CHAPTER III

THE EUROPEAN COMPANIES ON THE COROMANDAL COAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA (1600-1641 A.D.)

The commencement of the seventeenth century marks the beginning of the expansion of the European companies in the waters of the Indian Ocean. It also marks the end of the sole monopoly of the *Estado da Índia* in the East. This period was marked initially by a tough competition between the Europeans. But later on as it would be noticed there was an evolution of a sort of understanding among these powers for their mutual benefits. It must be stressed here that this understanding did not arise due to the treaties signed in Europe for as will be seen that these treaties were hardly implemented in the East. In the theme of the study, the study of the organization of the different European Companies and their configuration of powers would be studied. This topic holds relevance in the sense that without its understanding one would not be able to discern how the retreat of the Portuguese took place.

A new element marks the dawn of the seventeenth century as far as the ventures conducted by the European states of the time are concerned. This was the founding of the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (the United Dutch East India Company or VOC) in Holland and the English East India Company in England. Their predecessors in the sea borne activities, Spain and Portugal respectively had expanded on entirely different lines. The Portuguese overseas endeavours were driven by the initiatives taken by the Crown under the name of the Estado da India. On the other hand, in Spain it was important to channelize the surplus of soldiers. So the Crown initiated the soldiers in the maritime expansion. Due to the different motives and
expansionary zeal, the companies came to dominate the commercial world of Asia.

The Portuguese had monopolized the trading networks of the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth century. The entry of the Dutch in this theatre was bound to have repercussions. As the Dutch also concentrated on the spice trade, it resulted in their establishment of contacts with the Coromandel. This is evident as early as 1612 when they noticed the Coromandel textiles as trading item in the Moluccas. Hendrick Brouwer, a Governor General of the VOC noted that the Coromandel Coast was the “left arm of the Moluccas and the surrounding islands because without textiles that came from there [the Coromandel coast], the trade in the Moluccas will be dead.” ¹ It would thus be interesting to study the challenge posed by the VOC on the century-old Portuguese hegemony.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ESTADO DA INDIA

The expression Estado da Índia indicated in the seventeenth century not only a well-defined geographical space but also a set of territories, establishments, resources, persons and administration. The Portuguese Crown in the Indian Ocean from the Cape of Good Hope to Japan tutored all these interests. A Viceroy or a Governor who had his residence at Goa governed the territories as well as the institutions in this vast region. The Crown gave him powers to govern the region and report the matters of the concern. Luis Filipe Ferreira Reis Thomaz has explained the nature of the Estado da Índia by putting forward the notion that it was ‘a system of communication between

¹ Cited in Prakash, Om, The Dutch Factories in India, 1617-1623, Munshiram Manoharlal publishers private limited, Delhi, 1984, pp2
multiple spaces.' 2 In the year 1515 at the time of the death of Afonso de Albuquerque, Estado da Índia had already acquired a definite structure. A coherent network had been established which covered the whole of the Indian Ocean and integrated the Portuguese politically. But according to John Villers, the Estado da Índia never succeeded in acquiring any political homogeneity, and it remained little more than a scattered and often inchoate confederation of territories, military and commercial establishments, individuals, goods and interests, administered, controlled or protected, directly or indirectly with varying degrees of completeness by the Portuguese Crown or by others on behalf of the Crown.3

As far as the understanding of the administration of the Estado is concerned, the writings of the contemporary chroniclers – João de Barros, Diogo do Counto and António Boccaro also assume importance. The itinerary of Linschoten also provides a detailed account of its functioning. The records of the happenings and the proceedings of the Estado da India were held under the aegis of the Council of State4. These letters which had been corresponded between the Viceroy and the King of Portugal have been compiled together in Assentos dos Conselho do Estado. They along with Livros das Monções provide source for the study. Another source, which is of considerable

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2 Thomaz, Luis Filipe Ferreira Reis, “Estrutura Política e Administrativa do Estado da Índia no Século XVI” in II Seminario Internacional de Historia Indo-Portuguesa-Actas, Lisboa, 1985 p459
4 The origin of the Council of State, Conselho do Estado can be traced in the Councils of the captains, Conselho dos Capitães which Afonso de Albuquerque used to convene in the matters of high importance during the first quarter of the sixteenth century. The government functionaries who also served as councillors were Captain of the city of Goa, Head of the Fortress (Alcaide-Mor), Factor (feitor) who collected taxes and worked as an agent on commercial matters. Besides them there was a Notary, Captain of the Sea and Fidalgos or Noblemen who were invited to attend the meetings.
importance, is the diary of the Conde de Linhazes, Dom Miguel de Noronha, who served as a Viceroy between 1629 and 1635.

The Estado da Índia appears as a political entity with the appointment of the first governor at Goa. In the year 1505, Dom Francisco de Almeida secured this position. This period is marked by the political and diplomatic contacts that at the early stage were essentially important. The gradual domination of the military aspect in the policies of the Estado gave the Portuguese presence a peculiar character. From the very beginning the presence of the Portuguese in the waters of the Indian Ocean looked dissimilar. Their competitors in the seventeenth century that is the Dutch and the English were organized on entirely different lines. In the seventeenth century when the Estado was facing the brunt of its European counterparts, the Portuguese even envisaged a plan to build a company on the lines of the VOC.

According to the orders of the Crown, a new Viceroy was sent to India to administer the territories, every three years. His tenure was extended on the King’s pleasure, but this was not the regular norm of the day. According to Linschoten the Viceroy during the last year of his government visited the forts lying near to Goa to see how they were governed but also to fill up their purses and to get presents. Besides, the words of this famous Dutch itinerant who resided in Goa in an official position for a considerably long period show the Viceroy’s position: ‘these Viceroyes have great revenewes’. The Viceroy also had the authority to keep the King’s treasure and do with it whatever they please. The extent to which the Viceroy misused

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5 Diario Do 3º, Conde de Linhares, Vice-rei Da India, Tomo I, Biblioteca Nacional, Lisboa,1937 and Diario Do 3º,Conde de Linhares, Vice-rei Da India, Tomo II, Biblioteca Nacional, Lisboa,1943
7 Ibid, p219
the power disposed by the King was in most cases high. Besides this the great allowances which the Viceroy's got from the King also made his treasury mighty. Nonetheless the gifts bestowed by the indigenous polity on his arrival at Goa also had their share of the contribution.

As Linschoten observed, the Viceroys, while leaving Goa took everything with them. So the motive of most of the Viceroys was to acquire as much wealth as they could. Their attitude while leaving Goa itself portrays that they were more involved in their own service rather than in the service of the Crown. The reason behind such an approach could have been the mere fact that their tenure was limited and the chances of getting another one were less. A discourse of the general happenings of the three years of the Viceroy's occupancy is well described by Linschoten. In the first year of the term, the focus of the Viceroy was to repair his official residence and to furnish it. Besides he also ascertained the manners and customs of the area under his jurisdiction. The second year saw the Viceroy amassing treasure and to look for profits for which he had come to India. The last year was to prepare and set the things in order so that he could leave as soon as the new Viceroy came. François Pyrad de Laval also noted that the Viceroy's appointment to the coveted post was a lucrative assignment for him for he amassed as much wealth he could during his tenure. In his last years of the service, the Viceroy visited all nearby forts to fill their purses. This can also be implemented for the Captains of the forts and the other officers in Estado da India.

Thus this was the position of the highest authority that governed the Estado da India on the orders of the King of Portugal. His attitude if we are to believe Linschoten was not, which would make the Estado strong. Was this

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8 Linscoten (ibid, p221) noted "they leave the house as bare and naked [as possible maybe] so that the new Viceroy must make provision to furnish it, and gather a new treasure."

9 Gray, Albert,(trans) The Voyage of François Pyrad of Laval to the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil, The Hakluyt Society, London, 1887, p88
outlook of the Viceroy's also responsible for the retreat of the Portuguese in the seventeenth century? If the Viceroy, the Captains and the officers were upto such activities then such sort of corruption would definitely seep down the hierarchy. In one of the documents pertaining to the seventeenth century, the Viceroy reported the corrupt practices adopted by the guards to the King. In this letter which was dated of 26th February 1616, the Viceroy Dom Hieronymo (Jeronymo) d'azevedo had already communicated with the King about the act of the guards. It was also informed that the there was a lack of order and thefts were performed by the said guards while the naus leaving for Lisbon were being loaded. The King hence took the initiative of giving the authority to the Viceroy to take measures against the said group. The King also noted that it had come to his knowledge that persons who were performing the roles of the guards of the naus of the companhia of Dom Manuel Coutinho [private trader] had also performed the same act. So such acts were also performed in the private Portuguese ships besides the ones owned by the Estado. The King, in order to control such acts thus ordained that the 'Ouvidor Geral' would take every year a survey of all acts of the said guards.10

Another category of the Portuguese who had a notable presence were the 'fidalgos'. Amongst the two kinds of men who arrived in Estado da India, there were the married men and the soldiers. The Portuguese regarded the unmarried ones as soldiers which according to them was 'the best name that a man can have.'11 The men who leave the ship at Lisbon are mustered out of which some of them receive the title of the Fidalgo da Caza del Rey nossas Senhor that is, a Gentlemen of the King’s house and this was thought to be the chief title. Another honorable title was Mozos Fidalgos and this was generally given to the sons of the Gentlemen or by the King to whom he favored. Yet there was another category of

10 Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCLXXX, p.421
11 Burnell,A.C., vol I, 1997, p188
the fidalgos who were less in number. These received the title of *Cavalheiro Fidalgo*, which was the title of the knight. He got the designation for some valiant act that he had performed. *Mosas da Camara, do Numero, e do Serviço* was another title meant that they were in the service of the King whether at his chamber or the ones who managed his accounts or his service in general. This was the first title or degree of credit whereby through their good service they attained better and more glorious titles that would also give them riches of the world.\textsuperscript{12}

Besides these categories of the fidalgos, there were also others like *Escuderos Fidalgos* or *Esquires* whose title was a degree of credit. There were still others who were named as *Hommes honorados* who were the men of honour and the poorest among them [as they don't have any title] are set down for soldiers, who are common and a mischievous sort. All the men receive salaries according to their titles from the Crown. There was always a chance for them to rise in service either by the length of their service or by some good action. But in general it was favourism that led to ascend in their designations. Thus the fidalgos belonged to various categories and their promotion was ruled by favoritism. It is worth noting here that among the Portuguese who came to Asia, the fidalgos were the ones who outnumbered. The quest for monopoly of the Portuguese is seen from the fact so many men were sent to Asia for the purpose. The granting of such designations as noted above also proves the point that the Crown did it in order to lure more men in the service. Besides this one cannot disown the fact that the medieval mentality of granting titles and deeds was at work.

In addition to these men who were supposed to be the guardians of the Estado, there were others appointed at Goa to facilitate the working of the Estado. It has already been mentioned that before the fleet departed for Asia, a muster roll was prepared. This register was delivered to one of the King's officers at Goa. The

\textsuperscript{12} Burnell, A.C., vol I, 1997, pp188-189

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said officer was called *Chief Clerk of the Matricola General*\(^{13}\) and his tenure was for three years. Under his command were three or four clerks. Besides this there was another function of this officer. Whenever the Portuguese had to send an expedition for a certain purpose or to just keep an army ready on the coast or to convoy and safe-conduct the merchants traveling daily or to check the pirates, drums were struck that whosoever wants to serve the King in his fleet should come to the Matricola Generall. The Matricola Generall will provide the resources for the same purpose. After this the Viceroy would ordain a chief Captain and other captains under him for every fuste and galley. The Matricola Generall paid all the men who made this fleet according to their titles that had been registered at Lisbon.\(^{14}\)

After performing its task when the fleet returned back to Goa, the Viceroy made a certificate for the Captain General of the fleet wherein he testified that such a captain by his commandment had been for so many months at the service of the King at sea. Since he had performed an important task, all the information regarding it was relayed and in the said certificate it was also certified that he had spent money from his purse in the service of His Majesty. According to this credential the Captain General also made certificates for his subordinate captains and soldiers in the same way as his testimonial was made. Thus the manner in which the task was accomplished was important for it carried a recommendation of their feat in Asia. This could further lead to promotions in their ranks.

The Viceroy maintained an advisory council from an early date after 1505, which was closely modeled on the lines of the Conselho de Estado in Lisbon. In the Council of State that was held at Goa matters of high importance were discussed. The Government functionaries, who served the Estado, were its councilors. The chief civil, military, judicial and ecclesiastical were involved. It

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\(^{13}\) From Latin word "*matricula*" which means register.  
\(^{14}\) Burnell, A.C., vol I, 1997, pp189-190
comprised of the Captain of the city of Goa, Head of the fortress (Alcaide-Mor), Factor (Feitor) who collected taxes and worked as an agent on commercial matters, vendor da fazenda, Notary, Captain of the Sea and the Fidalgos along with the Archbishop, the chief inquisitor (after 1560). These personalities participated in the meeting that was convened by the Viceroy. The Council of State not only functioned at Goa but also in all fortresses and trading outposts (praças) forming part of the Portuguese dominion. Since it was composed of the highest functionaries of the State and was intended to act in certain respect as a check on the Viceroy, but practically its action was hampered by his influence. In March 1564, the Government of the Estado da India made a request to the King to restrict the membership of the Council as it often caused inconvenience to the smooth working of the administration. But it was not convenient to change this age-old practice and that in the important state affairs the opinions of the Fidalgos should be obtained and forwarded to Portugal. But the implementation of the resolution was left to the Viceroy. However the ultimate authority of taking the decisions remained in the hands of the King in the sixteenth century.

At the vice regal court the most important official after the Viceroy was that of the secretary. The King who had his confidence in him as well as some experience (of the candidate) granted this office only to those people. After the secretary came the various officials of the two main sections into which the vice regal administration was divided—the revenue department (fazenda) and the judiciary (justica). The vedor geral (overseer) controlled the fazenda, the post of which was created in 1549 and who also served as the chief financial advisor of the Estado da India. An escrivão (clerk) assisted him with a number of subordinate officials. Among them the treasurer of the city of Goa, the chief factor (feitor), the juiz da alfandega (a magistrate responsible for the customs), casas dos contos (the officers of the exchequer)
under a chief superintendent (provedor mór) who before the creation of the office of vedor, had been a chief financial officer in the vice regal administration. The customhouse was headed by an almoxarife, who was directly responsible to the vedor.\textsuperscript{15} The administrative organization of the Viceroy's court in Goa was replicated in smaller and simpler form in Malacca. Most of the Portuguese settlements in Asia, whether they were officially described as fortalezas or feitorias and whether or not they were in territories where the Portuguese exercised sovereignty or claimed possessão were governed. In each fortaleza there was a military force which was headed by a captain. Thus this was the general structure that can be seen in Portuguese Asia.

George Winius contradicts the theory that it was due to the Portuguese Crown's support that the Estado da India survived. The decision of King Manuel I to create his Asian operation was fabulous. But its survival owed anything but to chance. Winius argued that only the efforts of men like Duarte Pacheco Pereira, Francisco de Almeida and Afonso de Albuquerque together with many of their less famous colleagues saved Manuel and his councils from disaster in India. The Estado according to him seems to have designed itself with only a few guidelines (such as nominations, the feitoria structure and the three-year terms) imposed from Europe. He admits that the convoys of ships that traveled outwards to Goa were hardly adequate.\textsuperscript{16} Thus the Estado da India was almost wholly built by the Europeans who were on the scene and not by the ones who were in Portugal. There were hardly efforts put by the monarchs, their councils and board of directors.

\textsuperscript{15} Villers, John, "The Estado in Southeast Asia" in Kratoska(ed), 2001, pp 160-161
\textsuperscript{16} Winius, George, "Few Thanks to the King: The Building of Portuguese India" in Disney, Anthony and Booth, Emily, Vasco da Gama and the linking of Europe and Asia, OUP, 2000, pp 484-85
It is imperative from the construct above that besides the few guidelines that were given by Lisbon, the authorities at Goa functioned in their own way. As it has been noticed the focus was to grab as much wealth as they could in their three-year tenure. If we were to consider this, then is it possible to say that it was one of the reasons, which was leading the Estado to its retreat in the seventeenth century. The lines on which the VOC was organized especially did matter as the Dutch posed the greatest degree of threat to the Portuguese monopoly. The VOC was a tightly organized company and the officials did not have personal motives as we have noticed in the case of the Portuguese Estado. Moreover the authorities in Amsterdam also gave an emphasis on trade and war for they understood that they could only derive profits through these two ways.

The seventeenth century saw some changes in the functioning of the Estado da India. This was mainly due to the fact that the King gave some authority to the Viceroy to take decisions in matters of concern. The situation in the seventeenth century was overwhelmingly different and so the Estado was given liberty regarding the decisions to be taken. The correspondence from the King to the Viceroy of 16th January 1607\(^\text{17}\) clearly shows this fact. This letter is of particular importance considering how in the early seventeenth century there is already a marked change in the formulation of the policies by the King and by the Estado da India (Viceroy and Council). Earlier in the sixteenth century, the source and the initiative for policies was largely handled by the King and his advisors in Lisbon. Now with the Dutch presence asking for measures to be taken on the basis of development in accordance with “\textit{tempo for mostrando}” (the need of the moment). A second aspect of no less importance is the Viceroy resorting to the opinion of those

\(^{17}\) Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes,politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa,Tomo I,MDCCCLXXX,p.90
who have better information on the matter. This implies that within a period of one century has developed in Goa, a public opinion—surely formed by the high clergy, the members of the high echelons of the administration and the more affluent members of the trading community.

The presence of the Dutch must be also seen in a dimension that is the high margin of initiative that the Estado acquires in taking decision and implementing policies. The urgencies of one and another were motivated by the physical presence of the enemy (the VOC). A measure had to be taken and hardly anytime disposes the administration to get the clearance of the King and Lisbon. Therefore it asks for a careful evaluation of events that are going to take place with the arrival of the Dutch in Asia; and the conclusion of the peace agreement between the Portuguese and the Dutch. The giving of authority (political) to the viceroy on the matters of the East by Lisbon was a new development in this age that is thought to be of decadence (financial). Here decadence in economic aspect is seen but evolution in other aspect like political can be seen budding as early as the year 1607.\textsuperscript{18}

In a letter of 31\textsuperscript{st} January 1615, which was sent from the King to the Viceroy Dom Hieronymo (Jeronymo) d’Azevedo, the matters of the council of India are discussed. For some considerations regarding the service of Viceroy, it was decided by the Crown to abolish the Council of India. The purpose for doing was that from now on the subjects that used to be from Lisbon to the Estado da India and that were addressed to the tribunal would be from now on taken up by as follows: letters related with the Estado and the military operations will be taken up by Christovão Soares of the Viceroy’s Council and his State Secretary; matters related with granting of mercês (titles

\textsuperscript{18} Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remetidos da India ou Livros das moções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes,politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo I, MDCCCLXXX, p.74-75.
or advantages granted to someone who has rendered important service to the King) will be taken up by Ruy Dias de Meneses; those of justice to a desembargo (a judge of a higher court of justice); matters related with the treasury of the King that would be taken by the Council of the Viceroy.19

In the late sixteenth century, there was a startling administrative reform that was introduced. This was the decision to divide the Estado da Índia into three separate governments: the first one along the East African coast; the second from Hormuz to the Bay of Bengal and the third extending from the eastern Bay of Bengal littoral to Macau. In 1571 separate governors were appointed to the three sub-Estados, the first to be based in East Africa, the second one at Goa and the third one at Malacca.20 However this plan was sabotaged. There rose differences between the governor of Goa and that of Malacca that the King Dom Sebastião tried to solve. This ultimately let to the abandonment of the scheme.21

Besides these attempts, on reviewing the existing circumstances in the first two decades of the seventeenth century, a scheme to form a Portuguese Company to trade with India came into existence. At a meeting of the Spanish Council of State in Madrid, the Count of Olivares (later known as the Count-Duke), the favorite of Philip IV, gave his support for this proposal. But the Count suggested an amendment to the proposal. It said that rather than giving one person the charge to organize the Company, it would be better to give this responsibility to the governors of Portugal. This Company was finally constituted in 1628. When the Company came into existence there came into

19 Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes,politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa,Tomo III,MDCCCLXXX,pp180-181
20 Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, 1993,p122
21 Couto, Diogo do, Da Asia, Décadas IX,Livraria Sam Carlos. Facsimile of the 1777-78 Régia Oficina Tipográfica edition, Lisboa, 1973-74
being a contradiction of Olivare's original suggestion. Lorraine White has argued with regards to the failure of the Company that faction; religious bigotry and changes in administrative control triggered opposition to this Company and foreshadowed its political failure.

Thus the Estado da India had no doubt certain guidelines that it followed. But there were times when the superior authorities in the East took the decision on own. It has also been noticed that from the Viceroy to the guards, everyone who came within the ambit of the Estado, strove to gather as much wealth as they could. C.R. Boxer also takes note of the fact that the viceroyalty of Goa in the seventeenth century was still highly sought. Hence the Crown was very selective in appointing a Viceroy. The Count de Linhares, Dom Miguel de Noronha, who served, as a Viceroy from 1629 to 1635 is one such example. Noronha, when he reached Goa rather found the state of the Estado pitiful. Among the Viceroy of Goa, he is supposed to be the most successful one. His tenure of slightly over six years provides many insights into the social, economic and political situation of the period. Linhares took efforts to become familiarized with the rules and procedures. To assist him in the administration, there was a small staff that had accompanied him from Lisbon. Among it, there were his teenage son, Dom Fernando de Noronha, Pedro Barreto do Resende, the state archivist, António Boccaro and the Spanish military engineer Dom Domingo de Toral y Valdes. These personalities became well known in their own right. Nonetheless for the most part of it he had to rely on the pre-existing

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22 White, Lorraine, "Faction, Administrative Control, and the Failure of the Portuguese India Company, 1628-33" in Disney and Booth, 2000, p471
24 António Boccaro has two works to his credit viz: Historia da India and Livro das Plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e Povoações do Estado da India Oriental, which provide an ample quantity of information regarding the Estado da India.
bureaucracy that was made of individuals with personal needs and interests often different from those of the state.\textsuperscript{25} Thus the Crown had realized the importance of governance when its emissary, the Estado was facing the brunt of the VOC in the seventeenth century.

PORTUGAL AND HOLLAND: THEIR RELATIONS BEFORE 1600AD

The Iberians—the Portuguese and the Spaniards always had antagonistic relations between them. On the whole it was the mutual dislike between the two, which had bedeviled their relations more frequently from around the fourteenth century. Since both of them had intensions for overseas expansion, the hatred became more obvious with time. With the Roman Catholic Church favouring Spain, it was obvious for the Portuguese to react. In 1494, as a measure to mediate peace, the Treaty of Tordesillas was signed between the two. Its outcome was that it drew a notional line of demarcation through the Atlantic Ocean and continental South America separating the world, including the Oceans into an exclusive Portuguese zone to the East and a Castilian one to the west of the line. (See map 4)

The voyage of Magellan, however, opened the chapter again as he emphasized that the Moluccas (which was the Portuguese stronghold) lay in the extreme east of the Portuguese territory, (according to the Treaty of Tordesillas) and hence should be part of Spain. The problem was further aggravated due to vague and inaccurate maps based on Ptolemy’s concept of geography that placed the Malay Peninsula too far in the east. So important was this notion that the cartographic representation of Diego Riberia’s map of 1525 gave this impression. (See map 5) The places marked were: the southern part of the Malay Peninsula, the east of Sumatra, the north coast of Java and

\textsuperscript{25} Disney, Anthony, “The Viceroy Count of Linhares at Goa, 1629-1635” in II Semainario Internacional de Historia Indo-Portuguesa-Actas, Lisboa, 1985 p 306
Timor, some neighbouring islands, the Bay of Brunei with a small portion of
the north coast of Borneo, and the Moluccas group with the west coast of
Geilolo or Malmahera and the southern extremity of Phillipines. Thomaz
while analysing it observed, “Diogo Riberio was at the service of the Emperor
Charles V, King of Spain. Therefore he is inclined to exaggerate the breadth
of the Archipelago in longitude, so that Moluccas might fall within the
Spanish hemisphere.”

The Treaty of Zaragoza had led to a second division of the world that
was done in 1529. It divided the Asia-Pacific region into two mutually
exclusive Spanish and Portuguese spheres of interest. With the exception of
Philippines, most of the Southeast Asia fell within the Portuguese sphere.
However the Spaniards were still stubborn about the question of the
Moluccas. Their claims were based on their own interpretation of where the
Tordesillas line fell, on the other side of the world. George Winius points out
that the issue over the latitude of Moluccas had not been resolved. Moreover
it became all the more difficult when ‘longitude was almost impossible to
determine with any certainty.’ This long dispute was finally settled in 1529.
The Spanish monarch pledged his claims to the King of Portugal in return for
the loan of a large sum of money. Though this Luso-Spanish rivalry in the
Indonesian archipelago was short lived, but during its tenure, it was quite
disturbing for the Portuguese. Moluccas, as we know, were their priced
possession. Besides the Spanish had an upper hand in the overseas expansion.
Thus this conflict though short lived was crucial for the Portuguese.

The unification of Spain and Portugal took place in 1580. Between
1580 and 1600, some ambitious projects for territorial expansion were
adumbrated at Manila, Malacca and Goa in the name of the Cross or the

26 Thomaz, in Kratoska (ed.) 2001, pp53
27 Diffie and Winius, 1978, pp282

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Crown, which did not have any result. It was the indigenous polities who rivaled the Portuguese presence that became the prey of these projects. Aceh was one of them. Of the many attacks this Sumatran polity had laid on the Portuguese Malacca, the latter never succeeded in fighting an offensive war against Aceh. Dom Joao Ribeiro Gaio, Bishop of Malacca in 1584, put one detailed plan for an attack on Aceh forward. Based on the intelligence report of a certain Diago Gil, who had been a prisoner at Aceh for many years and had enjoyed a considerable freedom of movement. It described all the places from where the army could lay attack and even suggested tactics to be adopted.

The Bishop, presumably echoing his informants view stated the expeditionary force from Goa should comprise of at least four thousand Portuguese, exclusive of mariners, auxiliaries and camp followers. Moreover the said Bishop also advocated the capture of another enemy of Portugal, Johore and the recapture of Ternate. He further recommended that after these ventures; Siam, Cambodia, Cochinchina (Vietnam) and China should be conquered. Though proposals for the invasion of occupation of Aceh were discussed in Lisbon, Goa and Malacca throughout 1580’s, but all went in vain. During his stay at Goa, Linschoten noted that:

"It was long since concluded and determined by the King of Portugal and his Viceroy, that the isle of Sumatra should be conquered, and at this present there are certain captains, that to the same end have the King's pay, with the title of generals & chief captains, or Alelantado of this conquest, but

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28 Boxer, C.R., "Portuguese and Spanish Projects for the conquest of South east Asia, 1580-1600, from his own collection, Portuguese conquest commerce in South Asia 1500-1750, Variorum, Great Britain, 1990, pp119

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as yet there is nothing done therein, although they do still talk there of but do it not. 29

Again, in the 1580's, the Spaniards at Manila sent two expeditions to the Portuguese to help them retake Ternate from Sultan Kechil Babullah, but it was a failure. Patani was also in consideration of the Iberians. However it never materialized. Thus their projects remained ambitious.

The Dutch and the Portuguese enjoyed amiable relations in the sixteenth century. In Europe, the Dutch ships transported the spices and other Asian products between Lisbon and Northern Europe from the reign of Dom Joao III. Besides this, the accounts of the Dutch travellers like Dirk Gerritsen and Linschoten are full of appreciation for the Portuguese. They travelled to India in the Portuguese employment and this illustrates that the relations between the two powers were easy and cordial. The relations remained the same after the unification of Spain and Portugal but later in the seventeenth century they rather became antagonistic. On the arrival of the first Dutch ship to Asia in 1595 there seems a very little anti Portuguese motivation. The situation was such that it could become sensitive between the Dutch and the Portuguese had the latter acted on the orders of the King of Spain.

The early years of the seventeenth century however saw the Portuguese policy towards the Spanish at Manila taking a different shape. In a document of 6th march 1605 Dom Martin Affonso de Castro, the King of Portugal wrote that the Viceroy of the Estado da India, Ayres de Saldanha (1600-1605) has forbidden all trading activities with Manila on being instructed by the King. The said Viceroy informed the King that the captains of Malacca continued sending their own ships to Manila. The King in his own

interest understood that the mentioned prohibition should be maintained and
he highly recommended the said Ayres de Saldhana that those who have been
involved in such traffic must be severely punished. This document shows
that it in the early years of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese
understanding the conditions and their alignment with Spain wanted to
maintain a distance from the latter so that their own interest does not get
hampered. The punishment to be accorded to those who have been involved
shows itself that the King of Portugal was attempting to tighten the reins of
the Estado da India. Imparting such an instruction to the Viceroy on the
involvement of the captains of Malacca, which was the most important
Portuguese stronghold in Southeast Asia, does reflect the sense of insecurity,
which was being felt by the King.

But it was not too long when the trouble started. There had been many
independent voyages to the Moluccas till 1601. One of the highly successful
one was by a Captain Jacob Van Neck, of the Amsterdam Compaigne in 1601
A.D. It was during this voyage that the nuisance began. When the said
Captain reached Ternate, he learnt that the Portuguese visiting the nearby
Tidore has recently massacred the crew of a Dutch ship. To exact revenge,
Van Neck attacked Tidore, but was beaten off by the Portuguese. He tried to
make contacts with the Portuguese later in his journey but failed to do so. If
one goes by the record left by Van Neck, one would definitely get an insight
that it were the Portuguese who ignited the fire as far as their relations with
the Dutch were concerned.

Such an encounter was to have explosive results. This became very
ture soon when the Lisbon-bound Portuguese ship, Santa Catrina, was

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30 Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções,
publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes,politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das
sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo I, MDCCCLXXX, p.26-29
captioned by Jacob Van Heemskerk in June 1603. The matter was again revived when a Dutch factor, Apius, who returned to Europe via Goa revealed that except him and two others, the Portuguese had executed the whole crew. From this time onwards the Portuguese were identified in the Dutch documents as ‘the enemy’ and were lumped together with the Spaniards as if in-differentiable. Thereafter as Blusse and Winius point, the Dutch applied to their East India dealings with the Estado exactly the same formula which they applied to the Spaniards: “Do the enemy as much damage as possible” 31

THE DUTCH UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE VOC

In order to understand the conflict between the Portuguese and the Dutch, it is imperative to know the inception of the Dutch East India Company and its performa for the East. The knowledge about the functioning of the company would develop an understanding about the differences between the two and the resultant conflict. The constitution of the company was embodied in a charter adopted by the States General on 20th March 1602 by virtue of which the company came into existence. The previously existing companies at Amsterdam-Hoorn Enkhuizen, Rotterdam, Delft and Middelburg became chambers in it. Its central management was assigned to the court of Directors-Heeren XVII-consisting of seventeen delegates from the chambers. Of these, the majority consisted of those from Amsterdam (who were eight) and Zeeland (who were four). The VOC was thus purely a merchant’s combine and remained true throughout the two centuries of its existence to its commercial ideals though these could also imply military

actions to reinforce its quest of monopoly as Winius and Vink have correctly pointed. 32

The meetings of Heeren XVII were held twice a year and if further negotiations were urgent, they took place in a sub-committee, Kleine Zeventien. The directors of the chamber (the so-called bewindhebbers) took some of the decisions, but the final power vested with the seventeen Gentlemen. With the passage of time, Heeren XVII started appointing committees for treatments of various spheres. Thus four departments were distinguished: for receipts, for equipment of ships, for accountancy and for commerce. 33 The VOC as an organization was tightly organized and centralized too. The manner in which it was formed shows that there was no paucity of resources but was far better capitalized than its other European counterparts in the overseas expansion. The interest of the States General in making the Dutch Company a strong military power endowed it from its very foundation with a distinctive feature that was never obliterated. The Company was a “staat-buiten-de-staat” with its own administration, own jurisdiction, and finally also a right to make agreements with the foreign, Asiatic powers. 34

It is interesting to take note that around 1600, Amsterdam rose as a centre for trade in Europe. Thus the very foundation of the company and its motives are clear. It was structured to be a pure mercantile organization. From the charter, through which the company was secured, it was pointed that the basic motive behind its formation was to get monopoly of eastern trade. Throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, it sought zealously to maintain and safeguard this monopoly against interlopers and against any attempts at private trade by its officers. This fact is illustrated by the general

33 Glamann, Kristoff, Dutch Asiatic trade, 1620-1740, Martimes Nighoff S-Gravenhage, 1981, pp 3-5
34 ibid, p.7

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instructions given by the board of directors, Heren XVII to the Governor General in 1650. According to it; the trading options of the VOC were to be divided into three categories. These three categories were: firstly, the trade which the company enjoyed as an outcome of its own conquest, exercising its own jurisdiction, as for instance on Ceylon and to a lesser degree on the Coromandel Coast; secondly, the trade 'by virtue of exclusive contracts', giving its monopolistic rights on the local production as on the coast of Malabar; and third, the trade conducted 'by virtue of treaties', by which the Company did not occupy any special position at all and found itself only one amongst many, as in Gujarat and Bengal.\footnote{Winius, G.D. and Vink, Marcus P.M., 1990, pp10-11}

Prior to the formation of the VOC, a number of voyages that were undertaken by the Dutchmen were under the aegis of the so-called pre-companies (voorcompagniën). Captain Jacob Pietersz conducted one such itinerary. The said Captain had already visited the Coromandel Coast in 1603 before the new VOC had even had a chance to organize its own operations.\footnote{Raychaudhuri, Tapan, Jan Compagnie in Coromandel, 1605-1690: A Study in the Interrelations of European Commerce and Traditional Economies, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1962, p.15} Later on, in 1616 another route was developed on which the ships proceeded directly to Indonesia from the Cape of Good Hope. The Dutch ships made their way along the Indian coast and often touched Ceylon en route. This course of direction followed by the Dutch vessels came to be known as the 'Brouwer Route'.

It seems that the Directors of the VOC had in their minds to buy cloth from India for trading with the spices available in the Moluccas. The mace, clove and nutmegs could be obtained for silver in the spice markets of the Moluccas. But since the money economy to the east of Malacca was not yet fully developed, it seemed more advantageous for the VOC to offer cloth
instead of silver in such markets. As such the cloth from India was famous in this part of the world. The cloth from the Coromandel was bound to get the attention of the Dutch. So the balanced equation of trade between the cloth of the Coromandel Coast and the spices of the Moluccas dominated the mindset of the big whigs of the VOC. Another advantage, which the Dutch had on, this southeastern coast of India, was the absence of Portuguese strongholds. Though there were Portuguese settlements but the Portuguese here had settled privately and they generally dominated them. All these factors facilitated the establishments of factories by the Dutch for the enhancement of their trade.

The pattern of operation at the beginning of the seventeenth century was not yet developed. There was no strategic planning or even a fixed pattern of operation. According to Winius and Vink, it was more in the nature of an impromptu trading presence.\textsuperscript{37} From the experience of the pre-companies, it had figured the importance of the Moluccas, which combined the availability of the most valuable spices along with a great distance from the real centres of the Portuguese power. For an organization, which was still nascent, as far as its maritime activities are concerned the latter factor was of utmost importance. The Portuguese as we know had already been involved in such activities for a century. So for the VOC, the immediate source of peril was the Estado da India.

With its expansion and establishment in the East the Company extended this concept of monopoly to acquire as much Asian trade it could. In its early years, it developed the policy of acquiring a monopoly of certain key commodities of the network by controlling the areas of production and supply. This is best evident from Southeast Asia. The spices, which had been pivotal items of trade in the world commerce, drew their immediate attention.

\textsuperscript{37} Winius and Vink, 1990, p.12
The VOC in order to fulfil its trade requirements captured Fort Victoria from the Portuguese in 1605. This was the first effective base it had established in the Spice Islands from where it could conduct trade without the Portuguese interference. Till this time, the VOC had still not organized itself well enough for other expeditions and for establishing control. The need for a central authority to coordinate the activities was increasing. Thus in order to realise the mounting demands of the expansionary zeal, the Directors of the VOC in Holland created the post of gouverneur-generaal in 1609. The function of the gouverneur-generaal was to organize activities within the Asian part of their operation. He came to reside in and around the Malay Archipelago. After the establishment of Batavia in 1619, the Dutch capital shifted to the aforementioned place. Though it may seem that the establishment of Batavia marks the beginning of the centralization and modus operandi, but in practice it had started much before.

The foundation of Batavia as the head quarters of the VOC was also due to the fact that before the middle of the seventeenth century, the entire region west of Malacca had been identified as the Company’s Westerkwartieren. The focus was on the subordination of Indonesia and the China Seas for their trading interests. The subsequent strategy of the Company was to acquire pre-eminence in the spice trade over its English rivals and also to gain significant access to the lucrative China and Japan trades. At this point the Dutch did little more than to maintain a status quo in south Asia. The Dutch were to concentrate again on the Coromandel in the 1630’s as far as the control over the coast’s trading was concerned. In order to promote its own inter-Asian trading interests, the VOC imitated the Portuguese pas-convoy-armada system. In imitating this practice, the Dutch
motivation was less to generate revenue but to discourage competition and to concentrate the intra-Asian trade in the Company’s hands.\textsuperscript{38}

**THE BEGINNING OF THE ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY**

A charter from Queen Elizabeth I founded the Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies on 31 December 1600, following more than a year of political negotiations and finance raising. The charter named 218 subscribers to the new enterprise, which was granted a monopoly of all English trade in any lands laying east from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan—in other words, the whole of Asia and the Pacific. Spices were the spurs for this merchants' venture. They gave taste and flavour to otherwise bland foods, they were mixed, blended and distilled into medicines and perfumes, and their rarity made them extremely valuable. Trading in them offered the possibility of making a fortune.

In the first half of the seventeenth century, as seen in the above section, the Dutch policies and plans especially of J.P. Coen had made the English Company concentrate its activities in India and on developing the bilateral trade with Europe. From the middle of the seventeenth century this strategy began to pay-off, as the European market for Indian textiles expanded. This slow moving company gradually took lead over the Dutch as participants in trade both within Asia and between Europe and Asia in the eighteenth century.

The concentration of both the VOC and the English companies was in Southeast Asia, initially, especially in the insular part, which was the area of the cultivation of spices. The English were bound to follow the Dutch

\textsuperscript{38} Winius and Vink, 1990, p.16
wherever they went for the goals of both the companies were similar. So the competition with the English East India Company implied a far more serious threat to the Jan Company’s commercial interests. In 1604, the English east India Company sent its second fleet, which was commanded by Henry Middleton to the Malay archipelago. Van der Hagen commanded the Dutch fleet, which was also sent during the same time. These two fleets raced with each other at certain times to insure more gain from each other.

Prior to the beginning of the English Company’s endeavours, Francis Drake had already visited the Moluccas in 1579 during his celebrated voyage around the world. While off Motir, the governor of that island, persuaded Drake to visit the Ternate sovereign, Sultan Babu. So Drake accepted the proposal and on anchoring there, sent a message to its ruler inviting him to exchange commodities. Though it was not a matter of great relevance during that period, but later on this incident acquired an amount of significance.39

When the competition between the Dutch and the English gained pace in the Moluccas, the above-mentioned visit of Drake gathered importance. The English contended that they had a first claim to the commerce of the Moluccas on the ground that Drake had approached the ruler first for the cloves. Prior to the visit of Middleton, the Dutch had already tried to tarnish the image of the English in as early as 1596. A memoir written in 1853 by Horace St. John puts forward the situation in Bantam:

"...He Cornelius Houtman, a Dutch merchant had come to threat for alliance and claim the privileges of trade. The natives appeared were pleased with the Dutch, and warned them against the merchants of Portugal. The Hollanders as they assert, defended the people of that nation, praying that

they might not be confounded with those pirates, the English, who were already on strength of strange report hated and feared throughout that region.\(^{40}\)

The author of this account commented about the above quoted passage that whatever maybe true in these accounts, it is certain that each of the European adventurers endeavoured to supplant the other, and to secure the monopoly of the traffic.\(^{41}\) It is interesting to note that while writing in the second half of the nineteenth century, the author was not prejudiced but had a keen observation and understanding.

A correspondence from the King of Tidore to the King of England in the year 1605 pleaded the latter to help them against their old rival- Ternate. Not only this, they also desired that England and Spain should join them and help them combat Tidore who were supported by the Dutch.\(^{42}\) The Dutch had conquered the Portuguese stronghold of Amboyna in 1605. Thus they began to establish their hegemony in the Moluccas. They prohibited the English from trading in Amboyna, which was a true outcome of the principles of monopoly. The English took to the island of Ternate, whose Sultan was the successor of the prince with whom Sir Francis Drake had carried on commercial relations.

\(^{41}\) ibid
\(^{42}\) Foster, William,( The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton to the Moluccas.....1943,p.63). The letter was written as: "This writing of the King of Tydor to the King of England is to let Your Highnesse understand that the King of Holland hath sent hither into these partes a fleete of shippes to joyne with our ancient enemie, the King of Tamate; and they joyntly together have overrunne and spolyed part of our country, and are determined to destroy both us and our subjects. Nowe, understanding by the bearer hereof, Captaine Henry Middleton that your Highnesse is in frien[d]ship with King of Spaine, Wee desire your Majestie that you would take pittie of us, that wee may not be destroyed by the King(s) of Holland and Tamata, to whom wee have offered no wrong, but they by forceable meanes seek to bereave us of our Kingdome. And as great Kings upon the earth are ordaind by God to succour all them that be wrongfully oppressed, so I appeale unto your Majeste for succour against my enemies; not doubting but to find reliefe at your Majesties hands."
Unlike the Dutch, the English had no settled plan of action. The East India Company thought only in terms of separate voyages, and for a long time even the accounts of each voyage were kept in distinct. Too often the goods of the company and the general interest were sacrificed to the private quarrels of individual captains. This lack of a farsighted and vigorous policy, the meagre resources of the Company and the lack of support by the government of England made the chances of the Company’s obtaining a share of Southeast Asian trade very slight indeed. The contending Dutch company had precisely these advantages and their ultimate success against the English was certain.\(^{43}\)

The attitude of the Dutch became more hostile after 1609. As early as 1611, the English had established their factory at Masulipatnam and a little later, also opened a factory at Petapuli. ‘The Globe’, an English ship on its seventh voyage had visited Pulicat in June 1613, in the quest of trade. The Dutch did not allow the vessel to be anchored as they reminded the local authorities that they had an exclusive right on the port of Pulicat. The States General of Holland ordered the VOC to follow a friendly policy and not to obstruct the English trade. This led to the conflict between state policy and local commercial interest, which can also be observed in a one-line sarcasm- “The English would shear the sheep and we, the Dutch Pigs.”\(^{44}\) Thus, the Globe was forced by the Dutch strength to look for markets in Southeast Asia. But, they also, had to make their choice for the next best alternative like Bantam or Patani.

The Globe left for England in 1615. Between 1615 and 1619, the English could do little to improve their position in the eastern archipelago. In

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\(^{44}\) Peter Floris, pp10-12
1613, they had already established a factory at Bantam. It was an important factory and had a prospect of becoming a good stronghold in future in the archipelago. Bantam had the great export trade with China and the neighbouring islands and its nearness to the Sunda strait made it a more profitable centre for sale and purchase of goods from Aceh. Like the Dutch, the English had also suffered much, from the oppression of the Sultan. When the Dutch moved to Jakarta, the English after some delay followed their example in 1617. In 1618, the English opened a factory in Japara, then of considerable importance as it was the chief port of Mataram. In the meantime, competition with the Portuguese private traders constrained the English efforts at Makassar, while Amboyna, Bandas and Moluccas were bone of contention with the VOC.

The Dutch ships, forts and garrisons routinely obstructed English trading attempts. They were unable to offer effective counter-protection to the spice producers; indeed any promises made were soon broken and served as pretexts for Dutch reprisals against the island populations. In October 1616, in desperation at what had happened to their world, the Bandanese of Run ceded their island to the English Crown. The VOC moved from threats to open hostilities. Seven English ships were captured and a Dutch sharpshooter killed the Company's chief commander, John Jourdain, on the deck of his ship off Pattani during truce negotiations in July 1619. In the same year, the VOC's newly appointed Governor General, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, took the decision to make their small post at Jacatra, east of Bantam, the main rendezvous for Dutch trade. Javanese resistance was crushed, Jacatra was destroyed, and the castle and city of Batavia began to take shape. Batavia, now Jakarta the capital of Indonesia, became the headquarters of the VOC's operations throughout Asia, in imitation of Portuguese Goa. Ion of 8,000. Soldiers, overseas Chinese settlers, migrants
from Europe, and slaves bought in Madagascar, India and the islands poured in to create a Dutch settlement.

When in November 1617, the Dutch declared war on English in the Moluccas, Banda and Amboyna, the Company followed a policy of cautious vigilance on the Coromandel coast. There were no actual hostilities on the Coromandel for the concentration of the VOC was on the Spice Islands. In fact the Dutch factors on the Coromandel with their hands sufficiently full with the Portuguese would have preferred more friendly relations with the English.45 In a letter of 12 November 1618, General Coen wrote to the directors from Jacarta that: “It was a pity that due to the shortage of money and ships, the important trade at Surat was being neglected. Participation in this trade would have helped the Dutch against the English in the Moluccas, Amboina and Banda.” 46 As early as January 1617, the Dutch factors had been sensing the dangers they would face due to the intrigues of the English. Not only the English but also the Portuguese and the Mughal official at the port city of Surat were also the sources of worry for the Dutch. Since the concentration of the Dutch during this period was the Moluccas, the frequent intrigues by the English at the factory of VOC at Surat worsened the situation.

But a document of the VOC dated of 19th October 1617 wherein the Directors at Amsterdam wrote to De Haze at Pulicat about his approval of the plans shows a different aspect of the VOC towards the English. The Directors approved of Pulicat’s intention to reduce the size of the local garrison to one hundred and send the surplus soldiers to the Moluccas etc. This would reduce the costs at Pulicat and enable the factors to face more successfully the

45 EFI, 1618-1621, p.17
46 Om Prakash, The Dutch Factories in India 1617-1623, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1984, p.80. The documents of 5th January 1617 (p.20) and of 18th December 1617 (p.57) also hold importance with regards to the mentioned Dutch-English intrigues.
competition from the English, who were likely to begin trading in the area in the near future and who would be unencumbered by such costs.\textsuperscript{47} This document shows that in the early years the Dutch were not afraid from the English as competitors in the textile trade.

It was suggested by Franco van der Meer\textsuperscript{48} along with some others that Tegenapatam would provide a better roadstead for the Company’s ships. They even suggested the construction of a small fort at low cost. But the opinion on this subject differed and the Governor-General would communicate the final decision to Pulicat. The general policy that the Dutch were following now was not to build any more forts, particularly since the Company’s charter was due to expire in another five or six year’s time and the Director’s were still uncertain of its renewal. The factors were hence advised to keep as small a number of employees on the Coromandel Coast as possible. Notwithstanding the resultant problems caused on the Coromandel Coast, the Directors approved of the policy to permit free burghers living in the Moluccas, Amboina and Banda to operate on the Coromandel Coast. Even the closure of the factory at Petapuli was approved.\textsuperscript{49}

On the contrary, an English document suggests a different depiction. The situation that existed in the early 1618 is related by a correspondence between Sir Thomas Roe at Ahmedabad and the English Company:

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid, p.46
\textsuperscript{48} Franco van der Meer came to the East Indies on 28\textsuperscript{th} December 1610 on the \textit{Leeuw} as an upper merchant. In 1612, he became chief of the factory at Tegenapatam. He returned to Holland on 26\textsuperscript{th} February 1616 with the \textit{Zwarte Beer} but came out again as an upper merchant on the \textit{Delft} in the autumn of 1617. He arrived at Jacarta in October 1618, went to Amboina and Banda and was back in Jacarta in May 1619. On 9\textsuperscript{th} July 1619, he went to Coromandel as second-in-command and succeeded Adolff Thomasz as the head of the factory at Pulicat and the governor of Fort Geldria. He returned to Holland in October 1621, with the \textit{Woerden}.
\textsuperscript{49} Om Prakash, The Dutch Factories in India 1617-1623, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1984, p.46
“....The Dutch have spoyled Moluccoes which they fought for, and spent more then they will yield them. If quiet, in seaven yeares. Syndu you may freely goe too, lade and relade; but it is inhabited by the Portugal; lies noe way well for your stock (except you scatter it); it vents only your teeth [Ivory] and affords good cloth and many toyes. But if the sorts you have seen serve your marketts, you are nearer seated and may have what quanteties you please; and for your teeth, the marchant will fetch them at Suratt.”

The Dutch eagerness to expel the English at gunpoint checked by a contrary state policy had given place to a willingness to co-exist at a time, when the two nations were at war. There existed a conflict between state policy and local commercial interest of the Dutch though the circumstances had changed radically. The VOC was conscious of the power of its rival. So it was evidently seeking the establishment of a limited dual control on the buyer’s market, which would have eminently served their ultimate purpose of reducing the bargaining power of local supplier and eliminated the effects of powerful competition as Tapan Raychaudhuri has pointed out.

Meanwhile the English Company had finally managed to put together a large fleet of 15 ships and was prepared to challenge the VOC. But just as a naval battle was imminent, news arrived in March 1620 that agreement had been reached in Europe for the two Companies to share purchases and expenses in Asia. It reached far-away Run too late to prevent the surrender of the island to the Dutch of Banda Neira, after a siege of more than four years.
The Anglo-Dutch truce (Treaty of Defence) which was signed in Europe in the year 1619, came into effect in Asia in April 1620. Prior to this treaty, two treaties had already been signed and there were no fruitful results. In accordance with the seventh clause of the Treaty of Defence\(^{53}\), De Carpentier, Jacob Dedel and a third person on behalf of the VOC and three persons on behalf of the English company signed an agreement at Jacatra at a meeting of the Council of Defence, by which they were planning to send a ship to Pulicat for the purpose of trade. But the English were concerned with the presence of a Dutch garrison in the fort at Pulicat for \(^{54}\) they thought that the indigenous merchants might feel constrained to supply to the Dutch alone excluding the English in this manner. Among other points it was also agreed “in regard of the great blood-shed and cost, pretended to bee bestowed by the Hollanders, in winning of the Trade of the Iles of the Molluccos, Banda, and Amboyana, from the Spaniards and Portugals, and in building of Forts for the continuall securing of the same, the said Hollanders therefore should enjoy two thirds parts of that Trade, and the English the other third; and the charge of the Forts to bee maintained by taxes and impositions, to be levied upon the Merchandize.”

The following articles were agreed upon provisionally subject to confirmation by the Dutch Governor – General\(^{55}\): According to Article 1, accommodation would be provided to the English factors in Fort Geldria at Pulicat subject to the payment of the necessary rent. If accommodation could not be spared within the fort, the Dutch would arrange alternative lodgings or even have a new house built for the English. Till such an arrangement was

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\(^{53}\) According to the seventh clause of the Treaty of Defence, William Foster noted in EFI (1618-1621,p.Xliii) that: “The English Companie shall freely use and enjoy the traffique at the place of Pellicate and shall bear the moyetie of the charge of the maintenance of the fort and garrison there, this to begin from the tyme of the publication of this treaty in those parts.”

\(^{54}\) Purchas, Samuel, Purchas His Pilgrimes, The Tenth Volume, Hakluyt Society, p.507

\(^{55}\) Om Prakash, 1984, pp 157-158; also in EFI, 1618-1621, pp 253-254.
made, the English would be accommodated within this fort. Article 2 said that
the English factors would inform the Dutch what particular varieties of cloth
they desired to buy and in what quantity. If the Dutch intended to buy any of
the same kind, the goods would be bought jointly and afterwards divided in
proportion to the capital invested. Article 3 related to the English share of the
charges and the maintenance of the fort as well as the wages of the garrison
had been fixed by the seventh article of the Treaty of Defence. Additional
payment would, however, be made for any ammunition that the English might
buy from the Dutch. Article 4 was concerned with the cost of repairing any
damage to the fort would be borne jointly by the two companies. Article 5
said that the wages and the maintenance of Dutch employees exclusively
concerned with trade would not be treated as part of the expenses of the
garrison. According to Article 6 the servants of both the companies were
expressly prohibited from the private trade in cloth under penalty of the
confiscation of the goods. Article 7 was regarding the general costs; the
guidelines in clause 7 of the Treaty of Defence would be followed. Article 8
said that the English would pay the Dutch governor every month their share
of the cost of maintenance of the fort

The nature of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry by this treaty and along with
such clauses being developed made the English apprehensive about their trade
at Pulicat. Every article mentioned above was in the favour of the VOC. This
was bound to create more embitter ness between the two Companies. Though
the agreement was an important one, as far as the relations between the
English and the Dutch were concerned. But it was foreshadowed to failure. The
employees of the VOC, whatever the attitude of the masters, were unwilling
to give away entirely through a partnership, the definite advantages they had
over their rivals. General Coen, who seldom crushed matters, enquired if their
Honours in Amsterdam had been lacking in good counsel. To him, friendship
with the English was impossibility; it would mean that the Dutch "would have to quit not only Indies, but the world." 56 There followed a bitter struggle between the two companies mainly in the Indonesian archipelago and particularly around Batavia and the Moluccas. In Coromandel, there was a low-key confrontation as the English with factories at Masulipatnam and Nizamapatnam could ill-afford to enter into an armed confrontation with the Dutch, who were prosperous and relatively well supplied. In a correspondence, Matthew Duke at Petapoli to the Company dated 9th December 1618, the enraged English factor declared, "Iheis buterboxes [the Dutch] are groanne soe insolent, that yf they be suffered but a whit longer, they will make claims to the whole Indies." 57

The English were also apprehensive about this agreement. They felt that such a co-operation with a powerful rival would only mean numerous encumbrances and surrender of legitimate rights. The English Council as early as March 1622 reported to London that the partnership with the Dutch in Coromandel was working very badly and asked the home authorities to "consider whether to be free from them may not be more beneficial for your trade than to live under their subjection and take their leavings." 58

From the Treaty of Defence that was concluded between England and Holland, the Council of Defence was established in July 1619 between the two companies. This Council consisted of four Dutch and four English members. In order to inflict damage on the enemies and to promote the Dutch and the English trade on the coast of Malabar, the Council of Defence on recommendations of the representatives of the English and the Dutch Companies, and after ripe deliberations, had decided to send a fleet of nine

56 Raychaudhuri, 1962,p.104
57 EFI, 1618-1621,p.48
58 EFI, 1618-1621,p.48
ships and two yachts on the coast of Malabar and Goa. In all they would together carry 1,139 soldiers (730 on the Dutch ships and 385 on the English ships). The ships were to proceed on towards their destination without forewarning the enemy. It was thought that on reaching Goa, a word would be sent to Coromandel about the Portuguese strength so that the Portuguese on the Coromandel get inhibited with the Dutch and the English power.

The Dutch had in reality little reason to be insecure. In the pursuit of their monopoly policy they deliberately destroyed the clove plantations elsewhere in order to make Amboyana the only source for the supply of cloves. By 1623, the English finding nothing but obstructions and repeated fights, decided to close down their factories in the East. But before these orders reached Amboyana, an incident occurred which embittered relation between the Dutch and the English in the years to come. This was the famous Amboyana incident or the "Massacre of Amboyana" as is known in the documents. This was one incident among many of the extremes the Dutch went to ensure their monopoly. Ten Englishmen, after being tortured together with nine Japanese and one Portuguese, were executed on a charge of having attempted to seize the fortress of Amboyana. In spite of the agreement between the English and the Dutch this unfortunate incident took place. As part of the treaty that was signed between the two in 1619, the English East India Company had planted certain factories for their share in the trade of spices. Some of these factories were in Banda while some were in the Moluccas and the Amboyana.

From one point of view the "Massacre" was an event of world importance, for it finally convinced the English of the futility of their

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59 Om Prakash, 1984, p. 173
61 Purchas, Samuel, Purchas His Pilgrimes, Vol X, the Hakluyt Society, pp 507-521
attempts to compete with the Dutch. Moreover with this outrage all the hopes of future co-operation of the two nations in the Far East vanished. The President of the English East India Company was determined to quit Batavia where they had established headquarters in 1620 and establish now outside the Dutch jurisdiction. By the end of the year the factories at Patani, Pulicat, Siam and Hirado (Japan) had been dissolved, and the only ones left under the control of the English President and Council at Batavia were those at Masulipatnam, Achin, Jambi, Japara and Macassar.

On the Coromandel Coast, it was not found worthwhile to maintain a factory at Pulicat. The reasons given were that there was a need to reduce the expenses. Besides the textiles from the Coromandel Coast will not be required, as the English factories in the Moluccas had been closed. The Dutch at Batavia offered no objection to the proposal, though they intimated them that if the English desired to return to Pulicat, the question of the payment of the garrison would arise in period of their absence. Thus ‘the ruby’, was dispatched to Pulicat with orders for the dissolution of the factory and shifting to Masulipatnam. This ended the Anglo-Dutch partnership on the Coromandel coast.62

Thus the prominent place of the English on the Coromandel coast now shifted to Masulipatnam. Prior to the shifting of the factory of Pulicat to Masulipatnam, the latter had become a port for centralization and shipment of goods collected from the hinterland as well as the coast. William Methwold,

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62 EFI,1622-1623,pp246-247: "The shipp Rubie arrived att Pallacatt the 8th June, bringinge order for desoulvinge of this factory [i.e. Pulicat], the reasons whereof you shall understand, by the Presidents letter more large from the said Pallacatt I dispeeded this shipp Rubie the prime July and raised that factory and there inbayled 131 baylls cloth, being woven and paintings, which now suppose as, the case stands, will little advance our masters, is regard of the desoulving of all the factories in the Moluccas, beinge clothes most parte not vendable in other places, except Bantam when open (whereof in some hope). The 4th of July wee by Gods providence wee safly arived in this road of Musulapatnam."
who was in Masulipatnam between 1618 and 1622 referred to it as “the chief port of the Kingdom of Golchonda.” Anthony Schorer, around 1616 had called it the ‘most famous market on the coast’. Thus this already prosperous port city was given a new lease of life in the period following 1624. This was largely on account of the growth of the trade involving Macassar.

Macassar as will be seen in the proceeding chapters had provided refuge to the various trading diasporas who had fled from Malacca or expelled from elsewhere. The English had established a factory there in 1613. But it was not until the mid-1620’s that Macassar grew in importance largely due to its clove trade. Between 1622 and 1643, when the Dutch effectively snuffed out all sources of ‘smuggled’ cloves, the trade continued to grow apace. The English policy was to use their Coromandel factories to supply Batavia (upto 1628) and Banten (thereafter) with textiles, which were then carried to Macassar. Moreover the signing of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty in 1635 also made the Dutch apprehensive that the English were plotting with the Portuguese against them. The Dutch in their efforts to restrict clove trade of Macassar met success only after 1643 that lasted upto 1651. In this period, the English trade declined between Coromandel and the insular Southeast Asia. The combined English-Danish export of textiles to Macassar in 1646 was estimated to be only 400 bales.

Thus in this section as has been noticed till now the Dutch proved to be hostile enemies of the English in the Coromandel and Southeast Asia. So

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63 Methwold, William, “Relations of the Kingdom of Golchanda, and other neighbouring nations with the Gulfe of Bengala, Arreccan, Pepin, Tannassery, etc. and the English Trade in those Parts” in Moreland, W.H.(edt) Relations of Golconda in Early Seventeenth Century. The Hakluyt Society, London,1931, p.6
64 Schorer, Anthony, “Brief Relation of the trade of the Coromandel coast, especially at Masulipatnam, where I resided in the service of the Hon’ble Company in the seventh year” in Moreland (edt),1931,p.55
much so that an itinerant, Nathaniel Courthop to Southeast Asia observed between the years 1617 and 1618 that “the Hollanders are hated of all Nations in those parts: that they vaunt they have the Copies of the Companies Commission before any ships come forth: that no English Generall hath the King’s Commission: that they bring letters from petty Kings (which are reputed as their slaves) as of Amboyana and Hetto, with the like: that if the Bandaneses will have their Countreyes in peace, they must submit themselves to the Hollanders, for that no nation can compare with them.”

Thus the position of the Dutch as it seems from this account looks sound and strong. The success of the English trade was not only limited, but also of short duration in the first half of the seventeenth century. It was during this period that the English initiated the building of Fort St. George at Madras in 1639. This was to become the residence of their President and Council, controlling the trade of the Bay of Bengal and the one towards the further east.

Both the VOC and the English East India companies were organized on different lines from the Portuguese’s Estado da India as noticed above. While on the one hand, the Dutch East India Company and the Estado da India were at loggerheads, the English had a defensive attitude towards the Portuguese. Travelling between 1616 and 1620, Martin Pring noted that the Dutch had not only been doing wrongs with the Portuguese but with the English also. One of the Englishman, who was held as a prisoner by the Dutch in the Moluccas and had fled from there, had reported of the atrocities committed by the Dutch. If the English had met with such a treatment then what would have been the fate of the Portuguese?

The English and the Portuguese prior to the seventeenth century had amiable relations. Even in the seventeenth century when the competition

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66 Purchas, Samuel, Purchas His Pilgrimes, vol. V, Glasgow, 1905, p. 92
among the different European companies was lingering high then also the relations did not decline much. There existed a regular trade between the Iberian Peninsula and England at an early date. This is collaborated from the fact that on the 17th February, 1294, King Edward granted safe-conduct to the merchants of Spain and Portugal, to last only till the middle of the October, on condition that the Kings of Spain and Portugal should act in the same manner to his subjects.68 A letter that was being sent by the English ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe in 1619 by the Dutch to the Amsterdam reported, “the English had captured two Portuguese frigates worth over 5000 crowns.”69 There was another incident that reflected the English and the Portuguese relations. An English ship which was on its way from England to Bantam had accosted a Portuguese carrack on the Coromandel Coast and seized from it 90,000 rials. The carrack was allowed to proceed on with the remaining 400,000 rials. 70 This was the kind of the existence that the Portuguese had with the English.

Thus as it has been observed in the course of the theme above that there were different factors at work which gradually led to the diminishing of the monopoly of the Estado da India. The long established monopoly of the Portuguese was disrupted due to the fact that the Dutch East India Company (VOC) contended strongly to contain the domination of the Estado in the spice trade. One of the reasons behind the success of the Dutch Company was the way in which it was organized. The other European competitors in the scene were the English. At the end of the 16th century only, the Dutch and British interests in the region gave rise to a series of voyages: those of James Lancaster in 1591, Cornelis de Houtman in 1595 and again in 1598, Jacob van Neck in 1598, Lancaster again in 1601, and others. In 1602 the Dutch East

69 Prakash, Om, The Dutch factories in India, 1617-1623, Munshiram Manoharlal publishers pvt.ltd.1984,pp 82-83
70 Ibid, p 85
India Company (formal name United East India Company [Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie; VOC]) received its charter, two years after the formation of the English East India Company; it began to attempt to exclude European competitors from the Indies, control the trade carried on by indigenous Asian traders, and establish its own commercial monopoly.

The Dutch company's monopoly in Southeast Asia, however, was more extensive and came to form the basis of the Dutch territorial empire. Under the governor-generalship of Jan Pieterszoon Coen and his successors, particularly Anthony van Diemen (1636-45) and Joan Maetsuyker (1653-78), the company laid the foundations of the Dutch commercial empire and became the paramount power of the archipelago. It captured Malacca from the Portuguese (1641), confined the British, after a period of fierce rivalry, to a factory at Bencoolen in southwestern Sumatra, and established a network of factories in the eastern islands. Though it may have wished to limit its activities to trade, the company was soon drawn into local politics in Java and elsewhere, and, in becoming the arbiter in dynastic disputes or in conflicts between rival rulers, it inevitably emerged as the main political entity in the islands.

In acquiring territorial responsibilities, the company did not at first establish a close administrative system of its own in the areas that passed under its direct control. In effect, the VOC replaced the sovereign of the royal court and, in so doing, inherited the existing structure of authority. An indigenous aristocracy administered the collection of tribute on behalf of the company, and only gradually was this system converted into a formalized bureaucracy. The VOC, like the royal court before it, drew revenue in the form of produce from the peasantry within its domain.
To implement its commercial monopoly, the VOC established company factories (trading posts) for the collection of produce, pressured individual rulers to do business solely with the company, controlled the sources of supply of particular products (clove production, for example, was limited to Ambon, nutmeg and mace to the Banda Islands) and, in the 18th century, pushed through a system of so-called forced deliveries and contingencies. Contingencies constituted a form of tax payable in kind in areas under the direct control of the company; forced deliveries were produce that native cultivators were compelled to grow and sell to the company at a set price. There was little difference between the devices. In theory, forced deliveries were thought of as a form of trade in which goods were exchanged, but they were, in fact, as the British scholar J.S. Furnivall has described it, "tribute disguised as trade," while contingencies were "tribute undisguised." In effect, the whole system of company trade was designed to extract produce from the Indies for disposal on a European market, but without stimulating any fundamental technological change in the area's economy. The profits belonged to the company, not to the producers. The indigenous traders of the region were pushed aside by the VOC as it gained control of more and more of the export trade of the archipelago. The growth of Batavia resulted, for example, in the decline of the north coast ports of Java, through which much of the spice trade had been channeled since before the 15th century. In this way the traditional pattern of trade was checked and distorted.

Thus the Estado da India was bound to suffer. The relations of the Portuguese with Spain also contributed to the hostility between the Portuguese and the Dutch. The Dutch bought the indigenous polities to their help against the Portuguese. In the meantime the Portuguese had themselves started realizing the factors that were leading to their gradual decline of their domination. Sanjay Subrahmanyam has pointed that there was only a limited extent to which the Portuguese could follow the Dutch model. For firstly, they
had an elaborate local apparatus in place in the form of the Estado da India, which included designated cities with municipal chambers, and all sorts of sovereign claims, which could not be simply be added over to a Company. The state in Portuguese Asia already existed; one could not create a Company that would also be a quasi-state, as was in the case of the VOC. Besides the Portuguese even thought of creating a Company on similar as that of Dutch in as early as 1618! So much so that the King of Portugal even instructed the Viceroy to maintain healthy relations with the indigenous polities. Besides the giving of the power to take decisions for immediate affect were given to the Viceroy by the King of Portugal. The authorities at Lisbon had understood the situation and were acting accordingly. Thus the Portuguese by taking such measures were trying to prevent the retreat. On the other hand the way the other European companies were composed were the cause of trouble for the Estado da India.