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$LEV_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Log BS})_{it} + \beta_2(\% \text{ BI})_{it} + \beta_3(\text{CEOD})_{it} + \beta_4(\% \text{ROA})_{it} + \beta_5(\text{Log SZ})_{it}$

$+ \varepsilon$