Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean in the world. Its area is approximately 75 million sq. Kms. and has 21.3% of the world's ocean water. Geographically, the Indian Ocean region is an aggregate of various sub-regions. It includes South Asia, part of Middle East, West Asia, South East Asia, the Australian continent, the Horn of Africa, East Africa and South Eastern part of the African continent covering 44 littoral and hinterland states according to the U.N. records. They are distinct in ethical, national, racial and religious senses. The Indian Ocean states have different levels of economic development and positions in international division of labour and vary in their political orientation and role in world politics. This creates hinderences in the way of common position on various international problems. On one hand there are very rich states and on the other very poor and starving ones e.g. Somalia, Ethiopia and many others.

For many decades the Indian Ocean region had been an object of colonial domination by European states. But the post second world war era witnessed the process of decolonization of the area and it appeared to be set for ushering in the time of their increasingly greater independent role in world politics. But with the change in the old order, imperialism took the garb of neo-imperialism based on the maxim of 'divide et imperia'.
This is because the big powers feel that he, who controls this region, will dominate the whole world. It is very rich in oil and minerals. To some extent the U.S.A., to a large extent Western and European countries and to the maximum extent Japan are dependent on oil of this region. Similar is the case of minerals like magnese and bauxite. Due to big power politics the Indian Ocean region is plagued by internal dissensions and infighting resulting in bloodshed and strife. Some politicians and strategists of the Western countries single out this region as the most probable place for "detonation" of a global nuclear war. Had the former Soviet Union not disintegrated, the last Gulf War could have been a world catastrophe. There had been, in recent past, a race between two Super-Powers the U.S.A. and the former Soviet Union for bringing this area under the dominance of one or the other. Backward and poor countries of the region are usually used as scape goats of the chess-game of international politics. This is the reason that neither the feeling of regionalism nor South-South co-operation could foster in the Indian Ocean area.

After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., The world has entered into an era from Super Powers politics to sole power politics. Earlier there was rivalry between the two Super Powers each trying to contain the influence of the other and consolidate its position and increase its
dominance over the maximum chunk of the world. The Indian Ocean policy of the U.S.A. is a part of its global design. To it, this area is crucial because of oil and strategic reasons. In this sense U.S. interests in the area are linked with her security interests in Europe and East Asia because of its allies' dependence on Gulf oil and some minerals. For this it want uninterrupted oil supply to the West on one hand and Japan on the other. This is the most important determinant of its security interests in the region. To provide integrity of approach—economic, political and security considerations have also been given due consideration and importance. Naturally, for its own interests and also for the interests of its allies, it is neck deep involved in regional turbulence, dissensions and intra-regional conflicts. Overtly and covertly it adopts the policy of intervention. Likewise security policy, whether it takes the form of commitments, arms sales or power projection capabilities, would not be effective without a parallel political and diplomatic framework. In short the U.S. interest in the Indian Ocean region have been following:
i) to ensure access to secure oil supplies at reasonable prices,

ii) to balance Soviet influence and if possible to reduce it,

iii) to promote stability, and

iv) to pursue regional security and advance the Middle East peace process, while guaranteeing the security of Israel.

It should also be kept in mind that the U.S.A. is everywhere interested in arms sale and also in promoting its trade and commercial interests. Despite adherence to democratic ideals at home, authoritarianism is acceptable abroad as long as the political interests of the ruling establishments in third world countries are congruous with U.S. strategic and economic interests. It is an open secret that the U.S.A. in its interest helped the ousting of Shah Pahalvi of Iran, who had been a dependable U.S. agent for the Gulf region. Not only this but President Bush had sold arms to Saddam Hussein's Iraq to contain the influence of fundamentalist Iran.
To strengthen its hold over the Indian Ocean area the U.S.A. has been deploying advanced missiles and other strategic and sophisticated devices in the region. It has now full control over the Indian Ocean. The U.S.A. has set-up two important strategic bases— one in the, North-West Cape in Western Australia on one hand and Diego Garcia on the other. In the last Gulf war, powerful very low frequency transmitters (V.L.F.) at these stations played a crucial and decisive role in foiling Iraqi scud attacks with the help of the U.S. 'Patriot' missiles.

The year of 1973 is very important in Indian Ocean politics. In this year Saudi Arabia and Iran had imposed oil embargo which proved very effective. The allies of the U.S.A. were badly hit by this step. After this the U.S.A. decided to strengthen its position further among the oil producing countries of the Middle East. It soon won over Saudi Arabia and helped the process of ousting Shah Pahalvi of Iran. Not only this but a cleavage started between the Arabs and Iran. At present on one hand Pakistan and on the other Saudi Arabia are looking after the entire Middle East in the interest of the U.S.A. To a certain extent the U.S.A. covertly helped intra-regional conflicts in this region to
keep the oil producing countries under its influence. It supplied them military hardware and equipments at high prices. Not only this, but a contingent of American experts was maintained in Saudi Arabia to look after operational and ground work in connection with AWACS. In this way the U.S.A. and its allies are eating into the economic vitality of the oil rich countries of the region. After the recent Gulf War, the U.S. hold over the area is more firm. In addition to all this, the U.S. multinational corporations have substantial capital investments in the persian Gulf oil production, transportation and sale in the world market. The oil producing areas of South-West Asia, with petrodollar and ambitious development plans, have become a multi billion dollar market for the manufactured goods of the U.S.A. and its allies on massive scale. But after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, the present threats to the U.S. interest are emanating from revolutionary factors, intra-state conflicts and fundamentalist forces.

After the revolution in Iran Islamic fundamentalism has grown enormously. The revolutionary momentum of fundamentalism is largely a response to the arbitrary and
authoritarian rule of dynastic elites in South West Asia
who are perceived as middlemen for the U.S. and Western
dominance. The low intensity conflicts resulting from
revolutionary forces can hardly be fought by the kind of
superior forces which the United States has capacity to
mobilise. But after the last Gulf War, on one hand the U.S.
dominance stands consolidated and on the other the process
of democratization and liberalisation, though slow, yet has
set in. The post-war Kuwait is democratising its political
institutions. Besides all this, the present Arab and Muslim
world is getting anti-American. The post war Iraq has almost
healed up its war injury and Saddam Hussein is still firm in
the saddle enjoying sympathies of the Islamic people all
over the world. After enormous pressures, Iraq has not yet
given up its nuclear designs.

Though, much could be written about the 'Soviet
Indian Ocean Politics' or 'Soviet Threat' or Soviet Naval
Presence' in the Indian Ocean and such other subjects, yet
the disintegration of the Soviet Union has made such
studies infructuous, it appears, When the present research
project was taken up, the Soviet Union was intact—united
and strong and it had a clear policy on the Indian Ocean
and third world states. But no scholar could forecast the death of a Super power so quietly. If Vietnam and the Gulf wars could deliver severe jolt to the U.S.A. and its economy, the Afghan problem proved more disastrous for the Soviet Union. Even after its disintegration studies on its policies—home, economic, defence etc. are still worthy of serious considerations and analyses. Such efforts are even more useful for third world countries of the Indian Ocean region as they are to learn many lessons from super power rivalry, their policies, their advantages and disadvantages.

The U.S. and Western strategists and scholars have in fact created on a myth of the 'Soviet Threat' in the Indian Ocean region. From the fifties onwards military and strategic aspect of this so-called threat began to shift its focus from land to air and then to the seas. It was from 1955 onwards that the Soviet Union started giving due consideration to Asia and embarked on a long range plan for military and non-military aid and assistance to Afro-Asian countries notably Egypt and India. In this way the Indian Ocean assumed new significance for Soviet merchant
shipping. Soon after it became involved in the Indian Ocean and its hinterland and littoral states' affairs. Increasing maritime activities resulted in significant activities for the Soviet navy both military and non-military. In Super Power Politics the gain of the Soviet Union became loss to the U.S.A.

The basic role of the Soviet navy was to defend territorial waters and adjoining zones against the Western threat. The main thrust of post war Soviet naval force and strategy was on area defence perimeter, the outer zone guarded by submarines. The Khrushchevian defence policy laid more stress on nuclear and air strike capacity, but the U.S. deployment of nuclear ballistic missiles and submarines posed serious threat to the Soviet Union. Hence, a shift took place which emphasized the improvement of offensive capabilities against the American sea based systems. The new policy attempted to create a national strategic reserve with the primary objective to destroy the second strike capability of the Western alliance. This required that the U.S. submarine carrier forces be attacked at the first instance at the very outset of war and thus the Soviet forces were to be within weapon range contact at
the vital moment. During the 1979-80 crises in Afghanistan and Iran, the Soviet sent reinforcements to balance the U.S. naval potentiality in the area.

The Soviet Union developed its first significant naval presence at the southern end of the Red Sea, in the Gulf of Aden. It attempted to have bases in Berbera, Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa but could not succeed.

The real emphasis of the Soviet Union in regard to the Indian Ocean and third world countries was on trade instead of aid. It also supported liberation movements whenever it was possible. As the U.S.S.R. had been pretending to be socialist country, ideologically it was not to impose its system on any country contrary to the U.S. policy which adopted the technique of neo-colonialism under which covertly a country's economy is subjugated and its political system is made docile. Z.A. Bhutto has stated it in so many words in his book, "The Myth of Independence"

As a Minister for Foreign Trade in Ayub's ministry he had seen large scale U.S. intervention and dictation even in petty affairs in Pakistan's internal affairs. The Soviet
policy was to encourage liberation movements, make them self-reliant by providing them economic and military assistance emphasizing more on trade rather than aid. But this socialist policy could not meet the U.S. challenge which was encircling the Soviet Union and was posing threat from the Indian Ocean side as well. By water the Indian Ocean was far way from the U.S.S.R. and deployment of nuclear weapons by the U.S.A. in the Ocean was a severe challenge to it. Hence, it became imperative on the part of the U.S.S.R. to adopt forward policy in the Indian Ocean waters. At the same time it had to make intervention in Afghanistan contrary to the ideology of socialism/communism. Ideologically socialist system origins and grows from the soil of a country rather than its imposition from outside. Naturally the Soviet Union was caught in its own web in Afghanistan from where it had to retreat defeated and humiliated.

The Soviet show of its naval force in the Indian Ocean region was evident at the time of crises in the Suez war, Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia and Indo-Pak war in 1971. It had been acting as a protector of the Arab and the Vietnam causes. All these activities were justified
ideologically. However, the Soviet Union showed considerable reluctance to engage U.S. naval forces.

Among non-regional powers, besides the two Super Powers, Great Britain and Japan have been taking interest in the Indian Ocean politics. It is noteworthy that the first two—Great Britain and France belong to the Western system and are allied to the U.S.A. and Japan has no military designs at present in the Indian Ocean region. Hence, they are not rivals.

In past, Great Britain had been dominating the Indian Ocean due to colonial reasons and also due to its emotional ties with Australia and Netherland. Hence, the Indian Ocean was called a "British Lake." This British dominance came to an end at the time of the Second World War, when Japan humiliated British naval might in the Indian Ocean. After the war, the colonial era saw its end and Great Britain instead of being the master, became a camp-follower of the U.S.A. In the Middle East too, its influence lessened. The Suez war of 1956 shattered the British capability of intervention in the region. It handed over
Diego Garcia to the U.S.A. for military purposes. Mr. Herald Wilson, the British Prime Minister in 1968 announced his Government's decision to withdraw British forces from the 'East of Suez' by the end of 1971. The Soviet Union tried to take advantage of this but in vain.

The old rival of Great Britain in European politics and colonial race was France but this rivalry came to an end at the time of the First World War. Though an ally of the U.S.A. and Great Britain, France has deep interest in the Indian Ocean region. It is a rival of the U.S.A. and other European countries in the trade of armaments with the states of the area. Hence, it maintained naval bases in the Comros, Djibouti and other places. At present some times, France takes independent line in international politics in general and in the Indian Ocean area in particular.

Though at present Japan has no military designs in the Indian Oceans due to its commitment to peace and disarmament, yet it has deep interest in the area. Economically it is very prosperous. Japanese yen has beaten all the currencies in the world. But from the point of view of energy and natural resources, it is poor. To run its industries, it imports oil and minerals on a massive
scale. In this way Japan is dependent on the Indian Ocean. There are two evident factors for Japan's deep interest in the Indian Ocean area. Firstly, as one of the leading trading countries of the world and owners of a big merchant fleet, it uses the Indian Ocean sea-routes much more than many others. Its vital sea-links with Africa and Europe touch this area which has become very important to it. Secondly, Japan is dependent upon countries of this region—\[\ldots\]—as a source for raw materials and market for manufactured goods. Hence, expansion of foreign trade is the main object of Japan. The Indian Ocean routes are more important to Japan than the Pacific ones.

Though Japan, to a large extent, is dependent on this region, yet it does not exploit it in the colonial or neo-colonial way. It realises that exploitation breeds dissatisfaction leading to liberation movements and resulting in the loss of colony. Hence, Japan wants peace and stability in the area so that procurement of raw material and oil is secured to it on one hand and uninterrupted supply of finished goods is maintained to and from the littoral and hinterland states. Through Arabia Oil
Company, it has tried to have a foot-hold in oil industry. For these considerations it wanted reopening of the Suez Canal. It has set up a petro-chemical company in Iran. Besides this, it has taken-up several other projects. In automobiles and electronics too the Japanese industry is very advanced. The number of Japanese multinationals is increasing enormously. Japan is giving economic aid to the states of the area liberally to acquire a foothold there.

Though rationale behind these ventures is Japan's desire to see that the countries bordering the Indian Ocean attain sufficient economic vitality to sustain their political systems. Economic backwardness and political instability, according to Japan, are sources of insecurity in the area. Japan's most important fear is that rivalry among the powers may result in disruption of sea traffic. Hence it had supported the resolution for declaration of the Indian Ocean as a "Zone of Peace" in the U.N.O. meaning thereby that the security of the region should be left to the littoral and hinterland states of the area. By and large, Japan is in favour of littoral states expanding their naval strength to secure peace in the area.

But the basic question is - how long can Japan pursue this policy? What will Japan do in case of intense
rivalry resulting in interruption of sea-traffic in the Indian Ocean. Probably, Japan understands the implications of such a situation. Hence, it has undertaken the programme of M.S.D.F. (Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force). According to K.K. Nayyar "Japan's maritime profile is on increase—her naval budget exceeds India's total defence budget put together". M.S.D.F. operates 210 ships, including 20 submarines and 65 frigates/destroyers and corvettes along with other ships. Not only this but a recent report said that Japan is one of the largest consumer of nuclear fuel—plutonium. Quite possible, in future, Japan may undertake military programme in respect of the Indian Ocean, if necessary. A radical movement for militarisation of Japan is going on, though it has not gained strength.

In recent past, the Indian Ocean witnessed acute Big/Super Powers rivalry. The littoral and hinterland states were bound to be concerned about the frequent movements of nuclear powered submarines and warships of non-regional powers. On March 20, 1973 the U.S. communication base was commissioned and with this the U.S.A. became the first to establish a military base on a foreign territory in the area. The Nixon administration asked the Congress for 30
million dollars to build-up U.S. naval facilities in Diego Garcia. The Soviet Union watched these developments with apt attention. France, too was determined to make its presence felt in the area.

Thus great power rivalry had set in in the area. The littoral states felt that "weapons attract weapons and bases attract bases form opposing camps". It is noteworthy that the Indian Ocean had never been vital for the security of the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union too was not in a position to disrupt the western oil supply routes. Though at that time it has no base in the region, yet the Anglo-American policy worked up the bogey of a 'Soviet Threat'. Naturally, the littoral states were frightened. The U.S. gunboat diplomacy at the final phase of the Indo-Pak War in 1971 is an example in this respect. Due to the backwardness of the area and outer intervention, local differences could lead to local wars. Hence regional states wanted tension and rivalry free Ocean for their development. It is also noteworthy that most of the countries of the area has adopted the policy of Non-alignment. They desired to make the Indian Ocean area as a "Zone of Peace" for the sake of their independence. At the Non-alignment Conference at Cairo in 1964, it was recognised that the "Peace Zone" concept was inherent in the
policy of Non-alignment. At the Lusaka conference it was held that the Indian Ocean area should be free from big power rivalries. Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mrs. Bandarnaike advocated the same theme at the common wealth Prime Minister's conference in January 1971. She moved a resolution to this effect at the U.N. General Assembly in the same year which was adopted at its 26th session by 61 votes in favour, none against and 55 abstentions.

The objects of the "Peace Zone" concept were as follows: (i) to attain eventual evolution of the Indian Ocean community in which security problems were to be dealt with by orderly and institutional means, (ii) to make the Indian Ocean area nuclear free (Presumably by pressurizing India, a near nuclear power, not to exercise its nuclear option), (iii) to stabilize the Ocean as a power-vacuum area to made it free from cold war and power rivalry; (iv) to attain world peace and disarmament and (v) to enable the regional countries to work for their development and betterment.

Objection to this concept came mainly from outside powers. According to them, (a) it would transgress the freedom of navigation and maritime activities, (b) it was contrary to international law, and (c) it was against the spirit of the defence arrangement in the region. The
Protagonists of the Declaration held that such outdated approach should be modified to accommodate the needs and realities of the present day world. Moreover, the freedom of navigation in the high seas had always been weighted in favour of the dominant user countries—big powers.

But in reality the "Peace Zone" concept was too idyllic to contemplate. It expected the big powers to voluntarily renounce their claim of free navigation in the Ocean. At the same time it desired India to close its nuclear option though it was being threatened from Pakistan and China simultaneously and the latter was in possession of nuclear weapons and sophisticated missile systems for delivery purposes. The protagonists of the concept compared the "Peace Zone" Concept with the Rapacki plan of October 1957 and Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, the earlier relating to Central Europe and the latter relating to Latin America. But it is a wrong comparison as both of them were territorial in their character where as the "Peace Zone" concept was navigational with big powers having deep interest in the area owing to oil. At the time of the adoption of this resolution no nuclear power except China supported it. Hence, due to the approach of the big powers the declaration was confined to the archives of the U.N.O. After the recent Gulf War, the Super Powers, era has been
replaced by the sole power era. This has buried the Declaration deep.

Within the region - Pakistan and China had been playing anti-Indian politics. Pakistan's initial interest in the Indian Ocean was confined to the security of sea-lanes between Karachi (West Pakistan) and Chittagong (East Pakistan). Before 1971, Pakistani strategists assumed that East Pakistan could be defended from the West Pakistan meaning thereby that Pakistan could capture Indian territory in Punjab and Rajasthan which might be bargained with Indian gains in East Pakistan in case of war. This was a great strategic fallacy as the events of 1971 proved. Since 1971, Pakistan's primary concern became the Arabian sea which was of utmost importance to it as this sea connected with the middle East, Europe and East Africa. In the beginning Pakistan had relatively a small navy as it had a bias in favour of army. It was not in a position to have naval parity with India. But Pakistan's naval position improved when it joined the U.S. security alliance. After the fall of Shah Pahalvi and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan became a front line state in the U.S. security arrangements. In reality Pakistan had been more averse to Indian naval power rather than the U.S.
When 'Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai' era came to an end and differences arose between India and China, Pakistan started coming closer to China. After 1962 close relationship between the two was clearly evident. At the time of the 1965 war China wanted to intervene but could not dose due to the attitude of the U.S.A. and the Western countries. In 1970 top military delegations from Pakistan visited China. The latter gave a loan of Rs. 100 Crores to the former. Sino-Pak axis was a danger to India by not only land but also by the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. The Kashgar-Gilgit-Karachi Road had provided China a direct overland access to the Indian Ocean. Besides this, the entire north east could be exposed to insurgency backed by Pakistan and China both. Between the two there was close military and defence cooperation against India. Z.A. Bhutto started building bridges between the U.S.A. and China. It is also noteworthy in this respect that the Indo-U.S. relations were at the lowest ebb during the presidency of Nixon which was to the advantage of Pakistan.

The challenge put forth by this trio (Pak, U.S. and China) was very serious before India. India had been repairing the damage done to it in 1962 by improving its security preparedness and also by diplomacy. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 'Friendship of
1971 was Indian diplomatic victory over the aforesaid trio and the humiliating defeat inflicted on Pakistan by Indian forces was Indias' military victory. To the embarrassment of the U.S.A. and China both Pakistan became truncated and free and sovereign Bangladesh emerged. The credit of all this went to the able and courageous leadership of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The U.S. naval movement in the Bay of Bengal (The U.S.S. Enterprise) also proved a futile naval exercise.

Modernisation of defence forces including naval wing, defence preparedness, merger of Sikkim into India, 'Operation Meghdoot' (In siachen area), successful testfiring of various intermediate range ballistic missiles, and expansion of Indian navy have helped India to restore the country's prestige lost in 1962. With all these activities India was able to break Pak-Sino U.S. axis. Now India is having good neighbourly relations with China (barring the solution of the border problem) and India's relations with the U.S.A. too are improving leaving Pakistan high and dry.

At present India has a definite policy regarding the Indian Ocean and the economic zone which for a long time stood neglected at the hands of the Indian policy makers. Since independence (1947) India's main concern, from the point of view of national security was Pakistan
and later on China along with Pakistan. The threat was considered mainly from land, not from sea. At the time of Indo-Pak war in 1965 there were some activities in the Arabian sea. But actually speaking only after 1968, India started having a policy towards the Indian Ocean. During the war with Pakistan in 1971, India resorted to successful blockade of the then East Pakistan despite the U.S. threat in the Bay of Bengal.

After the British declaration the "East of Suez", the vacuum theory was propounded but the advocates of this theory were rebuffed by the Indian Foreign Minister as this theory in an implied way regarded Great Britain as the protector of Asia. It also implied that the U.S.A. should fill up the vacuum. Though India had been against setting-up bases in the Indian Ocean region, yet this policy was diluted in the light of the Chinese threat. At the time of Sino-Indian clash in 1962, the entry of the 7th fleet was rather welcomed by India and the criticism of it was brushed aside by Pt. Nehru himself in the Indian Parliament. When in 1965 Maldives gained independence, the base of Gan was retained by Britain. This evoked no protest from India. Setting up of bases in B.I.O. T. by Britain and the U.S.A. too evoked no strong reaction by New Delhi. All this shows that the Government of India
had till then no Indian Ocean policy. It was so because India had at that time no strong navy and its prestige too was badly shattered by the Chinese in 1962 and it was not in a position to re-establish itself in the regional or international politics till then.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi for the first time laid India's policy regarding the Indian Ocean and its regional states. In October 1968 she launched the frigate 'Nilgiri'. She had clearly declared the Ocean as an area of peace and decried Super Powers' rivalry in the region. In January 1971 at the Singapore Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, India took a line of strong opposition to the British sale of arms to South Africa and highlighted the danger posed to the interests of the littoral states by the transformation of the Indian Ocean into an arena of big powers' rivalry.

It is also noteworthy that India's policy at that time was critical of Super Powers' rivalry but this stand had a tilt towards the Soviet Union. The Soviet threat to the region was described as "hypothetical" by the Indian Foreign Minister who on January 21, 1971 had stated "All that had happened was that Soviet ships had began patrolling the area, thus
breaking the British monopoly in this regard.". This statement was made at the time when India's relations were much strained with the U.S.A. on the issue of the crisis in the then East Pakistan (Bangla Desh). In the other words it may also be said that this was the best period of the overall cordial Indo-Soviet relationship. In this context it is remarkable that both India and the Soviet Union had similar views on the regional economic and security matters and the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was born out of the aforesaid common approach. India with the help of the Soviet Union had undertaken a massive programme of rapid deployment and modernisation of its naval wing. Now India has the most powerful navy in the Indian Ocean next to the Super Powers'. It had also borrowed a nuclear powered submarine 'Chakra' from the Soviet Union which was later on returned to them as it is quite very close to have its own in near future.

Among the South Asian littoral states there is no competitor to India except Pakistan. It has cordial relations with all the littoral countries by and large. There were some irritants with Bangla Desh and Shri Lanka. The 'Tin Bigha' issue with Bangla Desh has been solved and an agreement has also been arrived at to solve the 'Chakma' issue. With the return of I.P.K.F. from Shri Lanka and banning of L.T.T.E. activities in
India, the main hurdles in cordial relationship between the two countries are over. It will take some time to heal-up the old wounds.

India's strides in economic and strategic spheres is not liked by Pakistan. It is waging a proxy war with India in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir by supplying arms and money and imparting subversive training to secessionist forces. India is meeting the challenge diplomatically and in a defensive way. It should adopt a hardline in this respect. Pakistan should not forget that its internal position is far from being satisfactory. A secessionist movement is gaining ground in Sindh and may also take birth elsewhere too in future. At present it is taking advantage of its ties with the Middle East and Sole Power international politics following disintegration of India's dependable friend - the U.S.S.R. If India and Pakistan resolve their differences and act jointly, they can very well meet the ills of sole-power politics in the Indian Ocean region.