CONCLUSION

The present work tries to clear some of the mist surrounding the Maratha-Rajput relations in the eighteenth century. The two most dominant themes in the major historical writings on eighteenth century India are the disintegration of the Mughal Empire and the rise of the Maratha power. As has been discussed, it was under the leadership of Shivaji that the Marathas gained prominence. He organized them into a force to reckon with. Due to Shivaji’s able leadership, the Marathas successfully challenged the mighty Mughal Empire. With the persistent decline in the Mughal power, a number of successor States came into being. From among these, the Marathas emerged as the most successful and spread their power far and wide. Under the Peshwas, by late 1730’s, the Maratha power had expanded beyond the Narmada. With their power firmly established in Khandesh, Malwa and Bundelkhand, they made central India as their base. From here they could easily venture into the neighbouring States of Rajasthan and the tracts North of the Chambal and the Yamuna rivers extending from Mathura, Agra belt to Allahabad.

The expansion of the Maratha power in North India in the eighteenth century naturally received wide attention from the Mughal court historians. The foremost among them namely, Khafi Khan, projected only a negative image of the Marathas. He describes in detail the hardships suffered by the Imperial camp. He also mentions the impact of the Maratha raids on the socio-economic life of the townsmen and the villagers in the affected areas.

But in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Mughal perception of the Marathas changed in the context of the historical situation of North India. While Persian accounts of the first half of the eighteenth century contented themselves with straight narration of events pertaining to Maratha inroads, most writers in the second half tried to give their accounts a new historical perspective and vision. It seems that with the appointment of Mahadaji Sindhia as wakil-i mutlaq by the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam, the prolonged Mughal-Maratha hostility was moderated. It also marked the beginning of a new era of reconciliation and adjustment between the two former
adversaries, changing the political scenario of the Delhi court. Efforts were made to work out a system based on mutual co-operation to cope with the growing challenge of British hegemony over North India by establishing peace and order in fairly large areas around Delhi. These trends and tendencies were reflected in the historical literature that developed in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The historians from North India avoided derogatory remarks previously used to explain the Maratha military thrusts and to portray the character of their generals. Now they politely referred to them as Maratha leaders (sardaran-i Maratha) or leaders from the Deccan (sardaran-i Janub).

The Mughal emperors followed a definite policy towards the Rajputs. The relations of the Mughal emperors and the Rajput rulers were not on a parity. The Rajput rulers were employed by the Mughal emperors, in the Imperial service which was indicated by their holding mansabs. As Mughal mansabdars, they served as the civil and military officers in the outlying subas. In lieu of salary they received jagirs. The Rajput Raja’s own territories were regarded as their watan jagirs. This implied that they could avail of the full revenues of their dominions and were under no obligation to pay tribute.

But the Emperor expected a peshkash especially at the time of a ruler’s accession or at the time of being allotted a jagir. The Rajput Rajas were the sword arms of the Mughal Empire and rendered great military service in consolidating the empire politically. In return for their services, they were rewarded with lucrative jagirs. Therefore, joining the Imperial service proved to be very beneficial for the Rajas. Another important feature of the Mughal policy towards the Rajput Rajas was to allow them to rule with minimum Imperial interference and control. At the same time, the Rajas were assured that in case of any external threat, the onus of protecting them would lie with the Emperor. Therefore, there was a feeling of mutual trust and respect.

While examining the Maratha-Rajput relations in the eighteenth century, we have considered the historical context in which they came into contact with each other. In the coronation ceremony of Shivaji, his lineage was linked with the Sisodias of Mewar, who enjoyed a premier status among the Rajput Rajas of Rajasthan. This
struck an amiable cord between the Marathas and the Rajputs. Shivaji’s son, Shahu also maintained the respect and dignity of the Mewar Maharana. The relations of the Marathas and the Rajputs should be studied first in the context of Mughal-Maratha relations. It was during this phase that the Rajputs first came in contact with the Marathas. Both, Mirza Raja Jai Singh of Amber and Maharaja Jaswant Singh of Marwar had served as the lieutenants of the Mughal emperors in the Deccan. The declining Mughal power fanned the aspirations of the Rajas of Amber and Marwar. In the period under study, Sawai Jai Singh and Ajit Singh were made the governors of Malwa and Gujarat respectively. Sawai Jai Singh had suggested a policy of judicious compromise while Ajit Singh was bent upon resisting the Marathas. Thus, both followed divergent policies towards the Marathas. However, under the able guidance of the Peshwas, the Maratha sardars were pursuing a policy of Northward expansion more carefully yet perseverently.

With Aurangzeb’s death, the Mughal Empire witnessed a quick succession of weak Emperors. Mughal weakness gave most opportune time when the Peshwa’s policy of Northward expansion could be materialized. It proved fruitful in many ways. Not only did it fulfill the Peshwa Baji Rao’s grand Northward scheme, it also helped the Peshwa economically as he could shake off the accumulating burden of debt. Besides this, it became imperative for the Peshwa, to check the fissiporous tendencies and ambitions of the enterprising Maratha sardars. This was done by properly channelizing their energy in the campaigns in North India. Under the able supervision of the Peshwas, the Marathas established their control over Malwa and Gujarat. As both Malwa and Gujarat shared their borders with Rajasthan, Rajasthan inevitably had to become their hunting ground in future. It foreboded evil for Rajasthan in general and border States like Kota, Bundi and Mewar in particular.

It was the geographical proximity of Rajasthan to the Maratha dominions that they made their early forays in the Rajput States. Malwa served as a convenient starting point for raids into Rajasthan. They followed the route from the Mukandara Pass and across the Chambal from Malwa via Harauti. From Gujarat they followed the route via Idar and Jalore. The Marathas initially made sporadic raids. But in the wake of the
declining Mughal authority, they were soon formally invited by the Rajput Rajas of Bundi, Jaipur, Marwar and later Mewar to intervene in their succession disputes. In order of chronology, the Rajput State of Bundi was the first to invite Maratha assistance in domestic feuds. The dispossessed Raja of Bundi, Bakht Singh’s queen, the sister of Bijay Singh, sent Sawai Pratap Singh to seek Maratha help against Dalel Singh who had been enthroned by Jai Singh. This set an ominous precedent which was followed by the States of Jaipur, Jodhpur and later even Mewar. Succession disputes between Ishwari Singh and Madho Singh of Jaipur and Ram Singh and his uncle Bakht Singh of Jodhpur invited the Marathas to help them achieve their goal of crowning themselves. In return for this support, they promised to pay huge sums of money. At times when they could not pay the due installments, certain territories were transferred to them. Thus, the Marathas entered Rajasthan to settle the domestic feuds, for which they were hired, later they became the masters who levied tribute and ravaged the land whenever they desired.

Everything seemed to work well for the Marathas. As Kota lay on the North of Malwa, the Marathas made it their tributary State. From there they could easily move in the various States of Rajasthan and finally to Delhi and Agra. Ajmer was another strategic location that was coveted by the Marathas. They brought it under their control in 1756. As Ajmer is centrally located in Rajasthan, from here they could keep an eye on all the Rajput States, especially Jaipur, Jodhpur and Mewar. Due to Ranthambhor’s strategic location it was also coveted by the Marathas. Besides this, it had a reputation for its strength, solidity and impregnability. The surrender of Tonk and Rampura by Jaipur to the Marathas provided the latter a strong base in the middle of Rajasthan to put pressure on the Rajputs and to carry on military operations as and when required. This study has shown that the political conflict between the Marathas and Rajputs ranged between piecemeal intrusion of Marathas into Rajasthan and headlong military confrontation.

But the relations of the Rajputs with the Marathas were not stable. At the same time their relations were not uniform with all the Rajput States. Jhala Zalim Singh, the regent of Kota was friendly to the Marathas. Though Shivaji claimed his descent from
the Sisodias of Mewar, it did not deter the Marathas to exact tribute from Mewar. Malhar Rao Holkar had exchanged the turban with Abhay Singh and also promised to take care of the interests of his son Ram Singh. But the latter’s insolent behavior alienated him from Holkar. Despite this, Holkar never supported his rival Bakht Singh. The Bundi Raja’s wife had made Malhar Rao Holkar her rakhi brother and in that capacity he rendered military help to her husband. Despite maintaining cordial relations the Marathas never let their economic motive loose sight. In the case of Jaipur, the basis of their rendering help to Madho Singh was monetary benefit. Both Madho Singh and Malhar Rao Holkar had exchanged turbans to strengthen their relations, but when the objective was achieved, their relations deteriorated. Clearly, the relations between the Marathas and Rajputs alternated between heightened activity and diminishing interests.

It is also interesting to note that besides providing military assistance in settling the matters of disputed throne, the smaller States like Machheri, Kishangarh and Salumbar looked upon the Marathas as a superior power to settle their inter-state disputes over various issues. Even the States of Kota and Bundi also reached out for Maratha assistance. The Marathas were more than keen to assist them as both these States lay on their route to Northern India and the States of Jaipur and Jodhpur. Later, due to the movement of their regular and irregular troops they had to suffer damage. But as good relations prevailed between Zalim Singh and the Maratha leaders, the latter tried not to deliberately cause any damage to their territory. In the long run, these States served as useful allies to the Marathas. Besides providing military help, they also rendered local intelligence. They benefitted the Marathas by availing supply of provision and also served as safe base for their army. The Marathas reciprocated their allies by helping them rise in their social status. A classic example of this was the Rao Raja of Machheri, Pratap Singh Naruka. Belonging to the Naruka sub-clan, Pratap Singh was a non-entity and held a jagir worth two and a half villages. In due course of time, he befriended Mahadaji Sindhia and carved out an independent principality of Alwar. While Jaipur and Jodhpur were resisting the Marathas, the Naruka chief helped Sindhia against them. He wanted to reap the harvest of his friendship with Mahadaji Sindhia by enlarging the territory of his own State, Alwar.
The Rathore State of Kishangarh also served as a useful ally of the Marathas. Their dispute with Jodhpur over territory and with Jaipur over succession to the throne, prompted them to seek Maratha help. The Marathas in turn benefitted with their friendship with Kishangarh as it served a convenient base in their fight against Jodhpur for regaining Ajmer. In this fight, the Marathas were supported by the ruler of Kishangarh. Similarly, Rawat Bhim Singh, the chief of Salumbar and Jhala Zalim Singh, the regent of Kota were also the allies of Mahadaji Sindhia.

The Marathas also created a powerful group of influential supporters in the courts of Jaipur and Jodhpur, in order to augment their prospects. Among these, the name that can be listed first is that of Khushaliram Bohra, the diwan of Jaipur. He stood for friendly relations with the Marathas whereas his adversary, Daulat Ram Haldia pursued an open anti-Maratha policy. After differences arose between him and the Jaipur Raja, he was considered to be pro-Marathas. After his fall from grace, he along with his partisans had to flee to the camp of Mahadaji Sindhia, in order to save their lives. This embittered him so much that he provided valuable services to Mahadaji Sindhia by supplying military information related to Jodhpur, their terms for settlement with the Marathas and other such relevant information.

In the case of Jodhpur, Singhvi Fateh Chand, Pradhan Devi Singh and Sawai Singh Champawat were against coming at logger-heads with the Marathas. At times they negotiated terms of settlement with the Marathas. The augmentation of power in the career of Bhawani Ram Bhandari was exclusively due to the support of Mahadaji Sindhia. For his services, he was made the diwan of Jodhpur and in this capacity he successfully brought many sardars to his side. Gulabrai Paswan along with Bhawani Ram Bhandari and Pradhan Sawai Singh Champawat were at the helm of political affairs. She not only sent some of the mutasaddis as guaranters to Mahadaji Sindhia but imprisoned her opponents at Jodhpur. Along with the diwan, Bhawani Ram Bhandari, the Paswan shouldered the responsibility of paying the mamlat to Mahadaji Sindhia. In return for this financial gain, Mahadaji ignored the rightful claimant, Zalim Singh and sent tika for Sher Singh, Paswan’s favourite. The ex-diwan, Govardhan Khichi was faithful to the Jodhpur Raja, Bijay Singh and followed a
strong anti-Maratha policy. Clearly, the Marathas gained and fanned factions in the courts of Rajput kingdoms.

The nature of Maratha intervention in Rajasthan was a bit different from the Mughals. The Marathas tried to impose themselves on the Rajputs and demanded *nazrana*. Like the Mughals they also sent *tika* signifying their paramountcy. When Ram Singh ascended the Marwar throne after the death of Abhay Singh, he was sent a *tika* by Malhar Rao Holkar. When the Jaipur Raja, Sawai Madho Singh died, they demanded *tika nazar* from the new ruler, Sawai Prithvi Singh. In 1756, when the Kota Maharao Durjansal died, his cousin Ajit Singh could succeed to the throne only after promising to pay a sum of rupees forty thousand as succession fee. A few years later when Maharao Ajit Singh died, his son Shatrusal could succeed to the throne after paying a sum of rupees two lakhs. The message was loud and clear that earlier this right was exercised by the Mughals but now the Marathas were the paramount power. In relation to the Rajput States of Udaipur, Jodhpur and Jaipur, the term *mamlat* was used for all the Maratha claims. They were also expected to pay their contribution more regularly and without much resistance. The Rajput States could avail of Maratha help only if they paid a sizable amount to them. This considerably increased the financial burden on the Rajput States that ultimately made them detest the Marathas.

But the Mughal objective in Rajputana was seldom economical, in fact, the Rajput Rajas became more prosperous by aligning themselves with the Mughals. Whereas, in relation to the Marathas, the Rajputs felt as if they were being economically fleeced. The Rajputs served as the military power for the Mughals. Unlike the Mughals, the Marathas failed to make the Rajputs as their swordsmen. The growing needs of the Maratha State demanded more resources and they could secure it only through aggrandizement. If the Mughals had a political motive, the Marathas had a purely economic motive. Under the Mughal care, the Rajas experienced a sense of security and they had also become more prosperous. But the incessant Maratha demands had made them loathful to the Rajas. Besides being a constant strain on the State treasury, there was a stress of being subjected to Maratha deprivations, if they did not pay the requisite amount. The Marathas were not interested in annexing them.
Rather they just wanted the Rajputs to recognize them as a paramount power. They were mostly interested in financially benefitting themselves from the Rajput States as much as possible. Even the areas that were transferred to the Marathas mostly lay in the eastern and south-eastern region, which has a more diversified character. It consists of very fertile land and was also rich in the mineral resources. Due to this it enjoyed a brisk agrarian commerce. These areas included Toda, Tonk, Malpura, Fagi, Barwada, Rampura, Chhota Rampura, Sherpura, Gagron, Newai, Sambhar, Khairwa, Masuda and 29 villages of pargana Bhinai etc. Ajmer was blessed with mineral wealth, copper and iron mines. Marble was also quarried in the area adjoining Ajmer. Sambhar was famous for its salt production and trade.

With Maratha help the claimants to the thrones of the Jaipur and Jodhpur States achieved their goals. They tried to pay the promised amount for the help extended but the increasingly exhorbitant demands was a great burden on the State treasuries. For this they had to sometimes transfer certain parganas to the Marathas. But the Maratha officials found it difficult to collect the revenue due to resistance at the local level, which was possible with the support of the Rajas and their officials. The Maratha defeat in the third battle of Panipat accelerated the efforts of the Rajputs to unite against them. They tried to avail of this opportunity to extricate themselves from the Maratha clutches. It also proved to be their last great effort to drive the Marathas out of Rajasthan.

The Maratha-Rajput relations in the pre-Panipat phase were marked by confrontation and conciliation. The pendulum always swung back from cordiality to resistance. There is definitely a change in the Maratha-Rajput relations in the post Panipat phase. The Maratha defeat in the third battle of Panipat had clearly demonstrated to the Rajputs that the Marathas were not as invincible as felt by the Rajputs. The Rajputs tried to unite themselves to oust the Marathas from Rajasthan. The bitterness had become too deep seated. When Mahadaji Sindhia became the regent of the Mughal emperor, the Rajas were asked to pay the arrears that had accumulated over the years. Their success in the battle of Lalsot further emboldened the Rajput Rajas. But Mahadaji did not reconcile with this repulsion. He soon reorganized his forces with
added vigour. It is significant to note that in the battles of Patan and Merta the Rao Raja of Machheri, the Rajas of Karauli and Kishangarh rendered help to the Marathas. It also provides the information about the presence of pro-Maratha faction at the courts of Jaipur and Jodhpur that facilitated the Maratha prospects. Mahadaji’s confusion was confounded due to the unco-operative stance of Tukoji Holkar.

In the later half of the eighteenth century, the Maratha activities were largely confined to South-eastern parts of Rajasthan. The reason was that most of the better revenue yielding pockets were located in this part. The areas included were Ajmer, Shahpura, Malpura, Rampura, Tonk, Toda, Sambhar, Kota and Bundi. These areas attracted the interest of the Marathas till the end of the eighteenth century. The importance of these areas also lay in the fact that these were located where frontiers of the three major Rajput States of Marwar, Mewar and Jaipur converged. Perhaps this explains the long term involvement of the Marathas in these parts of Rajasthan despite stiff resistance at several places.

The economic impact of the presence of the Marathas in the States of Jaipur and Jodhpur can be gauged from the economic hardships it brought on the State exchequers of the respective States. It remains an undisputed fact that the Marathas were invited by the contenders to the thrones of Jaipur and Jodhpur. The Marathas readily agreed to extend their support as they could foresee a steady supply of money from these two States. In comparison to Jodhpur, Jaipur had more fertile and revenue yielding territory and hence when the payment could not be made in cash it was commuted in territory. As the Maratha sardars themselves were not very vigilant when collection had to be made forcefully, the Maratha army committed atrocities. Due to this not only the crops were damaged but even the property of the people in the towns and villages was plundered. The amils of the affected parganas informed that due to the reckless plunder, the raiyat of those areas fled from the villages. Not only the countryside was devastasted and the raiyat ruined, it also led to the decline of agricultural production that further diminished revenue collection. The 1760’s and 1770’s have gone down in history as the years full of hardships that witnessed the depopulation of villages and decline in agriculture. The Rajput rulers found
themselves in dire straits and had to rely on the bankers for loans. The *chitthis* and the *kharitas* testify to the helplessness and anguish of the Rajput rulers.

The Rajput rulers tried to take advantage of the prevailing unstable political situation and the rift between the Maratha *sardars*. They evaded payment by adopting delaying tactics. Sometimes the payment was not only short but was also marked by irregularity. When the Marathas could not mobilize liquid money they asked the Jaipur Raja to meet the daily requirements of the Maratha officials posted in Jaipur. In the case of Jodhpur, Raja Bijay Singh had to levy extra taxes on the *raiyyat* and the *jagirdars* that paved the way for discontentment among both the sections. The situation was quite grim for the Jodhpur ruler even to perform his courtly affairs.

However, despite the existing hostility between the Rajputs and the Marathas, there was a continuous flow of diplomatic exchange and gifts between the two sides. Unfortunately this aspect of their relations has not been given its due credit in existing historiography. It has been generally perceived that the Rajputs had only bitter memories associated with the Maratha incursions, plunder, devastation and armed conflict. But the present study reveals that they not only maintained the protocol and diplomatic relations but also fulfilled social obligations. The Rajasthani documents throw immense light on the interaction of the Marathas with the societies outside Maharashtra. There was a continuous process of exchange of greetings at the time of coronation, various festivals and performance of marriages. Envoys and representatives from both sides were frequently sent for negotiations and also to clear certain contested issues. Cordiality in the past was frequently invoked and emphasis was laid on further strengthening it. With the expansion of the Maratha power in the North, there was a continuous movement of Maratha officials, dignitaries as well as people from diverse social groups such as traders, bankers, physicians and pilgrims.

The Peshwa and Maratha *sardars* frequently made requests to ensure safety of the Maratha travellers by ensuring them a safe passage through Rajput territory. Jaipur and Jodhpur were often visited by the representatives of the Maratha *sardars* to procure good quality horses, camels and at times even oxen. At times, requests were also made for arbitration and mediation for the settlement of accounts. The Maratha
sardars showed personal interest in promoting trade in the Rajput States. Both the sides co-operated with each other in briefing about the contemporary political developments. Besides this, co-operation was also sought by both in apprehending criminals. The Rajput States were also frequented by Maratha priests and bankers. In order to sustain their relationship, Maratha dignitaries visited the courts of the Rajput rulers and were accorded hospitality as per their status. The sources offer invaluable information regarding the treatment meted out to them and the arrangements made for their stay. Gift items were frequently exchanged between the two sides. However, care was taken to maintain the hierarchy of status on both the sides. Unfortunately, similar information in respect of Jodhpur is not available. Hence it is not possible to examine the nature of gift giving between the Jodhpur rulers and the Marathas. However, it can be safely assumed that the exchange of visits and gifts between the two sides must have been a regular feature of Maratha-Jodhpur relations.

Though the Marathas in general and Shinde in particular expressed their unhappiness and resentment over delaying tactics adopted by the Jaipur rulers with regard to the obligation of tribute payment and transfer of the territory promised to the Marathas, but Shinde was particular not to use harsh words and offensive language in any of the letters of reminders because he did not want to hurt the pride of the Jaipur ruler. This was because in the first place they had not employed the Rajputs. Secondly, their relations were more on an equal footing. Sometimes despite sending numerous letters as reminders when no response was forthcoming, the Maratha sardars resorted to mild warnings and wield threats. It was only in situation of extreme provocation that the letters from the Maratha side contained stern warning and threat of military action. The Rajput rulers were reprimanded by the Marathas when the former repeatedly defied and altogether ignored the pleas for a positive response. But all the matters raised in these letters concerned the Maratha affairs in Rajasthan and within the framework of the agreements arrived between the two sides. A survey of these kharitas shows that whenever the Maratha sardars became uncomfortable with the Rajput Rajas lukewarm response, Raja managed to make a modicum payment of tribute.
The Marathas needed the co-operation of the Rajputs in their pan-regional concerns. On the basis of the present study, it can be concluded that as compared to the Mughal-Rajput relations, the Maratha-Rajput relations were very different. The Marathas had all along tried to rope in the Rajputs in their expansionist policy in the North as well as in the Deccan. But the Marathas never pressurized the Rajputs to become a party in their rivalry with the other powers in the North and the Deccan. This proves that the Marathas did not treat the Rajputs as their subordinates who were under the obligation of rendering military service as and when demanded. The demand for military help of the Rajputs came as a request rather than as a dictate from the Maratha side. Similarly, the Marathas never tried to regulate the dealings of Rajput rulers with powers outside Rajasthan.

In order to avail of Maratha help in fulfilling their aims and objectives, the Rajput Rajas had promised substantial amount to them. At times when this money could not be paid in cash, they transferred their territories to the Marathas under duress, who appointed their officials to collect the revenue of these areas. From the above discussion it is clear that the Marathas never had a well planned policy of establishing their direct administration in the territories transferred to them by the rulers of Jaipur and Jodhpur. There is absolutely no similarity between their highly organized, systematic and efficient administrative system of Malwa and their nominal control over administration in the States of Jaipur and Jodhpur. In Malwa, they had a well developed bureaucracy that performed specific functions. Though they had appointed their vakils and other revenue collecting officials and had also established thanas, facts reveal that there was only nominal Maratha authority. While collecting revenue, the Maratha officials faced the problem of dual control. Especially in the case of Jaipur, constant reminders had to be sent to the Raja by both Sindhia and Holkar that his officials be instructed not to create disturbance in the collection of revenue. All this however, implies that there was only fragile Maratha control over the administration of these areas. In fact the Maratha officials were resisted by both the States in myriad ways ranging from diplomacy to armed struggle as well as passive form of resistance.
Before leaving for the Deccan, Mahadaji had settled the affairs of North India. In order to collect the Maratha dues from the Jaipur State, Mahadaji had given the responsibility to two armies there – one under Jiva Dada Bakshi, which was helped by De Boigne’s third brigade (commanded by Perron) and the second under Apa Khande Rao. The second army was charged with keeping order in Mewat and also for collecting dues from the Shekhawati chiefs of the Jaipur kingdom. For nine years, from 1792-99, though Jaipur heaved a sigh of relief from the external dangers but internally it was disturbed due to the painful history of Khandela, Khetri and Sikar which was marred by political intrigues and instability. This was also the time when some of the experienced, mature and far-sighted rulers/administrators disappeared from the political scene. Within two years, i.e., from 1793-95 many of the eminent political heads of States died in quick succession one after the other. Raja Bijay Singh of Jodhpur was the first to breathe his last on 7th July, 1793. Mahadaji Sindhia, who had dominated the political sphere of Northern India after the third battle of Panipat, died on 12th February and his son-in-law, Ladoji Deshmukh on 15th April, both in the same year, 1794. Ahalyabai Bai Holkar, who earned the reputation of being one of the most sober and capable administrator, passed away on 13th August, 1795. On 27th October, 1795, Peshwa Madhav Rao II also died. After almost one year, Baji Rao II, occupied the vacant throne and the Marathas headed for their impending disaster. After Mahadaji’s death, De Boigne left from Sindhia’s service in February, 1796 and his well trained army was to be commanded by Perron, who was much less competent than him.

Sensing internal dissensions among the Maratha leaders that erupted into a civil war between Sindhia and Holkar at Poona, and the breakdown of Daulat Rao’s administration, the Rajput Rajas tried to take advantage of the situation. But the misfortunes of Mewar coupled with Lakhwa Dada’s victory over the coalition of Jaipur and Jodhpur in the battle of Malpura on 16th April, 1800, destroyed the hope of any future resistance on the part of the Rajputs.

Militarily the Rajput States could not stand the might of the trained battalions of the Marathas. Though their States were devastated, they were not annihilated. They
realized that they could be delivered from their problems only by the rising British power. Hence, from 1803 to 1823, all the Rajput States including Alwar, Karauli, Kota, Jodhpur, Mewar, Bundi, Bikaner, Kishangarh, Jaipur, Banswara, Pratapgarh, Dungarpur, Jaisalmer and Sirohi concluded subsidiary treaties with the British Government.

At the end it may be concluded that the Maratha-Rajput relation is a field of study which despite being impregnated with daunting difficulties needs to be understood on the basis of contemporary documentation and not modern prejudices. In this work we have been able to explore, basing ourselves on a variety of sources, the nuanced and complex facets in the Maratha-Rajput relations during the eighteenth century.