CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1  PRELUDE

1.1.1  Self

The ‘self’ is generally considered as that entity which distinguishes one person from another person in particular and other beings in general. It is the source of consciousness and is generally regarded as the subject of self-reflexive thoughts. It is the entity to which sensations, perceptions, thoughts, desires and actions are ascribed. It is that which supplies the criteria of identity and individuation. One of the most integral aspects of the sense of the ‘self’ is that it is used to refer to the ultimate locus of personal identity: the agent and the knower involved in each person’s actions and cognitions. The ‘self’ as an agent and knower is accountable and enduring over a period of time and this sense of accountability has different aspects. We want an intelligible account of our feelings like having a temporal depth, connectivity to the past, assurance of being essentially the same entity over time. We also want an assurance that we have memories that truly represent the experiences we have had, that there is a sense of owing responsibility for certain events as our own action and for which we are answerable, and that we have a prudential concern for a future that is our future. All these are realities of our life and are very important aspects of selfhood. Of course, there are many other facets of selfhood – in particular those related to the identifying marks of physical appearances, of traits, of knowledge, of work, of relationships by which others identify us, and entertain expectations with respect to us and so on.

In Philosophy, there are numerous approaches to define the distinctive qualities of the self. The self as understood in the traditions emanating from Descartes and Locke, or conceived by some contemporary philosophers is supposed to be the permanent subject of successive states of consciousness or conscious experiences. It is taken to be the entity that endures through time and to which thoughts and actions of different moments belong. On the other hand, contrary to the idea of the self as an
enduring substance there is David Hume’s theory of the self. He refused to abide by
the very popular substantive theory of the self brought to prominence by Descartes.
Hume on the contrary, believed that the self is nothing but a bundle of interconnected
perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity and are linked
by the property of constancy and coherence. More accurately, according to him, our
idea of self is just the idea of such a bundle. The identity we ascribe to the mind is just
a fictional one. So, the opinion of those who think of ourselves as ‘real’ are plain
wrong. After he famously questioned the very existence of the self, the number,
intensity and variety of attacks on the concept of self has been increasing. The History
of Western Philosophy stands as a witness to the fact that we have an array of diverse
philosophical views on the self starting from that of the ancient Greek philosophers to
the most contemporary ones, views on the self that ranges from it being substantive in
nature, to that it does not exist as something real because it is not available to
introspection (Hume), to it being not a thing (Existentialist), to it being a soluble fish of
general meanings and representations (Postmodernists) and so on. Some diverse ways
in which the concept of the self is denoted in philosophy are: self as a substance; self
as an illusion; self in the context of self-knowledge; self as an activity; self as a
bundle of perceptions; self as a narrative centre of gravity and so on. There are several
other views on the notion of the self but these examples are sufficient enough to
illustrate the fact that even though we are closest to our own self like nothing else, yet,
there is no unanimity of opinion regarding its nature. The debate on the self in the
History of Western Philosophy exactly mirrors that. There has been no one answer to
what the self is all about and even at present we are engulfed by many intriguing
questions regarding it: What is the nature of the entity called self? What constitutes
the self – is it consciousness or body or both? What is consciousness and how is it
related to self? What is the relationship between the self and the body? Is there any
relation between consciousness and the body? Do I have a soul that is not physical or
do I have a soul that is connected to my body in some fashion? Is it possible that I do
not have a body at all i.e. have a disembodied existence? These questions about the
self can be said to be several expressions of the historical philosophical problem
commonly called the mind-body problem i.e. the problem of the relation of the mind
and the body. It is basically asking whether ‘the self is a physical or a non-physical
entity or an amalgamation of the two?’ In order to know the self we need to survey and explore the mind-body problem, its solutions and developments.

1.1.2 The Mind-body Problem with Reference to the Concept of the Self

That people are possessors of both physical and mental properties is considered almost a mundane, unremarkable and a general commonsensical observation. We do not generally think about a person just as a physical object but as having both physical and mental properties. For instance, under the category of the physical, the properties that can be included are weight, color, size or shape, a person’s occupying certain amount of space, location, movement and so on. One might, as well, include certain biological, chemical or physiological properties. And on the other hand, under the category of the mental, can be included such things as thoughts, intentions, wants, desires, feelings, emotions and so on. These are only a few examples of the diverse properties that belong to the realm of the physical and that of the mental. The division brings to our notice an important point, that, there are a range of properties that we automatically associate with the mental aspects of a human being, and there are a range of other properties that we automatically associate with the physical aspects of a human being. We sometimes describe a person as a body with particular properties, sometimes as a being that has mental properties and sometimes both and we usually have no trouble in deciding the appropriate ways to describe a person. Our commonsense view is that we need both aspects to describe, explain and predict fully certain facts about people.

What appears to be so unproblematic from the commonsensical perspective and what is accepted so easily in our daily dealings, is not so when we reflect on them philosophically. The hypothesis that the physical and the mental properties are separable properties that co-exist in the self has not gone easy in the philosophical world. Ever since the beginning of the mind-body problem it has been intriguing philosophers and theologians. Even today philosophers of mind, neuroscientists and psychologists are all concerned with this problem. Much discussion has followed since Rene Descartes’ Cartesian Dualism i.e. separation of mind and matter into two different but interacting substances. He claimed that our selves are purely
psychological entities, and our bodies are purely physical entities. There is no one thing that is the possessor of both kinds of properties. His way of distinguishing mind and body has certain plausibility. Otherwise, his theory would not have been taken seriously. The mind and things mental do not exist in space or have parts with spatial dimensions. Mental objects exist without doubt in our subjective appreciation of them. Since, minds and bodies are bearers of completely incompatible properties; they are referred to as separate metaphysical substances. The mind-body problem is that there seems to be no way to explain the substantial unity or the interactions of the mind and body.

In case, there cannot be a substantial unity of mind and body because of their distinct properties, than, how can they co-exist in the ‘self’ if general observation is to be believed? Descartes’ argument may be said to be the prime source of many of the ideas and problems that have bedeviled our commonsense notion of the self. Of course, even before him we have in history an entire entourage of philosophers who supported dualism. But Descartes’ attempt was the culminating point of the previous claims that led to the ultimate division of reality into two distinct hemispheres – the mind and the body. His mind-body thesis, thus, rekindled and instigated our enthusiasm to know our own self in a major way and raised several philosophical questions. If his claim is true, than the ‘I’ or ‘self’ is basically of the nature of consciousness. But in case his claim is wrong, than, the body, contra Descartes, is arguably integral to the concept of the self or the use of ‘I’. The question is – in what way? This is the basic question that this thesis explores. In other words, the motive is to know the nature of the self and that is best expressed by the question – ‘What am I?’ The self is just what is referred to when the word ‘I’ is used. It is the problem of asking what the self is all about – whether the self is a material entity, or it is something immaterial in nature, or it is an entity where both co-exist.

1.1.3 Self and Consciousness
One of the traits considered integral to the self is that of the enduring mind. The identity of an enduring mind lay in its conscious experiences or consciousness. So, consciousness is integral to the self. The most compelling argument for the existence
of consciousness is that the vast majority of mankind has an overwhelming intuition there truly exists such an entity. We are conscious of being conscious. We experience the self as continuity from the internal connectedness of our being conscious. The unity of awareness provided by consciousness seems like the inner truth within the external facts of our constancy, reliability and predictability. This awareness is the private essential requirement that provides a stable sense to our lives and enables us to make sense of ourselves and leads others to identify us. The characteristic unity of the self cannot exist without the unifying and integrating power of self-awareness. So, an account of the self must accommodate this integral aspect of the self i.e. consciousness.

Numerous questions emerge regarding the self and consciousness and these questions have not failed to perplex and fascinate philosophers of mind over the years. Some very common questions are: What is consciousness? Where is it located? What philosophical analysis can we give of it? Does it depend on the body for any or all of its features? How is it related to the self? The fact that consciousness is an intriguing and elusive phenomenon is beyond doubt. So, all these questions are not very easy to answer. The feeling of subjectivity or the feeling of ‘I’ associated with consciousness makes it at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is far from clear how to reconcile it with everything else we know. Max Velmans and Susan Schneider’s view in *The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness* represents our present perception on consciousness, “ Anything that we are aware of at a given moment forms part of our consciousness, making conscious experience at once the most familiar and most mysterious aspect of our lives”.

Although consciousness is almost certainly a property of the physical brain, the major mystery that remains unsolved according to philosophers is to understand how is it possible for neurons which are physical entities to produce the subjective feelings? Even though the scientific study of the brain has made remarkable progress but neuroscience has not reached the stage where it can satisfactorily answer these questions. Some philosophers like Thomas Nagel and David Chalmers have argued that the correlation

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between physical-brain states and mental states is not strong enough to support the
identity theory of mental and physical as suggested by neuroscientists. But others like
McGinn propagate a kind of ‘cognitive closure’ regarding consciousness with respect
to the mind-body problem. In *The Making of a Philosopher* he says that “just as a dog
cannot be expected to solve the problems of space and time and the speed of light,
that it took a brain like Einstein’s to solve, so maybe, the human species cannot be
expected to understand how the universe contains mind and matter in combination.
Isn’t it really a preposterous overconfidence on our part to think that our species – so
recent, so contingent, and so limited in many ways – can nevertheless unlock every
secret of the natural world? As Socrates always maintained, it is the wise man who
knows his ignorance.” Still we have other optimistic point of view like that of
Wittgenstein who is of the opinion that what we have been addressing as a problem
since ages might not be a problem at all. Human beings exist in time and history. We
cannot abstract their ‘minds’ and their ‘bodies’ from the complex and interactive
world in which they live. Instead the mind and body must be reconciled as a part of a
system and we must not let ourselves bewitched by language and thereby create
problems wherein there is none. We must take “Philosophy as a battle against the
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.”

All these varied views do point out that it is beyond doubt that the concept of
consciousness is indeed a philosophical puzzle. We still have not found the exact
answer to the question as to where within our brains is the seat of consciousness. Nor
have we encountered any extra-material substance as proposed by Descartes. We are
still grappling for an understanding. Edmund Husserl seems right when he states that
consciousness is the greatest wonder of all wonders. The debate about its nature is
very complex but its existence, nevertheless, cannot be denied. There are skeptics,
who on the other hand, argue that this intuition, despite its compelling characteristics,
is false, either because the concept of consciousness is intrinsically incoherent, or
because our intuitions about it are based on illusions. Gilbert Ryle, for example,

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argued that our traditional understanding of consciousness depends on a Cartesian
dualist outlook that improperly distinguishes between the mind and the body, or
between the mind and the world. Thus, by speaking of consciousness we end up
misleading ourselves by thinking that there is any sort of thing as consciousness
separated from behavior.

Even though we lack a universally agreed idea on the concept of consciousness,
yet, there is a reasonably wide and agreed upon consensus that an adequate account of
the self requires a clear understanding of consciousness and its place in nature.
Amidst the widespread acknowledgement that consciousness is one of the most
baffling phenomena, I have made an attempt to unveil it in this study with the hope
that it will pave the way to know the self in a better way.

1.1.4 Self and the Body

Another trait that is considered integral to the self is that of the enduring body.
Commonsense reveals to us that the self is always embodied. Psychological states or a
unity of awareness without an enduring body is something beyond the range of
identifiable objects. The focus on the self as enduring psychological states over a
period of time gives only a subjective dimension of continuity. The body in which
consciousness is housed in gives the self its outer face. Empirically we observe that
the self is always lodged in a body and there is a causal relation between them. Also
the contents of our memory relate to the external world and the external world cannot
be perceived without the body. We may think of memories after life in a disembodied
state (if at all there is one) but the memories in the disembodied state too will be
always that of our previous bodied existence. Hence, our common sense directs us to
the belief that there must be some kind of necessary relation between the self and the
body. The concept of the body as a necessary component of the self is also endorsed
by the fact that there can be no individuation (or distinction) of oneself from another
except with reference to the physical bodies. If there were only psychological states
than no one else could ever distinguish one disembodied person from another except
for one’s own self. So, there can be no doubt (at least from our common sense point
of view) that knowledge of the body and its relation to the self (if it has any) will
prove fruitful in our endeavour of knowing the self.
It is clear enough to all what is meant by the term body. We see it. We understand it. We generally define a ‘person’ or a ‘self’ as an embodied being having consciousness that makes them capable of certain types of complex psychological attributes. With respect to each individual self, a particular body, namely, his own occupies a unique place and significance in relation to his conscious experiences. Conscious experiences of a person seem to be dependent in a certain way on body. We, therefore, assume that all the experiences that are related in the relevant ways to a particular body are experiences of the ‘self’ or ‘person’ whose body it is and that each body indicates one person. Except in cases of split or multiple personalities this assumption is generally not questioned. The self does not seem to be distinct from the particular human body, with which it is associated. It is also constituted of mental properties which also determine what a person fundamentally is. There is a unique sense in which a person is conscious of his own identity. Both the aspects – body and consciousness – are considered to play their own distinctive roles in the determination of one’s continued self identity.

For much of the history, the body has been conceptualized as simply one biological object among others. In nature, people constantly encounter things with physical characteristics – trees, animals, automobiles, rocks and other objects, all of which have physical properties as weight, shape, color and the like. The human body too seems to belong to this world of nature for it has size, weight, mass and color. To have a body means that one is involved in a definite environment because our body is a vehicle for being in the world, it is our medium for having a world and for interacting with it. Bodies are aggregates of substances which appear to us as extended corporeal phenomena; they have their foundation in being real. Unlike consciousness the body is perceivable. I have explored upon whether the body is integral to some aspect of consciousness and if yes, than, what role does the body play in providing the grasp of us as a conscious being.

1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRESENT STUDY

The study of the ‘self’ and it’s relation to ‘consciousness’ and ‘body’ is of immense importance considering that they are the basis of our knowing ourselves. The study of
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the ‘self’ is important because it is the entity which defines who we are. It holds key to such questions as ‘Who am I?’ Or ‘What am I?’ An understanding of the self would require that we delve into the mind-body problem as it will help us to know the nature of the self in a better way.

The need to understand the self is extremely important. It is a human endeavour of great value. It has achieved even more significance in the contemporary times with the increasing awareness of the possibility of explaining differences in human behavior in terms of the functioning of a material organ – the brain and of the possibility of constructing machines which stimulate man’s most treasured possession – intelligence. Also an understanding of the relationship of the self to consciousness and the body may help us to shed light on such important and age old philosophical questions as: What is a person? What constitutes personal identity – consciousness or the body or both? What unites a succession of experiences making them the same person’s experience? What is the nature of the subject of the mental phenomenon – the entity to which we ascribe sensations, perceptions, thoughts, desires, actions etc.? The answers to these questions hold significance as they are the keys to know our own self i.e. the ‘I’ in a better light. Knowing the ‘self’ is extremely important and is aptly reflected in Dennett’s assertion that people can believe whatever they want to – but we should not make policy and resource decisions based on myth (i.e. issues such as euthanasia, capital punishment, abortion, or meat eating and so on). We must not succumb to myths about the concept of self as wrong beliefs about self will lead to mistaken judgments in all fronts of life which can even hamper future progress of humanity. Hence, a right understanding of self is a must and therefore, I think that the topic that I have worked on is significant and holds great value.

1.3 OBJECTIVES

This study strives to understand the self and in the process makes an effort to understand the conscious phenomenon and see what kind of relation it has with the body or brain. Although it has been a Herculean task, yet, I have tried hard to systematically examine the various aspects of the ‘self’ as it is addressed in the major traditional, modern and contemporary Western Philosophy. In this study I have also
attempted to unravel the mystery behind labeling the ‘self’ as one of the most elusive phenomenon in philosophy. To do so, I have tried to shed light on diverse viewpoints regarding the conscious phenomenon and see what kind of relation it has with the body or brain.

The self is generally considered to be an amalgamation of an enduring mind and an enduring body; the enduring mind denoted by consciousness or the unity of awareness. Continuity of self over time is supposed to have both of them i.e. objective and subjective aspects. Neither bodiless psychological states nor a body without psychological states provides any grounding for the sense of identity that the self exhibits. So, with the hypothesis that body and consciousness are integral to the concept of the self, the focus of my study has been to delve into its truth. My aim has been to understand whether the commonsensical notion regarding the self which goes against the mind-body dualism is true or not?

In this study I have made a survey of the important philosophical speculations on the concept of the self, consciousness and the body in the Western Philosophy. The expository task of analyzing the philosophical views across ages is philosophical rather than merely historical. In course of the expository task, I have provided a consistent reconstruction and analysis that has due regards to the following points:

a) The concept of self, consciousness and the body is analysed on the basis of the survey of important philosophical views across ages. But it is quite obvious that the domain of Philosophy of mind starting from that of the Greek Philosophers to that of the present times is too vast a field to be meaningfully summarized by me. Due to the enormity of this field of study and the constraint of space and time that has to be maintained while doing a research work, I have tried to be as precise as possible taking care of the fact that the main objective i.e. an understanding of self, consciousness and the body, holds the centre-stage.

b) I have started with an examination of the views of some of the prominent thinkers across the ages that have an important bearing on the subject of my research. I have examined the various philosophical perspectives from the Greek period to that of the contemporary times with the intention that an inquiry into
the concept from the remote distance to the present times will help us to get an idea about the nature and structure of mind-body or consciousness-brain relationship which in turn will help us in understanding the self.

c) I have reviewed the different contexts in which the terms – self, consciousness and the body are applied by the philosophers whose views are considered in the thesis.

d) I would also like to mention here that the discussion of self, consciousness and body by the philosophers under consideration take place within the broad frame work of the mind-body problem as it turns out that the speculations on self, consciousness and the body is actually several expressions of the mind-body problem in philosophy.

e) I would like to mention here that it is not without some difficulty that some of the texts reveal features that are relevant to describe the self, consciousness and the body. At times the concepts of the entities being studied are extracted as they have not been explicitly mentioned by the philosophers. In such cases, I have derived their philosophical views on the subjects from their other philosophical engagements as a whole. Certain interpretative tasks are involved at those stages where we do not encounter direct viewpoints about the subjects under consideration because it may be the case that consciousness, body and the self were not issues that some of them would have routinely discussed. Perhaps it may have figured in the theories of some of the surveyed thinkers as elements in other arguments and examples. I have taken note of these states of affairs as creating a need for a closer analysis and clarification of their understanding of the given subjects.

f) Last but not the least; one thing that need to be mentioned is that the area of my study is confined to human beings alone as they are the paradigmatic cases of beings to which the concept of self applies.

So, keeping in mind the above mentioned points, the aim of this study has been to understand the concept of the self by understanding consciousness and the body. The main motive of this study is directed at identifying the most rational view that truly represents the nature of the self.
1.4 CHAPTERIZATION

1.4.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the basic idea of this study. It provides a glimpse of the general concept of the self as is prevalent in Philosophy while delineating that the numerous discussions on the relationship between the self and the body, self and consciousness are nothing but several expressions of the perennial mind-body problem in Philosophy. It talks about how a survey of the mind-body problem, its solutions and development would go a long way in helping us to know the self in a better manner. It also throws light on the significance and basic objectives of this study.

1.4.2 Ancient Greek Philosopher’s attempt to unveil the mystery of Self, Consciousness and the Body

This chapter takes us to the earliest period in the History of Western Philosophy. It was that period when the quest for the self started as a breath of life, a shadowy duplicate which was regarded as the principle of life movement marking off a living being from a corpse. The prevalent belief about the mind at that period was mostly vague, unscientific and devoid of systematic enquiry as it was dependent on traditions, customs and superstitions. But at the same time it was an important phase as it was during period that doors were opened for rational and intellectual speculations thereby sharpening our enthusiasm to know ourselves and the world around. Most of the philosophers at that time were committed to believing either one of the two views – the belief that the self is divine in origin and nature or the belief that the self is a part of the vast and all pervading nature. These views may be said to be the root of the mind-body problem in Philosophy. Views of some of the important pre-Socratic philosophers and the three classical philosophers – Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, who have contributed to the development of the mind-body problem in Philosophy, are discussed here.

1.4.3 The Modern philosopher’s take on: Self, Consciousness and the Body: For a very long time the dead hands of Plato and Aristotle dominated the domain of the philosophical worldview. A new phase began in the 17th century with Descartes and
he was followed by a host of other philosophers. Their views were an outgrowth of scientific and rational approaches to the problems of the nature of the mind and its relation to the body. The whole lot of philosophers who belonged to this era was demarcated into two distinct groups based on their philosophical perspectives – the rationalists and the empiricists. Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz were proponents of rationalism and Locke, Berkeley and Hume endorsed the empirical approach. All of their varied view points are briefly analysed in this chapter. Also included in this chapter is the view of Kant who can be credited to have eradicated the last trace of the medieval world view for the realm of the modern philosophy. He not only reformulated empiricism but at the same time thoroughly modified rationalism and joined the key ideas of both the contradictory systems to make some deep running observations about consciousness and the self.

1.4.4 Some contemporary philosophical viewpoints on: Self, Consciousness and the Body

In the contemporary times too, Philosophy of mind has been deeply engaged in solving the problem of mind-body and is putting much efforts in the process. Of course, the way we talk about it has changed. It is now more popular as the problem of consciousness. But if we delve into the basic questions regarding the problem of consciousness we will discover that it is just another name of the age old mind-body problem of Philosophy. Despite great efforts of many contemporary philosophers, the study of consciousness has not reached its desired end. There is no dearth of invocations at the beginning of great texts by the greatest names in the Philosophy of mind regarding the bewitchment of our intelligence by the conscious phenomenon. Some of the contemporary philosophers of mind deny the existence of the conscious phenomenon, explain something else, or elevate the problem to the level of an eternal mystery. But there are many others who believe that with the right kind of investigation and knowledge we will be able to unravel the so-called mystery regarding consciousness. To make further progress, we only need further investigations, more refined theories, and more careful analysis. This group assures us that the hard problem is no doubt a hard problem, but there is no reason to believe that it will remain permanently unsolved. Thus, contemporary Philosophy of mind offers
various competitive theories to explain consciousness. But right now all of them are more of ideas rather than full-fledged theories. In order to have any hope of eventual explanatory success, they will have to be specified more fully and fleshed out in more powerful forms. Still they all are important because reflection on just what is plausible and implausible, on where it works and where it fails, can definitely lead to some successful results. All these aspects are a part of this particular chapter. More specifically it is an analysis of the views of Dennett, Searle, McGinn and Chalmers who represent the varied views of the contemporary times.

1.4.5 Recapitulating the survey on: Self, Consciousness and the Body

In this chapter I have summarized the survey of the philosophical speculations on the self from the period of the Greek Philosophy to that of the contemporary times. While analysing the problem I have discovered that the debate on the self – whether it is a material or an immaterial entity or a combination of the two – commences with the greatest vigor from the time of the heir to the Platonic tradition, namely the Cartesian conception of human beings as two one-sided things, a mind and a body. Despite the huge debate on the perennial problem commonly called the mind-body problem in Philosophy as mirrored in the History of Western Philosophy we are still engulfed by it and despite repeated attempts we have not been able to decide the true nature of the self. This chapter presents an overview of the problem while recapitulating the survey of the problem.

1.4.6 Analysis and Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to comprehend the nature of the mind-body problem. Most of the philosophers from the time of the Greek period to that of the modern age with a few exceptions have conceded to the mind being a subjective entity bounded up with the body. The mind according to Plato, Descartes, Locke does not have a necessary connection with the body. But Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz and Berkeley were exceptions as they somehow or the other approved of some kind of unification of the mind and the body. Each had given their own reason for accepting the unity of the mind and the body which have been thoroughly discussed in the thesis. Hume and
Kant talked more about the techniques that the mind employs in the process of understanding and both of them simply ignores the domain of the body. In the contemporary times the terminology and the way we ask about the mind-body problem has changed. Now we talk of the mind mostly as consciousness and the body in terms of the brain. The age old question about how to justify the reconciliation of the mind and the body has changed to the problem of grasping how to give an account of the production of the non-physical i.e. mental subjective conscious experiences from something like a physical lump of grey matter. The contemporary philosophers of mind have been majorly concerned with the realm of consciousness. Dennett, Searle, McGinn, Chalmers and so on have tried their best to explain or explain away consciousness. Whatever be the form of the question the substance of it remains the same – how do we explain the union of the physical and the mental in the self. I have tried to analyse the problem of reconciling the conscious experiences with the body by trying to locate the causes of it. While analyzing the causes I have realized that there are certain factors which are invariably associated with the conscious phenomenon and this association has rendered a mysterious aspect to it. They are the transitive part of consciousness and qualia. Examination of these aspects has revealed that there is nothing mysterious about consciousness. It is due to certain misconceptions that we again and again fall back on the easy way out to define consciousness i.e. by calling it a mysterious entity. In this chapter I have applied Wittgensteinian methodology of clarifying concepts in order to unravel the mystery of consciousness and its relation with the body so that in the process we understand the self in a better way.