Chapter-VI

Nepal: Strategy of Existence

6.1 Growth of Maoist Violence.
6.2 Political Support from India.
6.3 Political Support from China.
6.4 International Pressure.
Growth of Maoist Violence

Nepal has been ruled by hereditary prime ministers from the Rana clan or monarchs from the Shah family since the 18th century. A multiparty interlude from 1959-1960 ended when King Mahendra, father of Gyanendra, suspended the constitution following the election victory of the Nepali Congress Party. From then until 1990 a variety of constitutional formats emerged, none of which allowed for genuinely free political parties. Coming under increasing internal and external pressure, Nepal re-established multiparty democracy within the framework of a constitutional monarchy in 1990\textsuperscript{260}.

However, democracy failed to quell Nepal’s chronic political instability in the 1990s. Maoist rebels began a violent insurgency campaign against the government in rural areas from 1996, attempting to establish a People’s Republic. As the pattern of strikes and later bombings intensified through 2001 and 2002, Nepal’s constitutional and political order seemed under threat of disintegration. On 22 July 2001 Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba announced a unilateral ceasefire against the Maoists, which they immediately reciprocated. But the Maoists broke the ceasefire in November 2001, launching coordinated attacks on army and police posts. The conflict intensified over the following year and drew in the full participation of the Royal Nepalese Army\textsuperscript{261}.

In October 2002, King Gyanendra, facing a growing debate over potential plans to extend the state of emergency as a means to combat the Maoist insurgency, dismissed the government, assumed executive power and assured the public elections would be held in a timely fashion. However, the insurgency made the holding of elections impossible, and parliament remained disbanded. A January 2003 ceasefire between government and Maoist insurgents collapsed in August that year, sparking a catastrophic return to mass violence: over 1,000 died in the following four months alone. Although the reappointment of Sher Bahadur Deuba as prime minister in June 2004

\textsuperscript{260} Dixit, JN (editor), External Affairs, Cross Border Relations, Rolli Books, New Delhi, 2003, pp. 177.

\textsuperscript{261} Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy, Asia Report Briefing №104, 27 October 2005
marked an attempt to heal the rift between the palace and political parties, this ended with the royal coup on 1st February 2005.262

When the Maoist revolutionaries launched an armed struggle against feudal landlords and State bureaucracy in Nepal, the general opinion amongst political circles was that this is an adventures path and the movement will soon be crushed by the state. The CPN (UML) assessment of the movement was that it could hardly be sustained for six months at best and then it would fizzle out. Even the Nepali Congress leaders held somewhat similar views. But those who were not associated with any political party and therefore had no preconceived notions felt that this was a turning point in the history and politics of Nepal-one which could not be ignored. In the first phase of their campaign, the Maoists did not confine themselves to Rolpa, Runkum, Jajarkot, but by extending their activities to Kathmandu, Gorkha, Sidhuli and other places indicated that the movement would engulf the entire nation. Through their activities, pamphlets, press releases and on many occasions, the Maoists had clearly spelt out that the aim of the movement is to smash the reactionary State and establish a new democratic order. They also made it a point to underline the hollowness of electoral politics so that the political of armed struggle could gain ascendancy263.

The Maoists operated with such alacrity that within a month of the beginning of the armed struggle, there were such operations in 60 districts of the country. Substantial cache of arms and ammunition were looted from the police stations during this period. The ruling classes of Nepal had declared that the Maoists would be nipped into the bud within months. To actualise their declaration, they resorted to every conceivable kind of repressive measures. Scores of people were arrested on mere suspicion for being Maoists and many more innocent citizens were butchered. Thousands of houses were raided on suspicion that the residents may be sympathisers of the Maoists. Women were brutally raped on a scale never heard before264.

As the brutality of State repression increased and innocent people were being tortured, a significant section of the population started coming nearer to Maoists. This period also witnessed the State's proposal for the enactment of an Anti-Terrorism Act, ostensibly to deal

262 Verma Anand Swaroop, Maoist Movement In Nepal, Samkalin Teesari Duniya, New Delhi, 2001, pp 36
263 Ibid, pp.37.
orism, but the government had to shelve the proposal due to nationwide protests. In the meanwhile, the ruling classes of Nepal reacted halfheartedly by terming it a political issue which could not be resolved through armed struggle but only by negotiations. Nine left parties of Nepal declared their open support for the Maoist and expressed grave concern over violation of human rights in the name of combating Maoism. The Government's response was termed 'halfhearted' because on the one hand it denominated the problem as political which could only be resolved through political dialogue and not by violent means, but on the other hand, there was no letup in repression and its terror.

The way the People's War attracted sympathisers in a short span of two years was indeed astounding. Such sympathisers in clouded people from every walk of life—workers, peasants, Women, students, intellectuals, dalits, people belonging to oppressed nationalities, cultural activists—to name a few. Nepal is home to many oppressed tribes like Magar, Gurung, Tamang, Newar, Tharu, Rai, Limbu and other. They also found a ray of hope in the Maoist movement and various nationalities started forming liberation fronts. A new awareness dawned on them. It was primarily due to this awareness that today in Nepal, a dalit movement with a distinct class and leftist perspective is also taking roots.

In the third year of the People's War, there were glimpses of people's power asserting itself in those areas where political vacuum had been created in the aftermath of boycott of elections. In these areas and particularly in the hilly tracts of western Nepal, the guerillas brought to fight the operations of the police and their local agents. In western Nepal, under the supervision of the Party, co-operative societies were formed, collective agriculture was practiced, fair weather roads and makeshift bridges were built in the villages, martyr's memorials honouring those who had been killed by the police were constructed, registration of land holdings which had been bought or sold was carried out, squads for ensuring the security of the people were formed and Peoples' Courts were held to resolve disputes. Schools for imparting education to children were opened and various other activities were carried out so that people could have a feel of People's Power. These tasks were advanced with daring and confidence in western Nepal and every now

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265 Reports of The General Secretary, CPN(Maoist), The Worker, No. 4, 1998.
and then attempts were also made in the other mountainous regions of Nepal.

In the later half of 1998, PM Girija Prasad Koirala devised an extensive plan to crush the Maoist movement. He was aware that his step would find approval from India and the US. Incidentally, the Indian media had been splashing reports stating that the intelligence agency of the Pakistan-ISI was extending its network in Nepal and that Nepal had become a hotbed of anti-Indian activities. PM Koirala was concerned since he had to assure India, from time to time, that the territory of Nepal would not be used to mount activities hostile to India. In the meanwhile, the American agencies spread the canard that there are links between the Maoists and the ISI. The Indian media had been showing extra vigour in giving vent to such reports. Recently, the Indian media went out of its way to propagate that the People's War Group in Andhra Pradesh and LTTE of Sri Lanka has close links. By disseminating such news that there are fraternal links between the People's War Group and CPN (Maoists), it was being suggested that there is mutual understanding between the People's War Group, Maoists of Nepal, LTTE of Sri Lanka and ISI of Pakistan for carrying out anti-India activities.

One of the distinguishing features of the People's War led by CPN (Maoists) is the massive participation of women. The Nepalese society is not only feudal but extremely backward and consequently women face far greater cruelty, due to the sway of superstitions and decadent values. In such a scenario, women were obviously attracted towards Maoist revolutionaries as they felt that not only their own liberation but that of the entire society was possible only by allying with such forces. Even otherwise, the left politics has a long history in Nepal and women had joined left movements in far greater numbers as compared to other countries. One of the major problems of Nepalese people, according to Nepalese Maoists, is the Indian expansionism which they want to get rid of. Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, one of the ideologues of CPN (Maoist), wrote in one of his articles, 'Politico-Economic Relation of the People's War in Nepal', that the biggest and obvious form of imperialist exploitation and repression in Nepal is Indian expansionism. According to him this expansionism is a phenomenon under which a small and weak country becomes victim of such a country which has not developed to the status of an imperialist but gains strength from external imperialist forces and from within.²⁶⁸

Nepal is a land locked country, rather India locked to be more precise. It is surrounded by India from three sides and cannot contact or reach any other country without the assistance of India. Through analytical documentation of various data, Dr. Bhattarai has opined that the imposition of Sugauli treaty in 1816 with the British India amounted to convert Nepal into a semi colony which blocked its way of independent and self-reliant development. Bhattarai presents a comparative picture of conditions of socio-economic development in Nepal. Prior to the treaty, Nepal was fully self reliant in most of its basic needs-textile, items of bronze and copper, tools and utensils, arms and other necessities of armed forces. After the commencement of the treaty the Nepalese markets were inundated by the goods manufactured in the factories in India at the cost of Nepal's industry, craft and trade. According to him the process began the treaty itself and got accentuated after 1923 with Nepal being turned into India's common market. Treaty of 1950 with the Government of independent India made Nepal into a virtual semi colony of India. Through various trade relations based on the inequalities of relations inherent in the treaty India has been able to establish and strength its monopolistic dominance over Nepal's trade, industrial and financial horizons. These semi-colonial relations have various dimensions- economic, political, cultural and defence matters etc. The expansionist domination and exploitation of Nepal by India also has various dimensions. The final goal of all these dimensions expansionism is economic exploitation and domination269.

In Com. Bhattarai's opinion 'the world imperialism enters Nepal riding on the horse of Indian expansionism', Multinational Corporation of Britain, America, France, Germany etc. open their branches in India and route their goods through them to Nepal. The Indian branches of these multinationals have sub-branches in Nepal. Nepal's market is flooded with the products of Indian based multinationals Bata (shoes), Hoechst (medicines), Proctor &Gamble (soap, chocolates etc.), Nestle (coffee, milk etc), and Brook Bond (tea) and with the products of Joint-venture companies Maruti-Suzuki (automobile), Hero Honda (motorcycle) etc. The collaborative conspiracy of imperialism and expansionism has not only damaged the growth of national industries but has also created a situation in which the small scale units engaged in the production of

269 Nepal Backgrounder: Ceasefire I Soft Landing or Strategic Pause?, Asia Report N°50, 10 April 2003
soap, tea, shoes, biscuits, paper etc., which were earlier self dependant, have folded up and dying out. Earlier these were self-reliant enterprises. Some export oriented industries like woolen carpets, cloths etc developed during eightees and they constituted around 92% of the total export. These industries are also covertly or overtly controlled by 'Indian expansionists' through their domineering control over raw materials, labour market, capital and trade. Three out of the four five star hotels of the country are effectively being run-by Indian capitalists. He says 'our tourism industry is intimately tied up with the Indian economy'.

The national and international forces that were determined to crush the Maoist movement in Nepal were greatly perturbed by the documents of the second Congress of the CPN (Maoist) in which it had developed a mass line through the fusion of armed insurrection and people’s war. If the Party would have confined itself to the activities such as guerrilla warfare, developing base areas, formation of liberated zones or mobilising a people's army, it would have not raised such an alarm among its enemies. The experience of past two and half decades teaches us that many revolutionary groups, in the world, could not go further to any significant stage merely through such programmes. They were suppressed either by national and international reaction or they themselves stagnated. It was difficult to retain even their initial advances. Party leader Prachand too had asserted once that an armed struggle without vision becomes victim of a type of armed economics, i.e. a kind of reformism, armed reformism. It is for this reason that a living and vibrant relationship between the armed struggle and mass movement was evolved. The relevant and significant decisions, in this regard, adopted by the second Congress are as under:

(a) No definite model based on past proletarian revolution can be applied as in the past due to new changes in the world; it has brought forth concrete methodology of fusion of the strategy of general insurrection into the strategy of protracted people's war in Nepal.

(b) A materialistic review of the Nepalese history shows that the Nepalese Society, in essence and in psychological make up, has remained prodemocratic and self-governing and feudalism has forcibly suppressed that great tradition of the people of Nepal. Though this review of the Nepalese history it has provided materialistic ground for

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forging a broad united front by concretely locating the historical roots of the patriotic and traitorous trends seen in the country today;

(c) The Congress has seriously raised the issue of historic necessity of developing only one communist party based on correct ideology. It has appealed to all the communist revolutionaries of the country to march ahead with the process of unification and speed up the process of revolutionary polarization;

(d) By identifying many weaknesses that have come up during People’s War, it has put forward clean methodology of correcting such weaknesses following the principle of setting once own hair under fire;

(e) The question of organising people’s army at the central level and the military strategy and tactics under the new condition (including fusion of the strategy of insurrection into that of protracted people’s war) has been dwelt in detail;

(f) The document has provided detailed explanation of mass line based on the experiences of the People’s War. .. It has stressed the development of mass line based on new thinking;

(g) The party has formulated main strategic slogan for the coming days as "consolidate and expand base areas and local people's power" and March forward to the direction of building central people's government"; and

(h) On tactical plane it has been proposed to have dialogue with all concerned sections to call an all-section conference of all political parties, organizations and representatives of mass organizations in the country, election of an interim government by such a conference and guarantee of people's constitution under the leadership of the interim government.  

The methodology of political mobilization which the party began practicing in the post second Congress period, indicates quite a flexible attitude and approach. The Party chairman Prachand went a step further in inviting all such sincere elements who are willing to shed off their narrow and personnel interests in the larger interests of the country and the people to participate in the all Party conference. Barring Nepali Congress all other parties have shown a positive attitude towards this initiative from the Maoists. However, the main opposition Party, CPN (UML) expressed its discord by saying that the present Constitution if the

The government and yet it accepted that there are certain shortcomings in this constitution which could be removed through amendments. Criticizing the Koirala Government a senior politician and member of the Standing Committee of the UML, Jhal Nath Khanal said that it lacks political vision, due to which it is not prepared to talk with the Maoists. He said, 'the process can begin by bringing them to the negotiating table to discuss what are the main changes they want to the new constitution, and if those things can be corrected through amendments ... we are optimistic that we can reach an agreement on constitutional reform with the Maoists.' CPN (ML) leaders, Bamdev Gautam and C.P. Mainali, are willing to talk with the Maoists and participate in the all Party Conference sponsored by them. Even in the ruling Nepali Congress former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and the faction lad by him favour a compromise with the Maoists. Yet Prime Minister Girja Prasad Koirala and Deputy Prime Minister Ram Chandra Paudel are of the view that Maoists should be handled sternly. Paudel says 'The Maoists won't come to the talks unless they are cornered. He does regard the CPN (UML) positive attitude towards the Maoists proposal as their compulsion. He says that 'the Maoists are pulling the rug from beneath the UML and wooing away their cadre ... if this situation continues, the UML could even be pushed aside. Quite obviously he "is confident that Maoists can be won on the battle front, yet has conceded is this interview that the men or the Armed Police Force, which is being raised to contain the Maoists, would need a year's training to be competent enough to combat Maoists." In the meantime Newspapers are devoting more and more space to such news that there would be an all Party Conference at the initiative of Maoists in which a new government might be constituted. A favourable atmosphere is developing in the support of such an eventuality.

Despite this stand, the Maoist leadership would try not to involve itself unnecessarily in military confrontation. It is quite conscious that the National and International conspiracy, of which King Birendra was a victim, might logically culminate into engulfing Nepal into such a civil war in which foreign interference might become inevitable. Such a situation might provide a respite to the political life of Prime Minister Koirala, but it


Even at the time of the days of action in Dolpa, CPN (ML) leader Bamdev Gautam and others had warned that the use of the Army against the Maoists would push the entire country into civil war. If Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister would have put in even a fraction of their energy, which they did in order to push forward their plan for the deployment of the Army against the Maoists, in sorting out the political solution to the problem, the situation would have been possibly quite different. Last year Paudel deliberately sabotaged the talks with Maoists. Despite this the Maoists continuously sent feelers to the Government so that the talks could begin.

Nepal’s government and Maoist rebels have signed a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) declaring an end to the ten-year civil war, paving the way for inclusion of the rebels in mainstream politics and June 2007 elections to an assembly that is to write a new constitution. The deal has been welcomed by an optimistic public but implementation will not be straightforward: some central questions remain, and there is a serious risk the elections could be delayed, putting strain on the whole process. The UN has very high credibility but it will not last indefinitely, especially if there are delays. International support for its monitoring of both the two armies and the elections will be critical. The international community, having lost credibility by attempting to pressure the parties into an unworkable compromise with the king, must now work hard to support a difficult transition and peace process.

Since Maoist forces ended their four-month unilateral ceasefire on January 2, 2006, fighting in Nepal’s civil war has engulfed the entire country. Nearly every one of the country’s 75 districts has been affected by the fighting between the Royal Nepali Army (RNA) and the forces of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (the “Maoists”). Civilian casualties, who decreased significantly during the ceasefire, quickly returned to previous levels once fighting resumed. The ten-year-old civil war continues to place the civilian population at serious risk of war

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abuses while hindering economic development of the impoverished countryside.

At the same time, the overall human rights situation in Nepal has generally deteriorated since King Gyanendra assumed absolute executive authority on February 1, 2005. The king has repeatedly subjected critical political activists, journalists, and human rights monitors to arbitrary arrest and censorship, only releasing detainees and relaxing restrictions under intense international pressure.

Although the king justified his coup by citing the inability of the political parties to end the armed conflict, there is now a widespread consensus inside and outside Nepal that the conflict has reached a grinding military stalemate. It is now clear that the king's rule by fiat has failed to bring the conflict any closer to resolution and has not alleviated the conditions of Nepal's beleaguered population. Moreover, while the RNA has made progress in reducing certain serious abuses, its continued abusive practices and failure to prosecute past military crimes have turned many Nepalese against the government and army, diminishing their ability to wage an effective counterinsurgency campaign. It appears that the net effect of the February 2005 coup has been a significant loss of public support for the monarchy. Calls for the establishment of a republic, once rare are now commonplace.

In order to assess the situation after the ceasefire, Human Rights Watch conducted a three-week research trip in late February and early March, 2006. This was Human Rights Watch's fifth research mission in Nepal over the last two years, and its third since the royal takeover. This latest trip found significant grounds for concern about the impact of the war on civilians, chief among them: violations of international humanitarian law (the laws of war) by both parties, including indiscriminate aerial bombardment by the RNA in civilian areas; the increased risk to civilians in areas contested by government-sponsored

279 Nepal's Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation Worse, Asia Report N°91, 9 February 2005

vigilante groups and Maoists; the Maoists recruitment of children for military purposes; security forces continuing human rights abuses and impunity from prosecution.
Nepal is a least developed and land-locked country, beset with serious economic constraints and almost with no infrastructure, entered the era of economic development only in the early 1950, When the Rana regime, which had deliberately closed the door against the winds of change and pursued a policy of economic stagnation, came to an end. The kingdom began experiments in economic planning with the introduction of the first five years plan only in 1955. It hardly needs any emphases that few countries in the world embarked upon the process of development at late and with such geographical and economic handicaps as Nepal. With an area of 1, 45,320 sq. kilometers and a population of 15.02 million Nepal is one of the hard core least developed country\textsuperscript{281}. Nepal is one of the poorest and economically weakest even among the least developed countries is revealed from a united nations estimated in 1979. The per capita gross domestic product of Nepal is exceedingly low with the bulk of population for below any internationally accepted minimum standard of living that. As far as other economic and social criteria associated with the least developed countries are concerned, Nepal presents an even more dismal picture. This disappointing over all Performance of the domestic economy has led a world bank mission to Nepal in May/June 1979 to sound note of warning. The report says:

By indication then, Nepal has reached a critical time in its development. The country is caught in a vicious circle of poverty in which the ability to raise investment and per capita incomes is constrained by the thin natural resource base, scarcity of trained man power, limited domestic resource mobilization prospects, and assumption demands of the rapidly growing population itself. The dynamics of these forces are such that as difficult as it is to break this circle the next five to ten years may represent Nepal’s last chance to do so without having to become completely dependent upon the good will of the aid donors\textsuperscript{282}.

As one of the five land locked states of Asia, Nepal is situated on the southern slope of the Himalayas and is bordered by the Tibetan region of the people’s republic of china to the north and by the Indian provinces of U.P, Bihar, west Bengal and Sikkim to the west, the south

\textsuperscript{282} “Nepal: Development Performance and Prospects” A World Bank Country Study (1979)
Calcutta remains the nearest seaport at a distance of 890 km from Kathmandu and 710 km from the kingdom’s eastern border. This unfavorable geographical location renders Nepal completely landlocked with no direct access to the sea. Moreover on the issue of the transit routes the choices open to Nepal are extremely limited. Nepal has no option in the choice of transit routes. China’s ports and main production and consumption centers are several hundred miles away from Nepal. While the Indian ports are relatively nearer, even the construction of the Arniko Rajmarg, China did not prove viable from the standpoint of trade and transit. Despite link provided by this road between Kathmandu and the Tibetan border, it is more profitable for commercial traffic between Nepal and China to pass through the Indian seaport at Calcutta. Thus Nepal is as the Nepalese frequently observe for obvious reasons ‘India locked’. This uncomfortable geographical situation resulting in excessive dependence of the Himalayan kingdom on a single country India has been brilliantly summed up by a well known Nepalese Economist and public figure.

The compulsions of Nepal’s size face the obstacle of its location for Nepal is not only land-locked but his tropically had access to the sea only through India. In the past she has had to buy and sell with the world at large only via India. Even the building of the kodari road gave the economy only more effective access to the Tibetan market. It did not add an alternative transit route for the enormous distance to any Chinese part from Nepal means that calculate remains the only viable part of economic access to the rest of the world. The monopoly over transit facilities enjoyed by one neighbors has been to Nepal’s peculiar disadvantage\textsuperscript{283}.

Nepal’s trade performance in the part has been characterized by unfavorable terms of trade with India and the rest of the countries of the world, decline in exports and ever growing trade deficits. This dismal performance in the foreign trade sector was no doubts due to the country’s poor natural resources base, the low productivity in agriculture, slow rate of industrial expansion, its land locked geographical situation and poorly developed transport system\textsuperscript{284}. Nepal’s basic trade problems emanate from a huge commodity concentration and a high geographic centralization in its export trade. A close look at the direction of trade position reveals that in the first fourteen years of planning that is form

India had a dominant share in Nepal's foreign trade. During the third plan (1965-70), India absorbed 94.7 percent of total foreign trade of Nepal and the rest of the world accounted for only 5.3 percent. By the end of the fifth plan that is by the year 1979-80 India’s share in Nepal’s total exports came down to 41.26 percent. According to the last economic survey presented to the Rashtriya panchayat on 6 July 1983 by the then finance minister Y.P.Pant, India still continues to Nepal’s major trading partner accounting for 73.2 percent of the total exports and 4.5 percent of the total imports of Nepal during the first nine months of the financial year 1982-83.285

During the last part of the British rule in India Nepal India trade relation were governed by the treaty of 1923. Following India’s independence, Nepal and India decided to regulate the traditional trade principles and procedures and with this objective signed a treaty of trade and commerce in 1950. However, by 1960 both Nepal and India become convinced that the existing treaty provisions were inadequate and hence a new treaty was signed on 18 September 1960 with a view to removing the unequal and disadvantageous position of Nepal vis-a-vis India in their mutual trade relations on the expiry of treaty, a fresh treaty of trade and transit was concluded between the two countries in 1947 for the five year period.

Though the 1971 treaty of trade and transit had lapsed in 1976, it as kept in operation till 1978 because of continuing dead lock in trade negotiation between Nepal and India. It was a longstanding Nepalese demand to have two separate treaties on trade and transit. The objective behind the demand was Nepal’s desire to de-link the problems of her trade with India from her general overseas that had to go through India to transit because of Nepal land-locked position.286

In 1977, Janta Party Government came to power in India which resolved to improve the country’s relations with the immediate neighbours in accordance with its declared foreign policy objective of beneficial bilateralism. The Janta government conceded the Nepalese demand for two separates treaties during Prime Minister Morarji Desai’s visit to Kathmandu in Dec 1977. Ultimately, on 17 march 1978 two separate treaties on trade and transit and an agreement on cooperation in controlling unauthorized trade on the border were signed which came

An important policy instrument to diversify Nepal’s trade was the “Exporter Exchange Entitlement Scheme” initiated in the year 1960. The objective behind this scheme was to increase export in third countries. Though the “Exporter Exchange Entitlement scheme” gave a fillip to trade with overseas countries, for obvious reasons the policy failed to yield the desired result. “The scheme stressed only the geographical aspect of diversification without consideration to commodity diversification. The incentive thus granted to the industries exporting to countries other than India also led to a distortion in the country’s allocation of resources in a very uniform way.”

The net result was that the economy suffered a direct financial loss in view of the fact that India belongs to both the South Asia and the third world. The benefit of India regional trade should be fully exploited. Nepal is small and India is big if at all India is a big brother.

If we look back into history, Indo-Nepal relations in particular, it will be seen how Nepal went about creating problems for itself. India and Nepal have, in an inter-governmental Committee meeting held from 17-21 March 1983, agreed to extend their treaty of trade and agreement for cooperation for another five years. The scope of the new treaty has been enlarged. The Govt of India has agreed to import 36 items as against 26 items so far, free of basic duties.

The Geographical isolation of the country, and the primitive and backward nature of the economy have put Nepal in a situation of excessive dependence upon one country thereby limiting her options for promotion of trade with overseas countries. Now, Nepal has been able to establish trade relations with other countries. An important policy instrument is diversify Nepal’s trade was the “Exporter Exchange Entitlement Scheme” initiated in the year 1960. The objective behind this scheme was to increase export in third countries. Though the “Exporter Exchange Entitlement scheme” gave a fillip to trade with overseas countries, for obvious reasons the policy failed to yield the desired result. “The scheme stressed only the geographical aspect of diversification without consideration to commodity diversification. The incentive thus granted to the industries exporting to countries other than India also led to a distortion in the country’s allocation of resources in a very uniform way.”

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Nepal signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship as well as an agreement on matters of trade and commerce. The treaty and the letters of exchange stipulate that both governments should inform each other of any serious friction with neighbours, and neither government should tolerate any threat to the security of the other. King Tribhuvan, who was the ruler when independence came, was more or less a prisoner in his palace as the Ranas were effectively holding the reins of power. The king sought refuge in the Indian embassy on November 6, 1950, and asked for political asylum. The Ranas attempted to depose the king and place his four-year-old grandson on the throne. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru intervened, ensuring King Tribhuvan’s return to Kathmandu and also a democratic government headed by Mr. B P. Koirala.  

King Mahendra succeeded his father in March, 1955, and initiated a policy of distancing Nepal from India and developing close relations with China, with a treaty in September, 1956. Mahendra dismissed the Koirala Ministry in December, 1960, and more or less assumed direct rule. The setback suffered by India in the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962 made Mahendra even more assertive. King Birendra, who succeeded Mahendra, enunciated the “Doctrine of Zone of Peace”, equi-distancing Nepal from India and China. Actually he started leaning on China more and more, without realising the vital importance of India in Nepal’s economy. The Indo-Nepal Treaty permitted citizens of both countries equal rights of trade and commerce which benefited the Nepali’s considerably. Today up to 10 million Nepali’s are believed to be living and working in various parts of India and their remittances to their kith and kin in Nepal play an important role in sustaining its economy. The provision of free trade was misused by a few powerful families in Kathmandu which in collaboration with some unscrupulous Indian traders, used to import huge quantities of items like stainless steel and polyester fiber, which were not wanted in Nepal at all but were diverted to India through smuggling. When Rajiv Gandhi was Prime Minister he stopped this and also blocked the transportation of essential goods like petrol and kerosene to Nepal. Life in Nepal, in particular Kathmandu,  

came to a grinding halt, with the realisation dawning on the people and the king that they could hardly afford to offend India\textsuperscript{291}.

India played a significant role in the change of Nepalese political structure. The people of Nepal, inspired by the freedom struggles in neighbouring countries, launched a movement for removal of Rana regime. People wanted to free the King from the control of Ranas and set up a constitutional government. The King, Maharaja Tribhuvan Narain Shah was fully sympathetic with the aspirations of the people. Palace intrigues had become order of the day as Rana Shamsher Jang Bahadur imposed restrictions on the monarch. The Ranas were contemplating assistance from Western Powers. India’s anxiety was natural.

Forced by circumstances, King Tribhuvan left the palace along with 14 members of the royal family and took shelter in the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu, on November 6, 1950. The next day, Rana Shamsher made an unsuccessful attempt to get the King back. Prime Minister Rana Shamsher, in a vindictive mood, "deposed" the King and declared a child Jainendra as the new King of Nepal. Maharaja Tribhuvan then flew to India with members of his family. India, thus, was forced into the process of political change in Nepal, although Nehru firmly remained committed to independence of that country and principle of non-involvement in the internal affairs of other states. India tried to be discrete mediator between various groups. As a result of negotiations held in Delhi in February 1951, King Tribhuvan returned to Nepal as its monarch. It was decided in the tripartite negotiations (King, Rana and Nepali Congress) that a democratic system would soon be introduced\textsuperscript{292}.

The cooperation between Ranas and Nepal Congress could not last long. A revolt was organised under the leadership of Dr. K.I. Singh. India cooperated with Nepal in taking police action against K.I. Singh, who was detained. He fled from jail in 1952. By early 1952, most political parties in Nepal had adopted anti-India stance. King Tribhuvan died in March 1955. His son Mahendra became the new King who assumed all powers to himself. Mahendra was already deputising for his ailing father for sometime. Meanwhile, in 1954 Nepal was admitted to the United Nations. India had fully supported Nepal's membership of the U.N\textsuperscript{293}.

\textsuperscript{291} Muni, S. D : Nepal as a Zone of Peace, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, 1984, pp 789.
King Mahendra did not have the same feelings for India as his father had, and "Palace politics soon came to be dominated by elements and forces not too-friendly to New Delhi". The King began moving away from India. The rise of Chinese power in Tibet largely changed the situation for India-Nepal relations. Most of the opponents of King Mahendra were put in jail and the monarch instituted the Rashtriya Panchayat System. India was disturbed at the setback to democracy in neighbouring Nepal. Regrets were expressed in Indian media on Nepalese developments. Leaders and supporters of Nepali Congress, who stood for parliamentary democracy, fled to India to work for a democratic government in that country. These developments disturbed the King. Thus began difficult phase of Indo-Nepalese relations. While India supported democracy, it was not prepared to support insurgency from its territory. King Mahendra rapidly moved closer to China. This resulted in Nepal securing economic assistance from China, expansion of Sino-Nepalese economic cooperation, balance of relationship, and reduction in the dependence on India. "Peking was more than ready to play the game and not only encouraged and stoked the anti-Indian sentiments but seemingly gave concessions on a border treaty while obtaining the right to build the Kathmandu-Kodari road...." 294. The young King was trying to convey the impression that he was a champion of Nepalese nationalism. He approved his supporters' anti-India campaign. At times India felt that he was playing China against India. Mahendra had come to believe that India was supporting the rebels. This was not correct.

The then Prime Minister of Nepal T.P. Acharya was clearly pro-Chinese. During his visit to India in 1956, he said that Nepal was willing to act as a bridge between China and India. The Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai returned Acharya's China visit of 1956, in January 1957. He told the Nepalese that both the Chinese and Nepalese belonged to the same blood. He perhaps was intending to align China with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. As Acharya began to speak Chou's language in international relations Indo-Nepalese relations were strained. He also said that India, in its own interest, should support the cause of Nepalese nationalism. A Sino-Nepalese treaty relating to Tibet signed in 1956 caused anxiety in India. China also promised Rupees 6 crore assistance to Nepal. India never had any evil designes on Nepal. Indian President Rajendra

Prasad, during his 1956 visit to Nepal, assured the people of the country of interfering in internal affairs of Nepal nor did India claim any part of the Nepalese territory. In 1957, Dr. K.I. Singh became Prime Minister of Nepal. His policy was clearly pro-India but media did not permit him to change the anti-India stance of his predecessor B.P. Koirala, who became Prime Minister in 1959, tried to consolidate Nepal-China relations and even signed an agreement with China in regard to Mount Everest, which was bitterly criticised in Indian press. Even after the fall of Koirala Government (1960), Indo-Nepalese relations reminded strained till 1961.

After Koirala was sacked by King Mahendra and many leaders of Nepali Congress were arrested, several of Congress leaders fled to India. The King blamed India for promoting anti-Nepal agitation, which further strained the relations. Despite India's warning, King Mahendra entered into an agreement with China for the construction of Kathmandu-Lhasa Road. He praised the Communist Government during a visit to China. The Chinese aid to Nepal was highly appreciated in the press. The Chinese aid was, described as liberal and selfless.

Nepal assumed greater importance in India's security perception after the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. India's bid for improvement in relations was reciprocated. The soft-spoken Lal Bahadur Shastri, who was then Union Home Minister, visited Nepal and successfully removed doubts that the Nepalese had about India and its policy. Shastri laid the foundation of better bilateral relations. Nepal King's 13-day visit to India and President Radhakrishnan's return visit, further cemented the improved relations. Appreciating the detente in Indo-Nepal relations the President of Rashtriya Panchayat, Surya Bahadur Thapa assured India that none would be allowed to attack India through its territory so long as even one Nepalese was alive.

Relations were further improved when Foreign Minister Swarn Singh visited Nepal's in 1964 and signed an agreement of large economic assistance to Nepal. The King of Nepal again visited India in 1965 and conferred with Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. Nepal gave full support to India's position on Kashmir. It was stated by the two leaders that the principle of self-determination (as demanded by Pakistan) could apply only to a dependent country. It did not apply to

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to parts thereof. The King appreciated the economic assistance being provided by India to his country. However, the bilateral relations received another setback when a border dispute relating to Susta region arose. This region was claimed by Nepal in 1966. This one square-mile territory on Bihar-Nepal border remained a subject of dispute. Finally a boundary commission was appointed to resolve the issue.

The Zone of peace proposal of Nepal in its defined form appears to be quite ordinary on the face of it. It essentially presents the famous five principles of peaceful co-existence (Panchsheela) in a slightly elaborated and redefined form. Since Nepal and its two neighbours, India and China, have already committed themselves to the principles of peaceful coexistence the proposal may even appear as redundant and superfluous. Particularly so because Nepal has since long concluded treaties of Peace of Friendship both with India (1950) and China (1960), has enjoyed a settled, demarcated, stable and demilitarized (where as Nepal’s border with India is completely open and un-patrolled, it has a 20kms demilitarized zone on both sides of its border with China under the Boundary Agreement between them concluded in 1960) borders with them and has generally remained unaffected by their mutual conflicts in the region. Yet so much of Nepal’s diplomatic effort and emotional involvement are evident regarding the Zone of Peace proposal that one needs to understand the possible motives behind it.

In a very significant way, the proposal can be seen as the continuation of Nepal’s efforts to undo its traditional relations with India and redefine them on a balanced and ‘equal’ footing as compared to Nepal’s relations with other neighbours, such efforts were initiated during the mid-fifties by the late King Mahendra. Under these efforts, Indian Military Mission and the Advisory Group stationed in Nepal since 1950 was reorganised into a smaller Indian Military Liaison Group in 1958 and finally withdrawn in 1970. Demands were raised directly and indirectly at political level several times to terminate the Indo-Nepalese treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950. Towards the last years of King Mahendra’s rule, Nepali asked for the withdrawal of Indian military intelligence posts from the northern border along the Tibet region of China. After hectic negotiations between the two governments India agreed to withdraw these posts on explicit assurances from King Mahendra that Nepal would share its military intelligence regarding

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297 Dutt V. P. : India Foreign Policy, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, pp. 252.
northern border with India. King Birendra’s proposal of Zone of Peace foreign policy move after coming to power in January 1972 also seeks to seriously erode the remaining provision of security relationship with India and bring it at par with its relationship with China and Pakistan. This is one of the major factors behind India’s reservations towards the Nepal.

All this the matter of deep concern for King Birendra which had even taken the form of intense fear in view of the related developments in southern Asia where Monarchies in Afghanistan, Thailand and Sikkim had collapsed under domestic upheavals during the early seventies. In the Indian sub-continent, the emergence of Bangladesh was one such development in which mass upsurge against the military regime was actively supported by India in December 1971. Only a few weeks before Bindra’s coming to power, the emergence of Bangladesh had acted as an impetus for the democratic forces in the sub-continent particularly, the Nepali Congress whose leader B.P. Koirala was actively involved in mobilizing support in favour of the cause of Bangladesh in association with the Indian leader, Jayaprakash Narayan, throughout 1971.

Subsequently, India’s blessings to the democratic forces in Sikkim, comprising mostly the Sikkimese of Nepali origin resulted in the protectorate Kingdom’s integration with India in 1974. The Sikkim issue was active since the early 1973. Nepal’s political divide between the King and the Nepali Congress, joining hands with the popular forces. In the perception of the King, there emerged a real possibility of Indian backing for the Nepali Congress in its revolt against Monarchy. This was not so withstanding the fact that the Government of India, in deference to the King’s fears, had restricted the movement of the Nepali leaders in India. Further, king Birendra during his visit to India in October 1973 was explicitly assured that “no hostile activities” will be allowed against his regime from Indian soil. One of the principal motivations behind the proposal is to ensure that the political adversaries of the king and the Panchayat system did not receive any international support particularly from the neighbouring countries. King Birendra has occasionally hinted at this aspect. He said in a news conference at Paris in September 1981, that the main reason for the proposal was to check external interference in Nepal’s internal affairs.

300 Gorkha Patra, 9 September 1981.
The two countries are so closely tied up geographically, socially, culturally and economically that such Nepalese susceptibilities about the "big brother" in the south may not be regarded as unusual. There is always the sensitivity of being a small neighbor. There have been complaints galore, particularly from the protagonists of the royal regime, of India having interfered in the internal affairs of Nepal right from the time of the Revolution in 1951 (after the Rana regime was ended). These rose to a pitch after King Mahendra dismantled the parliamentary set-up, and all through the period of "rebel activities," particularly in Nepal's southern areas. Some of the main irritants, such as an Indian Military Mission being there (though at Nepalese request and for the purpose of training the Nepalese Army), or the manning of wireless posts in the northern border, were removed. Complaints about trade and transit, or the Kosi and Gandak projects were attended to; there was a limitation beyond which these could not be rectified. Yet the accusations continued and were intensified as China-India relations deteriorated in the sixties and early seventies and Nepal acquired an ally in China to ventilate its grievances with ever greater vehemence. After the Royal Proclamation of 24 May 1979, there is a fresh wind blowing. Neither the officials nor the politicians are protesting in strident voices of Indian interference in Nepalese affairs, as of yore. Just before the major upheaval in Kathmandu of 23 May, the outgoing Prime Minister, Kirti Nidhi Bistha "ruled out the interference of any foreign power or country in the recent incidents".

In Nepal, Morarji Desai, after Lal Bahadur Shastri, was the most popular of all Indian Prime Ministers, the Nehru phase, specially towards its closing period, implied a disapproval of what King Mahendra did in the end of 1960. The Shastri phase implied India's efforts at befriending the king. Senior Nepalese politicians appreciate the fact that Nehru helped the "Revolution" of 1951 but they still nurse a grudge against Nehru because he did not go far enough afterwards to side with democracy, "a setback to democracy To Tibet" Nehru, King Mahendra signed agreements with China and Pakistan on Kathmandu-Kodari road (connecting Nepal with China).

The main plank of Nepal's foreign policy in the past, ever since King Mahendra took over power by dismantling the Parliamentary system, has been to maintain a balance between India and China, and

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whenever he felt his position threatened by the people he distrusted as being sympathetic with India. Marshal Chen Yi, the then Foreign Minister of China, declared in October 1962, that "China will side with Nepal in case of aggression" (on Nepal, by any other country). The hint clearly was India.

Nepal is so strategically placed between India and China that it is almost inevitable that India and China will take more than a passing interest in what is going on in Nepal. This looks like an offshoot of King Birendra's proposal, that Nepal be accepted by the major countries as a "zone of peace" so that it can live in peace, without fear of attack from any side. The King propounded the idea first at the time of his Coronation in February 1975, and then followed it. In a speech he delivered at the Colombo Non-Aligned Nations Conference in the same year. The King has repeated the plea in all his foreign policy statements. China accepted the proposal with alacrity, and India, being pressed to react on the issue, has said it wanted not only Nepal, but the entire Indian sub-continent and the Indian Ocean being declared as a zone of peace, and has put forward this proposal before world nations and in the United Nations a long time ago.

Lal Bahadur Shastri paid another goodwill visit to Nepal soon after he became the Prime Minister succeeding Nehru, and was received extremely cordially. Surya Bahadur Thapa, then Chairman of the Nepalese Council of Ministers, spoke of Shastri "By his successful efforts to improve Indo-Nepalese relations, Shastri has already established himself in the eyes of the Nepalese as a true friend of Nepal and a champion of friendship between the two countries." At a state banquet, replying to a toast proposed to him by the King, Shastri reassured Nepal that whatever the sacrifice, India would do her best to help Nepal in her development. He wanted joint efforts to harness for mutual benefit the irrigation and power potential of the rivers flowing from Nepal into India. There was an effusive joint communiqué and Shastri inaugurated the work on the western Kosi canal project at the end of his three-day visit.

Next year, Indira Gandhi, India's new Prime Minister, came to Kathmandu on a three-day official visit and declared that India's aid to Nepal for its Third Plan would be doubled. India promised to buy more rice from Nepal. Asked by a foreign correspondent, when she returned to Delhi airport, whether India and China were competing for influence in Nepal for strategic reasons, Mrs. Gandhi replied there was no question of competition: "our ties with Nepal are very old. We share so much with them." Mrs. Gandhi was obviously seeking to consolidate on the gains
years passed, new strains developed in Indo-Nepalese relations as the two countries pushed each other to accept its point of view- India seeking to hark back on the "special relationship" of the 1950 Treaty between the two countries, and Nepal seeking to assert its independence in asking India to withdraw from Nepal the Indian Military Liaison Group and the India wireless operators from Nepal's northern check posts.

On account of the large number of Nepalese political leaders, who were living in self-exile in India and had taken political refuge. This was the single biggest factor as long as King Mahendra was alive (until January 1972) for souring of the relations between India and Nepal. Approval for the Panchayat System he had introduced and legitimacy for his regime, but this did not seem forthcoming so long as such a large number of leaders of the political opposition continued to remain as political refugees in India. This assessment that had led Nepal to turn to China, to Pakistan, on the basis of the theory: "your enemy is my friend." India fared militarily in the Sino-Indian conflict over the Himalayas in 1962.

Nepal wanted her neighbours to be "free and frank," and that as a landlocked country "we want nothing but transit facilities that are guaranteed under the U.N. convention." This was taken as a rebuff in India, who's Vice President, B. D. Jatti, was present at the ceremony. Jatti was reported to have left the ceremony soon after, and did not participate in the reception, “for it was a day of his fasting.”

The Nepalese plea of Nepal, being accepted and declared as "a zone of peace" was regarded in diplomatic circles as Nepal's latter day answer to the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India, and an innovation by which that Treaty could be superseded and rendered somewhat irrelevant. That Treaty, in Nepalese eyes, during the regime of King Mahendra and King Birendra, stood in the way of a "genuine non-alignment" policy. Nepal wanted to follow as between India and China. To diplomatic circles, it looked probable the Chinese leaders could have sponsored the idea. China at least responded to it enthusiastically, and backed up Nepal's proposal with alacrity, and since India had not, this at once appeared to put China in a better light than India in the Nepalese eyes.

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King Birendra was, however, coming from another direction. Major developments were suddenly taking place in neighbouring Sikkim that were not to the liking of Nepal, and it would not be an exaggeration to say that these even created a scare in the mind of the Nepalese regime.

On 11 May 1974, the Sikkim Assembly adopted a resolution asking the Indian government to take immediate steps for Sikkim’s participation in the political and economic institutions of India. In July, the Indian Parliament adopted a Constitution Amendment legislation whereby Sikkim, while retaining its identity, was associated with the Indian Union, to be represented in the Lok Sabha. The changes in Sikkim’s relationship with India at once led to protest demonstrations in Nepal, and were strongly criticized by the Chinese and Pakistan Government.

To develop trade and economic cooperation with that country and seek transit facilities for external trade the two governments signed four agreements related to trade, transit, civil aviation and technical cooperation. The transit agreement required consultation with New Delhi for permission to use the intervening West Bengal territory for a two-way transit. The items that would enter the trade between the two countries were also decided and the trading circles in Kathmandu were relieved that at long last Nepal had succeeded in securing a final market for its stainless steel and synthetic textiles (which it imports from abroad).

Nepal was not only a landlocked country, but it was also "India-locked". "Nepal needs India's cooperation. We expect this cooperation for our development, not for our survival. We need proper understanding from India of our problems and of our attitude. Nepal cannot be used by any country as a base." Indian government's reaction to the "zone of peace" idea was neither very enthusiastic, nor was it one of rejection.

Despite the changed international political scenario the dangerous deterioration in Indo-Nepal relation also contributed to pave the way to Nepali Congress for strengthening the pro-democracy movement. After 1961-62, with the exception of the period between 1977 and 1979, India stood for King Birendra and his regime. Indira Gandhi immediately after her return to power consciously and most visibly had lent India's full support for the panchayat regime. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi "went a step ahead in putting most of his diplomatic eggs in the King's basket to ensure a better rapport between the two countries". In all those days,

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India had only maintained "facade of sympathy" for the forces of democratic struggle in Nepal. But at that time, however, that could not succeed. India's rigid stand on the issue of trade and transit was only a reaction to the gradually building up political tension between the two countries. Actually, suspicions and misunderstandings in bilateral relations had provided the background for the Indo-Nepal trade impasse.

The Indian side became more "suspicious and sensitive" when it was reported of purchasing Chinese arms and imposition of work permits for Indian citizens by the Nepalese Government. Indian power structure thought that Nepal was deliberately pursuing the strategy of distancing itself from India. It became more apparent, when on October 6, 1988, the Indian Foreign Ministry had, for the first time, been driven to undertake an "intensive review" of the relationship with Nepal. On November 2, 1989, India's then Foreign Minister Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao expressed the deep concern of Chinese arms, in Rajya Sabha, saying "Nepal is not expected to use Chinese arms to attack India". This was the clear manifestation of the Indian sensitivity and suspicion. Despite the socio-cultural and religious proximity, relation between India and Nepal existed in a state of uneasy-flux. Kathmandu believed India was constantly trying to reinforce its hegemony in the region. New Delhi, on the other hand, viewed "the Hindu Kingdom's association with Beijing as an attempt to form an anti-Indian axis in the North-East".

The friendly ties between the two closest, neighbours were deformed to such ebb. Officially, the Indian side responded to Nepalese ruling elites by making changes in economic relations with Nepal. Consequently, on March 1, 1989, India proposed a single unified treaty on trade and transit, but to Nepal such Indian insistence was as a move that put the hands of the clock eleven years back.

After the expiry of trade and transit treaties, on March 23, 1989, the trade regime between the two countries collapsed. India closed all the entry points except Raxaul and Jogbani. Even essential commodities like petrol, kerosene, "coal and dry milk were stopped. A number of letters and high level visits were exchanged to resolve the issue but were in vain. The media war and futile recriminations between the two friendly countries continued for over a year, which caused several damages to Nepalese agriculture, industry, transportation and tourism-the mainstay

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When the King's side failed in making reasonable endeavour to evolve a national consensus, the party, the biggest opposition in the Kingdom, who had preserved internally and externally the strong democratic credentials and had a large number of dedicated leaders and workers, despite being out of power for about three decades, decided to launch a nationwide peaceful non-violent movement for the restoration of democratic polity. Moreover, upto the fall of 1989, the prolongation of the Indo-Nepal trade impasse had undoubtedly encouraged and strengthened the long awaited forces of democratic struggle, whereas weakened the royal regime's capabilities to maintain the stability in the Kingdom. Simultaneously to these developments the interactions of the Indian power elites with the King Birendra at that time might have given them the lesson that a democratic power structure was more reliable than a personalised one.

Thus, evaluating the whole situation, the party called for cooperation from all segments of the social spectrum and politico-circles aiming at democracy irrespective of political views. Furthermore, in preparing the movement the party did not lag behind itself to have living contact with external environment too. The party president Krishna Prasad Bhattarai's message to Indian premier- Mr. V.P. Singh saying "On this occasion, we aspire for the sympathy, goodwill and moral support of the newly-formed government, which believes in democratic socialism" was its alertness of maintaining the balance with National Front Government in India, backed by the Bharatiya Janata party which had special political sympathies for the Nepal King. Similarly, another party leader, Mr. G.P. Koirala's visit to New Delhi to request the Indian leaders to use their democratic and moral strength for the restoration of democracy in the Himalayan Kingdom was also an attempt to mobilize the external factors for the success of the movement. As he disclosed on his way back to Nepal in Patna that he had very useful talks with most of the leaders of the major political parties, who had agreed to send their representative to attend the Nepali Congress proposed Conference in Kathmandu (January 18-20, 1990). While staying in New Delhi in an interview he appealed to the Indian Government to take into account the democratic aspirations of the Nepalese people before agreeing to any

treaty with present government. Hence, the Indo-Nepal trade and transit impasse also provide most conducive atmosphere to launch pro-democracy movement.

The Nepali Congress fired its first salvo against the King's regime by holding a National Conference in Kathmandu on January 18-20, 1990. This was the first such conference of the party in the last 29 years. The conference decided to launch pro-democracy movement from February 18, 1990. Internally, for the first time the party shared the ideas with the leftists and externally it succeeded to get the support of the broad spectrum of Indian political parties. Not only the ruling Janata Dal MPs but the leaders of CPM, the CPI, the Congress (I) and the Janata Party were there to attend the conference. The participation of the representatives of the prominent political parties of India was giving an impression that only a democratic Nepal might be much more conducive to Indo-Nepal relations that the bureaucratic exercises of the past.

The Conference held in walled compound of party supremo Ganeshman Singh's residence at Chhetrapati was widely participated by its delegates, independent intellectuals and few communist leaders, beside the Indian representatives. The messages of goodwill had been extended for the success of the movement by Willy Brandt, President of the Socialist International, Rajiv Gandhi, former Indian premier, Madhu Dandavate, the then Finance minister of India and the Socialist Parties of Japan and Germany and the Labour Party of the United Kingdom and other.

Among the Indian guests Mr. Chandra Shekhar was lustily cheered by the big gathering when he announced that what he was saying was the voice of the Janata Dal and the National Front. All the guests from India, Subrahmaniam Swamy of Janata Party, Harkrishan Singh Surjit of the CPM, M. Farroqui of the CPI and M.I. Akbar of the Congress (I) sharing the common views in extending support to the pro-democracy movement in Nepal assured the Nepalese that Indians were fully with them in their struggle for achieving full fledge democracy. They further asserted that those at the helms of affairs should read the writings on the wall and understand the changed climate of democracy all over the world.

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308 Chaudhari, Kalyan: Frıtale Democracy; Nepal under G. P. Koirala, Frontline, Madras, Jan 1993, pp. 43-47.
In this way, the movement headed by the Nepali Congress succeeded in receiving remarkable support from the West, but the support from the Indian side was not less decisive for the struggle. The Indian parliament members issued a joint statement expressing their full support for the movement and condemned the repressive and authoritarian steps taken by the Nepalese Government to subvert and suppress the pro-democracy movement. They strongly warned the Nepalese Government that the people of India could not remain silent spectators to that brutal violation of human rights in Nepal.

On March 30, 1990 in the Lok Sabha Mr. Chandra Shekhar warned the Indian government against entering into any agreement with the King Birendra regime at the cost of the struggle being waged for democracy by the people of Nepal. In February and March 1990, when V.P. Singh government seemed to be starting trade talks with the King's regime.

At the center, the main opposition in the parliament Congress-I was also equally active in inspiring the people's movement in Nepal. On March 3, 1990, finally the Congress-I working committee adopted a resolution regarding Nepalese situation and explicitly supported the pro-democracy movement in Nepal. Even the Bharatiya Janata Party, which was considered to be adopting a softer attitude towards the King, did not lag behind in extending its support to the movement.

Furthermore, the Indian communist parties- CPM and CPI, the outside supporter of the National Front Government, also were actively involved in anti-panchayat movement due to their ideological attitudes with Nepalese leftists. Under such pulls and pressures, the V.P. Singh government which aimed at extending "quiet moral support" to the King and his regime, at the apex of the movement, was compelled to express rhetorical support to the pro-democracy movement in Nepal. On March 30, 1990, External Affairs Minister, Mr. I.K. Gujral told in the parliament:

The Government's attitude to the current mass-involvement in Nepal, with the stated aim of re-establishing a multi-party democratic system under a constitutional monarchy is determined by the fact that as a major democracy, we cannot but feel committed to the cause of democracy, of equality and human dignity. Today, when momentous changes are taking place all over the world and the global politics are democratised we can not be averse to such aspirations.

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The Nepali Congress had thus been able to mobilise the support of almost all the democratic as well as the other friendly countries of the world in favour of its great campaign. Here it should be recalled that the King's "regime that had enjoyed external legitimacy in the name of stability found itself isolated from the rest of the world". Finally, the King found no alternative but to announce the restoration of the multi-party system. Thereafter, a coalition government comprising the representatives of the King, the leftists, and the Nepali Congress was formed under the premiership of Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, the then Acting President of the Nepali Congress. The Interim Government framed a constitution, held the general elections, and ended the stalemate with India, and thus added a new phase and dimension in Indo-Nepal relations based upon mutual trust and understanding. One of the factors behind such spectacular international support of the people's movement launched under the leadership of the Nepali Congress was its image and international recognition as an organization constantly fighting for the cause of democracy, the other factor being the responsible attitude shown by it in the field of foreign policy while in power or out of it.

The India influence and interference in Nepal during the four years after the revolution increased so much that clear indications of the possibility of the emergence of a serious challenge before the nation's independent identity began to appear.

The foreign policy of Nepali Congress appears to be inspired more by the realistic nationalist attitudes than by any ideological or moral considerations. Ideologically the Nepali Congress is undoubtedly, closer to India. It was formed in India with a view to abolishing the despotic Rana regime. The Indian freedom struggle had been a source of inspiration for the Nepali freedom fighter. Moreover, several high ranking leaders of Nepali Congress had actively participated in the freedom struggle of India and also suffered in the inhuman tortures of imprisonment and fetters. Democracy was the declared objective to both. Besides, the leaders of both countries had come from similar social and economic backgrounds.

There were also some challenges which the then government could not avoid even it so wanted. India's traditional security perception and the impact of the Sino-Indian dispute had posed challenges to the Nepali Congress government. Truly speaking the firmness with which the

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those challenges constituted a measuring rod of the Nepali Congress in its foreign relations.

Despite the centuries old intimate relations with India, the independent national identity of Nepal had remained an issue of topmost concern. This was true at that time also. But it was that time when the complicated and controversial issues with India began to be clearly explained and defined and both countries tried their best to lay permanent foundations of bilateral relations on the basis of mutual trust and benefit.

Similarly Nepal-China relations have also been dictated by history and geography. But besides this the Nepali Congress government seems to have tried to rise up from the traditional views of China only as a country belonging to the communist bloc. In this period, it tried to prove that Nepal-China relations must not be influenced by the state of Indo-China relations. This is so because as the southern borders of Nepal adjoin India, the northern borders adjoin China.
Political Support from China

The keystone of Nepal's China policy was maintaining equal friendships with China and India while simultaneously seeking to decrease India's influence in Nepal and Nepal's dependence on India. Further, Kathmandu felt that the competition between its two giant neighbours China and India would benefit its own economic development.

The first recorded official relations with China and Tibet occurred near the middle of the seventh century. By the eighteenth century, Nepalese adventurism in Tibet led to Chinese intervention in favor of Tibet. The resultant Sino-Nepalese Treaty of 1792 provided for tribute-bearing missions from Nepal to China every five years as a symbol of Chinese political and cultural supremacy in the region. In the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-16, China refused Nepal's requests for military assistance and, by default, surrendered its dominant position in Nepal to the growing British influence. However, it appeared to be expedient for Nepal to retain the position of a tributary relationship with China in order to balance China against Britain.

Nepal invaded Tibet in 1854. Hostilities were quickly terminated when China intervened, and the Treaty of Thapathali was concluded in March 1856. The treaty recognized the special status of China, and Nepal agreed to assist Tibet in the event of foreign aggression. Relations between Nepal and China and Tibet continued without critical incident until 1904, when British India sent an armed expedition to Tibet and Nepal rejected Tibet's request for aid to avoid risking its good relations with Britain. Beginning in 1908, Nepal stopped paying tribute to China.

By 1910, apprehensive of British activity in Tibet, China had reasserted its claim to sovereign rights in Tibet and feudatory missions from Nepal. In 1912 Nepal warned the Chinese representative at Lhasa that Nepal would help Tibet attain independent status as long as it was consistent with British interests. Nepal broke relations with China when

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the Tibetans, taking advantage of the Chinese revolution of 1911, drove

When the Chinese communists invaded Tibet in 1950, Nepal's relations with China began to undergo drastic changes. Although annual Tibetan tribute missions appeared regularly in Nepal as late as 1953, Beijing had started to ignore the provisions of the 1856 treaty by curtailing the privileges and rights it accorded to Nepalese traders, by imposing restrictions on Nepalese pilgrims, and by stopping the Tibetan tributary missions. The break between Kathmandu and Beijing continued until 1955, when relations were reestablished with China. The two countries established resident ambassadors in their respective capitals in July 1960.

In 1956 the Treaty of Thapathali was replaced by a new treaty under which Nepal recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet and agreed to surrender all privileges and rights granted by the old treaty. In 1962 Nepal withdrew its ambassador from Tibet and substituted a consul general. An agreement on locating and demarcating the Nepal-Tibet boundary was signed in March 1960. Within a month, another Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed in Kathmandu.

The Sino-Nepal Boundary Treaty was signed in Beijing in October 1961. The treaty provided for a Sino-Nepal Joint Commission to agree on questions regarding alignment, location, and maintenance of the seventy-nine demarcation markers. The commission's findings were attached to the original treaty in a protocol signed in January 1963. During the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, Nepal reasserted its neutrality and warned that it would not submit to aggression from any state. Although the warning was directed at China, Nepal continued to support China's application for membership in the United Nations. A potential source of irritation in Sino-Nepalese relations was relieved in January 1964 when China agreed to release the frozen funds of Nepalese traders from Tibetan banks.

316 Dutt V. P: India's Foreign Policy, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, pp.252.
318 Muni S. D: India and Its Neighbours, in International Studies, J.N.U, Delhi, 1993, pp.199.
An agreement to construct an all-weather highway linking Kathmandu with Tibet was signed in October 1961, a time when neither Kathmandu nor Beijing had cordial relations with New Delhi. The Kathmandu-Kodari road opened in May 1967 but did not yield any commercial or trade benefits for Nepal. Because of the severe restrictions imposed by Beijing even before the road was opened, Kathmandu had closed its trade agencies in Tibet by January 1966. Although the highway had no economic or commercial value and was not viable as an alternate transit route, it was of strategic military importance to China. The highway established direct links between two major Chinese army bases within 100 kilometers of Kathmandu to forward bases at Gyirong in Tibet\(^\text{319}\).

Throughout the latter half of the 1960s, Nepal's relations with China remained fairly steady. One exception was the belligerent activities of the Chinese officials in Nepal who eulogized and extolled the successes of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) during the summer of 1967. The emergence of a strident and confident India in the early 1970s introduced some new dimensions in Nepal's China policy. King Birendra did not abandon the policy of equal friendship between China and India but wanted to woo China to counter India's growing influence in the region. China had implicitly recognized India's predominance in the region, however, and was willing to oblige Nepal only to the extent of pledging support in safeguarding its national independence and preventing foreign interference\(^\text{320}\).

In an open challenge to India's primacy in Nepal, Nepal negotiated a deal for the purchase of Chinese weapons in mid-1988. According to India, this deal contravened an earlier agreement that obliged Nepal to secure all defense supplies from India. Nepal's overtures to China also had economic implications. Ever since an economic aid agreement between China and Nepal had been concluded in 1956, China's steadily increasing economic and technical assistance was being used to build up Nepal's industrial infrastructure and implement economic planning. According to a 1990 report, an estimated 750 Chinese workers were in Nepal, most of them working on road-building crews and small-scale development projects. The foreign trade balance also was in Nepal's


China reportedly has ceded some territory to Nepal to facilitate boundary demarcation and has endorsed Nepal as a zone of peace.
In 1990, a pro-democracy movement forced King Birendra to lift the ban on political parties. The first free election in three decades provided a victory for the liberal Nepali Congress Party in 1991, although the Communists made a strong showing. A small but growing Maoist guerrilla movement, seeking to overthrow the constitutional monarchy and install a Communist government, began operating in the countryside in 1996.

On June 1, 2001, King Birendra was shot and killed in the palace. Prince Gyanendra, the younger brother of King Birendra, was then crowned king\(^\text{321}\). King Gyanendra dismissed the government in October 2002, calling it corrupt and ineffective. He declared a state of emergency in November and ordered the army to crack down on the Maoist guerrillas. The rebels intensified their campaign, and the government responded with equal intensity, killing hundreds of Maoists, the largest toll since the insurgency began in 1996. In Aug. 2003, the Maoist rebels withdrew from peace talks with the government and ended a cease-fire that had been signed in Jan. 2003. The following August, the rebels blockaded Kathmandu for a week, cutting off shipments of food and fuel to the capital\(^\text{322}\).

King Gyanendra fired the entire government in Feb. 2005 and assumed direct power. Many of the country's politicians were placed under house arrest, and severe restrictions on civil liberties were instituted. In Sept. 2005, the Maoist rebels declared a unilateral cease-fire, which ended in Jan. 2006. In April 2006, a massive pro-democracy protests organized by seven opposition parties and supported by the Maoists took place. They rejected King Gyanendra's offer to hand over executive power to a prime minister, saying he failed to address their main demands: the restoration of parliament and a referendum to redraft the constitution. Days later, as pressure mounted and the protests intensified, King Gyanendra agreed to reinstate parliament. The new parliament quickly moved to diminish the king's powers. In May 2006, it

\(^{321}\)The Times of India, June 2,2001,pp. 1.

\(^{322}\)Nepal Backgrounder: Ceasefire ? Soft Landing or Strategic Pause?, Asia Report N°50, 10 April 2003
voted unanimously to declare Nepal a secular nation and strip the king of military. The Maoist rebels and the government signed a landmark peace agreement in November 2006, ending the guerrilla’s 10-year insurgency that claimed some 12,000 people. In March 2007, the Maoists achieved another milestone when they joined the interim government.\footnote{Nepal: From People Power to Peace?, Asia Report N°115, 10 May 2006}

According to the 1999 Amnesty International Report, around 1800 persons were arrested on the suspicion of being either Party members or sympathisers of the Maoists. 400 persons out of them were kept behind the bars without trial. Neither was there any warrants against most of them nor were they produced in any court within the stipulated 24 hours in accordance with the constitutional provision.\footnote{Amnesty International. Nepal: A Pattern of Human Rights Violations. London: 1999.} In this atmosphere of repression and resistance, the Central Committee of the Party held its Fourth Extended Meeting in mid-1998. After prolonged discussions and keeping in view the need for building base areas, a 'New Plan for New Stage' was chalked out in the meeting. In this meeting, important decisions with the objective of better coordination between the three important components of people's war—the Party, the Army and the United Front were taken. Building and consolidation of base areas was designated as the primary goal. In the light of the experience of two years of People's War and the need to bring the tenets of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism in tune with the specificities of the Nepalese society, provisions were laid down for building base areas. Special emphasis was given in the meeting to the dangers of guerillaism and pitfalls of reformism in the military sector. Measures which could be pursued to protect the Party from the conspiracies of the enemy and dangers of right wing revisions' were also deliberated upon. It was also decided to consolidate the position of the General Secretary and Party leadership at various levels among the people. A decision was taken that as part of People's military power, platoons be constituted under the leadership of Regional Commanders which could be converted into companies at a
United States, Nepali Congress and the ruling Indian elite were worried by the escalation of the People's War launched by the Maoists in Nepal. As far as America is concerned, it did accord a prominent place to Nepal in its anti-communist agenda as early as 1990, when the multi-party democracy was restored there. The intensity of the US animosity towards the CPN (UML), which had come into being through the amalgamation of various communist groups, is too evident in the statement of the than General Secretary Madan Bhandari. In an interview Bhandari on May 3, 1991, expressed that he wanted his Party and Nepalese Congress to jointly contest the elections. He wanted the elections to be fought on a common programme. Nepali Congress too was inclined towards it. However, this could not materialise. While explaining this Bhandari said, "In fact, US Senator Stephen Solarez's, who looks after the South Asia affairs, visit to Nepal caused a sea change in the attitude of the Nepali Congress. He emphasised that the leftists should not have been inducted into the interim government. He asserted that the communists are being 'wiped out' all over the world and therefore they should not be encouraged in Nepal. Solarez assessed that if the leftists win the elections then it would be a very dangerous situation for the democracy." CPN (UML) is a parliamentary democratic party and its agenda has no mention of armed struggle—even for distant future—and yet US was worried about any increase in its sphere of influence. It is easier to imagine, in this context, to the extent which America is worried and perturbed over the ever growing influence of the Maoists. A noted American intelligence firm Stratford published its global intelligence update, in which it has stated Maoist insurgents have already captured one-third of the Country and announced the creation of a provisional government that aims to takeover the country within one or two years. Whole units of Nepalese Police have abandoned their posts and fled from the line of confrontation with the rebels, reported the Kathmandu Post on January 3, 2001. The army prefers to stay neutral, even if Maoist detachments are nearby. The population in Maoist


326 Phillip Robert, India, China and the US International, Herald Tribune, 23/6/03.
Dominate regions seemed to support the insurgents while some in Government-controlled districts sympathized with them. If current trends are unchanged, the chaos could ultimately lead to the Government's collapse and the potential victory for the Maoist rebels. It further states that if future Nepal Government becomes Maoist, this government will likely lean toward Beijing. China's presence in Nepal would complicate positions for the US Navy in the Indian Ocean.

A possible victory of the Maoists in Nepal can significantly change the balance of power in South Asia in favor of China. A situation which certainly is a cause of serious anxiety for America. It believes that it has, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, contained the 'danger' of communism. According to a news report published in Washington Post on March 24, 2001, the US Secretary for Defence Donald Rumsfeld, has advised President Bush that 'there should be a shift in policy from Europe to Asia, where China is seen as a growing threat compared to the decreasing danger posed by Russia.' Defence Secretary Rumsfeld's advice is nothing new. Even during the days of Clinton Administration America's principal target was South Asia. Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, Director of American Defense Intelligence Agency had told the US Senate Committee, in 1997, and warned about the potential threats to the American interests in the days to come. His report on the subject stated- "China is not of the few powers with the potential-political, economic and military-to emerge as a large scale regional threat to US interests within the next 10-20 years. Given Asia's growing global economic importance, its unsettled security picture, and the fact that four of the world's major powers- China, Russia, Japan and the US-all have interests and a presence there, the continued monitoring of Asia's security environment and notably its biggest country China will remain a primary task for the US Defense Intelligence community."

This report was presented in 1997, when the Maoist people's War in Nepal had hardly completed its first year. Everybody expected at that time, that this would soon come to an end. But as the People's War spread and advanced the US activities increased in this region. Simultaneously, the economic sanctions, imposed by America against India after Pokhran II were steadily withdrawn. It was followed by fresh

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cooperation between US and India in military spheres. The most significant event in this series of defense cooperation occurred when US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage visited Delhi and secured total support of Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh on the US sponsored National Missile Defense (NMD) system.

The US Administration is quite confident that if Maoists come to power in Nepal, China would be naturally and favourably inclined towards them. It is equally relevant that the US involvement in Tibet might give rise to some new complications. It is evident that America had started to loath King Birendra, because he did not allow the use of Army against Maoists.\(^{329}\) Even when he softened his stand, under terrific pressure, it was only for the deployment of the Army and not a combat. Koirala too had the similar grudge. Ever since the serious action and attack by Maoists in Dolpa he was demanding military support from King Birendra and the pressure for this intensified after the April incidents in Rukum. Koirala had some success in April when King Birendra consented to promulgate the Ordinance for the formation of Armed Police Force. Then the king also agreed for the deployment of armed forces' in Maoist dominated districts, under Integrated Security and Development Package (ISDP). And yet, the king did not deviate from his concept that the army should be used only to counter foreign aggression and not to repress any people's movement. He was equally aware about the increasing cordiality in the relations between India and America. He was particular in maintaining a balance in his relations with India and China.\(^{330}\)

Maoists have commended the nationalist approach and vision of king Birendra and some political analysts have termed it as 'opportunism'. They find it hard to believe how those are calling themselves Republican’s are appreciating the King. They forget that the Maoists are opposed to the institution of Monarchy and despite praising and hailing the nationalist approach of King Birendra, the struggle for the abolition of royalty can be lead to a logical conclusion. Not to understand this dialectics is to over simplify things. There are numerous examples in history about how a nationalist king can join, at the time of an imperialist aggression, the ranks of patriotic forces.\(^{331}\)


The lobbying, to build a favourable atmosphere in support of the new King Gyanendra, in the country and abroad, had begun. Some aristocratic journalists, displaying their political and economic clout, are working overtime to acquaint people with the "expertise and talent of King Gyanendra". These elements argued that only those people tried to see a conspiracy in the massacre in Narayan Hiti who found the conspiracy theory suitable to their agenda. Some of these intellectuals have landed into India to conduct such a propaganda drive here in favour of the new king. Though their presence undoubtedly, is more required in Nepal itself, at the moment, as the Parliament is to begin its session there from June 26, 2001 and the leader of the Opposition Madhav Nepal has raised a discussion on the report of the high power Enquiry Committee. A member of the Human Rights Commission of Nepal Sushi Myakurel too has called upon the parliamentarians that they should courageously act to bring out the truth behind the massacre.

Nepal is passing through the most crucial period of its history. The days to come are most challenging for it. The people of Nepal have never been under imperialist domination. As such their psyche has never been colonials. In fact herein lies their greatest asset and strength. If Nepal and its people emerge successful in meeting out the challenges at this critical juncture, they would carve out a new vision and path-not only for the people of South Asia, but for entire world and humankind.

Recent international pressure has made a difference in promoting greater respect for human rights by both government forces and the Maoists. We found that both the Maoists and the RNA had taken appropriate action during some of the clashes we investigated to minimize the harm to civilians. The RNA seems to have taken steps to reduce the practice of extrajudicial executions and “disappearances” of suspected Maoists and now turns many detainees over to police custody within a month. Security forces also allowed the Nepal Office of the

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332 Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, Asia Briefing №36, 24 February 2005
Another area where international action has clearly benefited Nepali civilians has been the restriction on legal military assistance to Nepal. Our observations bore out the opinion of Western and Nepali experts that the arms embargo has been very effective in limiting the access of both parties, and particularly the RNA, to more lethal weapons and ammunition that could have resulted in far higher numbers of civilian deaths and injuries. The RNA, which has frequently participated in United Nations peacekeeping operations abroad, also seems particularly sensitive to discussions within the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations about setting human rights conditions for force contributing countries. The possibility of the RNA being barred from future operations because of abuses by its troops in the civil war seems to have had a salutary effect, as have the conditions imposed by the U.S. Congress on military assistance.

These improvements indicate that concerted and targeted international pressure, coupled with monitoring from the U.N. and Nepali human rights groups and journalists, are vital for getting the government and the Maoists to curb abuses by their forces. But as this report demonstrates, there are still several major areas of concern where the warring parties have failed to observe international standards or tried to circumvent them. Human Rights Watch urges the international community to continue to exert pressure on both sides of the conflict to limit the harm to Nepali civilians and preserve the space for Nepal's small but vibrant community of civil society activists and journalists to monitor the parties' respect for human rights.

"International pressure so far has helped to curb some of the worst violations committed by the security forces but the fundamental problem of impunity for human rights violations has not been addressed," said

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333 Nepal’s Crisis: Mobilising International Influence, Asia Briefing N°49, 19 April 2006

Kate Allen, director of Amnesty International UK. "Even as the number of "disappearances" at the hands of the security forces fell over the past year, hundreds of cases remains unresolved and are the source of ongoing anguish for the victims family and friends. In the end, it is only with the cessation of hostilities that there can be adequate and effective protection of human rights for the Nepali people," said Purna Sen. "The decade-long conflict has exacted a very heavy toll, shattering the lives of families and severely limiting access to livelihoods, health, and education, among other human rights.\(^3\)"

Nepal is plunging deeper into a massive human rights crisis following seizure of power by King Gyanendra and the Royal Nepalese Army, Human Rights Watch said today. With ongoing arrests reported around the country, Human Rights Watch said that there is a risk that some of those being arrested will be "disappeared" by the security forces and never seen again, as happened during Nepal's last state of emergency in 2001.

On 1 February 2001, the king and the Royal Nepalese Army seized effective control of all levers of power in Nepal and embarked on a campaign of arbitrary arrests, censorship and general repression. The king has imposed a state of emergency throughout Nepal and has suspended fundamental constitutional rights, including freedom of assembly and expression, the right to information and privacy, the right to property and the prohibition against arbitrary detention. Human Rights Watch urged the diplomatic community to demand an immediate end to the arbitrary arrests in Nepal, and to take proactive steps to protect political leaders, student activists, human rights activist and journalists from abuses by the security forces.\(^3\) Human Rights Watch commended India for its strong response to the king's takeover. India cancelled its participation in the summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation because of the expected participation of King Gyanendra, calling for an immediate restoration of democracy and suspending military aid.\(^3\)


\(^3\) Gareth Evans "Media short-sightedness is truly staggering", AlertNet, 9 March 2005

\(^3\) Nepal's Crisis: Mobilising International Influence, Asia Briefing N°49, 19 April 2006
The United Kingdom and United States have also condemned the king's seizure of power, but the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, providers of significant economic assistance to Nepal, have remained silent. "It is crucial for the international community to demonstrate that it will not lightly accept the king's abusive actions," said Adams. If they act with a common purpose, the king and the army will have little choice but to reverse course.