Introduction:

The term ‘nationalism’ was first used in print in 1789 by the anti-Jacobin French priest Augustin Barruel and since then there has been no term as widely and intensely debated in the various discourses as ‘nationalism’ right from the days of Hegel, Mazzini and Renan down to Gellner, smith and Anderson. One of the reasons as to why nationalism has time and again been able to draw the attention of the academicians could be that nationalism much like Marxism has been a theory of praxis, a mass-moving ideology. Empirically, the earliest traces of nationalism might be discovered in the 17th c movements of the Levelers and republicans during English civil war or 18th c French national movements of Jacobins and others, but theoretically its earliest roots are seen in the writings of German philosophers like Herder, Fichte, and Hegel and so on. Nation also originated more or less in the same fashion as other primitive collective identities as race, religion, tribe, sect and so forth with the only difference and the most remarkable one, that nation unlike other primitive identities was able, in the aftermath of industrial revolution, to forcefully reincarnate itself to the effect of reigning supreme throughout the modern ages. In terms of its popular appeal nationalism could not be equated with any other institution than religion as rightly marked by Benedict Anderson that much like religion, nationalism has its own prophets, holy books and celebrations. Even in terms of mass-moving ideologies, nationalism could be equated only with Marxism during the cold war and never since the end of it.

Political scientists are however not of the one view about the origin of nationalism. The dates that some historians single out as signaling the advent of nationalism include 1775 (the first partition of Poland), 1776 (the American declaration of independence), 1789 and 1792 (the commencement and second phase of the French revolution), and 1807
(Fichte’s address to the German nation). Nationalism, as an ideological movement, did not emerge without antecedents. For some, millennial Christianity prepared the way, for others it was the printing press and especially newspapers. As far as the varieties of the nationalism are concerned, it was in and during the American and French revolutions that these various social, political and intellectual developments found powerful and explosive expression in radical politics. The causes of the revolutionary movements in America and Europe were many and varied, but their emotional and intellectual content were increasingly nationalist, and their consequences led to a dramatic transformation of absolutism into the mass nationalist state. After 1792 the French revolution, with its tricolor, ‘Marseilles’, assemblies, oaths, processions, fetes, and the like, began exporting its patriotic ideals all over Europe, and in this respect Napoleon’s conquests, and the strong reactions they provoked in England, Spain, Germany, Poland and Russia, intensified and diffused the civic ideas of national autonomy, unity, and identity in Europe and throughout Latin America (Kohn 1967). The period of royalist reaction from 1815 to 1848 brought into sharper focus the ethnic character of several of these nationalisms, together with what Hans Kohn has called the organic ‘eastern’ forms of nationalism, in contrast to the civic and rational ‘western’ versions current in France, England, and the united states. ¹

In India, too, the same note of romantic yearning for a return to an idealized ethnic and religious past, which was being eroded by westernization and capitalism, was to be found in late nineteenth-century intellectuals like Tilak and Aurobindo and in movements like the Arya Samaj (Kohn, 1960, Taylor and yap 1979, Kitromilides 1989). All these were movements of intelligentsia and opposition groups calling for the vernacular mobilization of the people against a variety of evils: autocracy, bureaucracy, capitalism, and western ways. But such was the chameleon like character of nationalism that it could be appropriated by the autocrats, bureaucrats and capitalists. The classic instances are Germany and Japan. In Germany the 1848 revolutions of the intellectuals were divided and crushed; the Prussian chancellor, Bismarck, swiftly appropriated and tamed German linguistic nationalism in the service of a Prussian-led Klein Deutschland and a Lutheran Prussian monarch. Popular German nationalism accordingly migrated into pan-German
expansionism and the volkish fantasies of an academic proletariat who dreamed of German conquest and agricultural settlement in the east.

It was from these fringe groups of intelligentsia that the Nazi movement developed, even if its racism was to leave far behind the original linguistic bases of German romantic nationalism. In Japan the Meiji restoration of 1868 put a swift end to the declining Tokugava era and instituted a modern bureaucratic state under the aegis of the restored emperor. The reformers quickly realized the importance of mass public education as the key to a civic nationalism on the French model, and, using the imperial authority, proceeded to inculcate the virtues of a specifically Japanese culture mixed with western arts and technology. The Japanese nationalist model proved highly successful, both in terms of modernizing Japanese society and of establishing a strong nation-state.

In India and Africa similar fusions and tensions could be found: on the one hand, a civic, territorial, anti-colonial nationalism, and, on the other hand, various ethnic and pan-cultural movements, among which Hindu nationalism and pan-Africanism have exerted the most powerful influence.

On the Question of Definition:

Authors like John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith are of the opinion that the questions of definitions have bedeviled this field of study (nationalism) and there is no agreement among scholars about ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ factors in the definition of nations, or about the relationship of nations and nationalism to ethnicity on the one hand, and statehood on the other.

Andrew Heywood in his work “Politics” (1997) notes down in the same tune that the difficulty of defining the term nation springs from the fact that all nations comprise a mixture of objective and subjective features, a blend of cultural and political characteristics. In objective terms, nations are cultural entities: groups of people, who speak the same language, have the same religion, are bound by a shared past; and so on.
Such factors undoubtedly shape the politics of nationalism. The nationalism of the Quebecois in Canada, for instance, is largely based on language differences between French-speaking Quebec and the predominantly English-speaking rest of Canada. Nationalist tensions in India invariably arise from religious divisions, examples being the struggle of Sikhs in Punjab for a separate homeland (Khalistan), and the campaign by some Islamic organizations in Kashmir for the incorporation of Kashmir into Pakistan. Nevertheless, it is impossible to define a nation using objective factors alone. All nations encompass a measure of cultural, ethnic and racial diversity. The Swiss nation has proved to be enduring and viable despite the use of three major languages (French, German and Italian), as well as a variety of local dialects. Divisions between Catholics and Protestants that have given rise to rival nationalisms in Northern Ireland have been largely irrelevant in mainland UK, and of only marginal significance in countries like Germany.

This emphasizes the fact that, ultimately, nations can only be defined subjectively by their members. In the final analysis, the nation is a psycho-political construct. What sets a nation apart from any other group or collectivity is that its members regard themselves as a nation. A nation in this sense, perceives itself to be a distinctive political community. This is what distinguishes a nation from an ethnic group. An ethnic group undoubtedly possesses a communal identity and a sense of cultural pride, but unlike a nation, it lacks collective political aspirations. These aspirations have traditionally taken the form of the quest for, or the desire to maintain, political independence or statehood. Nationalism is a difficult political phenomenon, partly because various nationalist traditions view the concept of a nation in different ways. Two contrasting concepts have been particularly influential. One portrays the nation as primarily a cultural community, and emphasizes the importance of ethnic ties and loyalties. The other sees it essentially as a political community, and highlights the significance of civil bonds and allegiances. These rival views not only offer alternative accounts of the origins of nations, but have also been linked to very different forms of nationalism.\(^4\)

The idea that a nation is essentially an ethnic or cultural entity has been described as the ‘primary’ concept of the nation (Lafont, 1968). Its roots can be traced back to late
eighteenth-century Germany and the writings of figures such as Herder and Fichte. Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), often portrayed as the ‘father of cultural nationalism’ emphasized more on the nation as an organic group characterized by a distinctive language, culture and spirit and this contributed significantly to the foundation of cultural history and also of a nationalism that emphasized the intrinsic value of national culture. For Herder, the innate character of each national group was ultimately determined by its natural environment, climate and physical geography, which shaped the lifestyle, working habits, attitudes and creative propensities of a people. Above all, he emphasized the importance of a language, which he believed was the embodiment of a people’s distinctive traditions and historical memories. In his view, each nation thus possesses a Volkgeist, which reveals itself in songs, myths and legends, and provides a nation with its source of creativity. Herder’s nationalism therefore amounts to a form of culturalism that emphasizes an awareness and appreciation of national traditions and collective memories instead of an overtly political quest for statehood. The implication of Herder’s culturalism is that nations are ‘natural’ or ‘organic’ entities that can be traced back to ancient times and will, by the same token, continue to exist as long as human society survives.

A similar view has been advanced by modern social psychologists, who point to the tendency of people to form groups in order to gain a sense of security, identity and belonging. From this perspective, the division of humankind into nations reflects nothing more than the natural human propensity to draw close to people who share a culture, background and lifestyle that is similar to their own. Such psychological insights, however, do not explain nationalism as a historical phenomenon, that is, as one that arose at a particular time and place, specifically in early 19th century Europe.

In ‘nations and nationalism’ (1983), Ernest Gellner emphasized the degree to which nationalism is linked to modernization, and in particular, to the process of industrialization. Gellner stressed that, while premodern or ‘agro-literate’ societies were structured by a network of feudal bonds and loyalties, emerging industrial societies promoted social mobility, self-striving and competition, and so required a new source of
cultural cohesion. This was provided by nationalism. Nationalism therefore developed to meet the needs of particular social conditions and circumstances. On the other hand, Gellner’s theory suggests that nationalism is now ineradicable, as a return to premodern loyalties and identities is unthinkable.

However, in “the ethnic origins of nations” (1986), Anthony Smith challenged the idea of a link between nationalism and modernization by highlighting the continuity between modern nations and premodern ethnic communities, which he called ‘ethnies’. In this view, nations are historically embedded: they are rooted in a common cultural heritage and language that may long predate the achievement of statehood or even the quest for national independence. Smith nevertheless acknowledged that, although ethnicity is the precursor of nationalism, modern nations only came into existence when established ethnies were linked to the emerging doctrine of political sovereignty. This conjunction occurred in Europe in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century and in Asia and Africa in the twentieth century.5

The idea that nations are political and not ethnic communities has been supported by a number of theories of nationalism. Eric Hobsbawm (1983), for instance, highlighted the degree to which nations are ‘invented traditions’. Rather than accepting that modern nations have developed out of long-established ethnic communities, Hobsbawm argued that a belief in historical continuity and cultural purity was invariably a myth, and, what is more, a myth created by nationalism itself. In this view, nationalism creates nations, not the other way round. A widespread consciousness of nationhood (sometimes called popular nationalism) did not for example develop until the late nineteenth century, perhaps fashioned by the invention of national anthems and national flags, and the extension of primary education. Certainly, the idea of a ‘mother tongue’ passed down from generation to generation and embodying a national culture is highly questionable. In reality, languages live and grow as each generation adapts the language to its own distinctive needs and circumstances. Moreover, it can be argued that the notion of a ‘national’ language is an absurdity, given the fact, that until the nineteenth century, the majority of people had no knowledge of the written form of their language and usually
spoke a regional dialect that had little in common with the language of the educated elite.6

Benedict Anderson (1983) also portrayed the modern nation as an artifact, in his case as an ‘imagined community’. Anderson pointed out that nations exist more as mental images than as genuine communities which require a level of face-to-face interaction to sustain the notion of a common identity. If nations exist, they exist as imagined artifices, constructed for us through education, the mass media and a process of political socialization. Whereas in Rousseau’s view a nation is animated by ideas of democracy and political freedom, the notion that nations are ‘invented’ or ‘imagined community’ has more in common with the Marxist belief that nationalism is a species of bourgeois ideology. From the perspective of orthodox Marxism, nationalism is a device through which the ruling class counters the threat of social revolution by ensuring that national loyalty is stronger than class solidarity, thus binding the working class to the existing power structure (Andrew Heywood, 1997).

Whether nations spring out of a desire for liberty and democracy or are merely cunning inventions of political elites or a ruling class, certain nations have an unmistakably political character. Following Meinecke these nations can be classified as ‘political nations’. A ‘political nation’ is one in which citizenship has greater political significance than ethnic identity; not uncommonly, political nations contain a number of ethnic groups, and so are marked by cultural heterogeneity. The UK, the USA and France have often been seen as classic examples of political nations. The UK is a union of what, in effect, are four ‘cultural’ nations: the English, the Scottish, the Welsh and the northern Irish (although the latter may comprise two nations, the protestant unionists and the catholic republicans). In so far as there is distinctively British national identity, this is based on political factors such as a common allegiance to the crown, respect for the Westminster parliament, and a belief in the historic rights and liberties of the British people. As a ‘land of immigrants’, the USA has a distinctively multiethnic and multicultural character, which makes it impossible for it to construct a national identity on the basis of shared cultural and historical ties. Instead, a sense of American
nationhood has been consciously developed through the educational system, and through the cultivation of respect for a set of common values, notably those outlined in the declaration of independence and the US constitution. Similarly French national identity is closely linked to the traditions and principles of the 1789 French revolution.

What such nations have in common is that, in theory, they were founded upon a voluntary acceptance of a common set of principles or goals, as opposed to an existing cultural identity. It is sometimes argued that the style of nationalism which develops in such societies is typically tolerant and democratic. If a nation is primarily a political entity, it is an inclusive group, in that membership is not restricted to those who fulfil particular language, religious, ethnic or suchlike criteria. Classic examples are the USA, with its image as a 'melting pot' nation, and the new south Africa, seen as a 'rainbow society’. On the other hand, political nations may at times fail to experience the organic unity and sense of historical rootedness that is found in cultural nations. This may, for instance, account for the relative weakness of specifically British nationalism in the UK, by comparison with Scottish and welsh nationalism and the insular form of English nationalism that is sometimes called 'little Englander’ nationalism.

Developing world states have encountered particular problems in their struggle to achieve a national identity. Such nations can be described as ‘political’ in two senses. First, in many cases, they have achieved statehood only after a struggle against colonial rule. In this case, the nation’s national identity is deeply influenced by the unifying quest for national liberation and freedom. Third world nationalism therefore tends to have a strong anticolonial character. Secondly, these nations have often been shaped by territorial boundaries inherited from their former colonial rulers. This has particularly been the case in Africa. African nations often encompass a wide range of ethnic, religious and regional groups that are bound together by little more than a shared colonial past. In contrast to the creation of classic European cultural nations, which sought statehood on the basis of a pre-existing national identity, an attempt has been made in Africa to build nations on the foundations of existing states. However the resulting mismatch of political and ethnic identities has bred recurrent tensions, as has been seen in Nigeria, Sudan, Rwanda and
Burundi, for example. However, such conflicts are by no means simply manifestations of ancient ‘tribalism’. On the contrary, they are, to a great degree, a consequence of the divide- and- rule policies used in the colonial past.

**Typologies of nationalism:**

On the question of typologies, there is immense debate and dispute among the authors of nationalism but broadly two perspectives have evolved in this respect. One deals with it in a manner that theoretically bisects nationalism into two fragments: civic/political nationalism and cultural nationalism (apart from the secessionist version of nationalisms). But here mention must be made of Seymour who introduces in his noted work “Plaidoyer pour la Nation Sociopolitique” (1999), a third category of nationalism which he calls “Socio-political nationalism”. According to Seymour, the socio-political nation represents a political community with recognized territorial boundaries within which there is a majority national community that considers itself to represent a nation, and that shares a common language, culture or history. For Seymour, the socio-political conception of the nation supersedes the purely civic or territorial conception in its scope for recognizing within its boundaries the presence of minority nations and/or individuals who may feel a sense of belonging and attachment to other national communities. He considers that a socio-political conception of the nation best captures the reality of Quebec. It permits the existence of a majority francophone population, with a shared history and culture, without excluding Anglophone Quebecers, First Nations communities, or the growing and varied immigrant population who reside within Quebec, but whose identity and sense of belonging may be pulled in other directions (Nicola McEwen, ‘Nationalism and the State’, 2006, 29). Another perspective partitions nationalism into four fragments: (a) liberal nationalism, (b) conservative nationalism, (c) expansionist nationalism and (d) anticolonial nationalism. But both of these perspectives have failed to take notice of another historically influential variant of nationalism, viz. ‘Left-Wing nationalism’. Any story of nationalism remains only half told unless the other side of it i.e. ‘Left-Wing nationalism’ is accommodated into it. Although this accommodation, it must be admitted, has to be a reluctant accommodation as the
proponents of this ideology themselves have done all to demean the very idea of nationalism by the instrumental treatment of it and more importantly by emphasizing extraordinarily on the provisionality and transcendence of nationalism in order to achieve the greater ideal of communism. This, however, makes little excuse for the exclusion of this variant from the literature of nationalism altogether as the socialist idea of a nation contributes seminally to the enrichment of the very literature.

Upon closer examination of the structures and functions of nationalism, it can easily be derived that nationalism has always been the most malleable structure ready under all the circumstances to be shaped either by the ideological forces or sometimes by the crude domestic or interventionist international forces. The nature and effect of ductility in nationalism is such that it becomes simultaneously both the source of its weakness and strength. Ductility as a source of weakness to nationalism is manifested during those critical times when any conceptual category – primordial or modern-rational e.g. race, religion, caste, ethnicity, ideology, gender, minority, subalternity and so on – comes closer to enforce the course of nationalism into its desired direction to the effect that the very form of territorial nationalism is intrinsically transformed. But at the same time the same ductility embodied in nationalism acts as its source of strength when any of the conceptual categories mentioned above gets exhausted within the frontiers of nationalism. In sum, the ductility of nationalism is potent enough to rob any conceptual category of its transnational universality, for instance, socialism got as many incarnations as there are nation states. By this virtue of malleability alone, nationalism has been the worst victim of paradigm-shift and acted as the most obedient son of the ruling idea since the advent of the modern age. It was for this reason only that sometimes nationalism has been seen as the byproduct of industrial revolution while at other as the simultaneous outcome of the first wave of democracy or that of the Lockeian democratic liberalism. In the same breath, Edmund Burke's conservatism and later Hegel's absolute idealism created the fertile ground for the nationalism to take into account the cultural elements in order to author cultural nationalism. In the same fashion, to my understanding, what distinguishes English conservatism from German Nazism and Italian fascism is the degree of culturalism resorted to and practiced by the ruling elites of the respective
countries as per the needs felt by them due to geopolitical and international compulsion and not because of any inherent qualitative component of an ethnic group. To put it differently, Burke’s England of late 18\textsuperscript{th} c did not by any means require either to preach or practice the extremist version of culturalism as by then English nation had outplayed its rivals in terms of the conquests, colonies, trades and prestige leaving its intelligentsia in self-indulgent academic world wherein they were privileged enough to concoct empirical theories independent of need-driven thinking. On the contrary, when the middle-class intellectuals of Germany and Italy came to their self-consciousness in 19\textsuperscript{th} c, they witnessed their beloved and once-so-glorious nations into a state of wretchedness and dilapidation and thus quite out of the fray. This left them gasping for invoking the forces of revivalism and culturalism as the sole remaining tools to bring their respective nations into the fray even at the expense of social and international harmony.

Thus the typological complications of nationalism could be simplified, with the exception of ‘Left-Wing nationalism’, into producing them in a continuum as more or less they appear from a close scrutiny to be the feathers of the same bird and wherever they are not, they are the helpless products of the inevitable socio-economic or international circumstances. For instance, there seemed little differences between English Whiggism and Toryism even at the time of Burke’s anti-French-revolutionary-rhetorics, or during Disraeli’s ‘one nation’ deal or Margaret Thatcher’s triumphalist reaction to victory in the Falklands war of 1982 and it was also evident in the engrained ‘Euroscepticism’ of the conservative right, particularly in relation to its recurrent bogey: a ‘federal Europe’. English Liberals despite their self-proclaimed progressive ethos never registered protest or minimum expected resentment either against reactionary English imperialism or against orthodox English symbols like monarchy, House of Lords and UK national anthem beginning with ‘God save the Queen’. When the whole world was taking left turn in the aftermath of WWII, the British revisionist version of socialism, viz, Labor Party also made it to the government to launch the nationalization drive and the conservative right of England adapted itself without delay to the pro-left environment. So virtually there was no remarkable ideological or political difference, barring a little in the party manifestoes, between the right, left and centre and the same was the situation in the post
cold-war period when the labor government of Tony Blair took a right-ward turn by adhering openly to the globalization and liberalization project. Thus it is self-evident that there exists a thin line between the civic-nationalism of the Liberals and the cultural-nationalism of the Conservatives and more often than not they get chances to make a blend. This, however, does not intend to blur all the refined distinctions between individualist social-Darwinism of Classical Liberals and collectivist Fabianism and Guild-Socialism of Social-Liberals. But these so-called ‘refined distinctions’ on their own begin to break out of their theoretical iron cages of rationality in order to embrace each other freely in the post cold-war period.

As to the remaining two categories of nationalism i.e. expansionist nationalism and anticolonial nationalism are concerned, they can also be named as Eurocentric nationalism and third-world nationalism respectively according to their origin of places and also according to their inherent bearing as the former got more associated with the ruling class while the latter with the ruled and exploited class. Many authors associate expansionist nationalism with highly reactionary nationalism pursued only by the fascist or totalitarian forces but to my understanding, in terms of the degree of the reactionariness of nationalism, English or French expansionist nationalism guided by the domestic liberal democracy has never been less brutal towards their overseas subjects than their German and Italian counterparts, but whatever difference there seemed to be was primarily due to the fact that Anglo Frankish empires have been much more long-lasting and durable than Germanic-Italian empires and this is why the latter were more restless and despotic than the former as also reflects in Mussolini’s war-cry: “Italy must expand or perish.” This has been one reason why expansionist nationalism got scuttled with the international paradigm-change after the end of WWII, and got translated into either liberal or conservative nationalism both in Germany and Italy. The same fate ‘anticolonial’ nationalism was able to meet with after the decolonization process as the whole of Afro-Asian nationalism could be split into two phases: colonial phase and post colonial phase. In the colonial phase almost all of the Afro-Asian countries engaged themselves with the national movements with a view to liberate their countries from the
concerned master countries whereas after the independence many of these countries like India happened to develop a categorically defined form of nationalism much like Europe.

Thus it can now be established that nationalisms of all kinds could be logically and precisely reduced to three forms: (a) civic nationalism, (b) cultural nationalism and (c) Left-Wing nationalism. Although civic nationalism could further be subdivided into two parts (i) civic-territorial nationalism (derived from Comprehensive Liberalism) and (ii) socio-political nationalism (derived from Political Liberalism). Apart from these three well-defined categories of nationalism, there are a great number of blended forms of nationalisms which make their presence felt as a result of the persistent intermixing of the two above-mentioned nationalisms, even all sorts of sub-nationalisms and dissenting nationalisms guided by the secessionist movements could be reduced to these three forms.

Whereas political nationalism claims to inherit considerably from the legal-rational tradition of the enlightenment emphasizing much more on the national frontiers, citizenship and rights as universal categories than other intra-national ethnic categories; cultural nationalism celebrates its linkages with the primordial and perennial ethnic identities. The conflicts and cooperation between these two broad conceptual categories procreates a variety of mixed nationalisms which are eventually reducible to the same two categories. While the third category of ‘Left-Wing nationalism’ made its remarkable intervention in the world polities during the cold war with the end of which this variant of nationalism also died its natural death. But in its transient life of forty five years it left an irreversible impact on the historical wheels of human civilization and by virtue of this it deserves its space in the literature of nationalism. Although in spite of all the common ground which ‘social-liberalism’ shares with the ‘Left-Wing nationalism’, I have chosen to keep off the former from the latter in my typology of nationalism and treat the ‘social-liberalism’ as a mere sub-category of ‘civic nationalism’. Even what has been called the historically suppressed nationalism or subnationalism falls either into one category or another. And what is more significantly noteworthy is the fact that by the end of the 20th century the dominant public opinion came to the consensus that political nationalism is a
‘good nationalism’ while cultural-nationalism is a ‘bad nationalism’ with United States of America being appointed as ‘Global Policeman’ to guard against the cultural nations.

The second perspective seems to examine the nationalism much more from the ideological facet than any other thing as it invokes liberalism, conservatism and fascism to define nationalism with the exception of the fourth category, namely, anticolonial nationalism which was an ensemble of a chaotic mix of a variety of nationalisms. To put more light on this, on the one hand nationalism can appear to be a progressive and liberating force, offering the prospect of national unity or independence. On the other, it can be an irrational and reactionary creed that allows political leaders to conduct policies of military expansion and war in the name of the nation. Nationalism certainly shows every sign of suffering from the political equivalent of multiple-personality syndrome. At various times, nationalism has been progressive and reactionary, democratic and authoritarian, liberating and oppressive, and left-wing and right-wing. For this reason, it is perhaps better to view nationalism not as a single or coherent political phenomenon, but as a series of ‘nationalisms’, that is, as a complex of traditions that share but one characteristic: each, in its own particular way, acknowledges the central political importance of the nation. However, the character of nationalism is also moulded by the circumstances in which nationalist aspirations arise, and by the political causes to which it is attached. Thus when nationalism is a reaction against the experience of foreign domination or colonial rule, it tends to be a liberating force linked to the goals of liberty, justice and democracy. When nationalism is a product of social dislocation and demographic change, it often has an insular and exclusive character, and can become a vehicle for racism and xenophobia. In their different ways, liberals, conservatives, socialists, fascists and even communists have been attracted to nationalism and in this sense nationalism is a cross-cutting ideology (Andrew Heywood, Politics, 1997, 108-9).

**Nationalism of Fabians and Revisionists:**

This goes without saying that there was little or no anti-nationalism in the social outlook of the Fabian and revisionist socialists. Besides they had little more than sympathy for the
international oppressed class and got their ideology of social-liberalism easily exhausted in their concerned nation states. They kept their programmes, policies and activism intact for the citizens of their concerned nation-states and philanthropic utopia for the transnational masses. With all their opposition to landlordism and industrial capitalism, they had no objection to an efficient and benevolent imperialism; they sought not to defeat but rather to socialize the colonial and international policy of the British Empire. Socialists, they said, should, approvingly or disapprovingly, recognize the fact that the world is on the point of being partitioned among the great powers; small groups of international traders and bankers will exploit this situation to their own advantage, if socialists and liberals are merely negative antimilitarists and anti-imperialists. Fabians must “accept the Empire”, point out its opportunities and responsibilities, and show how to make its imperial policy efficient and socialistic. Indeed, both Webb and Shaw appeared to be of the opinion that the division of the Western World into relatively large political and economic units tended to promote the major objectives of Fabian Socialism (Coker, Francis W, Recent Political Thought, 1934, 116-7).

Accordingly, it was also a part of Fabian policy to work for the “application of socialism to foreign trade”. Shaw held that England needs an expert, aggressive, businesslike consular service, in order to “bring the power, the information, and the organization of the Empire to the help of the individual trader” (Bernard Shaw, ed., Fabianism and the Empire, 1900, 12). They consistently maintained that if British foreign trade is not prosperous, it cannot be the means of bringing prosperity to the masses of British citizens and subjects. National efficiency came indeed, to be the slogan for Fabians – efficiency for the people of all classes and in all parts of the Empire, but an efficiency to be obtained only through intelligent, benevolent, strong, hard-headed control by the Mother Country. Virility-in-government must be maintained and devoted to the raising of an Imperial race (Sidney Webb, Lord Rosebery’s Escape from Houndsditch, 1901, 386).

The Fabian leaders became intolerant of premature appeals to an idealistic internationalism that might divert the nation from its imperial duty. In 1914, a majority of the Fabians split away from the Independent Labor Party and followed the Labor Party in
supporting British participation in the World War. Similarly German and French Revisionists repudiated the anti-nationalist doctrine of the Communist Manifesto. Bernstein argued that working men, having been endowed with political privileges, have a legitimate concern in the defense of national interests. Socialists should work for popular control of foreign policy and for international conciliation; but may defend nation rights, and they may, under proper conditions, even support colonial expansion. Jaures, accepting the national democratic state as an indispensable agency in the attainment of socialism, proclaimed, on several occasions, the loyalty of French socialists to the French Republic. Thus it can be witnessed that the social-patriotism of these Fabian socialists and Revisionists led them to a belief quite similar to the Gandhian notion of trusteeship council wherein the welfare of the oppressed masses is left on the impulsive benevolence of the capitalists and despots. So in the name of universal humanism they practiced social-Darwinism in disguise and ended up being liberals in the post cold-war era. Kautsky rightly puts forth the position of reformist socialists that both practical and theoretical socialists, outside of Russia, have become not only more moderate but also more eclectic in their programs. They have borrowed policies both from allied theoretical systems, such as guild-socialism and syndicalism, and from various practical schemes for a joint control of industry by workers and owners (Karl Kautsky, The Labor Revolution, 1925, 589-90). The Fabians have been on record to have embraced imperialism and flirted with racism; Blatchford’s Merry England, British socialism’s best seller, was openly chauvinistic; and even Keir Hardie’s legendary internationalism ‘stemmed from belief in the value of co-operation between national labor movements and not from either a deep sentiment in favor of the brotherhood of man or from the doctrine that the workers have no country’ (F. Reid, Keir Hardie, 1978, 123-4).

Left-Wing Nationalism:

A. W. Wright in his article ‘Socialism and Nationalism’ quotes the beautifully written words on who can be ideally a socialist by Isaac Deutscher in 1971 – “Socialists must be internationalists even if their working classes are not; socialists must also understand the nationalism of the masses, but only in the way in which a doctor understands the
weakness or the illness of his patient. Socialists should be aware of that nationalism, but, like nurses, they should wash their hands twenty times over whenever they approach an area of the labor movement infected by it.\textsuperscript{7}

Wright argues that Deutscher's picture of the international socialist constantly disinfecting himself against the nationalism of the working class points attention to the continuing difficulty of socialism in coming to terms, either theoretically or actually, with the 'national question'. He further argues that not merely does this difficulty continue but it intensifies; so that while Deutscher prescribes a sanitary dissociation of socialism from nationalism there are now to be found other Marxists who recommend a contagious embrace. The relationship has certainly come a long way since both movements announced their arrival on the European stage in 1848. In that year the founders of Marxism could confidently predict the socialization of the nation; but a century later it seemed more plausible to record (in E.H. Carr's phrase) the 'nationalization of socialism'.\textsuperscript{8}

It has logically been argued by Wright that the international expansion of capitalism has led not to the erosion of national frontiers but to a new fragmentation occasioned by the nationalist demand for statehood. Even within the 'old' capitalist states of Europe peripheral nationalism has intensified. Socialist internationalism has shown itself to be fragile and unreliable, classically so in August 1914, when compared with national loyalties and the deeply rooted nationalisms of the European working class. The center of gravity of socialism has passed from Europe to the underdeveloped world, not merely confounding the class analysis of classical Marxism but also bringing socialism and nationalism into an intimacy of contact that has spawned varieties of 'national communism' (Wright, 1981, 149). Eventually, there was unquestionably a ubiquitous development after 1917 of 'socialism in one country' with all its international implications and, later still, the unfolding international relationships between socialist states. It is interesting to note that whereas only 2-3 per cent of the writings of Marx and Engels touch on the national question, the percentage is ten times higher with Lenin and becomes more than 50 per cent with Stalin.\textsuperscript{9} Kolakowski adds emphatically that it has
continued to rise, for there is now wide agreement that this whole issue has been ‘a permanent, unsolved theoretical difficulty of Marxism and practical difficulty of socialist Movements’.  

**The Marxist Tradition:**

The focus here is to deal with the theoretical aspects of Marxism at the expense of other varieties of socialism concerning national question rather than with socialist practice as it was within Marxism that theoretical discussion of the national question overwhelmingly took place. In its classical period before 1917 there developed within Marxism an important discussion on the nation-state and nationalism, beginning with the original (but undeveloped) formulations of Marx and Engels, taking in the culturalist approach of Austro-Marxists like Otto Bauer and the ‘radical left’ position of Rosa Luxemburg, before culminating in the authoritative statements of Lenin and their mechanical transcription by Stalin. This period of discussion, which reached its intellectual peak in the Second International in the years before 1914, served to identify a number of approaches to the national question that claimed to be securely anchored to the Marxist tradition.  

There seems to be a general agreement on this argument that if the work of Marx and Engels served to open this period of debate, it was too sketchy and insubstantial to guarantee the future shape and direction that the debate would take. There was little in the writings of the founders of Marxism to suggest that the national question would loom large in, let alone subvert, the development of socialism. Instead, there were only the global pronouncements to be found in the Communist Manifesto about the international nature of the class struggle and its destined resolution, coupled with contemporary reflections on particular national struggles and evidence of a set of attitudes towards certain nations and races. This scarcely amounted to a developed theory of nationalism, as all studies of the thought of Marx and Engels on the national question agree.
Wright cites Marx that just as capitalism has eroded local particularisms and created the national state, its need for new markets 'chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe' and gives 'a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country', which has 'drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood'. Having created the national state, capitalism also created the conditions for its abolition. In Marx's view, 'national differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto'. Moreover, the victory of the proletariat would hasten the disappearance of national differences and antagonisms, for in proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end' (Ibid. 150).

This analysis sufficiently provides the basis for understanding the position of the proletariat in relation to the nation. Answering the reproach that Communists sought to abolish nations, Marx and Engels declared that 'the working men have no country', which meant that 'we cannot take from them what they have not got'. However they went on to say that 'since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word'. United national struggles by the proletariat of the leading countries were the road to general emancipation and harmony. The famous clarion call at the end of the manifesto ('Workingmen of All Countries, Unite!') thus became the cornerstone of the doctrine of 'proletarian internationalism' (Ibid. 149-50).

These few pages of the Manifesto, with their grand historical sweep, were to provide the theoretical framework within which revolutionary socialists approached the national question. Yet the theory was said to have been unsystematic and incomplete, a deficiency, Wright believes, that Marx never remedied despite some of his own later observations on national struggles that suggested the need for richer analysis, more precise definitions and a more concrete political strategy. Inveighing deeper against Marx, Wright argues that in the absence of further systematic theory, those seeking
guidance from the work of Marx and Engels in this area have to excavate amongst their obiter dicta and their commentaries on particular national struggles. The result of such excavation, he adds, is a curious mixture of suggestive interpretation and contradictory judgments, rooted in a set of national and racial stereotypes (more pronounced with Engels but seemingly shared by Marx) and decisively influenced by strategic considerations.

Here Wright has in mind Engels' theory of 'non-historic nations' – a category in which he includes, pell-mell, Southern Slavs, Bretons, Scots and Basques. According to Engels, these 'remnants of a nation mercilessly crushed, as Hegel said, by the course of history, this national refuse, is always the fanatical representative of counter-revolution and remains so until it is completely exterminated or denationalized, as its whole existence is in itself a protest against a great historical revolution' (Engels, 'The Magyar Struggle', in Marx The Revolutions of 1848, London, pp.221-22). Without doubt this idea of Engels shared by Marx does not constitute a fragment of their systematic class-based interpretation of social formation; at best it was an opinion guided by political expediency and strategic considerations subject to revision. In 1848-9, analyzing the failure of the democratic revolution in Central Europe, Engels attributed it to the counter-revolutionary role played by the South Slav nations (Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Rumanians, Slovenes, Dalmatians, Moravians, Ruthenians, etc.), who enlisted en masse in the Imperial Austrian and Russian armies and were used by the forces of reaction to crush the liberal revolution in Hungary, Poland, Austria and Italy. This is what led Engels to bring to the fore the idea of 'non-historic nations' and it has little to do with the racial stereotypes as Wright assumed. As Michael Lowy also notes that the basis of Engel’s position was democratic and revolutionary: how to defeat Tsarism and the Austrian Empire. He was in no way motivated by any kind of Slavophobia. In an article written before the 1848 revolution, he had called for the defeat of the Austrian Empire in order to 'clear all obstacles from the road to the liberation of the Italians and Slavs'. Neither was Engels prey to German chauvinism, as is proved by attacks on the German minority in Hungary who ‘persist in retaining an absurd nationality in the middle of a foreign
Wright’s criticism against Marx that his theory on national question was unsystematic, incomplete and a deficiency which he never remedied, seems quite unfounded for a couple of reasons; one, that nation and nationalism was never a mainstay for internationalist Marxian radical social-formation. Secondly, as Marx himself maintains that because the bourgeois political framework was that of the nation state, ‘the proletariat of each country must, of course, first settle matters with its own bourgeoisie’. But this was the ‘form’ not the ‘substance’ of the proletarian revolution (See Michael Lowy, Ibid.). Besides the Marxian idea of ‘Permanent Revolution’ provides with ample of reasons to convince that how insignificant and peripheral national frontiers are to the Marxian schema of international social revolution.

**The Radical Left and Centrists on the National Question:**

The ‘Radical Left’ current represented by Luxemburg, Pannekoek, Trotsky (before 1917) and Strasser was characterized, to varying degrees and sometimes in very different forms, by its opposition to national separatism, in the name of the principle of proletarian internationalism. Moreover, its stance on the national question was one of the principal differences between this current (as well as those of the Centrists) and Lenin, to whom it was close in its Marxist and revolutionary approach.

Rosa Luxemburg elaborated a doctrine of thorough-going proletarian internationalism in opposition to the notion of national self-determination. In the words of her biographer, Luxemburg ‘stands at the apex of the attempt to make operational the Marxist concept of class as the primary social referent, and to break once and for all the old alternative stranglehold of nation’. She, in spite of being a Polish Socialist, declared war on Polish nationalism in the name of a dynamic interpretation of Marxism, undeterred by Marx’s own earlier support for an independent Poland, and generalized this position into a comprehensive internationalism hostile to national movements. In the case of Poland, she
argued that nationalism was a distraction from the real business of the forthcoming social revolution in Russia itself, a position further buttressed by an economism that made the alleged economic integration of Poland with Russia into the decisive political fact (described by Lowy as an example of her ‘unmediated assimilation of politics to economics’ [Lowy, op.cit., 143]). In her disagreement with Marx on Poland, Luxemburg was justifiably convinced that Poland was not an issue of ideological difference with Marx but only a matter of political expediency as Marx did not have to be a Marxist for independence of Poland nor would Luxemburg be Un-Marxian for her stand on Poland being integrated with Russia.

More generally (and most notably in her 1908 work on The National Question and Autonomy), Rosa Luxemburg developed a systematic case against national self-determination and invoked the authority of scientific socialism: ‘Social Democracy, which has based its entire policy on the scientific method of historical materialism and class war, cannot make exceptions in the question of nationality’ (See Wright Ibid., 155). In her view, Marxists should reject the notion of a ‘right’ of nations to self-determination as hopelessly abstract, utopian and unscientific. Moreover, the whole concept of ‘nation’ was essentially transitory, the creation of the bourgeois epoch, and destined to wither away in the socialist world order. The ‘nation’ also suggested a unity of interest across classes, confirming nationalism as a bourgeois phenomenon that was reactionary from the point of view of the international class struggle. Finally, Luxemburg poured scorn on the aspirations to statehood of small national nationalities in the face of the inexorable logic of history.

Similarly, Trotsky’s writings on the national question prior to 1917 can be defined as ‘eclectic’, occupying a half-way position between Luxemburg and Lenin. It was in particular after 1914 that Trotsky became interested in the national question. He took it up in his pamphlet The War and the International (1914) – a polemical work directed against social-patriotism. In this work, Trotsky argued that the world war was a product of the contradiction between the productive forces, which tend towards a world economy, and the restrictive framework of the nation state. Trotsky therefore heralded ‘the
destruction of the nation state as an independent economic entity’ – which, from the strictly economic point of view, was a totally justifiable proposition. However, he concluded from this premise the ‘collapse’ and the ‘destruction’ of the nation state altogether; the nation state as such, the very concept of the nation, would only be able to exist in the future as a ‘cultural, ideological and psychological phenomenon’ (See Michael Lowy, Marxists and the National Question, New Left Review, 1976, 89). But unlike Luxemburg, Trotsky explicitly proclaimed the right of nations to self-determination as one of the conditions for ‘peace between nations’, which he contrasted with the ‘peace of the diplomats’. Moreover, he supported the perspective of an independent and united Poland as well as the independence of Hungary, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bohemia etc. It was in the liberation of these nations and their association in a Balkan federation that he saw the best barrier to Tsarism in Europe. In 1917 Trotsky abandoned these ‘eclectic’ positions and adopted the Leninist conception of the national question, which he brilliantly defended at Brest-Litovsk in his capacity as People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs (M. Lowy, Ibid. 90-1).

Another significant fraction within the larger Marxist School was that of Austro-Marxism, particularly on national question. As there seems be an agreement amongst the Left historians on the fact that in the debates on the national question in Second International, nationalism, characteristically, confounded routine theoretical positions and political demarcations. The clearest example of this was the opposition to national separatism and the endorsement of a policy of cultural autonomy shared both by the ultra-left Rosa Luxemburg and the centrist Austro-Marxists. This latter school of (the so-called) undogmatic Marxists, neglected but important, did pioneer work on nationalities, nationalism and the nation.14

Its most notable product was Otto Bauer’s study of ‘The National Question and Social Democracy (1907), described by Kolakowski as ‘the best treatise on nationality problems to be found in Marxist literature and one of the most significant products of Marxist theory in general’ (L. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 1978, 255).
Concerned chiefly by the particular problem of how to guarantee national rights within the framework of the multinational Austro-Hungarian state, Bauer developed a general Marxist analysis of the national question that was historical, psychological and sociological. The nation was a historically and culturally determined national character: it was ‘the totality of men bound together through a common destiny into a community of character’. In a class society, participation in the ‘national cultural community’ was the preserve of the ruling class, whereas ‘only socialism will give the whole people a share in the national culture’ (See Wright, op. cit., 153-4). The doubtful Marxist credentials of this approach became even more doubtful when it was extended by Bauer into an argument that socialism, far from producing an international socialist culture, would enhance the differentiations and diversities among national cultural communities, although without the national antagonisms associated with capitalism. There was thus no conflict between proletarian internationalism and national cultural diversity. Socialism, affirms Bauer, would realize nationality, and not abolish it.

When applied to the political and territorial problem of multinational states, Bauer’s approach (like that of another Austro-Marxist, Karl Renner) involved a rejection of separate statehood for each nation but an assertion of cultural autonomy and of the constitutional arrangements necessary to secure such self-determination. It also involved an acceptance of the need for international political organizations above the level of nation states in future socialist society, corresponding to the necessary development of larger economic regions, but linked to this was the parallel need to ensure a secure status for national communities in all their rich diversity. Bauer summed it up thus: ‘The transformation of men by the socialist mode of production leads necessarily to the organization of humanity in national communities. The international division of labor leads necessarily to the unification of the national communities in a social structure of higher order. All nations will be united for the common domination of nature, but the totality will be organized in national communities which will be encouraged to develop autonomously and to enjoy freely their national culture – that is the socialist principle of nationality’ (See Wright, Ibid.). Much of this cultural metaphysics aroused the wrath of the Marxist establishment; and, more generally, Bauer’s approach has been criticized for
its alleged failure to come to terms with the political and territorial dimensions of nationalism – the demand for statehood often regarded as its raison d’etre (Wright, Ibid.).

**Lenin’s Equilibrating Intervention:**

Lenin’s pragmatic and instrumental approach to nationalism is significant not only from the viewpoint of equilibrating between ultra-left anti-nationalism of Luxemburg and cultural autonomy of centrist Bauer but also for the fact that it set the preliminary guidelines for the future communist movements all over the world and also for its induction of a pioneering debate on the ‘relative autonomy of political process’ into the Marxist literature which was taken later academically by Althusser amidst others. Lenin grasped more precisely the dialectical relationship between national democratic struggles and the socialist revolution and showed that the popular masses (not just the proletariat, but also the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie) of the oppressed nation were the allies of the conscious proletariat: a proletariat whose task it would be to lead the struggle of this ‘disparate, discordant and heterogeneous mass’, containing elements of the petty bourgeoisie and backward workers with their ‘preconceptions, reactionary fantasies, weaknesses and errors’, against capitalism and the bourgeois state (M. Lowy, op. cit., 97).

From the methodological point of view, Lenin’s principal superiority over most of his contemporaries was his capacity to ‘put politics in command’, i.e. his obstinate, inflexible, constant and unflinching tendency to grasp and highlight the political aspect of every problem and every contradiction. This tendency stood out in his polemic against the Economists on the question of the Party in 1902-3; in his discussion with the Mensheviks on the question of the democratic revolution in 1905; in the originality of his writings on Imperialism in 1916; in the inspired turn which the April Theses represented in 1917; in the whole of his most important work *State and Revolution* and of course, in his writings on the national question. It is this methodological aspect which explains (amongst other things) the striking actuality of Lenin’s ideas in the twentieth century, an age of imperialism, which has seen the political level become increasingly dominant.
(even though, in the last analysis, it is of course determined by the economic) [M. Lowy, Ibid.].

On the national question, while most other Marxist writers saw only the economic, cultural or psychological dimension of the problem, Lenin stated clearly that the question of self-determination ‘belongs wholly and exclusively to the sphere of political democracy’ (Lenin, ‘The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination’, Collected Works, Vol. 22, 145). What is more, precisely because it concentrates on the political aspect, his theory makes absolutely no concession to nationalism beyond the political democracy, as to his opinion, bourgeois democratic demands must always be subordinated to the overriding interests of the revolutionary class struggle of the world proletariat. To avoid any contradiction, Lenin further suggests that it was the duty of the socialists to oppose secessionism in their own countries and to uphold the principle of international proletarian solidarity for socialists ‘are enemies of all nationalism and for democratic centralism...[and] are against particularism, being convinced that, other conditions being equal, large states can solve the tasks of the proletariat’s struggle with the bourgeoisie much more successfully than small states’ (See Wright, op. cit., 157).

This was precisely the form and substance of ‘Left-Wing Nationalism’ which in spite of its intrinsic differences maintains a coherently universal position and could not be ignored for its tactical and instrumental use of nationalism as it contributes immensely to enrich the holistic idea of nationalism. To its credibility, it can be asserted that it fills into the literature of nationalism all the spaces left vacant by both the variants of the ideology – cultural and political nationalism. But the greatest drawback of the ‘Left-Wing Nationalism’ could be seen in terms of its stagnation in its exploring and re-exploring journey especially since the demise of Lenin as even Stalin had little to add to it substantially.
A Contention on the Future of Nationalism:

As the 20th century advanced, claims were increasingly made that the age of nationalism was over. This was not because nationalism had been superseded by ‘higher’ supernational allegiances, but because its task had been completed: the world had become a world of nation-states. In effect, the nation had been accepted as the sole legitimate unit of political rule. Certainly, since 1789, the world had been fundamentally remodelled on nationalist lines. From amidst the three major geopolitical upheavals of the twentieth century (the First World War, the Second World War and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe) each gave a considerable impetus to the concept of the nation as a principle of political organization. Since 1991, at least eighteen new states have come into existence and all of them have claimed to be nation-states. The great strength of the nation-state is that it offers the prospect of both cultural cohesion and political unity. When a people who share a common cultural or ethnic identity gain the right to self-government, community and citizenship coincide. This is why nationalists believe that the forces that have created a world of independent nation-states are natural and irresistible, and that no other social-group could constitute a meaningful political community. They believe that the nation-state is ultimately the only viable political unit. This view implies, for instance, that supranational bodies such as the European Union will never be able to rival the capacity of national governments to establish legitimacy and command over popular allegiance.

Nevertheless, just as the principle of the nation-state has achieved its widest support, other, very powerful forces have emerged that threaten to make the nation-state redundant. A combination of internal pressures and external threats has produced what is commonly referred to as a ‘crisis of nation-state’. Internally, nation-states have been subject to centrifugal pressures, generated by an upsurge in ethnic and regional politics. This heightened concern with ethnicity may reflect the fact that, in a context of economic and cultural globalization, nations are no longer able to provide a meaningful collective identity or sense of social belonging. External threats to the nation-states have a variety of forms. First, advances in the technology of warfare, and especially the advent of the
nuclear age, have brought about demands that world peace is policed by supernational and international bodies. This led to the creation of the League of Nations and later the United Nations. Secondly, economic life has been progressively globalised. Markets are now world markets, businesses have increasingly become transnational corporations, and capital is moved around the globe in the flick of an eyelid. The question therefore arises that whether there is a future for the nation-state in a world in which no national government can control its economic destiny? Thirdly, the nation-state may be the enemy of the natural environment and a threat to the global ecological balance. Finally, distinctive national cultures and traditions, the source of cohesion which distinguishes nation-states from other forms of political organization, have been weakened by the emergence of a transnational and even global culture. This has been facilitated by international tourism and the dramatic growth in communications technologies, from ‘satellite television’ to the ‘information superhighway’.

**Nationalism: a byproduct of industrial revolution or high-cultures**

Nationalism has more often than not been linked with industrial revolution and cultures (high cultures in particular) by a chunk of authors, but the most conspicuous, stylist in having a sophisticated mannerism and by all means eloquent would be Ernest Gellner in his celebrated work “nations and nationalism” (1983). Before proceeding to put Gellner to test, it is of utmost importance to pre-examine into the established linkages amidst them in order to verify scientifically. Let us first proceed to examine into the connecting thread between nationalism and industrial revolution. To start with, there is no denying the fact that there was little nationalism, if any, before industrial revolution gained ground in Europe, not to mention the rest of the world. Mere presence of nations would certainly not insure the availability of nationalism and this impels one to affirm quite in agreement with John Armstrong’s argument that nations existed before nationalism (Armstrong, John, ‘Nations before Nationalism’, 1982). Much like other ethnic identities; nationalism also has been the outcome of perennial and restive search for self-identity, nay, and collective self-identity. Mankind has always since inception hungered for individual liberty and collective security in order to maximize his pleasure and keeping
this in mind, has given birth to a series of vital and seeming-to-be ever-lasting institutions like family, religion and state. Whereas ‘family’ satisfies the immediate human urge for food, property and sex; ‘state’ satisfies the twofold urges in two successively distinct phases: initially in the pre-nationalist phase, it serves the fundamental need for ‘security’ and later in the industrial-cum-nationalist phase, it satisfies the chauvinist need not only for possessing a nation mightier than others but also the urge for having “more-nation” even at the cost of lethal wars and slavery. Mankind did not confine themselves to the appeasement of base material needs but advanced further not only to discover the elevated spiritual needs or in other words material needs of ‘life after death’ but also to unearth a permanent cure, namely, ‘religion’. These were the eternally rigid demarcation lines which mankind drew as safeguards before starting on its long-lasting journey which met with an abrupt stumbling block only in industrial age or ‘age of ideologies’ wherein it encountered grave challenges from a good number of ideologues who began to inveigh against those deep-rooted fundamental institutions which were regarded so far as absolute and incontestable zones or the very life-blood of human civilization. It was for the first time in the history of human civilization that mankind saw itself entrapped into what seemed to be an irresolvable self-contradiction or too severe a crisis to get out of – an age which can be assumed to have started from the enlightenment era of 18th c onwards in western Europe and most importantly an age when statism got transformed into nationalism and since then nationalism has been an intrinsic and inseparable part of human civilization. The discrepancy between statism in agrarian society and nationalism in industrial society is the same as it is between ‘little tradition’ and ‘great tradition’ or to put it differently, as between ‘little agrarian man’ and ‘great industrial man’. Thus nationalism without doubt reflects the unilinear growth of human civilization, which is to say that with the advance of time man grows older and wiser in both aspects, positively and negatively i.e. ‘good’ tends to become ‘better’ and ‘bad’ tends to become ‘worse’ and this theorem is as much applicable to the technological advancement as to the ideological advancement. To illustrate this with one instance, no military adventure led by Genghis khan or Napoleon Bonaparte or even if all military adventures undertaken by either of them in the whole life brought together, was as disastrous to the human life and civilization as probably was one ‘military operation’ led by a Nazi General not just
because of technological improvement but also because of ideological advancement in the course of time.

Gellner has brilliantly argued that no other industrial development can replace the original industrial-revolution which took place in Western Europe in terms of the impacts it left subsequently on socio-political structures. This is more or less incontestable that industrial-revolution in Europe was a natural and evolutionary phenomenon based on the unintervened historical precedents while for the rest of the world; industrial-revolution was an imposed phenomenon as a result of colonial powers’ intervention and therefore a delayed happening. As to the origin of national consciousness among the peoples of the world, in the pre-industrial revolution times national consciousness was abstrusely existent, if at all, and that too in the pre-Christian Greece and Rome rather than in the Europe of dark ages. Whatever the degree of national consciousness revealed in the Greek city-states and the Roman republic got vanished after the ascendance of Christianity and if we go into the causation of this, what theory surfaces up is this that excessive of religion and nationalism are at odds with each other if not quite antithetical to each other and undoubtedly the rise of one conduces to the significant decline of another. To illustrate an example, during the middle age when Europe was in the clutch of pope-dom and at its height of superstition, there was scarcely any nation and nationalism apart from the feudal lords and their fiefdoms exhibiting their trans-national character by establishing their nuptial ties with their royal counterparts in other states which was the clear breach of the codes of nationalism. In the same manner, Nazi German Empire under the Third Reich shows a case where nationalism was at its zenith and most noticeably Christianity saw its rapid decline in the Third Reich where both Catholic and Protestant churches were devastated of Christ’s statues and holy bibles and instead the photos and statues of national heroes were planted in the church and this shows another typical bent of nation-religion dichotomy. In the post-colonial age however this extremist tendency of nation-religion dichotomy came to decline giving way to an alternative system where the same theory still holds true with the same force but in a moderate fashion and this modus operandi became so apparent that the very theoretical dichotomy went to become inconspicuous. Religious nationalism, hence
emanates as a self-contradictory identity and a religious nationalist therefore makes a compromise either with religion or nation or sometimes painfully with both, sometimes out of simple-minded ignorance and sometimes out of sheer pragmatic compulsions of a liberal political democracy. As far as the national consciousness of Greek city-states and the Roman republic are concerned, there figures one common element in each of these cases that this consciousness evaporates no sooner than the imperial ambitions take over in the concerned states. In these two cases national consciousness was closely attached to the republican democracy although it was a different matter that an insignificant minority was privileged with the citizenship rights and the majority of the population was reduced to the miserable life of slavery to the extent that even the then reigning academicians of these city-states either maintained a dignified silence upon slavery (Plato, Cicero) or justified it in sound academic terminologies (Aristotle). It can logically be derived from this that national consciousness/nationalism has noteworthyly cohesive connection with democracy or popular consciousness without whose corroborating presence, nationalism eventually fades away.

This is not to say that democracy is the only precondition of nationalism; had it been so, Athenian and Roman democracy would never have disappeared giving way to Greek and Roman empires respectively and it is here that industrial-revolution comes into the picture as it is industrial-revolution alone that gives birth to urban literate ‘middle-class’ – the vital most component to sustain the spirit of nationalism – which was conspicuously absent in the Athenian and Roman democracies leading to their disappearance. Despite the excruciating endeavors taken by the ancient Greek scholars to spread this consciousness among the common Greek citizens – for instance, Socrates did this by resorting to life-long preaching and ultimately sacrificing his life for the sake of “ideas”; Plato did this by establishing a university-system – if nationalism could not last longer in Greek city-states, it is primarily due to the fact that there was no sizable urban middle-class to endorse the value of nationalism and the absence of middle-class in turn was caused by the absence of industrial-revolution. Thus it is established now that nationalism and industrial-revolution are inseparably linked to each other and the hypothesis that nationalism is the byproduct of industrial-revolution can not absolutely be disproved but
the only concession which can be given to the above-mentioned hypothesis would be that 
industrial-revolution just by its own virtue does not directly engender nationalism without 
the intermediary assistance of a number of institutions that go into the making of 
nationalism, for instance, democracy, middle-class and so on.

Now we can proceed to examine the next inevitable proposition that whether nationalism 
existed in the pre-industrial-revolution period or it was anything short of nationalism like 
parochialism, primordialism or any other regional form of ethnic identity. It remains to be 
a fascinating query to probe into the various conditions which keep nationalism breathing 
as well as those ones which leave nationalism breathless in different socio-political 
circumstances (paradigms) and ages. First of these conditions to figure out would be the 
different "forms of government" or what Aristotle would prefer to call the different 
"forms of constitution". To make it more coherent, if the idea and spirit of nationalism is 
applied to the three forms of government – monarchy, aristocracy and democracy – it 
goes without saying that nationalism is not compatible with either monarchy or 
aristocracy for a variety of reasons and it goes comfortably well only with democracy (or 
at least majoritarian democracy). In case of monarchy and aristocracy, nationalism seems 
to be encumbered with either 'one man' or a 'group of men' and in both the cases 
nationalism gets monopolized or oligopolized by the ruling elites with the masses being 
kept away from this. With the free-floating movement of nationalism being abruptly 
checked by a minority of feudal lords and nationalism itself being reduced to nothing 
more than a feudatory subject to sale and purchase; nationalism gets suffocated and 
stealthily slips into a state of hibernation for ages in order only to be awakened by the 
pushes and pulls of the industrial age. History has it that in Europe almost all of the royal 
families established their marital relationship with their foreign counterparts without even 
bothering for the national zeal of the concerned peoples. Thus it can be inferred that the 
frontiers of nationalism can safely be guarded only in an industrialized society by the 
people of a nation themselves rather than by the monarchs and aristocrats of agrarian 
society. Based on the same inference, it can be maintained that the nationalism which 
reflected itself in Greek city-states and the Roman republic was not the embodiment of its 
real self but the mere illusionary shadow of nationalism which was too vulnerable to
resist the ambitious imperial designs of either a Macedonian Alexander or a Roman Caesar; at the most it can be awarded the concession of what can most suitably be called “quasi-nationalism” and nothing more.

On the Linkages between Nationalism and Culture:

Culture has been the inevitable breeding ground of nationalisms of all sorts – civic or cultural, although cultural nationalism is frequently accused of feeding upon high-cultures, but evidence has it that even civic-nationalisms have more often than not relied upon local cultures to extract the political gains with the only difference that civic-nationalisms prey hypocritically upon both majority and minority cultures with a secularist-human face, for instance, it is Congress, in India, to wear officially the mask of civic-nationalism and present a typical secularist-communal case of it. Ernest Gellner in this respect brings to light a brilliant portrayal of the chasm between great and little traditions or between local and high cultures in the transition from agrarian to industrial society. Gellner begins with culture in agrarian society and emphatically holds that one development which takes place during the agrarian epoch of human history is comparable in importance with the emergence of the state itself: the emergence of literacy and of a specialized clerical class or estate, a clerisy. Gellner further affirms in a Hegelian style that not all agrarian societies attain literacy: at first none could read; then some could read; and eventually all can read. This, to the author, characterizes the three different and great ages of man; in the middle or agrarian age literacy appertains to some only and finally in industrial age all have it. In agrarian societies, he further establishes, literacy brings forth a major chasm between the great and the little traditions (or cults). The doctrines and forms of organization of the clerisy of the great and literate cultures are variable, and the depth of the chasm between the great and little traditions may vary a great deal. Literacy, Gellner asserts the establishment of a reasonably permanent and standardized script, means in effect the possibility of cultural and cognitive storage and centralization. The cognitive centralization and codification effected by a clerisy, and the political centralization which is the state, need not go hand in hand. Often they are rivals; sometimes one may capture the other; but more often, the red and the black, the
specialists of violence and of faith, are indeed independently operating rivals, and their territories are often not coextensive. In the characteristic agro-literate polity, the ruling class forms a small minority of the population, rigidly separate from the great majority of direct agricultural producers, or peasants. Generally speaking, Gellner assures us; its ideology exaggerates rather than underplays the inequality of classes and the degree of separation of the ruling stratum. He is quite convinced that this ruling stratum is subdivided into a number of more specialized layers like warriors, priests, clerics, administrators and so on and most notably this class does not aspire cultural homogeneity, instead they prefer cultural differentiation. It is believed that the more differentiated in style of all kinds the various strata are, the less friction and ambiguity there will be between them. The whole system, to the author’s belief, favors horizontal lines of cultural cleavage, and it may invent and reinforce them when they are absent. Below the horizontally stratified minority at the top, there is another world, that of the laterally separated petty communities of the lay members of the society. Here, once again, cultural differentiation is very marked, though the reasons are quite different. Gellner is of the opinion that even if the population of a given area starts from the same base-line — which very often is not the case — a kind of culture drift soon engenders dialectical and other differences. No-one, not even state, has an interest in promoting cultural homogeneity at this social level. Such societies, thus concludes the author on agro-literate polities, simply do not possess the means for making literacy near-universal and incorporating the broad masses of the population in a high culture, thus implementing the ideals of the clerisy[ to homogenize society by imposing certain shared cultural norms which remains a theoretical utopia in agrarian society]. Finally comes Gellner’s prophetic theorization: “had nationalism been invented in such a period its prospects of general acceptance would have been slender indeed. One might put it this way: of the two potential partners, culture and power, destined for each other according to the nationalist theory, neither has much inclination for the other in the conditions prevailing in the agrarian age.”

At the same time Gellner also notes down a mocking criticism against the Marxian class perspective in different modes of production. He points out that in an inherently mobile
and unstable society the maintenance of the social dams is intolerably difficult as the powerful currents of mobility are ever undermining them. Contrary to what Marxism has led people to expect, Gellner ensures, it is pre-industrial society which is addicted to horizontal differentiation within societies, whereas industrial society strengthens the boundaries between nations rather than those between classes.

Gellner is one of those few writers who deserve to be complimented not insomuch for what substantiality they discover but much more for the methodology which they employ to interpret an ideology like nationalism. Gellner’s use of the term culture in order to explain the concept of nationalism must be appreciated, albeit with a critical eye, for the methodological brilliance. He therefore, requires to be mentioned on every occasion where any possibility of exploring the linkages between culture and nationalism could be dug up. Without losing the edge, his arguments evolve in order to subscribe considerably to the theories of nationalism. He continues, arguing that the self-enclosed community tends to communicate in terms whose meaning can only be identified in context, in contrast to the relatively context-free scholasticism of the scribes. But the village patois (‘restricted code’) has no normative or political pretensions; quite the reverse. In brief, Gellner holds that cultures proliferate in this world but its conditions do not generally encourage what might be cultural imperialisms, the efforts of one culture or another to dominate and expand to fill out a political unit. Culture tends to be branded either horizontally (by social caste), or vertically, to define very small local communities. The factors determining political boundaries are totally distinct from those determining cultural units. Clerisies sometimes endeavor to extend the zone of a culture, or rather, of the faith they codified for it; and states sometimes indulge in crusades, faith-endorsed aggression. But these are not the normal, pervasive conditions of society. It is important to add that cultures in such a world proliferate in a very complex way: in many cases it is far from clear how a given individual is to be assigned to his ‘cultural background’. A Himalayan peasant, for instance, may be involved with priests and monks and shamans of several religions in different contexts at different times of the year; his caste, clan, and language may link him to diverse units. The speakers of a given tribal language may, for instance, not be treated as members of it, if they happen to be of the wrong occupational
Caste. Life-style, occupation, language, ritual practice, may fail to be congruent. A family's economic and political survival may hinge, precisely, on the adroit manipulation and maintenance of these ambiguities, on keeping options and connections open. Its members may not have the slightest interest in, or taste for, an unambiguous, categorical self-characterization such as is nowadays associated with a putative nation, aspiring to internal homogeneity and external autonomy. In a traditional milieu an ideal of a single overriding and cultural identity makes little sense. Nepalese hill peasants often have links with a variety of religious rituals, and think in terms of caste, clan, or village (but not of nation) according to circumstance. It hardly matters whether homogeneity is preached or not as it can find little resonance.

Political units of the agrarian age vary enormously in size and kind. Roughly speaking, however, Gellner divides them into two species, or perhaps poles: local self-governing communities, and large empires. On the one hand, there are the city-states, tribal segments, peasant communes and so forth, running their own affairs, with a fairly high political participation ratio (to adapt S. Andreski's useful phrase) and with only moderate inequality; and on the other, large territories controlled by a concentration of force at one point. A very characteristic political form is, of course, one which fuses these two principles: a central dominant authority co-exists with semi-autonomous local units. Gellner gets desperate at this point to raise what he calls the most concerned question: whether in our world, containing these types of unit there are forces making for that fusion of culture and polity which is the essence of nationalism...? The answer, he takes no time in responding, must be 'no'. The local communities depend for their functioning on a good measure of face-to-face contact, and they can not expand in size radically without transforming themselves out of all recognition. Hence these participatory communities seldom exhaust the culture of which they are part; they may have their local accent and customs, but these tend to be but variants of a wider inter-communicating culture containing many other similar communities. City-states, for instance seldom have a language of their own. No doubt the ancient Greeks were reasonably typical in this respect. While they possessed a vigorous awareness of their own shared culture and the contrast between it and that of all barbarians (with, incidentally, a rather low degree of
horizontal cultural differentiation between Hellenes), this sense of unity had little political expression, even in aspiration, let alone in achievement. But when a pan-Hellenic polity was established under Macedonian leadership, it very rapidly grew into an empire transcending by far the bounds of Hellenism. In ancient Greece, chauvinistic though the Greeks were in their own way, there appears to have been no slogan equivalent to Ein Reich, Ein volk, Ein führer. This was Gellner’s description of Greek nationalism premised upon the similar conclusions as mine, which is primarily to say that Greek nationalism was relatively weaker nationalism in comparison to post-industrial form of nationalism.

Subsequently, Gellner speaks of the connecting bridge between clerisy and culture, maintaining that the only stratum which can in any sense be said to have a cultural policy is the clerisy. Sometimes, as in the case of the Brahmins, its policy is in effect to create a complementarity and mutual interdependence between itself and the other orders. It seeks to strengthen its own position by making itself indispensable, and the complementary roles it ascribes to itself and to the laity, far from requiring its own universalization, formally preclude it. Notwithstanding the fact that it claims monopolistic authority over ritual propriety, it does not wish to see itself emulated. It has little wish for the sincerest form of flattery, imitation, though it does provoke it. Elsewhere, as in Islam, the clerisy from time to time takes its own missionary duties, to be practiced among the habitually relapsing weaker brethren within the faith, with becoming seriousness. There is here no rule enjoining that some must pray, some fight, and some work, and that these estates should not presume to meddle with each other’s realm. As far as the actual prescriptions of the faith go, everyone is allowed to do all three of these things, if his aptitudes and energy allow (This latent egalitarianism is very important for the successful adaptation of Islam to the modern world). Thus there is no formal or theological obstacle to a clerical missionary cultural policy. In practice there is still a problem: if everyone really systematically indulged in legal-theological studies, who would look after the sheep, goats and camels? In certain parts of the Sahara there are entire tribes designated, by inter-tribal compact, as people of the book. In practice, however, this only means that religious personnel are habitually drawn from among their number. It does not mean that
all of them become religious specialists. Most of them continue to work and fight. So for deep, powerful and insuperable reasons, clerisies in agro-literate societies cannot properly dominate and absorb the entire society. Sometimes their own rules prohibit it, and sometimes external obstacles make it impossible; but the latter would in any case constitute a sufficient and effective impediment, even if the rules were always favorable to this aspiration.

Here come Gellner’s conclusive remarks over the nationalism of agro-literate society: “in the agrarian order, to try to impose on all levels of society a universalized clerisy and a homogenized culture with centrally imposed norms, fortified by writing, would be an idle dream. Even if such a programme is contained in some theological doctrines, it cannot be, and is not, implemented. It simply can not be done for the resources are lacking”. At times Gellner theorizes too carelessly, bringing forth too far-fetched remarks, for instance, at one place his vindication – that agrarian man seems to be made of a corruptible metal whereas his successor, industrial man seems to be made of purer metal – is clearly an overstatement of the fact. In the same breath, he adds that in an age of universalized clerisy, literacy and what he calls Mamluk-dom, the relationship of culture and polity changes radically. A high culture pervades the whole of society, defines it and needs to be sustained by the polity. That, to Gellner, is the secret of nationalism.

The age of universal high culture:

Gellner goes ahead to delineate the phase of transformation from agro-literate society to industrial society wherein mankind passes into an age of universal high culture and education-bound society and most significantly into an age of nationalism. In the industrial society, he believes, it is not only mobility and retraining which engender this imperative but also the content of most professional activities. Work in the industrial society does not mean moving matter. The paradigm of work is no longer ploughing, reaping, thrashing. Work, in the main, is no longer the manipulation of things, but of meanings. It generally involves exchanging communications with other people, or manipulating the controls of a machine. The fact that sub-units of society are no longer
capable of self-reproduction that centralized exo-education is the obligatory norm, that such education complements (though it does not wholly replace) localized acculturation, is of the very first importance for the political sociology of the modern world; and its implications have, strangely enough, been seldom understood or appreciated or even examined. At the base of the modern social order stands not the executioner but the professor. Not the guillotine, but the doctorat d'etat is the main tool and symbol of state power. The monopoly of legitimate education is now more important, more central than is the monopoly of legitimate violence. When this is understood, then the imperative of nationalism, its roots, not in human nature as such, but in a certain kind of now pervasive social order, can also be understood.

Gellner establishes thereafter that contrary to popular and even scholarly belief, nationalism does not have any very deep roots in the human psyche. The human psyche can be assumed to have persisted unchanged through the many millennia of the existence of human race, and not to have become either better or worse during the relatively brief and very recent age of nationalism. The roots of nationalism in the distinctive structural requirements of industrial society are very deep indeed. This movement is the fruit neither of ideological aberration, nor of emotional excess. Although those who participate in it generally, indeed almost without exception, fail to understand what it is that they do, the movement is nonetheless the external manifestation of a deep adjustment in the relationship between polity and culture which is quite unavoidable. Recapitulating the central features of industrial society, the author holds that universal literacy and a high level of numerical, technical and general sophistication are among its functional prerequisites. Its members are and must be mobile, and ready to shift from one activity to another, and possess that generic training which enables them to follow the manuals and instructions of a new activity or occupation. In the course of their work they must constantly communicate with a large number of other men, with whom they frequently have no previous association, and with whom communication must consequently be explicit, rather than relying on context. They must also be able to communicate by means of written, impersonal, context-free, to-whom-it-may-concern type messages. Hence these communications must be in the same shared and standardarized linguistic medium
and script. The educational system which guarantees this social achievement becomes large and is indispensable, but at the same time it no longer possesses monopoly of access to the written word: its clientele is coextensive with the society at large and the replaceability of individuals within the system by others applies to the educational machine at least as much as to any other segment of society, and perhaps more so. Some very great teachers and researchers may perhaps be unique and irreplaceable, but the average professor and schoolmaster can be replaced from outside the teaching profession with the greatest of ease and often with little, if any, loss. The employability, dignity, security and self-respect of individuals, typically, and for the majority of men now hinges on their education; and the limits of the culture within which they were educated are also the limits of the world within which they can, morally and professionally, breathe. A man’s education is by far his most precious investment, and in effect confers his identity on him. Modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture. And he is, generally speaking, gelded. The Mamluk condition has become universal. No important links bind him to a kin group; nor do they stand between him and a wide, anonymous community of culture. The obverse of the fact that a school-transmitted culture, not a folk-transmitted one, alone confers his usability and dignity and self-respect on industrial man, is the fact that nothing else can do it for him to any comparable extent. Culture is no longer merely the adornment, confirmation and legitimation of a social order which was also sustained by harsher and coercive constraints; culture is now the necessary shared medium, the life-blood or perhaps rather the minimal shared atmosphere, within which alone the members of the society can breathe and survive and produce. For a given society, it must be one in which they can all breathe and speak and produce; so it must be the same culture. Moreover, it must now be a great or high (literate, training-sustained) culture, and it can no longer be a diversified, locality-tied, illiterate little culture or tradition. Exo-socialization, the production and reproduction of men outside the local intimate unit, is now the norm, and must be so. The imperative of exo-socialization is the main clue to why state and culture must now be linked, whereas in the past their connection was thin, fortuitous, varied, loose, and often minimal. Now it is unavoidable. That is what nationalism is about, and why we live in an age of nationalism. Here Gellner differs remarkably from Elie Kedourie in his assertion
on nationalism wherein Kedouri\textsuperscript{16} claims that nationalism imposes homogeneity; Gellner brings him upside down by counter establishing that it is rather that a homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism.

\textbf{On the weakness and hypocrisy of nationalism:}

As a clue to the understanding of nationalism, Gellner makes a stronger note on the weakness of nationalism than the strength of it. Having exhibited the dormant nature of this monster (nation) during the pre-industrial age, he goes ahead to show the feebleness of nationalism within the age of nationalism. He characterizes culture as an illusive concept which is deliberately left undefined. Considering language as the acceptable criterion of culture, he assumes that there are countless number of ‘potential nationalisms’ or at least ten for each ‘effective nationalism’, which is to say, that each potential culture even after having a distinct language does not possess the will to make a nation or even make efforts to do so. For instance, the linguistic distinctiveness of the Scottish highlands within Scotland is, of course, incomparably greater than the cultural distinctiveness of Scotland within UK; but there is no highland nationalism. Dialectal and cultural differences within Germany or Italy are as great as those between recognized Teutonic and romance languages. Southern Russians differ culturally from northern Russians, but, unlike Ukrainians, do not translate this into a sense of nationhood.

As regards the hypocrisy of nationalism, Gellner establishes that nationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in reality the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state. It uses some of the pre-existent cultures, generally transforming them in the process, but it can not possibly use them all, as there are too many of them. A viable higher culture-sustaining modern state can not fall below a certain minimal size (unless in effect parasitic on its neighbors), and there is only room for a limited number of such states on this earth. The high ratio of determined slumberers, who will not rise and shine and who
refuse to be woken, enables us to turn the tables on nationalism-as-seen-by-itself. Nationalism sees itself as a natural and universal ordering of the political life of mankind, only obscured by that long, persistent and mysterious somnolence. As Hegel expressed this vision: ‘nations may have had a long history before they finally reach their destination – that of forming themselves into states’. Hegel immediately goes on to suggest that this pre-state period is really ‘pre-historical’: so it would seem that on this view the real history of a nation only begins when it acquires its own state. At this point, Gellner inquires if one invokes the sleeping-beauty nations, neither possessing a state nor feeling the lack of it, against the nationalist doctrine, one tacitly accepts its social metaphysic, which sees nations as the bricks of which mankind is made up. He is not happy with the critics of nationalism who do not go far enough in denouncing the political movement and at the same time tacitly accept the existence of nations. Nations as a natural, god-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are, to Gellner’s observation, a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures. Summing up on nationalism, Gellner emphatically affirms that it is nationalism which engenders nations and not the other way round and more precisely it is always in the age of nationalism wherein dead languages are revived, traditions invented, quite fictitious pristine purities restored, thus laying the foundation of nationalism. The basic deception and self-deception practiced by nationalism is this: nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the population. It means that generalized diffusion of a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication. It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves. Nationalism usually conquers in the name of a putative folk culture. Its symbolism is drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peasants, of the volk, the narod. There is a certain element of truth in the nationalist self-presentation
when the narod or volk is ruled by officials of another, an alien high culture, whose oppression must be resisted first by a cultural revival and reaffirmation, and eventually by a war of national liberation. If the nationalism prospers it eliminates the alien high culture, but it does not then replace it by the old local low culture; it revives, or invents, a local high (literate, specialist-transmitted) culture of its own, though admittedly one which will have some links with the earlier local folk styles and dialects.

**A critical inquiry into the Gellner’s approach to nationalism:**

Gellner’s approach to nationalism is absolutely antithetical to that of Renan’s approach more or less in every aspect of it whereas Renan regards nation as a soul and spiritual principle unlike Gellner who considers it as an outcome of objective necessity and conscious imagination. Gellner does not appreciate the spirit of nationalism as it is, but always portrays it in negative light as if it were the embodiment of absolute craftiness in man. The portrayal of nationalism as an absolute artificial product/imaginess manufactured by the ruling elites in order only to serve their self-interests would devastate the whole idea of nationalism of its brighter subjective, organic and natural sides. Although initially nationalism might seem to have originated in a group of statesmen within a nation but sooner than later these statesmen begin to act as expediting agents who would extend this spirit to the larger chunks of the society and it is at this point that nationalism in its real or popular sense is born as well as preserved. This is what had happened in western Europe in the 18th century and further and the same followed in Afro-Asian countries throughout the 20th century, with the only difference that while in the former case, the enemy projected as the chief hurdle on the way to national-growth and pride, comes from amongst the fellow countrymen; whereas in the latter case, the enemy projected is a foreigner. Apart from this, the industrialization process and the western epistemology have also helped nationalism immensely in becoming a popular force.

Gellner, in his approach to nationalism, seems to be driven by the dominant universal structures of his age, for instance, he presumes a socialist pattern of education system
fully funded by the national government as the only source to guarantee universal literacy which is the minimal requirement for full citizenship of a modern community apart from a certain level of technological competence. Gellner assumes an ideal situation of nationalism wherein every citizen must be literate on the grounds of moral membership, to the effect that every citizen can really claim and exercise his rights and also can attain a level of affluence and style of life compatible with current notions of human dignity. However evidence has it that nationalism has nowhere emerged only as a result of the universal literacy of the total population although an educated urban middle-class always remains the greater source of nationalism than the rural peasantry it gets undoubtedly strengthened with the education spreading deeper among the masses. Gellner's hypothesis that only education makes a full man and citizen cannot certainly be disproved either from the logical-rational point of view or from philanthropic point of view but it confuses education with 'universal-literacy' as empirical data suggest that in many a cases literate parents have reproduced illiterate children and the same is true with education. Another naïve assumption Gellner seems to make is that nationalism accompanied by the forces of modernization is sufficiently enough to produce a full man and citizen as if they march forward unhinged and uninfluenced by the modern ideological forces like liberalism, socialism and fascism etc. In fact, right from its inception, nationalism has never journeyed through any nation-state as a lone wolf but always made friends with some or other political ideologies; somewhere it has aligned itself with conservatism and liberalism as in England, somewhere with democratic-socialism (in the sense of Nehruvian Fabian Socialism) as in India and somewhere with fascism as in Nazi Germany and so on.

Another major flaw in Gellner's description of nationalism is that he arbitrarily rules out any role whatsoever of subjectivity or sentimentality in the making of nationalism. While any slick effort to examine this generalization would result into a normal curiosity seeking to explain as to what might be the drifting forces, if not the sentimentality, behind the identity-based secessionist movements and above all behind the historic freedom movements against the imperial powers. Gellner would respond to this that the force behind was industrial-revolution, power-grasping intention of the ruling elites and
above all the practical and objective necessity. But the larger question is that if the citizens of a nation-state would be ready at any point of time or situation to sell their sovereignty to any imperial power in return of a promise or guarantee made by the imperial powers to satisfy all the demands which their own sovereign power failed to fulfil? The answer obviously goes in negative refuting the Gellner’s hypothesis.

Gellner remains throughout his work quite skeptical and ironical about the whole nation-building process and in particular about the linkages between nationalism and humanism. He dubs all the means which nationalism employs to reveal itself, as artificial and synthetic and comes closer to vindicate that whatever is synthetic does not exist in reality. This is what has led him to believe that nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness, but it creates nations where they do not exist. It was his skeptical treatment of nationalism which has made his conclusive assertions more out of place than his argumentative elaborations. To elaborate more on this, if nationalism chooses to elevate arbitrarily one of the dozens of the vernaculars spoken within the same nation-state, as a national language, this is of-course an artificial process but not at all an unreal or unethical process primarily because there is no other way to bring together the two or more regional low cultures, on a single plane in order not only to realize the oneness of a nation but also to lessen the administrative inconveniences in the federal structure. There is no second way to build up a national language for mankind cannot spontaneously improvise or invent a language. This is a rather humanizing process than the process that pre-existing faith-civilizations (Islam, Christendom, and Hinduism etc.) resorted to, for instance, the motive of the national language is to enable all the citizens to speak one language and thus make it a popular language, whereas the motive of a theocratic language is to confine it to the privileged class as could be witnessed in Indian case, Hindi is rapidly becoming a popular language in India but Sanskrit always remained a language of the priestly-class.

In the same fashion, nationalism (civic-nationalism in particular, as cultural-nationalism is ridden with communal overtones) by laying stress on folklore, popular culture and so on intends to nationalize very cautiously the selective local cultures from both the
majority and minority communities in order to turn them into high national culture. To nurture a national culture not guided by communal overtones is without doubt a viable tool in the nation-building process, which has little reason to be rebuffed as synthetic non-existence or sub-human existence. Gellner also produces in his theory of nationalism, a critique of working-class movements when he holds that the solidarity of the working-class is a myth. The most putative argument he puts forth in his defense is that it is a myth because advanced lands do not show any interest in sharing their prosperity with the ill-trained underdeveloped workers. This argument gets flawed in its presupposition that advanced lands do not have class-torn societies and they enjoy some kind of organic unity which is a gross misconception. Besides, this argument is also incapable of explaining the erstwhile Soviet Union’s contribution in building up of international working-class movements. This theory would also fail to explain as to why foreign-nationals like Che Guevara participated in Cuban revolution and thereafter moved to other countries to manufacture revolutions and got killed on the way. Gellner’s proposition that all freedom-fighters of the underdeveloped countries were guided by the self-centered motives of monopolizing all the resources after independence and deceiving the working-class thereafter, is fundamentally flawed since it ignores the altruistic sides of both the subjective human mind in general and of charismatic leadership in particular. To put forth one amidst many examples, Gandhi never before or after independence held any profit-making post and never tried to monopolize any resources whatsoever.

Finally, Gellner’s conclusions are little too authoritative and absolutist in nature as it outrightly rejects any positive contribution of nationalism to the advancement of human civilization, in the belief that nationalism practices deception and self-deception by imposing high cultures on the people. Here Gellner becomes self-contradictory as on the one hand, he himself admits that industrial age has qualitative advantages over agrarian age as mankind in the industrial-age gets rid of all those crude vices which they had previously, and more importantly, it is nationalism which unites, through its shared high culture, the people of different ethnic origins and local cultures into one national fold; on the other hand, he takes away all the credits from nationalism accusing it of practicing deception and self-deception. Although there is no denying the fact that nationalism has
time and again abused the authority entrusted by the people but still the deception it practices can not be seen in absolute terms but only in relative sense. Nationalism in general ought to be seen as the fragile ambivalent force which could safely be handled only in a democratic establishment backed by the popular support.

Nationalism and print-capitalism:

Benedict Anderson in his celebrated work “Imagined Communities” has brought to light a quite different perspective of nationalism which, apart from being a mass-imagination, also seeks to relate itself with print-capitalism. He begins with arguing that the very possibility of imagining the nation only arose historically when, and where, three fundamental cultural conceptions, all of great antiquity, lost their axiomatic grip on men’s minds. The first of these was the idea that a particular script-language offered privileged access to ontological truth, precisely because it was an inseparable part of that truth. It was this idea that called into being the great transcontinental sodalities of Christendom, the Ummah Islam, and the rest. Second was the belief that society was naturally organized around and under high centers – monarchs who were persons apart from other human beings and who ruled by some form of cosmological (divine) dispensation. Human loyalties were necessarily hierarchical and centripetal because the ruler, like the sacred script, was a node of access to being and inherent in it. Third was a conception of temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable, the origins of the world and of men essential identical. Combined, these ideas rooted human lives firmly in the very nature of things, giving certain meaning to the everyday fatalities of existence (above all death, loss, and servitude) and offering, in various ways, redemption from them.

The slow, uneven decline of these interlinked certainties, first in western Europe, later elsewhere, under the impact of economic change, ‘discoveries’(social and scientific), and the development of increasingly rapid communications, drove a harsh wedge between cosmology and history. But the search was on for a new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together. Nothing perhaps more precipitated this search, nor made
it more fruitful, than print-capitalism, which made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways. If the development of print-as-commodity is the key to the generation of wholly new ideas of simultaneity, still, we are simply at the point where communities of the type ‘horizontal-secular, transverse-time’ become possible. Here Anderson inquires why, within that type, the nation became so popular and answers himself that the factors involved are obviously complex and various but a strong case can be made for the primacy of capitalism.

Anderson discovers that one of the earliest forms of capitalist enterprise, book-publishing felt capitalism’s entire restless search for markets. The early printers established branches all over Europe: a veritable “international” of publishing houses, which ignored national frontiers, was created. The initial market was literate Europe, a wide but thin stratum of Latin readers. Saturation of this market took about 150 years. The determinative fact about Latin – aside from sacrality – was that it was a language of bilinguals. Relatively few were born to speak it and even fewer dreamed in it. Right from the 16th century when the proportion of the bilinguals within the total population of Europe was very small, down to now, the vast bulk of mankind is monoglot. The logic of capitalism thus meant that once the elite Latin market was saturated, the potentially huge markets represented by the monoglot masses would beckon. Meanwhile, a Europe-wide shortage of money made printers think more and more of peddling cheap editions in the vernaculars. The revolutionary vernacularizing thrust of capitalism was given further impetus by three factors, two of which contributed directly to the rise of national consciousness. Second was the impact of the reformation, which, at the same time, owed much of its success to print-capitalism. Before the age of print, Rome easily won every war against heresy in Western Europe because it always had better internal lines of communication than its challengers. But soon after Martin Luther nailed his thesis in German to the chapel-door in Wittenberg, his works represented no less than one third of all German-language books sold between 1518 and 1525. Thus emerged for the first time a truly mass readership and a popular literature within everybody’s reach and Luther became the first best-selling author so known. Where Luther led, others quickly followed, opening the colossal
religious propaganda war that raged across Europe for the next century. In this titanic ‘battle for men’s minds’, Protestantism was always fundamentally on the offensive, precisely because it knew how to make use of the expanding vernacular print-market being created by capitalism, while the counter-reformation defended the citadel of Latin.

Anderson makes it a point that the coalition between Protestantism and print-capitalism, exploiting cheap popular editions, quickly created large new reading publics – not least among merchants and women, who typically knew little or no Latin – and simultaneously mobilized them for politico-religious purposes. Inevitably, it was not merely the church that was shaken to its core. The same earthquake produced Europe’s first important non-dynastic, non-city-states in the Dutch republic and the commonwealth of the puritans (François I’s panic was as much political as religious). Third was the slow, geographically uneven, spread of particular vernaculars as instruments of administrative centralization by certain well-positioned would-be absolutist monarchs. The birth of administrative vernaculars predated both print and religious upheaval of the 16th century, and must therefore be regarded (at least initially) as an independent factor in the erosion of the sacred imagined community. At the same time, nothing suggests that any deep-seated ideological, let alone proto-national, impulses underlay this vernacularization where it occurred. The case of England – on the northwestern periphery of Latin Europe – is here especially enlightening. Prior to the Norman Conquest, the language of the court, literary and administrative, was Anglo-Saxon. For the next century and a half virtually all royal documents were composed in Latin. Between about 1200 and 1350 this state-Latin was superseded by Norman French. In the meantime, a slow fusion between this language of a foreign ruling class and the Anglo-Saxon of the subject population produced early English. The fusion made it possible for the new language to take its turn, after 1362, as the language of the courts – and for the opening of the parliament. Wycliffe’s vernacular manuscript Bible followed in 1382. It is essential to bear in mind, reminds Anderson, that this sequence was a series of ‘state’, not ‘national’ languages; and that the state concerned covered at various times not only today’s England and Wales, but also portions of Ireland, Scotland and France. Obviously, huge elements of the subject populations knew little or nothing of Latin, Norman French, or early English. On the
Seine, a similar movement took place, if at a slower pace. As Bloch wryly puts it, 'French, that is to say a language which, since it was regarded as merely a corrupt form of Latin, took several centuries to raise itself to literary dignity', only became the official language of the courts of justice in 1539, when François I issued the edict of Villers-Cotterets. In other dynastic realms Latin survived much longer – under the Hapsburgs well into the 19th century. In still others, 'foreign' vernaculars took over: in the 18th century the languages of the Romanov court were French and German. Nonetheless, the elevation of these vernaculars to the status of languages-of-power, where, in one sense, they were competitors with Latin, made its own contribution to the decline of the imagined community of Christendom. After this, it becomes quite possible to conceive of the emergence of the new imagined national communities and most importantly what made these new communities imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity.

Anderson is firmly of the opinion that had print-capitalism sought to exploit each potential oral vernacular market out of immense number of them, it would have remained a capitalism of petty proportions. But these varied idiolects were capable of being assembled, within definite limits, into print-languages far fewer in number. The very arbitrariness of any system of signs for sounds facilitated the assembling process. Nothing served to 'assemble' related vernaculars more than capitalism, which, within the limits imposed by grammars and syntaxes, created mechanically-reproduced print-languages, capable of dissemination through the market. These print-languages, to Anderson, laid the bases for national consciousnesses in three distinct ways. First and foremost, they created unified fields of exchange and communications below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars. Speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, Englishes, or Spanishes, who might find it difficult or even impossible to understand one another in conversation, became capable of comprehending one another via print and paper. In the process, they gradually became aware of the hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people in their particular language-field. These fellow-readers, to whom they were connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the
embryo of the nationally-imagined community. Second, print-capitalism gave a new
fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central
to the subjective idea of the nation. As Febvre and Martin remind us, the printed book
kept a permanent form, capable of virtually infinite reproduction, temporally and
spatially. It was no longer subject to the individualizing and 'unconsciously modernizing'
habits of monastic scribes. Third, print-capitalism created languages-of-power of a kind
different from the older administrative vernaculars. Certain dialects inevitably were
'closer' to each print-language and dominated their final forms. Their disadvantaged
cousins, still assimilable to the emerging print-language, lost caste, above all because
they were unsuccessful (or only relatively successful) in insisting on their own printing-
form.

Anderson emphasizes that in their origins, the fixing of print-languages and the
differentiation of status between them were largely unself-conscious processes resulting
from the explosive interaction between capitalism, technology and human linguistic
diversity. But as with so much else in the history of nationalism, once 'there', they could
become formal models to be imitated, and, where expedient, consciously exploited in a
Machiavellian spirit. Today, the Thai government actively discourages attempts by
foreign missionaries to provide its hill-tribe minorities with their own transcription-
systems and to develop publications in their own languages: the same government is
largely indifferent to what these minorities speak. The fate of the Turkic-speaking
peoples in the zones incorporated into today's Turkey, Iran, Iraq and the USSR is
especially exemplary. A family of spoken languages, once everywhere assemblable, thus
comprehensible, within an Arabic orthography, has lost that unity as a result of conscious
manipulations. To heighten Turkish national consciousness at the expense of any wider
Islamic identification, Ataturk imposed compulsory Romanization.

Anderson summarizes the conclusions to be drawn from the argument by saying that the
convergence of capitalism and print technology on fatal diversity of human language
created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic
morphology set the stage for the modern nation. The potential stretch of these
communities was inherently limited, and, at the same time, bore none but the most fortuitous relationship to existing political boundaries (which were, on the whole, the high watermarks of dynastic expansionisms). Yet it is obvious that while today almost all modern self-conceived nations – and also nation-states – have ‘national print-languages’, many of them have these languages in common, and in others only a tiny fraction of the population ‘uses’ the national language in conversation or on paper. The nation-states of Spanish America or those of the ‘Anglo-Saxon family’ are conspicuous examples of the first outcome; many ex-colonial states, particularly in Africa, of the second. In other words, the concrete formation of contemporary nation-states is by no means isomorphic with the determinate reach of particular print-languages. To account for the discontinuity-in-connectedness between print-languages, national consciousness, and nation-states, it is necessary to turn to the large cluster of new political entities that sprang up in the western hemisphere between 1776 and 1838, all of which self-consciously defined themselves as nations, and, with the interesting exception of Brazil, as (non-dynastic) republics. For they were historically the first such states to emerge on the world stage, and therefore inevitably provided the first real models of what such states should look like.\textsuperscript{18}

**Nationalism – an ideological invention:**

There is a set of theorists writing on nationalism in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century who almost unanimously treat nationalism as an ideological invention. Most of the theorists of this school treat nationalism in the negative light and unanimously regard it not only as an artificial construct of ideas but also as a lethal instrument into the hands of the ruling elites in order to serve their own interests in the pretext of the popular interests. Each author however even within the same school has his own distinguished and articulating approach to arrive almost at the same conclusion. Eric Hobsbawm also like other modernization theorists remains skeptical and critical of nationalism seeing it through the prism of ‘invented traditions’. He begins by stating that nationalism and paraphernalia rest on exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative, if only because historical novelty implies innovation. Hobsbawm goes very close to Gellner when he affirms that all national languages before they are appointed to become
national, are picked up as a vernacular spoken by the peasants and thereafter subjected to standardization by the government, for instance, Flemish taught in Belgium today is not the language which the mothers and grandmothers of Flanders spoke to their children.

Again Hobsbawm seems identical with Gellner when he narrates that we should not be misled by a curious but understandable paradox that modern nations and all their impedimenta generally claim to be the opposite of novel, namely rooted in the remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed, namely human communities so ‘natural’ as to require no definition other than self-assertion. He asserts that whatever the historic or other continuities embedded in the modern concept of ‘France’ and ‘the French’, these very concepts themselves must include a constructed or invented component. And just because so much of what subjectively makes up the modern nation consists of such constructs and is associated with appropriate and in general, fairly recent symbols or suitably tailored discourse (such as national history), the national phenomenon can not be adequately investigated without careful attention to the ‘invention of tradition’.

Furthering his ideas, Hobsbawm proclaims that the state linked formal and informal, official and unofficial, political and social inventions of tradition, at least in those countries where the need for it arose. Seen from below, the state, to author, increasingly defined the largest stage on which the crucial activities determining human lives as subjects and citizens were played out. It increasingly defined as well as registered their civil existence although it may not have been the only such stage, but its existence, frontiers and increasingly regular and probing interventions in the citizens’ life, were in the last analysis, decisive. A change in the frontiers of the state or in its policy had substantial and continuous material consequences for its citizens. The standardization of administration or law within it and in particular, state education transformed people into citizens of a specific country, peasants into Frenchmen. The state was the framework of the citizens’ collective actions, in so far as these were officially recognized. To influence or change the government of the state or its policy was plainly the main objective of the domestic politics, and the common man was increasingly entitled to take part in it. In short, Hobsbawm emphasizes that for practical purposes, society (civil-society) and the
state within which it operated became increasingly inseparable and thus state, nation and society all converged. It was thus natural, to Hobsbawm, that the classes within society, and in particular, the working-class should tend to identify themselves through nationwide political movements or organizations (parties) and equally natural that de facto these should operate essentially within the confines of the nation.

Hobsbawm prescribes three major forms of inventions of tradition: firstly, the development of a secular equivalent of the church – primary education, imbued with revolutionary and republican principles and content, and conducted by the secular equivalent of the priesthood – or perhaps given their poverty, the friars – the instituteurs; secondly, the invention of the public-ceremonies, and thirdly, the mass-production of public monuments.²⁰

Thus it can briefly be held that Hobsbawm is so close to Gellner in the portrayal of nationalism that the criticism of Gellner would more or less be the criticism of Hobsbawm. Much like Gellner, Hobsbawm also insists that nationalism and its spokespersons fabricate a number of invented situations which enchant the people of a nation into the national frenzy and that it has a broad-based trickle-down effect. Hobsbawm, in spite of his brilliant description of nationalism, also ignores the philanthropic areas of nationalism which Renan and to some extent even Hutchinson bring to light.

Elie Kedourie happens to be another theorist belonging to the same schools of thought who spurn the revivalists’ projects of national metaphysics and glorification of the past in order to subvert the present. Much in agreement with Renan’s definition of nationalism as “daily plebiscite”, Kedourie also examines into the nationalism from the angle of ‘self-determination’ and establishes that it is, in the final analysis, a determination of the will and nationalism is in the first place, a method of teaching the right determination of the will. Kedourie however gets too simplistic in his approach by making no distinction at all between linguistic, racial and religious nationalisms and obscurantly clubs them together as different aspects of the same primordial identity. This provides with too broad a
generalization while making a keen inquiry into the forms of nationalism. This is well
taken that evolution of every racial stock goes parallel with the evolution of at least one
language which every racial stock is fraught with for the obvious reason that no racial
identity has ever failed to invent a language. But it cannot be deduced from this that
racial and linguistic nationalisms are one and the same thing even though they might be
put into one broader category, namely, ethnic or cultural nationalism. For instance,
Kurds, in spite of sharing the same religious identity with the mainstream Iraqi people,
insist upon their demand for separate homeland primarily on the grounds of a distinct
racial identity and it is quite possible that once their demand is met, they might also
pronounce Arabic as the official language of Kurdistan rather than Kurdish as in the case
of many Arabic-speaking nations. Applying the same logic to the post-Saddam Iraq, it
could be witnessed that how people belonging to the same religion and most likely same
race but different sects (Shi’ites & Sunnis) are vigorously divided among themselves to
the degree of killing each other over regime-change. Thus Shiite nationalism and Sunni
nationalism, although seemingly inseparable components of Islamic nationalism, have
still their razor-sharp distinct identity-formations which cannot theoretically or politically
be ignored.

Thus, there are enough reasons to establish that the gulf between religious and racial
nationalism is even wider primarily because race is a closed anthropological category
whereas religion is an all-embracing and open-ended category and unlike race, birth is
not the sole qualification required for the membership of any religion with exception to
certain tribal religions. For instance, there was no room for any un-Aryan born German to
get a citizenship in Nazi Germany but at the same time any Aryan born outside Germany
could have become the citizen of Nazi Germany. While in the case of religious
nationalism, any newly-converted person residing in the same theocratic state could
easily get the citizenship of that state. To quote Eric Hobsbawm, “there is an evident
analogy between the insistence of racists on the importance of racial purity and the
horrors of miscegenation, and the insistence of so many forms of linguistic nationalism
on the need to purify the national language from foreign elements. In the 19th century, the
English were quite exceptional in boasting of their mongrel origin (Britons, Anglo-
Saxons, Scandinavians, Normans, Scots, and Irish etc.) and glorifying in the philological mixture of their language. However what brought ‘race’ and ‘nation’ closer was the practice of using both as virtual synonyms, generalizing equally wildly about racial/national character, as was the fashion. Thus before the Anglo-French entente cordiale of 1904, a French writer observed that the agreement between the two countries had been dismissed as impossible because of the hereditary enmity between the two races. Linguistic and ethnic nationalism thus reinforced each other.21

Unlike Kedourie, Hobsbawm at least comes closer to admit that ethnic and linguistic nationalisms are two different categories although reinforcing each other on most of the occasions. He also refutes Kedourie by exhibiting that even the English boasted of their mongrel origin and thus of their racial superiority over others. There is no denying the fact that despite their minute differences, racial and linguistic nationalisms have been witnessed to have worked together. Another instance could be cited of their collusion in Jewish nationalist movement which opted for a Modern Hebrew which nobody as yet spoke, and in a pronunciation unlike that used in European synagogues. Zionism rejected Yiddish, spoken by the substantial majority of the world’s Jews. Almost the same case could be cited of the Irish national movement which launched itself after 1900 into the doomed campaign to reconvert Irish to a language most of them no longer understood and which those who set about teaching it to their countrymen had only themselves begun to learn very incompletely.

Further Kedourie holds that British and American nationalisms cannot be defined in terms of language, race and religion. It is obviously established that British and American nationalisms do not get inspiration from cultural-nationalism; on the contrary, they follow the pattern of political-nationalism. But to take firstly the case of Britain, the two great events in the history of Britain – ‘civil-war’ and ‘glorious-revolution’ – the two landmarks, which helped England most profusely in its nation-building process, were both of them driven vehemently by the crude forces of religion or to be precise, by the anti-catholic motivations. Besides the failure of great-Britain to include the catholic Ireland in its compendium is another testimony of how post-industrial English nation was
foundationally rooted into primitive ethnic forces. But these primitive ethnic forces in England always remained disguisedly into the backseat and never manifestly reflected themselves on the English political system, not insomuch because England was inherently superior or progressive but more because England was the first nation to experience the industrial-revolution and hereby the leader of the colonizers. The people of England never landed into any frustration due to any imperial relative deprivation. This is primarily why English political parties never required using ‘cultural-nationalism’ as an ideological tool to gain political power.

Now if we take up the case of American nationalism, it is itself a product of modernity having barely three centuries of history and culture to glorify and revive. United states of America – a country of immigrants or, say, a confederation of distinct nationalities turned consensually into a federation of united states – being dominated since its origin by the English immigrants, borrows its rich political legacy from UK and by virtue of this it becomes a political system bound to imbibe, at least constitutionally, the ethos of ‘political-nationalism’ and in the same breath, to rebuff ‘cultural-nationalism’ at least theoretically. In practice, however, if we give a keen look into the American jingoist history, we see a country deeply submerged into a racial conflict, a country with a history of racist civil-war, a feudal army named Ku Klux Clan to suppress the blacks, and above all, the absence of even a single black or female president until 2009.

In brief, this is to imply that both the bourgeois ideologies – cultural nationalism and political nationalism – use the cards of race, language and religion with the difference of magnitude. Political nationalists use it in a much more delicate and latent form whereas cultural nationalists use it rather bluntly and crudely. Thus absolving British and American nationalisms fully, as Kedourie does, of ethnic components like race, religion and language would amount to projecting political nationalism as the ‘end-result’ of the rational quest for the ideal model of nationalism to be followed universally by all nation-states.
Another assumption on which Kedourie builds up his idea of nationalism is that all religious prophets were precursors of nationalism.  This assumption blindly confuses the motivating forces of religion with the motivating forces of nation. This holds true only with the primordial tribal war-lords rather than with such universal religions like Christianity, Islam and Buddhism. It is quite possible that Abraham or even Moses was a tribal cum nationalist cum spiritual leader; but it does not hold true with Christ, Buddha and Mohammad who never thought in terms of favoring his co-nationals and spurning the foreigners. In fact, they never divided mankind into two categories – citizens and foreigners – and that is why they kept the provision of conversion within which they invited the whole world to become one. In this respect, not only religion is anti-thesis to nation but also religious prophets like Christ and Buddha were anti-thesis to national prophets like Gandhi, Sunyat Sen or Kemal Pasha. Thus kedourie’s proposition intermixes all the primordial identities without a minimum logical distinction and hereby stands falsified. Kedourie seems too diffident to believe that any concrete theory of nationalism or its forms could be carved out of what he calls ‘too diverse world’. A great number of diverse identities and traditional loyalties and their complicated intermixing have misled Kedourie to believe that nationalism can not be adequately theorized. Apart from this Kedourie also appears to be obsessed with Euro-centric prejudices while authoring on nationalism.

The only area, where the minimum agreement with Kedourie could be arrived at, would be where he postulates that national self-determination is in the final analysis ‘a determination of the will’ and nationalism is in the first place a method of teaching the right determination of the will. But even this postulation remains far from being completed unless substantiated by another set of reasonings, for instance, national self-determination is not the final product of mere determination of the will unless this collective determination of the will is immediately reinforced by the general consensus of both the so-called subjugating imperial authority from which the given struggling nation wants to break free and at the same time ‘international community’. Mere self-determination of the will might create a nationality rather than a nation-state. Thus the
assumptions that Kedourie makes on nationalism are refutable in the majority of the realms with sufficient reasonings.

Tom Nairn happens to be another prominent political theorist from the same school of thought who unlike many theorists with Marxist leanings does not complicate the definition of nationalism and must be given credit for his lucidity. He does not get obscurant in comprehending both the realms of what constitutes nationalism and what not. Taking more or less a Marxist position, he believes that nationalism is an inwardly determined social necessity and a ‘growth-stage’ located somewhere between feudal societies and future societies where nationalism will become less prominent. In spite of his brilliant take on nationalism, it demands to be revised in particular on those areas where the author oscillates and also where he overdetermines.

The first instance of overdetermination comes up where Tom Nairn gives a cold treatment to the Hegelian side of nationalism to the effect that it never occurred to his mind that the so-called ‘inwardly-determined social necessity’ might also correspond with the ‘indwelling spirit of the community’ and have much more in common. To elaborate more upon this correspondence, it must be noted that social necessity, per se, never goes in conflict with the ‘indwelling subjective spirit’, on the contrary, they complement each other on most of the occasions and hence coexist ceaselessly. If nationalism, at some point of time in the march of history, becomes a social necessity for a community, there is little reason for the same community at the same historical juncture, to be in the low spirit unless nationalism is perceived as evil necessity by the members of the community which has rarely been the case except in the small coteries of intellectual Marxists and anarchists. To cut the story short, a hierarchy of perceived needs gets sooner followed by a hierarchy of subjective spirits in majority of the circumstances and this is primarily why the frenzy of nationalism gripped the masses, across the frontiers, only in the post-industrialization phase and never before; which is to say, that nationalism as a social-necessity would have been a deadweight, had it not been subjectively perceived in high spirits and thereafter made a case of it by the patriots. The greatest paradox with the political scientists trying to theorize nationalism is that either
they seem to be busy with objectifying around nationalism or with measuring it in terms of subjective value, but none of them can see the connecting thread between the two distinct categories.

The second wave of overdetermination on the part of author is where he endeavors to determine that nationalism is an ideology and since all ideologies are false consciousness, hence nationalism is nothing but false-consciousness. This kind of hypothetical generalizations on ideologies is fundamentally erroneous and under no circumstances can be verified if subjected to critical examination. An ideology could most suitably be defined in terms of an all-encompassing set of scientific ideas which tries to comprehend mankind in whole. Generally ideologies tend to be grand narratives fraught more with generalizations than contextualizations. The exclusion of specific contexts from the ideological ensemble can not be misinterpreted as engendering false-consciousness. Although it is quite possible that certain ideologies would tacitly promote false-consciousness, but it hardly leads one to conclude that all of them result into the same fate. On the contrary, the only way to uproot the false-consciousness is through deideologisation and thereafter reideologisation much like resocialisation process which could be made possible only through the assertion of an alternative and more substantially viable counter-ideology, for instance, Marxism was the counter-ideological response to capitalist social-order. Now nationalism might make a case for ‘false-consciousness’ in relation to classical Marxism rather than independently or in absolute sense. In fact ideologies begin to lose their scientificity and cohesiveness from the moment the people begin to treat it like a religion i.e. when they no longer subject it to the consistent critical inquiry and more importantly to the required reformulations as per the demands of the changing times.

Finally, Tom Nairn goes on to locate the real origins of nationalism and argues that they are located not in the folk, nor in the individual’s repressed passion for some sort of identity, but in the machinery of world political economy. Not simply as an inevitable concomitant of industrialization and urbanization, rather they are associated, to Tom, with more specific features of that process. The best way of categorizing these traits is to
say that they represent the uneven development of history since the 18th century. Any attempt to assess the author’s version of nationalism would lead one to believe that the origin of nationalism has nothing to do with either individual subjectivity or his urge for identity or national ethno-lingual culture. Tom Nairn outrightly rejects any role of education as an important factor that goes into the making of subjective mind which would agitate for nationalism. He rules out also the participation of people for the cause of nationalism. This makes a conservative determinist of Tom Nairn to propound that ‘uneven development of history’ by itself produces the whole ensemble of nationalism. There is no denying the fact that industrial revolution haunted the western Europe across the national frontiers giving birth to a radically new epistemology which, in turn, invariably facilitated a newly-emerged class of intellectuals to take up strongly the case of nationalism. But does it qualify to be a sufficient condition to construct a hypothesis, as our author does, that nationalist passion in an individual psyche is authoritatively authored by the material objective forces of history?

This historicist view does not allow even the most remarkable of human minds to build up a power-block, on its own, in order to resist the dictates of the historical forces and restructure them. This view ignores many real sides of the picture, and to be keen on the ignored parts, it fails to take notice of the fact that even the material side of the history gets exhausted in every age throwing itself open to the ambitious individuals who author upon it with as much freedom as they desire. This includes all the prophets of nationalism from the perennial ages to the modern era, or say, from Moses down to Gandhi. So eventually this argument of Tom Nairn therefore tends to be teleological and needs to be revised to give vent to a more scientifically precise definition of nationalism. To my observation, any attempt to define nationalism must take into consideration both the subjective and objective factors as the material side of the history prepares only the substructural ground on which it is left upon the skilled individuals to build up the superstructure of nationalism which does not get completed until the volk is invited to join and verify it.
John Breuilly happens to be an author on nationalism who can not be ignored in the debates on theories of nationalism for he is the only thinker who regards nationalism as an ideology but not as the arbitrary invention of nationalists for political purposes. Besides he is one of the few authors to divert the discourses on nationalism towards a direction which bifurcates it between state and society. He believes that nationalist ideology arises out of the need to make sense of complex social and political arrangements; but that need is itself shaped both by intellectual traditions and the sorts of responses which any intellectual scheme evokes when it is activated in some way or another. Although his conclusions are similar to those of Kedourie and Gellner, he distances himself from them in his demonstrative descriptions and particularly in those areas where he gives concession to the ruling elites by stating that their assumptions about national identity and need are not purely arbitrary, they have a more or less plausible connection with existing social arrangements and needs, with actual beliefs and with often widespread political grievances. But he concludes that this nationalist ideology is a pseudo-solution to the problem of the relationship between state and society, its plausibility, however, derives from its roots in genuine intellectual responses to that problem. The appeal of this pseudo-solution is that it enables the nationalist to take a wide variety of practices and sentiments prevailing among the population of a particular territory and to turn them into political justifications. Thus Breuilly concludes the debate, asserting that nationalist ideology never makes a rational connection between the cultural and the political concept of the nation because no such connection is possible.

Lastly, before bringing this discourse to an end, we must take into account Paul Brass’s opinion of nation-formation and elite competition as he is also capable of addressing the national question from a different perspective and of arriving at the same conclusion as above-mentioned authors. He makes mark by introducing the perspective of a dichotomy between ‘primordialism’ and ‘instrumentalism’ and most significantly by striking a balance between the two extreme views. He admits that there are some aspects of the primordialist formulation with which it is not difficult to agree. Even in modern industrial society, let alone in pre-modern or modernizing societies, most people develop attachments in childhood and youth that have deeply emotive significance, that remain
with them through life either consciously, in the actual persistence of such attachments in the routines of daily life, or embedded in the unconscious realms of the adult personality. Such attachments also often provide a basis for the formation of social and political groupings in adult life for those for whom they have a continuing conscious meaning in their daily lives. Even for those persons, particularly in modern societies, who have been removed from their origins or have rejected their childhood identifications, such attachments may remain available in the unconscious to be revived by some appeal that strikes a sympathetic psychic chord. It is at this juncture that Paul Brass would prevent the primordialists from traveling further on this line and take a turn towards instrumentalism. In defense of instrumentalism, he argues that the leaders of ethnic movements invariably select from traditional cultures only those aspects that they think will serve to unite the group and that will be useful in promoting the interests of the group as they define them. Thus Paul Brass summarizes by holding that ethnicity or nationality is the study of the process by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group's culture, attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups.  

A Primordial Dimension of Nationalism:

The discourses on political nationalism gets enormously enriched by the inclusion of ethnic-primordial dimension into it and the sole credit for this goes to one of the most widely discussed authors on nationalism, namely, Anthony Smith. Refuting nationalism to be a mere ideological invention, Smith goes back to delve into the ethnic origins of nations and comes up with an unprecedented primordialist theory of nationalism. He begins with the portrayal of the two inter-conflicting polar principles in the modern era, Viz, theocratic authority and rational-legal authority and the relative domination of the latter over the former and the subsequent crisis emerging out of this. Smith puts forth that historically and logically, three main positions on the question emerged out of the welter of speculation; and intellectuals have tended to divide along their lines ever since, with a good deal of interchange and even blurring in individual cases between the three options.
The first route, that of neo-traditionalism, tries to accept the technical achievements and some of the methods of western science and rationalism without any of its underlying assumptions. Socially and politically, it utilizes modern methods of mobilizing people but for traditionalist ends. A traditionalist is a self-conscious ideologue; he knows perfectly well that he is manipulating scientific techniques in order to defend the traditional values and dogma. He also approaches tradition 'from the outside'; he has seen it through the eye of the unbeliever, if only to reject his error, and of the foreigner, if only to be confirmed the more securely in the sense of what is his own. The neo-traditionalist is, moreover, politically self-conscious: he deliberately chooses secular political means for achieving traditional religious goals. Thus al-Afghani organized a pan-Islamic crusade, agitating through the press and politically, and mobilizing thinking Muslims from Egypt to Pakistan to revive and purify Islam and the Islamic umma in the face of western materialism and imperialism. And in India, slightly later, Tilak and Aurobindo were appealing to the masses in an attempt to revive the fortunes of Hinduism at a time when Christianity and westernization appeared to be eroding traditional faith, and they did so by politicizing the tradition and organizing the faithful into a modern-style crusade against alien unbelievers. Smith is firmly of the view that this kind of modernized religion and politicized tradition lends itself to ethnic historicism and outright nationalism. Neo-traditionalist intellectuals reject, on principle, the rationalist assumptions and critical language which they simultaneously require, if they are to communicate that rejection to their fellow-intellectuals and others.

The other two positions, those of the reformists and the assimilationists, accept science and rationalism together with their associated modes of critical reflection, systematic observation and open argument. But, while the assimilationist accepts such rationalism wholeheartedly, his reformist counterpart does so with many reservations. Assimilationists embrace with an almost messianic fervor the rationalist and scientific principles embodied in the modern state, principles in which they not only believe but which also validate their own aspirations for power and prestige. From their ranks have been drawn most of the ‘educators’, self-styled secular intellectuals bent on regenerating their communities through rationalist education. To these people there was really only
one modern, worthwhile civilization, that of the modern West with its rational discourse and scientific expertise; and they saw their task as that of assimilating themselves and their communities to the norms and lifestyles of that one global civilization. Assimilationists are, therefore, essentially cosmopolitan in aspiration, even if, in practice, they must always assimilate to a particular cultural variant (English, French, German, American, Russian) of ‘modern’ scientific civilization. To the assimilationist would-be educator, the ‘scientific state’ is a universal construct whose effect is the potential solution of the problem of meaning on a global scale. Through self-help and collective-planning, men can hope to solve problems that are really terrestrial and practical, but which till now had been represented by the traditional theodicies as supramundane, divinely ordained elements of the cosmos. The first task of the assimilationists was, therefore, critical and destructive: the breaking down of transcendental mysteries into earthly practical problems, so that men might be taught the scientific temper and techniques required for self-help programmes of collective regeneration.

Smith, at this juncture, raises two important questions: regarding the assimilationists’ stance in contribution to the rise of ethnic historicism and also regarding the incompatibility of critical cosmopolitanism with the cultural foundations of the ethnic revival. While making an inquiry into these abstruse zones, Smith himself responds that theoretically it is indeed incompatible. And it required a major reorientation of assimilationist aspirations, before they could lend themselves to an historicist resolution. A few assimilationists certainly managed to slip into the advanced Western societies, which they felt embodied their aspirations to be world-citizens. But most of them were refused entry. Curiously, the process of rejection began in the Western heartlands – in that initial contest between the philosophes and the ancien regime, which was soon replicated in much of Central and Eastern Europe. Exclusion was even more overt for the messianic intellectuals of the ‘Third World’. If they did not come to sense their rejection in the metropolitan lands which they visited, they were left in no doubt of it on their return home. So the assimilationists-in-retreat from the scientific state in the West poured all his messianic fervor and ardent hopes back onto the community which he had sought to abandon. In spite of this transformation process being painful, it was made easier by
the fact that the ideology of rational progress, which the assimilationist intellectuals had embraced, furnished them with an evolutionary outlook, which in turn could be harmonized with the history of particular ethnic communities. Given also their revolutionary impulses, assimilationists would be predisposed to an interventionist view of the historical process, one in which the educator could speed up the movement of history. It was therefore not so difficult for a disappointed assimilationist to transfer his progressive and revolutionary ideology from the stage of world history to that of his community within that larger framework. In that way, emphasizes Smith, his disillusion and rejection could be rationalized, even justified, by arguing that progress is slower, more piecemeal and fragmented, and requires a more active intervention in each area; in a word, by being more ‘realistic’. Besides, the failure of revolution of reason to occur in the advanced states led the assimilationists of the ‘Third World’ to presume if their own communities might not succeed where the advanced Western nations had failed?

Such reasonings, argues Smith, at any rate, helped to soften the disillusion of the assimilationists and turn them back to their ethnic homelands. A residual messianic cosmopolitanism still lingered in their hearts; but now it came to inspire their efforts to regenerate their respective ethnic communities and restore their past splendors. The arena of emancipation and revolution was no longer the world at large: it had narrowed itself down to the ‘scientific state’ of particular communities, and to the history and destiny of those communities.

It is here that the third position, that of reformists, commends itself. For the reformist, despite his commitment to critical rationalism and science, does not completely reject all religious authority or cosmic theodicies. The reformist acknowledges the situation of ‘dual legitimation’, the twin sources of authority in the modern world, that of the divine order and that of the scientific state. To a reformist, God makes history; but so does the man-made ‘scientific state’. Revelation and intuition show us the divine plan, even while reason and science allow man to become God’s co-worker. Power and value are divided today; man, through the scientific state, commands much value and considerable power, but God, in nature and morality, is the repository of power and value beyond man and his
comprehension. In his own terrestrial sphere, man can raise himself; he must not wait till death for emancipation. Cautiously optimistic, the reformist believes that God works for man through the scientific state; and man must therefore embrace the collective good which the state furthers, so that he can work with God. And only within a reformed religion can man work with God. In brief, the reformist attempt to reconcile opposites, to harmonize an ancient and profoundly ethical religious tradition with modern, secular rationalism, lies at the root of much liberal and even social-democratic thought. Yet it too, insists Smith, lends itself to an ethnic historicism. But the process of transformation is more complex. Like the assimilationist, the reformist is asked to determine his own destiny, to raise the collectivity through his own efforts. Self-help, rational-choice, collective planning, are therefore, as much a part of the mental armory of reformists as of others. In the still-meaningful traditions, and beliefs of the community, the reformist discerns the ‘essence’ of a modern faith. Thus Smith comes to conclude that each of these three positions – neo-traditionalism, reformism and assimilation – continue to be espoused to this day by intellectuals in many lands; and each in its own way continues to lead its devotees, under the pressure of external circumstances, towards an ethnic historicism.26

Cultural nationalism and moral regeneration:

So far we have been engaged with probing into the various dimensions of the viability of political nationalism in the general discourses on nationalism, keeping aside the equally important segment of nationalism, namely, ‘cultural nationalism’. With the exception of a few classical thinkers like Herder and Renan, we do not have many remarkable apologists of cultural nationalism especially in post-colonial era. John Hutchinson happens to be one of those few notable apologists of cultural-nationalism who dared to challenge its leading critics in the era of rationality and secularism. Hutchinson demonstrates that the two competing conceptions of the nation – cultural and political – must never be conflated as they form their own distinctive organizations and have sharply diverging political strategies in spite of sharing many things in common. Hutchinson argues that their common ideal is a civic polity of educated citizens united by common laws and mores.
like the polis of classical antiquity. Besides they also reject, in common, existing political and traditionalist allegiances that block the realization of this ideal, and theirs is a cosmopolitan rationalist conception of the nation that looks forward ultimately to a common humanity transcending cultural differences.

Coming to the distinctions between the two, Hutchinson emphasizes that in order to mobilize a political constituency on behalf of this goal (above-mentioned ideal), political nationalists may be driven to adopt ethnic-historical identities and in the process may become ethnicized and 're-traditionalized'. Their objectives are, however, essentially modernist: to secure a representative state for their community so that it might participate as an equal in the developing cosmopolitan rationalist civilization. By contrast, Hutchinson makes a point; the cultural nationalist perceives the state as an accidental, for the essence of a nation is its distinctive civilization, which is the product of its unique history, culture and geographical profile. Unlike the political nationalist, who is fundamentally a rationalist, a cultural nationalist like Herder affirms a cosmology according to which humanity, like nature, is infused with a creative force which endows all things with individuality. Nations are primordial expressions of this spirit; like families, they are natural solidarities. Nations are then not just political units but organic beings, living personalities, whose individuality must be cherished by their members in all their manifestations. Unlike the political nationalist, the cultural nationalist founds the nation not on 'mere' consent or law but on the passions implanted by nature and history. Rejecting the ideal of universal citizenship rights of political nationalism, cultural nationalists demand that the natural divisions within the nation – sexual, occupational, religious and regional – be respected, for the impulse to differentiation is the dynamo of national creativity. Herder projects the nation as a continuously mobile community over time, its historic identity and status order must be continuously renovated in terms of the needs of each generation, for no era can provide the model for another. Conflict, therefore, is built into the cultural nationalist conception of the nation, between aging traditionalists and the educated young. Hutchinson affirms that evil and decay come to the nation only through an inner degeneration – either from an excess of rationalism that
induces a passive dependence on the state or from an ossification of tradition such as was experienced in the middle ages.

John Hutchinson distances himself markedly from his contemporary theorists of political nationalism by maintaining that unlike political nationalism, which would uproot the traditional status order for a modern legal-rational society, cultural nationalism is a movement of moral regeneration which seeks to re-unite the different aspects of the nation – traditional and modern, agriculture and industry, science and religion – by returning to the creative life-principle of the nation. For this reason, its proponents are not politicians or legislators but are above all historical scholars and artists who form cultural and academic societies, designed to recover this creative force in all its dimensions with verisimilitude and project it to the members of the nation.

He further argues that unlike the great religions, the nationalist cosmology sets up no prophets to be imitated nor, any authoritative class of interpreters. The source of creativity is located not in a timeless supramundane order but in the continually evolving community itself, of which its heroes, religious or secular, can be but exemplifications who have to be emulated according to the needs of each era. Every true member of the nation, then is an artist-creator, and the great artists are they who create out of the collective experience of the people, preserved in historical legends, and dramatize their lessons for the present. Cultural nationalism has everywhere generated a flowering of the historical sciences and the arts as intellectuals have established cultural forums in which to challenge ossified political and cultural elites and to inspire a rising educated generation to campaign to ‘recreate’ the idea of the nation as a living principle in the lives of the people. Cultural nationalism then has a politics, but it is very different from that of the political nationalist in its goals and modes of organization. Typically cultural nationalists establish informal and decentralized clusters of cultural societies and journals, designed to inspire a spontaneous love of community in its different members by educating them to their common heritage of splendor and suffering. They engage in naming rituals, celebrate national cultural uniqueness and reject foreign practices, in order to identify the community to itself, embed this identity in everyday life and
differentiate it against other communities. Cultural nationalism remains in normal circumstances a small-scale movement that promotes progress through communal self-help. When given a socio-political programme by crusading journalists, it may, if adopted by a young intelligentsia, develop into a loose network of language societies, dramatic groups, publishing houses, lending libraries, summer schools, agricultural co-operatives and political parties. Even so, it generally remains a minority enthusiasm.

One of the clearest instances of this political trajectory is provided by early 19th century Czech cultural nationalism. Initially it was confined to a linguistic and literary revivalism before giving rise to more politicized activities in the 1830s and 1840s. Even then its membership was confined largely to an intelligentsia of teachers, officials, students, lower clergy and some businessmen. It was only the sudden relaxation of censorship on political and journalistic activity as a consequence of the constitutional revolution in Vienna in 1848-49 that gave the nationalist elites the chance to demand cultural autonomy and full civil-liberties, in which task they succeeded in mustering the support of the urban middle classes and the peasantry against the imperial state.

Cultural nationalism as a modernizing movement:

Hutchinson admits that among the scholars the general consensus is that cultural nationalism is a regressive force, a product of intellectuals from backward societies, who, when confronted by more scientifically advanced cultures, compensate for feelings of inferiority by retreating into history to claim descent from a once great civilization. Somehow or other, cultural nationalism, it is argued, is functional for the formation of nations in such backward cultures, but in itself cannot shape their path to socio-political modernization.

This interpretation was first put forward by the pioneering historian of nationalism, Hans Kohn, but its influence can be seen even in the brilliant sociological analysis of nationalism by Ernest Gellner. These authors regard cultural nationalism as antithetical to the modernization process but John Hutchinson considers it as an orthodoxy and proposes
to challenge it. Cultural nationalism, he insists, must be accorded a much more positive role in the modernization process. For it puts forward not a primitivist but an evolutionary vision of the community, and it emerges in conjunction with a trans-national secular culture that perceives the growth of world civilization in polycentric terms. Cultural nationalists, to Hutchinson, act as moral innovators establishing ideological movements at times of social crisis in order to transform the belief-systems of communities, and provide models of socio-political development that guide their modernizing strategies. In the formulation of these objectives, this secular trans-national culture plays an important part. Giving some concession to Kohn and Gellner, John admits that they are right to identify cultural nationalism as a defensive response by educated elites to the impact of exogenous modernization on existing status orders, which may result in a reassertion of traditionalist values in the community, as has occurred in contemporary Islamic countries in the Middle East and Asia. But they are wrong, argues John, to perceive the celebration of the folk as a retreat into an isolated agrarian simplicity free from all the disorders of civilization. Almost the opposite is, in fact, the case, retorts Hutchinson. Behind this evocation of the folk on the part of intellectuals and the intelligentsia is, first, a dynamic vision of the nation as a high civilization with a unique place in the development of humanity and, secondly, a corresponding drive to recreate this nation which, integrating the traditional and the modern on a higher level, will again rise to the forefront of world progress. Thus in its golden age, cultural nationalism inspires a glorious synthesis of religious and secular cultures and is a seminal contributor to human civilization. Cultural nationalists call on the rising educated generation to break with traditionalism and to restore their country to its former standing in the world, by constructing a modern scientific culture on the ethnic remains of the folk, who, remote from the great metropolitan centers, are the last repository of national traditions. The return to the folk, in short, is not a flight from the world but rather a means to catapult the nation from present backwardness and divisions to the most advanced stage of social development.

Thus the author is of the view that as an integrative movement, it repudiates both traditionalism and modernism as degenerations from a national vision that combines the
virtues of each: the sense of unique identity given by former with the idea of the community, embraced by the latter, as an active and equal participator in human progress. Conflict between national members can only occur because of a loss of touch with this national heritage. Cultural nationalists or what Hutchinson calls revivalists admire the human scale of the traditional community and its rootedness in nature, family, locality and religion, but they reject its other-worldliness and its barriers to the equal contribution of all groups (occupational, religious, sexual) to the nation as a corruption of native values. Likewise, they share with rationalist modernizers a commitment to a mobile meritocratic social order and contact with a wider humanity, but they oppose the latter’s adherence to external Universalist models of modernization, which produce only an anomic cosmopolitanism. History, they argue, shows that social progress comes not from the imposition of alien norms on the community but from the inner reformation of the traditional status order. The recovery of national pride is a prerequisite for successful participation in the wider word.

Cultural nationalists, concludes Hutchinson, should be seen as moral innovators who seek by ‘reviving’ an ethnic historicist vision of the nation to redirect traditionalists and modernists away from conflict and instead to unite them in the task of constructing an integrated distinctive and autonomous community, capable of competing in the modern world. The true matrix for both traditionalist and modernist is the nation in whose inner drive for realization all must find their individual and collective meanings. Hutchinson mentions that revivalists like Swami Vivekananda of the neo-Vedantic movement and Liang Ch’I Ch’ao of the Chinese reform movement, instead defend their community against the external challenge by presenting a polycentric vision of a world of distinct and equal nations, in which their culture has played in the past and will in the future play an active role. Hence to the traditionalists, Vivekananda proposed as the authentic India, a dynamic Aryan founding civilization that had been in touch with other world centers of learning (Persia and Greece) and that rejected any inherent barriers between sexes, castes, and between religious and secular branches of knowledge. He attacked the religious taboos on contact with aliens and the caste laws prescribed by the Brahmin priests as degeneration from this democratic civilization. To learn from foreign cultures entailed no
break with Indian tradition. On the contrary, it was merely a way of recovering skills and knowledge once in Indian possession. Such was his revulsion from the effects of physical and social decay produced by religious quietism that Vivekananda declared that playing football was a surer way of achieving salvation than reading the Gita.

Cultural nationalism, to the judgment of Hutchinson, is a political movement. It disavows the passive isolationism of the traditionalists and presents the nation as a progressive culture in active contact with other societies. At the same time it opposes the assimilation of the community to any universal model of development, liberal or socialist. Revivalists appeal to the intelligentsia to borrow from other cultures in order to regenerate rather than to efface the national community.27

Conclusion:

This chapter undertakes an inquiry into a plethora of intellectual claims not only for definitions of nations and nationalisms but also for the most contested causations, forms and moments of origin and age of nationalism. It also endeavors to see through the pre-existing and historically-determined conditions (ethnic, temporal and scientific) that built the ground for nation and nationalism. In order to serve the purpose of a disinterested but not indifferent study into nationalism, this chapter purports to draw a broader canvass embracing both classical (Romantic and realist) and contemporary (instrumentalist and primordialist) thinkers. In the face of all the contentions and contestations which nationalism has been subjected to, I have proposed, in order to simplify the theoretical complications involved into this nationalist discourse, to illustrate a universal typology of nationalism. This typology unfolds into the illustration of three major categories of nationalism: (a) cultural nationalism, (b) civic/political nationalism and (c) Left-Wing nationalism; apart from the fourth category of secessionist nationalism. All typologies of nationalism, it has been witnessed, seem to have engaged themselves eventually either with ‘restoration project’ (primordialist treatment) or ‘construction project’ (instrumentalist treatment). Besides, it is quite likely that each of these categories might have its own subcategories depending upon the time, history and context of each nation-
state. Out of these three given categories of nationalism, civic/political nationalism has been witnessed to have enjoyed greater success in terms of transforming itself into official and even popular nationalism in most of the nation-states. The credit for its success also goes to its consistent, historic and ideological alignment with liberalism (classical, positive and political) and one’s success goes coterminous with another. Another factor going into the success of civic/political nationalism is that it has been much more malleable in character in terms of changing its faces as per the suitability than other variants of nationalism. For instance, in its first phase, civic/political nationalism portrayed itself with individualist liberal face of laissez faire kind or to be precise ‘civic-territorial nationalism’ (as could be witnessed in 19th c England); while in its second phase it portrayed itself with socialist face (as witnessed in post WW II West European nation-states) and lastly it came to recognize the value-pluralism and difference-friendly state or to be precise, what Seymour calls ‘socio-political nationalism’ or what John Rawls would call “Political Liberalism”.

It is interesting here to note Will Kymlicka’s comment on the nationalism of political liberals like Rawls and Dworkin. He notes, “After all, Rawls and Dworkin do not endorse the idea of a single world government. They assume that the principles of justice they endorse should be adopted and implemented within some bounded political community. It is to our co-citizens, rather than humanity at large, that we have primary obligations of justice. They both accept that we have some obligations to humanity at large, but these ‘humanitarian’ obligations to foreigners are weaker than our ‘egalitarian’ obligations to co-citizens.”

Adding to the same, Kymlicka cites Samuel Black with approval, that in virtually all liberal theories, a subtle but profound shift takes place in terminology. What begins as a theory about the moral equality of persons typically ends up as a theory of the moral equality of citizens. The basic rights which liberalism accords to individuals turn out to be reserved for some individuals – namely, those who are citizens of the state. Only citizens have the right to move freely into a country, to earn a living, to share in collective self-government, or to receive social benefits. People outside the country, even
if born just five miles across the border, are not entitled to the rights of citizenship, since they are not members of ‘our’ community.  

Finally, when industrial society enters into the era of Information Technology (IT-Revolution) or when nationalism clashes with the internet and mobile technology, there comes into the picture another subcategory of nationalism which Benedict Anderson prefers to call as “Long-Distance Nationalism” or “Diaspora Nationalism”. On being asked to comment on if nationalism is become outdated in the globalization era, Anderson answers that on the contrary, nationalism has gone mobile globally in form of international diasporas rather than confined to its erstwhile territorial image. He further added that despite all the talk of transnationalism and fluid identity, nationalism is in the best of health. Citing the newer examples of nationalism, Anderson continues, are the long-distance nationalisms of migrants: Jews in the USA fighting for a state in the Middle East, or Tamils in Norway working for their own state in Sri Lanka, or for that matter Norwegian schools in Spain [the only reason for their existence is that people fear that their children will stop being Norwegian and these schools take Norway to Spain], similarly some of the most ardent Sikh nationalists are situated in Australia and Canada. Summarizing his views on contemporary relevance of nationalism, at the international literature festival Kapittel in Stavanger, Anderson holds that he has not met more than five cosmopolitan people in his lifetime (www.nationalismproject.org/what/anderson.htm).

In spite of the entire valid intellectual defense which Anderson has built up for Diaspora nationalism, it does not figure into my typology of nationalism, primarily because no Diaspora possesses ever a will to make a sovereign nation independent from the state it is located into and hence it can at best be called ‘subnationalism’ (which is itself an integral part of the civil-society of its currently-residential state) although its desire for ‘dual citizenship’ or the idea of having two legal passports is an unprecedented and unexplored idea which must be imbibed by the nationalist discourse in order to meet with the challenges of globalization age and also to transcend, if need arises, its own corporate like personality in discourses as well as realpolitik as the dynamism of human civilization march can not be arrested by its own instrumental servant and above all the ideology of identitarian nationalism can not travel across time and space.
ENDNOTE


2. John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, (Manchester: Manchester University 1982), 342-44.


8. Ibid.


22. Ibid.


29. Ibid.