CHAPTER 1

DETERMINANTS OF DETERRENCE IN INDIA

“When you talk about peace through strength, what you are talking about is the concept of deterrence.”

- Chris Gibson

Introduction

Peace is the harbinger for economic growth, development, and prosperity for of a nation while war brings in incalculable destruction and setback to economic growth and prosperity of a nation. Therefore, all the nations avoid war, but wars have still taken place. The perceived failure of deterrence has been one of the causes of all wars. Deterrence has been in existence since times immemorial and applies in all types of inter-state relations. The etymology of the word ‘deterrence’ starts with the Latin word *deterre* – to frighten from or away. It means to prevent an adversary from doing something inimical and reflects the desire to manipulate somebody’s behavior. Deterrence in simple form can be related to the traffic police in a city who manages and ensures orderliness of traffic in a city. The presence of the police and its threat of imposing penalties on the defaulter(s) constitutes the deterrence value of the traffic police. Similarly, the national security and interstate relations are managed by deterrence, normally by the threat of military retaliation. The primary objective of national security during peace is to create capabilities that deter a potential adversary from undertaking any inimical activities that are detrimental to the vital interests of the other nation. The capabilities developed over a period of time are the sum total of a nation’s comprehensive national power. It is imperative to understand the evolution of deterrence and the related theoretical construct followed by the determinants of deterrence and their application in the Indian context. The chapter has been accordingly structured as follows:

(a) Part I: Theoretical Construct of Deterrence
(b) Part II: Determinants and Application of Deterrence in the Indian Context
(c) Part III: Conclusion

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7 Gibson, Chris, Deterrence Quotes, Retrieved from Internet: https://www.brainyquote.com/chris_gibson=deterrence (Accessed on 18 October, 2018)
PART I: THEORETICAL CONSTRUCT OF DETERRENCE

The aim of deterrence is to prevent an enemy power or an inimical state from taking the decision to wage a war or undertake any hostile action(s) to achieve a political objective(s). Deterrence theoretically appears quite simplistic, but in the application, it is a vast subject guided by a number of theories, strategies, forms, types and numerous other factors. It is intended to cover the basic theoretical construct that would enable us to understand the essential aspects of deterrence for application in the Indian context. The theoretical aspects include the evolution, concept, strategies, the relationship between conventional and nuclear deterrence, the distinction between deterrence and dissuasion, non-nuclear strategic deterrence (NNSD) and the challenges to deterrence.

The Evolution and Concept of Deterrence

The relationship since time immemorial between antagonistic tribes and states was guided by deterrence based on the capabilities of opposing forces and the coalition between the nations or tribes. Till World War I, deterrence was based on the security alliances/partnerships amongst nations and their conventional military capability. Diplomatic isolation of a nation due to the absence of allies seriously undermined its deterrence capability which was considered essential for war.\(^9\) In the 1930s air power provided deterrence value equivalent to the nuclear arsenals today. The deterrence value of the Air Force was due to the threat of causing maximum punishment to the civilian population and the economic infrastructure located across the country. ‘The dirtier the bomb, better the deterrence.’\(^10\) The type of arsenal in possession of the nation’s air force was relevant to increase the deterrent value.

Deterrence continued to be based on security alliances driven by mutually accepted ideologies and military capability till World War II. But these alliances could not deter war. Germany after signing a non-aggression agreement with USSR invaded its ally Poland. It was not deterred by the mutual assistance agreement signed between the UK and Poland. In retaliation to the German invasion of Poland, the UK and France declared war on Germany signifying the commencement of World War II. The

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war was fought between the Axis powers Germany, Italy, and Japan and the Allies comprising of the USA, USSR, UK, and France. The dropping of the first atomic bomb in August 1945 on Japan during the Second World War triggered a race amongst the advanced nations to developing nuclear weapons. The development of atomic weapons by the USSR in the fifties in response to the US made nuclear deterrence an essential component of security strategy of a nation.

The concept of deterrence was developed into a deliberate objective in strategic planning and diplomacy after World War II. It was first put forward by Bernard Brodie in 1945 when he summed up the concept of a nuclear era as, “thus far the chief purpose of our military establishments has been to win wars, from now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them.”11 Due to their immense destructive potential, nuclear weapons are not considered as instruments of war-fighting but as instruments of averting wars. The first systematic application of deterrence took place when the US adopted a policy of threatened ‘massive retaliation’ against the Soviet Union by 1954.12 The ‘concept of deterrence’ thereafter took a notable shift to a ‘concept of nuclear deterrence’ resulting in major strategic narratives and development programmes getting aligned to and justified in terms of deterrence.13 Nuclear deterrence did not depend upon the size of an arsenal to deter an adversary, though states with larger arsenals are considered more capable. The emphasis of successful deterrence was focused on the understanding of the culture and the decision-making process of the adversary.14 As nuclear weapons could directly target population centres; the degradation of adversary’s conventional military capability was no longer considered necessary to destroy his power base.

The concept of nuclear deterrence is based on the ability of the defender to retaliate effectively with nuclear weapons despite being hit first by the aggressor. This is known as second-strike capability, Glenn Snyder considered one of the distinguished proponents of deterrence highlighted its definition as “discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his

12 Harvey, op cit, p 7
prospective gain; defence means reducing our own perspective costs and risks in the
event that deterrence fails.” The value of deterrence lies prior to the adversary
undertaking any hostile activity. The Romans in ancient times followed, “si vis pacem,
para bellum” which meant, ‘if you want peace, prepare for war’, implying the need to
have a strong military capability of deterring the other side from waging a war and
preserve peace. Ronald Reagen termed it “Peace through Strength.” Deterrence is
more a mind game intending to impact the adversary psychologically by influencing
his perceptions. The military as a deterrent force is “constantly engaged in a
psychological battle dissuading the adversary from attacking and confront him with a
prospect of costs greater than his prospective gains.” Deterrence is, thus, a strategy
for conflict management during peace-time that intends to impose psychological
constraints on the opponent. It influences the adversary that aggression in any form is
not a viable alternative, thereby reducing the risk of war. Therefore, “deterrence is not
purely a military concept, but also an aspect of diplomacy.” Deterrence is perhaps
one of the most direct yet subtle forms of signaling, but importantly the effect of such
signaling will depend upon the perception of the credibility of deterrence. The
atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to deter the erstwhile-USSR post-
war rather than to force a Japanese surrender who was already contemplating some
face-saving mechanism for the last few months of the war. Japan was expected to
have surrendered, latest by November 1945, even if the bombs were not dropped. The
perceptions of the adversary are impacted by the quality of political decisions and the
credibility of the means to implement such decisions. Bold political decisions impose
cautions on an adversary, while weak decisions embolden it to undertake inimical
activities.

Snyder, Glenn H, Deterrence and Defence: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961) p 3. Glenn Snyder was Professor of Political Science and renowned Scholar at the University of North Carolina, USA. He authored six books on international relations.


Ibid


Nuclear weapons came to be viewed as a strategic necessity that would reduce confrontation between the nations and ensure stability. Nuclear deterrence was considered an inherently stable condition.\(^{21}\) No industrial war of the level of World War I and II has taken place since 1945 testifies that the nuclear weapons have provided the cold war stability between the US and the USSR and its allies. China acquired nuclear capability in 1964, while India and Pakistan became overt nuclear powers in May 1998. Contrary to expectations that the advent of nuclear weapons would reduce confrontation between India and Pakistan, it has, in fact, intensified the confrontation between the two neighbors due to latter’s ingenuity to employ them as a shield to abet terrorism.

Deterrence is imposed by laying down various alternatives to the adversary and influences the choice of alternatives by threats and promises.\(^ {22}\) “Threats and Promises are conditional strategic moves that can be used either for deterrence or compellence, depending on what they are supposed to achieve.” \(^{23}\) The threats can be military, diplomatic or economic. A threat is a pledge to *impose costs* for non-compliance of demands while a promise is a pledge to *provide benefits* for compliance. Deterrence provides optimum value with a threat and compellence with a promise.\(^ {24}\) However, both are prohibitive in terms of cost, financial or material.

Compellence, like deterrence, is a related strategy, but there are differences between the two strategies. Deterrence and Compellence, are two major subsets of Strategic Coercion.\(^ {25}\) Both rely on threats to persuade the adversary’s hostile behavior. Compellence persuades an opponent to undo an action already undertaken or to give up something vital without armed resistance while deterrence dissuades an adversary from undertaking a damaging action in the future.\(^ {26}\) Compellence, is thus, active in nature and attempts to alter the status quo, while deterrence, in contrast, is passive and

\(^{21}\) Ogilvie, op cit, p 67


\(^{24}\) Ibid


conservative in nature seeking to maintain the status quo. Deterrence is the power to dissuade as opposed to the power to coerce or compel.\textsuperscript{27} For the compellence to succeed, the threat of coercing power must be credible enough to convince the adversary of its strong political resolve and military capacity to execute the same for non-compliance. Following the terrorist strike on Parliament in December 2001, India unsuccessfully tried compellence strategy against Pakistan to give up its cross-border terrorism policy already underway while Pakistan successfully deterred India from waging a war.

\textbf{Strategies of Deterrence}

Deterrence is both theory in international relations and a strategy of conflict management.\textsuperscript{28} The theory addresses the political and psychological assumptions of deterrence while strategy focuses on the application part of the theory. Deterrence theory “assumes the centrality of survival as a core value” and is subsumed in the assumption of rationality, i.e. “states will not want to suffer the risk of extinction or the enormous devastation that is inevitable in absorbing nuclear strikes.”\textsuperscript{29} \textbf{The certainty of colossal destruction by nuclear weapons is the core element of nuclear deterrence.}

The two most relevant and interlinked strategies of deterrence are the Strategy of Denial and the Strategy of Punishment. The Strategy of Denial intends to deny decisive victory to the enemy by the threat and the capacity to inflict punishment by adopting the Strategy of Punishment. Strategy of or Deterrence by Denial as is also referred implies denying the enemy to initiate any hostile activity or capture any territory or cause attrition to the war-fighting potential by pre-empting enemy intentions by either military deployment or by attacking his military strategy or adopting any other military means; the aim being to forewarn him of the adverse consequences of its planned activity. Strong states discourage others from attacking them by being able to repel such an attack through ‘Deterrence by Denial’.\textsuperscript{30} The effectiveness of this strategy provides the deterrent value, which reduces the probability of enemy attacks in the future. The Strategy of or Deterrence by

\textsuperscript{27} Snyder, op cit 1961, p 9  
\textsuperscript{29} Sridharan E, ‘International Relations Theory and the India-Pakistan Conflict’ in Sridharan, E, Ed, \textit{The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations} (New Delhi: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2007) p 27  
\textsuperscript{30} Snyder op cit, 1961, p 32
Punishment aims to target cities, key economic centres and civilians making fighting extremely painful, even triggering a popular revolt by causing extensive economic damage. In short, it threatens massive retaliation inflicting severe punishment. The strategy of punishment is more credible while the strategy of denial is less costly for the deterred and may be effective in denying gains to the attacker or minimizing his gains. “In principle, denial is a more reliable strategy than punishment because if the threats have to be implemented, it offers control rather than continuing coercion; with punishment, the adversary is left to decide how much more to take, with the denial, the choice is removed.” According to Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal, India follows a policy of “deterrence by punishment with a ‘counter value’ targeting strategy aimed at inflicting unacceptable damage to the adversary’s cities and industrial centres, as against ‘a counterforce’ strategy aimed at destroying the adversary’s nuclear forces.”

By adopting the strategy of punishment, India intends to raise the cost of aggression on Pakistan, thereby increasing the effectiveness of deterrence. This strategy pertains to the nuclear deterrence, however, even prior to the evolution of this deterrence in the Indian context, India carried out the deployment of its military along the border in 1950 to compel Pakistan to cease hostile activities in East Bengal and to pre-empt initiation of hostile activities in J&K and elsewhere in 1951.

To be effective the strategies of deterrence should be credible and capable. Credibility is based on two interlinked dimensions viz the political resolve and military capability. A threat is considered credible if the defending state possesses both the political resolve and the military capability to inflict severe punishment on the aggressor state. The adversary must be convinced about the existence of the threat and the conditions under which it will be implemented as well as of political, economic and military consequences of the same. “A nation’s reputation for carrying out past threats and the perceived level of commitment to the vital interests being challenged is a key determinant of credibility” The threat should be communicated effectively, through formal statements, press briefings and force deployments, etc. The correlation of capability, credibility, and communication considered essential to ensure the success and effectiveness of deterrence are illustrated diagrammatically.

31 Freedman, op cit 2004, p 39
32 Kanwal, Gurmeet, Sharpening the Arsenal India’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrence Policy (Noida: HarperCollins Publishers, 2017) p 7. Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal is a Distinguished Fellow at the IDSA and former Director of CLAWS. An expert on national security affairs he has authored numerous books and articles. The present book is his latest.
33 Maoz, Zeev, Paradoxes: On the Art of National Self Entrapment (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1996) p 33
34 Harvey, op cit, p 28
Illustration 1: Effectiveness of Deterrence

The nuclear relationship between two nuclear weapon states is assumed on the ‘stability-instability paradox’ as articulated by Glenn Snyder. He stated, “as long as both sides have a strike back capability and neither has a full first strike capability, the nuclear balance can be said to be very stable; the nuclear balance is most unstable when both sides have the full first strike capability viz. the ability to knock out the adversary’s strategic deterrent in a first strike.”

The stability-instability paradox does play a role in India-Pakistan relation. In the India-Pakistan context, Lieutenant General Prakash Menon observes, “a nascent nuclear arsenal coupled with an ongoing proxy war has presented both countries with a strategic dilemma that reflects the end products produced of the stability-instability paradox.”

Pakistan is abetting cross-border terrorism policy based on its nuclear capability to deter India from conventional war, thereby maintaining stability, but well aware it will not lead to the achievement of its strategic objective(s). Brinkmanship is a strategy that manipulates the shared risk of war and exploits the danger of inadvertent escalation. However, the onus of diffusing the risky situation is, ostensibly, passed on to the dormant player.

Pakistan uses nuclear brinkmanship strategy against India to buttress its deterrence. It is also used to magnify the fears of the international community about the nuclear

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36 Rasul, Bakshi Rais, ‘Conceptualising Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan’s Posture’ Sridharan, Ed, p 190
37 Menon, Prakash, Lieutenant General, The Strategy Trap India and Pakistan under the Nuclear Shadow (New Delhi: Wisdom Tree, 2018) p 99. A former Commandant of the National Defence College, Lieutenant General Menon served as the Military Advisor in India’s National Security Secretariat. He is a strategic analyst and author. Currently he is the Director of Strategic Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution Bengaluru
38 Schelling, op cit, pp 98-99
conflagration. **India’s nuclear doctrine is premised on a ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’ and ‘No First Use’ (NFU) posture.** NFU with an assured second-strike capability is India’s minimal deterrence. Minimum deterrence works on the ‘risk factor’, namely the risk of a direct nuclear war; the risk of escalation from a limited/full-scale conventional conflict to a full-scale nuclear war. The significance of risk factor implies the non-requirement of building large arsenals as greater the number, the greater the risks.

**The Relationship between Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence**

The nuclear weapons are meant to deter wars, while the conventional weapons are meant to fight wars. Brigadier (Later Lieutenant General) Menon, highlighting the impact of nuclear weapons on the conduct of war stated, “there are two definable paradigms of military security: one in which the organizing construct rests on preparing to fight and win the war, another in which war avoidance is the underlying goal of military preparations.”

During the cold war, both nuclear and conventional weapons coexisted. A nuclear deterrent seeks to prevent the outbreak of an all-out war between two nuclear power states but does not rule out the possibility of limited conventional wars. The world’s first limited conventional conflict between two overt nuclear powers – USSR and China took place in 1969. This conflict could have led to the use of nuclear weapons, but after two weeks of clashes, the conflict petered out. The Kargil war in 1999 between India and Pakistan demonstrated the application of limited war between two nuclear power countries wherein India evicted Pakistani intrusions exercising strategic military restraint.

Conventional military deterrence determines whether or not an adversary would opt for war to achieve political objectives. Conventional deterrence denies an aggressor his battlefield objectives with the application of the military force.

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39 Kanwal, op cit, p 7. Credible Minimum Deterrence implies holding a minimum number of nuclear weapons required to deter an adversary from attacking.
deterrence is thus a function of the military capability to inflict severe punishment on the enemy, capture or deny territory and minimize attrition to itself. The logic of conventional deterrence is based on achieving a quick victory and preventing an adversary from attaining its objectives and the local balance of military power between the conventional forces of the attacker and defender plays a crucial role. A strong conventional military capability is considered a symbol of power whose greater value lies in its ‘threat in being’ to deter war.

The possibility of conventional war between India and China or between India and Pakistan exists, despite being nuclear powers; though the probability is low. China’s concept of Local wars under modern high technology conditions envisions “a localized, short duration and high-intensity conflict using technologically advanced weapons for both symmetric and asymmetric combat, including cyber, space and information warfare.” Pakistani analysts feel, “one way to prevent the early use of nuclear weapons is for a conventional capability to be good enough to deny the adversary valuable strategic assets and maintain a stalemate for a reasonable time, assuming that the conventional pause would give the parties at war and the international community enough time to defuse tensions and negotiate peace.”

Adequate space, thus, exists for a limited conventional war between nuclear and conventional wars in the India-China and India-Pakistan context. All the respondents strongly agreed that the role of conventional military forces will continue to be pivotal regardless of the fact whether the opponents possess nuclear capability or not. The Kargil War is an example in the application of the concept of limited war in the India-Pakistan context. Given the self-restraint and self-deterrence in the usage of nuclear weapons and with the developments of new weapon systems, the role of conventional forces in achieving deterrence will always be important. Nuclear deterrence may have lost its predominance significance, but it is still relevant in the regional context. In fact, it has become complicated due to the change of deterrence

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46 Rasul in Sridharan, Ed, pp 57-58
47 Refer Question 3 of Appendix B on page 353
structure from ‘symmetric’ to ‘asymmetric’ wherein the ‘stronger’ (India) has not been able to deter the ‘weaker’ (Pakistan) as effectively as it used to be earlier. Pakistan’s nuclear capability deters India’s conventional military superiority.

The Distinction between Deterrence and Dissuasion

Deterrence is closely linked to Dissuasion. The word dissuasion derives from the Latin words “dis+suadere, i.e. to advise or persuade against”.\textsuperscript{48} Dissuasion covers a wide spectrum of deterring actions other than military deterrence like economic threats and promises. Dissuasion is, therefore, more comprehensive than deterrence. The purpose of dissuasion is “to discourage others from developing capabilities and/or adopting courses of action that are hostile to our interests.”\textsuperscript{49} Dissuasion can make deterrence easier by reducing the effectiveness of the adversary’s capabilities. It induces restraint in adversary’s behavior.\textsuperscript{50} The dissuasion’s role is even ‘pre-deterrence’ as it discourages or prevents an adversary from developing hostile capabilities and strategies, while deterrence forestalls the adversary from adopting hostile activities. Dissuasion and Deterrence are generally applied together to change the course of action of an adversary. Dissuasion involves both positive and negative actions adopted to influence the opponent of non-viability and ineffectiveness of creating hostile military capabilities and strategies, while deterrence involves measures including threats to convince the adversary that the costs of hostile action will outweigh the potential gains. Dissuasion addresses potential long-term challenges while deterrence focusses on the more immediate challenges.

Non-Nuclear Strategic Deterrence

Deterrence must not be considered only in military terms to prevent the occurrence of crisis or wars. It should also extend to the political domain which implies that the defending states should be able to resist the political and military demands of an adversary. The form of deterrence which is operational all the time and projected not

\textsuperscript{48} Berk, Ece, ‘Asymmetrical Deterrence for NBC Terrorism’ The Department of International Relations, September 2004, Ankara: Bilkent University, p 137
just through nuclear capability, but also through conventional, military and political capabilities is normally referred to as general deterrence.\textsuperscript{51} The general deterrence assumes increasing significance as it manages an adversarial relationship by balancing power over a long period of time and seeks to prevent an adversary from posing any military challenge. The immediate deterrence, on the other hand, pertains to specific military capabilities. Immediate deterrence attempts to “forestall an anticipated challenge to a well-defined and publicized commitment and is practiced when general deterrence is thought or perceived to be failing.”\textsuperscript{52} It refers to a scenario when one state is seriously considering an attack on its adversary while the other side is preparing for a possible response, with each side aware of the developments on the other side.

Owing to the developments in the geopolitical environment, nuclear deterrence, which was highly effective in the Cold War era, has seemingly lost its erstwhile predominant significance, particularly at the global level. As the ‘balance of interest’ tends to prevail over the ‘balance of power,’ a possible shift seems to be taking place from overt reliance on nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons. Non-Nuclear strategic weapons (NNSW) or Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) with conventional non-nuclear payloads are assuming greater significance in new concepts of deterrence. Conventional weapons having precision-guided munitions (PGM), advanced aircraft, stealth technology, non-nuclear armed cruise missiles and space-based earth penetrators have augmented NNSW capability, thereby facilitating effective ‘Non-Nuclear Strategic Deterrence (NNSD)’. NNSD in conjunction with non-military aspects like political alliances/partnerships, economic cooperation, technological collaboration, and diplomacy is a much more viable and credible deterrent strategy. A strong military capability based on NNSWs is imperative to deter war. Such a strategy is usable in all spectrums of conflict and will facilitate achievement of deterrence through the threat of use of conventional military means coupled with non-military elements of power of a state. The majority of the respondents also agreed that NNSD will be effective in deterring wars.\textsuperscript{53} NNSD can

\textsuperscript{51} Koithara, Verghese, \textit{Managing India’s Nuclear Forces}, (Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2012) p 72
\textsuperscript{52} Lebow, op cit, (Accessed on 09 January 2019)
\textsuperscript{53} Refer Question 2 of Appendix B on page 353
be adopted by both nuclear and non-nuclear states. NNSD strategy is more conducive in terms of the fallout and effect desired vis-a-vis nuclear deterrence strategy. Deterrence is better than going to war as “it forestalls an adversary’s behavior contrary to US interests; is less expensive in terms of human, economic, political costs and conserves national power – but requires a focus of will.” 54 This is equally relevant to all countries.

**Challenges to Deterrence**

Nuclear weapons, effective in deterring nuclear and conventional wars have proved ineffective in deterring an adversary from initiating a sub-conventional conflict and acts of terrorism by Non-State Actors. Since the non-state actors are elusive and ambiguous by nature, they make attribution for any attack difficult and thus evolving a credible deterrent policy for them is a major challenge, both conceptually and in practice. Although state-sponsored non-state actors are regarded to be more deterred since their state-sponsors can be targeted, but attributing their linkage to a state is a difficult proposition. Israel since its independence in 1948 faced problems of terrorism and non-state actors patronaged by its neighboring Arab states. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York, in September 2001 triggered the GWOT led by the USA; but has been unable to eliminate the threat of terrorism and contemplating withdrawal from Afghanistan. The conventional superiority of India has been unable to deter Pakistan from instigating and providing material and moral support for the proxy war in J&K as well as exporting terrorism in the rest of the country. Pakistan is using the shield of nuclear weapons to continue abetting terrorism in India. Pakistan not accepting even solid, credible evidence against various terrorists operating from its territory is illustrative of the challenges to deterrence. Suicidal attempts by the non-state actors are in fact not susceptible even to deterrence by retaliation. The majority of the respondents agreed that evolving a credible deterrent policy against non-state actors is a major challenge, both in conception and in practice.55 Mr. SS Menon, the former National Security Advisor and Foreign Secretary of India highlighted the constraints of employment of military force in

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54 Henry, Ryan, ‘op cit, Slide 5
55 Refer Question 9 of Appendix B on page 355
response to cross-border terrorism and non-state actors.\textsuperscript{56} Elaborating on the limitations of Israeli model, which is often quoted in India for replication, he highlighted that Israel’s use of force could achieve only temporary deterrence against the Arab terrorists and proved incapable of coercing any change in the behavior of non-state actors. As Israel recognized that producing deterrence against them is difficult, it adopted a patient military strategy of attrition to weaken its Arab opponents. As military deterrence against non-state actors is difficult to achieve, NNSD in terms of diplomatic outreach to the international community to isolate the sponsors can mitigate the threat.

Cyber Warfare is immune to any type of deterrence. Nuclear deterrence theories, strategies, and concepts are inapplicable to cyber war.\textsuperscript{57} The large-scale dependence on cyber connectivity has made it vulnerable to asymmetrical cyber-attacks through non-contact warfare. Deterrence strategies are ineffective as the potential attacker is sure of maintaining anonymity and if identification takes place, he is sure of disguising it as accidents. The attacker can also keep the level of damage below the adversary’s response threshold levels. There is a need to develop the ability to identify the attacker and capability to cause unacceptable damage to him. China has proved its efficiency in the cyber domain by executing and demonstrating cyber-attacks without owning them up. Cyber connectivity has permeated to all spheres of human life and its negative influences are almost undeterred due to the lack of any attribution. Cyber weapons are the new non-contact weapons that can cause huge damage and destruction /disruption to critical information and assets. The theories of deterrence which have stood the test of time through the era of nuclear brinkmanship will fall flat in the cyber context because there is complete obfuscation of attribution.\textsuperscript{58} Development of a viable cyber capability has become an essential ingredient of national security.

\textsuperscript{56} Interviewed on 27 February 2018. Mr SS Menon served as National Security Advisor of India from 2010 to 2014 and Foreign Secretary from 2006 to 2009. In 2010, he was chosen by \textit{Foreign Policy} magazine as one of the world’s Top 100 Global Thinkers.
\textsuperscript{58} Cyber Warfare: Changing Contours of Warfighting, CLAWS Seminar Report, 14 July 2017, p 7
PART II:
DETERMINANTS & APPLICATION OF DETERRENCE IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT

National security is a complex and intricate synthesis of economic, industrial, technological, military and the nuclear capabilities of a country. It aims to harmonize the external and internal interests and threats to achieve national aims and objectives while securing the core values. As deterrence is a vital instrument to achieve national security goals and avert wars, a brief overview of India’s security environment, with particular reference to the threat perceptions of China and Pakistan is considered necessary to get a better perspective for the application of deterrence in the Indian context. The implications of the global security environment on India will be deliberated specifically to the relevant determinants.

India’s Security Environment

India’s security environment encompasses numerous challenges ranging from a neighborhood to regional and global issues. The components of National Security can be explained by Kautilya’s concept of mandalas, wherein the security of a country is conceived as a series of concentric circles around the country each representing internal dynamics, neighbors, extended/strategic neighbors, and the rest of the world as illustrated diagrammatically:

Illustration 2: Concept of Mandalas

The globalization phenomenon has ushered numerous changes. Ideology has been pushed to the backstage, while the balance of interests overrides the balance of power.
This has given rise to the concepts of geopolitics, geostrategy, and geo-economics. Geopolitics is the analysis of the interface between geographic settings and political processes, while geostrategy is a subfield of geopolitics describing geographic direction and thrust of the state policy; Geo-economics is the combination of economic and geographic factors relating to international trade. Geo-economics entails systematic use of economic instruments to accomplish geopolitical objectives and can become instruments of promoting and defending national interests.

The architecture of the emerging global order is being shaped by the USA and China with Russia attempting to regain its erstwhile superpower status. The USA seeks to maintain its unipolar world status with new allies and partners, while China by virtue of its strong economic growth attempts to change this in favor of the bipolar world. The gradual shift in the ‘balance of power’ from Atlantic to Pacific and the Indian Ocean is primarily due to the phenomenal pace of economic development in the Asia-Pacific region. The renewed emphasis to link Indian-Ocean with Western Pacific, in the wider geographic perspective, has paved the way for the acronym ‘Indo-Pacific’. This shift in the global balance of power has introduced new dimensions among the major powers and regional states. A growing number of state and non-state actors’ pose substantial challenges of a complex nature. Regime stabilization, radicalization aiming to undermine the secular expansion and power rivalries may lead to instability in Central Asia. West Asia continues to be impacted by the sectarian fault-lines. The crisis in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have the potential to escalate into an ideological battle with deep sectarian undertones.

The developments beyond India’s immediate neighborhood impact its security perspective. South Asian neighborhood presents a challenge and an opportunity to India. While there have been positive political evolutions in Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the security situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan continues to remain a cause of international concern, being the epicenter of terrorism. The challenge from State-sponsored non-state actors is worrisome. The security threats from China and Pakistan are elaborated in the succeeding paragraphs.

59 Dwivedi, op cit, pp xi-xii
60 Dwivedi, op cit, p 13. The term ‘Indo-Pacific’ was first used by the Japanese PM Shinzo Abe while addressing the Indian Parliament on 22 August 2017.
**China.** China and India buoyed by the shift of the geopolitical centre of gravity to Asia are scripting a phenomenal economic growth story, with China acquiring a global power status and India aspiring for the regional power status. China seeks a multi-polar world order, but a unipolar regional order. Due to its territorial size, regional influence and economic growth, India is regarded as a potential threat and regional competing power, which could limit the Chinese influence in South Asia. That’s why China attempts to marginalize India regionally. At the global level, it requires India’s cooperation for multi-polar world order. The primary concern of China relates to US activities in the Indo-Pacific region and its military alliances with Japan and South Korea. China views India’s alignment with America with deep concern as it aspires to achieve economic parity with the US. China’s strategy of building infrastructure, including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as part of the Belt Road initiative (BRI) will strengthen its economic influence in South Asia and maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean.

India shares a 3768 km long border with China dominated by high mountain peaks. Out of this, 1958 km of the border is the Line of Actual Control (LAC) having a number of ‘disputed and sensitive areas’, with China claiming 1,30,005 square kilometers (sq km) of Indian territory. This is a perpetual source of confrontation between the two countries that led to the 1962 War and continues to raise border tensions frequently. The pending boundary dispute with frequent incursions characterizes the confrontation. While the ‘disputed areas’ are well known and routinely patrolled by both sides, China’s aggressive posturing and assertiveness in ‘sensitive areas’ as well as other areas which provide them operational and tactical advantages is a cause of concern. New ‘sensitive areas’ have emerged in the recent past. The two-month Doklam stand-off in July-August 2017 was the latest manifestation of the Chinese assertions. Its continuing development of infrastructure in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) confers numerous operational advantages. A rail line to Shigatse which may extend to Nepal, Bhutan and eventually to India is a possibility. Its support to Left-Wing Extremism and insurgencies in India’s North East continues. China’s cyber threat, in an increasingly network-reliant environment, can

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61 Based on personal knowledge and interaction with officers of Army and Command Headquarters in October 2018. Disputed areas are those areas along the Line of Actual Control where the differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) were mutually accepted by both sides during the 8th meeting of Joint Working Groups held in New Delhi in 1995. Sensitive and claimed areas are those where LAC perception varies but not been formally accepted.
manifest into a portent Non-Contact Warfare targeting the civilian facilities like banking, communications, railways as well as the military infrastructure. Keeping the border dispute alive in the context of India, while having bilaterally settled the same with most of the other neighbors remains a security challenge. China is unlikely to initiate steps to resolve the border dispute with India until its main issue of Taiwan is finally settled. The policy of ‘Aggressive Posturing’ along the borders is likely to continue.

As smaller neighbors look upon India to counter China’s regional dominance, India has to tread the path very cautiously – annoying neither China nor the neighbors. During an interview, Mr. Shyam Saran, India’s former Foreign Secretary and Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board, emphasized the need to build a comprehensive national power in all spheres to adjust to the growing power asymmetry between the two countries as China remains less sensitive to India’s concerns. Regarding military capability, he alluded to the need for modernization of forces and adopting a ‘strategic defensive strategy’ to deter China militarily but cautioned against adopting any provocative actions, while building own strength. He also emphasized on the need to engage with the USA, Australia, Japan, Indonesia, and Vietnam to build up deterrence. He wrote, “it is necessary to first build India’s comprehensive national power in all the different attributes Kautilya has listed, in particular, political leadership, good governance, a strong economy, and a strong military; this alone can chip away the power asymmetry between India and China, bringing a degree of ‘equality' in the relationship.”

According to Lieutenant General JS Bajwa, the former Chief of Staff of Eastern Command and expert on Chinese affairs, India should respond appropriately and adequately to Chinese policy of ‘aggressive posturing’ along the border, particularly in sensitive areas. A weak response is construed as a sign of weakness. India should follow a policy of effective border management exercising ‘tactical assertiveness and strategic restraint’ against China and build viable military strength including infrastructural development.

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62 Interview carried out on 21 February, 2018. Mr Shyam Saran is a former Foreign Secretary and has served as the PM’s Special Envoy for Nuclear Affairs and Climate Change. He also served as Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board.


64 Interview carried out on 15 February, 2018. Lieutenant General JS Bajwa has served as the Chief of Staff, Eastern Command, Director General Infantry and Commandant Infantry School. He is the Editor of ‘Indian Defence Review’ and authored two books on China ‘Modernisation of the PLA from Massed Militia to Force Projection’ in 2013’ and ‘China Threat or Challenge’ in 2017.
Pakistan. India shares 3323 km with Pakistan. Out of this, 746 km is the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K and 110 km the Actual Ground Position Line along the Siachen glacier. Pakistan claims the whole state of J&K as an unfinished agenda of partition and has fought four unsuccessful wars with India. Since the beginning of the nineties, Pakistan is abetting proxy war in J&K. Pakistan has a growing nuclear arsenal and believes that it has neutralized the Indian conventional military superiority which has emboldened it to pursue aggressive proxy war. India’s policy of exercising restraint during the Kargil Conflict and failure of coercive military diplomacy after the Parliament attack in 2001 was perceived as strategic weaknesses. India’s lack of any type of military response post the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008 reinforced their perception that their nuclear capability effectively deterred India and it could continue acts of terrorism with impunity.

While Pakistan continues to sponsor high-profile terrorists acts like the attack on Pathankot air base in January 2016, Uri military base in September 2016 and recently on the CRPF convoy at Pulwama in February in 2019, India’s effective military response to the last two incidents have shown firm political resolve. India has so far been unable to compel Pakistan from abetting cross-border terrorism in J&K. Unless Pakistan aborts its policy of cross-border terrorism in India, which seems unlikely, the probability of escalation from surgical and air strikes to conflict and war cannot be ruled out. A high-profile terrorist attack will put immense public pressure on the government to respond militarily, while the international community will pressurize India to exercise restraint. That is the challenge India is facing. Dominique Moisi has put it very aptly “When it comes to Pakistan, India seems to lack confidence; on all fronts – demographic, economic, military, and political – India is far above Pakistan. In reality, what prevails in India is a deep sense of frustration with Pakistan.”

A number of former diplomats whom the author interviewed emphasized the need to follow a consistent foreign policy with respect to Pakistan encompassing a multi-faceted engagement with the powerful countries as Pakistan is also a key player in the

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65 Personal knowledge and Interaction with Officers of Army and Command Headquarters in October 2018
67 Diplomats who were interviewed in February – March 2018 includes Mr Shyam Saran, Mr SS Menon, Mr K Parthasarathy, Mr Shekhar Dutt, Mr SD Pradhan, Mr KC Singh and Dr Satish Chandra
international environment. All the diplomats felt that India should develop a range of credible response options short of military retaliation but not reflecting any soft approach. Mr. KC Singh, a former career diplomat, during an interview, lamented the lack of consistency and continuity in India’s Pakistan policy.\textsuperscript{68} He bemoaned India’s inability to consistently raise the issue of Human rights in Baluchistan to counter Pakistan’s propaganda in J&K. One statement by the PM condemning Pakistan excesses in Baluchistan is not good enough, there should be a sustained follow-up action as any soft approach against Pakistan will not work.

Pakistan needs to be tackled from a position of strength. India needs to emulate the Israeli policy of retribution, which was enunciated in November 1955 in response to terrorist strikes. Moshe Dayan - the then Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), stated, “We cannot guard every water pipeline from the explosion and every tree from uprooting. We cannot prevent every murder of a worker in an orchard or a family in their bed. But it is in our power to set a high price on our blood, a price too high for the Arab community, the Arab army, or the Arab government to think it worth paying.”\textsuperscript{69}

**Collusive Threat from China and Pakistan.** The collusive threat by Pakistan and China has so far not manifested historically even when Pakistan desired of China to do in 1965 and 1971. Even now it is an unlikely scenario. However, the same cannot be said, in the eventuality of China launching aggression against India wherein Pakistan would attempt to exploit the situation to its advantage. During the 1962 India-China War, the Pakistani Army had recommended military action in Kashmir to take advantage of India’s weakness, but lack of support from Pakistan’s closest ally, the USA, seemed to be the major factor that prevented Pakistan from exploiting the situation.\textsuperscript{70} The US President Kennedy and British PM Macmillan asked Pakistani President not to initiate any action against India. This was admitted by Pakistani President Ayub and then Foreign Minister Bogra admitted the same in the National Assembly of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{71} China is unlikely to militarily intervene in a Pakistan-led

\textsuperscript{68} Interviewed Mr KC Singh on 12 February 2018. Mr KC Singh has served as India’s Ambassador to Iran and Saudi Arabia.


offensive due to the restraint enjoined upon it in its status as a responsible world power, there is no such restriction on Pakistan who is likely to militarily exploit the situation. Besides developing military capability, a diplomatic initiative would be imperative to forestall such an eventuality.

**Internal Security.** India is faced with four internal security challenges; the Proxy War in J&K, Militancy in the North East, Left Wing Extremism (LWE) and Terrorism in the hinterland. In J&K, vested interests spearheaded by the separatists are adopting complex strategies to keep the pot boiling to manipulate the environment to their advantage. Infiltration, radicalization, and attempts to enhance the indigenous component of the militants continue unabated. The effect of political regime change in Pakistan is yet to be seen, but positive developments are unlikely. Violence in Manipur, Nagaland, and Assam follow the usual swings of upward and downward trends, while Meghalaya and Tripura have been stable. LWE is a socio-economic problem warranting a political solution. Violence levels are down but sporadic incidents continue unabated. The sporadic acts of terrorism continue compounded by the exploitation of social media to spread disinformation and rumors targeting the vast majority of the populace to weaken their faith in the nation’s political system. Drug trafficking to adversely impact youth and as a source to fund terrorism and other anti-national activities are threats that cannot be overlooked. The need to strengthen all instruments of internal security and find a political solution is imperative.

Development of strategic deterrence including viable military capability and adequate infrastructure along the Northern borders are imperative to deter China from waging a war to settle the boundary dispute. Comprehensive Compellent strategies against Pakistan are required to compel the cessation of its policy of cross-border terrorism. Given the limitations of the application of force to change the strategic intent, a non-military resolution is imperative against both the adversaries, but the option of ‘use of force’ to defend aggression by China and cause cost prohibitive attrition to Pakistan must always be kept open. To deal with various internal security threats, India should develop robust domestic institutionalized mechanisms based on Police and Para Military Forces so as to relieve Army from its secondary responsibilities enabling it to focus on its primary responsibility of warding an external threat.
Determinants of Deterrence and Application in the Indian Context

National security encompasses a wide canvass of various determinants with each contributing in one or the other way towards deterrence. The assets at stake in international conflicts are valued on two scales - a power scale and an intrinsic scale and the ‘defence value’ of any given military force includes both the power and intrinsic values which can be preserved by using the forces in various contingencies. Amplifying these values further, Glen Snyder has explained that “power values are of three major kinds: strategic, deterrent and political; strategic value is a function of the war-making potential; deterrent value is an attribute primarily of the act of responding to aggression and political value is the effect of a response, and of its direct consequences, on the alignment or attitudes of third countries.” It implies that power values are extrinsic and their value lies in their contribution to intrinsic values. Deterrent Value is the effect that response against aggression in terms of defending or not defending will impact perceived future response; it amounts to establishing and maintaining a reputation; while the political value refers to the political impact of a response and its direct ramifications on relations with other countries. Extrapolating these values, the various determinants in the Indian context can be clubbed as follows:-

(a) Strategic Value Determinants include geography, economic strength, population, natural resources, and strategic culture.

(b) Deterrent Value Determinants comprise nuclear, military and technological capability.

(c) Political Value Determinants comprise foreign policy and diplomacy including international alliances/partnerships, leadership, smart power, and Indian diaspora.

**Strategic Value Determinants**

These are those determinants that contribute to the war-making potential of a country. The loss of any territory or huge military attrition due to enemy aggression will lead to a weakening of the population’s willingness to sacrifice in future wars and increase the potential for more such future attacks. The strategic value of the loss of territory or

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72 Snyder, op cit 1961, p 32
73 Ibid, pp 32-33
74 Harvey, op cit, p 26
causing any such disadvantageous situation would increase the enemy’s capability to make future moves and decrease own capacity to resist future attacks. Therefore, the need to build and exploit the potential of strategic value determinants is of utmost importance to India being a status quo nation.

**Geography.** Geography is an important determinant of national power that adds strategic value to deterrence. Henry Kissinger, the US statesman and geopolitical consultant who served as Secretary of State stated, “Geography has been the predominant factor in determining the fate of nations, from pharaonic Egypt to the Arab spring.” Geostrategic location of the nation can be a source of strength, while a disadvantageous location can also be a source of weakness. Large size can accommodate a bigger population and have a vast array of natural resources, be more helpful in the defence of the country. Natural boundaries based on mountain features enhance defence potential and strengthen national power. Conversely, artificial boundaries induce weakness. Argentina had counted on the geographical aspect of deterrence apart from the political and economic costs on the UK before annexing Falklands. However, these factors did not deter the UK to exploit the political opportunity it offered. Israel sandwiched amidst the Arab countries had been at war with most of them for its very survival. The geographical disadvantage emboldened Israel to enhance its military and technical prowess to deter its Arab adversaries from being hostile to it.

The geography has conferred immense advantages and challenges to India from the perspective of deterrence. The geo-strategic location of India roughly in the centre of four continents i.e. Europe, Africa, Asia and Australia and on the head of the Indian Ocean region (IOR) is a huge asset. Kaplan rightfully noted that “India is possessed of geographical logic, framed as it is by the Arabian Sea to the West and Southwest, by the Bay of Bengal in to the East and Southeast, by the mountainous Burmese jungles to the East and by the Himalayas and the knot of the Karakoram and the Hindu Kush to the North and Northwest.” Mahan noted that “India, located in the centre of the

75 Snyder, op cit 1961, p 34  
77 Kaplan op cit, p 229. Robert Kaplan is an American author and written numerous books on foreign affairs, politics and travel. He has been the best-selling author of eighteen books that have been translated into many languages.
Indian Ocean littoral, is critical for the seaward penetration of both the Middle East and China.” The geostrategic location both in terms of land mass along the mountain ranges and coastline in proximity to the Indian Ocean firmly anchors India in the geostrategy of the world. As the emerging architecture of the global world order is being shaped by the US and China, India is strategically well placed to exercise meaningful leverages that enhance its deterrence with respect to China. As the US and China become great power rivals, the direction which India adopts could determine the course of geopolitics in Eurasia in the twenty-first century. India has the potential to form an ultimate pivot between the US and China. It is, according to Spykman, “a Rimland power writ large.”

The IOR with India at its head has tremendous potential for growth of trade and commerce due to the numerous sea-trade routes that connect various continents pass through it. China has greatly enhanced its influence in the IOR by creating/upgrading a series of ports providing substantial economic and military support to the littoral states like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Myanmar. China’s vigorous pursuance of protecting its sea lines of communication by developing harbors in friendly countries has added on to India’s security concerns.

The geographical location has afforded India an opportunity to exercise meaningful leverages at the global level and encounter challenges at the regional level. China has greatly increased its influence over Nepal and wooing it away from India. It is deliberately attempting to woo Bhutan into its sphere of influence with the Doklam crisis in 2017 being the manifestation of the same. The Gulf region constitutes India’s extended neighborhood. By virtue of historical roots, the region has immense significance for India for its energy security. India’s Act East Policy and strategic engagement with the Gulf region is an opportunity to counter Chinese growing footprints and strengthen economic and trade relations.

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78 Ibid. Alfred Mahan was a US naval officer and historian. He was the President of US Naval War College and written numerous books on Sea Power.
79 Ibid, p 220
80 Ibid. Nicholas Spykman was a US political scientist and professor of international relations at Yale University.
Map 1: Physical Features of India

The vast borders with China in the North and Pakistan in the West interspersed with diversified terrain provides immense strategic depth with widely spread economic and military infrastructure. Historically the geographical features of Himalayas in the North including the Hindu Kush in the Northwest and the dense jungles in the North East provided India the natural barrier against invasions from the North and North East. However, the 1962 Chinese aggression breaching the impregnability of the Himalayas had posed a military challenge. The boundary dispute with China and the creation of a vast network of the infrastructure of roads, airfields, a communication network in Tibet by China coupled with lack of infrastructural developmental on own side close to the borders has significantly enhanced India’s security concerns.

India’s border with Pakistan is interspersed with the glaciated region, high altitude cum hilly region of J&K, the plains of Punjab and the deserts of Rajasthan and the vast coastline along the Arabian sea. The troubled state of J&K has 746 km of LoC along the mountainous region which aids infiltration. Pakistan taking advantage of the porosity of the LoC has been abetting infiltration of militants since the beginning of the nineties to launch the proxy war in J&K. India has a 7000 Km coastal boundary with the sea frontier extending into the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal.

The CPEC connecting the Xinjiang province of China with Gwadar – the southern tip of Pakistan passing through the Northern areas and the PoK will impact the strategic and geopolitical equations of the region with security implications for India. It would transform Pakistan into a convenient base for China to serve its long-term strategic interests. With US drawdown from Afghanistan, China is moving in to fill in the power vacuum with infrastructure that will greatly enhance China’s influence in the region, bolster Pakistan and enhance India’s vulnerability.

India’s vast geographical landmass that confers huge geo-strategic opportunities at the global level, however, throws more challenges at the national and the military level. **The geographical construct enjoins upon India to leverages its strengths at the global level and overcome the challenges at the national level.** India’s military force organization has been deliberately structured to have inherent flexibility for application along either frontier to enhance combat potential at the decisive point of application with minor modifications in terms of weaponry and mobility. There are well-formulated mobilization plans for quick induction of forces from the Western to the Eastern theatre and vice versa. However, infrastructure development along the
borders is going at a slow pace, which warrants greater attention to lend strength to the military capability building.

**Economic Strength.** The economic strength of a nation is an important determinant for capability building of armed forces, which in turn contributes towards building the military deterrence. The poor economic state of India after independence significantly inhibited military capability building. Through the fifties, India’s defence budget was constantly reduced and came down lower than the pre-independence era and also from that of Pakistan and China as well as those of the US and USSR. The average official expenditure as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) for the period 1957-59 for China, Pakistan and India was 4.4%, 3.0%, and 2.4% respectively. Due to the low budget allotment, India’s military capability building suffered adversely. India’s defence budget saw a quantum jump after the 1962 India-China War. The defence allocation was raised from 2.1% in 1961-62 to 3.7%, 3.5% and 3.7% of the GNP in the years 1963, 64 and 1965 respectively. The same is depicted graphically in Illustration 3.

The present state of the preparedness of India’s armed forces is sub-optimal, though it’s not as bad as it was prior to the 1962 War. The constant decline in the defence budget is worrisome. The defence budget which used to average roughly 2 percent of the GDP has come down to 1.56 and 1.49 percent in 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 respectively. The budget for 2019-20 is 1.40% of the GDP. The same is depicted graphically in Illustration 4. The budget is grossly inadequate to carry out any meaningful capability building. The world average of the defence expenditure varies between 2 to 2.5 percent of the GDP; for China, it is 2.1 and Pakistan 2.36 percent.

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86 Kakar, Harsha, Major General (Retired), 'Removing Myths of an Insufficient Budget’ *Fauji India*, New Delhi: March 2019, p 15

87 Ibid
The Armed Forces in 2018 had projected a requirement of Rs 1,72,203 crores for capital expenditure but were allotted only Rs 93,982 crores which were not sufficient to meet even the ‘committed liabilities’ estimated to be of the order of Rs 1,10,043 crores. It meant that the services are not even in a position to meet the payment obligations of the equipment already ordered. Sufficient funds have not been allotted for making up the stocks of ammunition for a 40-day war; the Army requires Rs 6,380 crores for making up the shortfall of ammunition but were allotted only Rs, 3,600 crores. Due to the allocation of insufficient funds, only liabilities of routine maintenance, making up deficiencies, emergency procurements were being met.

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88 Supra Notes 83 and 84
89 Supra Notes 85 and 86
90 Joshi, op cit
91 Ibid
Considering the manifold challenges and threats to national security, the adequate budgetary allotment is essential. Security and development are two sides of the same coin of nation-building. The late President Abdul Kalam had stated: “Development and national security go together.” As nations become secure, they develop faster. A strong military capability deters war and leads to faster economic development.

The economic strength of the country determines its international power and assists in pursuing an autonomous foreign policy. Today, nations are pursuing their political objectives not through war, but by resorting to commercial means. Developed countries can exercise economic leverages like aid, loan, rewards, trade, grants, economic sanctions to incentivize or deter to secure desired political goals. It is also a tool in the hands of diplomacy to apply coercive strategies against a country to mend its conflict behavior. In the economically interdependent world, the nation states’ most powerful tool for achieving its national security objectives can be the economic instrument of power, which normally comprises macroeconomic policy, international trade and investment policy, economic sanctions and foreign aid and monetary policy.

Economic support and sanctions are important instruments of deterrence and compellance strategies. Some of the economic tools applied to deter hostile behavior of adversarial states are limiting import and export quotas, imports and export tariffs, non-tariff barriers to trade as part of international trade, military assistance, defence support, and economic aid. International trade can be used as a ‘weapon’ to control the behavior of other countries. Economic sanctions have become an important foreign policy instrument that can mediate between diplomacy and employment of military force. The success of economic sanctions will, however, depend on the degree of dependence of the target nation on foreign trade/aid and its resultant impact on the economy; the aim of imposing sanctions and unilateral implementation or by an alliance of nations.

To develop economic and strategic relations with the South East Asian nations and also to counterbalance China’s growing influence, India initiated look East Policy in

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92 Kakar, op cit March 2019, p 14
93 Dwivedi, op cit, p xii
1991 that was vigorously pursued by successive governments. The current government, in order to provide renewed impetus, upcaled the policy to Act East Policy (AEP). The policy is considered India’s geo-economic initiative in response to China’s encirclement strategy around its periphery. The policy focuses well beyond economic integration by engaging in strategic dialogue with emphasis on regional security and stability.  

India has emerged as the seventh largest export destination for China. India-China trade is skewed in favor of China. The trade hit an all-time high of $ 84.60 billion last year with India’s exports to China being $ 16.34 billion and China’s exports to India $ 68.10 billion. India’s exports are basically raw and intermediate products while China’s exports are manufactured items to meet the growing demand for huge sectors like power and telecom. Mr Brahma Chellaney, strategic thinker and author, during an interview, opined that there is a scope for India to enhance its exports to China from the present approximate $2.4 billion to $5.00 billion per month. The majority of the respondents agreed that economic-cooperation with China is beneficial to both countries and can act to dissuade China from considering the use of military force against India.

India and Pakistan were subjected to economic and technological sanctions post the nuclear tests in 1998 causing considerable financial hardship and lack of transfer of technology to the country. Professor Ioana Petrescu M of the University of Maryland investigated 36 cases of economic sanctions between 1914 and 1995 to determine the desired effect of sanctions on the target country. His findings revealed the following:

(a) Economic Sanctions decrease the probability of the target country to indulge in similar activity by 8% if the sanction-imposing country is a large country or a large coalition of countries.

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95 Rana, DS, Brigadier, et al. ‘Contours of India’s Act East Policy’ NDC Journal, Volume 38, Number 1, 2017, p 45
96 Lidder, Jasbir Singh, Lieutenant General, ‘India-China Re-Assertion for 21st Century’ Address delivered at India-China Friendship Association (ICFA Punjab and Chandigarh Chapter) on 7th September 2018
97 Interviewed on 25th February 2018. Mr. Brahma Chellaney, is a strategic thinker, author, and analyst of geo-strategic trends. He has authored numerous books and is internationally known for his deep scholarly intellect and independent mind. He was a former member of the policy Advisory Group under the External Affairs Ministry and is now a Professor at the New Delhi based Centre for Policy Research.
98 Refer Question 7 and 13 of Appendix B on page 355 and 357 respectively
(b) Sanctions imposed by countries with GNP 100 times or larger than the GNP of the target country will have a deterrent effect. Large countries included the USA, China, European Union and the League of Nations.

(c) Reduction in trade or aid not accompanied by economic sanctions does not affect the future behavior of the target country. Very often the current behavior of target countries does not seem to change in the desired direction.

(d) Sanctions are meant to express disapproval and deter futuristic actions. They also act as signals to other countries who might behave in a similar manner.

The present India-Pakistan trade is a mere $5 billion and to increase the same by removing non-trade barriers are subject to Pakistan shunning violence.\textsuperscript{100} Pakistan did not accord Most Favoured Nation (MFN) to India as was decided in September 2012. Post the terrorist strike at Pulwama in J&K in February 2019 India has withdrawn the MFN status granted to Pakistan and has also increased the customs duty to 200 percent on all goods imported from Pakistan. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of India and Pakistan is $2,600,000 and 300,000 respectively.\textsuperscript{101} India’s GDP is less than ten times higher than that of Pakistan which is not viable to impose any economic sanctions.

Correlation of Professor Ioana Petrescu’s study to India-Pakistan economic engagement reveals that there is no scope for the application of economic sanctions against Pakistan to compel it to cease cross-border terrorism due to extremely low levels of trade between the two countries and the limited relative difference in their GNPs. However, there is tremendous scope to enhance economic engagement with China and address the skewed trade imbalance. Dissuasion based on ‘Economic Engagement’ build up over a period of time can prove to be an effective deterrence strategy against China due to its strategic focus on enhancing its economic strength and leveraging it regionally and globally. Enhancing economic relationship with China opens up avenues of cooperation which could be extended to mitigate areas of confrontation. It is imperative for India to develop rail-road communication infrastructure in the North Eastern region that would act as an


\textsuperscript{101} India-Pakistan Trade, Retrieved from Internet https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/india/pakistan (Accessed on 23 October, 2018)
enabler to link up with ASEAN. Given its size, geographical location, economic growth, trade links and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), India should extend its footprint beyond the extended neighborhood and act as a facilitator to integrate the economies of the West, Central, and East Asia.

**Natural Resources: Water.** Out of the various natural resources of a country’s water is the most fundamental necessity and a critical national asset which influences international relations and add to the strategic value of deterrence. While the population grows, the available water resources dwindle and thus riparian relations between states assume significance. Due to this disproportionate growth coupled with climatic changes, India is likely to face water scarcity problem by the middle of the 21st century. Accordingly, India's water relations with both China and Pakistan may become adversarial in the years to come. Water determines geostrategy and geoeconomics; economics determine the demand side, while geography determines the supply side. India’s water management warrants better utilization of its existing water resources and simultaneously work out mutually beneficial riparian relations with the neighbors, which are presently in a conflicting state.

China is the upper riparian in case of most of the important rivers which pass through Indian sub-continent. China is the point of origin for over ten major transboundary rivers, with three main rivers - Indus, Sutlej, and Brahmaputra flowing into India. By controlling the flow of water of several major rivers China wields considerable strategic and riparian advantage, which it exploits by creating numerous water projects. Presently there is no legally binding agreement in place to govern the water relations between China, India and other South Asian countries. China does not hesitate to use water and rivers as an instrument of political expediency to deal with the lower riparian states and also as a resource to meet her own domestic demands in total disregard of the needs of the lower riparian states. China's plans for hydropower development in Tibet exposes India’s vulnerability on the waterfront.

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The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is supposedly a symbol of cooperation between the two countries, but Pakistan tends to view the treaty and other river projects in J&K for political purposes. The significance of water to Pakistan can be gauged from the fact that stoppage of Indus waters by India has been identified as a nuclear threshold point. Respondents to the questionnaire partially agreed that revoking the IWT can alter Pakistan’s policy of supporting cross-border terrorism. India’s per capita water availability has decreased from over 5,177 meters per year in 1947 to 1,342 cubic meters in 2000, and by 2025, is expected to further reduce; while in the case of Pakistan it has fallen from 5,000 to 1,200 cubic meters per year. India, however, despite an upper riparian state, has not been able to optimize the water leverage effectively within the terms and conditions of the IWT.

There is tremendous scope for India to use water as a weapon against Pakistan without revoking the IWT. India should optimally utilize the water that can provide some deterrence value within the existing terms of IWT. With respect to China, India needs to work out certain cooperative arrangements in conjunction with other lower riparian states like Bangladesh and Nepal.

Population. India has the world's second largest population with a growth rate of 1.25 and due to the high birth rate, its population is relatively younger. It has approximately 65% of its population below the age of 35 and about 50% below the age group of 50. No nation can become economically strong without an educated population. An educated population helps in greater integration with the globalized world. India needs to invest in creating a knowledge economy and in research and development. China has approximately 20 percent of the total researchers in the world compared to India’s only 2.2 percent.

The population is a huge asset with India that contributes substantially to the nation’s war potential. With the government’s emphasis on training 400 million people, it will provide a quantum jump in India’s skilled workforce while other nations may see a

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105 Kidwai, Khalid, Lieutenant, General cited in Landau Report on ‘Nuclear Safety’ Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan’. Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai served in the Strategic Plans Division of the Pakistan Army and his views reflect the official version
106 Refer Question 5 of Appendix B on page 354
107 Sinha, Uttam Kumar, ‘Water a Pre-eminent Political Issue between India and Pakistan’, Strategic Analysis, IDSA, Volume 34, No. 4, July 2010, p 482
108 Average Age of People in India’ Retrieved from Internet https://www.quora.com (Accessed on 13 January 2019)
109 Balachandirane, G, ‘Strategic Implications of Human Capital’ in Venkatshamy and Princy, Ed, p 152
decrease in their skilled population. The younger age profile of the population will contribute in a significant manner in the economic growth rate of the country. This young population between the age group of 20 – 54 provides great extrinsic strategic value. The skill development programme launched by the government augurs well for developing the required skills. But an employment generation is a daunting challenge for the government, which needs urgent attention.

**Strategic Culture and Ideology.** Each state and security institution have a unique culture that explains the strategic behavior of a nation. Strategic culture is “an integrated set of symbols that acts to establish long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role of force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.” Johnston Strategic Culture is thus the ‘sum total of various ideals, behavioral patterns formed and responses developed over a period of time pertaining to national security’. All states have different predominant strategic preferences whose origin is attributed to the formative years of their existence. According to Johnston, the strategic culture tends to explain the basic assumptions of a country about the role of war and the efficacy of force in international statecraft depending upon the nature of adversaries and the threat posed by them. In today’s geopolitical world, the deterrence value of any nation is based on its strategic culture build up over a period of time.

Indian strategic culture has been observed to be defensive. George Tanham, in his essay on Indian strategic culture observed, “India, from a sub-continental and national perspective has almost always been on the strategic defensive.” Since the times of independence, India’s strategic culture has been influenced by the Gandhi - Nehruvian idealistic principles to avoid war and of peaceful coexistence. The majority of the respondents too felt that India’s strategic culture is passive. India’s reluctance to the optimal employment of force even in wars that could have later provided deterrence value conforms to the passive nature of its strategic culture. In 1965, the Indian Navy was not employed at all in the war against Pakistan. Similarly, in 1971 after the

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111 Ibid
113 Refer Question 12 of Appendix B on page 356
liberation of Bangladesh, India offered a unilateral cease-fire when there was a scope to prosecute the operations further along the western borders which could have further humiliated Pakistan and deterred future misadventures. There are self-imposed limits to use of force in internal security situations. The Army has been employed in aid to civil authorities where the pre-eminence of civil administration remains, and even in high-intensity violence levels, the Indian Army has very rarely used heavier weapons. While the minimum use of force in internal security is rational, but not so in external wars. Mr. SS Menon, the then NSA, justifying the overall strategic culture stated, “this is an Indian way, an Indian view and an Indian practice in the use and role of force, it is a result of our own history and experience and we feel it is best suited to our goals and situation.”

Christine Fair, an American political scientist, currently an associate professor in Security Studies at Georgetown University, an author and an expert on counter-terrorism, while analyzing the strategic culture of the Pakistani Army, concluded “Pakistan’s revisionism persists in regards to its efforts not only to undermine the territorial status quo in Kashmir but also to undermine India’s position in the region and beyond.” In Fair’s view, India being the larger nation prefers the status quo and Pakistan challenges the status quo and goes on to state that while Kashmir is the apparent casus belli, there is no reason to presume that the return of Kashmir to Pakistan will temper the attitude of the Pakistan Army towards India. The strategic culture of the Pakistan Army is to contest India’s ascendance and alter the territorial status quo at all costs. Pakistan’s cultural beliefs and values have shaped its strategic culture.

Harsh realities of terrorism around the globe have led India to rethink its stand and if not entirely alter it, to modify a bit. Since September 2001 and particularly after December 2001, Indian strategic thinking has evolved in a more neorealist direction. A change to employ force against Pakistan’s continued sponsorship of

114 Menon, SS, Key Note Address, ‘The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs’ NDC Golden Jubilee Seminar, New Delhi, 21 October 2010
116 Ibid, pp 4-5
117 Neorealists believe in the theory of international relations which says that power is the most important factor and propose structural constraints and not strategy, egoism, or motivation will determine behaviour in international relations
terrorist activities has dawned upon India’s strategic thought process. The military mobilization against Pakistan in 2001-2002, executing ground surgical strikes in PoK in 2016 in response to high-profile terrorist act at Uri followed by air strikes deep inside Pakistan in the wake of another terrorist strike on a CRPF convoy in February in 2019 are reflective of the change to employ force. Similarly, its growing strategic relationship with the US indicates a departure from the non-aligned policy of yesteryears. The threat of employment of military instrument and escalation can be leveraged to build up diplomatic pressure against Islamabad. If Pakistan perceives that India could use force to restrain its nefarious design, it could serve as a viable deterrence. If, however, Pakistan assumes that if India in line with its passive strategic culture of absorbing one blow after the other and not retaliating, she would remain emboldened to continue abetting terrorist activities in J & K and the rest of the country.

Colonel Harjeet, an author and strategic analyst, during an interview, emphasized on the need for India to develop a coherent strategic culture through its economic strengths and soft power. The economic leverages build across the globe have projected a very positive image of India. Similarly, Indian movies, cuisine, yoga, songs and enterprising nature of the immigrants have created vivid images of its cultural diversity. India is a land dominated by foreign thinking. Colonel Harjeet further elaborated that in order to exploit its potential for greatness, India needs to shed its insecurities and empower its institutions, while being more pro-active in facings internal and external challenges. To deal with cross-border terrorism, India needs to develop an assertive strategic culture in terms of appropriate retribution. With respect to China, it should remain resolute on the battlefield and reasonable in diplomacy as was exhibited during the Doklam face-off.

George Tanham rightly observed about India, “much is changing in India but much remains the same, Indians are quick to accept the modern materialistic life, but deep

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118 Interview carried out on 11 January, 2018. Colonel Harjeet (Retired) has authored numerous books important ones being ‘Asymmetric Warfare: Israel-Lebanon War 2006; Understanding Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 2001-2014; A War Nobody Won: The Sino-Vietnam War 1979; The Thirty-Six Stratagems; The Military Strategy of the Arthasastra; Terrorism in South Asia: A Chronology 2001-2010; Evolution of Strategy: From Sun Tzu to Clausewitz’. He has edited ‘Brahmand World Defence Updates (from 2016 to 2018) and South Asia Defence and Strategic Year Book (from 2007 to 2015). He has penned his thoughts in an unpublished essay ‘India’s Strategic Culture: The Impact of Culture’

within, they retain many old and basic beliefs.”\textsuperscript{120} The need for change to build on strengths is imperative.

**Deterrent Value Determinants**

Deterrent value is an attribute of the act of response to aggression. It can be described as “the effect of a response in reducing the probability of enemy attacks against other areas in the future, due to limited territorial gains or denied entirely and the costs inflicted upon the enemy were higher than expected in the present aggression.”\textsuperscript{121} Since India is a status-quo country and not interested in territorial expansion and the fact that it had fought wars of necessity against its neighbors to maintain territorial integrity, the relevance of the deterrent value determinants is significant.

**Nuclear Capability.** The nuclear weapons are political weapons meant for deterring wars and not for fighting due to their immense destructive value and having no defence against them. The very fact that no war of the scale of world wars has taken place since the advent of nuclear weapons testifies their deterrent value. The future scenario also does not support their employment. The probability of employment of nuclear weapons due to their tremendous destructive potential in the current strategic environment would remain extremely low.\textsuperscript{122} Besides this, the universal censure of the country employing it will preclude their use. Their value lies in their deterrent effect.

China’s policy is to have minimal nuclear deterrence with a sufficiently large arsenal that can destroy “adversary’s ‘strategic points so that the expected costs of a first strike outweigh the anticipated benefits.”\textsuperscript{123} It primarily relies on counter-value targeting. China’s nuclear capability encompasses ‘holding of approximately 260 warheads capable of targeting all major Indian cities, partial development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) as a retaliatory force; Theatre and Tactical Nuclear Weapons; Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and Space-based early warning and Command and Control

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\textsuperscript{120} Tanham, George, *Indian Strategic Thought An Interpretive Essay* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992) p 69

\textsuperscript{121} Synder, op cit 1961, p 32

\textsuperscript{122} Malik, VP, General (Retired), ‘Higher Management of Defence and Defence Reforms: Towards Better Management Techniques A Call for Change’ *Higher Defence Management IDSA Monograph* Series No. 6 July 2012

\textsuperscript{123} Ross, Robert S, ‘Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance and U.S.-China Relations’ *International Security* 27, Number 2 (Fall 2002) p 48
Systems, and Anti-Satellite (ASAT).” 124 India has developed a limited Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability in response to China’s similar capability. This would enable India to intercept and neutralize incoming ballistic missiles at the launch point, mid-course and the terminal phase. India seemingly possesses an adequate number of nuclear warheads. It claims acquisition of indigenous capability to manufacture nuclear warheads of varying capacities ranging from sub-kiloton to 200 kilotons. 125

India and Pakistan declared their overt nuclear status in 1998. This reduced the probability of war between them. The Lahore Declaration issued after a meeting of Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif in early 1999 affirmed: “that the nuclear dimension of the security of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries.” 126 But Pakistan’s intrusions at Kargil led to the first war post nuclearization of two countries where in India exercising strategic restraint, responded responsibly confining to the eviction of intruders only – possibly deterred by the nuclear factor.

Pakistan's nuclear deterrence is aimed at neutralizing India's conventional military superiority. A research report compiled by two U.S. think tanks assessed, “Pakistan has the capability to produce perhaps 20 nuclear warheads annually; India appears to be producing about five warheads annually.” 127 To avoid a decisive victory to India, it could resort to early employment of nuclear weapons. It is attempting to attain the second-strike capability and credibility, by expanding its nuclear and missile arsenal. To counter the threat created by India’s Cold Start Doctrine, Pakistan has evolved Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) whose scope ranges from neutralizing India’s conventional war at the strategic and tactical levels. 128 FSD has qualitatively improved its response to deter a full range of conventional capabilities and encompasses a credible second-strike nuclear capability with mutually assured destruction using all possible delivery systems, including battlefield or tactical nuclear

124 Ibid, p 60
125 Kanwal, op cit, p 8
127 Dalton, Toby and Krepon Michael, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan (Stimson Centre and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005) p 3
128 Ibid.
weapons (TNWs). The employment of TNWs by Pakistan is presaged that the use of a small nuclear weapon in the tactical battlespace will not lead to massive retaliation by India. The international community will prevail upon India to cease its conventional offensive or exercise restraint from nuclear retaliation. Therefore, in Pakistani perception, “the TNW is a deterrent at best, and a war termination weapon at worst.” Pakistan’s nuclear threat is considered credible by the majority of the respondents.

Pakistan has been very innovative in using nuclear weapons in statecraft. Dr K Subramanyam, highlighting the correlation of deterrence and terror stated “Winston Churchill talked about deterrence being a sturdy child of terror, but now the Pakistanis have reversed that proposition and said terror should be the child of nuclear deterrence and therefore, once Pakistan developed a nuclear deterrent capability, they decided to use terrorism as a tool of its foreign policy against India.” Pakistan has been using the shield of nuclear weapons to exercise deterrence to abet cross-border terrorism. Today deterrence between India and China is quite stable, the state to state deterrence between India and Pakistan is also quite stable, but beneath that nuclear deterrence is the whole thing of its use for terrorism.

With the development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery systems, one tends to conclude that only nuclear weapons can deter a nuclear weapon state (NWS) which is not true. Nuclear weapons need substantial conventional forces to support nuclear deterrence. The effectiveness of the deterrence depends upon the threat and capability to inflict punishment on the adversary and/or the capability to deny him his objectives by conventional military forces. This implies that the National Command Authority (NCA) in any given nation will rationally examine the conventional

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129 Sethi, Manpreet Dr, Debate on ‘Responding to Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Strategy of India’ at Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (IPCS), 18 Jan 2014
131 Refer Question 4 of Appendix B on page 354
132 Subrahmanyam, K, Professor, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in the Indian Context’ The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs’ NDC Golden Jubilee Seminar, New Delhi, October 2010, p 63. Dr K Subrahmanyam was the director of Institute of Defence Studies and Strategic Affairs (IDSA). He was a career bureaucrat and recognized as a brilliant strategist. He was associated with the IDSA since inception in 1965 and made a significant contribution on its growth as an autonomous think tank.
133 Ibid, p 64
134 National Command Authority refers to those actors (civilian and/or military; individual, collective, and/or institutional) specifically responsible for decisions to commit a nation to war.
military balance and decide to attack if the military balance is favorable, or do nothing if the military balance is unfavorable. Therefore, conventional deterrence along with nuclear deterrence is equally relevant as it was in the yesteryears.

Military Capability and Defence Industrial Base. The purpose of any military is to deter war and if that fails, to fight and win the war. As the centrality of the ‘military’ instrument, to the concept of deterrence is indisputable, it is imperative that the political and military leadership ensures optimum capability building in all its manifestations during peacetime to deter war. A military strategy of conventional deterrence encompasses a viable defensive posture and credible counter-offensive capability. It implies Defensive-Offensive strategy i.e. to have a robust defensive posture, capable of inflicting severe attrition on the aggressor and preventing him from achieving any worthwhile territorial gains. The containment of enemy offensive should be followed by a strong and credible counter-offensive capability of inflicting greater attrition on the aggressor at the time and place of defender’s choice. India’s military might is ranked fourth out of 136 countries of the world only after the USA, Russia, and China.\textsuperscript{135} The Indian Armed forces have not been able to deter wars but when the war was thrust upon the nation, they, except for the 1962 India-China War, defended stoutly and achieved victory in 1965 and 1999 and a decisive one in the 1971 India-Pakistan War. The relative numerical strength of the Armed Forces of India, China, and Pakistan, is given at Appendix A attached.

The Indian Armed forces enjoy a qualitative and quantitative conventional edge over Pakistan while being inferior to that of China. The geographical vastness and topography of Tibet are unfavorable to PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The Takla Makan desert and the Tibetan Plateau forces the PLAAF fighters and transport aircraft to fly with reduced fuel and ammunition, affording a tactical advantage to the IAF. As India doesn’t share a maritime border with China, a direct faceoff is unlikely. In case of a war, the Chinese Navy will have to cross the Strait of Malacca and Vietnam before being encountered by the Tri-Services command at Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

India intends to achieve ‘punitive deterrence’ and ‘dissuasive-defensive’ capability against Pakistan and China respectively. India has evolved a strategy of ‘Offensive-Defensive’ against Pakistan planned to be implemented through its ‘Cold Start

Doctrine’ that is expected to remain below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. Against China, the strategy is ‘Defensive-Offensive’ to deter it from waging war by successfully defending any offensive and launching a tactical level offensive(s). The existing force structure is considered adequate against both the adversaries, however, there is a need to provide greater momentum to modernization, infrastructural development and making up critical deficiencies in terms of ammunition and equipment. The latest report of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows India as the largest importer of major arms in the world in the 2013-2017 period, accounting for 12 percent of the global total with its imports increased 24 percent between 2008-2012 to 2013-2017.\textsuperscript{136} Indigenization of the Defence Industry is an imperative of utmost importance.

The Army being a manpower intensive service has been able to allot at an average of 18 to 20 percent of the budget to capital outlay, which is grossly inadequate. The details of capital and revenue expenditure with percentages are tabulated below for the last five years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
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<tr>
<td>2014-15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015-16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016-17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017-18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018-19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
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**Illustration 5: Distribution of Army Budget between Capital and Revenue**\textsuperscript{137}

To enhance the capital outlay, the COAS has formed three committees to restructure the force structure in order to reduce the manpower requirements of the Army. The first committees will scrutinize the field force- the combat units, brigades, divisions

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid
\textsuperscript{137} Interaction with officers of Financial Planning Directorate, Army HQ on 31 October, 2018
and corps that form the tip of the military sphere, the second committee will examine ways of pairing down Army HQ and the third committee will examine Army’s 49,500 strong officer cadre.\textsuperscript{138}

India needs to augment the qualitative conventional superiority with an infusion of state-of-the-art technology and achieve a punitive deterrence capability in conventional forces against Pakistan and a dissuasive deterrence capability against China. There is an urgent need for allocation of sufficient funds to make up the deficiencies and impart momentum to the modernization process. A war-winning strategy based on ‘Offensive-Defence’ focusing on cold-war doctrine and limited war concept needs to be applied against Pakistan while a war-fighting strategy based on ‘Defence-Offence’ against China along with force modernization programme should be pursued vigorously.

Defence Industrial Base. Field Marshal KM Cariappa had stated, “In modern warfare, a large Army is not sufficient; it needs industrial potential behind it; if the Army is the first line of defence, the industry is the second.”\textsuperscript{139} The indigenous industrial capacity of any country is thus an important determinant of its military capability as it is not dependent on imports to sustain its war-waging potential. It considerably enhances the deterrent value being not subjected to any war-time equipment or technology sanctions as happened to both India and Pakistan during the 1965 War. There is a necessity to enhance India’s indigenous defence industrial base capabilities. The lacklustre performance of the Defence Industrial Base (DIB) of India comprising of Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), Ordnance Factories (OFs) and a number of defence laboratories and a large number of private sector undertakings is a cause of concern.\textsuperscript{140} India’s inability to produce advanced, sophisticated weapons systems and state-of-the-art technologies indigenously has increased dependence on foreign vendors for defence purchases. The private sector due to the licensing requirement and monopoly of DPSUs and OFs has been a late entrant and struggling to catch up.

The ‘Make in India (MII)’ initiative launched in 2014 has tremendous potential but is yet to establish itself as a strong entity for the military, industrial growth and attract

\textsuperscript{138} Shukla, Ajai, ‘Reorganising the Army: Winds of Change’ Business Standard, 16 September, 2018
\textsuperscript{139} Singh, Harjeet, op cit, p 33
\textsuperscript{140} There are 9 DPSUs like the Hindustan Aeronautical Ltd (HAL), Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) and 41 Ordnance Factories like Ammunition Factories, Small Arms and Vehicle Factories, and 50 defence laboratories in India functioning under the Department of Defence Production/MoD.
foreign firms to establish defence manufacturing bases in India. Seeing the progress of the last few years the majority of the respondents partially agreed that greater indigenization would hasten capability building of India’s armed forces. India’s present defence acquisitions’ import component is more than 2/3rd which is alarming. The government support is essential to strengthen India’s industrial base due to the monopsony nature of defence commerce. MII Initiative to facilitate the participation of private industry in military products to expedite the procurement is seen as a strategic step for both militaries as well as industrial capability building. The government has recently incorporated the Strategic Partner policy that intends to create private sector DPSUs which would import manufacturing technology from foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). Some defence sector undertakings, including manufacturing, have been identified to revive India’s indigenous industrial growth. This concept is considered relatively inferior to the Raksha Udyog Ratnas (RuRs) envisaged by the Kelkar Committee. The RuR concept involved developing indigenous technology by incorporating foreign OEMs into consortia that would ultimately lead to creating specific defence platforms. Transfer of technology is essential to make up for the lack of highly sophisticated technology, till indigenous private and public industry is able to make reasonable progress in the design and development of futuristic weapon systems. The current acquisition process is basically incremental and not transformative. The defence procurement procedures are more restrictive than supportive. There is a need to make the defence procurement procedure more user-friendly rather than continuing with a restrictive procedure which imposes more constraints and relatively less facilitation.

Technological Capability, Cyber Domain, and Space Exploration. The indigenous development of state-of-the-art technologies shapes the economy and diplomacy of a nation and lends credence to their power-status. The technological boom in the last two decades has greatly expanded the scope and power of the informational instrument of national power. Securing Cyber Domain and Harnessing Space are the emerging imperatives to keep pace with the increasing use of technology in military affairs and gain a technological edge over the adversary.

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141 Refer Question 16 of Appendix B on page 358
143 Kelkar Committee was formed by the government in 2015 to revitalize the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model for infrastructural development in India
Cyberspace has now become a global phenomenon comprising of interdependent networks within the information environment. Cyberspace operations encompass employing capabilities to achieve military objectives and include computer network applications to operate and protect the information grid. Deterrence of any sort does not work in cyberspace due to lack of any attribution. A computer virus attack is generally non-controllable; the identification of an attacker by forensic experts may take months if identification is possible at all.\(^{144}\) Due to the increasing number of internet users with most of the core functions like banking, e-commerce, railways, electricity grid in the civil domain and precision targeting, communications, weapon operations, information acquisition, espionage activities, in the military domain are networked, the threat of non-contact warfare from our adversaries has increased manifold. China has reportedly raised a specialized cyber warfare unit called Unit 61398 manned by smart whiz kids with a single point agenda.\(^{145}\) The movement of troops through the railways during mobilization is subject to interference by the non-contact warfare means. Pakistan’s well-established spy network monitoring the social media in India is a cause of concern. The terror outfits such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS have demonstrated high levels of sophistication in their cyber operations. The likelihood of future wars being fought to a large extent in the cyberspace is a distinct possibility thereby bringing in a paradigm shift in the art and science of warfare.

The figures given by the government in Parliament reveal that between 2009 and 2014, a total number of 11831, 20701, 21699, 27695, 28481 and 14151 Indian websites were hacked by various hackers spread worldwide.\(^{146}\) A total of 22,207 Indian websites including 114 government portals were hacked between April 2017 and January 2018.\(^{147}\) The nearly two-fold increase in the hacking of Indian web sites since 2009 is an indicator of the potent threat. Since then, the possibility of cyber terrorists inflicting damage on India’s growing digital infrastructure has increased manifold, posing a new series of cyber risks.

\(^{145}\) CLAWS Seminar Report, p 7
\(^{146}\) Gokhale, A Nitin, Securing India The Modi Way Pathankot, Surgical Strikes and More (New Delhi: Bloomsbury, 2017) p 199
To explore and protect the cyber domain, the government has put in place a National Cyber Security Assurance Framework for governance in cyberspace; a National Information Board, the appointment of a national cybersecurity coordinator, allocation of funds for technology development and research. The need to protect own cyber networks and exploit that of adversaries is an operational necessity that warrants technical capability with a committed cyber force to combine both offensive and defensive aspects to build deterrence in cyberspace.

With the development of nuclear and missile capability, including long-range vectors, exploring the outer space, for military applications has become imperative. The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) has made tremendous strides in placing a number of satellites in space having varied applications. Space exploration and technology has emerged as a useful tool for neighborhood diplomacy. After the successful launch of PSLV-C23 satellite in June 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi exhorted Indian scientists to develop a SAARC satellite that can be dedicated to the neighborhood as a gift from India. In less than three years after his challenge, the Indian Space Research Organization launched the SAARC satellite on 5 May 2017, thereby opening a new chapter in space diplomacy. Considerable progress has been made in developing military infrastructure in terms of launching own navigational satellites. It needs to be pursued further.

**Political Value Determinants**

The political value is the effect of a response, and of its direct consequences, on the alignment or attitudes of third countries. The political loss of an ally to the adversary may enhance its capacity to make future aggressions and reduce own capability to deter.

**Alliances/ Partnerships, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy.** Throughout the history of mankind, political and military alliances have been used for safeguarding and serving their national interests as deterrence against their adversaries. Numbers of alliances were formed prior to both the world wars to nullify perceived threats. Closer to home, Pakistan-China friendship higher than the mountains and deeper than the seas have ominous portends for India. The deterrence value of Pakistan’s friendship with

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148 Gokhale, op cit, 2017, pp 200-205
149 Ibid, p 185
150 Snyder, op cit 1961, p 32
China prior to the 1971 India-Pakistan War was countered by signing an India-USSR Friendship treaty that provided safeguards against Chinese military intervention during the war. Military Alliances tend to deter potential adversaries from initiating hostilities and enhance the chances of success.

Famous strategic analyst, Samuel P Huntington highlighting the significance of alliances being developed by China in South Asia with relation to India predicted, “Chinese power is expanding at the moment, India’s power could grow substantially in the early twenty-first century; conflict seems highly probable.”\textsuperscript{151} China has been strengthening India’s neighbors. Besides providing military and technological aid to Pakistan’s nuclear and conventional forces, it has been rendering substantial economic and military aid to Myanmar. This is to be seen in the context of the power struggle between the USA and China with India emerging pivotal to the USA interests in the Indo-Pacific region. With the US rebalancing its priorities and military forces, the current century may witness another “Great Game’ in the East, in the form of power struggle between the US and China and India with its formidable military and nuclear capabilities, could again be a major player as a potential ‘swing state’ in the balance of power politics.”\textsuperscript{152} This enjoins upon India to evolve a pragmatic foreign policy that serves its national interest the best. India has established ‘strategic partnerships’ with a number of countries to include the United States, Russia, Japan, France, Germany, Britain, European Union, Vietnam, South Korea, Afghanistan, and several others.

**Forging multi-dimensional strategic partnerships based on bilateral agreements as well as through multilateral organizations build on ‘balance of interests’ instead of strategic alliances will serve India’s long-term interests.** If required, grant unilateral concessions overriding domestic political constraints and preferably avoiding the China-centric impression. The maturing of Indo-US strategic partnership is a welcome sign. The holding of the first India-US 2+2 dialogue in September 2018 marked the signing of the long-pending Communications Compatibility and Security


Agreement (COMCASA) that will provide India access to advanced US technologies. While the US secretary of State termed “the agreement a ‘milestone’ in the relationship”, the Indian Defence Minister asserted that “the pact would enhance India’s defence capability and preparedness.”

Close on the heels of this dialogue, India conducted the 19th India-Russia Summit and signed the agreement on state of the art S-400 Air Defence System that necessitates taking the waiver from the US under the US sanctions legislation Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). With the signing of the agreement, India managed a close relationship with both the US and Russia in the backdrop of friction between US-Russia and closer China-Russia relationship. Importantly, India asserted its strategic autonomy, with respect to China, and needs to manage its relationship for the long-term perspective. Mr. Shyam Saran explained during the interview that the present power asymmetry with China can be overcome with sustained economic growth that will substantially enhance India’s options to deal with the regional countries also. He expressed confidence that India being a benign, non-threatening country will find greater acceptance vis a vis China whose rise causes anxiety and concern. For dealing with Pakistan, Mr. SS Menon highlighting the constraints of the utility of force and diplomacy stated during the interview that India’s choices in countering Pakistan cross-border terrorism are limited and for deterring acts of terrorism, a suitable unpredictable retaliation should always be there. Elaborating the same, he stated in his book, “Deterring the state sponsors of terrorism requires some unpredictability of response and a conviction in the minds of terrorists and their state sponsors that retaliation will occur.” Besides the military option, India needs to strengthen partnerships with all Islamic countries as India has a Muslim population of 185 million. Inviting the External Affairs Minister for the first time as a ‘Guest of Honor’ to the inaugural session of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Foreign Ministers Conference on 01 March in Abu Dhabi is a significant diplomatic success amongst the Islamic countries. The fact that Pakistan Foreign Minister...

153 2+2 dialogue: India-US sign military communications pact, agree to speed up Delhi’s NSG bid.: Retrieved from Internet: https://indianexpress.com/article/india-us-talks (Accessed on 1 November 18)

154 Interview carried out on 21 February 18

155 Menon, SS, op cit, p 200

156 OIC with a membership of 57 states is the second largest inter-governmental organisation after the UNO. It is an influential grouping of Islamic countries. Bangladesh proposed last year to include non-Muslim countries in the OIC
boycotted after failure to block the attendance as it had done so in 1969 makes this diplomatic success more substantial. With terrorism becoming a global concern and to meet India’s growing energy needs, there is vast scope for cooperation in defence and security domain with the Gulf countries. **India’s extended neighborhood to include Australia, Korea, Vietnam, Japan, the Gulf countries as well as the African continent needs to be explored for economic and security alliances/partnerships.**

**Diplomacy.** Diplomacy concerns the implementation of the foreign policy of a nation, which is formulated by the political leadership and thereafter implemented by all the concerned ministers, diplomats, armed forces and other officials. The formulation of policy to employ the instrument of military application is broader than the decision to wage a war. Diplomacy is particularly necessary when the state’s interests are not perfectly aligned.\(^{157}\) It is a kind of communication by a representative of one state, aimed at influencing the actions of one or more states. Track II diplomacy is a concept where a diffused group of individuals taken from a wide spectrum of public life to include academicians, prominent personalities, military professionals are used to evolve multiple options in dealing with countries having a difficult relationship like Pakistan and China. It is used to create a conducive environment where official links are not being used extensively. In the context of India-Pakistan relationship, Track II diplomacy has been frequently employed to work out new initiatives for resolving contentious issues. Professor (Dr) Rakesh Datta,\(^{158}\) who has been a member of various Track II initiatives emphasized on the need to engage the other side, as it allows to read each other's mind in an informal manner within the overall framework of the structured mechanism. Think tanks, university, and foreign research institutions also enhance diplomatic outreach. Diplomatic outreach works at broadening contact among various constituencies, and at the same time works on intensifying the quality of relationship with individuals and organizations.\(^{159}\) It may be noted that India and Pakistan continued to conduct Track II diplomacy during the Kargil War. When the initial reports of an armed intrusion into the Kargil sector started trickling in around

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\(^{158}\) Dr Rakesh Datta is a former member of the National Security Advisory Board of India and now a professor in the Department of Defence and National Security Studies, Panjab University. He has been actively involved in various Track II initiatives. He has published books and articles in reputed journals and reviewed number of books. He was selected as Visiting Fellow at the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge.

mid-May 1999, there was a flurry of Track-II-level exchanges. All options which can avert war without compromising the national interest should be explored. Diplomacy assumes even greater significance after the conclusion of the war to work out peace agreements. While the military may achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield, by annexing the laid down geographical military objectives or destruction/degradation of the war-waging potential of the adversary, the political victory will still be achieved at the negotiating table by astute diplomacy. Firmness to achieve political objectives or failure to do so or a partial diplomatic victory in the form of concessions does not act as a viable deterrent for the future as is the case with Pakistan after the 1971 victory. The defeated nation can build up its war-waging capability over a period of time and the non-achievement of political objectives through decisions during negotiations do not provide the expected deterrence value.

Military diplomacy is another aspect that warrants a concerted and deliberate effort to optimize its vast potential. Military and diplomacy, though belong to very different realms, yet are considered two sides of the coin. India has a vast scope of enhancing the reach of its military diplomacy. Having highly professional training institutions and peacetime formations India Army conducts training for foreign friendly country officers and routine training exercises. Training exercises with the USA, Russia, China, Nepal, Bangladesh, and a number of other countries have matured and functioned quite well. However, there is a need to revisit the scope and level of training exercises to extract meaningful leverages at the politico-diplomatic levels. It is satisfying to state that Disaster management capsule introduced in the joint training with the Nepal Army in 2013 paid handsome dividends during the earthquake in Nepal in 2015. The Indian Army is presently involved in conducting peace-keeping operations as part of the UN peace-keeping missions in Congo, South Sudan, Lebanon, Gaza and other smaller trouble spots contributing nearly seven thousand troops. The active involvement of the military in peace-keeping operations has become a vital instrument of military diplomacy to project the image of the country.

The Indian armed forces and police are considered very competent and professional

160 Malik, VP, General (Retired), Kargil From Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers, 2006) p 98 General VP Malik was the COAS and Chairman COSC during the Kargil Conflict
162 The author was GOC of a mountain division assigned to conduct joint training with the Nepal Army in 2012-13
forces by the international community.\textsuperscript{163} Military diplomacy, as part of India’s overall diplomacy, helps to strengthen relations with friendly countries.\textsuperscript{164} This can be optimally employed. There is tremendous scope to build adequate leverages with influential countries that serves our national interest through military diplomacy in terms of conducting bilateral or multi-lateral training exercises.

**Political Leadership.** The political leadership of a country is an important determinant for nation’s capability building. The quality of decisions of the leadership projects the nation’s future course of direction, scope, and extent of power that a nation can exercise for achieving its national interests. Any decision related to national security with respect to the adversaries impacts the deterrence for the future. The personalities exert a strong and enduring influence on the decision-making process, particularly in foreign and security-related policies. “The foreign policy and security policies everywhere are the last portions of sovereign decision making, they are primarily the prerogative of the individual leader in all systems of government.”\textsuperscript{165}

In India, the PM, starting from Nehru, with few exceptions, invariably directed and guided the foreign policy. India’s successive PMs can be credited with important strategic decisions – both good and bad. PM Nehru can be credited with the Non-Aligned policy, but cannot be exonerated for his China policy. Mr. Shastri and Mrs. Gandhi took bold decisions for the war in 1965 and 1971, the latter resulted in the breakdown of Pakistan. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi ordered a military intervention in Sri Lanka which proved to be a wrong decision. Mr. Narsimha Rao liberalized the economy and signed the Border Peace and Tranquility agreement with China, while Manmohan Singh took a great political risk to sign the Indo- US Nuclear Agreement. Vajpayee took a strong decision to conduct the nuclear explosions and evicted the Pakistani intrusions exercising strategic restraint, but faulted in ordering military mobilization post-terrorist attack on the Parliament. Modi responded with boldness to Pakistani terrorist attacks by ordering the surgical strikes across the LoC in September 2016 and aerial strikes in February 2019. Each of these decisions changed the politico-strategic discourse and added tremendous substance to the political value of deterrence. The democratic political structure of India has impacted strategic decision-making that did


\textsuperscript{164} Malik, op cit, 2013 p 208

\textsuperscript{165} Menon, SS, op cit, p 189
not contribute to effective deterrence, e.g. the release of three high profile terrorists in exchange of the highjacked hostages through Indian Airlines Flight AI-814 on 31st December 1999. The political leadership succumbed to the huge public pressure. India’s soft state image was affirmed, having earlier released five terrorists in exchange for the kidnapped daughter of the then Union Home Minister in 1989. The handling of the hijacking was contrary to the earlier pronouncements by the Prime Minister that India had “zero tolerance” of terrorist activities. In contrast, Israel on 01st July 1976, launched a raid at Entebbe airfield in Uganda, where its hostages were kept and secured their release. These divergent decisions and responses, in turn, influenced the two country’s counter-terrorism policies. In India, the political decisions exhibited a soft approach, lack of confidence and indignity. While in the case of Israel, it marked a determined resolve to not to surrender to the terrorist’s demands. Both events deeply affected the national prestige and character post the incidents. The political decision-making, whether it reflects an aggressive or passive response to terrorist actions determines the value of deterrence that the leadership has imposed on the adversary. The need to empower political leadership needs no emphasis.

Soft Power. Power in international relations has been traditionally defined and assessed in easily quantifiable ‘hard’ terms normally related to the military and economic strength of the country. Nuclear capability is hard power. Hard power employs the military force, the economic strength and threatens with nuclear capability using compellence strategies like coercion, threats as well as promises. The term ‘soft power’ coined by Joseph Nye in the late eighties “evades the traditional foreign policy tools of hard and soft approach; it instead strives to achieve influence by building networks, communicating mutually benefitting narratives and building on assets that are attractive.” Soft Power plays a subtle role in deterrence as it tends to influence the perceptions of the international community by discrete and strategic communication including public opinion. India wields considerable strength in its soft power in terms of its cultural diversity, multi-religiosity, movies, songs, yoga, its vast

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167 Joseph, Nye, Jr is University Distinguished Service Professor and former Dean of the John F Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
168 What is Soft Power, op cit,
human resource having intellectual, entrepreneurial and skilled as well as non-skilled force abilities. India holds a 65 percent share of the global market in offshore Information Technology (IT) (export of software and services for maintenance and expansion of a firm’s business operations) and 46 percent of the worldwide market in Information Technology Enabled Services (ITES) (running of call centres, writing medical prescriptions, making cutting-edge designs etc.)\(^{169}\) “The natural ability to glocalize (be global, yet local) has been one of the strengths of Indian culture.”\(^{170}\) This is a huge asset with India with which it can influence the perceptions of the world community to its advantage that can be suitably leveraged.

India and Pakistan are linked by the same culture, history, language, domestic institutions, values, and traditions. Despite these tremendous valued common linkages of soft power has not worked between India and Pakistan. PM Vajpayee tried in 1999 when he took Deva Anand as part of his entourage to Pakistan in his famous Bus Diplomacy. The Pakistan PM was a huge fan of the former. It didn’t work. The aftermath of the bus diplomacy in the form of Kargil intrusions is well known to be recounted here. Later PM Manmohan Singh tried to revive old linkage of his birthplace and assiduously worked towards enhancing contact between people to people. He stated on 24 March 2004, “Borders cannot be redrawn, but we can work towards making them irrelevant” and reiterated greater “Cross LoC Connectivity” to increase people to people contacts.\(^ {171}\) Pakistan perceived these measures as evasive techniques to digress away from the core issues. Mumbai terror attack was launched in November 2008 by Pakistan based terrorists. With the real power in the hands of the military in Pakistan and seeing from numerous past experiences, soft power is unlikely to act as any sort of deterrence against Pakistan. Similarly, with China, the PM Nehru tried to build its relationship with China on Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai with effect from 1954 onwards. The result was the infliction of a humiliating defeat by China on India.

Smart Power is a step beyond the soft power and encompasses a judicious and balanced combination of the tools of hard conventional military and economic power.


\(^{170}\) Friedman, Thomas, *The World is Flat* (London: Allen Lane, 2005) p 325

\(^{171}\) Pattanaik, Smriti S, Dr and Anand, Arpita, ‘Cross LoC Confidence Building Measures Between India and Pakistan: A Giant Step or a Small Step Towards Peace’, *IDSA Issue Brief*, p 3
and soft power of culture, tourism, sports etc. **The smart power in India’s case can work favorably with respect to multi-lateral diplomacy** where it can leverage its virtues of democracy, multi-religion co-existence, technological advancements, English speaking population with a huge youthful profile. It is perhaps one of the few countries who houses denominations of nearly all the major religions of the world and integrated elements of multi-religious culture in its democratic systems. The vast resource of English-speaking youth having immense technological acumen has made Indians globally acceptable. India must leverage its vast potential of soft power to project a positive image of the country in the national interest. The inter-linkages of soft power with other determinants add on to its credibility.

**Indian Diaspora.** With increased globalization and technological advancement, migrations have increased manifold leading to a larger diaspora population living outside their homelands. A diaspora is “a large group of people with a similar heritage or homeland who have since moved out to places all over the world.” The Indian diaspora is settled across the globe engaged in a wide range of jobs ranging from the high end of elected political leaders, judiciary, engineers, doctors to non-skilled labors. As per the United Nations report, Indians make up the largest diaspora in the world; 16 million Indians are settled in 110 countries of the world. This diaspora project India’s soft power internationally in terms of India’s culture, cuisines, movies, songs, multi-religiosity etc. Engaging a country’s overseas community to build friendly relationships with foreign countries as diaspora diplomacy is assuming great significance.

The contribution of people settled in various countries has been quite significant. They have invested in developing projects, establishing cultural bonds and skill development. These people attempt to safeguard India’s interests in foreign countries. Indian diaspora in the US, acted positively to promote India’s interests while mustering support for India during Kargil War, the conduct of nuclear explosions and the signing of an agreement between India and the US on civil nuclear cooperation.

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Indian diasporas effectiveness in blocking the Burton amendment is praiseworthy.\textsuperscript{174} Mr Burton later remarked, “the Indian lobby has been very effective and I congratulate them.”\textsuperscript{175}

India’s economic success has enhanced the standing of its diaspora in their adoptive countries.\textsuperscript{176} However, some disgruntled or self-promote groups/individuals tend to provide moral and financial support to various terrorist organizations engaged in anti-national activities within India. Therefore, a careful balance needs to be maintained on engagement with the diaspora. They can induce both positive and negative influences abroad. Mr. KC Singh, during an interview with the author, opined that there is a vast scope to optimally employ this diaspora’s financial and intellectual capital by adopting a prudent, pro-active, secular approach encompassing all sections of the diaspora across the world.\textsuperscript{177} Pakistan has succeeded in employing its own as well as some members of the Indian diaspora to spread anti-India propaganda causing disenchantment amongst the community. Attempts to destabilize India by David Headley, Dawood Ibrahim and Abu Jundal are well-known cases of Pakistan’s nefarious designs against India. Diaspora, thus, is an important factor contributing that should be capitalized upon to build up positive perceptions of the country and make them meaningful contributors in nation-building.

PART III: CONCLUSION

Deterrence is the art of managing and compelling the adversary with the threat to use force to deter him from waging war. The nuclear deterrence has succeeded in averting large scale or industrial wars but has not been able to deter the low-end spectrum of conflict like the sub-conventional operations and acts of terrorism. Deterrence in the India-Pakistan and India-China context is peculiar and cannot be put into the template set out in the Western context due to the lingering territorial dispute, incompatible national identities, and differing ideologies.


\textsuperscript{175} Ibid

\textsuperscript{176} Kumar, Sanjay, “The Role of Diaspora in India’s Foreign Policy, National Security and Economic Development” Vivekananda International Foundation, 31 July 2012.

\textsuperscript{177} Interviewed on 12 February 2018
There are no well-defined parameters to assess the strength of a deterrent posture. The success of deterrence lies in compelling the adversary to abandon a particular hostile policy. Neither the nuclear weapons nor the conventional military means constitute an effective deterrence when other determinants remain dangerously weak. Yet the military deterrence remains pivotal to the concept of deterrence being the last resort. Deterrence does not out-rightly rule out war but prevents it to the extent possible. The various determinants that have been examined need to be carefully and objectively applied, keeping in mind, their dynamic nature, the interdependence, quantitative and qualitative aspects, the level of preparedness and the potential ability of each determinant. Military capability building in all its manifestations is an important determinant of the comprehensive national power that enhances the overall deterrent value of India.