus, in cases, where there are no gaps, the left-right causation through time at the top level, are exactly matched by left-right causation through time at the bottom level.

His solution is that if we have an adequate science of the brain, an account of the brain that would give causal explanation of consciousness in all its forms and variety and if we overcome our conceptual mistakes, no mind-body problem would remain. He is against the view that, explanations in science imply necessity and necessity implies inconceivability of the opposite, as Nagel says. 21 Nagel gives an example: we understand how the behaviour of H2O molecules causes water to be in a liquid form, because we see that the liquidity is a necessary consequence of the molecular behaviour. 22 Opposing this, Searle advocates that, (1) not all explanations in science have the kind of necessity that can be found in the relation between molecule movement and liquidity. For example, the inverse square law is an account of gravity, but it does not show why bodies have to have gravitational attraction. (2) The apparent necessity of any scientific explanation may be just a function of the fact we find the explanation so convincing that we cannot conceive of the molecules moving in a particular way and the H2O not being liquid.
Accordingly, Searle rejects McGinn's assumption that (1) consciousness is a kind of stuff, (2) this stuff is known by the faculty of introspection, and (3) in order that we have an understanding of mind-body relations, we would have to understand 'the link' between consciousness and the brain. Searle's view is that consciousness is not stuff; it is a feature or property of the brain in the sense that liquidity is a feature of the water. It is not known by introspection in a way analogous to the way object in the world are known by perception. Refuting the third assumption of McGinn, he holds that there is no link between consciousness and brain, any more than there is a link between the liquidity of water and H₂O molecules. Searle's efforts of explaining consciousness will complete only after giving the structural features of it.

Searle gives a dozen structural features of consciousness. They are: (1) finite modalities, (2) unity, (3) intentionality, (4) subjective feeling, (5) the connection between consciousness and intentionality, (6) the figure-ground Gestalt structure of conscious experience, (7) the aspect of familiarity, (8) overflow, (9) the center and the periphery, (10) boundary conditions, (11) mood, and (12) the pleasure/unpleasure dimension.

Human consciousness is manifested in a strictly limited number of modalities. But there is no a priori reason why consciousness should be limited to the number of modalities. We have bodily sensations and the stream of thought, in addition to the five senses of sight, touch, smell, taste and hearing and the sixth 'sense of balance.' Each modality can occur under the aspect of
pleasant/unpleasant and the way in which it is pleasant/unpleasant, is in generally specific to the modality. Hence, in the case of visual experience, it is intentionality that is internal to experience rather than purely sensory aspects that is pleasant or unpleasant.

Conscious states come to us as part of a unified sequence. This unity exists in at least two dimensions and Searle calls these as 'horizontal' and 'vertical'. Horizontal unity is the organization of conscious experiences through short stretches of time. Vertical unity is a matter of the simultaneous awareness of all the diverse features of any conscious state. But it is difficult to understand how the brain achieves this unity. In neurophysiology, it is called the 'binding problem'. In his matured phase, Searle claims that this unified field of consciousness is specifically, the presupposition of the operation of the self just as the self is a presupposition of the reason as well as explanation and the freedom of will arises where, there is no unity. Recently, he finds that the operation of rationality presupposes the freedom of will. For Searle, most, but not all, consciousness is intentional, and all intentionality is aspectual (that is seeing from a point of view). The first premise conveys the idea that since consciousness is indeed consciousness of something the 'of' in 'consciousness of' is the 'of' of intentionality. The second premise conveys idea that conscious experiences are always perspectival, i.e. they are always from a point of view. It reminds us that all intentionality is aspectual. Further, Searle adds that there are some capacities, which he calls 'Background Capacities', enable our mental
states to function. Intentional states do not function autonomously; instead it requires a set of background capacities for its functioning. The same type of intentional content can determine different conditions of satisfaction.

The most important puzzle about consciousness is the puzzle about subjectivity. Conscious states have subjective feeling. Subjectivity necessarily involves the what-it-feels-like aspect of conscious state. This is what is called the phenomenal aspect. There is a conceptual connection between consciousness and intentionality. It means that a complete theory of intentionality requires an account of consciousness. Only a being that could have conscious intentional state could have intentional state at all, and every conscious intentional state is at least potentially unconscious.

As per the Gestalt psychology, our perception experience comes to us as a figure against a background. Generally, what are the characteristics of perception seems to be characteristics of consciousness. Related to the figure-ground structure of conscious experience is the fact that our normal perceptions are always structures. The consequence is that all consciousness is consciousness of something as such and such.

Much of the organization and order of conscious experience are made possible by the aspect of familiarity. It comes in varying degrees: it is a scalar phenomenon. At the top of the familiar scale, according to Searle, are the objects, scenes, people and sights of ordinary and everyday life. Lower down are strange
scenes in which the object and people are not easily recognizable, and categorisable.

Conscious states in general refer beyond their mediate content and Searle calls this phenomenon ‘overflow’. In such a case, the immediate content tends to spill over, to connect with other thoughts that in a sense, were part of the content but in a sense, were not.

We have to distinguish between those things that are at the centre of our attention and those that are at the periphery. It means we are conscious of a very large number of things that we are not attending to or focusing our attention upon. An example of this is the different levels of attention one may require for different tasks.

Any conscious state is characteristically located. But the location may itself not to be at all the object of consciousness, not even at the periphery. This is what is called the sense of disorientation.

The mood provides the tone or colour that characterizes the whole of a conscious state or sequence of conscious state. It seems that we can get a good neurobiological or biochemical account of mood. A good example is given by the way drugs control depression.

There is always a dimension of pleasure and unpleasure in conscious state. In addition to this, within the pleasure-unpleasure dimension, there are many sub-dimensions also.
For Searle, without making the idea unconscious clear, we cannot explain consciousness and there is a close relation between these two. He says 'the notion of unconscious mental state implies accessibility to consciousness. We have no notion of the unconscious except as that which is potentially conscious'. If they are in principle inaccessible to consciousness, they cannot be mental states nor have intentionality content in anything other than a metaphoric or pretended sense. This is exactly the context in which Searle comes to formulate what he calls the 'connectionist argument'. This is purported to establish a bridge or a link between consciousness, unconsciousness and intentionality. As reviewed already earlier, Robert Von Gulick argues that its intended states is a little less than clear, since Searle explicitly denies that it should be understood as a simple deduction from axioms. So it is not a simple deductive argument. Is this an inference to the best explanation? It is so if one takes the main inference from (1) to (5) as leading towards simple inference in (6) and (7).

But since there is an unresolvable contradiction in the first five premises, we cannot take that the last two will resolve the problem by showing how to ground aspeuctual shape in neuro-physiological fact. So, the apparent contradiction seems to be the lack of coherence between the first five, which talks about the unconscious, and the last two, which draws an inference about the consciousness. Is the divide real? If so there is an apparent cleavage between the way Searle talks about the unconscious and the way he talks about the conscious.
Are there two versions of the connectionist argument, one for the conscious and another for unconscious?

Searle's escape route consists of comparison of his consumption of the unconscious and its relation to consciousness with that of Freud's. Searle's view is that mental phenomena are higher-level features of the brain. The unconscious mental states are those features of the brain that are capable of causing the state in a conscious form. In other words, there are a group of neurons embedded in glial cells inside our skull, and sometimes this vast and intricate system is conscious. Consciousness is caused by the behaviour of lower-level elements, presumably at neuronal synaptic and columnar levels. A crucial question needs to be explored with reference to the perspective of biological is that whether it has the necessary potency for coming to terms with functionalism like the one developed by Churchland? Thus, the only escape route lies in the way he wants to contrast his position with that of Freud's.

The contrast in ontology comes through by following a non-ontological way of looking at the constituents. In sharp contrast, Freud thinks that our unconscious mental states exist both as unconscious and as occurent intrinsic intentional states, even when it is unconscious. For him, all mental states are unconscious in themselves, and consciousness is just a mode of perception of states that are unconscious in their mode of existence. In Freudian concept, the unconscious is a 'place,' 'a realm,' as described by A.C. MacIntyre. Freud postulates an unconscious mental state, as the cause of behaviour that is not just neuro-
physiological, but is not conscious either. On Searle’s view, the ontology of the unconscious is strictly the ontology of a neurophysiology capable of generating the consciousness. 28 There are ‘as-if’ metaphorical attributions of intentionality to the brain, but there are Freudian cases of shallow unconscious desires, beliefs etc. only as the cases of repressed consciousness.

Searle has two important objections against Freud. Firstly, we continue to be in darkness about the way the ontology of the unconscious is supposed to match the ontology of the neurophysiology. Secondly, we do not have a clear notion of how to apply the perceptual analogy to the relation between consciousness and unconsciousness. It is this specific connection that impinges on his connectionist argument, which we have mentioned earlier. This is also what forces Searle to conclude that we have no unified notion of the unconsciousness, but we have as many as four different notions. Searle distinguishes them as follows:

1. There are ‘as-if’ metaphorical attributions of intentionality to the brain, which are not to be taken literally.

2. There is repressed consciousness, such as Freudian cases of shallow unconscious desires and belief etc.

3. There are unproblematic cases of shallow unconscious mental phenomena that just do not happen to form the content of one’s consciousness at any given point of time.
4. There is supposed to be a class of deep unconscious mental intentional phenomena that are not only unconscious but that are in principle inaccessible to consciousness.

So, there naturally arises a pointer to the connection between the conscious and the unconscious. This is what is captured by the connectionist argument.

3.3. The Structure of Intentionality and the Background Capacities:

Most conscious states are intentional, for they represent things, whether they exist or not. For Searle, all intentional states can function. In other words, they determine their conditions of satisfaction against background capacities, abilities, tendencies, dispositions and other causal structures that could not be analyzed in terms of other intentional states. This condition of satisfaction provides the connecting link between the theory of mind, including the theory of action on the one hand and the theory of speech acts on the other. Such is the interface between philosophy of language and philosophy of mind as it was discussed in the first chapter.

Searle proceeds to draw certain important distinction within the notion of intentionality. He examines the similarities and differences among intrinsic, 'as-if' and 'derived intentionality'. Intrinsic intentionality is a phenomenon that humans and certain other animals have as part of their biological nature. How they are used, or how they think of themselves or how they choose to describe themselves, it doesn't matter. 'As-if' intentionality does not ascribe any
intentionality at all, intrinsic or other. It is used merely to speak figuratively or metaphorically. It is important to emphasize here that as-if intentionality is as if it had the intentionality. There is nothing metaphorical or as-if about saying that certain sentences means certain things. These forms of intentionality are real, but they are derived from the intentionality of human agents. Thus, the third sort, i.e. derived intentionality, literally endows non-material phenomena with intentional properties.

Searle claims that perspectival character of conscious experience indicates that all intentionality is aspectual. For example, seeing an object from a point of view is seeing it under certain aspects and not others. In this sense, all seeing is 'seeing as'. And what goes for seeing goes for all forms of intentionality, conscious and unconscious. Here, it is important to mention the distinction between intrinsic, as-if and derived intentionality. In order to explain these distinctions, Searle gives three examples.

a) I am now thirsty, really thirsty, because I have not had anything to drink all day.

b) My lawn is thirsty, really thirsty, because it has not been watered in a week.

c) In French 'j'ai grand soif' means 'I am very thirsty'.

In the above sentences, first ascribes intrinsic intentionality. If such a statement is true, there must be an intentional state in the object of the ascription. Second sentence is used to speak figuratively or metaphorically. The intentionality in this ascription is merely 'as-if'. 'As-if intentionality' is not a kind of intentionality,
but, rather a system that has as-if intentionality, which is as-if-it-had intentionality. The intentionality in the French sentence is not intrinsic to that particular sentence construed just as a syntactical object. It is derived from the intrinsic intentionality of the users of the language.

In other words, intrinsic intentionality is a phenomenon that humans and certain other animals have as part of their biological nature. It is not a matter of how they are used or how they think of themselves or how they choose to describe themselves. 'As-if intentionality' does not imply the presence of any mental phenomena. Derived intentionality is something that is the result of somebody else’s uses of or attitudes towards the thing. Searle maintains that we cannot deny these distinctions. In order to prove this, he gives an example from the journal of pharmacology. 'Once the food is part the chrico-pharyngus sphincter, its movement is almost entirely involuntary except for the final expulsion of feces during defecation. The gastrointestinal tract is a highly intelligent organ that senses not only the presence of food in the lumen but also it’s chemical composition quantity, viscosity and adjusts to the rate of propulsion and mixing by producing appropriate patterns of contractions. Due to its highly developed decision making ability the gut wall comprised of the smooth muscle layers, the neuronal structures and paracrine-endocrine cells is often called the gut brain. The above example shows that any attempt to deny the distinction between intrinsic and as-if intentionality faces a general reductio ad absurdum. That is, denying the distinction is absurdity because it makes everything in the universe
mental. With this, Searle attacks the motivations underlying the sort of separationist view that Fodor promotes with respect to consciousness and intentionality. The urge to separate intentionality from consciousness, says Searle is that, we do not know how to explain consciousness, and we would like to get a theory of the mind that will not be discredited by the fact that it lacks a theory of consciousness. For him, there are capacities that enable our mental states to function on the consciousness and intentionality. They are called 'The Background Capacities'. Searle begins to remind us of the essential backdrop within which he undertake the task of building up a science of consciousness. The interface between philosophy of language and mind comes via two claims namely, the claim about literal meaning and the claim about compositionality of meaning. Here, his point is that intentional phenomena such as meanings, understandings, interpretations of beliefs, desires and experiences only function within a set of background capacities that are not intentional in themselves. That is, the same intentional state can determine different conditions in which they are satisfied. Searle calls this as conditions of satisfaction. We discussed it in the first chapter. So, another way of stating the thesis is that intentional phenomena only determine condition of satisfaction. To pursue this idea to its logical limit, he firstly proceeds to show some features of the background and the network. They are as follows:
1. Intentional states do not function autonomously and it is impossible for them to determine the conditions of satisfaction in isolation.

2. Each intentional state requires for its functioning a Network of other intentional states. Conditions of satisfaction are determined only relative to the Network.

3. The Network only functions relative to a set of Background Capacities.

4. These capacities are not part of the content of intentional states.

5. The same intentional content can determine different condition of satisfaction relative to different Background and relative to some Backgrounds it determines none at all.

Now, Searle wants to examine the understanding of sentences to see that representation presupposes a non-representational background of capacities. The literal expression will be interpreted differently in the different sentences. For, each sentence is interpreted against a Background of human capacities and those capacities will fix different interpretation, even though the literal meaning of the expression remain constant. Further, the meaning of a sentence is a compositional function of the meanings of its component parts and their syntactical arrangement in the sentence. It follows from these two premises that the principle of compositionality and the notion of literal meaning are absolutely essential to any coherent account of language. The notion of literal meaning thus becomes an important tool not only in his analysis of philosophy of language but also crucial to any study of cognitive science as it is understood by Searle. He
gives another argument for the Background. There are perfectly ordinary sentence of English and other natural languages that are uninterpretable. We can understand the meanings of the words but cannot understand the sentence.

Searle's next claim is that sentence meaning radically underdetermines the content of what is said. Literal meaning determines truth-conditions absolutely and in isolation. But literal meanings are vague and literal descriptions are always incomplete. For Searle, the above argument is powerful and appealing, from philosophy of language point of view. Two questions arise here. One is about the incompleteness. The second question is posed by taking a cue from another philosopher of language Recanati. 32 Recanati's argument is that any actual situation admits of an infinite number of true descriptions. The above point just extends Searle's earlier cluster theory of descriptions according to which a name is just equivalent to a cluster of descriptions. If they are logically equivalent, then the statement itself will become analytic.

But now Searle puts a different gloss. He recommends that we must proceed from a view according to which any linguistic representation will always be incomplete. 33 If so, then the argument for generalizing from literal meaning to all forms of intentionality will pose considerable difficulties. Searle's reply to the first one is that, incompleteness is not the main problem, because efforts to complete the description don't help. He adds that if you postulate a situation totally devoid of Background presupposition, you cannot fix any definite interpretation. His reply to the second appears in at least two forms.
(1) Incompleteness can be overcome only if we add further forms of incompleteness, without this, we cannot fix any definite interpretation.

(2) It is useful to have a taxonomy that captures our intuition that there is a match between thought and meaning.

A crucial step in understanding the Background is to see that one cannot be committed to the truth of the proposition without having any intentional state, whatever with that proposition as content. It means to have a conscious thought; one has to have the capacity to generate a lot of other conscious thoughts. If we want to add these conscious thought all still we require further capacities for their application.

It is in this context that Searle gives certain laws of operation of the Background. They are as follows:

(1) In general, there is no action without perception, no perception without action.

(2) Intentionality occurs in a coordinated flow of action and perceptions and the background is the condition of possibility of the forms taken by the flow.

(3) Intentionality tends to rise to the level of Background ability.

(4) Though intentionality rises to the level of the Background ability, it reaches all the way down to the bottom of ability.

(5) The Background only manifest when there is intentional content.
These all show that, we can not make a distinction between Background and the Network, because the network is that part of the Background which we describe in terms of its capacity to cause conscious intentionality. To have a conscious thought one has to have the capacity to generate a lot of other conscious thoughts. And these conscious thoughts all require further capacities for their application. 34

He wants to eliminate the misunderstandings, related with the hypothesis of the Background. One is the mistaken supposition that all understanding must involve some act of interpretation. That is, from the fact that whenever one understands something, one understands it in a certain way and not in other ways, and the fact that alternative interpretations are always possible, it does not thereby follow that in all discourse, we are engaged in constant ‘acts of interpretation.’ A similar mistake is made in those theories of cognition that claim that we must have made an inference if when we look at one side of a tree, we know that the tree has a backside. On the contrary, what we do is simply see a tree as a real tree.

But Background is emphatically not a system of rules. But the rules only have application relative to the Background capacities. The rules are not self interpreting, and in consequence, they require a Background to function; they are not themselves explanatory or constitutive of the Background. According to Searle, we need the following distinction, i.e., a distinction between those features of the Background that are common to all human beings and those
features that have to do with local, cultural practices. Thus he opposes these two as 'deep Background' versus 'local practices.' Difference in local Backgrounds makes translation from one language to another difficult; the commonality of deep Background makes it possible at all.

Many philosophers who became aware of the Background are extremely disconcerted by it, says Searle. It seems to them that meaning, intentionality rationality etc. are somehow threatened if their application depends on contingently existing biological and cultural facts about human beings. He argues that background does not show that meaning and intentionality are unstable or indeterminate; that we can never make ourselves understood, that communication is impossible or threatened. He merely shows that all of these functions against a contingently existing set, of Background capacities and practices.

Searle's theory of mental causation gets completed with the two important hypotheses he formulates in the context of the problem of freedom of the will. Searle accepts that this is essentially a problem about a certain aspect of consciousness, namely that form of consciousness that manifests these sorts of gap. Searle's two hypotheses are stated as follows (1) Psychological indeterminism coexists with neurobiological determinism; and (2) Psychological indeterminism is matched by neurobiological indeterminism. The type of causation theory that corresponds to the formulation (1) recommends that the psychological indeterminism goes all the way up even under circumstances that
neurobiological causation is deterministic. This is just to enable us cause the formulation of the second hypothesis. There is no question that any rational explanation of human behaviour, that is, explanations that cite the reasons the person acted on, are both non-deterministic in form and at the same time, completely adequate as explanation.

He believes that the existence of the gap, and the adequacy of non-deterministic explanations presupposing the gap, require us to postulate an irreducible, non-Humean self. He adds that the unified field of consciousness is precisely the presupposition of the operation of the self, just as the self is the presupposition of the effectiveness of reasons in acts and explanations where the action involves the gap. For him, the problem of the freedom of the will arises for those parts of the conscious field in which we experience the gap. These are the cases that are traditionally called 'volition.' We experience our own normal voluntary actions in such a way that we sense alternative possibilities of action open to us, and we sense that psychological antecedents of the action are not sufficient to fix the action. On this account, the problem of free will only arises for consciousness, and it only arises for volitional or active consciousness.

The argument is pursued further in his recent book *Rationality in Action*, where Searle argues that the very operation of rationality presupposes the gap, and it explains how irrational actions that exhibit weakness of will are possible. The gap is that feature of the consciousness of voluntary actions, whereby the actions are experienced as not having sufficient psychological causal conditions to
determine them. It is found in three experiential locations: in our experiences of not being causally determined (1) to decide what we decide, (2) to try to do what we have decided to do, and (3) to continue doing what we are trying to do. The 'manifestation' of the gap is said to lie 'between the reasons for a decision and the decision', the second 'between the decision and its execution' and the third 'between the initiation of an action and its continuation to completion'. Searle reports that this gap has a traditional name, 'the freedom of the will'.

He appeals to the gap both in attacking what he calls the 'Classical Model of Rationality' and in defending his own position on rationality. Searle shows following theses in his book. (1) Concerning rationality, the greatest single difference between human beings and other animals is our ability to create, recognize, and act on desire-independent reasons for actions. (2) There are irreducible, conscious selves. (3) The subject matter of philosophy of rationality, a goal-directed activity of conscious selves. (4) There are desire-independent reasons and they can motivate actions, and (5) Owing to certain features of desire, there will not be a deductive logic of practical reasons even in the limited sense in which [there can be] a deductive logic of theoretical reason.

The above viewpoints show that his earlier concept of disbelieving in free will has changed now. He thinks that there is an absence of causally sufficient conditions at the psychological level that is matched by a parallel lack of causally sufficient conditions at the neurobiological level. He formulates this view in following three principles (here, $t_i$ is the time at which an agent is presented with
some options, $t_2$ the time at which he makes a relevant decision, and $t_3$ the time at which he completes his execution of that decision).

(1) At any given point in time such as $t_1$, the total conscious state of the brain is entirely determined by the behaviour of the relevant microelements.

(2) The state of the brain at $t_1$ is not causally sufficient to determine the state of the brain at $t_2$ and $t_3$.

(3) The move from the state at $t_1$ to the state at $t_2$ and $t_3$ can be explained only by features of the whole system, specifically by the operation of the conscious self.

According to Searle, the gap is not synchronic. There is no gap between 'the behaviour of the relevant micro-elements' and 'the total conscious states of the brain': the former 'uniquely fix [CS]' the latter. 39

3.4 The Other Minds Problem:

Searle claims that there is an empirical basis for supposing that other people and higher animals have conscious mental phenomena more or less like our own. Even though many solutions are proposed by various thinkers, none of these solutions is satisfactory. Empiricists believe that the only evidence we have for attributing mental states to other systems is behaviour of those system. For them, we know of existence of consciousness in other people by inference is based on observation of their behaviour, especially their verbal behaviour.

A specimen argument from Peter Carruthers explains the difficulty of solving the problem of other minds.
(1) It is impossible to have direct awareness of the mental states of another human being. (C1) So our knowledge of such states (if it exists) must be bared upon inference from observable physical state.

(2) Because of the ever-present possibility of pretence, no such inference can ever be valid. (C2). So [from (C1) and (C2)] it cannot be reasonable to believe in the mental states of other human beings. 40

The above arguments are false, says Searle. He points out that we believe that other people are conscious is the fact their causal structure is like ours. We cannot reduce the first-person ontology to the third-person facts. That is why Searle disposes of different types of reductionism. Some of which are classified as follows.

(1) Ontological reduction by which objects of certain types can be shown to consist in nothing but objects of other types. 41

(2) Property Ontological Reductions: This concerns properties.

(3) Theoretical reduction is primarily a relation between theories, where the laws of the reduced theory can be deduced from the laws of the reducing theory.

(4) Logical or Definitional Reduction: It is a relation between words and sentences, where words and sentence referring to one type of entity can be translated without any residue into those referring to another type of entity.

(5) Causal Reduction: It is a relation between any two types of things that can have causal powers, where the existence and a fortiori the causal powers of 142
the reduced entity are shown to be entirely explainable in terms of the causal powers of the reducing phenomena.

Thus, Searle makes the conclusion that no description of the third person, objective physiological facts would convey the subjective, because the first-person features are different from the third-person features. Nagel states this point by contrasting the objectivity of the third-person features with the what-it-is like features of subjective states of consciousness. Jackson states the same point by calling attention to the fact that someone who had a complete knowledge of the neurophysiology of mental phenomena such as pain would still not known what a pain was if she or he did not know what it felt like. But Searle differs from all these Family-like Arguments and hence he does not seem to have an axe like others to grind while developing a new science of consciousness.

Further, he adds that having the actual intentional thought process is one thing, and the behaviour is some thing else. This distinction gets lost in the behaviourist and functionalist account. Searle says that 'it is mistake to suppose that we know of the existence of mental phenomena in others only by observing their behaviour'. The 'behaviour' only makes sense as the expression or manifestation of an underlying mental reality. The behaviour is considered as the sole basis because of the connection between behaviour and the causal structure of other organisms that behaviour is at all relevant to the discovery of mental states in others. If we understand the causal basis of the ascriptions of mental
states to other animals, then several traditional skeptical problems about 'other minds' have an easy solution.

According to him, except when doing philosophy, there really is no 'problem' about other minds. Because we do not hold a 'hypothesis', belief or 'supposition' that other people are conscious and those chairs, tables, computers and cars are not conscious. Searle declares that we are having certain Background Capacities, which enable our mental states or consciousness to relate to consciousness of other people. Now, we shall examine how Searle extends his theory of mental causation so as to have a wider base that includes an account and the role of intentionality in constructing social reality. Thus the difficulties of overcoming the gap between mind and body are laid at the door of constructing social reality. Searle thus makes an earnest attempt to bridge his philosophy of language and philosophy of mind and the consequent non-reductive type of physicalism with a brand of realism. It is necessary therefore to examine the credentials of his realism to see how it strikes a congenial chord to the above perspective of mind-body problem.

3.5 The Construction of Social Reality:

This phase brings language more close to intentionality and social reality. For, Searle's concept of social reality is established on his philosophy of language and it gives a basis to the concept of consciousness and intentionality. It is in his book *The Construction of Social Reality*, that Searle comes to develop his realistic worldview, starting with an independent world of particles and forces, up
through evolutionary biological systems capable of consciousness and intentionality, to institutions and social facts, which are created when persons impose status-features on things, which are collectively recognized and accepted. He tries to show that intentionality and reality is complementary to each other. It includes the ontology of social and institutional facts. The ontology of institutional reality can be explained using three concepts. They are collective intentionality, the assignment of function and constitutive rules of the form ‘X counts as Y in context C.’ Here at least six features are accounted to picturize the logical structure of human institutional reality.

They are as follows:

(1) The self-referentiality of social concepts.
(2) The use of performative utterances in the creation of institutional facts.
(3) The logical priority of brute facts over institutional facts.
(4) The requirement of systematic logical relationship among institutional facts.
(5) The primacy of social acts over social objects.
(6) The linguistic component of many institutional facts. Language not only describes but also is partly constitutive or institutional reality.

His aim is to ‘assimilate social reality to our basic ontology of physics, chemistry and biology’. He thinks that philosopher have failed to understand the social world because they have posed a false dilemma. They have taken states of collective intentionality to be manifestations of parts of a Hegelian world sprit. This is implausible, says Searle. The intentionality that exists in our individual
heads has the (simple) form ‘we intend’. In his worldview, the mental states can be thought of as intrinsic feature of reality because they are higher-level features of the brain, and brains are among the systems of particles. Besides, ‘we consciousness’ cannot be reduced to individual intentionality.

For him, language is the first institution, a pre-condition of all the others, our use of language rather than any distinctive form of thinking or of sociability, is what distinguishes us from non-human animals. In his account of language and meaning, a layer of convention is build upon intentions to represent. There are communicative intentions also. Since the success of declarative, status imposing speech acts is communicative success such intentions also play a part in the construction of institutional reality.

In Speech Act, he has given an account of a ‘some extra-ordinary’ properties of human communication. According to him, on the hearer’s side, understanding the speakers’ utterance is closely connected with recognizing his intentions. The close connection is such that a speaker’s being taken as doing what she/he intends is enough for her/his automatic illocutionary success. ‘We’- intentions per se don’t have a place here. The logical structure of speech acts must then make a transition to the logical structure of social facts.

Searle presents two different aspects or ideas about social institutions and institutional facts. The first emphasizes the function of social institutions and the second the deontic powers involved. These aspects have been integrated together with what we have termed as the semiotic thrust of Searle’s perspective,
criticisms notwithstanding. The general criticism is that such integration does not work very well. The first basic ideas is that the members of a collective, so to speak, collectively construct a social institution semiotically by conceptually or semiotically giving some thing a new status and a function to accompany it. Searle employs 'constitutive rules' of the form 'X counts as Y in C' to effect this. He gives the example of money. Some thing is only money or property if people think it is money or property. Simplifying greatly, X could here be a certain kind of piece paper with status and functions that have nothing to do with money, the collectively accepted new constitutive rule. 'This kind of piece of paper (X) counts as money (Y) in our community (C)' gives X the new status Y with a new function (something like quantitative, transferable unit of value for use in certain kinds of exchange) to go with this status. He requires that money is not money unless collectively thought to be money- this is the self-referentiality of social institution concepts he stresses. Accordingly, collective acceptance must be taken to entail shared belief in this sense. It can still be noted that at the bottom the thing (object, fact, etc.) to which the new status is given is a physical or material thing (or in any case a non-institutional thing) According to him, a part of society (including at least institutional facts) is conceptually created by us from our collective intentionality in a language-dependent way. He argues that functions are agent relative (relate to goals and ends of a system) and 'normative' (relate to what somebody is supposed to do). Whenever the function X is to Y, X and Y are parts of a system where the system
is in part defined by purposes, goals and values generally. Whenever the function of X is to Y, then X is supposed to cause or otherwise result in Y.

In his analysis of social reality, he takes collective intentionality as a fundamental notion. But 'we-intentions' cannot be reduced to 'I-intentions'. He needs an account of collective intentionality, which is consistent with methodological individualism. The existence of this collective intentionality as a psychological primitive in the individual heads of individual agents does not commit one to a primitive ontology of actual human collectives. On the contrary, the basic ontology is that of individual human organisms and their mental states. The collective arises from the fact that collective intentionality is in the individual heads of individual organisms. The actual social collective consists entirely of individual agents with collective intentionality in their heads, nothing more. Ontologically speaking, collective intentionality gives rise to the collective and not the other way round. Searle's view is that physical reality exists totally independently of our representation of it, in a way that institutional reality does not exist independently of our representations of it. Since institutional reality is in some sense our creation, we ought to be able to state precisely the mechanisms of that creation and ontology of the resulting structure. Further, 'the Background', the set of pre-intentional capacities, abilities and dispositions enable human intentionality to function in the construction of institutional reality.
Institutional reality consists of status functions and these are almost entirely positive and negative deontic powers: rights, duties, obligations, entitlements, authority, penalties, hierarchies and institutional power generally. And institutional facts have a more complex constitution. Searle believes that social behaviour is a biological given, common to many species. Often the imposition of status functions proceeds without any experience, conscious or otherwise, that is what is happening. The imposition and maintenance of status functions by collective intentionality is not something which just causes institutional reality, it is constitutive of that reality precisely because it is constitutive of the ontology according to the constitutive rules. He further adds that intentional causation is both logical and causal and phenomenology is unable to reveal this fact. In the case of institutional facts, the logical structure in the form of the constitutive rule, the ontology and the collective intentionality all come together in one unified phenomenon.

Searle connects social institutions with deontic powers by holding that they are collectively conferred on people since these powers are to be taken as being enablements and requirements. The basic hypothesis in this context is: there is one primitive logical operation by which institutional reality is created and constituted. It has this form: we collectively accept, acknowledge, recognize, go along with etc, that [S has power (S does A)]. Thus he accepts that many different kinds of activities fall under his notion of collective acceptance. However, Searle
says too little about the applicability and interconnection of these different notions. In any case, mutual belief is required to be always present.

On his analysis, there is a distinction between two kinds of rules, i.e. a distinction between two kinds of actions descriptions. The idea of constitutive rule is a theme that goes back to Searle’s own ‘How to Derive Ought from Is’ (1964) and Speech Acts (1969). The contrast between constitutive and regulative rules is that, a regulative rule ‘regulates’, but merely regulates, a type of behaviour, which is logically independent of those rules. Constitutive rules also regulate, but they do more as well: they create or define new forms of behaviour, which could not possibly exist independently of those rules.48

One of the ways in which Seale tries to make this more precise is this. Consider these two action sentences: ‘he sent out the invitation at least two weeks in advance’ (‘He R-ed’) and they played football (‘They C-ed’). There may be a rule of etiquette specifying advance notice for invitations, but from the fact that some person R-ed, it does not logically follow that any rules exist which regulate his R-ing. Searle claims that if there were no rules of football, there is no sense in which their behaviour could be described as playing football, so from the fact that they C-ed, it logically follows that some set of rules exist that regulates their behaviour.49

What Searle provides is an account of two different types of action description namely, rule-involving and non-rule-involving ones. Just as actions are intentional, basic or non-basic, only relative to a description, so too actions are
not rule-involving or non-rule involving per se, but only relative to a description. The distinction he has in mind marks no difference in types of rules, but only between types of action description.

He speaks a great deal about the roles of agreement, acceptance and collective imposition of function, in the creation and continued existence of institutional facts. Without these, there is a logical priority of act over institutional object. ‘What we think of as social objects... are in fact just placeholders for patterns of activities’. In other words, where institutional reality is concerned, the noun phrases tend to name placeholders for patterns of activity rather than independent entities. This is because the point of having institutional reality is to facilitate action. Institutional entities are more like a floating crap game than they are like Mount Everest. The above reflections pave way for recommending a realistic account of social reality in a much simpler way than anything than has been thought about before.

Thus while defending external realism, Searle pursues the view according to which there is a reality that exists totally independently of our representations of it. Together with a version of correspondence theory of truth, the idea that statements, if they are true, are true in virtue of how things are in the world that exists independently of the statement, the realism about social reality thrusts forward.

In conclusion, on the positive side, the explanatory gap is closable so long as a mental theory of causation is made to work. We can have an equally plausible
negative attitude to both. What falsifies the latter however is the way the intentional theory of mental causation with its entire widened base converges on a view of rationality and a realistic view of social reality. Before concluding we will have to examine what are the further challenges Searle has to meet with all these features of biological naturalism. One peculiarity of Searle’s critics is that there is none, which could play down the total perspective. This is altogether a fortune for Searle. His critics can be classified into many divisions where each one looks a loophole in at least one segment of the perspective. Hence, in the next chapter I shall explain the different criticisms of Searle’s views by different thinkers.
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43. F. Jackson, Epiphenomenal Qualia in *Philosophical Quarterly* 32, 1982

44. J. Searle, *RM*, pp71-77


46. Ibid, p-41

48. J. Searle, CSR, p-33


50. J. Searle, CSR, P-57