CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SECURITY
Security has been defined over and over again, quite obviously, to suit the national interests of states, as and how it does. More often it has been made synonymous with 'power and national interest' and thus it got naturally aligned with military power. Over the last two decades emphasis has been shifting simultaneously between military, economic, environmental and ecological, cultural and social contexts. As the state perceived insecurity from within and from without, both externally and internally, it became necessary to widen the scope of security. International security therefore gained prominence as a much broader concept encompassing its multidimensionality and its multilateral composition. Interdependence has over-shadowed an individual nation's concern for security and focuses it as a common problem. The security dilemma has, over the centuries, prompted nations to formulate theories and mechanisms to meet the challenge of insecurity. In doing so they have put forth several propositions according to the circumstances and national interests.

Ever since 'state' came into existence, whether due to compulsion, necessity or evolution, it has occupied a predominantly higher position than any other institution. Defined in terms of power, security constituted one of its
most important constituents. The search for security has been an unending process, thus the state vied with each other to have a place of pre-eminence in the society of states. Yet no security system proposed so far has been able to meet the challenges thrown over by insecurity.

Today, times have changed. International relations are undergoing tremendously fast changes. The present course of events beginning in the mid nineteen-eighties, with the Soviet experimentation with 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' at home and abroad, led to bilateral disarmament by USA and Soviet Union as a result of INF Treaty in 1987. This was the first step towards real disarmament and destruction of nuclear missiles. The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty soon followed suit. This period also witnessed the loosening of the Soviet alliance structure in East Europe and the unification of Germany. Long standing issues were resolved through super powers and United Nations efforts. The Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war came to an end. Namibia won its independence while South Africa diluted its apartheid orientations. There was relative peace on the African continent and in Latin America. Kampuchea is nearing a political solution under the UN supervision. There has been an appreciable increase in the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations.
But there seems no reason to be too much optimistic, as the integrative and disintegrative tendencies are working simultaneously. New issues are gaining prominence. Recently more than twenty new states have joined the world community due to break up of the erstwhile Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Fundamentalism, both religious and ethnic, is on the rise. Drugs and terrorism are new causes of concern. Although politically US remains a big power, economically Japan and the European community are emerging strong. Militarily new power centres as China and India are forging ahead. Such changes in world relations do not surprise international relations analysts except for the short time period over which they took place. Moreover, just as everyone honeymooned with the idea of a 'new world order' Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait, a blatant violation of international law, first since the second world war. Only the collective UN efforts, under US commandernship, could free Kuwait again. Will it be appropriate to indulge in any kind of futurology at the moment? Do the various concepts of security hold ground under the present situation?

I

Concept of Balance of Power

Since the days of Peloponnesion war (431-404 B.C) the concept of 'Balance of Power' has been used to explain
relations among states by political theorists and statesman of ancient time. It found expression in the commentaries of Thucydides, Demosthenes and Aristotle. Polybius has pointed out "Power should be able without let or hindrance, to execute every purpose and understanding." \(^1\) The Balance of power system existed wherever there was multiple-state system. Hence it lost relevance during the days of Roman empire, emerging again only in the writings of Bernardo Rucellai and Niccolo Machiavelli. David Hume, hence called it, 'a prevailing notion of ancient times'.

The Balance of power system is characterized by a special pattern of state behaviour. It is different from the other concepts of security, fundamentally in the degree of centralization of power and authority it implies. If several powers are competing with each other they will group together in a way to prevent any one power becoming dominant. A roughly equal capabilities among groups seems necessary constituent of the system. In current international relations, balance of power means 'a just equilibrium in power among nations so as to prevent any one from getting sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon others and endanger their security'.

Balance of power represents extreme form of decentralization - a la laissez-faire arrangement in the sphere of power-politics. Power forms the basis of theory of balance of power. In an 'anarchic society' of nations that live in a condition of trouble peace or in a 'state of war', there will always be a modicum of insecurity. The realists argue that all states desire an enlargement of their territory and prestige. It is only power in the hands of others that restrains them. They emphasize that state-system is no system at all but, instead, a polite lable for international anarchy. The legalists support the rights and duties fixed by international law. The idealists argue that goodwill and harmony must be attributed to religion and world 'public opinion'.

Hans Morgenthau frankly stated that he would use the term 'balance of power' in four different series: "as a policy aimed at certain state of affairs; as an actual state of affairs; as an approximate equal distribution of power and as any distribution of power". But without qualifications, it means power is equally distributed among nations. As a theory, balance of power requires certain prerequisites for itself:
- a multiplicity of sovereign political actors;

- absence of single, centralized and strong authority;
- a relative unequal distribution of status into big, intermediate and small states;
- continuous, but controlled competition and conflict among sovereign political actors;
- an understanding that perpetuation of existing power distribution benefits them mutually.

Stanley Hoffman's characterization of balance of power system as, "Five or six major actors, a central balancing mechanism in which actors would coalesce to prevent the expansion of one or more power; existence of common language and code of behaviour among major actors and hierarchy in international relations" is relatively simple.³

According to Morton Kaplan, it is characterized by operation of following rules. "States should - (1) increase capabilities, but negotiate rather than fight, (2) fight rather than fail to increase capabilities; (3) stop fighting rather than eliminate an actor; (4) oppose any coalition or single actors which tend to assume position of predomination within the system; (5) constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizational principles; (6) permit defeat or constrained essential national actors to re-enter the

system as acceptable partners."\(^4\)

The concept of balancer is an effective modernization of the balance of power model. It states that the balancer should be effectively powerful state whose strategic options have major impact on global system. George Liska describes a balancer as "both at its focus and outside it, otherwise it would not be free to withdraw and engage its weight in the function of the system's requirement and thus manipulate the balance.... A sufficiently powerful balancer of this kind might check the irrational derives and miscalculations jeopardizing the balance of power and promote realization of its objective norms."\(^5\)

England in the 18th and 19th centuries is one comfortable illustration of balancer, though today the role of balancer has disappeared.

The balance of power system, since ancient times, was contrived to provide security to member states of world community. In practical terms, absolute balance, like absolute security seldom exists due to dynamics of power politics. In fact, the system emerged as fight for dominance in the name of maintaining balance, where the states preferred a balance that was in their favour. It has


been recognized, despite controversy, that the primary purpose of the balance of power system is to maintain independence of nations and not to preserve peace. Force is needed to maintain balance, 'which in final analysis rests upon war'.

The principles of balance of power are not the immutable and universal law of internal policies, but at best, guidelines for statesmen to adopt to preserve independence and security of states. There are always constant shifts in the nature and distribution of power to which states must respond rapidly and flexibly so as to establish an adequate balance. A.K.F. Organski concludes that "imbalance of power is a characteristic pattern, particularly since the Industrial Revolution, with major states and their coalition actually trying to maintain equilibrium".

The trouble with balance of power is that it has too many meanings. It is not an easily measurable concept and nor is it precise. Ernst Haas has criticized it "as too


vague a concept for use by political scientists". 8 George Schwarzenberger asserting its universal applicability to the multiplicity of states, observed that balance of power is an 'equilibrium' or 'a certain amount of stability in international relations'. 9 Due to its unstable and temporary nature, Karl Deutsch and David Singer pointed out "No balance of power system has lasted longer than a few centuries, and most of the original powers contending in such systems have survived as independent powers only much shorter periods." 10 But despite its inner contradictions, Hedley Bull states the function of balance of power is to prevent the system from being transformed into a universal empire; protecting independence of states in particular areas from domination by locally preponderant power; to provide conditions, in which other institutions, on which international order depends, have been able to operate. The independence of respective nations can rest on no other foundations than the power of each nations to prevent the


power of other nations from encroaching upon its freedom.\(^\text{11}\) The fundamental weakness of the system is that it presupposes a static condition among nations, while nations have a dynamic equilibrium. In another contradiction, the theory recognizes great flux in action and aims of state while it demands unquestionable and everlasting dedication of all states towards balance of power.

Morton Kaplan, in his theory presents six models in the international system, yet it does not exhaust the possibility of international organization. These models are: the balance of power system, the loose bipolar system, the tight bipolar system, the universal system, the hierarchical system and unit veto system. Amongst these only the Balance of power and loose bipolar system have historical counterparts and rest are just possible projections.

The classical balance of power gained prominence with the signing of treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the firm establishment of the nation-state system. Systemic alliances, counter-alliances and frequent shifts accompanied the time period between Treaty of Utrecht (1713) to the

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partition of Poland (1772). The Congress of Vienna (1815) re-established the system after the disturbed era of the French Revolution and Napoleonic empire. The early twentieth century, an age of alliance, triple alliance and triple entente (1891-1907), was followed by a period when ideology gained prominence and revolutionary nationalism came to occupy centre stage. During inter war period, balance of power lost some importance and came to be identified with collective security system.

In the post Second World war period there was strong bipolarization of power. In a world ideologically divided and armed suicidily, the situation was more serious and led to rigid bloc-politics and cold war. Scholars are of the view that while during early 1950s, the system of balance was simple, during 1960s it passed through transition to be a complex one in 1970s. They are of the view that global bipolarity will minimize international conflict.12 Others argue that a multipolar balance of power system allows for less conflict than a bipolar one, as the attention of nation-state is not focused on a single source of threat.13 Richard Rosecrance calls it multi-bipolarity in which he believes there is least possibility of violence and


conflict. But this sense of balance and reciprocity which generates relative security and has traditionally ensured the survival of international system must, according to the realists, be based on a political settlement which is mutually acceptable to members of international community. Its effectiveness rests on the rationality of its leaders who strive for existence rather than destruction.

With new forces of warfare, industrialization, development, international law and organization and with new challenges like nationalism, ethnicity, economic and environmental interdependence, can we still mention balance of power as means of security? The qualitative and quantitative jumps in nuclear weapons resulted in a balance of terror - a relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence. It acts more as a psychological weapon on the opponent. It involves repulsion by threat and not retaliation. Herman Kahn refers to it as the rationality of irrationality. Thus it has been remarked and rightly so, "all the fundamental tendencies affecting the political realm in recent generation run counter to the requirements of working model of balance of power." Yet power and terror must not be


equated, while terror implies an instinctual and irrational impact, power is a rational and conscious effort. The emergence of bipolarity and deterrence did not constitute a negation of balance of power but a continuation of balance of power in an 'altered form' and elevated on a global scale.16 Analysis reveals while the balance of power is an objective phenomenon, deterrent relationship is basically subjective one. Whereas the former is defined as absence of preponderant powers, the latter is essentially an incidental consequence. Any unilateral or multilateral attempt to security through force can be manifestly self-defeating.

Although both the realist and neo-liberalists start from the same assumptions - that, international relations are anarchic; institutional structure, cooperation and coordination in international affairs in endogenous, nation-states are strategic 'goal directed' decision-makers - they differ as realists perceive balance of power as a single compelling equilibrium in which state must be vigilant about its relative position. "The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in hierarchy."17 The Neoliberalists see the complex interdependencies of contemporary affairs resulting in a


different kind of equilibrium in which state can pursue pure welfare maximization because threat to sovereignty cannot alone sustain the equilibrium. Hence "under different systemic conditions states will define their self-interest differently". Both the theories have drawbacks as neoliberals fail to define precisely the necessary conditions for cooperation, although it is part of interdependence theory; the realist have been unsuccessful in their attempt to measure and define power unambiguously. The neoliberals fail to give meaningful theoretical definition to its pivotal idea of regime; the realists struggle with specification of state goals and alternative conceptualization of balance of power.

Power is relative and in constant supply, so if nation maximize it, through balance of power or any other means, then international affairs is the 'constant total'. Though it may appear in the present circumstances that power is no longer an important factor in international considerations, it is no so. The game nations play are not easy to understand. In the cycle of crisis and harmony, we seem to have come again through the phase of harmony, perhaps for a still longer time. Although the priorities are different at the moment, power and national interests are here to stay as

the necessity of states, unless a total change of human psychology and his way of thinking, is underway. Only such an event can do away completely with pursuit for power dominance.

II

Concept of Collective Security

The Hobbesian concept of human nature as innately aggressive, inevitably leads to search for security and thus try to establish some kind of political and social system by social contract. It is collectively needed to achieve political, economic and social stability. Referring to social contract and collective security simultaneously, one basically tries to compare the behaviour of states in an unregulated community of political units with that of individuals, in conditions of anarchy. Humanity has suffered, often due to breaches of peace and threat of security under scourge of military conflicts and confrontations. Security, as always is an essential precondition of an ordered human existence and the state meets this contingency both internally and externally. The community of states, though theoretically and legalistically equal, is in fact a hierarchy determined by power potential and capability.
Meaning and Nature

Ideally a world-wide combination of all states directed against potential aggressor could create a global system of collective security. "Collective security is a method of managing the power relations of nations through a partially centralized system of security arrangements." The other option may be that emerged in the post war era in Europe - thus contributing to consciousness of security in both the camps. Collective Security emerged as one of the network of crisis management and contend that nation-state is not the historical model. Its primary purpose is to maintain peace security and this quest puts premium on power which often tends to become end in itself.

States, though not the only actor on the international scene, claim absolute sovereignty which coincides with growth of power theories in international relations. Broadly speaking, collective security is the method of managing the power equations between states through a partially centralized system of security arrangements, while the ultimate power remain diffused among independent sovereign states. The desire to establish an international organization, to pursue the collective security principle has held a central place in orthodox thinking since the

first world war. A viable collective security network became imperative due to increasingly changing power equations. It was observed, "the twentieth century hopes that international organization might serve to prevent, or failing that, to defend states subjected to armed attack in defiance of organized efforts to maintain peace, has been epitomized in the concept of collective security." 20 The core principle that constitutes the concept of collective security is that attack on any state is an attack on all. All states part of this joint exercise should consider prevention of aggression as an overriding objective of foreign policy and must be ready to oppose aggression with measures adequate for preservation of peace. Henceforth, the conclusion drawn remains to be essentially that it aims not at the mere elimination of power, but rather at the management of power.

This system involved a complex scheme of national commitments and international mechanism to prevent aggression and the victim with reliable promise of effective collective measures - diplomatic boycott, economic and military sanctions - to enforce peace. In the system of collective security, security remains the end, collective the means and system was the institution that made means to

serve the end: It involves the view that the national interests of state can be defended by collective action, even by limiting freedom of decision of individual state. In fact, it requires a more thorough going renunciation of free hand in foreign policy. Although the success of the collective security system does not presuppose a complete abandonment of national individuality, it does require the submission of individual national will to collective action. But collective security and collective defence should not be confused as the former is against any aggression, in the latter the nature of aggressor is defined. Collective security has far reaching commitment and obligations. Its core idea remains, by and large, a specialized instrument of inter-nation policy in contemporary international relations. Collective defense is a limited venture of few states on adhoc basis and runs counter to the spirit of collective security.

The collective security theory is structured along two lines that components are important features of security policies of states and that they are pre-requisites for organizational intervention and success: (a) collective security shares the idea of pacific settlement and prohibits the use of force. War can be and should be prevented. Due to interdependence, every nation ought to morally prevent aggression anywhere as peace is indivisible. It ensures
immediate and effective guarantee of response. It is no ad-hoc arrangement, it is permanent and institutionalized and should enjoy unflinching faith and loyalty of all. (b) Collective security rests subjectively on faith in rationality and goodness of man, as well as faith in world community. The objectivity of the security system demands impartiality. In short, it necessitates the willingness for maintaining the status-quo, though not inherently attempts to perpetuate the existing state of affairs.

The collective security system demands totality for its membership so that it is not reduced to an alliance. There should be diffusion of power as superpower is antithetical to the system. In the relationship among states, equilibrium must be maintained. The system should possess superior power so as to act as deterrent against potential aggressor, and world peace is ensured through collective international operations. Hence, the desire for world government, as operational vehicle of collective security system also requires a legal basis for their function. From such ideal collective security system, one draws conclusion that the system implies:

(a) All actors for one attitude;
(b) Mutual confidence among states;
(c) Favourable distribution of power;
(d) Overwhelming strength to deal with any combination of power;
(e) Members have an ideal concept of security;
(f) Substantial disarmament;
(g) Universality of membership.

Collective Security - The Experience with the League

Although earlier attempts were made, the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 and the ensuing world-war, convinced many to the need for new conceptual structure to regulate the lawlessness of community of states. They realized the need of a collective body of group of nations who could be trustee of the world peace.

The League of Nations was established at the Versailles Conference in 1919. It suggested that all states should be persuaded to act collectively for security. Its principles were summed up: any war or threat of war was to be thereby declared a matter of concern for the League; it incorporated a classical fundamental legal concept of the obligation of every state joining the system to preserve the territorial integrity of all members; it spelled out positive responsibilities of participating states to preserve collective security. This formed the ideological premise, the legal framework and positive responsibilities of all states.
The League resolution of 1921, that "it is the duty of each member of the League to decide for itself whether a breach of covenant was committed," destroyed the idea of collective security.\textsuperscript{21} While England and France attempted reconciliation of balance of power and collective security, US isolationism and Russia's exclusion weakened the purpose of the League. In an atmosphere of mutual mistrust, the Manchurian (1931) and Ethiopian crisis (1935) revealed its ineffectiveness and Euro-centric nature of the League. This inherently status-quo oriented system failed to perceive the dynamics of political, social and economic change. Pointing out to one of the inherent flaws, one scholar remarked "Ever since its inception in 1919, international organization somehow has been expected to operate above and beyond politics."\textsuperscript{22} Its basic flaw was the right of a nation to abstain from this system of enforcement programme.

The United Nations and Collective Security

Although, the League faced rough weather and belied all hopes reposed in it, the belief in intrinsic value and necessity of collective security was firmly held among

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement, no.\textsuperscript{8}, October 1921, p.21.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ernst B. Haas, "Types of Collective Security: An Examination of Operational Concepts", \textit{American Political Science Review} (Washington), vol.49, March 1955, p.40.
\end{itemize}
allied powers. It resulted in the birth of an international organization - the United Nations Organization - in 1945. Its very first article calls for effective measures for preservation of aggression and chapter seven details the collective measures to be applied. Article 39 to 51 of the UN charter deal with concept of collective security-provisions of economic and military sanctions. Defence was further strengthened by 'the uniting for peace resolution' signed in 1950. While article 39 gives the UN Security Council the right to determine whether there is threat or breach of peace or an act of aggression, it makes recommendation and decide what act has to be taken under article 41 and 42. Provisions of articles 43, 45 and 47 provide for availability of troops, assistance and facilities for UN action. Article 51 recognizes "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations".

The proper functioning of the UN depends upon unanimous consensus among great powers. It was apparently believed that the veto system would prevent direct confrontation between the world organization and the major powers. Yet it was believed, "Rising on the ashes of League, the UN accepted more frankly the apparent truth that collective security is no good against great powers. It strengthened
the power of the Organization to intervene anywhere against
a 'breach of peace' but at the same time it necessarily
strengthened the veto power of permanent members. It relied
on Great power unanimity."23

The system has inborn deficiencies. The UN General
Assembly, big and diffused in political composition, remains
only a recommendatory body. The 'uniting for peace
resolution', most important in time of crisis, lack from
universal commitment. States' willingness to follow UNGA
resolution depends on the extend to which alliance groups
are prepared to support or oppose the directives of
international organization. Joseph S.Nye supported the
view, "These organizations are a little more than
governments linked in permanent conclave. They have no
power and personality beyond the collective will of
governments and no capacity to grow apart from the ability
of the governments to learn."24 A more realistic
assessment, would be that the scheme was actually intended
less to equip the General Assembly to preside over
collective security operation than to facilitate and
regularize the utilization of that body as agency of

23. Roland Stromberg, "The Idea of Collective Security", in
Joel Larus, ed., From Collective Security to Preventive

24. Ernst B.Haas, Robert L.Butterworth and Joseph S.Nye,
Conflict Management by International Organizations
(Morristown, New Jersey, 1972), p.46.
collective legitimation in the use of military force. This can be most appropriately judged from Korean crisis in 1950 and the Kuwait fiasco (1990-91). In both cases, it were the US interests involved that resulted in American-led coalition against the aggressor.

In spite of some failures and drift from the original role intended in 1945, the UN efforts cannot be undermined. The Cyprus issue was resolved creditably due to UN. It "provided a forum to Greece and Turkey where they could pursue their argument non-violently."25 The Geneva Accord on Afghanistan was more a UN achievement, through its mediator Diego Cordovez, to end the strife. The Iran-Iraq war ended with Iran's acceptance of UN Security Council resolution for immediate cease-fire. The resolution 598 also provided for withdrawal of troops, exchange of prisoners of war and reconstruction. In both the cases, however, both the super powers owe their credits too as coincidentally it were their proxy wars in the region.

Namibia moved towards freedom as the cease-fire came into force in April 1989 and the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) and the administrator General, Louis Piennar administered its transition to independence as 171st member of the UN. The Paris Accord (1991) on Cambodia was signed.

by Supreme National Council, the UN, ASEAN members and India, Vietnam, Laos and Yugoslavia. In June 1993, free and fair elections were held under UN supervision. Lately, during the Kuwait crisis, it has been alleged that the US was able to gain international legitimacy from the UN for its own foreign policy goal, determining and planning the course of action unilaterally. It means, the Secretary-General was ineffectual, the UNGA was side-lined and the Security Council manipulated. Yugoslavia itself is witnessing internal civil war and creation of new states inspite of UN peace-keeping forces.

For a better and more secure world, the UN has proposed reallocation of funds for development through disarmament and arms control. It also resolved for reorientation of economic system to a more equalized and balanced one, but such efforts to enhance security do not find favour with industrialized countries.

The regional security systems are by no means collective security system. They are selective security system stemming from a particular power bloc. In fact, they threaten security. The other regional groupings are mere neutral meeting ground based in nationalistic sentiments. But a movement like the non-aligned movement, anti-bloc and a loose conglomeration of independent states, due to its heterogeneous and international character can be an
effective basis for regional collective security as it is not bound by any regional limits. Its interests, objectives, means and ends lie in line with the UN. Without forming any bloc, they can preserve them in the UN collective security system.

The polarizing impact of regional collective security arrangements on international system becomes painful during period of high tension and policing tendency of super power on global scale. The collective security precisely envisaged by the founding fathers was precluded by forty years of super power confrontation and cold war rivalry. The intensity of Cold War meant that loyalty to cold war alliance tended to predominate over loyalty to international community. While the stability of a collective security equilibrium is greatly enhanced by subgames that allow countries to realize mutual gains, they are damaged by subgames that allow subset of countries to realize their gains at expenses of others. The problem of international security remains: how to generate and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of cooperation in the face of competing efforts by actors to manipulate the system to their benefit?

The UN was supposed to be blue-print for a world organization and a system which was 'to save succeeding generations from scourge of war'. The most important feature here is to speculate the future of world security
system and, the UN under the impact of 'multiplicity' - a global system where "the major coalition would have both conflicting and common interests with each other and with other groupings... the coalition would be less cohesive than in bipolar system." 26 It will not be clear whose interests are primarily affected by disruptive acts. Yet, security policy remain the central theme to the interests of state. Therefore, to present day, collective security is an unquestioned ideal. The concept of collective security is conceived as legal rather than a moral one. It has to stay, in some form, in the anarchy of states inspite of changes in world politics. But a collective security system for the 1990s needs to be constructed around a broader definition of security. It is to be viewed as a means of enforcing order between independent political communities, of achieving a degree of centralization that does not radically threaten the independence and autonomy of states. The UN system does not embody the 'pure' collective system, specially in relation to the veto power of five permanent members of UNSC. It clearly recognizes that UN system could not deal with threats to peace emanating from superpowers. For a more equitable application of collective security system, it is necessary that the permanent membership of Security

Council should be expanded to give better and even distribution to states, emerging as new power centres in the new world order.

III

Concept of Disarmament and Arms Control

The states develop weapons to enhance, what the statesman call, 'the national security'. But due to their own fear and mutual mistrust land up in an unending insecurity. There is sharp discrepancy between the number of weapons and the security need. The actual employment of the weapon capability could be used for the purpose of weakening or destroying another nation. With new techniques in warfare and nuclear power with 'overkill capacity', they threaten national as well as international security. Patterned by the 'worst-case syndrome' such activities promote arms race, adversely affect the process of peaceful-coexistence, mutual understanding, cooperation and quality among nations. It also perpetuates under-development, inequalities and injustices in economic relations - another basis for international insecurity.

Disarmament: Its Meaning

The concept of disarmament has hence occupied a prominent place in the thinking of people concerned with
world peace. Disarmament seeks to eliminate war by eliminating the means of war i.e., armament.27 A more sophisticated version rests on the assumption that national military resources not only make war physically possible, but features prominently among factors that make war a political probability. It has been defined by Hedley Bull as "...the reduction or abolition of armaments. It may be — unilateral or multilateral; general or local; comprehensive or partial, controlled or uncontrolled."28

Disarmament is reduction of military means. Its theory stipulates that the corrupting influence of power operates not only in dictatorship but also in democracy where it tends to debase the popular standards of international morality and promote the excessive influence of military-men. Arms races are product rather than cause of intent to make war or the apprehension of danger of war. Peace is a political problem and disarmament should be envisaged as a happy result. In fact arms, war, disarmament and peace is a circular problem, in which causes, effects, policies and instruments of policy revolve in a cycle of interaction and

27. Immanuel Kant had included the elimination of armies and weapons as the third of his 'preliminary articles of perpetual peace between states'.

are blurred into indistinguishability. Disarmament, as a direct approach to peace rests upon the assumption that armaments make war not only physically possible but also probable.

The theory of disarmament has a broad spectrum relating to regulation, limitation, reduction and finally the elimination of armaments, forces and military expenditure. It also encompasses limitation or prohibition on development, testing, production, emplacement, deployment, proliferation, transfer or use of arms. Progress in disarmament and the strengthening of international security must be looked upon as parallel means in efforts to preserve peace and prevent war. Frequently the need to preserve a capability of retaliation is often used as justification for qualitative and quantitative improvement in weapons and arms race on grounds of national and international security. In fact, all such activities undermine the purpose of security.

The disarmament theorists put forward the proposition that only elimination of arms and limitation of competitive military development alone can offer hope for survival from destructiveness of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Such war preparedness will have corrupting and militarizing effect on the army. Economically disarmament will contribute humanely towards 'common security' and development Disarmament would reduce suspicion between
governments and thus dilute the "action-reaction" phenomenon. Although critics argue that arms race is not the only impediment towards security and does not have an autonomous process following its own logic, yet H. Bull saw in arms race a manifestation of inherent tension. Critics of disarmament argue that war, although an evil, is not the worst, and armaments remain the most dependable producer of security. They argue weapons are essentially a symptom rather than a cause of mistrust. The fundamental problem is not with weapons but politics. It is thought that disarmament on such massive scale is also not feasible.

Disarmament has been almost invariably linked with enhancement of international security. A determination of this relationship can promote peace, security and disarmament. Armament and development are linked because they both compete for the finite financial and material resources of the world. The report of the UN Secretary General on "Social and Economic consequences of Arms Race and of Military Expenditure" gives a comprehensive analysis of arms race. In fact, "there is a close relationship between disarmament and development, progress in the former

29. ibid.
30. UN Resolution 32/87C of 12 December 1977.
would greatly help in the realization of latter. Resources released as a result of disarmament measure should be devoted to economic and social development of all nations and contribute to bridging of economic gap between developed and developing countries.\textsuperscript{32} The present day watchwords are complexity and interdependence. The arms race consume resources and distorts economic structure, while development is equitable to peace, stability and security. Hence, the capacity of arms to provide for security is increasingly open to question. Military expenditure should be re-channelized towards developmental purposes.\textsuperscript{33}

The concept of disarmament is at its theoretical best when applied with other approaches to peace. It is integrally related to the collective security system and has assumed a prominent position in the development of theoretical approaches to peace through socio-economic welfare. 'The problem of disarmament is not one of disarmament alone but of the organization of world community'. In political terms it is feasible only within the context of an institutional system. Yet the trouble is

\textsuperscript{32} Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of UN General Assembly S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, para 35.

\textsuperscript{33} A.Kadachenko, "Disarmament and Underdeveloped Countries", \textit{International Affairs} (Moscow), vol.6, March 1969, pp.26-34.
that no time seems to be right and opportune enough to begin with.

Even as disarmament stands on firm ground politically, economically, socially and ethnically, arms remain a necessary permanent source of man's existence, and inevitable for imperialist designs of states. The agreements of disarmament spell out different approaches: 34

1. The Tension-First Approach states that changing national attitudes will reduce tension. Hence it emphasizes the psychological and educative factors.

2. The Political-Settlement Approach highlight that politically unresolved issues encourage states for war. It gives no consideration to arms or mistrust.

3. The Agreement-First Approach points out that disarmament should precede resolution of political problems by gradual trust building process.

Even as disarmament becomes acceptable, the debate polarized around the issue of multilateral or unilateral disarmament. While the former argue that as a semblance of national security 'disarmament should be negotiated, balanced and based on verification'; the latter argue that sometimes even independent and informal efforts result in reciprocal gestures of disarmament. The 'multilateralists'

believe in complete lack of trust among nations and agreement is among nations of equal power. The 'unilateralist' believe that war and arms are morally wrong and that diplomacy does not require threat or use of force.

With no formal definition, disarmament can logically be classified according to degree of arms reduction. Total or complete disarmament stands for eliminating military capabilities beyond what is deemed necessary for domestic order. Partial disarmament may cover complete, incomplete reduction or a combination of both. It also seeks budgetary ceiling to keep arms to the minimum.

Arms Control

Towards the end of 1950s, emerged an idea what Hedley Bull called, 'new thinking' providing for the development of arms control. There was concern for nuclear war and suspicion about existing security policies. It had determination and was optimistic about contribution of strategic theory to improving prospects of peace and security. T.C.Schelling and M.Halperin, summarizing the theory of arms control, state its essential features "a recognition of common interests, reciprocation and cooperation, even among potential enemies, with respect to their military establishment." 35 It is a restraint on

armament policy, which may be as regards level of armaments, their character for deployment.\textsuperscript{36} Its aim is to reduce the probability of war, reduce cost of war preparation and limit death and destruction just in case arms control fail to provide the essential security. The crux of arms control lies in the belief that mutual interests and trust can exist in mutual regulation of arms between adversaries.

The arms control negotiations can be categorized thus as: prohibition of deployment of particular weapons in new area; those primarily concerned with crisis management and restraining vertical and horizontal proliferation of arms, both qualitative and quantitative. The utmost, an agreement can offer to contain war is either a degree of 'crisis stability' or 'political disarmament.'\textsuperscript{37} The principle underlying 'crisis stability' is that no war is allowed to start, because of some military imperatives, before all other diplomatic options have failed. The other objective lies with 'arms race stability'. Its primary goal is to stop arms competition from getting out of hand on the pretext of other side gaining an advantage. Despite no close relationship, both 'crisis stability' and arms race stability co-exist. Arms control, in classical theory,

\textsuperscript{36} Hedley Bull, n.28.

solely adjusts and restores strategic equilibrium. The 'reformist approach' wants to bring substantial change in international relations and therefore regards the status-quo of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks as pointless. On the other hand, 'the managerial approach' wish to resolve the ideological conflict as it is source of other conflicts. This has also been termed as 'idealist' versus 'traditionalist' debate. In the debate, arms control "is a break out of the traditional confinement of disarmament".38

The protagonists of arms race criticize arms control as unrealistic as they think security lies in maintaining military superiority. Due to mutual mistrust, arms control are worthless if not thoroughly verifiable; arms control may lead to recession as arms are reflection of political mistrust and not the cause of it.39 Another flaw is manifest in the doctrine of deterrence - an essential offshoot of arms control philosophy - which knows no limits and its inconsistency hamper the negotiating process. Yet, arms


control should be practiced to avoid war destructiveness, as the cumulative effect of all arms control negotiations make a substantial contribution.

Disarmament and arms control are twin processes through which the world community of nations intend to stop arms race. From the point of view of international peace and security, both arms control and disarmament are complimentary to each other. Nations left free to develop more weapons in future may not ensure peace and security even after reduction and abolition. Mere arms control will also be negation of disarmament as reduction in existing level is as necessary as the check on arms race. Therefore, arms control is mere extension of the logic inherent in arms race.

Although the two terms are at times synonymous, it is necessary to make distinction. While disarmament emphasizes reduction, arms control is management of arms, even at higher level, by mutual restrain of an agreement. The approaches of arms control and disarmament to peace and security can be almost antithetical as can be seen from negotiations about anti ballistic missiles (ABM) in the SALT I. The negotiators were more interested in restricting the number instead of uncontrolled race. While disarmament wants to reverse the process, arms control wants the processes safe. Total disarmament being a near
impossibility in community of states, the shift towards arms control is quite realistic. Both the concepts are sometimes alternative strategies and sometimes they overlap.

The disarmament ideal has been enshrined in the UN charter. Initially the progress was slow. It focused around super powers as the Third World countries eager to inhibit nuclear arms race, than to cut their own expanding conventional arms expenses. The Antarctic Treaty (1959), the outer Space Treaty (1967), the Seabed Treaty (1971) and the Tlatelolco Treaty (1967) are achievements of disarmament which also overlap with arms control measures in a particular area. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) restricting nuclear testing underground was another achievement. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) has been dubbed biased by certain nations that it leaves the nuclear prerogative with a privileged few. On the arms control front, the threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974) the ABM treaty in SALT I agreement was other accomplishments. The INF Treaty was a watershed in genuine disarmament as it resulted in destruction of 396 Perishing II and Cruise US missile in Europe and elimination of 683 SS-20, SS-4, SS-12 and SS-23 Soviet missiles deployed.

The START Treaty concluded between US and the Soviet Union in July 1991 imposes limits on the aggregate numbers of deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicle (SNDVs) and
the weapon they carry over a period of seven years after the treaty has been in force. No side can exceed a limit of 1600 SNDVs (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers). But the START-Treaty does not prohibit modernization or replacement of strategic offensive system except those specified. Yet, till date, START is the first genuine arms control treaty reducing long range offensive nuclear weapons on both sides.

No clear and distinct line can be drawn to fully distinguish disarmament and arms control. No plan is effective unless it continues to serve national interest. To be dependable it should be pursued multilaterally. Nations should not lack the will for its enforcement. A more open view of security is necessary. "Arms race is a 'global folly' in which nations are buying greater and greater insecurity at higher and higher cost." Solutions to problems cannot be found in higher level of deterrence. It only enhances vulnerability. Disarmament and arms control have their limitations too, they need a superior authority to enforce agreements. Hence they are more effective in coordination with international institutions. Times are changing and we are in the transitionary phase. No hard predictions can be made. Yet, change should come in our thinking and ideas, these concepts will only be a means towards peace, common survival and common security.

IV

**Concept of Deterrence**

Deterrence is a behaviour common to all walks of life, and is present in social relationships and may be important in domestic political system. In its simplest form, deterrence can be seen as a particular type of social and political relationship in which one party attempts to influence the behaviour of another in a desired direction. It, being a coercive influence, rests explicitly on threats of sanctions.

In international politics, this may apply to relations between adversaries. "Deterrence refers to the attempt by decision makers in one nation or group of nations to restructure the set of alternatives available to decision makers in another nation or group of nations, by posing a threat to their key values."41 It is an attempt to exclude armed aggression, from consideration and thus is an effort to frighten the adversary into inaction at a national level. Deterrent attempts are essentially psychological in nature. Its essence is not physical obstruction or prevention of any particular course of action but to make a choice appear unattractive and undesirable for the input. The deterrence

theory is an attempt to threaten adversary into inactivity and for this it rests on the 'worst-case syndrome' as no one can guarantee the actions of a potential adversary. Its fundamental hypothesis is 'if the threat to values is sufficiently large, the exclusion of armed aggression from consideration is possible'.\textsuperscript{42} The central assumption that underlie this concept are:

(a) there is a rational decision maker who tends to reject war as an alternative where costs of aggression are greater than expected;

(b) threat is presumed to be a simple function of destructive capabilities. A refining of the conception of destructive capability has pointed out, "deterrence is more properly conceived of as a function of the amount of capability potential remaining after an attack has been absorbed."\textsuperscript{43}

(c) there should always be alternatives, other than war, available to decision-makers of deterrence policy.

The operation of deterrence has been dynamic and has acquired strength over the years from its success and failures. It is a meaningful strategic policy only when we

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{43} A.Wolstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror", \textit{Foreign Affairs} (New York), vol.37, no.2 (January 1959), pp.211-34.
are fairly confident that the retaliatory instrument upon which it relies, must not be called upon to function at all. From the beginning deterrent doctrines have been framed in terms of 'exceptional calculus,' i.e. a possible aggressor had to face a response which was relatively probable and punitive. The strategic balance of deterrence becomes somewhat less stable in a period in which political hostilities appear to decline. What really matters in deterrence are the threats than application of sanctions. Its success depends not only on threat of punishment but also an incentive for action that one deems inimical. Hence it is suggested, "deterrence strategies often need to be combined with positive inducement, thereby not only maximizing the cost of actions but also minimizing cost of inaction to the challenger."  

Nuclear Deterrence : Its Manifestations

The power and the energy of the atom challenged the physical scientists, so has it intrigued the social scientists for its encroachment into their domain. The potential destructiveness of nuclear energy has had considerable impact on international relations so as to initiate reconsideration of security policies and the

concept of war. Deterrence emerged in its present form, after the Second World War. It has clearest manifestations in western security system - an effort to contain communism and the threat of Soviet policies which resulted in bipolarity the world over. The deterrence doctrine was applied almost entirely to these antagonistic blocs to restrain each other. It settled largely on higher and continuing level of hostilities.

Mutual deterrence is a product of 'capacity' and 'credibility'. For an effective influence, it is essential that a deterrent should have a capability to threat and its credibility should be beyond doubt. In case of failure, the second strike forces are decisive elements. But, maximizing irrationality would be no attractive answer as it undercuts the position of both. Nations calculate costs and risks of their action before any aggressive step. They suggest prevention of war and creditable defence as twin purpose of deterrence.

The usually held western view is that deterrence exerts a moderating effect on the provocative and tension producing aspect of relationship. They always emphasize the political context of deterrence. As for the Soviet bloc, there is

debate over existence of a deterrence policy and there is doubt over its acceptance to them. Yet scholars like Fritz Ermarth, Benjamin Lambeth and Richard Pipes claim that Soviets were determined to achieve a superiority in both offensive and defensive weapons. Other dismissed the doctrinal statement of war fighting and winning. Experts say essence of the Soviet security policy lay in prevention of war by political means and peaceful, beneficial relations with all states irrespective of their system. According to them, ABM treaty provides evidence that Soviet Union did not embark upon a quest for "a winning capability in a potential nuclear conflict." For the non-aligned, deterrence constitutes a dissuasion of an adversary by another from undertaking hostile actions by persuading him that such an action would risk being unsuccessful or too costly. The protagonists of deterrence, accredit five decades of peace and security among superpowers to it and thus consider it indispensable. But for others, it has been the 'sword of Democles' - the end of precipice - which threatened to be a global catastrophe. The consequences in the aftermath of


failure of nuclear deterrence will engulf the aggressor, victim and by-stander, alike.

A fundamental requirement, for 'nuclear deterrence', is the totally unacceptable retaliatory damage even after the strongest foreseeable first strike.\(^{48}\) Mutual Assured Destruction rests on effective nuclear capability of either side to assure the destruction of other. Since then strategic and thought has made little progress in the strategy of conflict. A George and R. Smoke have in the meanwhile set forth what a competent deterrence theory should do:

i) identify variables that might determine opponents behaviour

ii) identify variables for deterrer

iii) describe difficulties involved in practicing deterrence, so that

iv) it becomes easy to assess patterns of failure of deterrence.

v) the theory should be something about the utility and limitations of deterrence.\(^{49}\)


\(^{49}\) George and Smoke, n.44, p.512.
Immediate or Pure Deterrence: It concerns relations among opposing states where at least one side seriously contemplates attack, while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation to prevent it. This exists in case of sharp crisis and where war impends. It is therefore almost always thought of as a conscious and deliberate policy. It asserts, if we have to deter, the enemy must be persuaded of our ability and intent to reach. Hence a threat should not merely be verbal but supported by military preparation.

General Deterrence: States usually operate in an environment of insecurity, suspicion and hostility—a situation typical of international politics. Forces are used to regulate relations among themselves, thus it is a relationship of hostility and conflict. War preparedness is typical of deterrence theory and the commitments are "non-situational." The doctrine of 'proportionate deterrence' is both rational and attractive to states with medium resources. On the contrary, nuclear weapons have high probability to be used in situation of asymmetry and with a increase in number of decision-makers.

Extended Deterrence: In past, superpowers were prepared to extend deterrence to non-nuclear states, too. But the

recent contradiction of alliances and the Third World disenchantment with power hierarchy have created new centres of decision-making. International relations are in transitionary stage towards multipolarity. Economically no one has a firm ground. We are passing through a phase where still "Violence is a hot headed activity in which actions and commitments can take on a logic and momentum of their own." Paradoxically, extended deterrence might be more effective in a world of mutual vulnerability than in strategic system dominated by defenses. Strategic equality was sufficient to deter attack but for extended deterrence a degree of superiority is necessary. Reiterating some of these concerns of Herman Kahn, Robert McNamara stated a decade later, "that assumed destruction is the very essence of the whole deterrence concept."

A past period of forty years, with no war between super-powers, has often been quoted as a point of success for mutual deterrence. But, in fact, the theory applied to host of other international political situations results either in a 'genuinely universal strategic man' or in abandoning of the concept. Nuclear weapons have contributed


to deterrence no doubt, nothing proves them as sole factor in its exercise. Some scholars display no confidence in deterrence as it depends on influencing the decision of another government, and "we still have no basis for determining how our strategic force decision, effects the probability of a nuclear war." 53

Strategists of general deterrence argue for a limitation of capabilities at the minimum. They point out that sustained efforts in producing weapons beyond the minimum is itself a stimulus for counter measures and arms race. The real problem is the likelihood of irrationality and miscalculations jeopardizing international security. There have been cases of technical failure of existing command and control systems. About 125 such incidents, twenty of serious nature, involving US nuclear force alone have been recorded between 1945-76 and an American Senate Report of 1980 noted that early warning system produced 180 false alarms in a period of 18 months. 54 This has prompted a remark, "a weapon you cannot trust, is of no use to you."

To deal with a paradox of failure of deterrence we should

53. Morton Halperin, "The Good, the Bad and the Wasteful", Foreign Policy (Washington), no.6 (Spring 1972), pp.75-81; also see Colin Gray, "Arms Race is About Politics", Foreign Policy, no.9 (Winter 1972-73), pp.123-4.

"abandon the notion of rationality, which is held central to deterrence, and replace it with the notion of sensible decision." 55

Western analysts feel that east-west relations have become controlled and safe due to deterrence. To them, it seems to have fully suffixed the preventive function; in case of failure there is early chance of control and termination. The Soviet assessment thinks it impossible to ensure security by constantly threatening it. The Third World stability has been held to ransom by their involvement in the military competition. Accordingly, deterrence and arms control had become too closely identified with the attempt to stabilize the 'US-Soviet balance.' It views the entire international system as 'a two person zero sum game.'

Today, with a multipolar deterrent capability among nations, political disputes world over may take a serious turn. A shift towards a multi-polar world would emphasize a reconsideration of commitments and alliances. New issues and trends are coming up, fundamentalism and terrorism are cause of serious concern, hence deterrence will have to depend more on political factors and new alignments. A

multi-polar world would lack the same stability, on the political level it will be a more flexible and loose alignment. The theoretical possibility of anonymous threat is greater and identification of protagonists difficult in a multipolar world 'leading to heightened nuclear instability'. Governments secretly supporting outrageous threats, can give rise to 'nuclear blackmail'. Fundamental changes in power equations have brought us at cross-roads as to the future of deterrence.

The non-aligned concept of security holds on to entirely different grounds. It was an effort to stay out of polarization and ideological conflict. Apart from the basic requirement of sovereign independence of nations it stood against colonization, discrimination, and all forms of domination and intervention. Instead of emphasizing the 'power concept' in relations among state to ensure security, the non-aligned concept relies on more genuine requirements of development, need for disarmament, democratization of international relations and common security. In the changing international scenario, the non-aligned propose to meet the challenge of economic, social and environmental insecurity on a collective basis, as a joint effort. They under play the 'power theory' because it is the economic

power that leads to genuine political independence. It stands not only for the goals of the NAM but for the 'purpose' of humanity.

The objectives of the non-aligned may seem far fetched but this is the long-term policy that leads to the goal of peace and security. The security, according to the non-aligned concept does not lie in maintaining a balance of power, arms race or deterrence among states; instead it resides in providing infrastructural facilities to all individuals, employment and thus bring about sustainable development. No doubt, it does not totally rule out the necessity of military security; but it is not accorded the same priority as it enjoys with the other concepts.

The basic common factor among all the other concepts stated above is their over-emphasis on 'power' - as means and as end. In this effort, the basic objective of security is lost in between. They give more prominence to external security and forget the multidimensional and multilateral aspect of security. Today domestic challenges-economic, social and cultural - along with environmental threats are more severe threats to security. Due to the interdependence among nations, developmental and environmental threats have transcended national frontiers. For a better cause of survival, nations have been robbed of their individuality. The non-alignment concept, through collective efforts, seek
to rechannelize resources for effective security. Too much power orientation can certainly rob them of their essence.

The non-aligned policy is rooted in world affairs. Its thrust changes with dynamics of world politics as it has been working towards the objective of international security since its inception. It graduated from joint survival among Third World and developing countries to the common cause of mankind. It is a step towards the 'Concept of common security.' But as for the other concepts of security, they can individually make some contribution towards the international security but cannot be the only basis for a more broad based concept—Common Security.