CHAPTER FOUR

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT NEGOTIATIONS

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter provides a comparative analysis of security and development negotiations and locates the explanatory variable, which is identified as a necessary factor for facilitating multi-stakeholder negotiations. The chapter has been divided roughly into three sections. The first section deals with the understanding of cooperation at the international level. The second section deals with the key driver, which can facilitate cooperation between the concerned actors. The explanatory variable is operationalised in context to two issue areas of security and development. The third section analyses the outcome of negotiations by focusing on the key factors, which lead to norm change.

COOPERATION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

International cooperation has been area of much heated debate in international relations. While the rationalists, who emphasize on reciprocal action, a tit of tat strategy as the main ingredient for international cooperation, the liberals have identified the role of institutions, as main mediators in holding the interests of states together. Constructivists however have focused on the role of ideas, which according to them gives meaning to the actions of various state actors. There are two dimensions to study cooperation: (a) to study as to what constitutes cooperation between the states at the international level and (b) to study what causes cooperation between the states at the international level. As the latter was studies in a detailed manner in Chapters 1, 2 &3. The present chapter would
focus on what constitutes cooperation and would analyze the role of ideas and norm shift in this process.

To answer what constitutes cooperative behaviour, scholars in International Relations have defined the phenomenon of cooperation through different perspectives. The realist/rationalist perspective has focused itself on the systemic factors—the overall structure and place of actors in international relations. Using game theory as its central tool of analysis, it has developed propositions about the conditions under which cooperation is likely to emerge. According to Morton Deutch the phenomenon of cooperation consists of two important elements: First, it assumes that each actor’s behaviour is directed towards some goal(s). It need not be the same goal for all the actors involved, but it does assume rational behaviour on their part. Second, the definition implies that cooperation provides the actors with gains and rewards. The gain need not be the magnitude or kind for each state, but they are mutual. Each actor helps the other to realize their goal by adjusting its policies in the anticipation of its own reward (Deutch cited in Milner 1992: 468). Thus the main analysis is that each actor is in anticipation of bettering one’s own situation; it is this that leads to the adjustment in one’s policies, when nations cooperate. Therefore what counts are two main elements (a) goal directed behaviour that entails (b) mutual policy adjustments so that all sides end up better off than they would otherwise be. However before coming to the material factors that facilitate cooperation, the antecedent conditions of what causes cooperation have to be reckoned with. The reason for this is to explore the reasons, which lead states to cooperate. This could be seen during the formula stage of World Commission on Dams, when the various stakeholders—advocacy groups, international organization and industries came to a common table to debate the pros and cons of large dams. The main reason was the belief of each actor that they were on the right side, as all the stakeholders had a valid argument to defend their actions. Thus the process involved risks for the advocacy groups, the industry and the World Bank (Personal communication with Peter Bosshard, 2007)
The emphasis of the risk factor by Bosshard, anticipates in it the most preferable strategy of rational actors, as understood through the explanation of "Prisoner's Dilemma" in game theory. The most preferable strategy for a particular rational actor in the prisoner's dilemma game is that, the first actor defects while the other actor cooperates (DC) and the worst outcome would be for the actor to cooperate, while the other defects (CD) and thereby exploit him. Therefore the dominant strategy for each player is defection, since the payoff from defecting is higher than the payoff from cooperating regardless of what the other player chooses to do. Both players, therefore, defect, and both receive the punishment payoff. This is so despite the existence of another outcome - the mutual reward-which would leave both players better off. As they cannot conclude an agreement binding each other to cooperate, the two prisoners are unable on their own to arrive at that outcome. Joanne Gowa has dismissed the explanation provided by the PD game as seriously flawed. He writes that in the real world, individuals or states engaged in PD situations are very unlikely to confront each other only once. Instead, they are more likely to engage each other in the equivalent of repeated plays of the PD game. This is important, because it profoundly influences the likelihood that cooperation will result (Gowa 1986:170). In order to explain the defect, which Gowa points out, Axelrod proposes that a high probability of future play is a necessary ingredient for sufficient condition for cooperation to emerge (Axelrod 1984:15). He therefore posits a strategy of Tit for Tat (TFT). TFT cooperates on the first move and then does on the next and all the subsequent moves, responding to the behaviour of the other player. This behaviour has been commonly defined as reciprocity. It is in congruence with this definition that W. Gouldner defines reciprocity as conditional action (Gouldner 1960:160). In game theory, "contingency" is a central component of reciprocity i.e. actors behaving in a reciprocal fashion respond to cooperation with cooperation and to defection with defection (Keohane 1986:6). Thus reciprocity is roughly associated with equivalence of benefits. Axelrod argues that that cooperative behaviour may be more likely when states pursue a strategy of reciprocity because they know they will be punished for defecting and rewarded for cooperating (Axelrod cited in Milner 1992: 470). The main reason for this argument is that cooperation through reciprocity has been defined as an appropriate standard of behaviour, which can produce quid pro quo among sovereign states.
Though Keohane emphasized the importance of institutional innovations as facilitating international cooperation, his ideas have not been taken seriously by rational choice theories. The reason for this exclusion is that the realist theory argues that international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy's constraining effects on inter-state cooperation. Cooperation, in this context is defined as a situation that contains a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests. This is in contrast to harmony, which requires complete identification of interests. Explained as the exchange of roughly equivalent values of both goods and bads, it emphasizes that lack of equivalence can lead actors to misunderstand the strategy and can produce escalating feuds rather than cooperation (Milner 1992:471). Reciprocity can be an effective strategy to induce cooperation among self-interested players, where values of each actor's options are clearly identified. The game theory therefore becomes associated with reciprocity and iteration as its key element in international cooperation. The reason why iteration along with reciprocity has been emphasized is the element of sustainability or the continuous interaction between the state actors. However it has to be emphasized that iteration in different games has different effects. In the game of the chicken or stag hunt it may not promote cooperation. However many scholars have shown that adding repeated play i.e. iteration to PD games makes cooperation more likely as over time the value of continued cooperation comes to outweigh the benefits of defection at any one time. Also a subjective evaluation contingent on the perceptions and expectations of decision-makers is extremely important in empirically evaluating the hypothesis about the effect of iteration. The perception of decision-makers is contingent on domestic pressures which the advocacy groups can use in their favour by employing through public debate and

1 Basically used in American debates on international trade policy, the notion of reciprocity as a policy has received considerable attention. For instance, Keohane explains reciprocity as a concept, which acquires two distinct meanings: specific reciprocity refers to situations in which specific partners exchange items of equivalent value in a strictly delimited sequence. That is if any obligations exist, they are clearly specified in terms of rights and duties of particular actors. The other situation is characterized by diffuse reciprocity in which the definition of equivalence is less precise. According to diffuse equivalence, one's partner may be viewed as a group rather than as particular actor and the sequence of events is less narrowly bounded. Thus in short, it involves conforming to generally accepted standards of behaviour (Keohane 1986:4).

2 The repeated play of the actors can be possible if more multi-stakeholder dialogues can be taken in similar fashion. The follow up process of the Ottawa Treaty and the World Commission on Dams can be usefully employed in this context.
action, as can be seen in the case of advocacy followed by Narmada Bachao Andolan and
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and also on external front as seen in the
pressure which was put on target actors like the World Bank and the United Nations,
which was persuaded to open the debate on dams and landmines respectively.

Going by this analysis, how does reciprocity respond to issues that are non-traditional in
nature? Issues, which are constantly being defined and redefined by stakeholders who are
articulating concepts and challenging the decisions of the state through international
discourses on security and development. The issues, resonating with the broadened
understanding of the consequences involved argue for a cost-benefit analysis of the
reciprocal—in this context landmines vis a vis security and dams vis a vis development.
Can reciprocity function in situations where the negotiating actors are states and non-state
actors. These multi-stake holder negotiations, which run contrary to the established
understanding of traditional inter-state diplomacy is constantly being fed by ideas which
gives a nuanced meaning to concepts, which are forwarded by framing and reframing the
reciprocal—the mutual benefits. According to Bikash Pande the utility of multi-stake-
holder negotiations lies in the process itself, i.e. what is it that you want from such
processes. The biggest benefit of such processes at the international level is the voice,
material and the credibility that it gives to the civil society. In developmental issues much
of it has to be tackled at the domestic level and therefore the follow-up process is more
important. However the framework negotiated at the international level can inform the
discourses in a realistic, effective and practical way at the national level (Personal
Communication with Bikash Pande, 2008). Similarly commenting on the utility of such
negotiations from a security perspective, Louis Meresca, says that NGOs in such
negotiations have to be primarily seen as humanitarian actors, who bring their experience
from the ground in terms of experience in dealing with conflict zones and expertise in
terms of technical know hows and a full recognition of the consequences of issues being
negotiated (Personal Communication with Louis Meresca, 2008). In fact it can be stated
that civil-society or non-governmental actors can be a determinant in shaping the
reciprocal or the reciprocity of the issue being discussed, thus, shaping in turn the very
tenor of negotiations.
The World Commission on Dams and the Ottawa case engaged many state actors and reciprocity was a pertinent element in the negotiations. Reciprocity as stated above has been associated with the equivalence of benefits. In the negotiations pertaining to both the case studies; however it is evident that there was a framing and reframing of agreements in an ongoing effort to assess the cost-benefit analysis in terms of defining the referent object and the meaning of security and development which was arrived at certain costs-costs, which were both social and environmental. Many scholars have argued that perceptions play an important role in negotiations. Zartman and Berman write that negotiability of an issue is ultimately a subjective matter of perception and will (Zartman and Berman 1982: 45). In the Ottawa case the political will was generated amongst the actors' through changing their perceptions towards landmines, where the landmine issue was penultimately framed as an issue related to humanitarian disarmament. A similar case is reflected in the case of World Commission on Dams, where the large dam's controversy was framed in terms of social, economic and environmental costs. This framework did help to frame the issues in a particular context and thus helped moulding the perception of various actors in the pre-negotiation phase to come to a negotiation table. Reciprocity thus was not limited to the material trade-offs but was largely contingent on values of effective dam building in terms of WCD and humanitarian security in terms of landmines.

Apart from framing and reframing issues by coordination of issues and actors, collaboration of information at various levels is also seen as a strategy employed during the negotiations. Therefore what provide the basic framework for such advocacy are two important elements of leadership (coordination of issues and actors and distribution of information (collaboration of information).

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have also taken these two concepts into analysis. Keck and Sikkink elaborate on the role of transnational advocacy in international relations. Bringing together case studies of non-governmental actors involved in advocacy campaigns for human rights, women rights and environment, they underline the similarities inherent in each of these. Some of the similarities they point out as inherent in
all the case studies are centrality of values or principled ideas, the beliefs that individuals can make a difference, the creative use of information and the employment of sophisticated political strategies in targeting their campaign (Keck and Sikkink 1998:2). Thus the thrust of the argument that the authors offer is the mobilization of information strategically to change the behavior of the concerned actors. This chapter aims to take this debate further by offering an analysis of leadership by non-governmental actors in international negotiations in facilitating this process. The focus here will therefore be to explore how leadership by advocacy groups was operationalised to change the framework of understanding by diffusing ideas and information at the national and international level. Also it attempts to answer the key qualities that triggered a norm-shift in the behaviour of sates both at the national and international level. Though this understanding has been inspired by the work of Sikkink and Keck it nevertheless is distinct by focusing two different areas of security and development, issue domains that interfere with distinct priorities of states at both the national and international level. This interference is potentially manifest in the articulation of discourses, which revolve around “national interest.” Keck and Sikkink have also termed leadership as a resource, which makes campaigns possible (Keck and Sikkink 1998:7). This chapter furthers the argument by isolating leadership as the key explanatory variable, which shapes the tenor, trajectory and “resources” for a successful/unsuccessful outcome.

Keck and Sikkink have also termed information sharing as the key element involved in the success of advocacy groups. In fact they delineate four strategies for effective lobbying employed as a means towards persuasion. These are: information politics the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically usable information and move it to where it will have the most impact; symbolic politics, or the ability to call upon symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far away; leverage politics, or the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence and accountability politics, or the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies or principles (Keck and Sikkink 1998:16).
Scholars in international negotiations have though from different prisms looked at problem of distribution and information as the main conduit for cooperation. The argument stems from the understanding that pairs of matched problems obstruct international cooperation. First is that of sanctioning and monitoring and the other is that of distribution and information. Where the first usually plagues the enforcement of cooperative arrangements, the second is related to the problems of coordination. Distributional and informational problems arise when the actors select precisely how they will cooperate from a set of possible solutions. The second set of problems generally precede the sanctioning and monitoring problems and as the actors cannot agree on how they will cooperate they therefore believe that there is nothing to enforce (James Morrow 1994: 388).

International negotiations literature has tried to address some of the above issues. Focusing on the problems of distribution and information, James Morrow has tried to outline the reasons that motivate actors to adopt different arrangements to address the problems of coordination in international cooperation. Using the two by two game of coordination, known as the Battle of Sexes\(^2\), he underlines the need to solve the informational problems, which can expedite cooperative outcomes. He proposes that the main focus is on exploring those formal communication channels between players, which can increase the chances of cooperation between them. These forms of communication help coordinate actions although they have no coercive power over any of the players. These channels alter the players’ expectations about one another’s actions by creating the opportunity to exchange meaningful messages. This successful communication requires both a forum for the exchange of messages and also a shared interpretation of those messages. Institutions like the IUCN, in the case of World Commission on Dams and UN in the case of landmines were therefore decisive in the two case-studies. This forum thus provides an equilibrium pointing to descriptions of stable behavior for successful cooperation. The equilibrium thus specifies what messages the players send to one

\(^2\) In the battle of sexes game, players try to cooperate on one of the two given solutions. Though both players are better off if they cooperate, they disagree about which solution is preferable. This is usually explained as the essence of the distributional problem.
another about the game, how they interpret those messages and what actions they take after interpreting those messages. Thus this model adds an informational problem (is there a solution that is best for all and if so, which solution) to the distributional problem (which solution will actors adopt in the face of the divergent preferences over the possible solutions). The relative importance of distribution of information influences the choices in the equilibrium, because a regime might fail when its members have an incentive to deviate from the behaviour that guides their convergent expectations. The response of state actors and utilities in the case of WCD was not very amicable to the final WCD report. Bikash Pande, an engineer who participated in the negotiations, articulates the reason behind this response, “we were looking for alternatives and ways of minimizing risks, however what happened in the process was that this space was squeezed out” (Personal Communication with Bikash Pande, 2008). Commenting on the equilibrium factor, Louis Meresca says, we were not balancing the issues confronting developing of developed countries, instead our concern was strongly humanitarian, the focus was on the issue it self, not the actors (Personal Communication with Louis Meresca, 2008). Pande’s and Meresca’s statement points towards explaining the behaviour of certain defectors. For instance India, U.S. were not a party to the Ottawa Convention primarily because no alternatives to landmines was explored. Also in the case of World Commission on Dams, alternatives were the weakest point. This perhaps suggests the importance of information sharing on alternatives, to transform interests of states which have high stakes, in case landmines and dams.

James Morrow suggests that institutions and regimes can enhance the chance of cooperation by making information available. This is because the regimes generally provide a forum for its members to negotiate solutions to the recurring problems of coordination. He also argues that institutions without any power of enforcement can help actors coordinate. The main problem, thus, with the issue of coordination/cooperation lies with the sharing of information. In order to break this impasse and facilitate the flow of information, Morrow has proposed another angle to the Battle of the Sex’s game, where he argues that the players are playing another game, which unlike the battle of the sexes game has a solution to which both the players mutually agree to. Taking a cue from
Keohane’s After Hegemony, he writes that “perceptions of self interest depend both on the actors” expectations of the likely consequence that will follow from particular actions and on their fundamental values (Keohane 1989: 63). However this uncertainty about the payoffs creates a mutual interest in sharing information. Thus where the battle of the sex’s game has distributional problems, as the preferred outcomes are only two, on the other hand if both the players share knowledge about the issues relating to the game being played, the beliefs about the outcome, which they prefer may change. Peter. M Haas’s notion of epistemic communities finds an appropriate place here in changing the preferences of the various actors. According to Peter Haas major dynamics for epistemic policy coordination are uncertainty, interpretation and institutionalization. Peter M. Hass defines epistemic community as a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area (Haas 1992:2). As the information produced is neither guesses nor raw data, but a product of human interpretations of social and physical phenomenon, epistemic communities become one possible provider of this sort of information and advice. This model has been emphasized on the grounds that the payoffs that will be received from cooperation will be much higher than not cooperating at all. This also explains the reason for extending the model beyond the battle of the sexes of game. Thus the main focus of the actors now is to maintain equilibrium for cooperation. However what defines the moves or the motivations of the actors is the information they are receiving while bargaining over the specific issues. James. D. Fearon argues that sustained cooperation between the parties can give states an incentive to bargain harder, delaying the agreement in the hope of getting the better deal (Fearon 1998: 272). Thus, it can be argued that the creation of durable expectation, which can be done by the epistemic communities about the future interactions on the issues in question, creates incentives for states to bargain hard for favorable terms.

Thus the actors here include both state and non-state and the causal mechanisms, which have been identified, are:

- Communication Channels: both formal and informal

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Thus as is evident from the above analysis, it can be proposed that certain communication skills in terms of sharing of information and ideas and arguments about the cost-benefit analysis can lead to the redefinition of interest of the state actors, thus determining the broad parameters of negotiation success. However the primary variable involved in channelising these is leadership. The role of ideas can be effectively gauged by assessing the role of formal institutions and though the role played by epistemic communities.

Leadership has been defined in contrast to formal power and often has been related to informal intervention by high officials of international organizations to influence the outcome of international negotiations. Calling them informal political entrepreneurs (Moravcsik: 1999:268) they are said to influence international negotiations through the persuasive manipulation of ideas and information. However the role of leadership in international negotiations is highly contested. There are two major schools of thoughts that try to look at the role of leaders in an active/passive manner. The first is represented by scholars like Andrew Moravcsik and Peter B Evans and Robert Putnam, who emphasize the role of efficient leaders in managing the state—society relationship, in other words underlining the role a two level game in international diplomacy. This kind of leadership is generally termed as two-level network manager (Evan 1993; Putnam 1988).

The other set of scholars like Sandholtz, Zysman and Oran Young, focus more on the different types of leadership, such as structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual, to make the bargaining strategies on cooperation more effective (Wayne and Zysman 1999; Young 1991).

TWO LEVEL NETWORK MANAGER

According to the proponents of this kind of leadership, a two level bargaining theory attentive to the dynamics of the state-society relations rather than the theory that focuses just on the collaboration problems is a more effective way of looking at international cooperation. Robert Putnam has sought to capture this quality of international
negotiations with the metaphor of a two level game. In Putnam's metaphor, statesmen are strategically positioned between two tables, one representing domestic politics and the other international negotiations. Diplomatic tactics and strategies are constrained simultaneously by what the other states will accept and what the domestic constituencies will ratify. To conclude negotiations successfully, the statesmen must bargain on these two tables, both reaching an international agreement and securing its domestic ratification (Moravcsik 1999:4). Thus the two level explanation relaxes the assumption of the unitary, rational state and directs attention instead to the ways in which leaders might help overcome domestic and transnational, rather than interstate, collective action problems. Thus in other words, as Moravscik argues, successful cooperation results not from asymmetries in the distribution of information and ideas among unitary states, but from a superior ability to coordinate and manipulate information and ideas held by domestic social groups and governmental officials (Moravscik 1999:282). However he argues that domestic and social interest will remain latent if one of the three steps breaks down. These three steps have been identified as failures of organization, representation and aggregation (Moravscik 1999: 283).

Organizational failures arise when interested and potentially powerful social groups fail to organize, leaving domestic actors and their government uninformed about the desirable international agreements. Representation failures arise when biases in domestic governmental institutions under represent social groups in favoring cooperation. This situation is most likely to occur when concentrated groups opposed to cooperation traditionally monopolize relations with key domestic bureaucracies and thereby block consideration of policies that the government might accept if informed or pressured by a full range of interests. Aggregation failure arises when bureaucracies and parliamentary procedures block the emergence of a coherent national position out of demands represented to disparate parts of the state. As a whole, states may possess the technical information, experience and interest group contact needed to promote cooperation, yet no single set of officials has access to them all, leading national leaders unaware of the proposals they would otherwise support.
BEHAVIORAL LEADERSHIP

Behavioral leadership focuses on the actions of individual. These actions have been identified as: structural leadership, entrepreneurial leadership and intellectual leadership. The structural leader is an individual who acts in the name of a party (ordinarily the state) engaged in cooperative behaviour and who leads by devising effective ways to bring that party’s structural power (that is power based on the possession of material resources) to bear in the form of bargaining leverage over the issues at stake in specific interactions. The entrepreneurial leadership, by contrast is an individual who may or may not act in the name of a major stakeholder but who leads by making use of negotiating skills to influence the manner in which, issues are presented and to fashion mutually acceptable deals bringing the willing parties together. The intellectual leader is an individual who may or may not be affiliated with a recognized actor in international politics but who relies on the power of ideas to shape the ways in which participants understand the issues at stake and to orient their thinking about options available to come to terms with these issues (Young 1991:288-307).

The actors in this leadership are generally non-state and can represent institutions and states depending on the varying contexts. The causal mechanisms thus identified are:

- Synchronization of the state—society relationship
- Structural leadership
- Entrepreneurial leadership
- Intellectual leadership

When operationalised in context to security and development negotiations leadership appears to be an important variable in shaping the cooperative outcomes between various actors. The most effective explanation which leadership theory proposes is the state society relationship—in other word the role of two-level game in international diplomacy. The Ottawa case offers a classic combination of two level network manager models, where the non-state actors fulfilled the three critical steps of organization, representation and aggregation. The International Campaign provided the organizational
base to advocate a ban on landmines, which helped creating a change of perception amongst the state actors towards the landmines, by giving a vision to the role of NGOs, thus exercising structural leadership. Banerjee commenting on the role of ICBL says, “it prepared reports for the conference, structuring various conferences and then taking that information to the public domain” (Personal communication with Maj General Dipankar Banerjee, 2007). ICBL also employed lobbying strategies with the member of parliaments in various countries, making landmines an electoral issue and the employment of media diplomacy to sensitise the public on landmines played an important role in gathering public support for the issue. The formation of different working groups at the national and the international level, by the respective nationals, helped creating the organizational, representational and aggregation base for effective negotiations. ICRC on the hand provided an institutional base by marking the landmine issue under international humanitarian law. An important strategy it employed was to reframe the security benefits provided by landmines in context to the risks they pose to the vulnerable women and children, farmers and ordinary citizens, not only leading to death but in maiming them through out their lives. The information stemmed from the experts who were working in ICRC hospitals worldwide. For instance in the Montreaux Symposim, convened by ICRC, Robin Coupland, a surgeon by profession noted,” …plastics used in mines posed no greater problems than the bits of foot, mud and grass blasted into the wounds by the mine. None of these materials was detectable by X-ray and all had to be removed” (Meresca and Maslen 2000:151).

On the other hand the World Commission on Dams lacked all the three basic ingredients of the two level network manager. For instance there was little domestic political support for the issues of large dams by the countries involved in pro-dam negotiations. Many governments also cited representational failures as the main factor impeding effective cooperation and thus blocking consensus over issues. For instance the Indian government’s refusal to allow the Commissioner’s to visit the dam affected sites and the refusal of the India state to hold a regional consultation in Bhopal, point towards the apprehensions of an international team of experts into Indian soil. Aggregation failures can also cited as the chief reason for the failure of creating consensus, over key areas of
the report, as there was a clear national position on the role-played by large dams and the benefits accrued by them in material terms of water supply and energy generation. Bureaucratic and parliamentary support was both lacking in the case of dams, which was in stark contrast to the case of landmines, which had gathered support from both the groups (in the case of signatories).

The Ottawa case also testifies the role of behavioral leadership as provided during the negotiations. For instance the structural leader in the Ottawa negotiations was Canada, which took a leadership role in context to landmines, which later came to be famously known as middle power leadership. Thus Lloyd Axworthy, Jody Williams, Bobby Muller, Thomas Gebauer to name a few, can be called as the structural entrepreneurs. The ICRC and the ICBL are also effective examples of entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership in giving a larger picture of negotiations in terms of the humanitarian issues. The entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership is important because it highlights the role played by active diplomacy at different level both international and national levels and not just the international level. It also reflects how multi-stakeholder inputs can be an instrumental tool, in shifting the focus of negotiations and gathering support from various quarters on issues where initially disagreements or uncertainty exists.

On the other hand though the World Commission on Dams was a multi-stake holder initiative and it failed to generate the same kind of fervour of political will as the landmine case. This contrast raises two important questions: first, the role of political consensus at the domestic level to negotiate issues effectively at the international level and second the failure of human rights concerns (economic and social rights) to generate consensus amongst the political actors involved. Resource use, rights based approach, sovereignty issue appear to be the main potent causes for blocking a consensual approach on the issues mentioned. An interesting comparison is the notion of human rights and human security. Where human security concerns, during the Ottawa process were defined to include political and economic rights and did manage to get the support of the various actors there at the same time the notion of social and economic rights received little support form the state actors. Another issue which emerged from the right or resource
based linkage is the role that political interests play in negotiation. Does framing or redefinition of issues necessarily cater to the interests of the actors involved is another areas which merits attention. Human rights literature has constantly drawn attention to the explanations and the extent to which the states have internalised these norms. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink have argued that the enduring implementation of human rights norms requires political systems to establish the rule of the law. They argue that stable improvements in human rights conditions usually require some measure of political transformation and can be regarded as one aspect of liberalization processes. Enduring human rights changes therefore go hand in hand with domestic structural changes (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999:4). These observations are important because they underline the critical role that advocacy groups play at the national level.

Where domestic institutional structures determine both the access to political systems and their ability to link with domestic actors processes of strategic bargaining over issues, which yield substantial tradeoffs, is important. The failure of issues surrounding energy, water, displacement, rights, participation in decision-making processes has failed to generate common grounds at the domestic level. An analogy with environmental negotiations can provide an interesting dimension here, where technology transfer played an important role overcoming issues of related to domestic issues pertaining to sovereignty. In the negotiations pertaining to World Commission on Dams such issue linkages were prominently missing, a reason, which can be assigned to nature of the issues, relating more to governance norms than the shared responsibility of the state actors towards, environmental policy making. Another issue which is pertinent regarding the negotiations relating to landmines and dams is the nature of negotiations which can fully incorporate multi-stakeholder interests from a people’s perspective as both the cases underline a people-centric approach. How has international diplomacy catered to the voices and interests of the affected peoples groups is another areas, which has been studied in this context. How do the various stakeholders balance a people centric approach in negotiating with various actors and how far is the definition of security and development identify with the empirical process of the negotiations is another area of the concern which the present study has attempted to answer. While studying the case
specific episodic analysis of NBA, it was found that the NBA has in fact received
dramatic success in making the state and the multilateral institutions accountable to
policy-making on large dams. During the WCD negotiations, however, it was found that
where there was appreciation of issues related to dams and decision-making, domestic
response of the state was not very favourable. This raises two important issues. First,
where intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership is evident on the NBA case, and
therefore was successful in exploring the spaces at the international level, there at the
domestic level, such fervor was missing. The answer perhaps, can best be put in
Dharmadhikary's own words:

"In case of India, domestic level actions are far more important. In other
countries international advocacy may be more influential. However in the
Indian case, where in specific cases where there is external support for the
project, international advocacy is important" (Personal Communication
with Shripad Dharamadhikary, 2007).

Leadership exercised by non-governmental organizations is also evident from the
response of Ambassador Satnam Singh, who argues the case of Indian civil society in
case of India's landmine position. Lack of leadership in India which has been largely
been personality based rather than issue based is the main reason for the issue remaining
in the backwaters. Commenting on the policy-making set-up in India he points out that
India as an emerging power is allergic to being dictated by Western interests and
responsiveness of the government is largely contingent on domestic level lobbying efforts
and raising the public conscience on the issue, which at present is absent (Personal
Communication with Ambassador Singh, 2008). In fact Singh's statement buttresses the
argument on the relevance of leadership to be exercised at the national level, before
focusing on any international initiatives to pressurize the government. Col. Saini
commenting on the security compulsions of India says that landmine issues in India are
driven by the security of the borders, to check infiltration. However if alternatives are
found and the government feels that other means of deterrence can be used, India can sign
the Ottawa treaty. It has any way been participating as an observer in the Geneva meetings (Personal Communication with Col. Saini, 2008).

Though the analysis above broadly reviews, the leadership exercised in the negotiations, leadership traits have to be seen as being exercised in both horizontal and vertical ways. Where the vertical axis implies the two level leadership theory, leaders being active at the national level; the horizontal axis implies the distribution of information to strategic alliances at the transnational and the international level. Both these axis are measured in terms of four non-governmental organizations, ICRC and ICBL in context to Ottawa Treaty and Berne Declaration and Narmada Bachao Andolan in context to the World Commission on Dams. To identify the exercise of leadership at both horizontal and vertical scales three indicators have been identified. These are Framing i.e. the *reciprocity* of benefits involved with the object of negotiations; *political communication*, i.e. the distribution of information to key strategic stakeholders during negotiations and *ripeness*, i.e. the structures of opportunity, through which defining moments of a successful outcome can be realized. The analysis has been separated, by isolating the case studies pertaining to the security and development negotiations.

**Framing and Leadership**

Framing as a strategy assumes importance because of its relevance in context to the formula phase. The formula phase as seen in the preceding chapters was important in shaping the methodology for the procedural phase. Also it is during the formula phase that interests are articulated and identified. Issues are therefore framed so that a broad agreement can be gained for further engagement and consensus building, thus organising complex phenomenon into coherent understandable categories. Framing has been understood by authors as “providing meaning through filtering people’s perception so as to provide them a field of vision for a problem” (Kaufman, Eliot, Shmueli: 2003). Initially developed as a tool of analysis in negotiations, Putnam and Holmer, define framing as:

Framing and reframing are vital to negotiation process and are tied to information processing, message patterns and socially constructed
meanings. Knowing what types of frames are in use and how they are constructed allows one to draw conclusions about how they effect the development of conflict and can be used to influence it.... With this insight and with the help of framing stakeholders may find new ways to reach agreements (Putnam and Holmer 1992: 128-155)

Going back to the earlier discussion on reciprocity, the cost-benefit analysis of the "mutual benefits" of landmines and dams were questioned by the non-governmental actors. This provided the diplomatic basis for the procedural phase, which took a detailed analysis of the "reframing" of security and development negotiations. The leadership exercised was vertical, thus coordinating the beliefs and ideas associated with the object of negotiations. The process was two ways—from top-bottom to bottom—up. In fact Louis Meresca pointed out that the reason for success of Mine—Ban Convention lay on one hand on the ICBL, which was proactive at national level lobbying, and therefore was decisive in generating political will, there ICRC’s engagement with high level governmental delegations and efforts made towards engaging experts and ministers through seminars and symposiums proved decisive at the transnational and international level (Personal Communication with Louis Meresca, 2008).

Security Negotiations: Role of ICBL and ICRC

The efficacy of ICBL lay in its independent foundation, preparations of various reports, structures of the various conferences and taking that information to the required choke points (Personal Communication with Maj General Dipankar Banerjee, 2007). Describing ICBL’s activities Landmine reporter establishes the role the coalition played in raising awareness:

ICBL was an unprecedented coalition bringing together human rights, humanitarian mine action, children, peace, disability, veterans, medical, development, arms control, religious, environmental and women’s groups who work locally, nationally, regionally and internationally to achieve its goals. Since its inception, the ICBL has remained focused on its call for a
ban on the use, production, trade and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines (APMs), and for increased resources for mine clearance and victim assistance (ICBL Landmine Monitor Report 2000).

With this comprehensive outreach ICBL thus started its campaign by calling for a global ban on the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel landmines (William and Goose: 1997, cited in Behringer 2003). Thus the success of International Campaign to Ban Landmines can be attributed to networks which were spread across countries and lobbied their respective governments at the national level. For instance in 1993, the Campaign Steering Committee, consisting of the original six organizations (Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, medico international, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation) was formalized and a coordinator was recognized. As dozens of national campaigns formed and hundreds of organizations joined the Campaign, the Steering Committee was expanded in 1996 and 1997 to reflect the growth and diversity of the Campaign. The new members included Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines, Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines, Kenyan Coalition against Landmines and South African Campaign to Ban Landmines. This formation was strategically important because its support from the mine affected states. An example of this can be found by reviewing the mine affected people in these countries. Afghanistan, Cambodia and the South African countries were the main focal areas for revealing the manifest effect of landmines on civilian population.

Thus the framework of ICBL was established in unambiguous terms and clear terms, which was a comprehensive ban on landmines. The next step involved key alliances with governments. Main tool employed to build alliances was to publicise the pro-ban message widely. For instance the campaigners states that ‘education of the public and officials about the landmine crises would be essential to force changes in national and international policies and practices’ (Williams and Goose, cited in Keegan 2003). One of the initial successes therefore the campaign was to get the support of Senator Patrick Leahy and Representative Lane Evans, who introduced legislation in the U.S congress that would place a one year moratorium on APL’s. Signed on October 1992, United
States became the first country to enact domestic legislation to ban landmines. France followed this with its own export ban, in 1993; a call by Sweden’s parliament to recognize the importance of APL ban for humanitarian reasons on 1994; a call by President Clinton to call for an “eventual elimination” of APL’s in a speech before the UNGA and with Belgium and Norway following suit three months later (Keegan 2003). A main reason for the action of the state actors, as also have been noted in detail in Chapter 3 (in the section on the response of state actors) was the lobbying activities of the ICBL at the national level, which had achieved success in reframing the trajectory for mine ban in categorical terms. Another reason for this awareness in most of the European states were the efforts of Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, which published in 1991, *Landmines in Cambodia: The Coward’s War* The report derided the effectiveness of Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapon (CCW) that governed the employment of APLs. In May 1992, *Landmines in Cambodia* was presented at a conference in Paris and within seven months the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for a ban on the exportation of landmines (Snyder, Mazarr and Quircy *undated*). Public meetings were thus held, which helped in the dissemination of ideas and knowledge. Medico International, Germany initiated a series of meetings to coordinate the German national campaign, followed by Swedish NGOs beginning public meetings on landmines. On February 1993, the French Foreign Ministry sent a letter to the Secretary General officially requesting a review conference of the 1980 CCW Convention. As a consequence on May 1993, the first NGO International Conference on Landmines is held in London bringing together fifty representatives of forty NGOs to strategize on building the campaign to ban landmines. On June 1993, British NGOs held the first in a series of meetings to coordinate work on the British landmines campaign. Meanwhile, the New Zealand Campaign against Landmines, held a symposium, *Landmines - A Human Rights Crisis*, followed with a workshop in Rome. Swedish company, Bofors also announced that for "moral" reasons it would stop manufacturing AP mines as well as the export of fuses and explosives to buyers who might use the material to produce such mines. Canadian NGOs were pressing for a ban throughout foreign and defense policy reviews and on December 1993, adopted a resolution calling for a moratorium on the export of AP mines, Meanwhile another landmark success
achieved by the campaign in its earlier stages was on 1994 when the Dutch Minister of Defense announced in the Parliament that they would destroy 4, 23,000 stockpiled landmines (ICBL Campaign History).

Though the Vienna process did not bring the APL issue to the negotiating table, nevertheless the landmine issue had made its visibility felt as humanitarian disarmament and formed critical mass or alliances with certain states, which proved to be strategic allies to take the issue of landmines further. However the leadership employed in framing the issue was vertical, where domestic consensus was stirred for land mine action.

The role of ICRC was critical in framing the issue in legal terms, thus making the critical shift from humanitarian disarmament to international humanitarian law. The rubric of humanitarian law, gave the focal point to negotiate the issue under a specific framework, thus framing the issue on the basis of legal humanitarian norms. However the role of ICRC was more confined to the horizontal scale, where it played an important role in political communication, by providing important source of reference to the governments and non-governmental organizations. In their future activities in pursuit of mine-ban treaty (Meresca and Maslen 2000: 129).

Development Negotiations: Role of Berne Declaration and Narmada Bachao Andolan

The Swiss advocacy group, lead by Peter Bosshard as noted before was formed in 1969, in response to the policies followed by the World Bank and export credit agencies. Development finance was the pressure thrust point for its advocacy, defining its role as an advocate of “equitable North-South relations through research, public education and advocacy work” (Berne Declaration Brochure 1968). The framework of the World Commission of Dams was shaped through important pillars, which questioned the utility of dams in terms of social, environmental and economic benefits. The main reason for arriving at this framework was the structure of the Gland Workshop, formed during the
formula phase of the WCD negotiations. Its strategic significance can be best captured in Bosshard’s own words:

The Gland workshop was not a model of the United Nations. Its main mandate therefore was not to reach a global consensus, as this assumption would have involved in consensually arriving at the lowest common denominator. Different sectors had tried this approach long enough and they could not resolve the problem. A different approach was needed and there is where the Gland workshop was rooted (Personal Communication with Peter Bosshard, 2007).

Another reason that Bosshard reveals for the evolution of the framework, which was achieved in the Gland, was its mandate, which focused on inviting experts from different fora, with independent personalities and minds, to a common table. He communicated that due to this strategy the difference of opinions was great as it was not merely a forum of UN agencies and World Bank. It was a platform of NGOs, their institutions and people of reputation. A major reason for holding this framework together was the role of IUCN, which had the trust of participants as the “neutral moderator” (Personal Communication with Peter Bosshard, 2007).

Berne Declaration had made itself visible in the international level by advocating against the funding of large dam, Bakun in Malaysia. A major success was the turn around of Asea Brown Boveri, the world’s most important supplier of hydropower equipment which divested its business dealing with the Malaysian government. This major turn around was possible due to the study by the Swiss advocacy group in 1998, which had forecast a shrinking hydropower market due to increasing social and environmental protests and lack of public and private finance (Hildyard 1998). Thus reframing of economic costs vis a vis risks has been an important factor in reframing the debate on dams at the national and international levels. The target actors for reframing issues therefore according to Bosshard are the financers, who take the major part of the risks. The crucial strategy therefore for reframing issue is to identify financers, which can be done through public means, while communicating with the executive directors of the
companies, who have large stakes in the dam project (Personal Communication with Peter Bosshard, 2007). Thus one of the main important framework which the WCD arrived at to assess the effectiveness of dams was the rights and risks approach. Where the rights emphasized the participatory rights of the affected peoples’ group, where they decide what the risks and rights are. This intellectual work of the Commission was influenced by the role and activities of Berne Declaration. Bosshard revealed “Prof Thomas Sayer, a professor of international law who shaped this core concept, was influenced by the small role we played in the negotiations (Personal Communication with Peter Bosshard, 2007).

The role of Narmada Bachao Andolan in framing the issue of large dams goes back to the deliberations of Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal, (NWDT) which was constituted in 1969. NWDT was formed due to the conflict between the states of Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat in India over the Sardar Sarovar Project (then the Navgam Dam). In the mid 1950s, large scale protests were taking place and in response to these developments, Save Nimad-Save Narmada Committee was formed. Apart from raising displacement issue and submergence of fertile land, it also dealt in details about the optimum water management and utilization., presenting its case before the NWDT (Sangvi 2000:15). Amongst the many points it raised were danger of earthquakes due to such large reservoir, increased silting, displacement of tribals, farmers, backward classes and castes leading to their unemployment and destitutions. The thrust of opposition was therefore submergence of

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3 The dispute arose over the distribution between Narmada river between the two state governments. The Broach irrigation project, precursor to SSP, was cleared by the Planning Commission, on August 1960, with the height of 162 feet for irrigating 9.97 lakhs hectares of land. The second stage of the dam contemplated a height of 320 feet, to which Madhya Pradesh did not agree, in order to resolve the dispute, the Union government appointed Narmada Water Resource Development Committee under the Chairmanship of Dr A.N Khosla. The commission in 1965 proposed a dam of over 500 feet near Navagam in Bharuch district of Gujarat and allocated 13.9 MAF to M.P and 10.6 MAF to Gujarat. M.P, however objected to this and contested the claims of Gujarat to Narmada river, making clear that the river belonged to M.P, accusing that the dam was primarily built for the benefit of Gujarat, while submerging a stretch of 140 miles in Madhya Pradesh. Gujarat in response to M.P claims and the rejection of Khosla Committee recommendations launched a formal complaint under the Inter-State Water Dispute Act, 1956. M.P proposed the water allocation of 24.08 MAF for itself while 4.44 MAF FOR Gujarat. Gujarat however proposed the requirement of M.P AT 6.00 MAF and that of Gujarat at 22.72 MAF. The height of the dam was proposed AT 210 ft and 530 ft by M.P and Gujarat respectively. Later Rajasthan was also included to strengthen Gujarat’s case.
land for the sake of power generation (Letter to NWDT 1974 cited in Sangvi 2000:35). This process culminated into the question of dams and displacement in 1985-86, with an emphasis on right to information and issues like consent of the people, displacement of various types—their costs and the benefits of dams, the international aid aspects all emerged through the long process of discussion, representation and experimentation (Medha Patkar: 1988:145, cited in Sangvi 2000). The saga of Narmada Bachao Andolan was thus started in these terms. However, one of the immediate factors, which framed the social and environmental costs of the dams, catching world wide attention was the Manibeli Decaration, 1994 and the Curitaba Declaration of 1997. Manibeli Satyagraha was launched on 1991 against the forcible displacement and submergence of Manibeli, the first village to be affected by dam in Maharashtra. The slogan, which caught the eye of the street power of the people who chanted slogans like doobenge par naho hatinge (we will drown but not budge). This called attention from other international non-governmental organizations, which started pressurizing the World Bank for an independent review, and also called for the establishment of an independent commission. (Please see chapter 4, Formula phase for more details.) The leadership exercised thus was more vertical. In terms of mobilization of social capital and achieving the consensus from the state government of Madhya Pradesh to stop dam building and pressuring the World Bank to withdraw from the dam, which was supported by Independent review of the World Bank funded projects, undertaken by the Morse Committee. However once the agenda was framed and crystallized at the international level, it was more confined to the international discourse related to dams and development. The Gland workshop however took this debate further by calling for an assessment of dam effectiveness, by taking this process further to the procedural phase, which involved the preparation for guidelines on large dams.

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4 For the detailed history of Narmada Bachao Andolan, see Sanghvi, 2000. The leadership is termed as vertical because it stemmed from the response from below. It developed a critique of the World Bank much later in the 80s. The success of the Narmada Campaign reached fruition on 1993 when the World Bank withdrew from the project and on 1994, when the M.P government declared not to support further dams.
Political Communication and Leadership

Political communication has been explained above as the distribution of information and its diffusion to strategic areas, where a shared interpretation of issues could be arrived. The focus therefore was on situating those formal and informal communication channels which leadership in the two cases employed to reach the desired solutions. Information presented thus helped in achieving two main goals (a) it informed the negotiators about the impact of landmines and dams on the lives of the common people and how security and development decisions were manifesting themselves through the costs–benefit analysis and also assisted in distributional aspects relating to the solutions the actors should adopt to reach a possible solution. This is most applicable to issue areas, which have contested claims over the utilitarian value inherent in the object of negotiations. Thus interests are therefore contingent on the understanding of security and development payoffs of the concerned object under negotiations. This as pointed earlier is the determinant for changing the preferences of various actors.

Security Negotiations

As noted earlier where the ICBL played a critical vertical leadership role, ICRC’s contribution was more towards horizontal exchange and lobbying of information. The first in this series was therefore the Montreaux Symposium held on April 1993 in Switzerland. The report of this symposium was sent to all governments in August 1993. The symposium invited established experts from different disciplines related to the whole issue of the use of APLs and their effects including military strategists, mine specialists and manufactures, legal experts in international humanitarian law and disarmament fields, surgeons and orthopedists, representatives of demining organizations, concerned NGOs and the media. The fundamental point raised in the symposium was the method of warfare, thus underlining that landmines are not in conformity with certain fundamental rules of international humanitarian law governing conduct of hostilities (ICRC 1993).
Some of the points flagged off were that instead of minimizing security risks, the landmine solution maximizes costs. For instance, Jean Manod pointed out, that humanitarian action in Angola totaled to about 2,600 Swiss franks. It could have been 106 Swiss franks had the landmines not been present (ICRC 1993). Another point which was raised was that mines are neither designed nor disseminated with any thought, thus impacting security of civilians in long terms. Examples of Afghanistan ad Laos were called upon, where thousands of people are being killed and maimed every year (Mine Advisory Group 1993). Similarly it was also pointed out that Anti-personnel landmines have shifted in their understanding from a defensive to a more strategic and a tactical one, thus becoming more offensive in nature. Their use in internal conflicts specifically needs attention (Human Rights Watch 1993). The surgical coordinator of ICRC pointed out the variable capacities that landmines possess to kill and maim people, pointing out that military activities in Cambodia accounted for only 26 percent of injuries in comparison to 45% of civilian deaths, who were injured while collecting firewood and fruits in the forests. He also pointed out that 37 percent of women were injured during cultivation in the fields. Citing the example of ICRC hospitals in Peshawar and Quetta, he pointed out that 15% were civilian deaths out of which one quarter consisted of children (Gray 1993). International Campaign to Ban Landmines, headed by Jody Williams, drew attention to indiscriminate use of weapons on the livelihood support of people in terms of human and material damage and brought to light the basic statistics on the effects of the use of landmines impacting civilians mainly women and children (Williams 1993).

Handicap International, on the other hand, presented an overview of its research work compiled for over ten years on physically handicap people. The figures revealed an increasing number of amputees in different parts of the world, where Handicap International was working with Cambodia alone amounting to around 35,000 (Handicap International 1993). With all these presentations ICRC raised questions over the detectability of Mines among many others. The significance of the role of the conference was thus to get expert knowledge together to sensitise the governments with symbolic facts and the brutal effect of mines on the civilians rather than the military personnel.
The next significant role that the ICRC played was through the reports it submitted to the
group of governmental experts as the review conference started in Vienna in 1995. Some
of the points it emphasized upon were on definition of the mine, detectability and self-
destruction and neutralization of mines. It also highlighted the use of mines during
internal rather than international conflicts and by linking landmines to humanitarian law
s, stated that” the use of weapons is of course subject to international customary law but
it is clear that a specific treaty regulation is preferable in that it favours clarity of legal
obligation”(Meresca and Maslen 2000:270). After the failure of the Vienna Meeting to
incorporate a ban on landmines ICRC appealed to the UNGA in its fiftieth session where
it appealed to the states to evaluate whether measures short of ban on APLs would infact
put a stop to the present situation (ICRC 1995). A remarkable move by ICRC post
Vienna impasse, was the launch of the public campaign in print, radio and television
media, where the message was that the landmines stop (Sommaruga:1995).Outreach to
“dictates of public conscience” was the solution , which the President ,ICRC thus
forwarded as an effective strategy. Another landmark development after this public
campaign was the study commissioned by ICRC of the military use and effectiveness of
land mines. Endorsed by military officers, the documents, Anti-personnel Landmines:
Friend or foe? A Study of the Military Use and Effectiveness of Anti-Personnel Mines
concluded that the limited military utility of AP Mines is far outweighed by their
humanitarian consequences in actual conflicts. The significance of the meeting was that it
questioned the “legitimacy of the Anti Personnellandmines”. This parallel process which
was going along with the formal negotiations was significant as far as the role of the
ICRC was concerned (Personal Communication with Maj General Dipankar Banerjee,
1997).

Also at the regional level in association with national Red Cross Societies, ICRC did
persuasive lobbying. One of these was ICRC seminar in Managua, Nicargua on 1996,
which was attended by seventy-five officials form Central American states and Mexico.
The declaration was instrumental in encouraging the Central American region to be made
mine free zone (Maresca and Maslen 2000:461). Thus the ICRC helped in establishing a
legal humanitarian norm regarding the APL’s at the international level.
Thus what the above description shows is the role of distribution of information and the role of coordination in generating consensus among political actors and concerned groups towards a particular issue. Formal and informal communication channels played an important role in changing perception towards the landmine issue and generating the political will to ban landmines. Strategic Alliances with the OAU helped it conducting regional meetings in Africa in 1995 at Addis Ababa, Harare and Cameroon, thus enabling it to generate awareness on landmines in African region which later helped in overcoming the North-South split, which could have impeded the efficacy of negotiations in later stages.

**Development Negotiations**

The case of World Commission on Dams on the other hand presents a different picture. Where the negotiations related to the dams can be divided into two phases. The first, was the Gland Workshop, the negotiations related to getting the various stakeholders to the table; the second, related to the negotiations related to the publication of the commission’s report on large dams. The dam controversy had created ripples way back in 1980s when proposals for large dams (for e.g. Sardar Sarovar) began to be fundamentally questioned by locally affected interests and global coalitions of environmental and human rights groups, resulting in a succession of calls for a moratorium on World Bank funding and large dams. For instance, in June 1994, on the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Bretton Woods Institutions, a coalition of 326 social movements and non-governmental organization (NGOs) from 44 countries around the world endorsed a statement calling for a moratorium on the World Bank’s funding of large dams. Thus the second declaration which was a consequence of Manibeli, the Curitaba Declaration, in 1997 called for the suspension of construction of new dams until an independent international commission conducted a complete review of all large dams financed or supported by international credit and aid agencies. The reasons for the institutional focus of Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank which began a review of large dam projects therefore can be attributed the pressure and the
public attention, which was generated by the meetings of these dam affected groups through the Manibeli and the Curitaba Declaration.

One of the primary tools, which helped bringing the stakeholders together, was information sharing, which helped in the identification of many controversial issues. Two areas where such information sharing through both informal and formal communication channels were therefore the formula phase and the procedural phase, where thematic reviews, public consultations and country studies) helped in providing legitimacy to the views of non-governmental organization and the affected peoples group at the international level. Scholars have noted that one of the greatest leverage which multi-stakeholder negotiations provide is the gathering and exchange of information, much of which happens during the face to face meetings (Susskind, Fuller, Ferenz and Fairman 2002). They argue that dialogues focused on information sharing are also devices through which convening agencies and organizations can help build the long-term capacity of key group of stakeholders. The case of WCD is important because though not a negotiating treaty, like the case of landmines, it was a non-binding forum, and had the aim of bridging various view points, for the effectiveness of large dams. Nevertheless its political role cannot be discarded because it did create a lot of political voice by the governments and the industry that took a positional stand on various issues. For this reason the variables of information sharing and distribution becomes important because they greatly factor in as substantive leverage, which the non-governmental organizations employed in their favour. The withdrawal of the Chinese delegate, Shen Guiyo, on health reasons, without any alternative replacement, forms the WCD negotiations by China is an instant reminder to the sensitivities associated by developmental issues faced by the state actors.

An important communication tool used by non-governmental organizations was the use of information technology – World Wide Web and telephonic conversations between the key leaders at the initial stages. This helped in close coordination amongst the various leaders. At the time of Gland as Bosshard pointed out very few anti dam campaigns were visible - International River Network, Berne Declaration and Narmada Bachao Andolan.
were the visible ones (Personal Communication with Peter Bosshard, 2007). This statement by Bosshard is reflective of the accessibility factor of non-governmental organizations at the international level, in the first instance for the mobilization to happen. The WCD was perhaps the kick starting for the process. Communication in the form of close coordination was therefore the formula in the early stages. Also trust, working on same terms, coordination of work on weekly basis and good strategic thinking and hard work with facts and data was what helped the process to start in the initial stages (Personal Communication with Peter Bosshard, 2007).

Thematic reviews and regional consultations were the main outreach channels, through which the social and environmental costs were emphasized. A remarkable strategy used in the process was the presentations through the affected people themselves who narrated their own life histories. Good contact and trust of the grass root activities that went to the regional consultations was the main reason according to Bosshard for this intervention (Personal Communication with Peter Bosshard, 2007). This symbolic message seemed to be the most powerful and effective tool, which the advocacy groups had, a critical element, which would have been missing if the negotiations had been a forum of international organizations. The relationship between the secretariat and the commissioners was also particularly noteworthy. This also helped in getting the real act associated with social and environmental costs, which are generally non quantifiable.

The coordination of communication between the secretariat and the commissioners was another reason for the success of the recognition of social and environmental costs. In Bosshard’s words the main reasons for this was “mutual respect, competency on the complexities associated with social and environmental aspects of large dams, commitment to the issue and persistency and professionalism”. An important example where such attributes were manifest by the NGO leadership was the “crises meeting” which was called on early 1998 in Johannesburg. Medha Patkar, was the main reason for this meeting, as the World Bank was initially reluctant in getting her to the World Commission. (Personal Communication with Peter Bosshard, 2007).
Thus where information and distribution sharing did help to shape up the effectiveness of negotiations in both the issue areas of security and development, with the non-state actors playing a crucial role in the whole process, it is observed that domestic level advocacy, in other words vertical leadership by engaging the state actors and the building of political consensus is an important factor for the effectiveness of any negotiations.

Ripeness

Ripeness of negotiations or the negotiation success as can be drawn from the above-illustrative case studies is contingent on the outreach of both vertical and horizontal leadership. The understanding which has emerged from the analyses, undertaken both at conceptual and empirical level points towards the successful speech act performed by leadership at both levels. Framing and political communication were two strategies underlined for its success. However one aspect which is yet unanswered is the role of ideas and norm change. The interaction of these two elements, are presented as determinants for a ripe moment in negotiation outcome.

These elements are critical for analyzing the effective role played by vertical and horizontal leadership because it is significantly associated with the redefinition of interests and hence identities of the state actors, and can therefore play a role in shaping the negotiation outcome. This is because where ideas take inspiration from norms and endow meaning to them in context to the perceived interest of the actors, there, norms are critical in presenting these ideas as relevant to the field of international relations by establishing their correlation with internationally ratified covenants, which bind the states to a particular standard of behaviour. However if this correlation is not established leadership seems to have a limited impact.

A detailed explanation on desecuritising and securitising was taken up in chapter two. The analysis forwarded the argument that the two concepts capture the conflict between the referant object in context to the two case studies. Just to illustrate a small example, in the contest of landmines and dams, the process of securitization can be seen as being employed in defining national interest. For instance take the case study of India. The
landmine debate in India was securitised and did not have any impact in the public domain, as it was considered to be meeting the “legitimate security needs.” A similar case can also be seen in the case of non-signatories to the Ottawa Convention. In fact where ever the landmines issue was securitised, the leadership factor had limited effects. The consequences of securitising the land mines issue were seen during Operation Parakram, in India, when many soldiers and civilians alike lost their lives—an issue which draws attention to the conflict inherent over the securitisation of the referent object. A similar case is in the debate which revolved around the Sardar Sarovar Project, then the Navagam Dam, in the 1960s. The environment in India during the 1960s was shadowed by the India-China war, with security vigilance being the top priority of the Indian state. To add to these security concerns in 1963-64 agricultural production was going down due to a severe drought. Thus one of the main parameters for the conceptualization of dam was the provision of irrigation to the arid areas around the international borders with Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch (Gujarat) and in Rajasthan. The security of the borders was the key factor employed by the Gujarat government to raise the height of the dam to 300 feet, so that it could reclaim the irrigated land at the Rann of Kutch. The claim to this idea was put forth by Lalit Dalal, then the Secretary of Irrigation and later Chief Secretary to the Government of Gujarat, who drew parallels with Israel’s agricultural kibbutz manned by reserve soldiers with full equipment and sophisticated weapons to keep a watch on the activities of unfriendly neighbours. (Government of Gujarat: 1991, cited in Dwivedi 2006:69). This explanation offers insight to the conflict between the securitisation of state borders, which found explanation for dams. This securitisation at that time overshadowed the issue of submergence of fertile land, as made by the Madhya Pradesh government, an issue that was later taken up by the Narmada Bachao Andolan which is now extended to securitising the environmental and the societal sector.

Thus where the landmine issue was deseuritised in the Ottawa Treaty, there the issue dams was securitised during negotiations. In the former this was particularly seen in the context of different campaigns, conferences, expert seminars held at the international and national level by the ICRC and the ICBL. In countries where such efforts were lacking, states were not very perceptive to change their positions. In the World Commission on
Dams, the process was more confined to the international level. This is concluded from the content of the report, which overwhelmingly, conceded to the social and environmental costs of large dams. However as one analysis the responses of the state actors, any commitment to meet the standards of the guidelines are missing. A reason, which can be attributed to the absence of stakeholder dialogues, held at the national level. According to Bosshard the main reason was that many governments slept through the process. Similarly according to Banerjee the main reason which can be attributed to India’s landmine position was due to the absence of coherent advocacy of Indian NGOs at the national level (Personal Communication with Banerjee and Bosshard, 2007).

Security and Development: Ideas to Norms

Going by the above analysis therefore security and development are not isolated domains, but can be studied under a common framework by their access to the international discourses on security and development, which are being revisited due the diplomatic space and practice exercised by non-governmental actors. Effective leadership can be better understood by elaborating on how it influences ideas in determining issues and interests, which further lead to the process of norm change.

Issues: The debate between development and security issues has been of two different issue domain in international politics. Where development issues have been relegated to the domestic concerns of the state, related to governance problems and therefore to that of low politics there issues of security are generally framed as that of high politics often closed to public debate and scrutiny. This disjunction between issues of security and development has continued and continues to shape the analytical focus of the discipline in international relations, which employs the international level as its tool of analysis. However of late due to the participation of non-state actors, which both have an interest and accessibility to international negotiations are articulating issues of concern. A major reason for this is the growing complexities of threats emerging in contemporary world politics, resulting in bridging the traditional concerns with the emerging ones.
Thus the participation of various actors both state and non-state in international diplomacy has articulated the concerns related to security and development in a broader perspective, i.e. one that goes beyond the traditional understanding of both security and development. The present work shows the growing linkage of these two issue domains in international negotiations and the growing relevance these issues are having in international negotiations, especially for the states in contemporary diplomacy. It is seen that often development concerns are subordinated to security imperatives of the states and development issues are contingent on four factors in explaining their effective presence in international political decision-making. First is the role of agent (s), which consists of international institutions at the international level and influential political circles at the domestic level, which can render visibility to the issue of concern. The tool employed therefore by the agent (leader) is important. Political communication along with public diplomacy and the perception of gains and risks accrued by cooperating at the international level are the remaining decisive factors in elevating development concerns in international political consent. Effective explanation of state behaviour, thus cannot be understood by defining issues primarily as security and development ones, but have their explanatory potential in the sociology of knowledge, a process which is explained through multi-stakeholder negotiations and the speech act.

**Interests**: Interests have been the *lieu motif* of international cooperation in the literature pertaining to bargaining and international negotiations. Where the primary debate has revolved around relative and absolute gains, the realists arguing that absolute gains (i.e. who gains more) is what matters and the liberals arguing for relative gains (will both of us gain), the present work shows that interests are primarily shaped by the perception of those interests. The role of agents in shaping the perception of interests through a common prism therefore becomes important. Perception of interest should be understood as "anticipation on part of the concerned actor or the decision maker, of impending gains and risks associated with the object. The framework under which the object of negotiation has been defined determines the perceptions of these interests. These may include an actual interest, which means the cost-benefit analysis in traditional terms of enquiry or potential, which means broadening the notion of interests by including the
potential cost–benefit analysis accrued by different set of stakeholders. The internal and external environment is a potent defining feature, which shapes the perception of the interests when it comes to decision-making by these actors. In other words it can be said that precedents in the form of international treaties and covenants and internal pressure groups at the domestic level are the keys to explain the change of behavior by the state actors. Scholars have often-explained interests differentially in terms of issue domains, i.e. states would be more willing to look for absolute gains in economic issues than on security issues and more relative gains in economic issues than on security issues. It was observed in the present study that cooperation is not so much contingent on the bifurcation of issues over relative or absolute gains but on the quality of leadership in defining cooperation. Though relative and absolute gains are important and cannot be shied away with, its framing and communication of the ideas inherent in framing are important. This is also because the Ottawa and Dams negotiations both point towards the legitimate justification of interests, as in many cases through inappropriate alternatives many actors shy away from the negotiated settlement.

Norms Change: In case of Ottawa Treaty, the diffusion of ideas and norms was simultaneous, both in the vertical and the horizontal level. Wherever this correlation was missing, a substantive behavioral mismatch was prominent manifested in the normative self-understanding of the ends which landmines are meant to serve. A similar case was seen in the responses of various state actors, which presented the benefits of dams as outweighing the costs being delivered by them.

Thus where ideas employed during the negotiations are more identified with the framing of the issue and the communication skills used; there norms are grasped through the normative mechanisms employed by the non-governmental actors. The normative mechanism in context to the Ottawa treaty was the international humanitarian law and in context to the World Commission on Dams it was the human rights covenants. As responses testify the desired ends were of a different nature! The answer to this question of norm change therefore can be gathered form the internal approaches to norms as elaborated in Chapter 2. It was found that norm internalization was not automatic and had
to be forged through communication and persuasive arguments of cost benefit analysis. Negotiations between state and non-state actors, was the key factor in giving a normative framework to both the negotiations- a framework which took into account the humanitarian issues. Norm internalization however could not shape itself in cases, where communication between state and non-state actors was missing. Clarity in approach and arguments supported with factual knowledge was also responsible for norm change, especially in the case of the Ottawa Treaty. Thus domestic mobilization is equally important from any norm change as external processes. The institutional base, expert knowledge and key alliances with the states were the main reasons for its success. Another factor, which comes out is the sustained campaigning provide by the two non-governmental organizations. Funding from states and international organizations were therefore the key mobilization strategies. This was in contrast to the negotiations in the World Commission on Dams, where lack of funding was cited as the main factor for not sustaining the campaign to the national level. Also has reported by Bosshard, “norms and ideas are beyond the influence of small advocacy groups. NGOs can have influence when ripe moment comes and that is the defining moment when you can work with the governments. The Brundtland Commission is one such success story” (Personal Communication with Peter Bosshard, 2007). Thus for any successful outcome partnership between governmental and non-governmental organizations becomes important. This conclusion can be drawn from the outcome of the case studies undertaken for study.

LEADERSHIP AND NEGOTIATIONS

The research suggests, the significance of leadership solutions by advocacy groups to shape and inform the understanding of international negotiations. The two main observations it noted while studying leadership traits were horizontal and vertical advocacy, where vertical leadership implied a two-level leadership theory with leaders being active at the national level, there horizontal leadership implied the distribution of information at the transnational and international level. Framing of issues by making the vulnerable target groups the referent point of security and development analysis and
political communication of ideas and information to key stakeholders involved were explored as an effective lobbying strategy.

International Organisations like the United Nations and the World Bank were involved in these negotiations as they were called into through mobilization at the national and international level. The perceived interests mandate and stakes of these organizations in the negotiation outcome were the main reasons for their initial involvement. International norms governing both issue areas were employed. In the landmine case it was the invocation of international humanitarian law and in the case of large dams it was international human rights covenants. The participation and interests of the states was evident by the issues being discussed in both negotiation processes. In both cases this was related to the redefining of the parameters of security and development risks of the state vis a vis the people—an issue which challenges the political values of the state as sovereign decision-maker. These values related to the “legitimacy” of security and development needs, as far as the state is concerned and the implied consequences of these on the people whose security and development, it was meant to serve. It was found that the invocation of norms can largely be shaped by humanitarian actors, and much is contingent on the micro—mobilization strategies exercised at the national level.

Thus in both case studies, there was a manifest polarization on the issues at the initial level. These related to definition, use, and verification and compliance of state actors in the case of landmines, issues much focused on the technical and mechanical processes—the main factors for delaying and blocking of negotiation success. Major turn of events was reflected in the tenor and direction of negotiations only after the Vienna Negotiations, when the non-governmental actors started getting actively involved in the negotiation. Public advocacy campaign at the domestic level by the ICBL and the positional stand of the ICRC that landmines issue is a humanitarian one was the main reason for the change of perception of interests on landmines amongst the state actors. In the large dams’ case, however the involvement of non-state actors was inherent right from the outset. The technical issues, therefore were not the main center of focus, instead what was brought to attention were the social and economic
costs of dams. The Gland workshop, in this context was useful as it explored the social, environmental and economic benefits of dams on an equal platform. The broad focus therefore was on aspects of environmental policy making, which resulted in expediting the process of negotiations in Gland. These two different strategies, determining the negotiation outcome, in both case studies flag off the role of multi-stakeholder negotiations, in emphasizing the relationship between the stakes and perception of interests. As negotiations progressed it was observed that the employment of leadership strategies both at the national and international level can become a key determinant to shape the negotiation outcome.

Thus leadership employed by ICRC at the international and by ICBL through national campaigns, proved decisive in shaping the shift of focus of landmines as defensive weapons to landmines as humanitarian disarmament. In case of Berne Declaration and Narmada Bachao Andolan, it is observed that leadership received a fractured response at the national level, in stark contrast to the close coordination exercised by these at the international and the regional level. In order to understand the strengths and weakness of the leadership factor a two-fold characteristics of vertical and horizontal leadership is offered. These are (a) Motivations and (b) Resources. These characteristics were also identifies in James Mc Gregor Burns classic work On Leadership, who has emphasizes on two essentials of leadership: Motives and Resources. Establishing a dialectical relationship between the two, he writes that “lacking motives resource diminishes and lacking resources motives lie idle” (Burns 1979:12).

This understanding draws both from the predominant available leadership theories. Leadership has been conceptualized as a process, where a person influences others to accomplish a mission, task or objective and provides direction in a way that makes it more cohesive and coherent. A person carries out this process by applying leadership attributes by motivating and enabling people to achieve high goals and objectives. As leadership can connote a dual emphasis between the leader and the follower, one way to understand leadership, is by differentiating between a leadership and authority. Authoritarian leadership is exercised by holding formal positions thereby directing
behaviour. Leadership on the other hand as a concept is much stronger and different from the concept of decision-making, which is often, inclined to more authoritative overtones. Decision-making per se therefore does not necessarily include or represent leadership as one could be part of the decision-making process and not be powerful enough to influence that decision. In contrast leaders do not use force and coerce their decisions to achieve a common goal. What makes an entity exercise leadership quality is the sense of direction, which is achieved by conveying a strong vision of the future. Leadership exercised by non-state actors vis a vis the state actors thus has been seen in this context, where through their participation at the international level, there are defining and challenging the traditional understanding of costs and benefits associated with security and development issues.

The main reason for identifying Burn’s understanding with this work is his argument, where he draws a correlation between power and leadership, as according to him leadership is a special form of power. When applied in context to the negotiations undertaken, motives and resources appear to be relevant in both horizontal and vertical leadership. Where institutional leadership of ICRC provided the adequate resources in terms of its outreach and resources to lobby governments at the regional and international level, there collective leadership of the ICBL provided the common vision and motivation of various splinter organization across the globe for humanitarian disarmament. Motives and Resources thus were channelised by both these organizational structures on sustainable basis through collective leadership of ICBL and institutional leadership of ICRC respectively. When it comes to the question of resources, in the case of large dams, resources were the main constraints to take the issue of dams rigorously to the national level (Personal Communication with Peter Bosshard, 2007). Institutional leadership thus in terms of lobbying individual governments and organisations was missing, as Shripad Dharamadikary points out “we did not focus on any particular actor, rather we focuses on the issues and gathering and presenting evidence. If at all there was a focus, it was in making efforts to get the voices of the affected people, those who had been heard only minimally, to be heard.” At the international level deliberations he points out, “there wasn’t a consensus between all players... I think there was a better
appreciation to the issues concerned." Also though all the countries agreed on the five valued and mostly on the seven strategic priorities, they differed on the detailed interpretation of these. In some cases the agreement on the core values also seemed superficial (Personal Communication with Shripad Dharamadhikary, 2007). Going by these arguments institutional leadership in negotiations can be termed as giving mandate, recognition, and identity to the ideas and norms as lobbied by the various non-governmental organization. Thus, though the World Commission on Dams was an outstanding initiative, its weakness to engage various interest and pressure groups at the domestic level impeded effective translation of the redefinition of development or a norm change in the behavior of state actors. This conclusion can be drawn from the fact that issues on which no consensus existed; negligible efforts were made on reframing or negotiating the issue further. A potential reason for this is the divide on developmental issues and strategies between the state and the advocacy networks, a pointer towards the structured thinking on the understanding of development at the international level and its operational ineffectiveness at the state level. Though national dialogues did take place after the report was published, little effort was made to hold simultaneous public consultations at the domestic level, by advocacy groups, when the report by the WCD was being prepared. Another shortcoming of the commission was that the along with the deliberations of the commission and the protocols of their meetings were not made accessible to the public. Thus in the following process to shape and define the work programme, the commission erred towards providing opportunities for public comment, a serious weakness which affected in generating tenor the pressure on the state actors (Navroz 2001 56, Klaus Dingwerth 2005:75). Perhaps the outcome of the mobilization phase and the participation of the civil-society actors can be seen the institutionalization of NGOs in a group called, International Committee of Dams, River and People. A institutional focus which has taken shape post WCD negotiations is best reflected in Christine Eberlein’s words who says,

We lobbied the industry and the DDP to take our points on board, and basically had to “correct” what they came up with. Industry and the UN, and specially the World Bank tried to undermine the entire process and I
think it was due to the enormous efforts of NGOs to bring in the reality and make the WCD report be accepted internationally and bring the UNEP, to continue with the DDP” (E-Mail Communication with Christine Eberlane, 2007)

The collective vision, which is more, related to focusing on national level campaigns however seems to be missing during the WCD negotiations. Though NBA has been active at domestic advocacy an important reason, which Dharamadhhikary points out, is the misbalance of power (political, economic etc) between the players. Also Bosshard’s views complimenting Dharamadhhikary’s view on varied interpretations of the goals and the definition and participation in development activities seem to be a possible reason for this. One can therefore state that motivation complimented by resources form the basic bedrock for understanding the institutional and collective leadership, which further facilitated efficacy of horizontal and vertical leadership.

Assessment

Thus going by the aforementioned arguments, issues, interests and norms have to be seen in a holistic context in order to understand the emerging nature of contemporary negotiations in international relations. The exercise of leadership, domestic and international linkages that the actors form at national and trans-national level is important pointers explaining these key factors. The agentic explanation rather than a structural explanation thus is important in explaining the behaviour of actors. Though actors are motivated by self-gain and the political trade-off they are getting over a particular issue it would not be wrong to say that the choice which the actor makes is the manifestation of the intent and the perception of interest at stake. Domestic linkage is important to foment the political will to participate in the respective negotiations and transnational linkages are important to facilitate consensus over issues at the international level. The broadened understanding on various issues related to development and security is emerging as a new platform to build consensus at the international level. Issues, ideas and interests are not necessarily therefore self-explanatory but have to be seen in the way they are presented in negotiations.
Three variables were identified on the basis of the available literature on negotiations and international cooperation. These were reciprocity, leadership and political communication. The research suggests that leadership was the main factor, which facilitated cooperation in the two case studies, thus shaping the reciprocity and distribution of information. It was also observed that multi-stakeholder negotiations facilitate the perpetuation of norms, thus informing the negotiation processes in a substantive way. Role of ideas help in transforming the perception and beliefs of the state actors played an important role in coordination and distribution of information. The leadership factor provided a functional role to norms and ideas through framing and political communication. The exercise of leadership at both levels, therefore has to be seen in an analogous manner specially in understanding the objectives of the theses which were to understand the role of inter-national and non-governmental organizations in context to that of the states which are considered to be primary decision-makers in international negotiations; the variables enabled the study to identify how certain forms of formal and informal communication channels between the actors can increase the chances of cooperation amongst them. It also helped in examining the significance of leadership solutions by non-governmental organisations to coordinate problems in international negotiations and highlighted the significance of studying the processes and lobbying strategies, which were held at the various stages of the respective case studies.