CHAPTER-IV

THE THIRD WORLD AND SMALL STATES: PROBLEMS OF SECURITY
The course of international relations has never been streamlined and predictable. It has been full of surprises and often we face situations quite unprecedented. The international system does not take a mathematical course where results could be inferred by precalculations. Instead the dynamics of world system takes different courses even under similar conditions and thus every time face a peculiar situation.

As the twentieth century unfolded, particularly during its second half, it became more and more clear that this is a century, in which the Third World is emerging as a dynamic part of the revolution against western colonialism and capitalism. By means of national liberation movements, which smashed western political domination and which pointed towards ongoing revolution entailing the socialization of the national economic resources. The Third World revolution represents an important phase of world movement. In the post-war period, the original East-West confrontation was retained in the gradual adoption of the term 'First World' to denote the industrialized developed market economy countries i.e., the Western-capitalist countries. The term 'Second World' referred to the industrialized or industrializing centrally directed economies i.e., the
socialist or the communist bloc. The term 'Third World' referred to the nations lately decolonised and which were underdeveloped, exploited by the former colonial rulers. Yet another latter introduction is the induction of the term 'Fourth World' which refers to the chronically poor, least developed countries. But for the purpose of our study, we will consider the third and the fourth world as one category as they have had a common past and face the same problems in the present system.

Third World

The term 'Third World' was coined by French demographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952, by analogy with the "third estate" - the commoners of France before and during the French Revolution - who were opposed to the priests and the nobles. 1 It is further emphasized that the 'Third World' like the 'third estate' is nothing and "wants to be something." Till as late as 1945, besides political bondage, the economically underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, Oceania and Latin American suffered deprivation, dependence, exploitation and insecurity. The process of decolonization that reached its plateau at the end of 1950s, gave birth to the Third World in contemporary international relations system. This group consisted mainly of states

removed recently from colonial dependency. Although, the group is still comprised, to a large extent, of post colonial states located in the southern hemisphere, it no longer has any geographical, cultural or specific political connotations.

The confrontation which emerged in the 1950s and the 1960s was one between the capitalist West and the communist East - a conflict of ideology. This was replaced in the late sixties by the North-South confrontation as the great majority of poor nations lie in the southern hemisphere. Yet the nations of the south are not homogenous or a unified whole. The differ among themselves in size, level of development, ethnic composition, religious and class structure, political orientation, etc. Nonetheless, the term 'third' in a general way share at least some characteristics:
- a political background of colonialism, quasi or neo-colonialism;
- a socio-economic and technological position of relative under-development, viz-a-viz Europe and North America;
- a relative lack of interest or reluctance in adopting modern economic and social advances and the modernization process;
- with varying degree of commitment, an unwillingness to become involved in the politics of superpowers;
— a commitment to economic and social changes towards greater world equality.

The 'Third World status' is more easily defined with reference to the economic situation and level of development than in terms of political alignment and geographical location, ideological orientation or governmental structures. It was from this group of nations that non-aligned movement grew up during the early years of cold war; partly as a reaction and counter to the ideological bloc polarization that followed soon and more due to their wish to stay away from power-blocs as an independent entity. Nonetheless, it (NAM) was never meant to be a 'third bloc'. It has its origin even before the super power relations turned cold and still remains a loose conglomeration of independent states.

Many of the development problems that the Third World confront today may be traced to effects of colonialism and continued excessive dependence on external powers. This was the situation during colonial period and a similar one exists even now, although indirectly, as neo-colonialism. But the term 'Third World' itself has less relevance as it could not be properly defined as a definite category. The best term we come to, while describing relations among nations of the world can be what John Galtung rightly called
"the centre-periphery relationship."\(^2\) The term 'Centre' as used by Galtung implies a globally dominant core of capitalist economies, the 'periphery' was a set of industrially, financially and politically weaker states operating within a set of relationship largely constructed by the Centre. The semi-periphery, which aspire to be part of the core, consists of developed nations in the periphery. The relationship is characterized by vertical-hierarchical interaction among the centre and periphery. This explains and forms the crux of the dynamics of international relations theory.

Along with political bondage, these nations suffered economic deprivation. Today with a population quite beyond control,\(^3\) a peasant society is still considered a determining factor of what Third World is. There is insufficient land to till, exploitation of product and of their labour, insecurity generated due to unemployment and cultural retardation. A traditional Third World society is generally economically underdeveloped with a low quality of life as: life expectancy at birth is low; infant mortality

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3. Developing countries account for over ninety per cent of the population increase which is expected to peak at 6.2 billion by the year 2001. In 1980 the world population was around 4.4 billion, of which 72 per cent was in the Third World.
rate is high; national average calorie intake is low, illiteracy is rampant and unemployment swear high. Also bulk of the population suffers from malnutrition, access to safe-drinking water and a high rate of death. Such Third World countries are clearly behind the First and the Second World countries in their economic growth and viability. Yet, underdevelopment, as basic feature does not mean that these societies are homogeneous. Here too, the rich are relatively richer and the poor abysmally poor.

Imperialism had systematically excluded the indigenous population from power and property within the Third World societies. Over the centuries the colonial rulers had exploited them politically, economically as well as socially and culturally. Politically they had dominated these states under authoritarian rule, extracting maximum advantage from their erstwhile colonies for the benefit of the colonial power. Economically they robbed them of their resources - raw material was taken at low price and the colonies served as the market for their finished products. Hence these nations did not witness the Industrial Revolution which Europe had undergone in the eighteenth century. This was a major cause of underdevelopment in these states as they were deliberately left out so as to serve as cheap markets for the imperial powers. For their own interests, they kept education at low key, played one community against another
thus wrecking havoc on Third World society. National movements awakened and played on popular dreams of transformation and justice in the Third World. The period after 1945, was characterized by greatest expression of nationalism in human history as about three-quarters of world population was affected by demand for self determination. This struggle for political independence expressed a contradiction between international development of capitalism on world scale and struggle of the Third World people to 'recapture their own history.'

As the imperial power withdrew they left behind glaring disparity among nations. The gap between the developed and developing has been increasing ever since. It was noted by Paul Baran that 67 per cent of world's population living in poorest countries accounted for 15 per cent of the world income in 1949. In contrast, in richest countries, 18 per cent of world population enjoyed 67 per cent of its income.\(^4\) In 1969, 25.4 per cent of world population had access to 79.1 per cent of world income in the richest countries while the 67.3 per cent living in the poorest states accounted for 13 per cent of the world's income.\(^5\) Even at inter-societal level there is a completely unequal distribution: the poor -


5. Ibid (Penguin edn.) pp.267-75.
gets poorer while the rich rolls in wealth. Problems were aggravated by arbitrary division of nation-states and redrawal of international boundaries, thereby dividing the linguistically, ethnically and religiously/culturally similar communities across the borders. Lately this has been a major issue leading to conflict.

The unequal and uneven distribution of international resources reflect a process involving more than three centuries of subordination and interaction with the West. The development of capitalism in the Third World is characterized by uneven development. Colonialism meant more than just loss of sovereignty. because the colonized nations could only watch helplessly as their social systems, cultures and ideologies were eroded and remoulded to provide support for the colonial machinery. This put them to psychological and social humiliation. Neglect of internal infrastructural development and a reluctance to widen internal markets for fear of generating economic competition not only limited the potential for further development but also bred instability within the colonies themselves. Yet most of the colonial powers had no intention of giving up their empire, if they could, as it helped them to be a major world force and moreover helped them economically.

It was only by the end of the Second World War, that their declining status, as a result of the war and the
nationalistic upsurge world over, compelled them to withdraw from the colonies like India, Ceylon, Burma and Palestine. Little was done to prepare the colonies for independence and legitimacy was accepted in the rule by local bourgeoisies. As for the weak and distorted character of colonial social formations, so did they do little to assist the newly independent state to attain any semblance of economic autonomy. In many Third World countries, unstable class alliances emerged in compensation and as a result of 'weakness of class formation'. Shared power among a number of allied classes, often, is not conducive to stability or development strategies. Hence many countries experienced political intervention by their military forces to mediate between conflicting political alliance. Yet liberation was generally welcomed regardless of constraints they faced. Leaders of the post-colonial states were determined to develop their nations in ways in which colonial powers had little interest. For once, development became an issue for global debate and initiative, and independence was rightly regarded as necessary precondition for national development.

There were two basic problems that the Third World and developing nations faced: the sources of primitive accumulation, so relied upon, had already been removed by colonization and their industry had to compete with advanced products. Moreover, continuing unequal exchange between the
core and periphery, provided further resistance to Third World's independent growth. Inappropriate technology for many industries forced Third World countries to abandon plans for autonomous economic growth and laid a new way for dependency. They believed modernization and industrialization would bring rich dividends as capitalism grew, but failed to recognize the capitalism-imperialism nexus. What the Third World were forced to do, to survive, was to perpetuate rather than reduce the inequalities which restricted internal growth due to reliance of newly nationalized industries on same consumer market.

The Zambian Daily Mail stated, 'one has a feeling that everything is collapsing around us'. The social conflicts, that followed in the wake of crises like exploitation, unemployment and inflation, threatened the very survival of some states and societies. In more seriously affected area, the Third World witnessed falling real wages, growing poverty, landlessness and marginalization in the countryside. Clive Thomas notes: "in the periphery, where both the traditional classes of the capitalist social formation are underdeveloped and where both of these classes are small in number and qualitatively weak, there is no

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clearly hegemonic ruling power." In such a sense of ruination all around 'development' became a self-conscious end, the subject of purposive political action and economic strategy. Growth was the subject of a national political will and effort. What the Third World wanted to attain can be summarized as - 'technologically based industrialized economy, economic growth and efficiency, a high overall standard of social development, structures specialized enough to deal with increased societal demands and needs, and greater control of nature and social environment.' The crisis of the Third World is the historical experience of uneven capitalistic development. It produced characteristic problems of poverty and stagnation. The crisis of the last decades have sharpened the contradictions and suffering produced by underdevelopment.

Broadly, development can be defined as the realization of the potential of human personality which can best be achieved by reducing poverty, unemployment and inequality and at the same time bring about even more social justice and liberty. 'Development also implies increased self-reliance and cultural and intellectual independence.'

Development is considered a more broader and general concept whereas 'modernization' implies a particular case. "Modernization implies three conditions - a social system that can constantly innovate without falling apart; differential and flexible social structure; and a social framework to provide the skills and knowledge necessary for living in a technologically advanced world." Economic development in the developing states, according to the neoclassical theory, is possible only through diffusion of capital and technology from the developed countries. Indirectly, it implies foreign aid and investment, even foreign intervention, in developing countries. On the contrary, the 'dependency theory' hypothesizes that development and underdevelopment are partially interdependent structures in the world capitalist system.

Uneven development is one of the core elements of most peripheral, i.e. Third World, economies and societies. This unevenness is varyingly conceptualized as regional disparities, rural-urban hiatus, urban biased growth and development, extreme economic inequalities between social groups, primacy of primary agricultural sector, and unequal exchange at international level. In the Third World context, major setback to the developmental efforts are 

ethnic, racial or fundamentalist conflicts among primordial collectivities which neither dependency nor modernization theory is equipped to deal with conceptually.

Although post-war period saw a polarization in the power system, since late sixties, there has been a keen awareness of 'diffusion of power' in the international system. But the replacement of detente by a second cold war tended to reinforce the strategic bipolar perceptions. The situation in most of the Third World countries and the national interests of the superpowers themselves, provided the latter with an opportunity to interfere, directly or indirectly. Sources of Third World conflicts are many: legacies of colonialism, uneven economic development, crisis of political legitimacy of ruling elites, dissipation of broad-based coalitions that emerged in the struggle for independence, the growth of militarism, and resurgence of sectarian tendencies as ethnic, tribal, religious, linguistic and communal passions. More often such conflicts are not limited and do spill over international borders with ethnic groups straddling across the borders, as in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, there is lack of harmony between nations and state in most part of Third World.

To understand the international system in general and Third World in particular, it may be necessary to have a
structural understanding of global conflict patterns. It is derived from 'imperialism, dependency and world system theory.' D. Senghaas has correctly pointed out 'we are presently living in a time in which it might be possible to interrupt the hitherto existing cycles of major wars and period of hegemonic peace; i.e., we are living in a time of structural change which implies considerable dangers for peace as well as new chances for a new international order.' Arms race on various levels of world system is fed, but not necessarily created by the cold war or East-West conflicts. The internal crises in Third World countries often have external implication because international relations are still based on inter-state system. It is argued that 'lack of stronger sense of regional security sub-system is a major weakness in contemporary analysis of international relations.'

The global diffusion of power and a slow shift towards a multipolar world generate new regional conflict formations and rivalries. Distrust is generated when neighbours acquire better or more weapons. Accumulation of weapons by one state unavoidably provokes reciprocal action by others. Till the 1970s, the arms control initiative were initiated by suppliers as an expression of their vested interests and

the proposals seldom reflected conviction. In short, it was not a buyers' market. However, things have changed with competition even from semi-periphery states. Despite economic problems, Third World continue to receive two-third global flow of major weapons. In mid-eighties, half of this was directed towards five nations namely Egypt, India, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria. This has made the control of proliferation of weapons, difficult. Often it has resulted in rechannelizing of meagre resources from development towards armament. "Arms race and development are in a competitive relationship. Military outlay by definition reflect consumption of resources and not an input into investment. It affirms that arms-race and development are not two problems, they are one. They must be solved together or neither will ever be solved." 11 Militarization of economy is at the root of present global problem - the military, industrial and bureaucratic complex. The global economy of the second half of twentieth century is dominated by transnational corporations which control investment, technology, trade and other decisive instruments of market economy.

There is a strong connection between the process of nation-building and militarization and this, to an extent, explains Third World re-armament. In many parts of the world, the process of state formation and nation-building has been arrested or replaced by disintegrative tendencies to an extent that the very future of nation-state as a mode of political organization becomes questionable. The ethno-regional identification in most part of the world has great importance viz-a-viz quantitative change in arms transfer; "... people are challenging nation-states. In one of the most perplexing trends of second half of the twentieth century governments are being hounded, cajoled and defied by minorities within their societies by ethno-nationalism." 12

The cold war manifested itself in arms supply, ideological fundamentalism, political pressure on allied countries and intensified struggle for influence in the non-aligned countries. The other underlying causes are regional conflicts, more or less, independent of superpower struggle and political decay leading to break down of states. Some regional powers base their new status on strategic resources, while others on export-based industrialization. Yet others, combine both to be a regional power. Although the military potential of individual highly armed developing

countries does not currently represent a direct military threat to industrial nations, it can jeopardize the security of the concerned region. Regional 'security complexes' will rather have a dynamics of its own and in absence of a stable order, will rather have a regional arms-race independent of conflicts on world level.

The arms build-up in developing countries is particularly problematic in connection with aggressive regime and increasing international terrorism. "The Transnationalists" while putting the structure of international system under scrutiny, argue that the role and function of nation-state has changed and new actors like multinational corporations, international organizations, cartels and terrorists have emerged. The thrust has shifted to non-military issues like population, pollution, food, depletion of natural resources, and dependency of Third World on developed countries. The relationship among nations has changed with increasing interdependence in trade, technology-transfer, investment, travel and immigration. Weapons of mass destruction have changed the nature of war as purpose of foreign policy. The identification of transnationalism and interdependence is both a conceptual and empirical problem. Keohane and Nye do not argue that 'realism' has become completely redundant but that it fails to address important issues of contemporary
international politics. Nye argues that as "in an interdependent world both distribution of power and its goals are not fixed, agenda setting and its control becomes necessary. The increased transnational and trans-governmental relations blur the distinction between national and international policies, thus increasing the scope of international organization." 13 They have helped in bringing together the representatives of less developed countries. In the United Nations system, 'one state-one vote principle' favours the small and weak. To sum up, these organizations allow states to pursue the linkage strategy.

The rapid turn of events during the last four decades or so has characterized phenomenal changes in world politics, economy, diplomacy, culture, and security strategy. As a consequence of linkage between these developments and their total impact on humanity, what has been particularly emphasized was global interdependence. No man or state is an island; they exist within a system. Linkage has strengthened the interdisciplinary approach. New theoretical and political notions of security have gained currency as a result of development of world community, into regional and international security, under

the impact of the process of interdependence of the world. Security has hence gained both interdisciplinary - military, political, economic, social and environmental - and interdependent - national, regional and international/global - connotations. Hence it has become essential to study relationship between disarmament, development and security and between power, security and peace.

Non-alignment was basically a policy to keep parts of the Third World out of the East-West conflict, to maintain an individual and independent stand on international issues. Although, the process started with 'decolonization', later disarmament, development, dissemination and democratization formed the foundation pillars of the Non-Aligned Movement. Non-alignment was also an element of solidarity between developing countries and a certain focal point for the enactment of the North-South conflict. It emphasized the need for transition from an old order based on domination to a new order of cooperation, equality and justice. As the decolonization process becomes remote, governments of periphery states find themselves in tight spot as the reality of continued inferiority reasserts itself in the form of underdevelopment and lack of resources. The thawing

of superpower relations have opened up the boundary questions in a big way, so as these states find it difficult to sustain their legitimacy of colonial boundaries that so clearly failed to define viable states. The policy of non-alignment gained significance as its membership increased from a meagre twenty-five in 1961 to 108 in 1992 while it got transformed into a movement during early seventies. Most decolonised states, wishing to stay away from bloc-politics, with a homogeneous history formed a heterogeneous non-aligned movement (NAM).

Political independence loses credibility in the absence of economic independence and it is the issue of development that made most non-aligned states synonymous with the Third World. In the existing international financial system, dominated by the developed/capitalistic orientation, the non-aligned Third World countries evolved in a very different way from the First. Imperialist distorted social formations, disarticulated economies creating forms of development that reinforced their dominant role in world economy. Third World's ability to adopt a particular developmental strategy was limited by the very nature of their colonial inheritance.

15. We witness strong revisionist pressures within East Europe, the erstwhile Soviet Union and Yugoslavia for redrawing or redefining national borders.
Obviously, these nations desired the freedom to adopt their own indigenous economic and political structures. No doubt, more specialized attention was needed for problems of underdevelopment than to bi-polar antagonism. Many developmental problems confronting the Third World can trace their origins from colonialism and continued excessive dependence on external powers. The basis of this crisis was rooted in the nature of Third World relations to the world capitalist economy. These relations imposed different conditions on different countries within the international division of labour. There was an urgent need of restructuring of world monetary system as it was controlled by developed nations. The terms of trade were constantly becoming more unfavourable while funds from advanced countries were constantly diminishing. There has been a constant demand for a New International Economic Order, since early 1970s by developing countries for a more equitable distribution of resources.\textsuperscript{16} The newly industrialized countries were often forced, because of their reliance on some consumer market, to perpetuate rather than reduce the inequalities which restricted internal growth.

\textsuperscript{16} The call for NIEO at the Algiers Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries (1973) resulted in a lively debate about the future of global economy. Realizing that political independence and sovereignty were dependent on economic development they adopted economic independence and collective self-reliance as goals of non-alignment.
Modernization accorded different emphasis to the adoption of capital and technology, western cultural values, entrepreneurial skills or political institutions. It was argued that western historical experience was the only applicable model, where all problems could be overcome by capitalization. This only worked to increase the dependency of Third World economies on transnational corporations (TNC) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), thus creating a neo-colonialist syndrome and economic insecurity.

An unprecedented ideological conflict preceded the birth of most non-aligned countries, thus they were determined to maintain their individual sovereignties. The factors influencing the states to opt for a non-aligned status vary, yet each of these new states saw a fair amount of conformity between their national interests and the international goals of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The movement includes all those who want to preserve independence, alleviate international tension and contribute positively towards arresting the worsening international situation. No state ever admits that it wants the other state to be insecure, yet favours the creation of that kind of equilibrium or disequilibrium which affords the maximum security to it and consequently makes the neighbour

insecure. NAM has peace and security as one of its major goals, which are also the main focus of the United Nations. It pursues all its goals, not as a 'third bloc' in the international system thus bypassing the UN, but through the UN acting as a group within it. It voices its demands - decolonization, development and NIEO, disarmament - regularly from the UN platform. Further still, they demand for democratization of international relations - the UN and the international monetary system - for equal rights and participation in international forums as the present system often leads to insecurity, among nations.

In short, all problems that the Third World face today generate insecurity and instability for these nations. It was the urge to maintain their sovereignty, after a long period of domination, the need to avoid the ideological confrontation and thus reducing the tension, that pulled the nations of the Third World together as the Non-Aligned Movement. In the ensuing years, as the membership expanded, so did its heterogeneous character. Nations, big or small, semi-industrialized developing or underdeveloped, resourceful or resourceless of all sorts opted for a non-aligned policy. Though all sorts of problems sprang up in due course, one was too peculiar and outstanding from the point of view of international politics i.e., the security of small states. With the present disintegrative tendency
among nations the situation aggravates further and harsh questions of viability and vulnerability of small states have come up.

**Small States**

Although small nations have existed since long and they have all right to do so, it raises question about their viability, their security and existence. Does it not pose security problem both at regional and international levels? Are these nations, some of them a few hundred square kilometers across, viable entities viz-a-viz their resources? Is their economy self-sufficient, in the minimum sense of term, to support the state or is it giving rise to a dependency? Is not their smallness, a constraint to their existence militarily, politically and economically? Above all, is it not an impediment to international peace with as many borders cutting across the globe, disputes increase, ethnicity and religion result in change of loyalties across national frontiers. The international balance itself faces instability in an age of such changing alignments. Still the right of small states to exist cannot be rejected and therefore the small states should be understood and analyzed well before drawing conclusions.

No law has ever tried to define state attributes like area or population till now. States have existed as they
are, especially since the late seventeenth century when the nation-state system came into existence. Small states, like Monaco or Luxembourg, could not call for attention in the game played by powerful nations. The international community sought to ignore their existence as the system was dominated by medium or great powers or 'governed by the self-judgement of "civilized" nations'. In the past, the balance of power equation so pervaded the international security doctrines and structures that it clouded a proper comprehension of the definitional and typological categorization of the threats of the security of contemporary nation-states. As no nation can exist in isolation from the international order, the roots of insecurity of small states can be traced to the pulls and pressure of the international system itself. Their vulnerability may increase depending not so much on their military power, area or population, but on their prime strategic location. This situation has worsened with the shift of conflicts from the European continent to the periphery nation states. The great powers often meddle in their internal problems and in the process internationalize them.

“Smallness” is a difficult term to define when it is associated with a nation-state because the term state itself is not quite well defined. Any state is defined with reference to terms like sovereignty, territory, population and government. These terms are themselves subjective and therefore ill-equipped to highlight its basic definition. Yet the term 'smallness' denotes relational and relative characteristics, regardless of the adopted criteria. Till late small states were not much concern of study as bulk of contemporary security debate was dominated by East-West balance and conventional military-oriented external security. As decolonization progressed and new states emerged, the epicentre of conflicts shifted to the Third World, where many of the newly independent states were small by all standards. Vulnerability of states like Chad, Libya, Grenada and Afghanistan increased overnight with the shift in conflict scenario. It was their security linked up with that of the system as a whole which brought about a shift in the field of study.

In his analysis Robert Keohane had arranged states in a four-step power-hierarchy. At the apex are the "system determining states", like USA and the erstwhile USSR, who play a critical role in international system by their interaction. The second step are the "system influencing states, like China, Japan, Germany, India or UK, which can significantly influence the nature of the system's
unilateral and multilateral actions. The third category comprises of middle power, like Canada, Brazil and Australia; who can, working as small group or through international or regional organization, exert enough pressure on the system. These are the "system-affecting states". Last of all are the "system-ineffectual states" which cannot, collectively or individually, influence the system of inter-state behaviour.19

John Galtung puts an emphasis on the nature of interaction in his ranking of states in a global framework. In his paradigm of international stratification, he states that 'the world is pinned at the top and poised at the bottom', with an interaction pattern that the 'periphery' is dependent on the 'centre', while the centre is interdependent amongst itself. Thus concluding he states, "international politics... is a big power politics and that the initiative is concentrated on the big and taken away from the small" because "if you think it over, it is only the USA and Soviet Union that really count the other countries are of little or no importance."20


Both Keohane and Galtung take pessimistic view about small states and their ineffectuality in the international system. They fail to perceive that these are the states that create worldwide instability, may be due to their strategic location, their fragile socio-economic conditions or their ability to influence the system through change of alignment. But others, unlike them, define small states as separate analytical category. Some like David Vital find a definition of smallness, unnecessary, while some others explains it in relative terms, depending on geographical position and the domestic political system of the small states. R.L. Rothstein describes small states as those 'that recognize their own incapability and thus the fundamental need of dependence on other states and also, "the small powers' belief in its instability to rely on its own measure must be recognized by other states" involved in international politics'.

State can be small in size, population, indicators like GNP, productive capability, resource base or industrial capacity. However a consensus emerged on about a population of one million or less as critical threshold, and the size of the population as the criterion for defining a small

This criterion was also adopted by the Commonwealth Consultative Group. They also held a working definition of national security as "the absence of threat to exercise the capacity to govern, protect, preserve and advance the state and its peoples, consistent with the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states."

Prior to the Second World War, these small states had emerged, survived, disappeared and reemerged and yet much of them remain recognized actors. Situated as they were, mostly on the European continent, they went unnoticed. Today, we face an altogether different situation vis-a-vis small states. They are scattered all over the globe, occupying strategic location, their number has by far increased a lot; most of them are members of the United Nations and thus stand on equal footing with any other nation. Together they form a sizeable lobby, mostly through NAM or other regional organizations, and can therefore be strong group contending for change in international order. Many a trouble spots like Fiji, Grenada or Maldives have recently shattered the peace in their area while others, like Vanuatu, leave the superpowers vying for influence. More often, their vulnerability increases with a low

capacity to respond to crises. Their size makes them particularly more susceptible to both natural and man-made catastrophe. Despite the fact that today they can push the world to the brink of nuclear war, the best that community of states have done is to apply the existing set of assumptions to the small states.\textsuperscript{23} The 'small' does not always, by definition, have means to deter or repulse attack and therefore have to depend on a major power for protection or diminish vulnerabilities to enhance its security. The importance of small states has increased lately due to development in means of communication and transportation, innovations in technology and their easy accessibility.

As defined by the Commonwealth Consultative Group, 23 per cent of sovereign nation-states are characterized as small. With an upward shift to 10 million, 64 per cent can be termed so, of which, 85 per cent are developing. This explains the close relationship and overlapping among the developing, the Third World and the small nations. Still, there has been a general lack of awareness, among the international community, about the security of small states, often characterized by underdevelopment and backwardness. As a matter of fact most Third World nations irrespective of

\textsuperscript{23} The aggression of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990, and the war that followed in early 1991 to liberate Kuwait, highlights the instability towards which small states can push the global community.
their size, location or resource-endowment appeared to be vulnerable in the present pyramidical power-structure with Great powers at the apex followed by regional and middle powers. In an effort to be broad-based and conceptually clear, smallness of the countries is associated with a 'Third World syndrome'. They are:

subjected to a stigma of smallness in terms of their total capacity to deter their security in view of their inherent and enormous socio-economic and political problems irrespective of the size of their land area, population and even at times enormous wealth.24

The paradox today is that insecurity does not mostly arise from fear of being annexed (what happened in Kuwait in 1990-91 is an exception) but from possibilities of internal wars, external interventionism, and coercive diplomacy resulting from withdrawal of food grains, energy resources or sustained economic aid.

The sources of insecurity in the current international order, specifically those affecting the developing world, are primarily summed up as:25

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- intra state conflicts: resulting from internal violence and linked to regime security, they might or might not have an interventionist power attached;
- coercive politics: of great powers or developed world;
- economic insecurity: might generate from economic unviability of some of the states;
- inter-state violence: resulting from conflicts among neighbours - a legacy of their colonial past.

Problems of Security in Third World and Small States

It is this part of the world today, that contains greater potential for conflicts, as is evident from different manifestation of violence here. Of about 160 conflicts that have taken place since the end of the War to date, most point to some broad conclusion: that there has been an increase in frequency of war; conflicts occur mostly on the territories of Third World; over the years there has been increase in inter-state conflict although the intra-state conflicts are still more; there has been considerable increase in presence of forces of one developing country in another developing country (e.g., Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia, or the Vietnamese in Kampuchea); conflicts that are intra-state are increasingly anti-regime, with or without foreign support; this has obviously resulted in escalation of military budget of these states, both in

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aggregate terms and percentage of world military expenditure and this has been a result of increasing number of sovereign states and diffusion of military capacity among them. 26

From the point of view of socio-economic and political development, the rise of the Third World states is similar to the evolution of European states. Consequently, the Third World along with small states witness the same nationalistic upsurge and consciousness of their identities that the Europeans did in late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Their size has seldom been a hindrance in their solidarity and determination of its people to preserve their cultural and racial identity. Yet they face the accompanying traumas and upheavals common to the process of nation building. It may reach a peak in parochial, religious, linguistic and ethnic differences, sometimes their effects spill over state boundaries turning them into intra-state conflict. It is partly the present international system of interdependence and partly the rising expectations of masses after independence that has hastened the process of progress. Asymmetrical development of social forces and institutions has thus been a legacy for these states. A short cut in the process of development has

led to concentration of power and therefore there is the tendency to stem the alternative leadership base. Hence, often their government can be undemocratic in nature and tend to identify the regime with the state and in the process lead to distortion in conceptualization of national security. The question of legitimacy is foremost for any regime and it is this that encourages the leadership to seek alignments in a way that enhance its prestige both internally and externally. But in such process they do indulge in activities that lead to interference of outside power in the area. It gives an opportunity to the forces of division, cleavages, primordial loyalty and particularism to effect social and political cohesion, and thus bring instability.

Apart from the inadequacy of means to influence the external environment, the small states have limited administrative capability and economic leverage. Dependency, a striking feature of national development in small states can be traced to the transnational corporations in an era of interdependence. The world has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspirations, apart from being so in military and strategic

sphere. "The calculations of power are even more delicate - and deceptive than in previous age." 28 Various other transnational bodies operating within a territory too influence and manipulate affairs and thus creating a dependency syndrome. "So the traditional approach to security or insecurity, without a socio-political and economic content, is simply inapplicable to these countries where security is complex and the links between its various dimensions are further complicating factor." 29

The small states face two over-arching security threats in the external sphere: the escalating East-West tension and the increasing use of military force in resolution of conflicts. 30 The superpower conflicts are hence reduced to a 'zero-sum game' in each part of Third World, irrespective of its geographical location. It had a purpose of overstretching the opponent's military and political resources. 31 The small states became more vulnerable due to


possession of strategic raw materials and resources inviting active interest of the international powers. Other than direct intervention, territorial security can be threatened indirectly by external assistance provided to overseas based national dissident mercenaries, or internally, to guerrilla or break-away groups.\textsuperscript{32} Modern states, also face externally controlled illegal activities like piracy, drug-trafficking and smuggling. These are the factors which jeopardise national and international security, both economically and politically. The problem of the refugees has become perennial in the conflict-torn international politics. It can work havoc with the economies of small states which cannot sustain their weight.

The threats to economic security may adversely affect the economic development policies, the international financial position and international trade policies of small states. Characterized by a narrow and fragile structure, a poor and unexploited resource base, small domestic market, inability to penetrate foreign markets, poor infrastructural facilities and lack of indigenous technology, the small state economies are extremely dependent. Apart from that, the state autonomy is limited by the debt burden incurred by such states. Infrastructural development demands external \textsuperscript{32} R.P.Barton, "Diplomacy and Security: Dilemmas for Small States", in Hafiz and Khan, n.25, p.232.
aids which is more often than not attached with strings of allegiance to power-blocs. Such a situation was not acceptable to most of these countries which preferred to stay out of bi-polar politics.

Clearly the micro-states in the world, although they enjoy sovereignty in all technical sense still have a facade of dependency. Nevertheless, they have the capacity to cause macro-political havoc at the UN and in major world capitals. The Falkland Crisis (1982), Grenada (1983), Fiji in 1987, Maldives Coup (1988) and the Kuwait fiasco (1990-91) are examples of how even small states generate insecurity. "Small is beautiful" but not so with small states as they have problems regarding their viability in the imperfect community of nations. Sheila Harden has drawn a right analogy while stating, "Sometimes it seems as if small states are like small boats, pushed out in a turbulent sea, free in one sense to traverse it, but without oars or provisions, without compass or sails, free also to perish or perhaps to be rescued and taken aboard a large vessel." For some nations economic and social threats are a threat to their political stability. Economically, such states are heavily dependent on others. Their viability is threatened due to problem of fundamental 'supply'. Small states have

34. Ibid.

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restricted area in land and so are its inherent resources. They have a narrow base of skilled labour and an imbalanced demographic structure. Number of entrepreneurs are restricted and lacking in organizational skills. The investment is more often owned and controlled by foreign organizations and governments may rely heavily on foreign loans. On the demand front, the domestic market is fragmented with a diversification in demand which limits the narrow base of home markets; in the external market, exports are typically highly concentrated on one product, while imports are diverse. They lack capacity to influence the international market either for price or quotas, individually. Apart from this, bilateralism in international trading and financial arrangements at the expense of multilateral cooperation raise further threat to economic independence and security.

It has been rightly emphasized that security and development are mixed with each other; a nation should start with security, its political independence and territorial integrity; it should develop in a way that security is ensured and enhanced. The external orientation of security has its origin virtually in a systemic concept of security. In this framework it follows a deductive reasoning - if the system is secured, the components are secured. In short, it reduces security, to security of two competing bloc powers.
It is hardly necessary to emphasize that the international community should ensure the security of small states in its own interests for they are the potential trouble spot. It adds no additional responsibility to the system, instead it is an old problem with a new dimension. Therefore security of small states is part of the wider problem of security and it would be much proper to look at it as security of the components leading to security of the whole. What differentiates between the security of small states and the big powers is the concept of vulnerability. Security is conceived not only as absence of threats but also elimination of vulnerabilities as shown in Figure 1.

It explains that vulnerabilities exist in combination with threats to security of small states. If and when small states are the target of threat, their vulnerability incapacitates them to cope with them. As the input level is insufficient both vulnerability and threats get maximized in what is called insecurity. Still proliferation of small states has had a moderating effect on the prevailing law in the community of nations. The tremendous expansion of the membership of the United Nations since 1945 and other international organizations, the acceptance of the principle of self determination of people as an operating norm in international politics, consciousness against imperialism

35. M.S.Rajan, n.18
and domination had led to democratization of international relations. Whenever there had been aggression with impunity whether it be in Bahamas, the Camoros, Grenada, Lesotho, Seychelles, Vanuatu or Kuwait, the aggressor has to explain his conduct to the international community. It acknowledges the inherent right of the sovereign states, irrespective of its apparent ability to defend itself by its own armed strength against external attempts of aggression or subjugation. Within the United Nations' collective security system, the small and the weak states - like individuals within the state - can exist with the big and strong.

Small states, isolated as they are, economically and technologically, want to remain so with regard to larger global issue. Their involvement anywhere would present others with a pretext to meddle in their affairs. The cold war period was dominated by highly militarized and highly polarized ideological confrontation between the superpowers. In spite of its apparent intensity, the relationship was far less dangerous and more controlled than on the surface. The reason was the realization that uncontrolled conflict would inevitably lead to war no one could win, and the recognition that a carefully managed antagonism would actually serve their mutual interests better.\textsuperscript{37} Ever since the war ended, till late 1980s, the two superpowers alone have resorted to the demonstrative use of force without war on more than 426 occasions. Amongst this 98 per cent of the US threat of force was away from its own borders, far in the Third World; while on 80 per cent of the occasions that the Soviet Union employed force it was around its borders, closer at home. Since there was intense rivalry, and the political and military concerns dominated the security agenda, the threat of war was real in the early days of the cold war.

Global insecurity increased in the post-war era in direct proportion to the obsessive concern of great powers, \textsuperscript{37}Michael Cox, "From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower Detente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War", \textit{Journal of Peace Research}, (Oslo), vol.27, no.1 (February, 1990), pp.25-41.
specially America, to enhance their security. An increase in socio-political violence, increase in armed conflicts and proxy-wars are general indicator of global insecurity and instability. Operationally cold war politics implied a global search for states which had shared security concerns and a related desire of reward. Territorial disputes, conflict and tensions happen to be abiding features of Third World reality, some inherited from colonial era while others accentuated by cold war politics. The unstable global situation pose a continual potential for crisis, given both the absence of any recognizable authority at global level and continued legitimacy of national sovereignty within the Third World. These pluralistic societies suffer intolerable pressure from political centralization and repression which increases their vulnerability towards balkanization. The linkage between the Third World level of dependence and the attempts of these states to create domestic social security has led to "mushrooming chain of security establishment".38 The creation of military forces capable of nuclear power with a stated objective of intervention had worsened the situation which can be linked to current doctrines of deterrence and mutual assured destruction (MAD). In short, the cold war helped the antagonistic states to legitimize

38. Seven Third World countries namely Israel, India, Brazil, Taiwan, Argentina, South Africa and South Korea manufacture around 90 per cent of total arms production of the Third World.
their power-systems internationally, while securing a respected position on the continent for themselves. The Third World on the other hand emerged from the cold war, more distorted and divided than the structure that existed during the colonial period. Detente, in its first phase, though a promising and audacious strategy, collapsed even before any concrete achievement.

The current rapprochement may disturb the shape of the continent into a less cohesive western alliance by weakening of the blocs over time and a continent without the superpowers. The end of the cold war has created a remarkable fluidity and openness in the whole pattern of international relations. Although the events that unfolded since 1989 were mostly taking place on the European continent, they have led to a change of the system as a whole. The altered nature of these relations have ushered a process of global restructuring. The loosening of the communist hold upon Eastern Europe and the unification of two Germany were fair indicators of the road that change was going to tread in coming years. The superpowers realized that they were facing challenges both economically and politically. Ideology, one of the main determinant of the cold war politics ceased to be an important factor in East-West conflict. Most nations broke away from the communist fold in favour of the free-market economy. In military and
technological terms, they realized that security was an elusive pursuit. Arms, specially nuclear ones, bought security that was still more fragile. Arms race was diverting diminishing resources from more productive projects. This for the first time pursued them towards disarmament, culminating in the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty. Though initiatives came from both sides, one cannot underplay the 'Gorbachev factor' in ushering in an era of change. Economically, new centres of power are emerging in Europe and Japan, therefore, polycentricism is becoming an important factor in international system.

Further changes have been witnessed by the international order, in the mean time. The year 1991 saw the demise of erstwhile Soviet Union as a union of states. Instead, the fifteen states declared independence and formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Disintegrative tendencies have set-in in Yugoslavia as the ethnic minorities/majorities become more assertive of their rights. Last few years witnessed the settling down of old conflicts, yet the present order faced new threats. The Iraqi aggression of Kuwait was quite unexpected in an age when relations were smoothening. But then that is what international relations are. The demographic growth and migration, proliferation of weapons and ethnic revolts are nothing new to political vocabulary. They might be
manageable individually, but together, they acquire a totaly new significance. Historically, there has been a political, cultural and religious division between 'Eastern' and 'Western' Europe, partly bridged by Austrian-Hungarian empire. A new 'arc of crisis' has emerged in Europe. It ranges from the Baltic Republics via Central Europe and the Balkans to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and its hinterland. As potential source of conflict, the Transcaucasians and Central Asian Soviet republics, and the Arab states, south of the Mediterranean are also included in the area.39 As the nations of East Europe and erstwhile Soviet Union, assert and 're-nationalize' themselves, there are bound to be tensions and conflicts due to self-determination of minorities.

What will be the security consequences for the periphery states with a change in relationship among the major powers? It might bring about a substantial change in security agenda of periphery states. What is more important in today's context is a lot many terms used by social scientists might turn useless. Third World, a term of everyday parlence, has lost all its contents with the

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disintegration of the Second. 40 Similarly the term developing countries loose meaning when Israel, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan are included in the category. These nations are much above in the level of development and industrialization, in the average GNP and in their bargaining capability with the big powers. Terms like 'superpower' had already lost credibility in the emerging multipolarity and shift in economic and militaristic centre of power. The North-South divide itself faces questions regarding its definition. What does North mean when it includes Albania, Romania or the Soviet Union, what does West mean with inclusion of Australia and Japan? It is thus quite correct to arrange nation states, in order of actual importance, in a centre-periphery relationship. A similar problem is faced by developing countries about their definition. The 'Third World', developing countries, the non-aligned and the small states have all an overlapping membership and thus creates confusion. They have only one thing in common, they are part of the periphery. Scholars like Van Evera are wrong when they underestimate the capability and capacity of the Third World and try to

re-emphasize the primacy of 'North-North interaction'.  

Probably he was mistaken about the major axis of US national security policy, which is North-South. In essence, the bottom line of security is survival. As we begin to confront immense environmental degradation — deforestation, desertification and global warming — and health problems as AIDS, famine, malnutrition, etc. we cannot ignore the others.  

Today, the Third World is relevant not as a theoretical construct but as a label that several countries have decided to adopt. Right from their independence Third World countries attempted to construct independent national strategies for controlling their own process of development. Today, they find their unity in a common perception of external and, to a lesser extent, internal conditions. Does the Third World possess any power? Is the Third World withering away? Although there might appear conflicting views, Hedley Bull states they assisted in the transformation and dismantling of the old order. They have overturned the old system of international law and


organization that once served to satisfy their subject status. In spite of the fact that the Third World lag behind the developed in GNP and current military expenditure, their resources, population and vast area they control makes them a major factor. Their weakness lies in achieving unity among themselves. Yet in International Organizations, many Third World countries command majority and collective bargaining power. What is required is more mobilization and organization under proper leadership which can accord a proper status to the Third World. R. Keohane has concluded that such mobilization of resources is most likely to take place first in small regional groups. Further, blocs will develop within the Third World, dissolving perceived common conditions and interests that have held the Third World together. Regionalization may strengthen mobilization on common issues as is seen in South-South cooperation. Moreover, the diminishing role of superpowers, with powerful international institutions, will strengthen the Third World and perhaps sow the seeds for global detente. Yet there are others who doubt, that the


44. Robert Keohane, Beyond Hegemony (Boston, 1986).

southern countries will be able to enjoy the collective leverage they enjoyed in early 1970s because they are today palpably weaker and more differentiated. Nevertheless, the political platform that Third World represents will undoubtedly remain a central international theme of world politics, and development will remain the central concept of Third World security.

One of the advantages of a broad conceptualization of security is that it can minimize the age old and intractable problem of defence-development dilemma as faced by developed countries. In its correct perspective, security is as McNamara puts it:

> Security means development. Security is not military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military force, though it may involve it, security is not traditional military activity, though may encompass it, security is development and without development there can be no security.

In short, development and security are absolutely linked up and so is their linkage settled with disarmament. It would be rather wrong to squander resources on armaments while the basic needs of millions remain unattended. As all nations are linked up in complex and interdependent network, solution to international problems can only be found through


multilateral efforts. The threats to disarmament, development and security are enhanced by linkages between the conflicts in Third World and big powers. Even the international economic system works systematically to the disadvantage of poorer nations, while they have a worsening economic standing as compared to their developed counterparts. The report of the expert group strengthened the intimate relationship between disarmament and development stating, "development at an accelerated rate would be hard if not impossible to reconcile with a continuation of arms-race" and "disarmament should be so defined that close connection between disarmament and development gets full recognition." 48

As a concept of peace, security originates from the idea of national rights and responsibilities and the United Nations charter. Peace based approach to security is much broader and holistic. It favours a systemic approach, emphasizing national security in broader context of collective security encompassing its military and non-military aspects - underdevelopment, resource wastage, polarization of wealth and poverty, illiteracy, diseases and malnutrition. Security has to be defined together, and not against other states as joint survival and peaceful

coexistence are better ways of enhancing security at all levels. At all times, the global political, economic, military and ideological orders are impinging on internal processes in all the countries in various ways. The nature and intensity of their impact depends on the strength of the external influences or receptivity of the internal dynamics.

The militarization of global economy is at the root of the present global problem. It gets reflected in a more concrete form from the cost that military expenditure involves from the civilian sector. According to Trade and Development Report of UNCTAD (1982), $250 billion worth of output is lost to the civilian sector every year because of diversion of manpower and other resources for military production. About twenty-five per cent of world's scientific and research resources are diverted for military purposes. The Global expenditure on military R & D in 1980 was estimated by a UN Committee as about $35 billion, about one and half times more than the civilian sector. Now with about three tons of TNT for every individual human being in existence, disarmament, is no longer a moral issue. It is today a question of human survival.

At the International Conference on Disarmament and Development sponsored by the United Nations, Paris, July 1986, France insisted on the responsibilities of the Great Powers for the arms-race and the necessity to establish a
right of compensation to those states who suffered directly as a result of international tensions. Aid was necessary for them through a comprehensive assistance programme. The decade from 1975-85 saw more than a 30 per cent increase in the world-wide defence spending in real terms. In 1970, the developing countries imported $2.5 billion worth of major weapons in 1980 the amount was $9 billion – an annual growth rate of 14 per cent for the decade as a whole. It was on the request of the UN General Assembly that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) prepared a report on International Disarmament Fund for Development (FIDD), which emphasized the destructive effects of arms-race on world security and the negative impact of military expenditure on national economies. The Fund preconditioned real disarmament as a basis for its effectiveness. It was to be used for reinforcement of disarmament and development aid, thus reducing economic insecurity.

Security from external attack and internal disorder is an essential prerequisite for sustainable development. From a global standpoint, the attempts by a state individually, to provide for its military security, can result in widespread

frustration. As armaments accumulate military security becomes both an intensifying concern and a more elusive state. While at the same time the difficulty of resolving the underlying political issues is magnified. Thus the capacity of armaments to fulfill their purpose of providing security appears increasingly open to question. It is military expenditure which is seen as unproductive from socio-economic point of view. The national security, military expenditure and economic development have a complex relationship as shown in Figure 2. These problems are compounded as there is no unidimensional causality. The model of political economy that tries to encapsulate the essential features of the inter-relationship has to accommodate feedback and the reverse effects. Depending on the structural characteristics of the concerned country, these effects might be positive or negative. Threats, both external and internal, that exist lead to high defence burden which itself can have negative or positive effect on growth. It is positive if, through tickle-down effect, it can lead to socio-economic growth and negative if it reduces growth and development. In turn such cases lead to still higher defence expenditure, thus entering a vicious circle of security, military expenditure and economic development.
For nearly half a century, as a consequence of the Second World War, the earth has been held to ransom by the two superpowers fully capable in their rivalry, complicity, similarity, of annihilating life on it. Changes that have accompanied the end of cold war are not yet clearly understood. But they continue to shape international affairs. Political, social, economic and cultural interdependence among countries is not a new phenomenon, but has increased dramatically during the last decade.

Different economies have become more closely linked through the globalization of markets - an inescapable fact of modern economic life. Peace and security cannot be achieved unless international cooperation is also extended to deal with threats that stem from failures in development, from environmental degradation and from lack of progress towards ensuring tangible human development.

The world is being increasingly confronted with issues that affect mankind as a whole. They call for joint actions that go far beyond short term interests of nation-states. Many of the interrelated issues of economic development, poverty and environment, affecting the well being of a large segment of humanity today can no longer be solved strictly by fragmented national efforts. No nation can stand aloof, absolutely. Nor can the importance of any one nation be under or over-estimated. As this century come to a close, major unintended global challenges are also occurring. If the trends persist, neither human capacity nor technology may have the power, when the twenty-first century begins, to combat radically the deterioration of global system. The world seems to be marching towards the brink of new abyss. Such interdependence had led to the genesis of new theoretical and political notions of international security namely "Common Security". In view of the fact that such crisis hold our survival to a common ranson and only joint-
multilateral efforts can meet the challenges, common security is the most appropriate approach to security of all nations and security in general. NAM contributed to the consolidation of the concept of security by insisting on the key thesis that a radical transformation of the whole system of international policies - socio, economic and cultural relations - is a condition sine-quo-non for realising international security. United Nations has followed and supported the genesis of the notion of international security, both as an object of core powers and the subject of realization of aspirations of the periphery.