CHAPTER V

THE DECLINE OF THE PORTUGUESE SETTLEMENTS ON THE COROMANDEL COAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA (1642-1662)

The decline of the settlements of the Estado da Índia on the Coromandel Coast and Southeast Asia was an important development that gradually led to the establishment of the Dutch hegemony in Indonesia and the English one on the Coromandel Coast. In the previous chapter we have already noticed the factors that led to the retreat. In the period before the capture of Malacca by the Dutch, Syriam, Hormuz and Pulicat had already slipped out of the hands of the Portuguese. It was in the 1630’s that the decline gained momentum from where there was no looking back. In spite of the measures that the Portuguese Crown had taken, nothing seemed to bear a consequence. Perhaps the very structure of the Estado da Índia was responsible for this decline. The Anglo-Portuguese agreement can be counted among the very few positive aspects to the 1630’s from the Portuguese viewpoint, relieving them of the burden of having to combat at least one adversary. Dom Miguel de Noronha, Conde de Linhares, who was the Viceroy between the years 1629 and 1635 made attempts to stall the Portuguese retreat but to no avail!

The understanding of the ‘whys’ behind the decline of the Portuguese settlements has already been studied in the previous chapter. As has been understood in the previous chapter, the factors within the Estado were responsible for the rapid decline of the Portuguese settlements that was being witnessed in the seventeenth century. The King of Portugal had instructed the Viceroy at Goa to take measures that he had suggested. However these measures were of no help, as they did not facilitate the Portuguese in overcoming the enemy. In the period of the concern in this theme, an attempt
would be made to develop an understanding and try to relate the process of the decline of the Portuguese settlements. Though the retreat of the Portuguese started much earlier than 1641, but in the context of this chapter the decline of the Portuguese settlements is concerned in the perspective of the rapid decline of settlements after 1641.

THE RETREAT

The year 1641 was a turning point in the history of the Estado da India. The most important port of the Portuguese, Malacca was no more under their occupation. The capture of Malacca however did not end the Portuguese and the Dutch colonial rivalry, but saw a beginning of a new phase with respect to it. This phase saw a rapid decline of the Portuguese settlements on the Coromandel Coast as well as Southeast Asia. This chapter of the rivalry began with the proclamation of the ten-year truce between Portugal and Holland in February 1642 in Asia although the truce had already been signed in Europe in November 1641. Though both the sides were to maintain peace for the next ten years, but the hostilities continued. By this time, the Viceroy at Goa, the Count de Aveirias, had at least made an attempt to persuade the

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1 As Philip Baldaeus (Baldaeus, Philip, A Description of the East India, coast of Malabar and Coromandel and also of the isle of Ceylon with their adjacent kingdoms and provinces, Asian Educational series, 200, pp 615-616) noted it was: “a firm Alliance and Truce has been concluded for 10 years betwixt the most Potent Dom John IV, King of Portugal, Algver, and Lord of Guinea, and of the conquests made on the shores of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India, on one side, and their High and Mightiness the States General of the United Provinces on the other side, including all the before mentioned Kingdoms, Countries, Provinces, Islands, and other places on both side of the Equinoctical Line (without exception) all such as now actually are, or for the future maybe under the Jurisdiction of the said King and States-General; during which space of ten years successively all Hostilities betwixt their respective Subjects shall cease both by sea and Land, without limitation or exception of any Places, Persons or Circumstances, as by the Articles of the said Truce, does more amply and fully appear. It is therefore that we are commanded to cease all manner of Hostilities from this day for next succeeding ten years, according to which all our subject shall regulate themselves, and to take effectual care that nothing may be transacted any wise contrary to the true intent of the Articles of the said alliance and Truce, but to maintain the same fame inviolably. And that nobody may plead ignorance in this case, but have ordered these Presents to be published enjoying everybody under severe Penalties, not to infringe any of the before mentioned Articles, as they will answer, the same at their peril.”
Dutch to accept a local truce to Asia. However the Dutch refused to do so since each passing month enabled them to press forward in their attempt to gain ground in Sri Lanka and elsewhere.²

The Portuguese as is known were succumbing to the attacks by the Dutch due to the lack of finance as well as its administration was becoming incapable of organizing a coherent overall strategy. Thus if one keeps these aspects in mind, Malacca was bound to be seized by the VOC. Besides the Dutch success and failures depended on local conditions that is whether the indigenous polities supported their cause or not. In the taking over of Malacca the VOC had the support of Johore, which was the crucial factor in the seizure of the port-town.³ The Dutch Council at Batavia acknowledged this event while writing to the Heren XVII in July, 1675: “We must continue to remember that the Johorese contributed substantially toward the conquest of Malacca. Without their help we could have never become masters of that strong place.”⁴ The VOC also enabled Johore to build up its trading network at the cost of Aceh between the years 1641 and 1680. Thus the rewards for assisting the VOC in the capture of Malacca were truly worthwhile for Johore.

The fall of Malacca was the last major episode in the string of reverses that extend from Syriam, through Hormuz and Hughli, to Japan and the Sri Lankan east coast ports. The Estado, in the 1640's enjoyed a relative respite not only from the Dutch but also from their Asian adversaries.⁵ With the implementation of the ten-year truce, the fact remained that the Dutch did not cease their hostilities. When the Portuguese in a council meeting held at Goa,  

² Subrahmanyan, Sanjay, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700, Longman, 1993, p.175  
³ This is elaborately dealt by Leonard Y. Andaya in his “Kingdom of Johore 1641-1728”, OUP, 1975  
⁴ ibid, p.35  
⁵ Subrahmanyan, 1993, p.175
on the third of October 1642, decided to send a ship to Batavia to make the
truce known to them, they met with a hostile reception. This is noted
particularly in a letter from the Assentos dos Conselho dos Estado -

"Father Frei Goncalo Sao Jose in order to make known to
the Dutch superior authority that had its head quarters
there, to inform him that his Majesty was wishing to observe
it. And that due to the bad weather conditions the ship was
not able to leave up to 26th September; when having arrived
at the entrance of this port seven Dutch ships; They with the
purpose to conduct military operations against us and, as in
the previous year, to harm us as much as possible. And are
not disposed to accept the suspension of hostilities and
having declared that they had in mind to conduct acts of war
and plunder as it has taken place in the previous years."

As far as the Coromandel Coast was concerned, a Dutch fleet was sent
in April 1642 on a plunder raid to the Portuguese settlement at Nagapattinam.
As is known, Nagapattinam was a bigger settlement of the Portuguese and had
been an important center for trade since the early days. However this raid was
held off only because of the intervention of the Nayak of Tanjavur. This
implied that the indigenous polities still had a role to play in the struggle of
the European companies on this coast. A similar incident occurred in 1649 at
the Portuguese settlement of Tuticorin, which was located on the Fishery
cost in the territory of the Nayak of Madurai. The Nayak willingly checked
the forces of the VOC.

In the period during which the negotiations for the implementation of
the ten-year truce were going on, the Portuguese were still optimistic about
the positive attitude and behavior of the VOC towards the Estado. An

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influential fiscal officer and later adviser to Dom João IV, José Pinto Pereira, who wrote to the Crown from Goa in March 1644 shows this optimism in his letter:

"The state of affairs teaches and tells us that the most healing remedy for now is Your Majesty to go along with and adjust with this nation [Holland] tolerating their deceits, double dealing and frauds, for it is thus that I believe one can check the luck they enjoy, and the greatest war one can make is to enter into a peace with them...for once trade is free, it is a force that will weaken their trade, and also the force which [you] have; which is of no less importance; and our trade will expand, the custom houses will begin to yield[money], the royal revenues will increase, [your] subjects who are finished and consumed by the robbery and piracy practiced by this enemy, the reason for his greater expansion, will thrive."\(^7\)

After the conquest of Malacca there was a desire on the part of the Dutch to normalize the trade, which had been disrupted by the long siege of the entrepôt. Passes were freely issued from Indian factories to Malacca and orders were placed to stop the place with goods that would be desired by the merchants. The other policy followed by the VOC areas was to achieve monopolistic aims through their commercial policies. In the context of Malacca, it implied Dutch control of the main articles of import and export with the view to dictate prices.\(^8\) The Dutch were also trying to force the traders to call only at Malacca to transact their business. They also decided on a policy of exclusive contracts with Malay rules to monopolize trade. Thus

\(^7\) Boxer, C.R., "Portuguese and Dutch colonial rivalry,1641-1661", Studia 2, 1958,p.18

the policy which the Dutch started following in these eastern waters was monopolistic in nature.

Besides this in Southeast Asia, the Dutch also signed treaties with the indigenous rulers. With the Sultan of Kedah, it was signed on 18th June 1642 whereby half of the tin produced or imported in Kedah was to be sold to the Dutch at a fixed price. A year later a similar treaty, was signed with the overlord of Junk Ceylon (Phuket). In this treaty, the ruler promised not to allow any traders from Kedah, Perak, Java, Coromandel, Bengal and other neighbouring places unless they had the Dutch passes and had sojourned at Malacca besides paying the tolls there. With the governor of Bangery, a treaty was signed in 1645 which implied that all the tin found in the state was to be delivered to the Dutch.

The Sultan of Johore who had helped the Dutch in the latter’s conquest of Malacca, had fallen out with them around 1645. He was trying to establish a port to rival Malacca. The Raja of Kedah made several requests to the Governor of Malacca for issuing a pass to sail to the Coromandel but was repeatedly refused. The sale of cargoes brought from Coromandel in the markets of Southeast Asia, which comprised of cloth, was affected by the Dutch policies. The merchants who traded in them had to pay a heavy toll tax of 10% on cloth. As we know prior to the Portuguese monopolization of this market of Coromandel clothes in Southeast Asia and subsequently also, the keling merchants were the ones who were largely involved in this trade. During the Portuguese period besides they had enjoyed great privileges and they belonged to the esteemed lot due to the help they provided to the Portuguese in settling down in this trading world. So exacting such high duties on the part of the VOC on the merchandise from Coromandel was to disturb this long-existing trade as well as the merchants involved in it.
Though there was some relief granted in it, but the merchants always complained of the tariff policy.

Though the Dutch tried to adopt measures of restrictions in case of the indigenous rulers, at the same time were hostile to other European powers. The Portuguese were one of them. At the council meeting held at Goa on 6th of February 1642, the Viceroy informed the members who were present that:

"he has been informed through different sources, that the Dutch enemy was preparing itself to attack some of the pracas (military installations) of Colombo, Jaffna, Manar and Saint Thomas and for this purpose have left from Batavia. Six naus and from those that are outside this port have left for to join them and on their way they were in a position to create some damage to the fortress of Canara, Cannanor or Cragnaore, if the opportunity raised they would not miss it. Thus the need of the anticipated the needed help."9

The places mentioned in the document actually became the scene of conflicts between 1642 and 1662. One after the other they succumbed to the Dutch pressure. So the Dutch had already decided their plan of action which was effectively put into practice later.

Although the VOC’s sphere of activity extended across the Indian Ocean but it was only in certain regions that they were able to exercise effective monopoly. In Sir George Downing’s word, who served as an English envoy at Hague at the outbreak of the second Anglo Dutch conflict, it was ‘mare clausam’ in the eastern waters. This meant that the Dutch took

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measures in the east to carve out sections of the sea and the traffic therein for themselves to the exclusion of other European and Asian traders.\textsuperscript{10} We have already noticed in the previous section that the Dutch had vigorously assaulted the Portuguese monopoly in Southeast Asia as well as on the Coromandel Coast. They disposed off the Portuguese claims and set to enunciate the principles on which restrictions of various kinds were put.

A good review of their position can be visualized by the general instructions compiled by the Hereen XVII. This was meant to be the guideline for the Governor General and his council at Batavia and was issued in 1650. The Hereen XVII explicitly recognized that the Company’s trade in Asia could be divided into three categories: firstly, trade in regions where the VOC exercised unchallenged territorial control by right of cession or conquest. In 1650 these places were limited to a few islands in the Moluccas and some of the fortified trading settlements like Batavia, Malacca and Pulicat. Secondly, regions where the VOC enjoyed exclusive trading rights due to monopoly contracts negotiated with the indigenous polities such as the sultan of Ternate and the village headman of Amboyna. Thirdly, trade conducted by virtue of treaties with the rulers ‘both on the basis of freely negotiated agreements as well as on the basis of free trade alongside merchants of all other nations.’\textsuperscript{11}

The years between 1641 and 1680 represent the height of the Dutch maritime influence in the Asian waters. As far as macro-region of this study is concerned, by 1662, the Dutch had conquered most of the important niches. On the Coromandel coast Nagapattinam and Tuticorin were captured in 1658 and the conquest of the Coromandel Coast was over with the capture of São Thomé in 1662. Their other concern in the Bay of Bengal, Ceylon had met a similar fate. Soon after the Dutch take over of Malacca, they seized the

\textsuperscript{10} As cited in Boxer, C.R.,1965, p.92
\textsuperscript{11} Boxer, 1965,p.94
Portuguese strongholds of Galle (1641), Negombo (1642), Colombo (1656) and Jaffna (1658). This cinnamon-producing island was also in the Dutch sway. Thus the seizure of so many Portuguese settlements shows that the VOC was not an easy rival for the Estado da India to combat.

Regarding the Dutch, the captain of the English ship, expedition, commented that the trust the English company will not be-

"again circumvented by that politick nation, who aspire to the sole trade of India, especially that of spice, which the better to compass, they have for these four months invested in Colombo on Zealon with a straight siege, by sea and land assaulted it, and entered the city, but were suddenly beaten back with great loss; also four of their ships[lost] by fowle weather there; which have been recrewted from Paleacatt [with] much provision, the siege still continuing, and tis thought they [will go] neere to carry it at last by storme, the Portugall having not eq[ual forces] to oppose or strength by sea to relieve it. And for Amboyana, tis wholly reduced to obedience; and Maccassers utterly routed [with] great slaughter of their people."

The above statement made by the English Captain shows the very presence of the VOC in Southeast Asia. The assaults on the Portuguese settlements are clearly discerned from this statement by the contemporary English captain.

In the light of the ongoing discussion on the retreat of the Portuguese in seventeenth century, one cannot forgo two aspects—the strains felt by carreira da Índia and subsequently the vicissitudes of the Portuguese enterprise in the Atlantic world. As early as the 1620’s, the Portuguese had

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12 Foster, William, The English Factories in India, 1655-1660, Oxford, 1921, p.45
started feeling the strain in the Indian Ocean world due to the presence of the other European powers. It was becoming increasingly difficult for the Portuguese to maintain the claims of a monopoly over the trade between Europe and the East. Some Portuguese even proclaimed to have lost command of the sea to the Dutch. Of the sixty ships that left Lisbon in 1620's, only nineteen of them arrived back. According to Newitt, this disparity shows the strain which during this decade was being felt in all parts of the carreira. The principal problem regarding this strain has been pointed out by him as the problem of finance. So there was a problem of equipping the fleets which the Casa da Índia was facing. Another concern for the carreira da Índia was the establishment of an overland messenger service due to which the dispatches could move swiftly between Goa and the Iberian peninsula without falling in the hands of the Dutch.

The ever increasing number of the Dutch, English and French plying on the Asian sea routes proved to be an immense threat to the security of the Portuguese century-old establishments. Further, as we have already noticed the structure of the vessels of carreira da Índia. The náo, or carrack, plying the route from Europe to India and thence to Malacca, China, and Japan had antecedents in the Italian merchant vessels of the later Middle Ages, but the Portuguese had placed their own imprint on them. They grew to be unmanageably large and heavy to the point of disaster with time. Pyrard de Laval pointed that in seamanship, the Portuguese were seriously handicapped in the struggle with the Dutch and the English. The experience of a whole century of annual voyages had not taught them the virtues of small and handy ships, such as were at that time

13 Disney, Anthony, Twilight of the Pepper Empire. Portuguese Trade in South-West India in the Early Seventeenth Century, Harvard University Press, 1978, p 65
14 Newitt, 2005, p223
used by the English and the Dutch discoverers. Besides, the Portuguese ships were lightly laden by arms in comparison to Dutch and English ships.

With the onset of the Dutch and English companies in the network of commerce of the Indian Ocean, the previously safe anchorages starting from the western African coast like St. Helena now became hide-outs for the enemy ships of the Portuguese. Madeira, the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands, which were on the main Atlantic shipping routes, were also easy prey to the enemy ships. Besides the founding of the Dutch West India Company in 1621 also threatened the Portuguese fortresses in west Africa. So it became pertinent for the Portuguese to look for a solution. The key came in the form of the 'Atlantic turning'. The lands across the Atlantic gave solace to the Estado da Índia in the seventeenth century. Brazil was already under the Portuguese occupation in the sixteenth century. Now the Portuguese started concentrating more on colonization of Brazil especially after 1640.

Another point observed by Newitt is that the Dutch military and the naval victories did not weaken the Estado da Índia so much as the encouragement given by the Dutch to the indigenous states of Asia to break free from the Portuguese control. This fact has been well-noticed both on the Coromandel and insular Southeast Asia. In the seventeenth century there were many indigenous polities who due to the above mentioned region started siding with the Dutch. However they did not realize that the pretensions of the Dutch were similar to those of the Portuguese. They just swayed with the advice of the Dutch without realizing the consequences.

During the decade of the 1630's, the misguided optimism of the Estado quickly evaporated in the light of frequent attacks at the choke-points of commerce.

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16 Winius, George D., Studies on Portuguese Asia, 1459-1689, Variorum Series, Ashgate, 2001
which were under the Portuguese monopoly. The prolonged blockade of Goa from 1635 to 1642 and the recurrent sieges at Malacca by the Dutch almost ruined the carreira da Índia. From 1638, the structure of the Estado started crumbling evidently. When Peter Mundy arrived at Malacca in January 1638, the population of Malacca was in a state of panic. In Mundy’s words:

“The people her in perplexity on report off the Hollanders comming to beesiege them, who this year had taken and burnt many many off their vessels and Destroyed much people. Besides, not long since there were sentt From hence aboutt 200 souldiers to Goa to look there For their pay, because there was no Mony For them, Nor scarce Meat to bee had For their Mony; All things Dear and the Inhabitants in Fear.”

Thus this was the state of Malacca three years before it was captured by the Dutch. The misery of the populace is quite evident from Mundy’s writing. Another definable aspect about which we have already referred to in the Chapter IV of the thesis is the position of the soldiers. As it is well-known, Portuguese Asia lacked manpower. The sending of the two hundred soldiers to Goa to procure their pay as noted by Mundy, also shows the paucity of funds. Thus the Estado’s retreat had already set in.

Between 1638 and 1642, all the forts on the coast of Ceylon except Colombo and Jaffna; the ending of Japan trade and the fall of Malacca to the Dutch occurred. This was nothing but the setting of disaster on the Estado. Though the authority had already been granted to the Council of State by the King to act according to the ‘tempo por mostrado’ [that is according to the need of the time] in


The decline of the Portuguese power in Malacca dated from 1606 when the Dutch Admiral Cornelis Matelief gained a victory over their fleet in the Straits of Malacca. From that time Malacca was continually besieged by the Dutch, with varying success, till the city at last fell into their hands in 1641, the final siege having lasted nine months.
the second decade of the seventeenth century, but it seems that it was not brought much into use. In 1643, the King took this responsibility back from the Council and constituted Concelho Ultramarino to focus on decision-making. As far as sending of more forces from Lisbon was concerned, it could not be done. So the Estado having limited option had to survive on its own which in actual it had been doing by borrowing funds from Misericordias and Bishoprics.

MACASSER AND THE LESSER SUNDA ISLANDS

Most of the insular Southeast Asia had come under the Dutch occupation by the second half of the seventeenth century. Macassar, which was one of the main markets of spices was the only one left on the eastern part of the archipelago, which was still out of the ambit of the Dutch control. Located at south Celebes, this had been a land where ships from Manila, Goa, Macao, England and Holland. Friar Domingo Navarette who was on his voyage to this part of the world in 1657-58, commented that “abundance of rich Commodities were brought thither from all parts of the Archipelago, and Trade enrich’d the Country, making its Sovereign powerful.”

This port had grown important after the capture of Malacca by the Dutch in 1641. When the Portuguese took over Malacca, many Muslim merchants migrated to Macassar. The attack by Achen on Johore and later on the Dutch blockades at Malacca drove Malay and Javenese traders and also Portuguese eastwards to Macasser that soon became a great center of shipping. The Portuguese began to trade with Macasser in the second half of the sixteenth century on a regular basis. The popularity of the Coromandel and Bengal cloth was encashed here by the Portuguese in lieu of rice and slaves besides spices and rials.

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18 Cummins, J.S. (edt), The Travels and controversies as of Friar Domingo Navaratte, Volume I 1618-1686, p113

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As early as 1601, the Dutch had established a factory here, but when their treaty expired in 1619 the Sultan of Macassar did not renew it. Sanjay Subrahmanyam has pointed that several of the concession voyages from the Coromandel Coast to the Moluccas suffered after the Dutch capture of Ambon and Tidore (1605). Hence from about 1610, the Portuguese had to resort increasingly to the port of Macassar from where the cloves and other spices were brought in the face of the Dutch opposition. But there was no regular concession route developed as its terminus. Also, Macassar looked to the Portuguese, English, Danish and Chinese traders for support and indeed these traders flocked to Macassar in ever increasing numbers to escape the heavy duties levied at either at Malacca or Batavia. An English merchant traveling in 1625 rightly pointed that the Portuguese looked upon Macassar as a second and better Malacca and "held themselves as safe as if they had no enemies in India, since they never once been attacked there." Thus Macassar had substantial importance which was to grow more after 1641.

The Portuguese on their expulsion from the Moluccas had used Macassar as a base for trading in cloves, sandalwood and other Indonesian products, under the protection of the tolerant Muslim rulers of Gowa and Tallo, and in defiance of the monopolistic claims of the Dutch East India Company with its headquarters at Batavia since 1619. Prior to this when the

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20 Subrahmanyam, 1993, p141
22 The Kingdom of Makassar at time of Portuguese expansion in the Asian seas comprised the two kingdom of Gowa and Tallo. Portuguese merchants frequented Makassar (Ujung Pandang) intermittently during 16th century, but were only after the Islamization of the Makassar's Kingdom (1600s,) that there presence growth. The Portuguese during the 17th century used Makassar as a commercial center for the silk, the cloves, the textiles, the sandalwood and the diamonds. In 1620s. There were regularly as many as 500 Portuguese merchants that frequented the port of Makassar, they traded here in safety and the Sultans, that were fluent in Portuguese, gave aid and confort to them. The friendly relations between Makassar and Portugal were strengthened by their common attempts to stop the Dutch power in the Moluccas and Sunda islands. The prosperity of Makassar greatly incresed after the fall of Malacca in Dutch hands (1641), when many Portuguese merchants immigrated to Makassar. In 1650s, the Dominicans founded a church in Makassar. In 1660, there were about 2,000 Portuguese residents in the town; they lived in their own residential area called Portuguese quarter.
Portuguese had occupied Malacca in the sixteenth century, many Muslim merchants had migrated to Macassar. Achinese attacks on Johore and the blockade of Malacca of the Dutch led Javanese and Malay traders to this southern market of Sulawesi. Thus Macassar had been associated to give refuge to the ones expelled no matter whether they were Portuguese or expatriate trading communities or the indigenous lot. The disruption of the spice trade in the Moluccas by the Dutch made it a more approachable center for the procurement of spices. Moreover new production centers developed in the small islands of Ambelau and Manipa, where Macassar traders could more easily buy the cloves without being detected by the Dutch.\textsuperscript{23}

Fray Sebastein Maurique, travelling between 1629 and 1643 noticed that during Emperor Sumbanco’s tenure, the Portuguese had taken shelter in Macassar.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover after the said King’s death, his successor Prince Carrim Liquio was to remain with a regent called Carrim Patingoloa who was a Portuguese. Born in Macassar and a follower of Islam, this regent, in Maurique’s words was “in actual practice and in zeal for increasing the lustre of the Portuguese name he could hold his own with those most eager and anxious for the common good and the enhancement of our country’s glory.”\textsuperscript{25} It seems that the said regent was too impressed with the Portuguese and so he wanted to attain glory by doing such an act.

The Dutch took Malacca in 1641. Navarrete observed that “when the Dutch took Malaca, most of the Portugueses, the Mungrels, and all others

\textsuperscript{24} Luard, C.Eckford (trans), Travels of Fray Sebastein Maurique, (1629-1643) Vol.II: China, India, etc., Hakluyt Society, London, 1927 pp.79. In Maurique’s words—“he has been a real father to all the Portuguese who reached his shores in a distressed condition, aiding and assisting them all with paternal solicitude.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
who serv'd them, retir'd to this Country."^{26} The King received them and assigned them a place to live. By the time Navarrete reached Macasser there was a considerable population of the Portuguese. Not only this, he also saw Malays at this town besides an ambassador from the Nawab of Golconda. According to Navarrete there were no charges levied for anchorage at the port or any other duty. The captains of the ships as well as the merchants bestowed gifts to the Sumbane (the King) and thus all trade that they did with this part of the world was free. So much so that "this made it the universal Mart of those parts of the World."^{27}

Thus Macassar provided immense support to the Portuguese. The Portuguese on their behalf also maintained amiable relations with the Sumbane. When Macassar was engaged in conquest of Boni, Sambawa, Xulla isles and Butung they came in contact with the Dutch power in 1665 at the latter's establishment at Buntung; Macassar had destroyed the establishment in an effort to conquer Buntung. The Dutch determined to take revenge sent a powerful force against the Macassars in 1660. The Portuguese^{28} in 1620 had assisted Macassar while Macassar's enemy, Boni, was assisted the Dutch. After a long siege, the ruler of Macassar, Hassan Udin, capitulated and accepted the Treaty of Bongaya in 1668. Thus the VOC ultimately secured a monopoly of the trade in Macassar and insisted that all non-Dutch traders could be compelled to leave the city.

Prior to the capture of Macasser, the Dutch were forced to mount two major expeditions against it. The first one was in 1660 followed by another in 1669. It was only after these expeditions that the Dutch could oust the Portuguese from Macasser. In the expulsion of the Portuguese from Macasser,

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^{26} Cummins, J.S. (ed), The Travels and controversies as of Friar Domingo Navaratte, Volume I 1618-1686, pp. 113-114

^{27} ibid, p. 114

^{28} Crawfurd, Vol.II, p338
it was not solely the effort of the Dutch East India Company. The English and the Danish East India Companies had also sent their representatives to help the VOC. This further implied that Macasser was another place besides Malacca where the hold of the Portuguese was strong. Among the other Portuguese settlements where the Dutch or the English Companies were not able to make inroads was Macao on the south China Coast and in the innermost Islands of the Lesser Sunda Group that is- Timor, Solor and Flores-in Indonesia.

In the Lesser Sunda Group of islands, Timor was known for supplying of fragrant sandalwood of both white and yellow variety. It was the main source of supply for the markets on the Coromandel but also in China. After the conquest of Malacca in 1511, it was not until fifty years later that the Portuguese had made their first proper settlement in the Lesser Sunda Group of islands. After that it was not actually Timor but the neighboring Solor that became the center of activities. The Fathers of the Dominican Order laid the foundation of this center in 1566 by building a stone fortress. There grew a settlement round this fortress that comprised of the native converts, and the offspring of the Portuguese soldiery and sandalwood traders from Malacca and Macao who intermarried with the native women. This mixed race that came to exist was known as ‘topasses’. It was at Solor that trade and conversions were centered around. As far as Timor was concerned, the Portuguese only visited the island to collect the sandalwood.

The Dominicans on their arrival to the Lesser Sunda Islands had concentrated on the conversion of the local rulers on the coasts in order to

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30 Boxer, 1948, pp 173-175
gain their support. In a correspondence of 11th December 1606, the King of Portugal wrote that the Bishop of Malacca had written to him that the Fathers of the Order of St. Domingos had settled Christians at Solor and Hende. Referring to the previous century, he said there were many churches. The said Bishop requested the King to send religious to the Lesser Sunda Islands. Again in a letter of 15th October 1606 it was requested to the King that the Dominicans be approached so that as many religious can be sent in their naus, considering the necessity of the state. In this way the service to the God could be continued.

The Portuguese domination in the Lesser Sunda Islands had been there since the early days of the Estado. They had first sailed to these remote islands in search of the sandalwood that grew in abundance. Since 1561, the Dominicans had maintained a precarious presence at first on Solor. Larantuka, on the island of Flores was the next place to occupy their attention in 1613. Eventually it was Timor that gained their interest in the course of time. The most interesting fact is that the Estado never controlled these islands directly but indirectly through the Dominican Order. The Dominican missionaries were the ones who with their activities controlled these islands. The Portuguese frequented these islands for the purpose of trade. The Dominican influence was so much so that the inhabitants fought against the Dutch.

31 Villers, John, “As derradeiras do mundo: The Dominican missions and the sandalwood trade in the lesser Sunda Islands in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries” in II Semainario Internacional de Historia Indo-Portuguesa-Actas, Lisboa, 1985
32 Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes,politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo I, MDCCCLXXX, pp. 158-159
The growth of the Dutch power in this micro-region seemed to grow in the second decade of the seventeenth century. Antonio Pinto de Fonseca\textsuperscript{33} had delivered the information to the Viceroy about the arrival of the Dutch at Malacca. In the correspondence between the King of Portugal and the Viceroy, Conde de Redondo dated 18\textsuperscript{th} March 1619, according to the information of Fonseca, the Dutch had arrived at Solor. There had to be a decision taken to send to Solor “some soldiers and ammunitions”. Thus the Crown instructed the Viceroy to act and adopt measures in the shortest possible period of time as the situation permitted.\textsuperscript{34}

Thus in one of the proceeding correspondences, like in a letter of 6\textsuperscript{th} February 1620, which was corresponded between the Governor Fernão de Albuquerque and the Viceroy, the Viceroy had instructed Antonio Pinto de Fonseca to send ships from Malacca to Solor with a Dominican priest, as there were no ships available at Goa at that time. The aim was to send foodstuffs. In the last part of the letter the Governor expressed the opinion that: since the Dutch have consolidated their position in Solor, it was beyond the possibility of the Estado to send to the island a powerful naval unit. It was thought to be more advisable to maintain contacts with the Portuguese in the island as well as with the Christians and the priests through periodical visits of light ships carrying food stuffs and “maintaining highly the spirit of this segment of Christians isolated from the Motherland.”\textsuperscript{35} Thus the Portuguese had well understood their position in Solor.

\textsuperscript{33} Antonio Pinto da Fonseca was well-known figure in the seventeenth century. In 1611, he held the position of the Provedor and Visitador of the fortresses of Malacca.

\textsuperscript{34} Antônio da Silva Rego, Documentos Remetidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes,politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa,Tomo VI, MCMLXXIV, p 11

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., pp 11-13
As far the administration of the Estado in these islands was concerned, John Villers noted that the establishment of the Portuguese administration beyond the walls of the fortalazes which the Dominicans and later the Portuguese military authorities set up successively in Solor, Flores and Timor was never seriously or systematically undertaken. This was because of the extraordinary degree of antagonism to their presence that the Portuguese encountered especially in Timor. In the first quarter of the sixteenth century, the captain of the fort of Timor was chosen by Dominicans prior at Malacca subject to the confirmation of his choice by the Captain of Malacca. So much so that the Portuguese settlements in these islands were not even officially listed as parts of the Estado da India till 1681!

But after the capture of Malacca by the Dutch, at a council meeting held at Goa on 25th November 1642, the Dominican priests requested the Viceroy to permit them to travel in a Dutch ship to Solor. This is an interesting fact because the priest now sorts the permission of Goa. Prior to this they acted as autonomous body of power. Also the document gives a clear idea of the decline of the Portuguese Empire beyond Malacca. It also shows a growing initiative taken by the individuals and in this case the members of the

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37 Pissurencar, S.S. (ed.), Assentas do conselho do Estado, Tripagria Rangel, Bastora - Goa, 1956, Doc: 137, vol. IV, pp.380-381.The letter gives a clear idea of the state of affairs of the Portuguese: “It was proposed that the Dominican religious that had submitted a request in which have declared that with the purpose of giving assistance to the Christians of Solor, that were entrusted to them, having no shipping connection that would be leaving from the fortress of His Majesty having a departure to that port. As it was most convenient that a large loss of time would not take place they request that the Viceroy granted them permission to travel by any Dutch shipping. And have been debated the method by all the councilors they expressed the uniform opinion that any case the Count Viceroy would grant such a permission through a written document as it would be against the interest of his Majesty and of the state of India. And wishing the said religious deal this method of the journey, the method would be conducted in a way in which the Count Viceroy would be maintained ignorant of the development and no instruction would be issued on the method.”
Dominican order to organize themselves in the dealings with the Dutch as autonomous personalities.

Nevertheless the loss of Malacca by the Portuguese in 1641 was not a death blow to their influence in the Sunda Islands, but it only sort to strengthen it. Macasser was the abode that the refugees looked forward to. The growth of Macasser is attributed to the fall of Malacca. The position of Macasser was such that it fell in the main trade route between Malacca and Java and the Spice Islands. Not only this it was close to major sources of supply of goods, notably the pepper of south Borneo, the rice of Bima and the sandalwood of Timor. A certain Portuguese, Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo, who traded from Maccaser to Macao, Timor, Flores and the Coromandel Coast, became a favorite of the Sultan Hasan Udin in the Lesser Sunda Islands.38

Thus the Lesser Sunda Islands were never under the direct control of the Estado da India in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. The Portuguese on being ousted from Malacca took refuge in Macasser and thereafter at Larantuka in the Lesser Sunda group. Though the Estado da India had retreated from its center of power in Southeast Asia in 1641, nevertheless they found a new niche to stay on, where they had been occupied with the trading activities only previously. Macasser was finally occupied by the Dutch in 1667.

As late as 1670’s the Portuguese, either the itinerants or those living in Asia, blamed the Dutch for their decline. Travelling between 1672 and 1674, the French itinerant, Abbe Carre while on his way to Madras, blamed the

38 Boxer, 1948, p 179
Portuguese for their own decline. Pretending to be a Portuguese due to circumstances, Carre questioned his fellow traveller as to why did he have a roaring reaction over the Dutch. The thought, an interesting one, goes on as:

"Why do you blame the Dutch for all the calamities and misery that your nation has suffered in India? Why do you accuse that nation of baseness? God has used them as He does, to chastise or abase the pride and haughtiness with which he wished to rule and govern everything. No, no, I said, you must not rage against the Dutch, but against idolatry, against wild passion to amass treasures, against luxury against illicit delights and voluptuous excesses. You must denounce all these, for they have ruined our fine government and lost all our credit and reputation, as well as our trade, our towns, and principal places, and finally have reduced us to misery contempt all over the East."

It is interesting to note how Carre explains to the fellow traveller about the decline of the Portuguese in his conversation. The Portuguese themselves created the entire web of decline. The totally hostile attitude of Carre’s fellow traveller can be countered by the consideration that the Dutch had, though in their early years. A correspondence between General Coen and Andries Soury at Masulipatam in 1621 adjuncts to this fact. Coen wrote: "it should be realized that the fort and the factories in Coromandel were maintained to carry on profitable trade and not simply to trouble the Muslims and the Portuguese."

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40 Prakash, Om,1984,p.169
Thus the retreat of the Portuguese in the years from 1610 to 1665 was not only the result of the rivalry between the Dutch and the Portuguese. The Portuguese retreat was the result of their design. In this retreat, as Sanjay Subrahmanyam has analyzed, the Dutch acted as a catalyst.\footnote{Subrahmanyam, 1993, p. 180} The taking of the beachheads like Malacca could not have been accomplished had the local polities like Johore not helped the Dutch. So the Dutch East India Company that at its inception was a pure merchant's combine, enforced its quest for monopoly and acquired the major niches of the commercial world of the Indian Ocean. In October 1664, the Company submitted to the States-General the following list of their settlements in Southeast Asia and the Coromandel coast: Amboyna; the Banda islands, Pulo Roon; Ternate and other islands in the Moluccas group; Macassar and Manado in Celebus; Timor; Bima on Sambawa; in Sumatra, Jambi, Palembang and Indragiri, Malacca, Tenasserim; Junk Ceylon; and factories in Tonquin, Arakan, Pegu, Ava and Sirian. On the Coromandel Coast, they had acquired Pulicat, São Thomé, Nagapattinam, Masulipatam and Tuticorin. Hence in a short period of time the Dutch were able to build their presence, which posited a strong challenge to the century-old Portuguese hegemony in Coromandel and Southeast Asia.

THE GROWTH OF THE ENGLISH COMPANY AS A MERCANTILE POWER

In the first half of the seventeenth century, as seen in the above section, the Dutch policies and plans especially of J.P. Coen had made the English Company concentrate its activities in India and on developing the bilateral trade with Europe. From the middle of the seventeenth century this strategy began to pay-off, as the European market for Indian textiles expanded. This slow moving company gradually took lead over the Dutch as participants in trade both within Asia and between Europe and Asia in the
eighteenth century. The Amboyana incident was of great consequence as far as the relations of the English with the VOC in the archipelago were concerned. The Dutch had burnt all clove plantations at this place.

The access to the English to the Spice Islands was now firmly closed due to this incident. The English concentrated on the pepper trade of Bantam and southern Sumatra, while at the same time opening contact for fine spices with Macassar, on the southwestern arm of Sulawesi, whose intrepid Bugis seafarers continued to visit the islands in defiance of the Dutch. This loophole was not closed until 1667, when the VOC occupied Makassar and forced its ruler to exclude all other Europeans.

Bantam and Batavia thus, continued an uneasy relationship, punctuated by the VOC capture of Malacca in 1641 and the three Anglo-Dutch Wars of 1652-54, 1665-67 and 1672-74. Whatever their outcomes in Europe, in Asia the English invariably saw their ships captured and their Bantam trade interrupted. The Treaty of Breda at the end of the second war. The final VOC triumph came in 1682. Abu'l Fatah, the 'old' Sultan of Bantam, who had resigned his throne under pressure from his son, Sultan Abdul Kahar, two years before, resumed the government by force. Fulfilling one of the conditions for Dutch assistance, the English factory was ordered out and its personnel evacuated Bantam on 11 April. News of their expulsion reached London in mid-March 1683. Preparations to meet force with force began but were soon abandoned, and it looked as if the VOC would succeed in excluding its rival from the trade in Indonesian pepper as well as fine spices.

As has already been related earlier, the English and the Portuguese relations were always amiable except in the period when Portugal was under the Spanish domination (1580-1640). Indeed in 1635, some years before the
successful Portuguese revolt of December 1640 against Castilian rule (the Restauração), the Count-Viceroy of Linhares, Dom Miguel de Noronha, concluded a non-aggression pact with William Methwold, then president of Surat. Soon after the accession of Dom João de Bragança as King, Portugal and England negotiated a formal peace at London in January 1642. 42

Due to the kind of relations that existed between the English and the Portuguese, it made the way easy for the English to establish Fort St. George (Madras) on the Coromandel Coast. In 1639, the pact made by Conde de Linhares had already conditioned Goa’s consent to allow an English settlement near São Thomé. But the residents of this Portuguese settlement were against this idea and even made an attempt to block the English from provisioning themselves inland. Due to this the English Governor threatened hostilities against the Portuguese if the Captain and the residents of the town continued with their approach. The intervention of Goa led to the replacement of the obstructive Captain so that the English could start building the said fort. 43

This was the point from which the English, acting as private traders rather than in any official capacity, began to incorporate the Portuguese into their operations from Fort St. George and other meeting points, whether English, neutral or Portuguese. Perhaps chief among them was Porto Novo, where the English had another establishment, Fort St. David. Not only this, Anglo-Portuguese business firms also came into existence. Some of the notable ones which remained prominent throughout the eighteenth century were those of Lucas Luis de Oliveira, João Pereira de Faria and Cosmo and Luis de Medeiros and they appeared in Madras itself. 44

42 Winius and Vink, 1991, p57
44 Ibid., pp154-156
The Dutch records as well as the correspondences of the English also reported an improvement in the state of English trade on the Coromandel Coast between 1649 and 1652. But their position again deteriorated considerably after 1652 despite the fact that they enjoyed a certain advantage, over the Dutch due to their friendly relations with Mir Jumla. The situation became so pathetic that in 1653-54, with the exception of Masulipatnam and Fort St. George, all factories were abandoned, as they could not incur profits. During the outbreak of the Anglo-Dutch war in 1653, there were no actual hostilities as the English ships had practically stopped sailing due to the fear of the Dutch. Once peace was established, the English started seafaring again. The English Company’s troubles with Mir Jumla, in 1657-58 led to attacks on Madras, which helped the Dutch to maintain their ascendancy on the coast.

The English trade became a serious threat to the Dutch commercial enterprise from the early 1660’s. The investments of the English in the imported vertices of the cloth were large enough. By this time their network of acquiring the cloth from the Coromandel hinterland had solidified. In Southeast Asia, while the Dutch had their main market in Malacca and adjacent regions, the English sold their cloth at Achin from where it eventually reached Johore. As the English developed more efficient network it caused a glut in the markets of Southeast Asia. The situation was so severe in 1661 that for many months not a bale of Coromandel cloth could be sold in Malacca. This resulted in reducing the orders for the succeeding year. In the 1670’s the impact of the English competition was felt in the cloth trade of Java as well.

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45 EFI, 1641-1645, p.154
EFI, 1651-1654, p.22
46 Raychaudhuri, 1962, p.108
The outbreak of the second Anglo-Dutch war in Europe had its repercussions in Asia also. In August 1665, Batavia instructed the factors at Coromandel to inflict as much damage on the English as they can. Not only this, three yachts were sent from Pulicat under Peter de Lange to capture the English ships anchored off Madras. But they merely succeeded in seizing a small ship belonging to an English private trader near Masulipatnam. This action was accorded by the Golconda authorities as an unlawful violation of the peace of the harbour and temporarily involved the Dutch in serious difficulties.

Meanwhile in the second half of the seventeenth century, the English had grown strong. So much so that during the second Anglo-Dutch war, the Dutch factors at Masulipatnam feared an attack on their factory by the numerically stronger English. The administrators at Fort Geldria in Pulicat decided to postpone any decisive action until further orders from Batavia. The Dutch received instructions from Holland in 1668 that the ships of the enemy should be attacked in neutral harbours but by then the peace between England and Holland had been settled.

In 1672, the Dutch at Batavia informed their fellows in Coromandel of the renewal of the war with England. This resulted in a naval engagement to the south of Masulipatnam. A fleet of four Dutch ships and ten English vessels fought which ended with the victory of Hollanders. This was decisive because a fleet of four ships had captured three of the enemy. This success made the Dutch factors in Coromandel approve of Batavia’s recommendation that in the time of war no heed should be paid to the prohibition of the indigenous polities like Golconda in their waters. The war in Europe
terminated in 1674 and before it no further hostilities with the English took place.\textsuperscript{47}

Thus the changing situation especially in the late seventies was in favour of the English. The English East India Company had the support of capital from home with which they could make large purchases from Europe. The Dutch on the other hand, were inadequately supplied with the capital from the Netherlands. They had to depend on the credit now for a large part of their business. With the fulcrum of Coromandel trade increasingly going on the English side, the Dutch openly admitted that the ascendancy of the trade has passed on to the English. The situation had two implications for the VOC. Firstly they could no longer procure from Coromandel, the textiles of right quality and quantity. The Masulipatnam market was totally in control of the English. Secondly, due to the English ascendancy on the coast, the Dutch were ousted from the market of Coromandel cloth in Europe.

The very organization of the English Company was also responsible for its successes on the Coromandel. From the diary of Streynsham Master, who was an agent appointed at Fort St. George to bring order to the chaos in the Company's factories on the Coromandel Coast and the Bay of Bengal, we understand the methods English adopted to settle an unsatisfactory state of affair. The chief points which Master was ordered to inquire into at the factories of Masulipatam, Balasor, Hugli, and Kasimbazar were the method of keeping accounts, the disposal of European commodities, the mode of contracting for Indian piece-goods, raw silk, etc., the character and the ability of the Company's servants, the Company's privileges and the \textit{farmāns} by which they were obtained. He was also, according to his private papers, specially empowered, to inquire and settle the disputes then widespread among the Company's servants, to make a

minute examination into the case of Raghu the poddar, whose case was in the
limelight since August 1673. He was also supposed to use his influence to induce
the captains of the Company's ships to take their vessels as far up the Hugli river.
Master was also supposed to send a detailed list to England of all persons in the
Company's pay, with remarks on their 'abilityes and capacityes'.

At a consultation held on January 8th 1677, in which Streynsham Master,
Mathew Mainwaring, Christopher Hatton and George Chamberlaine, it was
decided that the following rules would be observed as regulations of the
Masaulipatam Factory:

"The accompt of Sallary to be entered in the booke on Lady day yearly.
That the bills and attestations for all moneys paid out of cash (as
Directed the 10: of August last) be read and passed in Councell every
week, and the same noted in the Consultation booke.
The accompt of cash to be Ballanced in the Ledger monthly as in the
Surratt Bookes.
That the Purser Gennerall, in the Bookes formerly appointed to be kept
for a register of the wills and Inventoryes of the deceased, doe alsoe
therein keepe a register of Marriages, Birthes, Christenings, and
Burialls.
That the Third in Madapollam or in the Subordinate Factoryes doe take
charge of all expences of the same, and to keep the accompt thereof, as
the Purser Gennerall is appointed in this Factory, and such assistance to
be appointed him as shall be necessary.
That upon occasssions of treating the Dutch or other Strangers, the young
men of the Factory at such times doe eat apart by themselves, and those
only to come to the table whome the Chiefe shall think fitt to call, as is
practised in Surratt.
That all outcryes of apparel and necessaries of the deceased be made in
English money and reduced into Pagodas at 9s. or into Rupees at
2s.6d.,to be paid in ready money and not charged in the bookes to the
accompt of the buyers.

48 Temple, R.C. (ed), The Diaries of Streynsham Master,1675-1680 Published for the Government
of India ,London,John Murray, Albemarle Street,1911, pp 1-3
That the Letters and advices of the Honourable Company be adressed with a becoming aspect in a Submissive stile, and directed, To the Honourable the Governour and Company of Merchants of London trading to the East Indies.

Whereas in the Consultation of the 12\textsuperscript{th} of August last, [it] was directed that the Coppyes of all Consulations should be sent to the Agent and Councel of Fort St. George by every conveighance after they were transacted, It is now thought more convenient that a Duplicate of the diary and Consultation booke, and alsoe a Copy of the accompt of cash, be every moneth fairly transcribed, signed and sent to the Agent and Councell at the Fort.

That Madapollam or the Subordinate Factoryes doe observe the same method that is there prescribed in the keeping their accompts, and alsoe in their Diary and Consultation booke, and that every moneth they send two Duplicates thereof, and of their accompts of cash, one for Metchlepam, and the other to be thence forwarded to the Agent and Councell at the Fort, and also Treble coppyes of their bookes every yeare to be Superscribed, one at Metchlepam, one for the Fort, and one for England; and that there be kept in that Factory one Copy of their bookes of accompts, one copy of their Diary and Consultation booke, and Copyes of their Letters received and sent, which are not to be carryed away upon the removeall of any Chiefe.\textsuperscript{49}

Thus in the light of the regulations framed by Master for the Masulipatam Factory, one can notice the working of the English East India Company. The Dutch as we know were still competing with the English on the Coromandel. But by devising such kinds of rules and regulations, the Company started controlling its factories effectively.

The English, at last, had gained grounds on the Coromandel coast at the tail-end of the seventeenth century. In Southeast Asia they had a limited presence in few places like Bencoolen on western Sumatra. It was partly due to their private trade and interloping that the English hegemony had been established. The interlopers, for example, were satisfied with even lower rates of profit per unit than the English Company’s. They were thus considered the

\textsuperscript{49} Master, Vol II, 1911, pp103-104
most dangerous competitors of the Dutch. Due to the increased capital of their rivals, the Dutch lost their control over the Coromandel market though they posited as power in the insular Southeast Asia. When the English abandoned Bantam and were involved in a war with Mughals in 1689-1690, the Dutch thought that they could still outrival the English. But these were just false hopes. The focus of the English in the second half of the century had been the Indian sub-continent and not Southeast Asia.

Thus in the seventeenth century, there were different scenes being enacted simultaneously in the theatre beyond Cape Comorin. On the one hand there was the fading Portuguese power whose decline was accentuated by the hostile Dutch presence. While on the other hand, the Dutch rivaled with the English in their quest for monopoly of trade of the Indian Ocean world. The primary aim of the Dutch as is well known was to monopolise the trade in spices. So was also the case of the English. Initially, both the English and the Portuguese received fatal blows due to the Dutch attacks. The Portuguese and the English had signed a treaty in 1635 that stood meaningless as far as their power relations in Asia were concerned. The second half of the seventeenth century not only saw the Dutch occupying the important Portuguese settlements especially in insular Southeast Asia but also a rapid growth of the English power on the Coromandel. So if we are to locate the Portuguese presence around 1661, almost nothing was left of that majestic ‘seaborne empire’. Goa, Diu and Damão on the western Indian coast and in the east-Macao and Timor were the only settlements that were under the Portuguese. The Portuguese monopoly of more of one hundred fifty years had come to a virtual end but their legacy lived on in the areas which were once under their influence.  

50 Philip Baldaeus <Baldaeus, P. 2000, p. 651> while visiting Nagapattinam in 1660 said that he “preached the first the 18th, both in Dutch and Portuguese and administered the Holy Sacrament to 20 Persons, and Baptism to several children.” If Baldaeus is to be believed then it took two years before the Dutch could start with their religious preaching. His preachings in Portuguese show that though the Portuguese were not present in that part, but their legacy was there.