CHAPTER III
CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

The mediation of tradition and the understanding of subjectively intended meaning has been the prime concern of hermeneutics discussed so far. However, hermeneutic philosophy and hermeneutical theory differ when discussing the question of 'how such an understanding was possible and to what extent it would constitute objective knowledge'. But while both approaches placed conflicting emphasis on the role of the interpreter, they share the exclusion of one dimension: the questioning the content of the object of interpretation. Any reflection as to the truth of a text or of tradition meaning was either excluded as falling outside the concerns of an epistemology and methodology of the understanding process. This led to distorted or incomplete understanding of understanding.

Critical hermeneutics arose to seek out the causes of distorted understanding and communication which operate underneath seemingly normal interaction. Critical understanding contains an element of causal explanation because of its references to empirical contingencies underlying intellectual process. K.O. Apel and J. Habermas, the two exponents of critical hermeneutics combine the methodological and objective approach to arrive at practically relevant knowledge.

Karl Otto Apel, acts as a synthesizer of hermeneutical theory and hermeneutical philosophy. Language, according to him, plays a crucial role in constructing historical meaning as it is a historical condition for the possibility of truth. He argued for a complementarity of technical and hermeneutical interests in acquiring knowledge for a critical theory of society.
He attempted to demonstrate the necessity of the hermeneutical approach as it is always part of the existing systems of knowledge and cannot be divorced from them. While acknowledging the difference between the natural and social science he does not treat them as totally exclusive, but as complementary to each other. Both these sciences are grounded in a commonly shared apriori which Apel terms as "linguistic community of communication". However, Apel insists that this idea of complementarity is not to be confused with that of 'unified sciences'. Through a dialectical mediation of 'explanation' and 'Understanding', Apel aims at a critique of ideology.

Apel is against Gadamer's 'fusion of horizon', which according to Gadamer is sufficient for the purpose of demonstrating the possibility of understanding. According to Apel, before we can answer any question about the possibility of understanding, we require some criteria to distinguish between understanding and misunderstanding. Apel accused Gadamer and also Betti of restricting progress in interpretation to emergence of different interpretations. He, therefore calls for a normatively-methodologically relevant philosophical hermeneutic to reassert the possibility of progress in interpretations.

A free society which allows an open discussion remains a precondition for better understanding. Apel says, our understanding of texts and authors allows us to criticize and go beyond the truths contained in them because we are in possession of the idea of a more truthful way of life. Progress in human communication can be achieved, according to critical hermeneutics, only when we develop a free society. Apel like Habermas combines the methodical and objective approach to arrive at
practically relevant knowledge.

Apel points out to the necessity of progress in interpretative understanding. We become aware of this only when our communication is hindered or made impossible. Sometimes an individual (neurotic patient) or the group (acting under a false consciousness) are not able to detect this break-down in communication. A critical sociologist or a psychoanalyst is in a position to spot these hurdles and remove them with the help of a critique of ideology and psychoanalysis. Actions which arise as a result of inadequate understanding of its motives become understandable when their causes are pinpointed.

Apel utilizes, for the purpose of emancipation, "the intrusion of a mode of cognition appropriate to the investigation of natural processes into the field of intersubjective communication and mediation of tradition". This, according to Apel helps the actors, (through a process of reflection) to pursue their development with 'will and consciousness'.

Casual approaches to human sciences believe that human behaviour needs to be explained rather than understood. Whereas statistical approach would be successful in those cases wherein human behaviour is regular - without any creativity or spontaneity. These two types of trends which we find in the methodology of social sciences are diametrically opposed to each other. On the one hand, there are those who argue for the irreducibility of social sciences to natural sciences, and on the other, there are those who try to grant the social sciences the objectivity and certainty of natural sciences.

Apel, following Habermas, argues that human actions cannot be
reduced to natural sciences. The intentional structure of human actions cannot be reduced to observable behaviour. These intentions are controlled by fundamental cognitive interests. The connection of the hermeneutical discipline with the process of the transmission of tradition, according to Apel, accounts for their independence of the natural sciences. The methods of natural sciences are, therefore, different from that of human sciences.

Critical hermeneutics, attempts a dialectical mediation of the two approaches in the form of a critique of ideology. A true hermeneutical inquiring, according to Apel, stands in complementary relationship, to the natural science inquiry. Apel argues that "a natural scientist, as solus ipse, cannot seek to explain something for himself alone. And in order, merely to know 'what' he should explain, he must have come to some agreement with others about it". Such an intersubjective agreement, however, can never be replaced by the methods of natural science.

Apel lists two complementary cognitive interests to man: (1) an interest that is "determined by the necessity for a technical praxis as the basis of insights into natural laws", and (2) an interest that is governed by our need for a social, morally relevant practice.

The second interest aims at an agreement upon the possibility and the norms of a meaningful human 'being-in-the-world'. This interest, apart from aiming at a communication amongst contemporaries also aims at achieving a communication of the present with the past through a mediation of tradition. Through such a mediation of tradition we accumulate technical knowledge and enhance our own understanding of the possible meaningful motivation. This makes the humans superior than any other species.
Apel's complementarity of scientific and hermeneutical science, is based on the fact that the existence of a 'communication community' presupposes any knowledge in subject-object dimension. This communication community acts as the "intersubjective metadimension for the objective description and explanation of data in the world". This, according to Apel, should also become the theme of scientific knowledge. After coming in contact with the 'nature', not only should the human being perceive sense-data and develop ideas, but he should interpret these ideas in an exchange with the other members of a historical community.

This dialectical mediation between the natural and social sciences, is what Apel calls as the 'critique of ideology'. It serves as the only "meaningful logical foundation and moral justification of the objective and explanatory sciences of man". The empirical science presupposes a 'hermeneutic communication' in the 'communication community' of the practitioners of science. This hermeneutic communication in turn uses the available factual information - including analytical-empirical sciences. Our hermeneutical communication is also a communication about our needs and goals and hence presupposes an ethics and this ethics in turn implies the hermeneutical communication.

For Apel there is a fundamental difference between the critical hermeneutics (in the form of a critical sociology) and positivist social sciences. The positivist attitude to social sciences tries to reduce the social sciences to natural sciences by using the methodology of natural sciences. Here the individuals are treated as mere objects of quantification. Social events are treated as natural phenomenon falling outside the domain of conscious intervention. On the other hand, the critical approach tries to eliminate the causal element in human actions by
making public their mechanism and thereby allowing the human's control of their own destiny.

According to Apel, the critical reconstruction of social or individual processes replace the 'hermeneutic(al) interpretation of meaning. Hermeneutics regards the belief to know better as misguided. Critical hermeneutics, according to them, commits a fallacy by trying to gain access to meaning outside or behind the intentional self-understanding of actors. On such a background, how can critical hermeneutics be justified?

The answer, to the problem regarding the conditions for the possibility of critical understanding according to Apel, has to be as fundamental as that which "Kant provided for the possibility of natural sciences - without starting from the hypostatization of a subject or consciousness as the metaphysical guarantor of the intersubjective validity of knowledge, but from the presupposition that we are because of the fact that no one can follow a rule alone or only once (Wittgenstein) - destined a priori to intersubjective communication and understanding ... In this sense, a hermeneutically transformed transcendental philosophy starts from the apriori of an actual communicative community which is, for us, practically identical with the human species or society".

The distortions in our communication are due to the intrusion of the element of force. This makes it necessary that we establish a 'regulative principle' which would help us to judge the actual state of affairs and help towards better understanding. This is only possible in a free society. Apel's ideal communicative community which is implied in every communicative act, picturizes a state of affairs which can only be approximated. An open society which allows free discussions, enhances better understanding.
Only our anticipation of a truly human form of existence, provides the conditions for the possibility of a critique of our distorted communication, and inadequate self-understanding. It is only a human being who is in possession of an idea of a more truthful way of life. This idea allows us to understand texts and to transcend the truths contained in them. According to critical hermeneutics, then only our development towards a society free from any constraints can bring about a progress in communication.

Jurgen Habermas represented critical hermeneutics and challenged the idealist assumptions of hermeneutical theory as well as hermeneutical philosophy. According to Habermas both hermeneutical philosophy and theory failed to take into account the extra-linguistic factors which are a part of our thought and action. He aimed at removing all distortions in communication.

The Scientistic approaches to the social world infused it with objectivism. Habermas with the aim to combat the objectivist approaches to social science introduced hermeneutics into the methodology of the social sciences. However, our social existence is not to be treated as characterized solely by the actor's intentions but it also has an objective context that limits our recognition of the intentions of those acting within it. Through synthesis of psycho-analysis and hermeneutical philosophy he arrives at an outline of a dialectical-hermeneutical theory of action. Psycho-analysis provides Habermas with the model for a theoretical framework that allows us to transcend the communicative consensus meta-hermeneutically. Critical philosophy like psychoanalysis must be a liberating reflection.
The critical hermeneutics of Habermas as a dialectical social science aims to mediate the objectivity of historical processes with the motives of those acting within it. Critical theory like other reflection has an emancipatory interest. The goal of these critical sciences is to further processes of self-reflection. Habermas argues that for a proper understanding of all social activities, critical sciences are necessary. By exposing "the systematic distortions in communication and action, they attempt to aid human beings in coming to awareness so that they can make history with will and consciousness".  

Habermas provided a theory of communication in an attempt to provide a normative foundation for critical theory. The theory of communicative competence is an important aspect of this theory of communication. His criticism and acceptance of Gadamer's view contain the seeds of his theory of communicative competence. Habermas criticized those approaches which focussed on the subjectively intended meaning. These approaches according to Habermas accepted the meaning of an act as defined by the actor and failed to consider the interpreter and actor as partners in a dialogue. Gadamer's 'fusion of horizon' according to Habermas serves to legitimize the critical component in understanding the subjective intended meaning. Gadamer recognized the limitations of behaviouristic approaches to social world. Gadamer's hermeneutics stressed the role of reflecting partner in understanding the objects of the social sciences through a dialogue.

The possibility of social sciences rests on the communication between the subject and the object. This communication also affects the natural sciences. Progress in natural sciences in dependent to a large extent on the communication between scientists. Though this may not directly affect
their work, the understanding between scientists helps to establish a scientific community, to have common opinions, to form a common criteria for the acceptance or rejection of findings within a scientific community. Habermas called this language which is used to talk about the formal language of scientific systems as metalanguage.

Habermas _Zur Logik de Sozialwissenschaften_ started the hermeneutic dispute between Habermas and Gadamer. Gadamer according to Habermas is reluctant to engage in any sort of methodical considerations. Gadamer stated the difference between methodical experience and hermeneutics which according to Habermas supports the positivist degradation of hermeneutics. Though he supports Gadamer's 'fusion of horizon', Habermas rejects his 'rehabilitation of prejudice' and the 'predominance of tradition'. For Habermas, tradition as a continuous process can never be objectified and cannot therefore provide a basis for all activities, methodical or otherwise.

Our understanding, according to Gadamer depends on authority and tradition. But he, according to Habermas, fails to see the importance of reflection in understanding. Reflection is capable of rejecting the claims of tradition. Universal history, which is the basis of all historical understanding provides a frame of reference which transcends tradition, and can be criticized within traditions.

Habermas introduces a concept of totality (of a pre-understood universal history) as an anticipatory explanation that should create a 'whole' in relation to which the parts of historically given become meaningful. And the main aim of the anticipation of the totality of history is the removal of all distortions in communications. Further Gadamer's use of language as a transcendental absolute, Habermas points out, lacks
any objective content. Rather a system of labour and domination along
with language provides an objective context, within which it is possible
to understand social actions. Gadamer's ontologisation of language along
with hypostatisation of continuity of tradition have been the target of
Habermas's criticism of Gadamer.

Gadamer's formulation of consensus in the context of traditional
language according to Habermas may be a result of pseudo communication.
It is possible that due to a distortion in language we are in no position
to recognize our own intentions. What we need instead, is a concept of
truth which arises as a result of free communication.

Habermas wanted to replace hermeneutics which understands meaning
subjectively with the one which understands meaning objectively; such a
theory according to Habermas will view the society as moving towards the
final stage of right living in free communication. However, the critical
theory which he formulates is avowedly hermeneutical. Consequently, the
central aim of critical theory is the critique of positivism and the
rehabilitation of the concept of reflection as a category of valid knowledge.

Critical social sciences treat objects as potential subjects rather
than objectivating them. A critical social science should be guided by an
emancipatory interest. Habermas lists three types of interest: the
technical, the practical and the emancipatory interests, which developed
in three social media, namely, labour, interaction and power. These give
rise to three possible sciences: the empirical-analytic, the hermeneutic,
and the critical.
The natural sciences, according to Habermas are governed by a technical interest and are oriented towards production of technically useful knowledge. Positivism tried to reduce everything to the natural sciences. This according to Habermas cannot succeed since there are other viewpoints besides natural sciences which disclose the reality.

Historical-hermeneutic sciences (cultural or human) present such a viewpoint. These sciences according to Habermas "aim at producing mutual understanding and agreement. They try to grasp the interpretations of reality with regard to possible intersubjectivity of action-oriented mutual understanding, specific to a given hermeneutic starting point". These cultural sciences have a practical interest in the sense that they try to overcome conflicting interpretations and misunderstandings, in our practical life by aiming at mutual agreement and understandings. Successful communication is necessary for human species to function properly. Ordinary language grammar here helps to establish a transcendental framework by providing "schemata for world interpretation as soon as the individual is socialised into language community".

This provides the starting point for the hermeneutician to start his interpretation of texts, which includes both symbols and facts. The nature of this inquiry is therefore, both conceptual as well as empirical. However, historicism, infused with different world views blocks critical reflection in cultural sciences. It reduces the meaning of cultural objects to those given to them by the subjects of their study. To overcome this, what is needed according to Habermas, is a critical science or a critical theory with an emancipatory interest.
These critical sciences are different from natural sciences as well as cultural disciplines concerned with interpretations and with renewing our cultural heritage. The critical sciences aim at an emancipatory interest in gaining freedom from constraints, power and distorted communication. They are above all characterized by self-reflection (overlooked by positivism), the capacity to act rationally and to be self-determinant. However, our self-understanding is restricted by the constraints imposed by history. If, we are to attain a rational capacity which can function properly then we need a type of knowledge which would help to remove these constraints. Such a form of knowledge is what Habermas calls as self-reflection.

Habermas argues that "self-reflection brings to consciousness those determinants of a self-formative process of cultivation and self-formation (bildung) which ideologically determine a contemporary practice and conception of the world ... It (leads) to insight due to the fact that what has previously been unconscious is made conscious in a manner rich in consequence: analytic insights intervene in life". This self-reflection thus helps to overcome distortions by revealing them.

Humans have a capacity to reflect on their own failure and achievements and act with greater consciousness and autonomy. This forms the basis on which emancipatory interest can be revealed. In self-reflection, unlike the natural science and cultural sciences, the theory and practice are linked to one another. Critical sciences with an emancipatory interest try to further this aspect of self-reflection and to remove conditions which do not allow self-conscious development of the humans to take place; to have a proper understanding of social activities, critical sciences are therefore necessary. By pointing out the distortions in action and
communication they help the human beings to create history with "Will and consciousness".

Freud's psychoanalysis, according to Habermas presents a model which helps him to form a critical social theory. Through an integration of psychoanalysis and hermeneutic philosophy, Habermas aimed at a dialectical-hermeneutic theory of action. Freud according to Habermas was wrong in considering psychoanalysis as a part of natural sciences. Psychoanalysis, according to Habermas, shares the same metatheoretical status as that of hermeneutical theory or empirical theories.

The legitimacy of critical hermeneutics according to Habermas depends on the rejection of the hermeneutic claim to universality. Hermeneutic approaches deal with understandable speech. They prove to be inadequate when they come in contact with systematically distorted communications. These defects present in the speech are disregarded by hermeneutics. Hermeneutics thus works within a limited area.

Habermas argues that the "Self-conception of hermeneutics can be shaken when it appears that patterns of systematically distorted communication are also evident in 'normal' speech. This is the case in the pseudo-communication in which the participants cannot recognize a breakdown in their communication; only an external observer recognizes that they misunderstand each other". And since hermeneutics does not allow us to be a spectator, we are unable to detect when we fall prey to a false consciousness of pseudo-normal understanding which in fact requires systematic explanation.

Habermas uses psychoanalysis as a critique of individual self-understanding by taking into account individual life-history. Influenced
by a particular ideology the social groups are kept away from recognizing their interest and from pursuing them. Falling prey to a 'false consciousness' members even hand over their rights to the continuance of an unjust social system which provides pseudo-scientific explanations to the contradictions inherent in their ideology. This the analyst tries to bring to light by helping to bring to consciousness their distinctive self-formative processes.

An anticipation of the 'final state' allows a critical understanding of the present. Habermas makes extensive use of psychoanalysis to uncover the conditions for possibility of a critical social science. Psychoanalysis aids Habermas to transcend the communication consensus metahermeneutically, by providing a model for a theoretical framework needed for such a task. With the help of scenic understanding, Freud explained how the "explanatory reconstruction of development processes can be combined with the interpretation of behaviour symptoms, so that in the end insights can coincide with emancipation from unrecognized dependencies".12

This reconstructed scene is usually a childhood situation which the child represses and further excludes it from public communication; unconsciously he desymbolizes the meaning of the object which causes conflict. This opens up a gap in the semantic field which is closed with the help of a symptom, (an unsuspicious symbol takes the place of the symbolic content that has been split off) which gains its own private meaning and which violates the rules of public language. Scenic understanding helps to find out the conditions which led to the distortion of language, and "breaks through the specific incomprehensibility of the symptom and assists in resymbolization i.e. the re-introduction into public communication of a symbolic content that has been split off".13 The
analyst tries to make comprehensible the latent meaning underlying a present situation by relating it to analogous situations (scenes) in the transference situation. This helped to provide clues to the original scene in infancy which is the cause of the distortions and which had so far remained inaccessible but determined behavior.

Habermas thus aimed at providing a depth hermeneutics which tried to explain "the emergence of patterns of speech which have to remain incomprehensible to hermeneuticians since they affect the organization of language itself". Habermas argues that one can develop the theoretical assumptions underlying depth-hermeneutical language analysis in relation to three aspects of psychoanalysis. The psychoanalyst in the beginning has some preconceived idea as to what constitutes undistorted (normal) every day language. When he comes across systematically distorted language he tries to trace this distortions "back to the fusion of pre-linguistic and linguistic organizations of symbols which are separated as two stages in the developmental process and lastly he explains the emergence of deformation with a theory of deviant processes of socialization which extends onto the connection of patterns of infant interaction with the formation of understanding".

Scenic understanding is the tool of depth hermeneutics to engage in such an exercise. However, scenic understanding is not to be confused with hermeneutic understanding, in the sense that hermeneutical understanding, deals with our everyday undistorted communication and helps to sanction the prevalent use of language, whereas scenic understanding is an explanatory understanding which locates the conditions which lead to language distortions. Incomprehensible forms of expression are made
accessible with reference to the initial conditions of the distortions itself through scenic understanding.

Habermas's depth hermeneutics takes note of the exercise of power and repression which lead to distorted communication. Psychoanalysis, for Habermas constitutes an important component of a theory of communicative competence. Habermas argues that the requirements of such a theory are to be found in an analysis but not of the linguistic competence of a native speaker, but of systematic distortions of communication of the type postulated by psychoanalytic theory.

Habermas outlines his theory of communicative competence by criticizing Chomsky's linguistic theory. Chomsky aimed at describing the syntax "by specifying the rules underlying the construction of sentences". This linguistic theory according to Chomsky is concerned with linguistic competence i.e. the ability of an ideal speaker to master the abstract system of rules. Habermas rejects three assumptions of Chomsky's work namely, (1) **Monologism** - linguistic universals belong solely to the basic equipment of the solitary organism of the speaking subject; (2) **A priorism** - Linguistic Universals precede all experiences; and (3) **Elementalism** - meaning can be adequately analysed in terms of combinations of a finite number of lexical components.

Habermas negates these three assumptions. Against the first two he argues that linguistic universals do not precede all experiences as pointed out by Chomsky; neither are they all rooted in the human organism prior to socialization. Habermas makes a distinction between **aposteriori** linguistic universals which process experiences "in the sense that they represent invariant features of contingent scopes of experiences common to
all cultures and *apriori* linguistic universals which make such a processing possible by establishing the conditions of potential communication and general schemes of interpretation". 18

Against the third assumption of elementarism, Habermas argues that our considering of linguistic universals, such as kinship terms and colour words exhibit that our semantic analysis is very much dependent on the "non exceedable common context of the society to which the speaker belongs". 19 This Socio-cultural context needs to be taken into account when we attempt an adequate analysis of meaning. Habermas argues that this analysis is dependent on a changing world view and hence it is valid only at a particular stage of development.

It is necessary therefore that we take into account all possible global interpretation; what is needed for such a massive analysis is a frame of reference. We encounter such a frame of reference when we discover that for a speaker to gain competence over language it is not merely enough to have a mastery of rules for constructing sentences, but what is really required is a capacity to communicate. The speaker can engage in communication when he has linguistic competence as well as 'basic qualifications of speech and symbolic interaction (role - behaviour)' which Habermas terms as communicative competence.

A theory of communicative competence is required in order to rebuild the competence of an ideal speaker to master an *ideal-speech situation*. This ideal-speech situation according to Habermas is characterized by symmetry requirements: (1) unrestricted discussion which would allow to attain free consensus; (2) mutual unimpaired self-presentation in which it is possible to achieve subtle nearness with unviolable distance
among the patterners and that means communication under conditions of extreme individuation; and (3) full complementation of expectations which makes possible the claim of universal understanding and universalized norms. For Habermas, these three symmetries represent a linguistic conceptualization for that which we traditionally apprehend as the ideas of truth, freedom, and justice.\textsuperscript{20}

Habermas argues that this ideal speech situation is an idealisation but he argues that it is indispensable since it is "necessary implied with the structure of potential speech".\textsuperscript{21} All truth, according to Habermas, is oriented towards an idea of truth, and this idea of truth can only be assessed in terms of consensus which is achieved in free and universal discourse. Habermas further argues that our ability to conceive of an ideal speech situation implies that we can also anticipate ideas of justice, truth, and freedom.

Habermas tries to establish a principle to distinguish between true and false consensus with the help of the description of a discourse. This discourse according to Habermas is different from communicative action. Communicative action includes those forms of social interaction which take for granted all the norms and opinions of society, whereas a discourse questions these opinions before accepting them. Sometimes in our everyday interaction we encounter situations in which the validity of these beliefs and values becomes problematic. It is at this time that "through a discourse' the validity claims which have become problematic are made the topic and are examined for their justification".\textsuperscript{22} Through argumentation, discourse tries to end disputes over truth claims.

The validity of norms, and the truth of statements therefore, accordin
to Habermas, depends upon a form of life, free from domination. This form of life is what he terms as ideal-speech situation. Ideal speech situation creates a favourable condition for free debates to take place which allows arguments to emerge and acceptance of the best arguments and finally a true consensus is reached. This brings about an universal agreement.

Habermas is successful in moving from the ontologization of language and tradition of a philosophical hermeneutic by combining the idea of truth and ideal speech situation, (freedom from domination). Habermas argues that the idea of truth, which measures itself against the "idea of true consensus implies the idea of a true life or we could say, it includes the idea of Mundigkeit, (being of age). It is only the formal anticipation of an idealized dialogue, as the form of life to be realized in the future, which guarantees the ultimate supporting and contra-factual agreement that already unites us; in relation to it we can criticize every factual agreement, should it be false one, as false consciousness". 23

Habermas's ideas have been subjected to severe criticisms, Gadamer in a counter reaction to Habermas pointed out that Habermas conceives of hermeneutics as concerned only with 'subjectively-intended meaning'. What makes hermeneutical problem universal and fundamental to all inter-human experience is that "meaning can be perceived even where it is not intended".

Even Habermas's idea of depth hermeneutics, (understanding of meaning cannot be limited either to the mens auctoris or to mens actoris) is, according to Gadamer, the most characteristic point of his own hermeneutics. Habermas, according to Gadamer uses this position in rejecting the 'hermeneutic's claim to universality' because he conceives hermeneutics in a restricted ser
By restricting the scope of hermeneutics, Habermas believes that he can no longer solve the problems of systematic distortion of communication as a participant in a dialogue but only as an analyst or a therapist of society as a whole. This depth hermeneutics, according to Gadamer entails a "role of a social engineer who creates but does not liberate". 25

Further Gadamer criticized Habermas's analogy between psychoanalysis and sociological theory. The use of psychoanalysis to explicate the frame work of the critique of an individual's distorted self-understanding is acceptable to Gadamer, but when it is transferred onto a social sphere it creates a problem. At an individual level the society lists certain limits that are to be followed when psychoanalysis is applied. Gadamer argues that Habermas transcends these limits when he applies psychoanalysis to a large group, and thus forfeits this socially based legitimacy.

Application of psychoanalysis to a whole social order "contains the danger of an uncontrolled exercise of force on the part of self-appointed elites, who dramatically claim a privileged insight into the delusions of others, and the truth of their own viewpoint". 26 According to Gadamer our openness to the ideas of other people and our effort to reach a common agreement through dialogue is what leads us to truth.

David Held criticized Habermas's notion of ideal-speech situation, pointing out that it is not a sufficient condition for a fully open discourse. Ideal-speech situation is a narrow concept in the sense that it does not "cover a range of phenomena from the nature (content) of cultural traditions to the distribution of material resources, which are obviously important determinants of the possibility of discourse and, more generally, of a rational, free and just society". 27 Alvin Gouldner, points out to the
the ideal-speech situation by stating the conditions of a rational consensus; they in fact, according to Alvin Gouldner, create barriers to agreement and consensus.

Paul Ricoeur's phenomenological hermeneutic, while not representing a clearly separable strand, brings into sharp relief the different strands and attempts to integrate them into a larger framework. While doing so, he acts as a mediator in both the hermeneutical and hermeneutic disputes. The important role played by the structuralist analysis of a system of sign in relation to the hermeneutical interpretation of a text is brought to light in Ricoeur's work.

Ricoeur treats textual exegesis as the central element in hermeneutics. He defines hermeneutics as the "theory of rules that govern an exegesis, that is to say, an interpretation of a particular text or collection of signs susceptible to being considered as a text". Even a dream is considered as a text. And the psychonanalyst uses the interpretative system to bring to light the hidden meaning. Text includes also a myth, literature and symbols.

He distinguishes between univocal (having one meaning) and equivocal (having variety of meaning) symbols. The latter happens to be the true focus of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics, thus deals with symbolic texts which have multiple meanings. Such symbolic texts have a fully coherent surface meaning and at the same time a deeper significance.

Ricoeur points out to two totally different syndromes of hermeneutics in modern times. One represented by Bultmann's demythologizing, wherein hermeneutics is understood as the manifestation and restoration of a meaning addressed through a message or a proclamation (kerygma). And the other
represented by Freud's demystification; which seeks to destroy the symbol as the representation of false reality. Because of these two divergent approaches to the interpretation of symbols Ricoeur felt the impossibility of forming universal canons for exegesis. We can only have separate theories regarding the rules of interpretation.

Ricoeur's theory of the conflict of interpretation mediates between "theories of hermeneutics so far advanced by considering the reconstructive determination of objective sense and the existential appropriation of traditional meaning as equally justified and operating on different strategic levels".29 Ricoeur formulated a concept of text which serves as a basis for a theory of interpretation.

The theory of interpretation does not restrict itself to literary texts but extends itself to the sphere of social action. Individuals in this world act and speak in a meaningful way. Their actions can be understood only through a process of interpretation. Ricoeur argues that to see "an action" as a text is to view it as meaningfully constituted behaviour, which can be interpreted in various ways; and to view action as meaningfully constituted behaviour is to identify the primary source of the phenomenology of ideology".30

Ricoeur's study centered around language. Ricoeur adopted Benveniste's distinction between a semiotics of the sign and a semantic of a sentence to highlight some of the features of language. A semiotic study concerns itself with different types of signs. However, the level of sentence in a language does not fall under the domain of semiotics. Though a sentence is composed of signs it is not the same as signs. Ricoeur argues that there are certain characteristics which distinguish it
from signs, namely "the sign only has a function of discrimination: What is peculiar to each sign is what distinguishes it from other signs; for the sign, to be distinctive and to be significant are the same thing. The sentence, by contrast, has a function of synthesis. It's specific character is to be a predicate". A sentence has a reference as opposed to a sign which is defined by difference.

The basic unit of discourse is a sentence. Ricoeur, in order to justify between written and spoken language introduces the concept of discourse. He accepts the definition of discourse formulated by linguistics as a counterpart of language system or linguistic codes. It is given as an event. This is because when someone speaks it produces some effects. As opposed to a-temporality of system of signs, a discourse has an actual eventful character. It is distinguished from the system of signs by a number of traits, namely, "realized-temporality", 'self-referentiality' "outside-object reference", "existence of an addressee", etc.

However one can differentiate between written and spoken speech, depending on the way in which these traits are actualized. The inscription of discourse in writing involves a series of transformations which Ricoeur calls as distanciation.

The first transformation concerns itself with the fixing of a discourse. In spoken speech, discourse has a fleeting character which leads to the problem of fixation. In order to preserve the meaning of what is said one should take recourse to writing, "fixing it in a material medium such as paper and thereby surpassing the fleeting character of the instance of discourse". According to Ricoeur, surpassing is done by the 'intentional exteriorization of the speech-act.
Ricoeur illustrated this point by reference to Austin's speech-acts. The different components of speech-acts (namely locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts), Ricoeur argues can be realized in writing. A locutionary act when written can be identified and reidentified. The illocutionary act which conveys the force of the act can also be written down. The perlocutionary act, according to Ricoeur, is the least inscribable and least discursive aspect of discourse. It is discourse qua stimulus.

Ricoeur argues that discourse operates "not through the recognition of my intention by the interlocutor, but in an energetic mode, as it were, by direct influence upon the emotions and affective attitudes of the interlocutor. Thus the propositional act, the illocutionary force and prelocutionary action are susceptible in decreasing degrees, to the intentional exteriorization which renders inscription by writing possible". 33

The second form of distanciation concerns with the relation between the author's intention and the textual meaning. The intentions of the author and the meaning of the text overlaps in spoken discourse; whereas in the case of written discourse, the verbal meaning and the intentions are dissociated from each other. Ricoeur argues that the "text's career escapes the finite horizon lived by its author. What the text says now matters more than what the author meant to say, and every exegesis unfolds its procedures within the circumference of a meaning that has broken its mooring to the psychology of its author". 34

The third form of distanciation marks the emancipation of text from the limits of 'ostensive reference'. Discourse has a reference i.e. the world. Spoken discourse, refers to a common situation of the
interlocutors. Thus in written discourse the link between discourse and ostensive reference is shattered. The text frees itself from the limits of ostensive reference. It does not "refer to features of the situation in which it was produced, but opens up a world and projects a new way of being. To unfold this deferential dimension of the text, and to relate it to the subject who is 'metamorphized' by the text, is the task of the theory of interpretation".35

In the fourth and the final form of distanciation, there is a discrepancy between the text and its social condition of production. Discourse is the foundation of communication as it is addressed to someone. In spoken discourse the dialogical situation determines the hearer; whereas a text creates its own audience. It is addressed to any invisible unknown audience, who can read. Thus a text has a universal character as compared to the limited number of partners in spoken discourse.

Ricoeur's theory of interpretation centres around his concept of text. Any discourse fixed by writing is defined as a text. This fixation of writing replaces speech, "occurring at the site where speech could have emerged. This suggests that a text is really a text only when it is not restricted to transcribing an anterior speech, when instead it inscribes directly in written letters what the discourse means".36

The transition from sentence to a text is the transition from semantics to the sphere of hermeneutics. In this transition new problems surface which did not arise in spoken language. The text being a written discourse is therefore termed as a work.

Ricoeur lists three distinctive features of a work, namely:

(a) A work cannot be reduced to a sentence. It thus gives rise to a new
problem of understanding. (b) A work is produced in accordance with rules which allow us to classify it as a play, poem, etc. (c) When a work is produced in accordance to a literary genre it is given a unique configuration which likens it to an individual and which may be called its 'styles'.

This concept of text exhibits the four forms of distanciation. Ricoeur based his theory of interpretation on such a conception of text. It is text or written discourse as such which defines the object domain of hermeneutics. Ricoeur avoids the romantic and psychological tendencies characterizing some forms of hermeneutics. Ricoeur treats text as a written work and suggests two types of readings of this text: (1) Explanatory attitude, which prolongs and reinforces "the suspense which affects the text's reference to a surrounding world and to the audience of speaking subjects".\(^{37}\) (2) Interpretative attitude, which removes the suspense and reveals its true nature and fulfils the text in present speech. The openness of the text enables reading; and reading of a text conjoins a new discourse to the discourse of a text. This conjunction of a discourse "reveals, in the very constitution of the text, an original capacity for renewal which is its open characteristic. Interpretation is the concrete outcome of conjunction and renewal".\(^{38}\) Written text has an autonomous character, and interpretation is the type of reading which responds to this autonomy. Since the time of Dilthey the contrast between explanation and understanding became common in hermeneutics. Understanding was conceptualized in psychological terms and explanation was considered as the objectivist intrusion in social sciences and hence rejected. Ricoeur characterizes this tendency as misleading, and tries to bring together understanding and explanation and synthesize them into a complex
Interpretative process.

The four forms of distanciation reveal the aspects of this interpretative process. The first two forms of distanciation, namely, "the eclipse of the event of saying by the meaning, of what is said and the severance of the latter from the intentions of the speaking subject", according to Ricoeur imply that the objective meaning of the text is something other than the author's intention.

Ricoeur argues that taking recourse to the author's intention does not help to solve the problems of understanding. A text is different from a sentence and hence the meaning of a text must be constructed as a whole, taking into account its structured totality irreducible to a sentence. Interpretation is an open process and hence can be constructed in many ways. Each construction of a text is therefore necessarily a guess.

However, such a conception of interpretation does not make it arbitrary. Ricoeur argues that it is always possible to argue for or against interpretation, "to confront interpretation, to arbitrate between them and to seek agreement, even if this agreement remains beyond our immediate reach". Our arguments in favour of or against an interpretation is to bring to light the plausibility or validity of one interpretation over some other. Interpretation thus, does not aim at certainty but at the same time avoids scepticism.

The remaining two forms of distanciation are of equal importance to Ricoeur. The emancipation of the text from the writer and the social circumstances enhances the possibility of two different attitudes towards the text. On one hand, by treating the text as a self enclosed, worldless entity the reader may suspend any judgement regarding the references of
the text, whereas on the other, the reader may give up his *epoche* and try to bring to light the non-ostensive references of the text.

The structuralistic approaches to the study of language and myth adopted the first attitude. They offered a new way of explanation which took into consideration the internal relations of the text. This novel type of explanation, however comes from the field of language itself and not from that of natural sciences.

According to Ricoeur, however, such a type of analysis presupposes a form of understanding which cannot be reduced to structural explanation. The second attitude which a reader adopts in relation to the text takes into consideration this presupposed form of understanding. What the reader tries to discover is not something that is internal or hidden in the text but what is projected by it, that is, a world about which it seeks.

Though the text is not limited by the ostensive reference, it has a referential dimension which is divided in such a way that the suspension of ostensive reference is the condition for the realization of a second order reference. Ricoeur argues that "the literary work discloses a world only under the condition that the reference of descriptive discourse is suspended or, in other words, in the literary work, discourse unfolds its denotation or a denotation of the second order in virtue of the suspension of the first order denotation of discourse". 41

The understanding of text at this stage involves a movement from that which the text says to that about which it says, i.e. from sense to reference; the reader thereby appropriates the world of text.

By appropriation, Ricoeur means to make ones "own what initially
was alien. It is an act through which interpretation brings together, equalizes, renders contemporary and similar". This act Ricoeur emphasizes does not take into account the author's intentions but tries to free the prior self and deepen one's self-understanding and that of the other by virtue of the meaning inscribed in the text. Ricoeur thus treats explanation and understanding not as contradictory but as two levels in the process of interpretation.

Ricoeur argues that if structural analysis is treated as a mediator between surface and depth interpretation "then it seem possible to situate explanation and interpretation along a unique hermeneutical arc and to integrate the opposed attitudes of explanation and understanding within an overall conception of reading as the recovery of meaning". Such a synthesis of the two (explanation and understanding), while not neglecting the subject, avoids subjectivism.

Ricoeur does not restrict the theory of interpretation only to the text but extends it to include even human actions. Meaningful actions become the object of sociological study when it undergoes a kind of objectification similar to the forms of distanciation expressed in a text. The inner traits of the action which are similar to the structure of the speech act make this objectification possible. A discourse when fixed, surpasses the event of saying, by the meaning of what is said. In the same way, an action, when objectified or fixed, surpasses the event of doing, by the significance of what is done.

An action is analogous to a text in many ways. An action like a text has a structure of locutionary act, in so far as they can be identified and reidentified. It also exhibits the variety of illocutionary
traits. Like the speech acts, even the actions have a force of warning, threat, etc. An action is autonomous in the sense that like a text it is detached from its agent. This autonomous character of action allows to leave its traces on human history. Further, an action like a text being open work, can be interpreted by those who witnessed it and also by those who can read it. Finally the human actions like a text are free from ostensive reference. They transcend the social conditions of its production.

It is on the basis of these similarities that Ricoeur extends his interpretative theory of actions. Ricoeur's interpretations of actions helped him to overcome the understanding-explanation dichotomy. The action like a text has a sense and a reference. It projects a possible world and at the same time has an internal structure. Through the process of interpretation the potential mode of human existence can be revealed.

The structure and totality of text can be constructed in different ways. In the same manner even human actions could be interpreted in various ways. To understand an action it is necessary to explain why a person acted the way he did and this can be done if the reasons for the actions are known. The actor may make his actions understandable by explaining that it was done out of a particular feeling or motive (jealousy or revenge). To explain one's action in this manner is to make a claim which could be defended or contested. All interpretations in the literary criticisms and in the field of social sciences can be challenged like the legal utterances. This is because the query 'what can defeat a claim?' is a common element of all arguments. Yet whereas in legal tribunal one reaches a point where all procedures of appeal are exhausted, in social science and literary criticism there is no such last
word. Discussion in this field can only be terminated by violence.

The rest of the aspects of interpretation theory are also applicable to actions. Ricoeur argues that the structuralist mode of analysis can be generalised. It can be made applicable also to social phenomena which may be said to have a semiological character (which may be characterized in terms of systems of interrelated signs). If such an extension is allowed then the type of explanations given by the structural mode of analysis differs from the classical causal model, like the flumean account of causality, where cause and effect occur without any logical connections between them. As against this, the structuralist imply correlative relations rather than consequetive or sequential. Such correlations do not exhaust the task of interpretations. It is only a primary phase in the depth-interpretation of social phenomena.

Objectified actions are a part of social phenomena which has a reference and a structure. These actions like a text project a world and point towards human existence. This appropriation revealed in depth hermeneutics does not reduce the objectivity of social science phenomena to individual subjectivity. This is because such appropriation does not concern itself with the author’s intentions.

Ricoeur’s Phenomenological Hermeneutics

Ricoeur’s primary aim is to propose a hermeneutics different from hermeneutics that concerned itself with religio-theological problem. He therefore, introduced ‘phenomenological-hermeneutics’. Taking into account the above classifications, one can now understand what is phenomenological about Ricoeur’s hermeneutics.

Though the approaches of phenomenology and hermeneutics seem
to be diverse, they have something in common and are therefore inseparable. Phenomenology, according to Ricoeur, serves as the basis of hermeneutics. Phenomenology therefore is the fundamental presupposition of hermeneutic philosophy. On the other hand, neither can phenomenology proceed without an hermeneutical presupposition. The hermeneutical condition of phenomenology, argues Ricoeur, is tied up with the role of explication (Auslegung) in the fulfilment of its philosophical project. Ricoeur thus aims at a phenomenological hermeneutics by grafting hermeneutics to a phenomenological philosophy.

Ricoeur lists three stages of this 'graft' of hermeneutical problem and textual paradigms to a phenomenological methodology. In the first stage, Ricoeur holds on to the notion of a textual analysis of symbolic discourse. He restricted himself to form methodological grounds for a theory of analogous meaning. Here phenomenology enters hermeneutics, "as a version of a comparativist strategy and as a means of 'recovering' the intentionalities of symbolic expressions, i.e. of layering the experimental significations of these expressions. Thus the constellation of meaning surrounding the various confessions of the experience of evil are explored". The object of analysis in this stage is the 'text'.

In the second stage, which began specially with his writings on Freud, he retains the textual element. Ricoeur treats Freudian analysis of dreams, jokes, art works, etc. as a type of hermeneutics. These art works or dreams are treated as 'texts' which a psychoanalyst must interpret. However, the object of analysis is the human subject and not the text. Ricoeur argues that what we need here is an interpretation which takes into consideration the concealed meaning of the text 'self'.
Hermeneutics, when restricted to biblical exegesis included the problem of faith. Ricoeur's use of hermeneutic of belief is latently religious in intention. The question of faith, finds itself hidden in the hermeneutical problem now linked to an understanding of phenomenology itself. On this background, (third stage) the dialectic of hermeneutics, which emerges, "is one which counterplays those interpretations of meaning which demythize the existential-cum-religious significations with those which seek a 'recovery' of forgotten significations. The counter-part of suspicion is a latent belief in Ricoeur's version of a hermeneutical-phenomenology". 45

This grafting of hermeneutical problem to a phenomenological methodology shows evidences of previous graft (like the grafting of the question of faith to the hermeneutical problem). Since the hermeneutical problem started long before phenomenology, Ricoeur felt the need to graft hermeneutics onto phenomenology. Ricoeur lists two ways of doing this. One, which he calls the short route, (explored by Heidegger) since it short-circuited the problem by directly carrying itself to the "level of an ontology of finite being in order there to recover understanding, no longer as a mode of knowledge, but rather as a mode of being". 46 This process is not gradual but a sudden one.

Ricoeur takes the other route, which is a difficult one, and aims at carrying reflections to the level of ontology in a slow, step by step, method. Ricoeur felt that with Heidegger's sudden manner of questioning, the problem that aroused our investigations remained unsolved and lost from sight. Heidegger treats historical knowledge as secondary to ontological understanding, as a derived form of a primordial understanding.
Ricoeur as opposed to Heidegger, felt the need to take into consideration the derived forms of understanding and to pinpoint in them the signs of their derivations. He therefore begins on the level of language, since this is the level on which understanding operates. By substituting the analysis of language to the analytic of Dasein, Ricoeur hopes to keep in touch with those disciplines which aim to practice interpretations in a methodical manner. At the same time he hopes that this will keep him away from separating truth and characteristics of understanding from those methods followed by the various disciplines sprung from exegesis.

If a problem of understanding is to be resolved, then it must proceed from the semantic elucidation of the concept of interpretations, common to all hermeneutic disciplines. Ricoeur intends to solve the question of existence through a detour of this semantics. A purely semantic explanation remains incomplete till one exhibits that our understanding of multivocal or symbolic expressions is a moment of self-understanding. The semantic approach thus follows a reflective approach. While interpreting the signs the subject interprets himself. The interpreter becomes a "being who discovers by the exegesis of his own life, that he is placed in 'being' before he places and possesses himself".47

The semantical approach keeps hermeneutics in touch with various methodologies and also grafts hermeneutics onto phenomenology at the level at which Phenomenology is most sure of itself (at the level of the theory of meaning like the one developed in the logical investigations).

Interpretation, according to Ricoeur aims at making one's own, something that is remote or alien. By overcoming this remoteness the interpreter can appropriate its meaning to himself. Through an under-
standing of the other, the interpreter, expands his own understanding of himself. Every hermeneutics, thus according to Ricoeur is a self understanding. Therefore, it would not be wrong on our part, to graft hermeneutics onto phenomenology, on the level of the problem of the cogito. By combining the multiple meanings in the semantic field with self-knowledge, we radically transform the problem of cogito.

Ricoeur's route in grafting hermeneutics onto phenomenology is a long one and begins with distanciation and with determination of the objectivity of sense which is embedded in a text. In his essay 'phenomenology and hermeneutics', Ricoeur presents a hermeneutical critique of phenomenology in its most idealistic form (that advanced by Husserl'). Once this idealistic form is given up, the mutual affinity between hermeneutics and phenomenology comes to the fore.

Ricoeur lists five objections levelled against the Husserllian idealism by the hermeneutical philosophy:

a) Husserllian Idealism construed the ideal of 'scientificity' as ultimate justification. This ideal according to Ricoeur encounters its fundamental limit in the ontological condition of understanding. This ideal of scientificity, Ricoeur argues, needs to be questioned; unless this is done the problem of ultimate justification for Hermeneutics still rests within the domain of objectifying thought. Such a position, goes back from the idea of scientificity to the ontological condition of belonging. The subject who questions, belongs to the very thing about which he questions.

So long as the ideal of scientificity is not questioned, the problem of ultimate justification for Hermeneutics still rests within the domain of objectifying thought. Such a position, goes back from the idea of
scientificity to the ontological condition of belonging. The subject who questions, belongs to the very thing about which he questions.

b) According to Ricoeur, Husserl's demand for the return to intuition is countered by the necessity for all understanding to be mediated by an interpreter, and remains on the level of epistemology; whereas that of hermeneutic philosophy refers to universality of understanding. The text according to hermeneutic philosophy has an autonomous character and opens up a possibility of variety of meaning. Thus it is an unlimited and open process.

c) His central thesis is that all intuitions depend on subjectivity. All transcendence and self-knowledge according to Husserl is doubtful because it proceeds by sketches (Abschattungen) which are presumptive. Only immanence which does not proceed by sketches is indubitable. This contention, according to Ricoeur becomes doubtful, when we realise that the cogito also becomes the target of criticism.

Ricoeur argues that only a hermeneutic of communication by showing the "insurmountable character of the ideological phenomenology through its mediation on the role of pre-understanding the apprehensions of any cultural objects ... (and by) demonstrating the necessity of a critique of ideology", can incorporate the critique of ideology into self-understanding. Hermeneutics thus has a way of attaining both the unsurpassable character ideological phenomena and the need and the possibility of a critique of ideology. This is possible because as against phenomenology, hermeneutic has a subject which is always open to the efficacy of history.

(d) Fourthly, hermeneutics, according to Ricoeur, aims at a work which is in front of the text and not the intentions of the author. And
aim of the hermeneutician becomes the task of discerning the 'matter' available in the text. The implications of this preoccupation of hermeneutics with the textual 'matter' on the Husserllian idealism is that "phenomenology, which was born with the discovery of the universal character of intentionality, has not remained faithful to its own discovery, namely that consciousness has its meaning beyond itself. The idealist theory of the constitution of meaning has thus 'hypostasized subjectivity'". 49

Lastly, hermeneutics treats subjectivity as the last category of the theory of understanding. Instead of becoming the beginning point, it stands for a fulfilling agency through which hermeneutics leads to self-comprehension. It becomes the discipline of the text.

Inspite of these objections, Ricoeur felt the need to justify his thesis that "phenomenology remains the unsurpassable presupposition of hermeneutics". 50

The primary phenomenolgical presupposition of hermeneutics is that, every question regarding any type of 'being' is a question regarding the meaning of that 'being'. The question of meaning becomes hermeneutical, when the meaning is concealed by everything which denies access to it. Only when this question of meaning is treated as central to phenomenology, it becomes a hermeneutical problem. In doing this, the phenomenological attitude is placed above the naturalistic-objectivistic attitude. The choice in favour of meaning, is thus, according to Ricoeur, the most general presupposition of any theory of interpretation. Such a breakdown between phenomenology and a naturalistic-objective attitude, according to Ricoeur leads to "nothing more than an opting for the consciousness 'in' which it occurs". 51
Hermeneutic philosophy, according to Ricoeur can explore the conditions of hermeneutical understanding only through reference to its linguisticality. This according to him presupposes a general theory of sense where the concept of meaning is coextensive with the notion of intentionality. Ricoeur contends that we are right in speaking of the 'meaning of perception' or the 'meaning of will', etc. Ricoeur further argues that this "subordination of the logical notion of signification to the universal notion of meaning, under the guidance of the concept of intentionality, in no way implies that a transcendental subjectivity has sovereign mastery of meaning towards which it orients itself. On the contrary phenomenology can establish the priority of meaning above self-consciousness". 52

Another way in which phenomenology presupposes hermeneutics is through the moment of distanciation. Hermeneutical distanciation is related to phenomenological epoche. All consciousness of meaning involves distanciation, (a distancing from lived experience). Phenomenology, argues Ricoeur, starts "when, not content to live or 'relive', we interrupt lived experience in order to signify it. Thus the epoche and the meaning-intention are closely linked". 53

The epoche is a virtual event, which involves the exchange of signs for things. Phenomenology is similar to this epoche, "which it raises to the dignity of the act, the philosophical gesture. It renders thematic what was only operative, and thereby makes meaning appear as meaning". 54 Hermeneutic makes use of this philosophical gesture into the human sciences. The lived experience, which hermeneutics tries to bring into language and raise to meaning is really the historical connection, mediated by the transmission of texts, works etc., which renders present
the historical past.

The 'lived experiences' of phenomenology and the 'consciousness exposed to efficacy of history' in hermeneutics correspond to each other. Hence, Ricoeur argues, that the relation between 'distanciation' and 'belonging' in hermeneutics is parallel to that of epoche and lived experience in phenomenology. Hermeneutics therefore, "begins when not content to belong to transmitted tradition, we interrupt the relation of belonging in order to signify it".55 This similarity allows hermeneutics to include the critical moment from which psychoanalysis, critique of ideology etc. could begin. The critical moment and the relation of belonging can be integrated together, if distanciation is consubstantial with belonging. This, according to phenomenology, becomes possible 'when it elevates to a philosophical decision the Virtual act of instituting the 'empty space' which enables a subject to signify his lived experience of his belonging to a historical tradition'.56

Thirdly, Ricoeur stresses the primacy of the structure of experience in relation to linguisticality as the most fundamental phenomenological presupposition in hermeneutics. He refers to the 'experience of art' in the form of a 'game' (referred by Gadamer) and the noematic analysis of the pre-linguistic sphere. In both these cases "linguistic considerations' are preceded by the presentation of 'what it is' that is brought to language.

The relation between the pre-predicative of phenomenology and that of hermeneutical philosophy, concerns the relation between the 'life world' and 'world of science' on one hand, and that of the objectivating approach of the 'Geisteswissenschaften' to artistic, historic, and linguistic experiences on the other. Both the 'Dasein' and 'leben Welt' (Life-world) "designate
the surplus of meaning of 'lived experience, which makes possible objectifying and explanatory attitudes".57

These links between phenomenology and the hermeneutic philosophy, make it necessary for phenomenology to incorporate a hermeneutical presupposition, namely; to conceive of its method as an explication, an interpretation, an as Auslegung. Phenomenology thus can be realized only hermeneutically.

NOTES


3. Ibid., p. 59.

4. Ibid., p. 60.

5. Ibid., p. 72.


18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 365.

20. Ibid., pp. 370-72.


22. Rick Roderick, Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory, p. 82.


25. Ibid., p. 197.


31. Ibid. p. 176.

32. Ibid. p. 179.


34. Paul Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text", in Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutic and the Human Sciences, p. 201.


36. Paul Ricoeur, "What is a Text", in Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutic and the Human Sciences, p. 146.


38. Paul Ricoeur, "What is a text", p. 158.


40. Ibid., p. 181.

41. Ibid., p. 182.

42. Paul Ricoeur, "Appropriation", in Paul Ricoeur Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, p. 185.


45. Ibid., p. xvii.


47. Ibid.

48. Paul Ricoeur 'Phenomenology and Hermeneutics' in Hermeneutics and Human Sciences, p. 110.

49. Josef Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics, p. 220.


51. Ibid., p. 115.

52. Ibid., p. 116.

53. Ibid., p. 116.

54. Ibid., p. 116.

55. Ibid., p. 117.

56. Ibid., p. 117.

57. Ibid., p. 119.