CHAPTER I
MARATHA INTERVENTION IN RAJASTHAN:
1730-1760 (PART I)

In order to understand the Rajput-Maratha relations in the eighteenth century, it is pertinent that we consider the circumstances that brought the Marathas into Rajasthan. For the sake of convenience the period from 1730 to 1794 is divided into two phases. The first phase covers the period from 1730-1760. The second phase covers the span from 1761-1794 and will be dealt with in the subsequent chapter. The period covering the first phase was the span within which they made their early forays into Rajasthan via the Mukandara Pass. The excuse for their official entry into the area was provided by the Rajputs themselves when they were invited by the Rajput States of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Bundi to help them in their succession disputes. Though the disputes were settled, the Rajput Rajas found it difficult to extricate themselves from the hold that was exercised by the Marathas in these States. The Maratha-Rajput relations need to be seen first in the context of the Mughal-Maratha relations. It was while serving the Mughal Emperors that Mirza Raja Jai Singh and Raja Jaswant Singh had the first contact with the Marathas.

It is clear that the Rajputs first came into contact with the Marathas while serving as the mansabdars of the Mughal emperors. Both the Rajput Rajas, Mirza Raja Jai Singh and Raja Jaswant Singh had tried to subdue the Marathas under the leadership of Shivaji but were unsuccessful. This failure did not go down well with Aurangzeb and he did not hide his displeasure. The Emperor suspected that Shivaji had fled from Agra with the connivance of Sawai Jai Singh’s son, Ram Singh. The Rajput prince was punished, first by being forbidden the court and then by being deprived of his rank and pay.¹

Establishment of the Maratha power in Malwa
The initial phase of the Maratha-Rajput relations must be seen as a part of Mughal-Maratha conflict in Malwa. The province of Malwa was a part of the Mughal Empire. Sawai Jai Singh, who represented the Mughal power failed to meet the Maratha

¹ Jadunath Sarkar, A Short History of Aurangzeb, Orient Blackswan, 2009, Delhi, p. 171.
challenge, and once Malwa came under Maratha domination, it was not possible for Sawai Jai Singh to control Peshwa’s territorial ambitions further North. This will be discussed in the subsequent pages but let us first take into account the rise of Maratha power in Malwa.

The strategic importance of Malwa lay in the fact that it was the link which joined North India with South India. All the military and trade routes passed through it. Aurangzeb’s Deccan wars increased the importance of Malwa and the Emperor set the precedent of appointing a prince of the royal blood or some most trusted officer as it’s governor. On the basis of the contemporary Marathi records, Raghubir Sinh says that during the period 1698-1707 the Marathas fought against Aurangzeb for their existence. At this time the main purpose of the Maratha bands was to roam anywhere and everywhere, plundering the Imperial treasury and territory and harass the enemy in all possible ways. Initially their motive to invade Malwa was just to divert the attention of the Emperor, but after 1707, it was the prosperity of Malwa and Gujarat that lured them to invade these areas. The new Peshwa Baji Rao further encouraged them to conquer new lands. He gave a systematic form and political content to the sporadic raids by the Maratha sardars for he perceived the political, economic and strategic value of these provinces. Baji Rao decided to overrun and bring under control the rich and flourishing provinces of Malwa and Gujarat. “Thus the establishment of a Maratha domination in Malwa and Gujarat was the first step to the establishment of a large and powerful Maratha empire.”

After securing themselves in Malwa they turned their gaze on Rajasthan. The political situation in northern India also proved helpful to the Marathas in fulfilling their ambition of expanding their power base. They followed the route from the Mukandara Pass and across the Chambal from Malwa via Harauti, and from Gujarat via Idar and Jalore. In both the cases the Maratha entry was facilitated by the internal disputes among the Rajputs. In the case of Kota and Bundi the Marathas hovered on the outskirts since 1725 but could make an entry only in 1732.

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2 Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, p. 191.
3 Ibid., P.192.
In the beginning the sporadic Maratha forays into the Mewar territory resulted in the annoyance expressed by the Mewar Maharana in the kharitas addressed to the Maratha king Shahu. The latter also took cognizance of the situation and rebuked his officials in consideration of the old ties that they had with the house of Mewar. Raja Shahu exhibited his earnestness and sincerity towards the Maharana when in 1726, he issued a permanent ajna-patra (written order) under his own as well as the seals of the Peshwa and the Pratinidhi, in favour of Rawat Bagh Singh Shaktawat, son of Hathi Singh Shaktawat of Piplia, a noble of Mewar. He instructed his military commanders and all officers not to disturb the land and the people of the Piplia village (situated within the Mewar State territories adjoining the Malwa suba. During the reign of Sawai Jai Singh also the cordiality enjoyed by the Marathas with the house of Jaipur was invoked on many occasions. But the Maratha king could not check the ambitions of the sardars. After establishing their power in Malwa, Gujarat and Bundelkhand, the Marathas advanced into Rajasthan. They turned their gaze towards Rajasthan where in the words of Manucci: “The most powerful Rajahs are three in number : The first is the rajah Rana …the second is called Rathor…the third is called Chaque (? Kachhwaha)…”

Objectives of the Marathas in Malwa and Rajasthan

In the 1730’s, Malwa served as the frontier for the Marathas in their movement towards the North and West of it was Rajasthan. There are various reasons ascribed to the Maratha invasions in Malwa and the spread of their power subsequently in Rajasthan and North India. The Marathi writers generally believe that the Peshwa wanted to establish the ideal of Hindu-pad-Padshahi (Hindu paramountcy over the whole of India). The Maratha advance into the province of Malwa served as a “convenient starting point for raids into Rajputana.” In the Maratha plan of action the policy of north-ward expansion could be materialized only when they had a strong base in Malwa. Sir John Malcolm writes:

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“Thus invited, by weakness and provoked by injury, we are not surprised to find that the Rajput princes and chiefs of Jeypoor, Marwar, Mewar and Malwa, so far from continuing to be that defense they had before proved themselves of the Empire, were either secretly or openly the supporters of the Maratha invaders, to whose first invasion of Malwa, we are told by every Persian or Hindu writer that notices the subjects, hardly any opposition was given; and we possess many testimonies to show that they chiefly attributed their success on this occasion to the action of religious feelings.”

This seems to be partly true. Having gained their right to levy dues on all the area south of the Narmada, the invasion of Malwa fitted very well in the ambitious northward scheme of Peshwa, Baji Rao. Another cause that led the Marathas to spread their authority all over India, was that the Peshwa was unable to check the ambition of the Maratha sardars. The Peshwa feared them lest they disturb the peace of their native country. Hence they were constantly employed in outward expeditions.

Raghubir Sinh assigns economic cause as an important factor for the Maratha invasions in Malwa and later North India. He reasons that the Peshwa and Shahu were in deep debt and that he wanted money to pay it off. Gujarat and Malwa were the nearest to the Deccan but Gujarat had already been under the domination of the Maratha leader Dabhade that only left Malwa for the Peshwa. Even though the Peshwas were credited with having turned the Maratha State into an Empire, the Marathi documents in the form of correspondence and account sheets confirm that the Peshwas were heavily in debt. In a letter to his guru Brahmendra Swami, Baji Rao described his pathetic indebtedness in the following words:

“Our sardars (Dabhade, Gaikwad, Bande and others) are masters of crores, while I, who am devoted to you and to Chhatrapati Shahu, find it difficult to eke out a bare maintenance. I have been suffering humiliation at the hands of the money-lenders, and my forehead has suffered a lot by making apologies to the men of my army [due to my inability to pay them regularly].”

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8 Ibid., p. 75.
9 Raghubir Sinh, Malwa in Transition, pp. 188, 189.
The economic motive further becomes clear when after Chimnaji defeated Girdhar Bahadur, the Peshwa ordered his brother that he should make heavy exactions from the city of Ujjain. He further instructed that once the affairs of the province were settled, Chimnaji should immediately hasten to a rich country to collect money and to refurbish the army. The Peshwa aimed at defeating the enemy in order to clear the debts.\textsuperscript{11} Baji Rao wrote to his brother that he could roam about anywhere he liked but that he should bring back money somehow or the other.\textsuperscript{12}

**Rajasthan: Ecology and its Economic Resources**

The nature of the present work requires that we take into account the geographical and topographical features of Rajasthan. This will help us to understand the socio-economic conditions of the area. It will also enable us to know the objectives of the Marathas in the region. Rajasthan is broadly divided into two natural divisions, namely, the North-western and South-eastern. This division is on account of the Aravali range of hills that run diagonally from South-west to North-east. In the North-west lie the arid plains and shifting sand hills of Marwar, Jaisalmer, Bikaner and Shekhawati region of Jaipur, collectively termed Marusthali. This region is characterized by low ridges and sand dunes. South-east has low-lying plains with narrow escarpments as the land rises towards the Harauti plateau. The Banas and the Chambal rivers irrigate this region. The well watered alluvial low lands of the latter forming one of the more productive parts of Rajasthan. The seasonal temperature variations of the weather of Rajasthan was recorded by Abul Fazl\textsuperscript{13} and Jahangir.\textsuperscript{14} In Marwar the climate is extremely dry. The days are intensely hot in summers.\textsuperscript{15} In the North, especially on the Bikaner border there is sometimes hard frost at night, and it is much colder than in the Southern states.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{12} S.P.D., Vol. XIII, No. 29.
\textsuperscript{16} Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. XXI, London, 1908, p. 91.
The North and North-west division covers nearly three-fifth of Rajasthan and is characterized by the presence of low ridges and sand dunes. The sandy tract extended in the West from Runn of Kutch to the border of Sindh and formed a part of the Thar Desert. The climate is characterized by extremes of temperatures and by a marked degree of aridity. The soils are classified as light textured, grey-brown desert soils, which are alkaline and saline. Rivers play only a very subordinate role in moulding the surface features of this area. The only river of any importance is Looni or Salt River. It flows though the Marwar desert. The region falls outside the regular course of both South-western and North-eastern monsoons and according to T.H. Hendley the maximum rainfall is between July and September.17 Almost the entire region is sandy waste, ill watered and unproductive, except in the neighbourhood of the Aravalis. Water is brackish and found at the depth of 200 feet to 300 feet below the surface. The oasis alone, which are highly scattered supports vegetation and human clusters with their artificial tanks or natural hollows or pools that collect water during the rainy season and therefore, are able to retain the same for a few months.

The South-eastern part has a very diversified character. Although this part of Rajasthan18 is considerably smaller in extent, it consists of the higher and more fertile land behind the Aravalis. The location of Mewar is towards the South, along the loftiest and most clearly defined section of the Aravalis. The South-eastern region contains extensive hill ranges and long stretches of rocky mould and woodland. Many rivers flow in this part of Rajasthan, the primary being the Banas and the Chambal. In many parts there are fertile table lands and stretches of excellent soils. The region is characterized by a diverse variety of alluvial soil, varying both in texture, from clayey loam (chikni) to sandy (bhur) and in the tints from pale brown, yellowish brown to dark brown. Towards South and West in the Harauti region, one comes across black soil. The region receives between 50 to 100 cms. of rainfall annually. Agriculture was practiced in the semi-arid part of Rajasthan and in the arid parts, pastoral activities

18 Satya Prakash Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan (c. 1650-1750), Centre for Advanced Study in History, Aligarh Muslim University, Manohar, Delhi, 1986. Gupta’s work is on Eastern Rajasthan and he has mainly scrutinized the records of six contiguous parganas, which were under the authority of the Amber/Jaipur rulers most consistently. These parganas were: Amber (later Jaipur) Bahatari (Basawa), Chatsu, Dausa, Lalsot and Malarana.
dominated. Variety of crops were grown in the agriculturally conducive areas. Though many different political and social factors have affected the development of the regional economy over centuries, the basic facets of physical environment – land, soil, rainfall and natural vegetation, have remained the same.

The most western part broadly corresponds to Jaisalmer. The soil all along the Western boundary is for the most part light and sandy. In this region, agriculture was possible during the rainy season, as the rain would sink in and not flow off the surface. Hence, little rainfall would suffice for the crops. Except for some places where water could be stored, only rain crops such as bajra, jowar, moong, moth and till were grown. The North-western region shelters a characteristic sub-division; the South-western region comprising broadly of Marwar. It is generally a sandy tract, though the terrain gradually changes as we move eastwards; from a mere desert in the West to comparatively fertile lands along the eastern borders. Bikaner region formed the North-eastern section of this broad division. It formed a plain of the lightest class of sandy soil, broken at short intervals by ridges of almost pure sand. In the eastern side, the soil was sandy loam, for the most part well adapted to the conditions of local rainfall, while in the South-east it was less loamy, and sand hills were most frequently met with.

Though land was available in abundance, the climatic conditions were a major limiting factor. Even in semi-arid region, cultivation required capital investment. For this the poorer sections solicited loans, which were required to procure means of cultivation: seeds, manure, plough and bullocks:

“… in many cases the peasant indebtedness was collective and we find the entire ryots of villages borrowing money from the bohra to purchase seeds, manure, ploughs and bullocks so that they could cultivate the fallow lands of the village, construct ponds and dig wells. … The ryots had to pay the debt with interest at the time of next harvest usually through their traditional representatives, the zamindars or the patels.”

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21 Masanori Sato and B.L. Bhadani, Economy and Polity of Rajasthan: Study of Kota and Marwar (17th-19th centuries), (henceforth Economy and Polity of Rajasthan) Publication Scheme, 1997. Sato has done extensive research encompassing south-eastern Rajasthan (Kota) while Bhadani concentrates on western Rajasthan (Marwar).
The physiographic features of North-western desert region did not always play a negative role. The ground water in this region being brackish/saline, prohibited artificial irrigation on a large scale. But the same was turned into a productive resource. The eastern fringe of the Rajasthan desert, from Didwana through the Sambhar Lake and the Pachbhadra salt basin to the Great Rann of Kutch, forms one of the important salt producing zones of India. Nainsi gives us village wise details of the salt pits.24 Salt was extracted by a particular caste known as Kharwal.25

In the South-west Marwar, the principal mineral found was salt. It was manufactured extensively at Sambhar Lake, Didwana Lake26 and Pachbhadra Lake.27 Marble was mostly obtained from Makrana near Sambhar Lake. In terms of mineral resources, the North-western region was not very rich. It was mainly desert. Scanty rainfalls, non-perennial streams, low water level, that too brackish.28 These conditions posed severe limitations on agricultural production. Agriculture could not become profitable and dependable. However, natural vegetation was conducive for pastoralism. The hoards of camels, cattle, sheep and goats constituted the wealth of the rural population.29

Leather industry comprised an important component of pastoral sector. In Marwar, there is a reference of tax on the caste of bhanbhi (leather workers) in pargana Sojat.30 It must have been a tax on tanning. It shows that cattle wealth constituted an important aspect of the socio-economic life of the region. This is corroborated from the nature of prevalent non-commercial taxes such as ‘pan charai, ghas charai, korad and jakhira (fodder tax).31 The inability of the Rajputs to pay regularly can be seen in these environmental features. Maratha penetration was more severe in agriculturally rich parts of Rajasthan. Sambhar salt trade was an important source of income.

24 Muhnot Nainsi, Vigat, Vol. III, is full of such references where the number of salt pits in the villages are recorded.
25 Ibid., p. 130.
29 There are numerous references of fight/war over cattle, camels etc. in the Nainsi’s Khyat.
Strategic Importance of Rajasthan

Rajasthan fitted very well in the Maratha policy of Northward expansion. They had already become a power to reckon with in Malwa and Gujarat. As both these areas shared their border with Rajasthan, it served as a convenient foot-hold from where the Marathas could strike targeted places. The State of Kota lay on the North of Malwa where the Marathas had already obtained a firm footing. They entered Kota by the Eastern route, and crossed the ford of the Parbati near Atru. Kota suffered from their incursions and had to spend a lot of money to avoid their destructive raids. The State of Bundi could be reached only after crossing the river Chambal, which was just below the State of Kota and then a large portion of the Kota State. Therefore, Bundi was not directly exposed to the Maratha raid. Jaipur could be reached only after crossing Kota and Bundi. Mewar was exposed to the Marathas from the East and the South-east. The State of Marwar was harassed by the Marathas from the Gujarat side.

Therefore, they made Kota as their tributary State which easily succumbed to their pressure. With Kota as their base, the Maratha movement in the various States of Rajasthan became easy. Ajmer was another area coveted by the Marathas. It is centrally located in Rajasthan. From the early times, we find that in order to establish their hold over Rajasthan, possession of Ajmer was considered to be of strategic importance for dynasties of the Delhi Sultanate, or the Mughals followed by the Marathas and the British. In the context of the Marathas, the unfolding of events at Jodhpur is self explanatory. In 1756, the war between Bijay Singh and Ram Singh was brought to an end after an agreement was signed. According to the agreement, Marwar was divided into two halves between Bijay Singh and Ram Singh and Ajmer was given to the Marathas, as they had rendered help to Ram Singh. The long campaign of the Marathas in Marwar ended by making it as their tributary. Ajmer was given to the Marathas in moondkati (compensation for the blood ) of Jayappa. The possession of this stronghold, perpetuated Maratha influence over Rajasthan.

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33 Ibid., p. 15.
However, the Rajput Rajas did not digest the loss of Ajmer. When the Marathas were defeated in the third battle of Panipat, the Rajput Rajas took advantage of the disturbed political situation in North India and tried to recover Ajmer from the Marathas. With the consent of Bijay Singh, Ballu Joshi attacked Ajmer and occupied the city. At this, the Maratha patel appointed at Ajmer asked Mahadaji Sindhia to save Ajmer quickly, otherwise Garh Bithli would be lost to them. This would adversely affect their prospects in the three States of Rajasthan as Mewar, Dhundhar (Jaipur) and Marwar could be controlled from Ajmer only. If Ajmer was lost to them then their control over the three States would also be lost:

“garh vitli chhoot jasi ne tinoo hee mulak su amal uuth jasi. Mewar, Dhundhar, Marwar ae sara hee Ajmer su dabel chhai.”

Rampura and Gagron were the other strategic areas which were under the control of the Marathas. Both were their important outposts that lay on the bordering areas of Malwa and Rajasthan. Rampura was a fertile plain of Mewar which had been given to Sawai Madho Singh by the Mewar Maharana. Later, in 1752, Sawai Madho Singh gave this stronghold to Malhar Rao Holkar. Its importance cannot be denied as the Mewar nobles seized it from the Maratha control after the 1761 debacle. The seizure of Rampura from the Marathas added powerful sources to the already depleted treasury of the Jaipur State. For the Marathas it was a revolt against their domination. Soon the Marathas recaptured Rampura after killing four hundred Chundawats.

The geographic location of Rajasthan boosted trading activities, as it is situated on the path of major land and sea trade routes. Undoubtedly, this trade sustained the economy of North-western Rajasthan. Salt called Sambhar loon, or salt of Sambhar was exported over the greater part of Hindustan from the Indus to the Ganges. The banjaras transported salt to different places as the factors of the banias.

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36 R.K. Saxena, Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana, p. 60.
38 Masanori Sato and B.L. Bhadani, Economy and Polity of Rajasthan, p. 104.
Rajasthan assumed importance due to the presence of the following trade routes:

- The route between Agra and Ahmedabad passed through this region in two principal branches, one of them passed through Ajmer and the other one reached Ahmedabad via Chittor, Chatsu, Merta and Jalore.
- Several routes connected Agra and Delhi with lower Sindh via Ajmer and Hindaun.
- One trade route passed from Jodhpur to Peshawar.
- From Agra to Ajmer via Hindaun, Lalsot and Mauzabad.
- From Delhi to Ahmedabad through Churu, Nagore, Jodhpur, Jalore, Sirohi.
- From Rajgarh to Khairpur (Sindh) through Churu and Bikaner.
- From Agra to Khairpur through Bikaner and Jaisalmer.
- From Multan to Jaipur through Bahawalpur, Pugal, Bikaner, Churu, Sikar and Jodhpur.
- From Delhi to Khorasar via Nagaur, Jodhpur and Udaipur.
- Trade route connecting Jaipur-Karauli-Gwalior.

These routes assumed greater importance in the eighteenth century for the Marathas. They facilitated their movement in Rajasthan and other parts of North India. The route generally followed by them was from the eastern side of Kota from where they moved on to Bundi, and various territories of Jaipur like Tonk, Shahpura etc. Traders from Gwalior and Indore who settled in Rajasthan engaged in the profession of money-lending and trade actively.

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42 Ibid.
46 Ibid., pp. 603-608.
49 Ibid.
The Marathas procured many items from the markets of Rajasthan. The old records of Marwar and Bikaner show that the fairs also promoted local and long distance trade. The traders participated in the fairs either to sell their merchandise or to procure the goods. For the royal exchequer, fairs constituted an important source of revenue. The importance of these can be realized from the fact that the rulers considered it their duty to organize them. The *hakim* of the pargana in which the fair was to be held, was expected to personally supervise the arrangements. The safety and security of the merchants and their merchandise also had to be ensured by him. Besides all this, the *hakim* had to arrange provisions of water for the merchants and fodder for their animals. A police station or *kotwali* *chabutara* was also established in the fairs where armed personnel were kept ready to provide necessary protection to traders and merchandise.\(^{50}\) Important cattle fairs were the Gogameri held in August-September at Gogano, near Nohar in the East, and the other at Kolayat. Tilwara near Balotra was the venue for the principal horse and cattle fair.\(^{51}\) In Marwar, the fairs were held for the sale and purchase of cattle such as bullocks, camels, horses and other goods such as hides, tanned leather, brass and tin utensils wearing apparels and blankets.\(^{52}\)

Agriculture was the basic means of subsistence in many parts of Rajasthan. In the North-western region, it was mainly dependent on rains, therefore, production was very precarious and usually low value cereals could be cultivated. The following description by Manucci is worth noting:

“The land of the Rathor, who rules nine districts, are for the most part all sand; they have little or no water…. The cereals grown in this country come up by help of rain only.” \(^{53}\)

This was the reason that the State of Marwar paid the installments to the Marathas generally in the form of miscellaneous goods. The South-eastern region had a more diversified character and most of the region supported two crops a year. Not only the cultivation was intensive, the area also had a variability of lucrative crops. The Eastern and South-eastern part also had a land surplus situation, the possibilities of


\(^{52}\) Gian Chand Sharma, *Administrative System of the Rajputs*, pp. 155,156.

production with the human intervention were immense. But availability of necessary capital was a major handicap.

It has been emphasized by Dilbagh Singh that raiyatis were heavily dependent on the superior sections of the society, i.e., the zamindars, patels, mahajan and other rich riyayatis for resources needed for cultivation. They were frequently in debt and were obliged to mortgage their lands to the riyayatis. Often the raiyatis collectively fell into debt in order to purchase seed, ploughs and bullocks needed for cultivating their lands. In the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century, there was an extention of cultivation. Revenue collection from the crops production yielded good income to the State. South-eastern Rajasthan enjoyed a fairly brisk agrarian commerce. Since western Rajasthan had been agriculturally poor, and eastern Rajasthan was food surplus area it can be safely assumed that the eastern area must have been more coveted by the Marathas. As compared to the North-western Rajasthan, the Eastern and South-eastern Rajasthan had an edge not only in respect of agriculture, it was also rich in mineral resources. Salt was largely manufactured at the Sambhar lake, and Khetri had a copper mine. The hills of Ajmer-Merwara were well endowed in mineral wealth. Marbles of various colours were quarried in the vicinity of Ajmer. Most of the areas which were transferred to the Marathas had intensive cultivation and supported two crops a year. Besides being rich in agriculture, it also had an edge in the mineral resources.

**Impact of Mughal Empire’s Decline on the States of Rajasthan**

The Rajput Rajas played an important role in consolidating the Empire politically. They served the Mughal emperors as their military and civil officers in the outlying subas and during the campaigns on the Mughal frontier. In essence, the policy consisted of treating the Rajput rulers as Mughal nobles at par with others, obliged to render military services while receiving jagirs in lieu of salary. The Rajput policy of Akbar was in fact initiated with the agreement he made with Raja Bharmal of Amber. In the words of Abu’l Fazl:

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“Rajah Bihari Mal Kacwaha, who by the favourable grace of the Shahinshah, became one of the officers of the Sultanate, and rose to a rank superior to that of all the Rajahs and Raises in India, and whose sons and grandsons and whole clan rose to high rank and great office.”

The Kachhwahas were accorded a special recognition by Jahangir, when he designated them as Mirza Rajas. In Rajasthan, the Mughals were the paramount power without annexing the territories of the Rajput kings. The Mughal supremacy and assertion of their paramountcy over Rajput principalities was well established. The rulers of the Rajput States were in the Imperial service and they held high mansabs. The Mughals levied no tribute, but they expected substantial peshkash or offering at the time of a ruler’s accession or at the time of grant of a jagir. The Mughals had maintained a truce in Rajasthan, preventing the Rajputs from encroaching on areas outside Rajasthan, and also placing a check upon the ambitions of the stronger Rajput States. Satish Chandra calls this as the imposition of a kind of a pax Mughalica which was a precondition. This implied control of inter-state disputes, and also, on occasions, disputes between a ruler and his sardars. The ruler was the final court of appeal in his State.

But in the parganas received by a ruler as tankhwah, inam or on ijara, the Emperor was the final court of appeal. In matters of succession, the Emperor could interfere. The tika sent by the Emperor was significant for succession. In order to maintain a direct contact with the Mughal court, the rulers appointed their vakils there.

If we compare the relationship of the Mughal-Rajput vis-à-vis the Maratha-Rajput, we find that the former was much more stable and only occasionally disturbed by the personal whims of the Emperor as in the case of Aurangzeb. There was an atmosphere of peace and security, and a feeling of mutual trust. The Rajas knew that in case of any external threat, the Imperial power was there to safeguard their interests. They did not find the payment of the peshkash burdensome as they were rewarded with important assignments. It was only during the reign of Aurangzeb and his successors, that the Rajputs relations with the Mughal Emperors became sour.

57 Abu’l Fazl, The Akbarnama, Translated, H. Beveridge, Vol. II, Bibliotheca Indica, Published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Rare Books, Delhi, 1972, p. 36.
60 V.S. Bhatnagar, Life and times of Sawai Jai Singh, pp. 279-281.
Sardesai opines that Shahu, while in Mughal captivity had gauged the depth of this Rajput feeling. He had even gained the sympathies of some of them and was given a cordial send-off on his release in Malwa. He further says that Sawai Jai Singh continued to be friendly to the Maratha overtures even upto the time of his death in 1743. However, later events brought about a complete estrangement between the Marathas and the Rajputs. But we must particularly bear in mind that during Shahu’s life-time, there was an entire agreement and cordiality between the two sides. Therefore, when Shahu and his first Peshwa began to shape the future destinies of the rising Maratha power, there existed respectful amity between the Marathas and the Rajputs.\(^{61}\)

With the decline in Mughal power and prestige, the leading Rajput States felt free to resume the old process of conquest and territorial expansion. Jaipur was the foremost to acquire the position as a major State in the first half of the eighteenth century. Sawai Jai Singh cherished the ambition of establishing a hegemony from the Sambhar Lake in the West to Agra and Mathura in the East, and extending upto the Narmada in the South. By grants from the Emperor and \textit{ijara} he expanded considerably the dominion inherited by him.\(^{62}\) As the Mughal empire weakened, the Jaipur rulers absorbed these territories into their hereditary State.\(^{63}\) This should become amply clear from the way the Kachhwaha State prospered. Initially Amber was a single pargana state of the \textit{sarkar} of Ajmer having 11,35,095 bighas of measured land and an assessed revenue of 1,22,56,297 dams.\(^{64}\) By the year 1650, Mirza Raja Jai Singh held a jagir worth 820 lakh dams in the parganas of Amber, Chatsu, Fagi, Mauzbad, Jhag, Baharana, Pachwara, Kho, Deoli, Sanchi, Bharkol, Jalapur, Umran, Sakras, Bawal and Jat Kalyewa.\(^{65}\) The area got further extended under Sawai Jai Singh. He was able to obtain jagirs in \textit{tankha}, \textit{ijara} and \textit{inam}. Shah Jahan gave Kama to Mirza Raja Jai Singh’s son Kirat Singh. Later, Mirza Raja Jai Singh acquired Chalkaliana and Tonk as the reward of his subjugation of Shivaji in 1665.

\(^{61}\) G.S. Sardesai, \textit{Main Currents of Maratha History}, p. 96.  
\(^{64}\) Abu'l Fazl, \textit{The Ain}, Vol. II, p. 278.  
Later, Shah Jahan bestowed the parganas of Toda and Tonk on Maharana Rai Singh of Udaipur. This was given as a gesture of the acknowledgement of the help rendered by Rai Singh’s father Maharana Bhim Singh to Shah Jahan against his father, Emperor Jahangir. But Rai Singh’s successors were weak and could not retain the parganas. Aurangzeb brought the two parganas under khalisa.\(^{66}\) When Sawai Madho Singh ascended the Jaipur throne, he transferred the territories of Tonk and Rampura to Malhar Rao Holkar in 1750. There was always a friction between Sawai Madho Singh and Holkar regarding the possession of Tonk located hundred kilometers South-west of Jaipur. Sawai Jai Singh extended his possessions which included the parganas Bhangarh, Malarana and rupees 80,000 in pargana Amarsar, the areas of Jhilai, Uniara and Barwara.\(^{67}\) In 1748, Sawai Jai Singh’s son Ishwari Singh obtained a farman from the Mughal Court allowing all the territories which had been in the possession of Jaipur State to continue in his control.\(^{68}\)

The Maharajas of Jodhpur seized several areas belonging to the Mughal province of Gujarat, and dreamt of a hegemony from Sambhar Lake to Ahmadabad and the sea.\(^{69}\) In 1657, the jagirs held by Maharaja Jaswant Singh included Jodhpur, Pokaran, Merta, Sojat, Jaitaran, Siwana, Jalore, Phalodi and Gajsinghpura.\(^{70}\) In 1770, there arose a dispute between the nobles of the Mewar Maharana Ari Singh and his nephew Ratan Singh. On this occasion, the Maharana had requested Bijay Singh for help. The latter immediately sent his troops and settled the dispute.\(^{71}\) Bagh Singh, after removing the control of Ratan Singh from Godwad, requested the Maharana that in order to have a firm control over Godwad, it was necessary that they station their army there. If this was not done Ratan Singh would re-establish his control over the area and this would enhance


his military might. The Maharana then conveyed to the Jodhpur Raja, Bijay Singh asking him to maintain 3,000 soldiers to suppress Ratan Singh. As long as the army would be stationed there, the revenue of Godwad could be used for its expenses but the sardars of Godwad would be under the control of the Mewar Maharana. Bijay Singh then responded that under normal circumstances 200 cavalry and 300 infantry would be stationed there but in case of a battle, an army of 3,000 would be made available. The day the Maharana would send back his army, his control over the pargana of Godwad would be re-established.  

In 1772, Maharaja Bijay Singh went to Nathdwara where he was joined by the Bikaner ruler, Gaj Singhji and Kishangarh ruler, Bahadur Singhji. Considering it to be a good opportunity, Maharana Ari Singh also went there and requested Bijay Singh to return Godwad but the latter refused.

**Resurgence of Mutual Rivalries among the Rajputs**

Kolff emphasizes that during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the top layer of Rajputs tended to close ranks and articulate new norms of Rajput behavior. Earlier bards had always encouraged their Rajput employers to assume aristocratic self-images closely linked with myths of origin that established their status as kshatriyas and traced back their genealogies to the great dynasties of ancient Indian history. Later the political power and social status of the more successful lineages tended to be legitimised exclusively in the language of descent and kinship. From the sixteenth century onwards, the political opportunities provided by the Mughals and the importance attached to the Mughals themselves gave a new vigour and largely pushed into the background the more ancient character of the Rajputs as an open status group. Kolff suggests that since the late sixteenth century a new Rajput Great Tradition emerged which recognized little else than unilineal kin bodies as the elements of which genuine Rajput history ought to be made up. By the middle of the seventeenth century, Rajasthan and particularly Mewar had become the seat of this new Rajput genealogical orthodoxy.

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75 Ibid.
Thus, every Rajput State was, generally speaking, one clan politically organized into one unit under the pressure of historical circumstances and political conditions. During the formative period, the polities of each Rajput State was largely organized around the principle of *bhai-banth*, i.e., brotherhood.\textsuperscript{76} As expressed in a modern work:

> ‘the ruling class belongs to one particular clan …. The humblest members of the clan considered themselves along with the ruler as the sons of the same father enjoying their patrimony by the same right as the ruler himself. The latter was thus nothing but *primus inter pares* …. The State in fact did not belong to the ruler – it belonged to the clan as whole.’

This identification of the clan with the State was the most characteristic feature of medieval Rajput polity. The clan system not only affected the internal administration of the State; it stood in the way of centralization of political power. Submission to a common superior was basically inconsistent with the traditions of the clan system.\textsuperscript{77} The struggle between the Chundwats and Shaktawats in Mewar in the last quarter of the eighteenth century is one of the worst examples of clan feuds which increased the vulnerability of the Rajput States to Maratha aggressions during this period.\textsuperscript{78} The rise of Rajput States as centralized polities was possible due to a complete subversion of the system of *bhai-banth*. This concept made the Rajput king master of the clan by relegating other lineage members to the level of *chakars* (servants). As an organizing principle *chakri* was antithetical to the idea of *bhai-banth*. The former emerged out of the debris of the latter. The relations between the Narukas of Alwar and their clan-chief, the Jaipur Raja (both Kachhwahas) is a classic example of the changing contours of *chakari*.\textsuperscript{79} Those traditions crystallized themselves into clan feuds which constitute one of the most salient features of Rajput history discussed in our work.

\textsuperscript{76} G.D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity*, pp. 5-10 and 118.
\textsuperscript{79} R.P. Rana, ‘Chakar to Raja: The Emergence of Naruka State of Alwar (c. 1660-1790),’ *Social Science Probings*, June, 2006, p. 60.
Richard Fox has explained the political change among the Rajput clans on the basis of the organizing principles of relationships between the Rajput Raja and his kinsmen. According to Fox when the expansion of the lineage tends to slow down because of non-availability of land in home territory, the clan comes into conflict with adjoining groups. This leads to intensification of inter lineage and intra lineage conflict for control over land – both at home and in the neighbouring areas.\textsuperscript{80} In Sarkar’s opinion, war was the only occupation of the Rajputs.\textsuperscript{81}

As in the case of Jodhpur, in the process of the expansion of the territory, the sons and brothers of the ruler were allowed to occupy the various territories conquered by them. These holdings were recognized as their *thikanas*. This practice was called *bhai-bant*, because, being members of the same clan, they believed that it was their share in a co-operative effort of the clan. Though accepting the sovereignty of the chief of the ruling clan the *sardars* treated him just as *primus-inter-pares*. Following *bhai-bant*, Rao Jodha had assigned the conquered territories to his sons and brothers.\textsuperscript{82}

But the concept of *bhai-bant* weakened the central authority. Later rulers, therefore, had to resort to *pattadari* system.

The reign of Muhammad Shah (1719-1748) witnessed a complete breakdown of Imperial authority in Rajasthan.\textsuperscript{83} In the course of the eighteenth century the Rajput chiefs motivated by personal ambition became aggressive against one another. All these factors revived the pre-Mughal polity in Rajasthan. The Rajputs spent themselves in clan rivalries and civil wars. Jadunath Sarkar observed:

“The imperial Government of Delhi had held together and protected all the feudatory States of India. But when the Emperor became lifeless shadow confined within the harem, when the wazir’s role was pursuit of pleasure varied only by contests of his Court rivals, this unifying bond and common controlling authority was dissolved. No superior power was left to enforce

\textsuperscript{80} Richard G. Fox, *Kin, Clan, Raja and Rule: State Hinterland Relations in Pre-Industrial India*, University of Carlifornia Press, California, 1971.


\textsuperscript{82} G.D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity*, p. 5.

lawful rights and prevent ambitious conflicts between one vassal State and another, or between one prince and another of the same royal house. All the pent-up personal ambitions and inter-State rivalries (hitherto checked) now burst forth without fear or check, and Rajputana became a zoological garden with the barrier of the cages thrown down and the keepers removed. The fiercest animal passions raged throughout the land, redeemed only now and then by individual instances of devotion and chivalry which had not yet totally disappeared from the human bosom.**84**

Under Akbar and his successors, Rajput soldiers had carried the Mughal banner far and wide. But Aurangzeb’s attempt to annex Jodhpur after Jaswant Singh’s death and his invasion of Mewar alienated the Rajputs. This was the opportunity of the Marathas. By appealing to this feeling, Baji Rao I, easily entered Malwa and then made his hold upon that province good.**85** The last vestige of Imperial suzerainty disappeared from Rajasthan completely when Ranthambhor was gained by the Jaipur Raja in October 1753 and Ajmer by the Jodhpur Raja in 1752.**86** Thus, it can be concluded that the Mughal authority in Rajasthan waned on its own. The Rajput States were left to fend for themselves. It is against this background that the Rajputs came into direct contact with the Marathas.

The chief storm centres in Rajasthan during the second quarter of the eighteenth century were Bundi, Jaipur and Marwar. These centres became an arena of inter and intra clan quarrels. Sarkar has commented that:

> “Each of these three dynastic quarrels drew into its vortex the neighbours of the two main contestants, and in time all three became merged into one, with a clear cut array of allies facing opponents similarly confederated. The Marathas were called in to decide the issue, and that by every party and almost in every year. In the end the Rajput kingdoms were ruined, leaving the Marathas in supreme command over a divided and impoverished Rajasthan which was subjected to annual exactions.”**87**

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**87** Ibid., P. 134.
Maratha Presence in Dungarpur, Banswara, Rampura, Kota and Bundi

An amiable cord was struck between the Marathas and the House of Mewar when in 1673, at the time of Shivaji’s coronation it was finally asserted that the Bhonsle house had descended from Sajjan, the son of Rana Hamir of Chittaur’s uncle and predecessor in the Sisodia House. However, the Maratha presence in Mewar can be traced as early as 1724. On 24th November, 1724, Sawai Jai Singh received a kharita from Maharana Sangram Singh in which the latter expressed his concern about the Deccanies creating disturbances in his territory. The Maharana was of the opinion that the Deccanies were thieves and would not give up their habits unless they were properly chastised.88 On 14th March, 1726, another kharita was sent by the Maharana to Sawai Jai Singh informing him about the Maratha ravages. He wrote:

“Deccanies came this side and created great trouble, details of which will be known through Maya Ram. The trouble has been particularly severe, the account of which as sent to you in my previous letter… the Maratha trouble has been so (severe) that if they were not checked, in a year or six months, it would spread far and wide.”89

The Maharana suggested that the Rajput Rajas ought to collaborate to check the Maratha menace.

The territories of Dungarpur and Banswara had acknowledged the suzerainty of Mewar. In 1726, Baji Bhivrao Retrakar, a Maratha commander, visited Mewar and realized chauth from a Mewar district. In 1728 Rawal Ram Singh of Dungarpur received a letter of demand from Baji Rao instructing him to pay khiraj (land revenue) to Udaji Pawar. Another letter of demand was issued on 26th May, 1728 to pay half of the ‘khiraj’ to Malhar Rao Holkar and other half to Udaji Pawar. In order to protect themselves from Maratha aggression, the Rawal of Banswara and Dungarpur agreed to pay khiraj to the Marathas.

Despite this, the Marathas committed aggression when Raghoji Kadam Rao and Sawai Kat Singh Kadam Rao ravaged Banswara and Dungarpur and realized rupees

89 Kharita from Maharana Sangram Singh to Sawai Jai Singh, Baisakh Badi 9, V.S. 1781/1724.
50,000 and rupees 1,13,000 from them respectively. When this was brought into the notice of the Satara government they were rebuked for this trespass as the province was the sphere of influence of Baji Rao. They were directed to transfer all the booty to Baji Rao and warned them sternly against plundering the area in future. Towards the end of 1732, Holkar and Sindhia went to Banswara and Dungarpur to settle the payment of their dues. Maharana Sangram Singh died on 11th January, 1734. Soon his successor was subjected to demands by the Marathas.  

The small State of Rampura was located on the North-western border of Malwa. It lay between the States of Kota and Deolia (Partapgarh). It was ruled by the Chandawat offshoot of Sisodia Rajputs. Prior to its being made an independent principality by Akbar, it was a part of Mewar territory. Now it became a buffer State between Mewar and Malwa. Gopal Singh succeeded to his ancestral domain in 1689. Late in the seventeenth century while he was serving under Prince Bidar Bakht in the Deccan, he sent his son, Ratan Singh, to Rampura to manage the affairs of the State. Ratan Singh dispossessed his father Rao Gopal Singh, himself became a Muslim assuming the name of Islam Khan. He became successful in being recognized as the new ruler. In his despair Gopal Singh joined the Marathas in their Gujarat raids in 1705. Later when Ratan Singh got killed in a battle in 1712, Gopal Singh reoccupied Rampura in 1714 with the help of the Maharana’s forces. The latter, however, gave only a portion of the whole district to the former and annexed the rest to Mewar. In August, 1717, Gopal Singh and his grandson Sangram Singh entered into an agreement by which they became tribute paying zamindars under the Maharana and renounced their independent status till it was granted to bhanej (nephew) Madho Singh.

In December, 1728, a son was born to Sawai Jai Singh by his Udaipuri queen and the Maharana was induced by Jai Singh to grant Rampura to this infant, Madho Singh, who was to remain loyal to Mewar. The Jaipur agents ousted Sangram Singh and took charge of Rampura. When Sawai Madho Singh succeeded to the Jaipur throne in 1750, he attached Rampura to the Kachhwaha dominions. Later Rampura passed on to

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Holkar in 1750. The period between 1761-82 in Mewar was marked by internal strifes. The State of Mewar witnessed a civil war between Maharana Ari Singh and Ratan Singh. Ratan Singh claimed to be the posthumous son of Rana Raj Singh II. The Marathas were invited on several occasions to help the rivals. When this phase passed, the state was destined to be governed by minor rulers that further precipitated the conflict between the Chundawats and the Shaktawats.

In 1726, an unauthorized raid was made in Hadauti by three Maratha leaders – Krishnaji Pant, Baji Pant and Ambaji Pant. They entered the States of Kota and Bundi with light cavalry through the Mukandara Pass with the object of plundering the remote parts of the region, but they were not successful and returned as quickly as they had come.\(^{92}\) As the Maharao had friendly relations with the Maratha chiefs they did not think it wise to fight with the Kota forces, and left the territory as soon as the Maharao and his ministers had received information of their operations. The Marathas entered the territory of Kota again in 1733, under Pilaji Jadhav. This was the time when Holkar and Sindhia marched towards Malwa. The Marathas entered Kota by the eastern route, and crossed the ford of the river Parbati near Atru where Asuji Maratha held a jagir. They raided and ravaged many villages and operated in the territory for about a month. It was for the first time that the villagers suffered such extensive devastations and ravages. To save his people from further plunder the Malhar Rao bribed them heavily and asked to invest the fort of Nahargarh and oust its ruler, Nahar Khan. Maharao Durjan Sal utilized Pilaji’s services in repressing the recalcitrant chief Nahar Khan. The Maratha chief was to besiege Nahargarh and expel him from there. In return he received rupees one lakh and fifty thousand.\(^{93}\) This was the first monetary bribe the Marathas received from Hadauti for abstaining from plundering a portion of it. Countless bribes like this were offered and accepted throughout the troubled period of the eighteenth century. Kota was subjected to much degradation at the hands of the Marathas as it lay in their march towards the North.\(^{94}\)

\(^{92}\) S.P.D., Vol. XIV, Nos. 7 & 8.
\(^{93}\) Beni Gupta, \textit{Maratha Penetration into Rajastan}, p.6.
\(^{94}\) R.K. Saxena, \textit{Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana}, p. 23.
The Maharana of Udaipur was the hereditary overlord of the Hara clan of Bundi. In 1569 the chief of Bundi, Rao Surjan sapped his relations with the Maharana of Udaipur, gave the fort of Ranthambhor to the Mughal Emperor Akbar and accepted him as the overlord. In 1623, the Mughal Emperor Jahangir bestowed Kota on the second son of Rao Ratan. The clan of Haras now lived divided between the two States of Kota and Bundi. In 1707, following the death of Aurangzeb, in the war of succession to the throne, Budh Singh of Bundi fought on the side of Bahadur Shah at the battle of Jaju. As fate would have it, Ram Singh of Kota sided with the defeated rival Prince Azam Shah. The new Emperor Bahadur Shah was grateful to Budh Singh and, therefore, rewarded him with the title of Rao Raja, along with 54 forts of Harauti, including Kota, which had been confiscated due to the treason of it’s ruler. But the city actually remained in the hands of Ram Singh’s son Bhim Singh. The latter secured the patronage of the Sayyid brothers. With Bhim Singh begins the title of Maha Rao, borne by his family, as a fruit of his adhesion to the Sayyid brothers. Bhim Singh was succeeded by his youngest son Durjan Sal in 1724 and reigned till 1756.

Budh Singh had three queens, the chief queen being Jai Singh’s step-sister, Amar Kunwar. His second wife, a Chudawat of Begun, in Mewar, was more dear to him. In 1720, the chief queen, who was till then childless, smuggled an infant into the palace and declared him to be her son by Budh Singh. The boy was named Bhawani Singh. All was well till the queen expressed her desire to marry her son, Bhawani Singh to a daughter of the Maharana. Budh Singh opposed the match on the ground that the boy was an imposter and not his son. Sawai Jai Singh accused Budh Singh that he was repudiating the paternity of Bhawani Singh as he wanted to keep the succession open for a son of his favourite Chudawat queen. At this Budh Singh gave a written undertaking that if Bhawani Singh was done away with, he would not install any of his sons born by his other two wives. He also gave the authority to Sawai Jai Singh to choose a successor for the Bundi throne. Budh Singh got the document attested by his nobles. The matter was also brought to the notice of the Udaipur Maharana. Sawai Jai Singh requested the Maharana to be a witness to the agreement. The Maharana put his signature on the document signed by Budh Singh in which the latter had declared

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Bhawani Singh to be an illegitimate child, and got it attested by his sixteen Umraos.\footnote{Suryamal Misra, *Vamsha Bhaskar (Mahachampu)*, ed., Chandra Prakash Dewal, Vol. VI, Sahitya Akadami, New Delhi, 2007, P. 4605.}

On the basis of the agreement, Bhawani Singh was put to death.\footnote{V.S., Bhatnagar, *Life and times of Sawai Jai Singh*, p. 216.}

Sawai Jai Singh made the best use of this opportunity. Through his efforts, Muhammad Shah granted the State to Dalel Singh, the second son of Salim Singh Hada of Karwar. The strained relations between Sawai Jai Singh and Budh Singh are also mentioned in the *Khyats*. After Bundi being given to Dalel Singh, Budh Singh went and stayed at Jodhpur for sometime.\footnote{Vishveshwar Nath Reu, *Marwar ka Itihas*, Vol. I, p. 334.}

In the meantime a son was born to Budh Singh by his Chudawat queen, the heroic Ummed Singh Hada. On the basis of Budh Singh’s written undertaking, Sawai Jai Singh demanded the surrender of this infant. Budh Singh rolled back on his word and tried to recover Bundi. A fierce battle was fought at Pancholas on 6th April, 1730 in which all the Jaipur nobles lost their lives. Among those who fell on Jai Singh’s side were the five great chieftains Fathmal (of Sarso), Kojuram (of Isarda), Shyamaldas (of Suhad), Bahadur Singh (of Buddhani), Ghasi Ram (of Rasor), besides many others, including Khande Rao, the regent of Narwar.\footnote{Jadunath Sarkar, *A History of Jaipur*, p. 193.}

According to the poet Suraj Mal, the Hada casualties were 1200 slain and 1000 wounded.\footnote{Suryamal, *Vamsha Bhaskar*, Vol.VI, P. 4714.} The Hadas were defeated and Budh Singh took refuge in Mewar, where he died a broken heart.

At the time of the battle being fought, Sawai Jai Singh was in Malwa. He returned from there and halted at the border of Kota, where he was received by Maharao Durjansal, on 11\textsuperscript{th} May, 1730. Sawai Jai Singh’s first task was to bring about a reconciliation between Durjansal and Salim Singh, then took Dalel Singh to meet the Maharao. Sawai Jai Singh then placed the document before Durjansal, containing the terms of the agreement made by Budh Singh and testified by the Maharana. He then asked the Maharao to put his seal also on the document, which the Kota ruler did. On 19\textsuperscript{th} May, 1730, on the bank of the Kusak, Sawai Jai Singh crowned Dalel Singh, the Kota ruler first applying the *tika* on Dalel Singh’s brow, followed by Sawai Jai Singh,
who, waving *chamvar* on the head of the young Hada, proclaimed him as the new Rao Raja of Bundi.\textsuperscript{101}

The contest for the throne of Bundi invited the Marathas into the land of the Hada Rajputs. Budh Singh’s queen sent Pratap Singh Hada to seek help from Malhar Rao Holkar. Accordingly on 22\textsuperscript{nd} April, 1734, the Marathas attacked the fort of Bundi and carried it after a severe fight. The Marathas received rupees six lakhs for their assistance.\textsuperscript{102} This was just the beginning of one of the most traumatic phases that was to be witnessed by Rajasthan and it continued for almost a century. After the death of Budh Singh, the struggle was carried on by his son, Ummed Singh. Towards the end of January, 1745, Jayappa Sindhia and Ishwari Singh attacked Kota and looted it, as Maharao Durjan Sal had been one of the chief supporters of Ummed Singh. In the encounter, Jayappa lost one of his arms which was blown off by a cannon ball. He imposed a heavy fine on Kota. Maharao Durjan Sal held that as Kota had been paying tribute to Sindhia, Holkar and Panwar, they should not have attacked Kota and that the damages for the loss of his hand should be paid either by Ishawari Singh or Dalel Singh and not by Kota. Accordingly, Ishwari Singh asked Dalel Singh to give four villages along with Raprane and Kesho-Rai-Patan with 42 villages to the Marathas. Kota also promised to pay rupees four lakhs.\textsuperscript{103}

In 1748, he finally succeeded to the throne with the help of Holkar. As a price for Malhar Rao Holkar’s help, Ummed Singh awarded the town and district of Patan to him. It remained under the Maratha control and continued to be so till the Hara States came under the East India Company.\textsuperscript{104} Besides this, Ummed Singh promised to give him ten lakh rupees. Out of this two lakhs were paid in 1749 and another three lakhs were given by the Raja in 1751 to Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayappa Sindhia equally.

The balance of five lakhs was to be paid to the Satara treasury along with the *chauth* from Bundi and Nenwa.\textsuperscript{105} Though the verdict of the battle of Bagru proved final and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[103] R.K. Saxena, *Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana*, p. 27.
\item[105] S.P.D., Vol. XIV, No. 23.
\end{footnotes}
irrevocable but it made Ummed Singh the feudatory of the Marathas.\textsuperscript{106} As a price for Malhar Rao Holkar’s help, Ummed Singh awarded the town and district of Patan to him. It remained under the Maratha control and continued to be so till the Hara states came under the East India Company. The bitterness that had developed in the Jaipur-Bundi relations persisted for a long time to come. Probably this was the reason that the \textit{Vamsha Bhaskar} which was written in 1840 by Surya Mal Mishran, the court historian of Bundi tried to be critical of Sawai Jai Singh. Bundi was recovered by Ummed Singh, son of Budh Singh in 1748 and he naturally had a bitter memory of Sawai Jai Singh who had deprived him of his patrimony. It is, therefore, quite likely that Surya Mal derived some malicious pleasure in describing that Jai Singh had died of a horrible disease.\textsuperscript{107}

\textbf{Sawai Jai Singh and the Marathas}

Interaction between Malwa and Rajasthan began with the appointment of Sawai Jai Singh of Amber/Jaipur as the Mughal \textit{subedar} of Malwa thrice. Sawai Jai Singh has been charged with contributing to the Maratha conquest of Malwa and indeed, of Hindustan. Let us take into account the correspondence between Sawai Jai Singh and Baji Rao I that according to Sir John Malcolm, commenced on a characteristic note. Baji Rao is said to have sent a verse of the \textit{Puran} to Sawai Jai Singh, which when literally translated reads:

``Thou art like the cloud which drinketh the waters of the sea, and returneth them with thunder to fertilize the earth. The mountains, in dread of Indra, fly to thee for protection. Thou art the tree of desires. Thou art the sea whence springeth the tree of desires, who can tell thy depth! I have no power to describe the depth of the ocean; but in all thy actions remember Agastya Moonee.”

According to Hindu mythology, the sage Agastya \textit{muni} drank up the sea. Though flattering, Baji Rao communicated metaphorically a distinct warning of what might happen if Sawai Jai Singh opposed the Brahmin sway. Sawai Jai Singh retorted as mentioned under:

\textsuperscript{106} Beni Gupta, \textit{Maratha Penetration into Rajasthan}, p. 42.
“If the offspring of Brahma sin with me, I forgive them. This pledge I hold sacred. It was of no consequence that Agastya Moonee drank up the sea; but if God should doom the walls that retain the ocean to be thrown down, then the world would be destroyed, and what would become of Agastya Moonee?”

The Hindus believe the sea to be walled in; and the allusion to the consequences of that element being let loose upon the earth, is considered, as addressed to one of the sacred offspring of Brahma, whose duty it was to preserve, instead of destroying, the general order, to be peculiarly opposite. This correspondence, however, highlights that it was the object of the proud Rajput, while he gave encouragement and accepted the proffered friendship, to retort the threat by warning Baji Rao of the consequences that would ensue from breaking down long-established authority. This indicates that Baji Rao had met his match in Sawai Jai Singh who refused to be cowed down.

Sawai Jai Singh’s First Governorship of Malwa (February, 1713 - November, 1717)

As the governor of Malwa Sawai Jai Singh had won a great victory against the Maratha invaders in 1715. He drove them across the river Narmada with heavy losses. The impact of this crushing defeat was so strong that the Marathas did not meddle in the affairs of Malwa for the next two years. After 1715 Sawai Jai Singh was absent from Malwa as half of the Kachhwaha contingent was busy with the Jat campaign. His deputy was not as vigilant and Maratha raids got revived in the province. In November, 1717, Sawai Jai Singh was replaced by Muhammad Amin Khan.

Here it should be remembered that the favour shown to Sawai Jai Singh by granting the subedari of Malwa led to his disassociation from Ajit Singh. Jai Singh had succeeded in getting the subedari on the recommendation of Khan-i-Dauran and had direct access to the Emperor Farrukh Siyar. The growing animosity between Sawai Jai Singh and Ajit Singh was because both of them wanted to extend their influence over...

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Rajasthan. Ajit Singh felt that he had been deprived of Sambhar and Didwana due to Sawai Jai Singh. On the other hand, the appointment of Ajit Singh to the subedari of Gujarat on the recommendation of the Saiyyad brothers brought him closer to them. Besides the subedari of Gujarat, Ajit Singh also held the parganas of Sojat, Jaitaran, Phalodi, Siwana, Merta and Gajsinghpura. He also took advantage of the situation prevailing at the Mughal Court in expanding his territorial control around Marwar. While proceeding to Gujarat in A.D. 1715, he occupied Bhinmal and Jalor which had been in the Rathor domain during the time of Maharaja Jaswant Singh. After the assassination of Farrukh Siyar, in February 1719, Ajit Singh gained the most advantageous position. He was granted the subedari of both Ajmer and Gujarat.109

This clearly exhibits that though Sawai Jai Singh and Ajit Singh had collaborated when their respective watan jagirs were taken away from them. Internally in order to augment their own prospects they could leave each other in a lurch as and when the situation demanded. The same was true in the case of their respective successors also.

Sawai Jai Singh’s Second Governorship of Malwa (November 1729-September 19, 1730)

Raja Sawai Jai Singh’s second governorship lasted barely for ten months. Prior to the second governorship, Sawai Jai Singh was repeatedly urged by the Emporer to go to the aid of Raja Girdhar Bahadur, the governor of Malwa, to check the Maratha depredations but Sawai Jai Singh did not pay any heed to this. Sarkar ascribes this indifference to Sawai Jai Singh’s disgust with court politics and Raghubir Sinh attributes it to the Raja’s collusion with the Marathas. Raghubir Sinh held the view that religion did not play a role in guiding Sawai Jai Singh’s policy of favouring the Marathas rather he was motivated by a feeling of self-interest and personal gain. He wanted to become the governor of Malwa and extend his dominion from the Jamuna to the Narmada. He hoped that he could keep the Marathas out of the province by paying them their dues regularly and in this way he would perpetuate his hold on the province. But he could hope to become the governor of Malwa only if the Marathas

made the position of every other governor untenable there.\textsuperscript{110} Satish Chandra, however, does not accept either of the two arguments. Malcolm opines that during his governorship, Sawai Jai Singh either conceived opposition hopeless or entertained a secret friendship and understanding with the Marathas.\textsuperscript{111} In 1725 Sawai Jai Singh had proposed to the Emperor that a policy of judicious compromise should be followed with the Marathas. He suggested that Shahu and four of his principle men should be taken into Imperial service, and Shahu be granted jagir worth ten lakhs in each of the two provinces of Malwa and Gujarat.\textsuperscript{112}

During his second governorship Sawai Jai Singh got the opportunity to follow his policy. This is evident through a document in which he pointed out that:

\begin{quote}
“The Marathas had tasted Malwa for a long time past. If this year, by reason of our heavy concentration of troops, they were unable to enter the suba or chastised (after they have entered) you know what heavy expenditure would be necessary for this object every year in the future. I therefore suggest that as Raja Shahu has been ranked as an Imperial mansabdar since the days of Aurangzeb, your Majesty should give him a jagir worth ten lakh of rupees in the name of his (adopted) son, Khushal Singh, on condition that he prevented any future disturbance in Malwa and an auxiliary contingent of his troops should attend the subedar of that province. This will give peace to the land and save us from the expense of campaigning (every year).”\textsuperscript{113}
\end{quote}

Shahu’s agent, Dado Bhimsen, gave written undertakings to this effect, on behalf of his master (26\textsuperscript{th} February and 27\textsuperscript{th} September, 1730).\textsuperscript{114} Sawai Jai Singh’s policy was at first approved by the Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah and he wrote ‘Agreed’ on Jai Singh’s letter. But within a short span of a few months the Emperor not only reversed Sawai Jai Singh’s policy but also charged him with slothfulness and treachery and soon replaced him as governor with Muhammad Khan Bangash whose utter failure in two years proved how correct Sawai Jai Singh’s assessment was.

\textsuperscript{110} Raghubir Sinh, \textit{Malwa inTransition}, p.194.
\textsuperscript{111} John Malcolm, \textit{A Memoir of Central India}, p. 80.
\textsuperscript{112} Satish Chandra, “Raja Jai Singh Sawai’s Contribution to Imperial politics”, \textit{Proceedings of History Congress}, 11\textsuperscript{th} Session, Delhi, 1948, p. 183.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., p. 184.
\textsuperscript{114} Jadunath Sarkar, \textit{A History of Jaipur}, p.177.
According to Satish Chandra, Sawai Jai Singh’s policy was clearly aimed at keeping the Marathas out of Malwa. But after 1725, he considered that possible only by a settlement with the Marathas through a judicious compromise and war should be seen as the last resort. The policy suggested by Sawai Jai Singh had been successfully followed by Nizam ul-Mulk. He strengthened his alliance with the Marathas. He had also agreed for their right of levying *chauth* of the revenue of the Deccan. In the words of one of Nizam-ul-Mulk’s biographers, Muhammad Qasim, who penned his biography in Persian, *Ahwal-i-Khawaqin*,

“At this time the Marathas are so strong that only a person with the luck of Alexander can deal with them effectively. The work is not easy. All this is due to our own folly and dissensions. It is due to this that things have come to this pass. It is to be seen what God has in store for us.”

On being conferred the governorship for the second time Sawai Jai Singh arrived at the provincial capital Ujjain in December. A few weeks earlier the fortress of Mandu had been taken by the Marathas. To recover it, Sawai Jai Singh appealed to the Maratha king Shahu in the name of the old friendship that existed between their royal ancestors. The Maratha king relented and ordered Mandu to be restored to the Imperialists. Early in May, Sawai Jai Singh was recalled to Jaipur by more pressing business there.

**Sawai Jai Singh’s Third Governorship in Malwa (1732-1737)**

The Mughal Emperor made Sawai Jai Singh the *subedar* of Malwa for the third time on 6th September, 1732. He was asked to maintain an army of 30,000 horse and foot in equal numbers for which he was granted rupees 13 lakhs and 7 lakhs as loan from the Emperor on the condition that he would raise an army and drive the Marathas out of Malwa. Sawai Jai Singh was also assigned two-third of the total revenues of Malwa to meet the expenses. Thus, unprecedented resources were placed at Sawai Jai Singh’s disposal. In 1732, after the rainy season was over, the Marathas became

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116 Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, p.218
active once again. Sawai Jai Singh reached Ujjain in December, 1732. When Sawai
Jai Singh was at Mandsaur in February, 1733, Holkar and Sindhia after leaving their
heavy baggage near the Mahi, hemmed Sawai Jai Singh round and put his troops to
great privations, by cutting off their grain and water supplies.\footnote{\textit{Holkar

This was also the time when Sawai Jai Singh was involved in the disputed succession to
the throne of Bundi. Therefore, he tried to avoid an open conflict with the Marathas. As one
of the claimants implored the Maratha king, Shahu for help against Sawai Jai Singh, the
Marathas found this opportunity to intrude into Rajasthan. Budh Singh’s wife, the
Kachhwaha queen had invited the Marathas to restore Bundi to her husband on payment of six
lakhs of rupees as their expences.\footnote{Suryamal, \textit{Vamsha Bhaskar}, Vol. VI, P. 4789.} Ranoji Sindhia and Malhar Rao Holkar were
deputed to help her. The two \textit{sardars} took over Bundi in their possession on 12\textsuperscript{th} April, 1734. However, Sawai Jai Singh again brought Bundi under his control.

Probably this act of the Marathas made Sawai Jai Singh realize that if not resisted, the
Marathas would thwart his own ambitions. He therefore, entreated the Emperor to send him additional troops with funds and supplies. Sawai Jai Singh further strengthened his efforts by forming a strong league of the Rajput Rajas in 1734.

**Hurda Conference**

Sawai Jai Singh convened a conference of all the rulers of the various States of
Rajasthan in July, 1734, at Hurda to devise ways to resist the Marathas.\footnote{Vishveshwar Nath Reu, \textit{Marwar ka Itihas}, Vol. I, pp. 347,348.} Among those who attended the conference were the Maharana of Udaipur, Jagat Singh II, Abhay Singh of Jodhpur, Bakht Singh of Nagore, Dalel Singh of Bundi, Gopal Pal of
Bikaner and the Rajas of Kishangarh and Karauli. Accordingly, an agreement with following terms was concluded among them:

1. To remain united in all circumstances, good or bad, with a pledge to abide by the terms.
2. No one shall countenance the traitor of another.
3. After the rains, to re-assemble at Rampura. In his absence the head of a State shall send his heir or some person of standing.
4. In case an heir commits any error, the Rana alone shall mediate to correct it.
5. In every enterprise all shall unite to execute the agreement.

Soon the agreement fell flat due to the ‘non-agreement’ (naittifaqi) between Bikaner and Nagore, the ‘deception’ (daghabazi) of Sawai Jai Singh leading to the ‘ruin’ (tabahi) of Kota and Bundi and Maharana Jagat Singh’s attempts to exhibit his own greatness in making Madho Singh as the rightful claimant to the Jaipur throne. Each one’s eagerness to secure Maratha help further enabled the Marathas to intrude into Rajasthan. In the end the Marathas emerged as the victors and dictated terms to the Rajputs: “jisse dakhini ghali bhokar inpar hukumat ka danka bajate the.” Thus, the terms of the agreement could not be executed, as they could not follow a unified policy. Outwardly Sawai Jai Singh and Abhay Singh put up a joint front but in reality they followed divergent paths.

With the waning authority of the Mughal emperor and the division of the Imperial Court into two almost equally balanced groups among the nobles. One of these groups was led by the wazir Qamar-ud-din Khan and the other by the chief bakshi, Khan-i-Dauran. The wazir had the ability to perceive the dangers facing the Empire better than any of his contemporaries and was an enemy of oppression and promoted the war party. The chief bakshi was a learned man and his character in personal life was above reproach but he was not a strong military commander. This made him shrink from war.

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and therefore, he relied on diplomacy and promoted the peace party. He believed in
the balance of power and was loosely allied with Sawai Jai Singh. Abhay Singh had
got so disgusted with the Marathas that he was not in favour of the appeasement
policy followed by Sawai Jai Singh towards them. Therefore, he joined hands with the
party led by Qamar-ud-din Khan in the Mughal Court that followed the policy of
resistance towards the Marathas. In pursuance of the hard line, Sawai Jai Singh was
also compelled to join the plan of action. Accordingly, the wazir, Abhay Singh and
Sadat Khan were to march by way of Gwalior while Sawai Jai Singh and Khan-i-
Dauran were to be sent by way of Jaipur.

With these grand preparations, two divisions marched from Delhi in the winter of
1734-35, one under the wazir, Qamar-ud-din Khan by the eastern route into
Bundelkhand and the second under the mir bakshi, Khan-i-Dauran by the western
route into Rajasthan. The first army under the wazir totally failed against Pilaji Jadhav
and returned to Delhi in May, 1735. The second army under Khan-i-Dauran was
joined on the way to Ajmer by Sawai Jai Singh, Abhay Singh and Durjansal of Kota.
This army crossed the Mukandara pass and reached Rampura territory. The Marathas
gave a stiff fight to the the Mughal army: “Mukandara utarun Rampura prante
Marathyanchya rokhane Monglache kuch jhale.”

The Imperial army was doomed to failure due to lack of direction. For eight days the
Marathas surrounded the Imperial army, absolutely immobilizing it and depriving it of
food and fodder: “tyapramaane aath roj laskarche chaugird kahikabad danaghas
bund kela.” Thus, an army of twenty thousand Marathas proved superior to the
Mughal army of two lakh.

Having attained a lightning victory the Marathas crossed the Mukundara pass and
entered the defenceless Jaipur and Jodhpur kingdoms. Malhar Rao Holkar, who had
no more than 7,000 to 8,000 men, awaited the arrival of Pratap Singh Hada of Bundi.

128 Ibid., p. 42.
129 Govind Sakharam Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. II, Second Impression 1958,
Phoenix Publications, Bombay, p. 159.
Pratap Singh Hada had put his well-equipped army at the disposal of the Marathas. The Imperialists were completely outwitted by the Maratha strategy. Malhar Rao at the head of a much smaller force was plundering areas around Ajmer. Sambhar also suffered from his marauding. Malhar Rao further raided many places in both regions. The loot of the rich city of Sambhar on 28th February, 1735, yielded him rich dividends. The Imperial faujdar of the city was robbed of everything. By early March, Khan-i-Dauran was at Kota and Sawai Jai Singh was near his own capital. Ranoji and Malhar Rao were some twenty miles from Jaipur. Circumstances compelled Khan-i-Dauran to listen to Sawai Jai Singh’s advice. Accordingly, the Marathas were persuaded to retire beyond the Narmada. On behalf of the Emperor twenty two lakhs of rupees as chauth from Malwa was promised. On 22nd March, 1735, this understanding was effected at a meeting between the two sides arranged by Sawai Jai Singh near Kota. After this Sawai Jai Singh and Khan-i-Dauran returned to Delhi only to be charged with treason. The war party at the Mughal court became more vociferous, thereby ignoring Sawai Jai Singh’s sober reasoning: “bakshi va Jaisingh yanjvirudh Turani pakshane Badshahkade takrar keli.”

He had suggested that the way to restore peace in Malwa was to win over the Peshwa by friendly negotiations. The Peshwa was to be converted into an Imperial officer by granting a jagir and inducing him to visit the Emperor. As the agreement of 22nd March, 1735 was not ratified by the Emperor, Sawai Jai Singh got enraged and he decided to invite the Peshwa to Northern India. He called the Maratha envoy to his court and told him: “I …cannot trust the Turks. If the latter triumph over the Deccani forces, they will disregard us. Therefore in every matter I shall follow the behest of the Peshwa.”

In a letter dated August 1735, the Peshwa’s agent posted with Sawai Jai Singh wrote to him the details of the negotiations which the writer was conducting with the Raja in

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131 Ibid., p. 280.
order to prevent the Marathas from entering Malwa. Accordingly, he sent a proposal to Baji Rao to come to Jaipur at the head of only five thousand horse. Sawai Jai Singh promised to bear his daily expenses of rupees five thousand. Another important letter indicates Baji Rao’s entrance into Imperial politics at Delhi. Baji Rao arranged terms with Sawai Jai Singh through Mahadev Bhatt Hingane, his agent at the Mughal Court.

One, Ram Chandra Baba is mentioned as being instrumental in arranging the accommodation. It seems that the Marathas Northward policy was arrived at by deliberations between eminent Maratha sardars. In an interesting development Baji Rao’s mother expressed her desire to go on a pilgrimage to North India.

**Radhabai’s pilgrimage**

When Radhabai’s intention of visiting the holy places of Northern India became known, both the Rajput Rajas and the Mughal officials, requested the revered lady to visit their States and shrines. Leaving Poona on the 14th February, 1735, Radhabai made a successful pilgrimage through Northern India. The Emperor himself ordered an escort of one thousand troops of his own body-guard to accompany her during the period of her stay beyond the river Narmada. Radhabai received an honourable and warm welcome from the Maharana of Udaipur. When she arrived near Jaipur in June 1735, Sawai Jai Singh personally came out of his capital to receive her. Arrangements were made for her to stay in the royal palace and during the seven days of her stay at Jaipur, Sawai Jai Singh came to see her several times and each time suitable gifts were given to her. Radhabai also reciprocated by giving suitable presents. During Radhabai’s stay, Sawai Jai Singh successfully sought her blessings for his daughter, Krishna Kunwari, who was married to Rao Raja Dalel Singh of Bundi. There could be a probability that since Radhabai had blessed Krishna Kunwari, Dalel Singh was not disturbed by the Marathas till 1748. The Marathas highly appreciated the warm

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136 S.P.D., Vol. XIV, No. 47.  
137 S.P.D., Vol. XIV, No. 50.  
and respectful welcome accorded to Radhbai in Rajasthan. Her pilgrimage paved the way for Baji Rao’s visit to Rajasthan.

**Baji Rao’s visit to Rajasthan**

Baji Rao agreed to the proposal out of his regard for Sawai Jai Singh and also for a chance of winning over the Rajput princes through friendly discourses.\(^{140}\) He left Puna on 9\(^{th}\) October, 1735. To meet the Rana of Mewar, the Peshwa came via Lunawada, Banswara and Dungarpur.\(^{141}\) He was given a grand reception at Udaipur and was accommodated at the *Champabagh* palace in January 1734. Moreover, the Maharana honoured him in an open *darbar*, where two gold embroidered seats were arranged for the guest and the host. When Baji Rao approached the seat which the Maharana pointed to him, he politely declined to accept the position of equality with the Maharana, and simply occupied a seat just below. For five days dresses and presents were offered and entertainments took place.\(^{142}\) Baji Rao got a written promise of annual payment of rupees 1,60,000. The pargana of Banheda was ceded to the Marathas to cover this amount.

After his successful visit to Udaipur, Baji Rao proceeded via the holy city of Nathdwara towards Jaipur. Sawai Jai Singh moved South to welcome his guest and the two met at village Bhamola, thirty miles east of Ajmer. A pavilion had been erected at the meeting place, between the two camps, while the Rajput and Maratha escorts stood fully armed on the two sides. After descending from their respective elephants, both exchanged embraces and sat down on the same cushion. The visit having lasted for several days, Sawai Jai Singh and Baji Rao discussed the peace terms. They also had prolonged discussions regarding a lasting settlement between the Marathas and the Mughals. The visit was marked by the usual exchange of gifts.

In May, 1736, the Emperor agreed to appoint Baji Rao the deputy governor (*naib-subedar*) and *de facto* master of Malwa, while Sawai Jai Singh was to continue as the nominal *subedar*. As all the demands of the Marathas were not accepted, Baji Rao organized the


\(^{141}\) *Holkarshahicha itihas*, Vol. I, p. 44.

most spectacular campaign of his career. Leaving Poona on 12th November, 1736, he swept through Malwa, Bundelkhand and the Gangetic doab and reached the very gates of the Imperial capital. In 1737, Peshwa Baji Rao wrote to his brother:

“Sawaiji has also sent us friendly letters requesting us to leave his territory undisturbed… we do not disturb his territory as we expect to get supplies of grain and fodder from Sawaiji on our way.”

With the accession of Balaji Baji Rao in 1740 up to the death of Sawai Jai Singh in 1743, there was friendly interaction between the latter and the Marathas. According to Malcolm, Sawai Jai Singh’s object was to keep the dialogue between the Marathas and the Emperor open. Clearly Sawai Jai Singh desired to combine his loyalty to the Emperor and friendship with the Marathas.

**Jodhpur and the Marathas**

The Marathas featured in Marwar politics for the first time in 1724. After the deposition of Farrukhshiyar, Ajit Singh enjoyed an influential position at the royal court and was appointed as governor of Gujarat as well as of Ajmer, which had religious and strategical importance attached to it. Ajit Singh helped the Saiyyid brothers to stabilize their position at the imperial court. This was beneficial for Ajit Singh as his closeness to the Saiyyids helped him to safeguard his own interests. With the fall of the Saiyyid brothers, Ajit Singh also fell into disfavour at the imperial court. Imperial hostility drove Ajit Singh into an alliance with Churaman Jat. This alliance was not liked by Sawai Jai Singh and he contrived to weaken Ajit Singh’s position. Thus, the murder of Maharaja Ajit Singh was planned and executed as a result of an understanding between the Mughal Emperor, Sawai Jai Singh and Abhay Singh, the son of Ajit Singh. After the murder of Maharaja Ajit Singh by his son Bakht Singh on 23rd June 1724, Marwar plunged into a war of succession among Ajit Singh’s sons. At the time of his father’s murder, Abhay Singh was at Delhi. The

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Mughal Emperor recognized Abhay Singh as the new ruler on 17th July, 1724 and he was coronated there only. The Emperor presented him a *khilat*, bestowed the title of ‘Rajrajeshwar’ and also the area of Nagor on him. The younger sons of Ajit Singh, Anand Singh and Rai Singh raised the standard of revolt. A civil war had started between the brothers. Abhay Singh was able to crush the revolt with the timely help advanced by the strong contingents of Jaipur and Mewar.

Anand Singh and Rai Singh fled to Gujarat where they seem to have even proposed a matrimonial alliance with the Marathas. They tried to secure the help of the Marathas to occupy Jodhpur. The two brothers tried to gain Idar for themselves with the help of their Maratha allies. Idar in Gujarat had been bestowed on Abhay Singh by the Emperor. It was attacked in the middle of 1725. Though the Marathas failed to dislodge the Rathor hold on the territory, their regular incursions ruined all sources of revenue from that area. In March 1726, the two brothers and their Maratha allies made preparation to march towards Jodhpur.

Meanwhile, Sawai Jai Singh made an attempt to reconcile the brothers by suggesting that Anand Singh and Rai Singh be allotted some *jagirs* in Abhay Singh’s territory, but it did not succeed. Rather Abhay Singh agreed to hand over the *jagir* of Idar to the Maharana of Mewar on condition that he would get Anand Singh and Rai Singh murdered. Abhay Singh also assured the Maharana to make a common cause against the Marathas. The Maharana was successful in establishing his hold over Idar but both the brothers escaped and headed towards Marwar and devastated the Maharana’s territory as well. Clearly, the internal feuds and their inter-state rivalries between Ajit Singh’s sons gave an opportunity to the Marathas to gradually move towards Rajasthan.

Marathas inroads into Marwar dates from 1728, when Kanthaji Kadam and Pilaji Gaekwad invaded Jalore and fomented trouble at the request of Rai Singh and Anand Singh. Abhay Singh sent Bhandari Khivsi to make peace with the Maratha leaders and persuade them to withdraw. Bhandari Khivsi

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succeeded in his mission and the Marathas withdrew. When Abhay Singh was the subedar of Gujarat he instigated the Mughals against the Marathas. This was rankling in the mind of Malhar Rao Holkar. Consequently in 1736, Malhar Rao Holkar advanced from Gujarat and invaded Marwar. He plundered Jalore, Sojat, Bilara, Merta and Jodhpur. Meanwhile, the long struggle with his brothers came to an end as Abhay Singh gave Idar as a jagir to them in August 1728. The death of Abhay Singh and the disputed throne of Marwar provided splendid opportunities to the Marathas to visit the State again and again.

The interests of the Jodhpur Raja and the Marathas clashed in Gujarat. Its geographical location is in the South of Marwar across Palanpur and Sirohi, bordering on Jalore, Jaswantpura and Bhinmal tehsils of Jodhpur division. The traders of Marwar, carried their trade via the routes of Gujarat. As the State charged custom duty from these traders, the Rathor rulers had to provide security of the trade routes beyond their territory also. The first consideration of the Rathors in wishing for peaceful political conditions in Gujarat was the prosperity of their own trade. Secondly, the richness of the land was a compensation for their own territory’s dry western part. Moreover, Gujarat’s strategic location made them covet it as their own territory.

As Maharaja Jaswant Singh and Ajit Singh had been given jagirs in Gujarat followed by Abhay Singh’s governorship of the same, the Rathors attempted to push Marwar frontier towards Gujarat. On the other hand, the Marathas treated Gujarat as a source of additional income since the days of Shivaji. The Marathas under the leadership of Pilaji, the deputy of Khande Rao Dabhade, established their control over Baroda, Dabholi etc. and converted the province into a sort of marauding ground for themselves. These were the circumstances when Abhay Singh was entrusted the task

of ridding Gujarat of the Maratha marauders. But Baji Rao I came with an army from the Deccan to Ahmedabad and sent a message to Abhay Singh that Khande Rao had been taking *chauth* from Gujarat. Since Khande Rao was no more, therefore, *chauth* should now be given to him.

On *Mah Sudi* 15, V.S. 1787/1730 Baji Rao met Abhay Singh and cordialities were exchanged. He stayed there for a month and both met for a couple of times. When the Peshwa heard about the *Nizam’s* arrival at Narmada, he had to leave, though the *chauth* was not finalized. Abhay Singh then presented a *siropav* to the Peshwa and deputed *bhandari* Vijay Raj and Rathor Amar Singh Kushlawat with a force to safely see off the Peshwa. They accompanied him to Baroda. Afterwards Abhay Singh entered into an agreement with them, under the Ahmadabad Pact of 1731. He agreed to pay rupees 13 lakhs as *chauth* of Gujarat. In return, the Peshwa promised to help in expelling Pilaji Gaekwar and Kanthaji Bande from Gujarat. However, the pact was soon repudiated and Abhay Singh got Pilaji murdered. Malhar Rao Holkar and Ranoji Sindhia occupied Champaner and Pavagarh in 1733. Abhay Singh had no choice but to agree to pay rupees 80,000 out of the revenues of Ahmadabad along with the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*.

The animosity between the Kachhwahas and the Rathors stretched over generations and the Peshwa knew about it. Hence, he took advantage of it. The relations between Sawai Jai Singh and Abhay Singh were quite bitter. So much so that on the advice of Sawai Jai Singh, Baji Rao asked Malhar Rao and Ranoji Sindhia, Kanthaji and Anand Rao Panwar to invade Marwar and devastate it. Abhay Singh had antagonized Baji Rao by not paying the amount promised in 1735. Earlier Naro Shankar had reported to the Peshwa that Abhay Singh promises to relieve the Peshwa of his debts. The Peshwa dispatched a force under Shinde and Holkar towards Marwar. Soon the two *sardars* besieged the fort of Merta. Malhar Rao Holkar and

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153 Ibid.
154 Holkarshahicha Itihas, Vol. I, p. 44.
Ranoji Sindhia informed the Peshwa about the severe encounter at Merta. Soon Abhay Singh’s general, bhandari Bijay Raj surrendered and agreed to pay the ransom. Bakht Singh was also forced to pay the tribute. But as per the Merta agreement, when Holkar and Sindhia came to collect the tribute in March, 1742, they experienced difficulty in raising money from the people of Sojat, Raipur and Jaitaran. It may be noted here that Sawai Jai Singh and Abhay Singh had divergent policies towards the Marathas. Almost a similar situation cropped up later during the reigns of Sawai Madho Singh and Bijay Singh. If Sawai Jai Singh had taken interest in the internal disturbance caused by the revolt of Bakht Singh at Nagor in October, 1740, Sawai Madho Singh also supported the cause of Ram Singh. The battle of Gangwana fought on 28th May, 1741, was the net outcome of these hostilities. Sawai Jai Singh joined Ratan Singh in the battle but ultimately peace was concluded. It was a decisive victory for Sawai Jai Singh as it humbled the pride of Maharaja Abhay Singh. Soon after the battle Sawai Jai Singh performed the Ashvamedha Yajna. The Marathas were ever on the look out for such an opportunity. When hostility between Abhay Singh and Bakht Singh resumed, the former invited Malhar Rao Holkar on a daily payment of rupees 11,000. Abhay Singh’s failing health and intensification of internal conflicts within Jodhpur led him to secure the support of the Marathas. Ironically, this was the policy that had all along been suggested by Jai Singh. Abhay Singh exchanged turbans with Holkar at Pushkar, dined on the same table and thus developed close relationship.

Marwar Civil War and Maratha Intervention

After the death of Abhay Singh, his son Ram Singh ascended the throne of Jodhpur on 13th July, 1749. Malhar Rao recognized him as the rightful claimant for the leadership of the Rathors and sent a tika and an elephant at the time of his coronation. The message sent was loud and clear. Earlier the change in kingship was recognized and approved officially by the Mughal Emperors, now the same was done by the Marathas. It was a remarkable change in political equations in the politics of Rajasthan. As expected, Bakht Singh did not acknowledge the new Raja. The State

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159 G.R. Parihar, Marwar and the Marathas, p. 57.
160 V.S. Bhargava, Rise of the Kachhawas in Dhundhar (Jaipur) : From the earliest times to the death of Sawai Jai Singh (1743 A.D.), Shabd Sanchar, Ajmer, 1979, p. 160.
was to witness a civil war and the court got divided into two armed camps. There is a famous saying prevalent in Marwar: “Rinmala thapiya teeke Raja,” which means, one who gets support of the nobles becomes the ruler of Marwar.162

If one group of nobles supported Ram Singh, the other organized itself under the banner of his uncle Bakht Singh. Thakur Kesari Singh of Ras, Kalyan Singh of Nimajj, Prem Singh of Pali and Devi Singh of Pokaran received jagirs from Bakht Singh as they extended their support to him.163 Ram Singh sought the political support of Kachhwaha rular Sawai Ishwari Singh,164 Bakht Singh secured the co-operation of Madho Singh. A Maratha report was sent to the Peshwa informing him about the war between Ram Singh and Sawai Ishwari Singh on the one side and Bakht Singh on the other.165 Through Sawai Ishwari Singh, Ram Singh secured the Peshwa’s support who sent a force of 1,500. Holkar also sent a force under his son. An armed conflict was imminent. The two sides reached Pipar but the scarcity of water and the scorching heat thwarted any active action. Ultimately a confrontation took place on 14th April, 1750, without any conclusive results. At last a peace unfavourable to Bakht Singh was concluded.

With the death of his ally Sawai Ishwari Singh, Ram Singh lost one of his allies. Except the sardars of Merta, almost all the others had joined Bakht Singh. This particular situation popularized a doha (couplet) in Marwar implying that majority of the Thakurs were unhappy with Ram Singh and they invited his uncle, Bakht Singh to come to Jodhpur and enthrone himself: “Ramai sun raji nahin, dino uttar desh, Jodhano jhala karai, aow dhani Bakhtesh.”166 Sawai Madho Singh was now the Raja of Jaipur through whose help, Bakht Singh prevailed upon Holkar to at least remain neutral. Holkar’s neutrality sealed the fate of Ram Singh. Bakht Singh defeated Ram Singh at Merta and occupied Jodhpur on 21st June, 1751. After loosing Jodhpur, Ram Singh went to Maroth. He sent his agent purohit Jagan Nath to Jaipur to secure Sawai Madho Singh’s aid. Since

the growing power of Bakht Singh could be a menace to Jaipur, Sawai Madho Singh
decided to support Ram Singh. When the purohit went to seek Maratha help, Jayappa
Sindhia agreed to help Ram Singh for which he was paid an advance amount of ten to
twelve thousand.  
At the end of May, 1752, he attacked and occupied Ajmer but soon
had to leave for Poona. Therefore, he deputed his general, Sahiba Patel to take care of
Ram Singh’s affairs. Soon Bakht Singh attacked and defeated Ram Singh and the
Maratha force on 28th July, 1752. After this success, Bakht Singh even tried to activate an
anti-Maratha coalition of the Rajput rulers, the Jats and the Mughal wazir. However, these
efforts could not materialize due to his death on 21st, September, 1752. He died leaving
a disputed succession and an impending civil strife for his son, Bijay Singh.

Accession of Bijay Singh and the Battle of Merta

With the open support of Malhar Rao Holkar, Bijay Singh was coronated on 31st
January, 1753. Once again Ram Singh tried to secure Maratha help. At Raghunath
Rao’s instructions, Jayappa marched towards Jodhpur to reinstate Ram Singh on the
throne. He was accompanied by his son, Jankoji and brother, Dattaji along with Raja
Sawant Singh’s son, Sardar Singh. They all came to Kishangarh. With 30,000 cavalry,
the city was looted by them. From Kishangarh, Jayappa’s army marched to
Pokharan and encamped there. From Pokharan they went to Alanias and looted the
place. Afterwards they reached Gangarade, near Ajmer. The news of the Maratha
arrival led to hectic preparations by Bijay Singh. He was joined in his efforts by the
Bikaner and Kishangarh rulers, Gaj Singh and Bhadar Singh respectively. The
forces of the Dakhanis numbered 60,000 while Marwar forces were 40,000.

On the first day, the Rathors were victorious while the Dakhanis suffered a defeat.
From here they marched to Merta. The next day being the shraddh of Maharaja Bakht
Singh, the Rathors felt it improper to fight the Marathas. When the Jodhpur Raja’s
supporters were not able to decide whether to fight or not, suddenly the Dakhanis

170 Ibid
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
attacked them with a force of 5,000. The bullocks were taken away by them and the cannons were destroyed. Surano Devichand was killed. They started moving towards their cannons but the *Dakhanis* again attacked them from behind.\textsuperscript{173} The encounter took place on 14\textsuperscript{th} September, 1754 on the plains of Merta city. The Marathas attacked from all sides. Almost 10,000 Rathor soldiers were killed. Many of the *Dakhanis* also got killed.\textsuperscript{174} The Rathor leaders could not stand the Maratha onslaught. All the three rulers of the Rathor clan, Bijay Singh, Gaj Singh and Bhadar Singh fled leaving Jayappa and Ram Singh to enter the city in triumph on 17\textsuperscript{th} September.\textsuperscript{175} When Bijay Singh reached Merta, Jayappa had taken possession of the cannons.\textsuperscript{176} At Nagaur, Bijay Singh asked the *hakim*, Pratapmal Fatechand about the preparations. The latter replied that he had arranged for the supplies that would last for two years.

**Maratha Attack on Nagaur and Jodhpur**

Leaving their *hakim* at Merta, Jayappa Sindhia and Ram Singh marched to Nagaur. After encamping at Tausar, they besieged the fort. It turned out to be a thirteen month long siege during which Bijay Singh and his men suffered great hardships.\textsuperscript{177} On 31\textsuperscript{st} October, 1754, Thursday, *purohit* Jagoji and Jayappa Sindhia along with Ram Singh’s nobles, marched to Jodhpur. There they encamped at Abhay Sagar and laid siege.\textsuperscript{178} In the meanwhile, the fort of Jalore was captured by the Marathas. The fort of Phalodi was also laid under siege. Jodhpur, Nagaur, Jalore and Didwana were under the control of Bijay Singh while the other areas were under the hold of Ram Singh and Jayappa Sindhia. When the siege dragged on, Bijay Singh sent Bijay Ram Bharti to Udaipur to request the Maharana and send the Salumbar chief Rao Jait Singh to initiate a settlement with Jayappa Sindhia.

\textsuperscript{173} *Marwar ri Khyat*, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., p. 32.
\textsuperscript{175} G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, pp. 79, 80.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid.
Accordingly, Raj Singh Chauhan was sent to convey to Jayappa that as he was supporting Ram Singh, so only Ram Singh had the ability to rule. At this Jayappa replied that he knew it that despite his efforts, it had not materialized. But as he had given his word, if he stayed alive, then at least once he would get Ram Singh enthroned: “Vachan diyo hai, su jivto rai gayo to ekbar garh mein besan desu.”

In this way negotiations continued but without Bijay Singh’s agreeing to surrender Jodhpur, the issue could not be resolved. The siege of Nagore was further intensified. It turned out to be a long siege.

**Jayappa’s Murder**

It was evident that Ram Singh’s strength lay in the Maratha support. Seeing no respite in sight, the Rathor’s decided to murder Jayappa to conquer their own land. An important news letter was sent to report about the murder of Jayappa Sindhia. In Sai Das Chauhan’s contingent of the silepos (a category of soldiers) and belonging to his own clan, two soldiers, Khokhar Kesarkhan and Gehlot, felt that if they had to die, it was better that they die after killing Jayappa. They requested Sain Das to convey their resolve to the Maharaja who approved of their stratagem. Saiindas then conveyed to the Maharaja. Bijay Singh called both of them and said, if they accomplished this task, he would give them pattas worth 10,000 each and a patta worth 20,000 to the diwan along with the thikana of Bhakhrod to live. Both were given money for their expenses along with a peskabaj (a dagger worn in front) each.

Then they were made to accompany the negotiators and were facilitated to open a shop in the army camp of the Dakhanis.

One day when Jayappa was sitting on a bajot (stool) in his tent, his attendants were giving him bath. They indulged in a mock fight and started moving towards Jayappa and said that they were partners in the shop. One of them said that he gave rupees 500 to the other to go to Merta to buy various things for the shop. But he seems to have hidden the money and is now telling a lie that someone has snatched the money from him on the route between

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181 Rathora ri Khyat, Vol. III, the Marathas were addressed as ‘Dikhni’, by the Rajputs, p. 534.
Khajwada and Deswal village. Having listened to their complaint, Jayappa asked them to sit down and wait for justice. Suddenly they held Jayappa’s throat and struck him with the peskabaj. There was a great commotion in the camp. Chauhan Raj Singh and the Salumbar chief Rao Jait Singh,\footnote{Shyamal Das, \textit{Vir Vinod}, Vol. II, p. 853. According to the information given in \textit{Vir Vinod} the Mewar Maharana had sent Jait Singh to assist Jayappa to kill Bijay Singh. \textit{Rathora ri Khyat} says that he was invited by Bijay Singh through Bijay Ram Bharti so that he could mediate with the Marathas for a settlement. The latter information seems to be correct.} along with some others were killed. Soon Chauhan Sain Das secretly informed Bijay Singh that Jayappa was killed and that the atmosphere was rife with fear: “aaj Aape nu mariyo, tin ro vedo chhai.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 534.}

Taking advantage of the confusion, the Rathor army came out from the Nagore fort and attacked the Marathas.\footnote{Vishveshwar Nath Reu, \textit{Marwar ka Itihas}, Vol. I, p. 374.} The Marathas immediately took stock of the situation and handed over the command to Jayappa’s son, Jankoji, while Dattaji infused vigour among the Marathas and resolved to teach a lesson to the Rathors. As the Maratha prestige was at stake in Marwar, Antaji Mankeshwar was called from Bundelkhand by Dattaji. Antaji Mankeshwar wrote to his agent at Poona, that he was proceeding to Marwar to succour Sindhia’s forces who had suffered from the murder of Jayappa.\footnote{S.P.D., Vol. II, No. 52.} The Maratha focus had now shifted from fighting for the cause of Ram Singh to avenging the murder of Jayappa. This fact is corroborated by an important news-letter dated 3\textsuperscript{rd} September 1755, reporting that Bijay Singh had got Jayaji Shinde treacherously killed: “Jayaji Shinde yaans Bijay Singhani daga karun maarile hai;” and that he was conspiring with Sawai Madho Singh, the Maharana, the Jats and other Rajput Rajas.\footnote{\textit{Hingane Daftar}, No. 163.} Another letter dated 29\textsuperscript{th} September 1755, also mentions about Bijay Singh’s efforts to garner the support of the above mentioned Rajas.\footnote{Ibid., 171.} A Maratha letter dated 5\textsuperscript{th} September 1755 informs about Sawai Madho Singh joining in this effort.\footnote{Shindeshahi, Vol. I, No. 143.}

He sent his general Anirudh Singh Khangarot along with the forces of Umed Singh of Shalpura, Bahadur Singh of Rupnagar, Gopal Singh of Karauli and the Hadas of Bundi. About 25,000 to 30,000 men and a strong artillery moved towards Ramgarh to join Bijay Singh. They were joined by the Bikaner contingent under \textit{diwan} Bakhtawar Mal along with Bijay Singh’s forces from Nagor. But the Marathas defeated the combined army. Jankoji
informed Bhau Saheb about the defeat at Didwana he inflicted on Anirudh Singh, sent by Madho Singh of Jaipur to help Bijay Singh against Jankoji. Dattaji Sindhia in a letter to the Peshwa, described the details of the defeat inflicted by his forces on Bijay Singh. As the prospects of success were grim, Sawai Madho Singh’s general had already started negotiations for peace. As success was eluding, Bijay Singh thought it prudent to sue for peace. As a result, a treaty of peace was signed in February, 1756. An annual tribute of rupees 1,50,000 was fixed on Bijay Singh.

**Jankoji Sindhia Invades Jodhpur**

Jankoji Sindhia brought a huge army to Jodhpur and attacked the Siwanchi Gate. But despite great efforts loss of 500 soldiers success was not in sight. But the fact that the fort held out against the adversaries was on account of its good defence. The fort of Jodhpur is constructed on Jodhgiri hills. The rugged portions of the hill are scraped and in order to strengthen it, big bastions, 12 feet to 70 feet thick were built on the massive walls of the fort. The height of the walls of the fort range from 21-120 feet. It is situated about 400 feet above the surrounding plains and an area of about four miles was covered with defences when it was constructed. Meanwhile the nobles helped Bijay Singh to secretly move out of the fort. He proceeded to Bikaner accompanied by many important nobles.

**Bijay Singh and Gaj Singh meet Sawai Madho Singh**

After corresponding with the Jaipur ruler, both the Rajas reached Jaipur. Sawai Madho Singh personally received them and all the courtesies due to their stature were bestowed on them. After the formalities were completed, Sawai Madho Singh addressed them and said that they did not have cordial relations with Malhar Rao Holkar, while he himself had enmity with the sons and brothers of Jayappa Sindhia. Therefore, he suggested that they should unite. Udaipur, Jodhpur, Jaipur, Bikaner, Rupnagar, were already together. Efforts were made to unite Kota and Bundi with them. If all of them united, the *Dakhanis*

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190 Ibid., No. 49.  
would not dare to put their foot on Rajasthan. All of them could unite and compel them to raise their siege at Nagore. At the instance of Sawai Madho Singh, Anirudh Singh Khangarot with an army of 60,000, was instructed to inveigle the *Dakhanis* into a fight. Anirudh Singh was joined by Udawat Dalkaran, the *Thakur* of Dera, Ratnot Jadho Jujhar Singh, *Thakur* of Dugoli. The 7,000 contingent of Bikaner also joined the Kachhwahas. The *Dakhanis* got the information about the move of the Kachhwahas and they covered the wells with dried *fog* plants. When the Kachhwaha and the Bikaner army arrived, the *Dakhanis* set the *fog* plants to fire. Their opponents could not even drink water from the affected wells. The *Dakhanis also* burnt the grass and the horses of the Kachhwahas died without fodder. Soon the efforts of Ram Singh and Marathas started showing results as they captured the fort of Jalore in the beginning of 1755, where the treasures of the Jodhpur rulers had been kept for centuries. Ajmer capitulated on 21st February, 1755 paving the way for a compromise with the Marathas.

**Compromise with the Marathas**

At Nagore, Singhvi Fatehchand and Devi Singh Champavat Mahasinghot negotiated with the Marathas that they would:

1. Surrender half of the Marwar territory.

2. From among the 5,000 villages of Marwar, 2,500 villages were given to Ram Singh. These included Merta, Parbatsar, Maroth, Sojat, Jalore, Bhinai, Kekri, 16 villages of Dewalia, 27 villages of Masoda. Jodhpur, Nagore, Didwana, Phalodi, Jaitaran *parganas* were given to Bijay Singh.

3. Ajmer was given to the *Dakhanis*.

4. rupees 60 lakhs were to be given as cash, 32 elephants, one *bhawan* worth one lakh, two lakhs worth jewellery. Some people were kept as hostages (*ne haki rupiya mein ol dini*). These were Singhvi Budhmal, the brother of Fateh Chand, Singhvi Budhmal, Vijayraj’s *Purohit* Jeevraj, Harnath’s Aasopa Sadashiv and Jagneshwar Srimali, who later died at Ujjain.\(^\text{194}\)

\(^{194}\) Ibid., p. 539.
Ever since 1756, Marwar had become the hunting-ground for the family of Sindhia. From 1755 to 1759, Marwar faced severe famine conditions. The State was under the obligation of paying a huge amount to the Marathas and the economic conditions were not favourable. There was scarce agricultural production. It became difficult to meet even the day to day expenses of the court. Even the lamps of the court could not be lighted and it became very difficult to carry out the court proceedings: “Rusnai ra hi tel ra phora padai.” In order to save himself from embarrassment, Bijay Singh held the darbar only when the khansama, bhandari Narsinghdas came and saluted him. This was a secret way of communicating to the Maharaja symbolically that oil to light the lamps was available and hence, the Maharaja could conduct the court proceedings. The day when Narsinghdas did not come to salute, it indicated that oil could not be arranged. On that particular day, the court could not be held.

However, it appears to be an exaggerated way of highlighting fiscal difficulties of the ruler. Due to the famine conditions, Ram Singh went to Jhilai and Dattaji Sindhia went towards the Narmada. Bijay Singh’s nobles decided that as the Marathas were appointed on their thanas, this was a good opportunity to recover their parganas. Once Ram Singh returned and resided at Merta, then it would be very difficult to recover them. At this Devi Singh expressed his views that it was already decided that for a year the parganas would not be taken from Ram Singh. Hearing this, the meeting was dissolved for the time being. But after a few days, the nobles again complained of fiscal difficulties. Anyhow, they started from Jodhpur for Merta and soon established control over it. Jalore was also attacked. Similarly, the Thakur of Chandawal, Prithvi Singh and Jethawat Pand Singh, also recovered Sojat.

**Maratha Reaction**

In the absence of Ram Singh and Dattaji Sindhia, when Bijay Singh’s men established their control over Merta, Jalore and Sojat, letters were sent to the Maratha commanders. Jankoji and Dattaji Sindhia were encamping on the banks of the river

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196 *Marwar ri Khyat*, p. xix.
197 Ibid., p. 41.
Narmada. Bijay Singh was planning to capture Ajmer also. All this infuriated Jankoji and he decided to go back to Marwar. But his men refused to go to Marwar. At this Kanhoji Jadu offered himself to go to Marwar. Having decided thus, Kanhoji left for Marwar with 500 horsemen while Jankoji went towards the Deccan. Kanhoji assembled an army of 4,000 and reached Ajmer. There he was joined by Ram Singh’s army of 3,000 and together they left for Merta. Both the sides lay opposite each other and there was some fight. At this time Devi Singh, secretly wrote to the Dakhanis that they should persist in their claim for the parganas as these belonged to them. He also assured them that Bijay Singh’s men would not fight. In this way, the Dakhanis lay their claim on the Lambia and Baluda thikanas.

Soon the Marwar nobles got divided into two groups. Kesari Singh and Jait Singh were in favour of putting up a fight while Devi Singh and Kalyan Singh were reluctant. The nobles then wrote to the Maharaja that only his arrival could motivate the nobles to fight so that the Dakhanis could be thrown out of Marwar. Bijay Singh then marched from Jodhpur. When they camped at Lambia, the supporters of Bharat Singh Udawat fired at them from inside. The Marwar army left Lambia and stationed their canons at Siraicha and after taking a chhadi fauj (the advanced army), they went to Ladpura. There they fought with the Dakhanis. Kanhoji was reinforced by Ram Singh Panwar who brought 1200 men from the Deccan. The sardars immediately left for Ajmer to visit the camp of Bijay Singh at Pisangan. It was decided that Bijay Singh would pay rupees 20,000 for Pisangan.

Once again, the differences in the approach of the nobles came to the fore. Kesari Singh suggested to recover Ajmer while Devi Singh suggested just to collect money from the Mertias. After all these deliberations, they first moved to Alaniawas, then to Bhirunda, Harsor and further towards Merta. In the meanwhile, Kanhoji decided to enter Marwar with an army of 6,000 as suggested by Devi Singh. On the way he halted at Naand and later at Jhadau. Immediately Bijay Singh was informed by his

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200 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
messengers that Kanhoji was going to enter Marwar territory. Bijay Singh also followed him to Jhadau. In this way wherever Kanhoji marched, Bijay Singh also followed him on his heels. Finally Kesari Singh suggested that they should mount their horses to fight with the Dakhanis and bring all their woes to an end.203 From Mokaale Kahoji marched on to Merta but he could not establish his control over Merta and Malkot. Then he moved on to Maandre and Bijay Singh camped at Gangaarne. Here Thakur Umar Singh’s men got killed and the Dakhanis lost 70 soldiers. The Marathas then looted Kuchera. Bijay Singh then camped at Harsolav and Kanhoji conquered Kharnal. In this way, Bijay Singh continued to follow Kanhoji on his heels. Bijay Singh realized that the sardars were not fighting whole-heartedly. Therefore, he sent Raghunath Singh, Surtaan Singh, Karanidan Barath to Maandre (Mandore) where Kanhoji was encamping. They offered that the land which Jankoji and Dattaji Sindhia had acquired for Ram Singh would be returned to them. Soon the parganas were returned. The Rathors evacuated Merta and the fort of Jalore. The Dakhanis established their thanas over there and Kanhoji left for the Deccan.

*Rathora ri Khyat* reveals that in the Jodhpur and Jaipur courts there were some officials and nobles who had aligned themselves with the Marathas. In 1754, seeing the adverse circumstances, Singhvi Fatehchand and Pradhan Devi Singh Champawat decided to negotiate the terms for a settlement.204

Again we find Devi Singh showing his reluctance when the other sardars suggested to occupy Merta in 1756, when they were facing severe famine conditions. He tried to dissuade them saying that they had entered into an agreement with Ram Singh, and therefore, at least for a year, they should not flout that agreement.205 It can be easily inferred from the sources that Devi Singh was secretly in league with the Marathas. For he knew that as soon as they would try to recover Merta and the other parganas, the Marathas were bound to return and disturb the peace of Marwar. The other sardars reacted saying that Devi Singh’s children were safe in the palace of Pokaran

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204 Ibid., p. 539.
205 Ibid., p. 541.
but their children were dependent on others. With reluctance, Devi Singh, along with the other sardars left to attack Merta. But even there he was in communication with the Dakhanis and conveyed to them that he did not want to oppose them. But despite all his efforts, the Marwar sardars had occupied the parganas. But they should stand firmly as he was not interested in fighting with them. He wrote a letter to Kanhoji that the entire Marwar army was away and the path was open for them to enter Marwar. Later, Jorawar Singh informed the Maharaja about the treachery of Champawat Devi Singh. As a proof, he also produced the letter written by Devi Singh to the Dakhanis and cautioned Bijay Singh that he was trusting the sardar who had aligned himself with the Dakhanis: “Aap kinre bharose barai baitha ho aap raa umrawan ra to ai parnam chhai…”

Jaipur

During the lifetime of Sawai Jai Singh, the Marathas did not disturb his territories, nor could they levy any tribute on Amber/Jaipur. Though the Marathas had become increasingly aggressive in Rajasthan right after the acquisition of Malwa, their presence there came to be felt only after the death of Sawai Jai Singh (1743). As already mentioned, in 1708 Sawai Jai Singh had concluded a treaty (ahadnamah) with Amar Singh II, the Maharana of Udaipur. According to this commitment, the son of Udaipuri princess would succeed Sawai Jai Singh even if he was younger than the sons born of wedlock with other princesses. The marriage treaty was especially unfortunate, since it opened the way for perpetual quarrels over the succession and gave the Marathas a pretext for interference. The treaty sowed the seeds of dissension by disregarding the law of primogeniture. Princess Chandra Kunwar, the Udaipuri princess was first blessed with a daughter who was later married to

207 Ibid., p. 542.
208 Ibid., pp. 543, 544.
Maharaja Abhai Singh of Jodhpur.212 Then for many years no child was born out of this wedlock. In December 1738, the Mewar princess was blessed with a son, named Madho Singh. But in the intervening period, Sawai Jai Singh’s other queens were blessed with sons. His eldest son was Shiv Singh who had served as his father’s deputy faujdar of Mathura but died suddenly in 1724. The second son Ishwari Singh was now the eldest surviving son and after his father’s death assumed the crown. The succession was also recognized by the Mughal Emperor, Muhammad Shah.213 But this succession was disputed. It ultimately paved way for the Marathas to intervene in the affairs of Jaipur.

After his accession, the new Raja went to Delhi to meet the Emperor and receive the tika for himself. The Maharana of Udaipur supported his nephew Madho Singh. In the eyes of the Maharana Sawai Ishwari Singh’s succession to the throne was a repudiation of the 1708 agreement concluded between Sawai Jai Singh and Maharana Amar Singh. However, Sawai Ishwari Singh ruled for seven years. Both the brothers were supported by different thikanedars (chiefs). Ishwari Singh was joined by Rao Raja Sardar Singh (of Uniara), Rao Raja Shiv Singh (of Sikar), Jorawar Singh of Kalakh), Sheodan Singh (of Ugriawas), Jorawar Singh (of Khandela), Deep Singh, Megh Singh etc.214 The thikanedars who supported Madho Singh were Mohan Singh (of Bhadwa), Anirudh Singh of (Gadra), Anoop Singh of (Pachewar), Budh Singh (of Bachusi) and Shyam Singh (of Sakhun). Thakur Jagat Singh, Gyan Singh (of Diggi) and Zalim Singh (of Tordi) joined Madho Singh with a contingent of 3000 cavalry. Besides these, Madho Singh also received the support of other chiefs including Shyam Singh Khangarot (of Dudu), Jodh Singh (of Chomu), Ram Singh (of Samod), Gulab Singh (of Bagru), Jaswant Singh (of Chir), Man Singh (of Bhadwa), Pem Singh (of Godawat) and Sakat Singh.215

214 R.K. Saxena, *Rajput Nobility*, p. 208. The chiefs of Jaipur were known as thikanedars, not pattayats as has been assumed by Saxena.
215 Ibid., p. 208.
The Maharana also marched in support of Madho Singh and reached Jamoli, five miles west of Jahazpur where he halted for forty days on the banks of the river Banas. The Jaipur army was facing him. As time was required for his return from Delhi, the Kachhwaha commander Hemraj Bakshi pretended to go over to the side of Madho Singh who paid him some money. On his return march to Jaipur from Delhi, Sawai Ishwari Singh secured Maratha aid on the way and agreed to pay rupees 20,000 to them. Due to the efforts of the officials on both the sides, a battle was averted. Sawai Ishwari Singh was asked to give Madho Singh an appanage of five lakhs a year that included the parganas of Tonk, Toda, three others, and included the town of Tonk where Madho Singh must construct a home and live peacefully. This paper known as the Jamoli agreement, dated 19th December 1744, was signed by Baba Bakht Singh, Baba Nathji, Kaka Bhagat Singh and Thakur Sardar Singh. Sawai Ishwari Singh paid the amount he had promised to the Marathas but the Maharana refused pay the war indemnity to them. In early 1745, the Maratha allies of Sawai Ishwari Singh attacked the Mewar camp at midnight and the Mewar troops fled from the camp. Sawai Ishwari Singh repudiated the Jamoli agreement.

**The Battle of Rajmahal (March, 1747)**

The repudiation of the Jamoli agreement infuriated Maharana Jagat Singh who redoubled his efforts for his nephew’s rights. This time he was joined by the dispossessed heir of Bundi, Ummed Singh and the Rao Raja of Kota, Durjan Sal. They met at Nathdwara to plan the future course of action. Khuman Singhji, the vakil of the Maharana and Pem Singhji Gogawat were sent to seek the help of the Marathas. They offered rupees two lakhs to Malhar Rao Holkar for pressurising Sawai Ishwari Singh to cede four parganas to Madho Singh, restore Bundi to Ummed Singh and allow the three parganas of Nenwa, Samidhi and Karwar to be held by Rao Raja Durjan Sal of Kota and Pratap Singh of Karwar.

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217 Hingane Daftar, No. 29.
Malhar Rao Holkar sent his son Khande Rao ignoring the advice of his colleagues Ranoji Sindhia and Ramchandra Baba Shenvi. Khanderao crossed the southern frontier of Jaipur via Udaipur, and reached Rajmahal on the Banas river. The contingents of Udaipur and Kota joined him on the way. Sawai Ishwari Singh decided to face the situation boldly and transferred the command of his advanced division to Hargovind Natani. Sawai Ishwari Singh himself arrived with the reserve force. A battle was fought on 1st March, 1747. Though both the sides suffered heavily, the Jaipur army under the leadership of Hargovind Natani carried the day. The Jaipur troops captured Madho Singh’s standard-bearing elephant and band, all his artillery etc. Durjan Sal fled to Kota and the Maharana, on hearing the debacle returned to his capital. Khanderao was repulsed and forced to retire to Bundelkhand. This battle proved to be very expensive for the Maharana as Sawai Ishwari Singh got the rich trade centre at Bhilwara wherefrom a large ransom was exacted. Besides, he also compelled the Maharana to pay a war indemnity. Thus, the battle at Rajmahal turned out to be a clear victory for Sawai Ishwari Singh.

The Battle of Bagru (August, 1748)

The battle of Rajmahal proved that contest for the throne of Jaipur was not easy. Sawai Madho Singh realized that he could not succeed without the support of the Marathas. For this purpose he befriended Malhar Rao Holkar and even exchanged turbans with him and the two became pagadi badal bhai. Despite the severe defeat at Rajmahal, Maharana Jagat Singh intensified his efforts and this time sent an envoy to Puna with an offer of ten lakhs to Raja Shahu. In return the Peshwa was to support Madho Singh and compel Sawai Ishwari Singh to give his brother an appanage worth twenty four lakhs a year or a fourth of the total revenue of his kingdom. Earlier the Peshwa had supported Sawai Ishwari Singh, on account of consideration for Mirza Raja Jai Singh and Sawai Jai Singh’s cordial relations with Balaji Rao and Baji Rao himself. However, he was tempted to support Madho Singh in order to pay for his debts. In March, 1747, he instructed Ramchandra Baba to coerce Sawai Ishwari Singh to cede the concerned territory to Madho Singh. Sawai Ishwari Singh found it disgraceful to part with one-fourth of his territory and wrote in reply:

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“This question is one of inheritance of ancestral property. We are Rajahs and must follow our hereditary usage. The question relates to territory; how can I oblige the Peshwa in this matter? I had previously given Madho what Malhar had pressed me to grant on the ground of service to the state. He now asks for more. How can I give him that without fighting? How can I bring down upon myself the name of a coward and an unworthy son by dividing my entire kingdom with a younger brother?”

Next year on fourth April, 1748, Peshwa Balaji Rao held a meeting with Madho Singh and entered the Kachhwaha territory, Ishwari Singh fled from the field of Manupur. It was followed by the devastation of his territory and he was compelled to sue for peace. The Raja sent his minister Keshavdas to resolve the matter peacefully, but the Marathas made exhorbitant demands leading to the failure of negotiations.

Malhar Rao Holkar and Gangadhar Tatya with their army entered Jaipur territory near Uniara in July. After wresting parganas Toda, Tonk and Malpura, they handed them over to Madho Singh. In their forward journey via Piplod, Fagi and Ladana, they were joined by many Rajput chiefs. They were joined by Durjan Sal and Ummed Singh also. This army reached Bagru, twenty three miles east of the Sambhar town. The battle that commenced on the first of August, continued for six days. In this battle, Sawai Ishwari Singh received the much needed support from the Jat Raja, Suraj Mal. With the efforts of Keshavdas, peace was concluded and the Maharana’s demands were accepted. Sawai Ishwari Singh gave five parganas to his brother, Madho Singh, and Bundi was restored to Ummed Singh. Thus, with the help of the Marathas the Maharana was partially successful in safeguarding the rights of his nephew.

Ishwari Singh’s suicide (1750)

Sawai Ishwari Singh was a weak administrator and his loyal and able ministers either died or were done away with. Raja Ayamal Khatri, the ablest of Jaipur diwans and administrators, died on 9th February, 1747. He was succeeded by his son Keshavdas, but Sawai Ishwari Singh got him poisoned on a false charge. It was due to

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225 Ibid.
Keshavdas’s efforts that in the battle of Bagru peace was negotiated with the Marathas. But soon Hargovind Natani rose in Sawai Ishwari Singh’s favour who wanted to oust Keshavdas. For this correspondence between Holkar and Keshavdas was forged saying that it was Keshavdas’s connivance with Holkar that gave Bundi to Ummed Singh and the four parganas of Tonk to Madho Singh. Thus, Keshavdas was falsely implicated and forced to drink poison by Sawai Ishwari Singh. Keshavdas spoke of his innocence and even said to have exclaimed that natural justice would soon befall Jaipur. It is said that while dying, he uttered the following words: “Mujh bekusoor khairkhwah ko marne ka badla ishwar aapko jald hi dega”. A couplet relating this incident was composed by a poet in the Marwari language: “Mantri moto martyo, Khatri Keshavdas, Jad hi chhodi Isra, raj karan ri aas.” Natani secretly corresponded with Holkar to get rid of his master, Sawai Ishwari Singh. He kept the Maharaja in the dark about the military preparations in defence of Jaipur.

Vidyadhar, another elder statesman, was bedridden. Shivnath Bhaya, the old chief of artillery was thrown into a prison with his entire family. The only people whom the Raja trusted were people from humble origin. One of them was a barber, Shambhu Bari and the other was an elephant-rider, Khanu mahut. Sawai Ishwari Singh had promised to pay hefty sums to the Marathas for their support against his brother and as war indemnity after the Battle of Bagru. The promised sum had fallen into arrears and the Peshwa being in great need of money directed Malhar Rao Holkar to take charge of the situation.

On hearing that Malhar Rao Holkar along with Gangadhar Tatya were heading towards Jaipur, Sawai Ishwari Singh tried to appease them by sending his envoys with two lakh rupees but it only infuriated Malhar Rao Holkar. But the Raja seems to have given up. He was filled with remorse for having poisoned his faithful noble under the influence of the self-serving Natani. Narendra Singh is of the opinion that Sawai

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227 Ibid., P. 1239.
228 Ibid., p. 1240.
Ishwari Singh preferred to end his own life than to stake the honour of his state to the Marathas. On 12th December, 1750, Sawai Ishwari Singh committed suicide. He got himself stung by a poisonous cobra. Three of his queens and one favourite concubine consumed poison along with him. This is corroborated by a news-letter addressed to Govind Pant Bundele by his accountant Baburao Visnu from the camp of Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayappa Shinde camping near Jaipur. For eighteen hours the corpse lay unattended and unburnt. Tod aptly describes the situation:

“a dose of poison gave Madho Singh the gaddi, Holkar his bribe, and the Mahrattas a firm hold upon Rajasthan”.  

Madho Singh’s Accession and the Marathas

With the accession of Sawai Madho Singh on the throne of Jaipur, the Maratha-Rajput relations entered a new phase. The temptation for inviting the Marathas was unending. Both, Sawai Ishwari Singh and Madho Singh had promised huge amounts to the Marathas for their assistance. Madho Singh had sought Maratha help to oust Sawai Ishwari Singh and ultimately emerged as a winner in the contest to the throne. The Marathas participated in this fratricidal war due to financial reasons. After Sawai Ishwari Singh committed suicide, at Holkar’s invitation, Madho Singh came from Udaipur and occupied the throne on 29th December, 1750. It was decided that Sawai Madho Singh would pay rupees ten lakhs to the Marathas. The pargana of Rampura which was given to Madho Singh by the Mewar Maharana was now transferred by Sawai Madho Singh to Malhar Rao Hokar. But soon Jayappa Sindhia arrived on 6th January, 1751, and made new exorbitant demands on Jaipur. From this moment onwards Sawai Madho Singh stopped trusting the Marathas.

The pent-up hatred of the Rajputs due to the exhorbitant Maratha demands found expression in the form of a sudden and violent attack on the unsuspecting Marathas when four thousand of them entered the Jaipur city for sight seeing. Almost fifteen hundred Marathas were slain and many were wounded. There was a heavy loss of men and property. An important Maratha news-letter gives a vivid account of the murder of

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Marathas insides Jaipur. In this letter can be traced the dormant enmity which the Marathas and Rajputs bore towards each other. The immediate impact of this was felt in the adjacent villages where Maratha couriers were killed and treated harshly. Sawai Madho Singh opened negotiations after eight days and tried to convince them that the unfortunate incident was the result of the spontaneous outburst which was not supported by him. The Marathas on their part agreed to forgive him on the condition that besides the ten lakhs subsidy, he would restore the looted property and pay two lakhs as compensation to the dead and wounded. Clearly, the Marathas could barter even their anger for money.

In October, 1753, when Sawai Madho Singh made a courtesy visit to the Emperor, the wazir, Safdar Jang was in open revolt against the young Emperor, Ahmad Shah. Sawai Madho Singh offered to mediate. He was well placed to intervene as he had some leverage over Suraj Mal, the Jat ruler of Bharatpur on whose forces Safdar Jang was banking. Sawai Madho Singh was rewarded with the imperial grant of Ranthambhor for dousing the rebellion. The fort was exceedingly strong and had plenty of water. A contemporary historian Minhaz-us-'Siraz writes, “The fort was famous throughout Hindustan for its exceeding strength, solidity and impregnability.”

Sawai Madho Singh also built Sawai Madhopur near Ranthambhor. Due to its strategic location the Marathas had tried to gain control of the fort. Malhar Rao Holkar obtained sanad from the Mughal Emperor about the occupation of the fort but the keeper of the fort refused to hand it over to the Marathas. The fort was then besieged by the Marathas under Gangadhar Tantia only to be fired by the defenders. They forced the Marathas to retreat. The Marathas then shelled the defences of the fort from Shivpur. The importance of the fort can be gauged from the fact that the Marathas continued to besiege the fort for three years. The defenders decided to hand over the fort to Sawai Madho Singh. With the help of the Jaipur forces, the defenders forced the Marathas to withdraw from

236 L.P. Mathur, Forts and Strongholds of Rajasthan, pp. 36,37.
Ranthambhor. Finally in 1759, Sawai Madho Singh occupied the fort. The nearby town of Sawai Madhopur was named after him.238

The Marathas again visited Jaipur under Raghunath Dada and Malhar Rao Holkar in 1753 to demand the tribute agreed in the past. On 30th October, 1753, they crossed the Mukandara Pass and by way of Kota-Bundi entered the Jaipur territory. However, direct conflict was averted. Rupees 1,25,000 were presented to Raghunath Dada and 15,25,000 were paid as outstanding tribute. Out of this sum, rupees 7,35,074 were paid in cash and three lakhs in orders on bankers, by Jago Pandit, the Jaipur minister to Jayappa Sindhia in April, 1755, leaving a balance of rupees 5,14,926 in arrears.239

In 1757, the Peshwa’s brother, Raghunath Dada again visited Jaipur and exerted pressure on Sawai Madho Singh. This time he made exorbitant demands on the Jaipur Raja amounting to forty or fifty lakhs in cash and large secession of territory with an annual income of forty or fifty lakhs. Sawai Madho Singh agreed to pay the same amount as agreed in the past. Raghunath Rao agreed to be content with eleven lakhs, six of which were paid down and shared between him and Holkar in the proportion of two to one. In August, 1758, Sindhia and Holkar came to an understanding to share the Maratha acquisitions and claims in Rajasthan and Malwa. Accordingly, Jankoji Sindhia entered the Jaipur territory. Sawai Madho Singh was coerced to pay thirty six lakh rupees besides an additional three lakhs in the first year. Jaipur was a wealthy Rajput State. In 1759, the Peshwa ordered Malhar Rao Holkar to claim the amount promised by the Jaipur Raja. He was specifically ordered to recover rupees twelve lakhs for the year 1758 and rupees nine lakhs for the year 1759. The Rajputs decided to resist the Marathas. Forty thousand soldiers assembled for a fight. However, the Rajputs were completely crushed at Lakheri and twenty of their leaders were slayed. As Madho Singh was in regular communication with Ahmad Shah Durrani and Najib ud-daula, he knew that the Durrani was expected in India in November 1759 and the Maratha commander would have to retire immediately. Therefore, he held out

bravely.\textsuperscript{240} By middle of December, Holkar laid siege to Barwara. But had to give it up to reinforce Dattaji Sindhia at Delhi against Ahmad Shah Abdali’s attack.

Jaipur was free from Maratha attacks during 1760 and for sometime after their debacle at Panipat. Interestingly, on the eve of the battle of Panipat, the seventeen Kachhwaha chiefs entered into an agreement with Sawai Madho Singh. They assured the Raja that they would neither help the Muslims nor the *Dakhanis*. Infact, they would have no correspondence with them. If they proved faithless to the *darbar* they would be liable to social boycot.\textsuperscript{241} The changing contours of the Maratha-Rajput relations between 1761 and 1794 will be discussed in the subsequent chapter.

\textsuperscript{240} Hari Ram Gupta, *Marathas and Panipat*, Panjab University, Chandigarh, 1961, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{241} Kapat-Dwara, Transcribed copy, Historical Section, available at Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, *Jaisath Badi* 9, 1816 V.S., No. 776, the names of these *sardars* are as follows: Jaswant Singh Rajawat, Jodh Singh Nathawat Chomu, Gulab Singh Chatrabhugat Bagru, Jagat Singh, Nand Singh Rao, Bikramaditya Barwara, Dalel Singh Rajawat Dhula, Rao Sardar Singh Uniara, Jalim Singh Nathawat, Ratan Singh Nathawat, Sultan Singh Naruka, Salim Singh, Chhaju Ram Naruka, Chand Singh Kumbhani, Fateh Singh Kumbhani, Ajit Singh Sheobrahmpota, Dalel Singh.