CHAPTER-1
THE CREATION OF PAKISTAN
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Nations, it is said, are made in solitude. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, India seldom had the solitude to become a nation. Moreover, the country was too vast. All India-empires were short lived. The integrative process in India was again and again interrupted by foreign invasions. Even if there had been no foreign invasions, it is doubtful whether a country of the size of India could have become a nation before the development of the modern means of communication in the nineteenth century. But it would be wrong to conclude that India was entirely lacking in the essentials of nationalism.

Nature has made the peninsula of India probably the most compact territory in Asia. It has given India distinct geographical unity and well defined frontiers. And from very early times the people of India have been conscious of this fact. Communication between different parts of India was frequent. Pilgrims travelled great distances to visit shrines distributed throughout the country. So did merchants and scholars. The physical and administrative barriers within the country seldom impeded the free flow of men or goods or ideas. The two major religious communities in India—The Hindu and the Muslim—were dispersed all over the subcontinent. The sense of belonging to an all India community cut across regional and linguistic loyalties. Despite the apparent diversity of language, custom, race and religion, India, from the Indus to the
Brahmaputra and from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, possessed a certain underlying uniformity of life which distinguished it from the rest of the world. The web of Indian life was woven of diverse but interlocking patterns. The ancient Hindu ideal of a 'Chakravarti' was that of a monarch who ruled over the entire subcontinent. This ideal was only briefly realized under the Mauryas in the 4th century B.C. and under the Guptas in the 4th century A.D., but what is significant is the fact that the ideal was firmly implanted in the Indian mind. The result was that later when the Mughals succeeded in the sixteenth century in bringing almost the entire subcontinent under one political umbrella, the emperor of Delhi began to be looked upon by the people as the paramount ruler of India.

The British once again gave political unity to India. Common subjection, common laws and institutions began to shape the people of India in a common mould. The spirit of being one undivided people was also visible in the Hindus and Muslims till almost the end of the 19th century. Hindus and the Muslims were the heroes of the Mutiny (1857) alike. But within next thirty years, how these two communities became rivals, this is something which requires a detailed study and impartial analysis of the divisive forces.

Factors Underlying the Division

Behind the conceptual unity of India, which existed in the minds of India's elite for centuries, there has always been various kinds of division and divisive forces at work. The
socio-economic, political and geographical factors stated below, played a significant role in the major political conflict of the two communities which resulted in the creation of Pakistan.

**SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS**

Communalism in India had its economic base in the fact that the Hindu middle class had registered spectacular growth during the first several decades of British rule, while the Muslims had failed to provide significantly any such class during the same period.

In areas where the British first established their rule, the traditional Hindu elite adjusted to the new situation while their Muslim counterparts attempted to resist the British. As the Hindus entered the new avenues opened up by the extension of British administration in various parts of the country and the Muslims kept away from them, a divergence arose in the structure and composition of the elite of the two communities. In Bengal, for example, within a hundred years of the introduction of British rule, the traditional Hindu elite had undergone a process of modernization and what is known as the Bengal Renaissance had occurred. Likewise in other coastal regions like Madras and Bombay, the traditional elite had been exposed to a process of social change and change in attitudes. The Muslims were hardly touched by these revolutionary changes; in trades and professions, education and administration, their role was relatively insignificant.\(^3\)

This was due partly to an accident of geography. The

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\(^3\) Sisir Gupta, 'Kashmir: A Study in India Pakistan Relations', P-2
invading Muslims of India came through the land routes of the North and consequently Northern India came under the economic and political domination of the Muslims. The British on the other hand, came by sea, and the coastal belts of India, early centres of British activity, were generally far away from the areas of dominant Muslim influence. As a result, the commercial and educational opportunities opened up by the British rule benefitted a class of people of which the greater proportion was non-Muslim. Even during the heyday of Mughal supremacy, the Muslims had not competed with the Hindus in non-military and minor professions or in trade, with the result that the development of a sizable Muslim middle class was long delayed.

There is no reason whatsoever to believe that the Hindu peasantry in the villages were better off than their Muslim colleagues. The majority of the Indians suffered, Hindus and Muslims alike, and it was only among the ranks of the middle classes that an uneven growth persisted throughout. Muslim separatism in India may be said to have originated in this wide gulf between the two communities, arising not so much out of their religious practices and beliefs, but out of concrete social and economic factors of the late nineteenth century:

(1) **DISAPPOINTMENT OVER JOBS**—Lack of higher education in Muslims and their failure to get high posts under Government, and not communalism made Sir Syed and Iqbal change their

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4. Dr. J.B. Das Gupta, 'Indo-Pakistan Relations 1947-1955' p. 9
attitudes and finally think exclusively in terms of their own community. They became communalists for all practical purposes.

The Mohammedan Civil Service Association was formed in 1884. The Association was formed at a time when frustration had begun to be seriously felt and expressed and men like Ameer Ali had already lost faith in the method of selection by competition. In 1892, Ameer Ali drafted a comprehensive memorial on the subject of 'Mohammedans' grievances and claims' and submitted it to the Viceroy Lord Ripon, on behalf of the Central Association, urging the recognition of the Muslim claim to Government jobs.

Ameer Ali's memorial was examined thoroughly by the authorities concerned. It was the strikingly disproportionate number of Muslims in the Government Services of Bengal that had mainly given Ameer Ali cause of grievance. It was reported that of the 213 ministerial officers in the 24 Parganas, only six were Muslims. The proportion was more or less the same in other districts of Bengal. In several offices at Calcutta there were no Muslims at all.

'The cause of the disparity' according to the Bengal Government's findings, as contained in its resolution dated October 8, 1886 'is to be sought primarily in the predilections of the Mohammedans themselves, who prefer Persian and Arabic learning, now of little use in the conduct of business, to the English education given to their children by Minias!'
W. W. Hunters, in his capacity as the President of the Education Commission for India, made almost the same observations:

'Before a Mohammedan child begins his education in a school, he has to obtain the rudiments of his religious training in a mosque or some Mohammedan institution, while the young Hindu is devoting his whole energies to obtaining a single education on a purely secular basis, the young Mohammedan is struggling to acquire a double education on both a secular and religious basis.'

(2) FALL OF STATUS: A very frank and lucid exposition of the situation was given by a liberal Muslim leader Mr. R. M. Sayani as follows:

"Before the advent of the British in India, the Mussulmans were the rulers of the country. The Mussulmans had, therefore, all the advantages appertaining to the ruling class. By a stroke of misfortune, the Mussulmans had to abrogate their position and descend to the level of their Hindu fellow-countrymen....new rulers of the country introduced English education into the country. The learning of an entirely unknown foreign language of course, required hard application and industry. The Hindus were accustomed to this, as even under the Mussulman rule they had practically to master a foreign tongue, and so easily took to the new education. Moreover, they resented competing with the Hindus whom they had till recently regarded as their inferiors. The result was that so far as education was concerned the Mussulmans, who were once superior to the Hindus, now..."

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6. The Aligarh Institute Gazette dated August 8, 1922.
actually became their inferiors. The Mussulmans were gradually ousted from their lands, their offices, in fact everything was lost save their honour. 7

The factors which accentuated the differences are noted by Khalid bin Saeed in the following words:

"It should be stressed that the sense of Muslim separatism, which is a dominant theme in the Quran, was an equally potent factor which prevented the growth of a common Indian nationalism. In addition, memories of Muslim rule in India not only remained alive, particularly among the upper class Muslims, but were constantly used by them to impress upon the Muslim masses that Muslims having ruled India, should not allow themselves to be ruled by the Hindu majority. 8"

This analysis enables us to understand the inner feelings that alienated the Muslims from the Hindus, and also the reasons why the political outlook of the two communities was very different from the very beginning. The establishment of the Mohammedi Anglo Oriental College at Aligarh and several Muslim High Schools at other places in the country offer proof that for secular education also Muslims wanted separate institutions. It was not till the third quarter of the nineteenth century that the Muslims appreciated the value of English education. As a result, in the race for progress, the Muslims were handicapped by a time lag of about fifty years.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL FACTORS

The Muslims had been the immediate predecessor of the British as rulers of India and they had held many positions of power and privilege. When they were gradually ousted from these, they were naturally full of resentment against the new Power. On the other hand, the new rulers also followed for a considerable time the policy of breaking the Muslims up and keeping them down. Their education policy was responsible for the increase of unemployment and the closing of the other avenue for the Muslims. It is alleged that in 1871, only 92 Muslims, out of a total of 2141 employees were in the service of the British Government as against 711 Hindus. The Wahabi Movement and their involvement in the Mutiny (1857) also led to the British treating the Muslims rough after the suppression of the Mutiny. But it was about the same time that a marked change in the attitude of the rulers towards the community becomes visible. Sir William Hunter's book "The Indian Musalmans" contended that the Muslims were too weak for rebellion and "it was expedient now to take them into alliance rather than continue to antagonise them."  

PART PLAYED BY MR. BECK

In bringing about the new reapprochment, an important part was played by Mr. Beck, Principal of the M.A.O. College, Aligarh, who managed to persuade the great Muslim leader Sir Syed Ahmed Khan that an Anglo-Muslim alliance

would ameliorate the condition of the Muslim community. As a result, Syed Ahmad's unique influence was used to keep the Muslims, particularly in northern India, away from the Congress, though earlier he had once declared that the Hindus and the Muslims were "the two eyes of the beautiful bride that was India" and if united, we can support each other. If not, the effect of one against the other would lead to the destruction and downfall of both.  

Under the fateful influence of Mr. Beck he began to attack the congress and the Hindus, and defined the former as a "Civil War without arms". When in 1889 Charles Bradlaugh brought forward a Bill in the British Parliament, giving representative institutions to India, it was Beck, who organized Muslim opposition there to. The Muslim memorial contended that the introduction of democratic institutions in India was unsuited to India because she was not one nation. As one of the secretaries of the Mohammedan Defence Association formed in 1893, he wrote, "the objective of the congress is to transfer the political control of the country from the British to the Hindus. Muslims can have not sympathy with these demands", obviously to prevent Muslims from joining Congress. Some, who witnessed the Aligarh drama being enacted, held the same view. One of them is Wilayat Hussain. He contributed an article to the 'Conference Gazette' (Aligarh) dated Nov. 8, 1935 in which he said that after hearing Surendra Nath Banerjee's speech at

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10. H. H. Dowdell, op. cit., page 616
Aligarh on the demand for the entry of Indians into the Civil Service, the reaction that Beck conveyed to his Muslim students was that if the competitive examination for the Civil Service was allowed to be held simultaneously in India as well, the only people to benefit from it would be Bengalis and that the timid Bengalis would rule over the sturdy people of northern India, he asked the Rajputs and Pathans whether they would tolerate this. Wilayat Hussain further says that had not Beck, who took over the editorship of the Aligarh Institute Gazette from Sir syed, begun abusing Bengalis and their movement through the editorial columns, the relations between Aligarh and nationalism would not have become as bitter as they did.

Wilayat Hussain also confirmed that Beck not only sponsored Muslim opposition to Charles Krailough’s Bill, but also fraudulently obtained the signatures of Muslims on the Memorial. Batches of Aligarh students were sent round to various towns on a signature campaign. Beck himself accompanied one that proceeded to Delhi. He sat down at the gates of the famous Jumma Mosque. Few were capable of understanding the Bill and its implications affecting the Muslims. On the advice of Beck, while asking for signatures, the students said that they were petitioning the Government to uphold the right of Muslims to sacrifice cows. By this device, 20735 signatures were obtained and the memorial was presented to the British Government.11

11. Ram Gopal ‘Indian Muslims: A Political History (1858-1947)’ p-70
In December 1933, he founded, with the support of Sir Syed, the Moheemedan Anglo Oriental Defence Association of upper India. The objects of the Defence Association were -

1. To acquaint the British people in general and the Government in particular with the views of the Muslim India and to protect the political rights of the Muslims.
2. To support measures designed to strengthen British rule in India.
3. To prevent political agitation from spreading among Muslims.
4. To help the Government in maintaining peace and to foster a spirit of loyalty.

In 1895, Beck proceeded to England where he addressed the annual meeting of the London branch of the Association. He pointed out:

1. A friendship between the British people and the Muslims was possible, but not between Muslims and followers of other religions, for example, the followers of Shivajee and those of Guru Govindi Singh would never agree with the Muslims in accepting Aurangzeb as their hero.
2. Muslims would never accept a system of Government in which the Hindu majority would rule over them, the Muslims of Kashmir who were living under the yoke of Brahmin officers envied the good fortune of the Muslims who were living happily under the British rule.
3. Indians, themselves did not like democratic system, they preferred Monarchy.
4. Muslim behaviour during and after the Revolt of 1857 had warned the community against agitational politics of Hindus, and they were now wisely acting on the advice of Sir Syed - it was the advice of loyalty to the British.
5. Muslims were opposed
to the holding of the competitive examinations in India, for they know that this step would mean the replacement of many impartial British officers by anti-Muslim Hindus.

**POLICY OF DIVIDE AND RULE**

The British, like all imperial powers, instinctively followed the policy of Divide and Rule in governing India. They could not be possibly unaware of the fact that after two generations of the Hindus had imbibed Western ideas through English education, they showed signs of political development which alarmed the Government as anti British and almost revolutionary, so they seized the opportunity of enlisting the support of the great but politically uneducated Muslim community and holding it as a counterpoise to the progressive Hindu community. Henceforth the British Government steadily followed the policy of clogging or putting a brake on one wheel of India's car of political evolution, so that its progress may be slowed down, even if not altogether stopped. With the same mission Mr. Beck made a systematic effort to alienate the Muslims from the Hindus.

**SIR SYED AND ALIGARH MOVEMENT**

The Muslims were in a very sad plight after the suppression of the out break of 1857. There was a general impression among the British that the Muslims were the Chief instigators and ringleaders of that great out break. The Muslims lost whatever little political influence they possessed and their future prospect was indeed very gloomy. It was at this juncture that Syed Ahmed appeared as the saviour of the Muslim community.

He exerted his utmost to wean away the Muslims from
the fruitless, vindictive and sentimental opposition to the British and gradually convinced them that their future interests from all points of view depended entirely on the favours of the government. On the other hand, he persuaded the Englishmen to believe that the Muslims were not at heart disloyal to the British Crown, and there was nothing in the religious tenets of Islam which as the Wahabis thought, render it obligatory upon the Muslims to take to 'Jehai' i.e., declare a war of independence against the British.\textsuperscript{12} The efforts of Syed Ahmed were not confined to the social and religious reforms. He gave distinctly new turn to Muslim politics which became anti-Hindu and therefore also anti-congress, for he looked upon the Indian National congress as a Hindu organisation.

It is, however, not difficult to understand Syed Ahmed's opposition to the congress. The congress fought for a representative government on British lines. This meant the rule of the majority community. As the Muslims formed only a fourth of the total population in India, they could never hope to wield any real power in a democratic form of Government. As early as 1883, he delivered a long speech deprecating the system of representative institutions even for local self bodies for fear that "the larger community would totally override the interests of the smaller community."\textsuperscript{13}

In this speech Syed Ahmed harps upon the elements of discord and disunion that divide India. He says "In one and the

\textsuperscript{12} Tara Chani, 'History of the Freedom Movement in India' Vol.III, Page-386.

\textsuperscript{13} A. Coupland 'The Constitutional Problem in India' (Part-I) Page 154-6
same district the population may consist of various creeds and
various nationalities." The whole speech is an eloquent plea against
the conception of Indian nationality and indicates the wide chasm
that divided the Hindu and Muslim leaders. As a matter of fact,
Syed Ahmed and his followers, in their speeches and writings, were
never tire of emphasizing that India was inhabited by different
nations with different social, political, religious and historical
traditions. He even broadly hinted that if the demand of the
congress for a representative system were conceded, the Muslim
minority might be forced to take up sword to prevent the tyranny of
the majority. The M.A.O. College of Aligarh became the Chief centre
of the propaganda against the congress under the direction of
Mr. Beck, who was the friend, philosopher and guide of Sir Syed Ahmed.

The object and ideal of the Aligarh Movement may be formulated in
the shape of four fundamental principles as follows –

(1) The Hindus and Muslims form two separate political
entities with separate outlook and conflicting interests.

(2) The grant of representative institutions and appointment
to high offices by open competitive examination in India
would mean subjection to the Hindus which is far worse
than the British rule.

(3) The Muslims should regard the paramountcy of the British
as the Chief safeguard of their interests.

(4) Muslims should keep themselves aloof from political
agitation against the government and avoid politics
except in so far as it is necessary to counterbalance the mischief of Hindu political agitator.

There were Muslim leaders like Bairudin Tyabji and Sayani in Bombay, Nawab Syed Mehomad Bahgjur in Madras, A:Rasul in Bengal, Maulvi Mazar-ul-Haq in Bihar and others who regarded themselves as Indian first and Muslim afterwards. But their number was few and their followers fewer still. In general, it may be said that the Muslims of Northern India were as firmly attached to the policy of Syed Ahmed as the Hindus to the Indian National Congress.

Both the Aligarh Movement and its founder have been severely criticized and condemned by a class of writers - mostly Hindu. They point out that this movement was responsible for bringing about that conflict between Hindus and Muslims which culminated in the foundations of Pakistan. But it is necessary to look at the movement, fairly and squarely, from the point of view of the Muslims for whom it was primarily intended. There can be no denial of the fact that the Aligarh Movement was to the Muslims what the Renaissance and Nationalist movement of the 19th century was to the Hindus. It raised the Muslim community from the slough of despondency in which it had sunk after the Mutiny and transformed it from the Medieval into the Modern age.

DEMAND FOR SEPARATE ELECTORATES

The most notable event in Indian nationalist history after the rising of 1857 was the birth of the Indian national congress in 1885. The growing influence of the congress was a
potent threat to the British in India. Hence the British Government lent encouragement to the Muslims who opposed the claims of the Congress. In order to promote Muslim separatism, the province of Bengal was partitioned in 1905 and East Bengal was carved out as a predominantly Muslim unit. This action of the Government was strongly resented by Congress and by nationalist opinion all over India, with the result that the Viceroy had to annul it in 1911.

When constitutional reforms were in the air, the Muslims for the first time came forward with a demand for separate electorates. M.M. the Aga Khan leading a deputation to the Viceroy, Lord Minto, on behalf of the Muslim community. The Viceroy received the deputation graciously, and in his reply expressed full accord with the views and demands of the deputationists: that the Mohammedan community should receive representation as a community. Significantly we learn from Lady Minto's diary that the Viceroy described this day as "an epoch in Indian history."

Minto then took up the matter of separate electorates with the Secretary of State for India Lord Morley, who was not in favour of the Viceroy's proposals but ultimately accepted the view of "The man on the spot," that the step was necessary to satisfy the Muslims of India and the 1909 Act accordingly made

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15 Tara Cheni "History of the Freedom Movement in India" Vol. XIII, Page-319
provision for separate electorates for Muslims. But Lord Minto was the "real father of communal electorates".

**BIRTH OF THE FATEFUL MUSLIM LEAGUE**

It was December 1906, when the fateful organization All India Muslim League came into existence. Its object was "to support whenever possible, all measures emanating from the Government and to protect the cause and advance the interests of our co-religionists throughout the country to controvert the growing influence of the so called Indian National Congress and to enable our young men of education, who for want of such an Association have joined the congress to find scope according to their fitness and ability for public life."

After 1911, the relations between the two great organizations, the congress and the League, were cordial and for a time they worked in collaboration, a major cause thereof being the attitude of the European Power towards Turkey before 1914, which was interpreted as a crusade against European Muslims. The Sultan of Turkey was regarded by Muslims everywhere as the head of Islam and the symbol of Islamic greatness. For several years the annual sessions of the two bodies—Congress and the League—were held at the same places e.g. at Lucknow where the well-known Lucknow Pact was signed in 1916.

**CONGRESS-LEAGUE PACT 1916**

This pact was in favour of freeing the provinces to the maximum extent possible from Central control. It desired an 80%
elected and a 20% nominated element in all Legislative Councils, Central or Provincial. Although to please the Muslims, a number of concessions were made, British Officials were not slow to suggest to them that they deserved more than they had been given. It is noteworthy that congress Leaders attended the League sessions in 1915, 1916 and 1917 and delivered speeches from the League platform. The President of the Calcutta Session of the League The Raja of Mahmudabad declared - "The interests of the country are paramount. We need not try to argue whether we are Muslims first or Indians we are both. The question of precedence has no meaning." Thus both the communities took part, shoulder to shoulder, in the ensuing Non-cooperation Movement.

However, the credit goes to the congress for its efforts to secure an agreement with the Muslim League in order to fight for freedom. In its anxiety, it even compromised its basic principle of secularism by conceding the League's demand for separate electorates for Muslims. During 1920 and 1930, when Mahatma Gandhi launched his historic non-violent movement for freedom from foreign rule, the incubus of communalism did not at all come in its way and the Muslim masses largely responded to the Congress call for non-cooperation against the alien rulers." The Khilafat Committee and the Jamaat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind also acquired a hold over the Muslims, so after 1920, the League receded temporarily into the background."

JINNAH TAKES THE LEAD

On the withdrawal of the Non-cooperation Movement, there was an out break of communal riots in several places. The Hindu programme of 'Shudhi' and 'Sangathan'18 annoyed the Muslims and Mr. Mohammed Ali Jinnah eagerly fanned these embers of Muslim discontent to revitalise the League. When the Simon commission was appointed, the League was divided on the question of its attitude towards the commission. One section led by Mr. Jinnah was in favour of boycotting the commission, while the other section led by Sir Mohammad Shafi was in favour of co-operating with it. This led to a break up of the League, many nationalist Muslim leaders like Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari, Dr. Seifuddin Kitchlew, Maulana Azad and Dr. Syed Mahmud, forming a separate party. Mr. Jinnah, finding himself alone, went into political retirement, and withdrew to England to practice at the British Bar.

But, fate was generous to Mr. Jinnah, in removing, one by one within a few years, almost all his political rivals from the Muslim political scene—Sir Fazl Hussain, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Sir Mohammad Shafi, Dr. Ansari and Maulana Mohammed Ali were gathered to the grave within a few years, and the field was clear for Mr. Jinnah to return from overseas and take up the leadership of the Muslim communals. The British Government in the meantime invited the League's representatives to attend the Round Table Conference in London in 1930-31 to consider reform in the constitutional set up of India.

18 The Hindu Mahasabha proposed the formation of Hindu organization (Sangathan) and started the scheme of reclaiming the Muslim converts (Shudhi) in 1923.
The Communal Award - 1932

The government rewarded the League for its intransigent attitude towards Congress by conceding to them the notorious "Communal Award" of 1932, whose provisions concerning the Muslims were later incorporated in the Government of India Act of 1935. The Communal award granted the Muslim League's demand for (1) separate electorates on a communal basis (2) provision of 'weightage' to Muslims in allotment of seats in the legislatures of provinces where Muslims were in a minority (3) reservation of posts for Muslims in the services.19

In the Government of India Act of 1935, the principle of "weightage" was applied very unfairly in Bengal and Punjab where the Hindus were in minority. In effect the Award divided the various communities and gave further encouragement to communal fanatics and to those bent upon scuttling the national Movement for freedom. The avowed policy of the Muslim League was to preach violent hatred against the Congress and against the Hindus in particular by rousing the religious ire of the Muslims. The League wanted to proclaim itself the sole representative body of the Indian Muslims as against the Congress which it branded as Hindu.

The elections to the provincial assemblies held in 1937 further intensified the antagonism. The Congress formed government in most of the provinces, but the League could not win power even in provinces like Punjab and Bengal where the Muslims were in a majority. Mr. Jinnah, suggested, therefore, the establishment of coalition Governments. But the negotiations broke down on the
question of the terms on which the Leaguers were to join the coalition. Mr. Jinnah described the terms as a "direct rebuff" and said "The Muslims can expect neither justice nor fair play under the Congress command." He denounced the Congress organization as a Fascist Hindu body all out to crush other parties, especially the League.

**Iqbal's Dream**

The concept of separatism was first advocated by the great poet-philosopher Sir Mohammadi Iqbal. On 29th December 1930 as the President of the All India Muslim League he said, "I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self Government formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India." 20

In the same address, Sir Iqbal claimed that the Indian Muslim was entitled to a full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own 'homelands' which would solve the communal problem. 21 This statement was significant for two reasons. Firstly, it spelt out a separate identity for the Muslims of North-West India only, ignoring the urge of the Millat and the need of the other Muslim majority area in the East, namely Muslim Bengal. Secondly, he placed his Muslim State

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20. D.N. Banerjee 'East Pakistan: A case study in Muslim Politics' 1942, page-312
21. Mohammadi Noman 'Muslim India' 1942, page-312
with in the Indian system as a confederation.

THE CONCEPT OF PAKISTAN

Some Muslims studying at Cambridge were attracted by the new idea and in 1933, their leader Rahmat Ali prepared a plan for the establishment of Pakistan comprising Punjab, Afghanistan (North-West Frontier), Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. The Cambridge Movement was also critical of Iqbal's provision for a possible confederation with Hindu India. Rahmat Ali had a distinct philosophy of Pakistan, and he quotes from the note of her interview with Chaukhandy Rahmat Ali which reads: "But the incontestable fact remains that in its fundamentals, the clash is neither inter-religious nor inter-communal nor even economic. It is, in fact, an international conflict of two-nations' ambitions-Muslims for survival and Hindus for supremacy." 22

He had no plan for Muslim Bengal then. It is stated that it was later in 1937 that he extended his ideas by propounding the concept of two other Muslim States namely Beng-e-Islam for Bengal and Assam and Usmanistan for Hyderabad (Deccan). This second part of his programme was enunciated in a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Pakistan National Movement held at Karachi on 8th March, 1940. 23 It is claimed that it was his Pakistan ideology which gained recognition in the Lahore Resolution of 23rd March 1940 when the All India Muslim League accepted

22. Halide Edib 'Inside India' 1937 - Page 358
23. Khan A. Ahmad 'The Founder of Pakistan through Trial to Triumph ', Page 7
Rehmat Ali's idea of Pakistan, this view was supported by Sir Alfred Watson when he referred in 1941 to the concept of Pakistan — "The idea is not of Mr. Jinnah. He has adopted it but its pioneer advocate is Chaudhury Rehmat Ali."

Addressing the Supreme Council, M. Rehmat Ali made a statement (the statement was reproduced in the Indian Press and in pamphlet form in England under the title 'the Millat of Islam and the Menace of Indianism' by C. Rehmat Ali, Founder President, Pakistan National Movement, 16, Montague Road, Cambridge) which restated the case for Pakistan thus:

1. The Muslims in so-called India are 'Muslim not Hindu, Pakistani not Hindustani, and Asian not Indian...In retrospect the India of today is the South Asia of yesterday, but in prospect the sphere of the individual solidarity of several nations of tomorrow.'

2. The choice now facing the Muslim community (Millat) is 'between reconstruction in Asia and re-destruction in India'. In the past, Indianism spiritually and morally corrupted the standards of our Islamic values and politically it deprived us of imperial supremacy, dispossessed us of national sovereignty, and reduced us to a "minority community." In the future, 'Indianism', on the premise of the territorial unity of India, proposes to create the Central government, control its civil...

24 Sir Alfred Watson 'Great Britain and the East.' Sept. 1941
administration and command its military arm. ... when sure of its power, it will in the name of democracy and with the help of British bayonets, make use of it to coerce and crush us, its prey, into complete captivity.

(3) The millat can only be saved by severing all ties with India which 'never was and never would be the Muslim motherland.'

**THE SCHISM WIDENS**

After the elections of 1937 Jinnah redoubled his efforts to make the Muslim League the sole representative organization of the Muslims so as to enable him - as the leader of the League - to bargain on a level of equality with the leaders of the Congress. A vigorous campaign was launched to organize the Muslim League at various levels all over the country the cry was raised - even before the Congress formed ministries in the six provinces where it had secured clear majorities - that Islam was in danger and that the Congress was trying to divide the Muslims in its bid to establish Hindu raj throughout the country. The formation of a Congress ministry in the predominantly Muslim North West Frontier Province later in the year was treated as an insult to the Muslims and as a warning that very soon the Congress would capture governments even in the remaining Muslim-majority provinces.

The results of the 1937 elections also underlined the fact that while the Hindus enjoyed an overwhelming numerical

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25 Ram Gopal 'Indian Muslims A Political History' (1858-1947) Page: 271
superiority in almost all the provinces in which they were in a majority, the Muslims did not enjoy the same superiority in at least two of the provinces in which they were in a majority namely Punjab and Bengal. These provinces accounted for forty million out of the eighty million Muslims in British India. Unpromising as the situation was in the provinces from the point of view of the Muslim League, it was likely to be far worse in the future federation of India.\textsuperscript{26}

The lessons of the 1937 elections were clear and unmistakable and the Muslim League did not fail to learn them. The prospect that was starkly obvious to the leaders of the League was this, either they must cease to be the leaders of the League or they must accept a position of permanent inferiority and exclusion from office in the Hindu majority provinces and the proposed All India Federation. Only in the Muslim majority provinces was there some chance for the leaders of the League, provided they could make their organisation as effective as the congress. Not unnaturally, the leaders of the League clutched at this chance—but very soon they realized that their ambition could not be fulfilled without detaching the Muslim majority provinces from the rest of India. It is in this context that the Muslim League gave up its demand for "minority" rights and began to claim a status of "parity" with the Congress based on the theme that there were two nations in India.

\textsuperscript{26} S.R. Mehrotra 'Towards India's freedom and partition' Page-185
THE DECISIVE FACTOR

Historians have traced the idea of Pakistan back to Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan in the nineteenth century, to Shah Waliullah and Shah Abid Ali in the eighteenth century and even to Mohammad Bin Qasim, the first Muslim invader of India early in the eighteenth century. They have attributed its emergence to the ancient and allegedly incurable religious and cultural schism between the Hindu and the Muslim, to the British policy of divide and rule (which later took the form of 'divide and quit'), to the working of the inescapable logic of the separate electorates conceded to the Muslims in 1909 to the theory of 'two nations', to the determination of the Muslims in India not to submit to the Hindu majority and instead secure a home land for themselves, and to the lapses on the part of the Hindu and Congress leaders.

These theories are often illuminating, but while they may explain the historical phenomenon of Muslim separatism in India, they do not really explain the emergence of Pakistan as a geographical and political phenomenon. Muslim separatism in India had a long history, but it was not the only separatism that afflicted India. Muslim separatism in itself could not have led to Pakistan, unless there were Muslim majority regions in India which could be easily separated from the rest of India. The Muslim desire for a separate homeland of their own could not even if it had arisen—have found fulfillment in the manner in which it ultimately did, unless there were clearly demarcable regions in which the Muslims were in a majority and which they could turn into their own separate homeland.
Even the existence of well defined and easily separable Muslim majority provinces and the Muslim desire to dominate them as a community would not necessarily have led to the partition of India. It was the alliance of Muslim Separatism with the Muslim will to power which proved decisive. It was the determination of the All India Muslim League, the carrier of the ideology of Muslim separation in India to dominate the Muslim majority provinces which led directly and inevitably to the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan.

As long as constitutional reforms in India were limited to the introduction of representative institutions, the Muslims as a minority community felt their position fully safeguarded by separate electorates. But no sooner did the prospect of responsible government in India appear on the horizon after the first world war than the Muslims began to fear for their own future in a State in which under any system of popular election, they would be in a position of perpetual subordination to the Hindu majority.

**RELIGIOUS - POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES OF HINDU LEADERS**

Earlier Muslim politics had been confined to the feudal and professional upper classes, but the Khalifat movement brought politics to the masses. Mr. Gandhi later justified himself by saying that the awakening of the Muslim masses was a tremendous political gain. It may have been, but it was a gain for communal and not for humanist forces and Mr. Gandhi does not seem to have realized that being Anti-British was not synonymous with being pro-Indian."27

27. M.A.A. Baig "The Muslim Dilemma in India" Page-63
After this movement Muslims were never the same again. Nor were the Hindus. The reaction to the upsurge of Muslim communalism not only strengthened Hindu Communal Organisations such as the Arya Samaj and the Hindu Mahasabha, but generated anti-Muslim prejudice among Hindus who even if pro-Hindu were not hitherto necessarily anti-Muslim. Moreover, the fact that at that period it was possible for the leaders of these two movements, such as Lajpat Rai and Madan Mohan Malviya, to be simultaneously members of the Congress Working Committee made the Congress appear a Hindu and an anti-Muslim organization in Muslim eyes.

Much controversy rages round Tilak, the undisputed Hindu leader. Tilak certainly indulged in religious revivalism, but he did so as a means and not as an end. If he played on Hindu emotions it was because even if he was tactically communal, he was strategically intensely patriotic. Tilak found the people he wished to liberate apathetic, violent and indifferent to everything except their immediate needs. Backward people find an escape in legends and mythology, and Tilak rightly judged that only through these would he touch their emotions and capture their imagination. He, therefore, resurrected the memory of the forgotten hero, Shivaji. But though his motives were political and patriotic, the fact remains that out of a plural society he crystallized a "Hindu identity."  

28 A.B. Shah 'Bal Gangadhar Tilak', Quest, July, August 1971
29 M.A.A. Baig 'The Muslim Dilemma in India' Page-59
Tilak, in due course, passed into the wings, but before Gandhi strode on the stage several other players had played their parts, lesser, perhaps but of the greatest psychological significance. Saints, not politicians, such as Vivekanand and Aurobindo, and a saintly woman, Annie Besant, equated religion with patriotism and thereby, no doubt unwittingly, provided the religious base for the religio-political ideologies of the Hindu Mahasabha, the R.S.S., and the Jana Sangh.

LAPSES ON THE PART OF CONGRESS LEADERS

It is often alleged that before the 1937 elections, Mr. Jinnah was eager for a settlement between the Congress and the Muslim League and that the election manifestos of the Congress and the League were very similar. But after its unexpectedly sweeping victory in the 1937 elections, the Congress became power mad, it refused to give even two seats in the cabinet to the League and imposed impossible conditions for a coalition with it. If only the Congress had been generous enough to take two Muslim Leagueers into the U.P. Cabinet, the Muslim League would have first disintegrated in the United provinces, which was its stronghold and later all over India, and there would have been no demand for Pakistan.30

30 Abdul Kalam Azai 'India Wins Freedom' Page-144
Only a complete ignoramus in recent Indian history would accept the statement that the League and the Congress were very close to each other in 1937. The Congress and the League represented two contradictory urges: the Congress stood for democracy, secularism and a common Indian nationality; the League existed primarily to safeguard the interests of Muslims in India as a separate political entity. They were never close to each other except for a brief period during 1915-21 under very exceptional circumstances, and it proved to be a disaster, for the Congress was persuaded, as a matter of expediency, to agree to the Lucknow Pact of 1916 which was a surrender to Muslim communalism and separatism.

Mr. Jinnah was, no doubt, eager in the 1930s for a settlement between the Congress and the Muslim League, but he wanted this on his own terms: a weak centre for minimum common purpose; complete autonomy for the provinces, with residuary powers vesting in the provinces, the share of the Muslims in the services, elected bodies and cabinets to be fixed by statute, and the congress to admit that it was and function as a Hindu body and to recognize the League as the sole spokesman for the Muslims.

THE NATION CONCEPT OF MAHASABHA

The League's invitation to the Muslims to come under its banner, excited the Hindu Mahasabha to start a counter campaign among Hindus. The Mahasabha's re-entry into aggressive politics made the League's task of rallying Muslims easy. It also affirmed
a Muslim idea, which was that the Hindus and the Muslims could never constitute a single Indian nation speaking at the annual Hindu Mahasabha session of 1937 from the presidential chair, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, the renowned revolutionary leader who had been released by the Congress Government, said; "the solid fact is that the so called communal questions are but a legacy handed down to us by centuries of cultural, religious and national antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims. When the time is ripe you can solve them, but you can not suppress them by merely refusing recognition of them. It is safer to diagnose and treat the deep-seated disease than to ignore it. Let us bravely face unpleasant facts as they are. India can not be assumed today to be a unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on the contrary there are two nations in the main, the Hindus and the Muslims."31

But Savarkar's solution was not the division of the country into a Hindu India and a Muslim India: he would have a dominant position for the Hindus who constituted the majority. He proposed to secure the Muslim rights thus: "When once the Hindu Mahasabha not only accepts but maintains the principles of "one man and one vote" and the public services to go by merit alone added to the fundamental rights and obligations to be shared by all citizens alike irrespective of any distinction of race or religion....any further mention of minority rights on

31 Ram Gopal "Indian Muslims: A Political History(1958-1947)" Page-264
the principle not only unnecessary but self-contradictory, because it again introduces a consciousness of majority and minority on communal basis."

D A Y O F D E L I V E R A N C E

The two nation theory captured the imagination of some Leaguers of Sindi, who at the annual session of the Provincial League in Oct. 1938, had a resolution passed proposing the partition of India, thus forestalling the All-India Muslim League by seventeen months. The resolution said: "this Sindi Muslim League Conference considers it absolutely essential in the interests of abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, that India may be divided into two federations viz the federation of Muslim States and the federation of non-Muslim States."

The Sindi conference was presided over by Jinnah, but he did not yet seem to have been converted to the two-nation theory. He was confining himself to attacks on the congress Governments. His statements compelled top congress leaders, like Gaihni, Nehru, Subhash Bose, Rajenira Prasad and Kripalani,
to open correspondence with him to find what truth, if any, there was in the grievances put forward from public platforms. But the correspondence produced no results except more ill will. Later, Jinnah made a demand for a Royal Commission to investigate his charges, but it was not conceded by the British Government. However, if the British authorities were to be considered impartial judges, the Congress Government in U.P. produced such an authority vindicating its claim of fair treatment of Muslims. The U.P. Governor, Sir Harry Haig, said after his retirement at the end of 1939:

"In dealing with communal issues the Ministers, in my judgement, normally acted with impartiality and a desire to do what was fair. Indeed, towards the end of their time they were being seriously criticised by the Hindu Mahasabha on the ground that they were not being fair to the Hindus."

By August 1939, the League's faith in even the British authorities was shaken, and on the 28th of that month, its Working Committee said in a resolution that the hopes once cherished by Muslims that their position would be secured by the safeguards had proved a complete illusion in face of a 'permanent hostile communal majority.' the resolution deplored the utter neglect and indifference shown by the Viceroy and the Governors in the Congress-governed provinces in exercising their special powers, to protect and secure justice to the minorities.

In September 1939, on the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, the complexion of politics in India underwent some change within a few hours of the declaration of war on Sept. 3,
the Viceroy of India, without any consultation with the provincial Ministries, proclaimed India a Belligerent. An amendment to the Government of India Act was rushed through Parliament in eleven minutes, empowering the Viceroy to override the provisions of the constitution even in respect of provincial autonomy. The same day, the Defence of India Ordinance was promulgated by the Viceroy considerably curtailiing the civil liberties of the people. The Congress Working Committee met to consider the new situation and said, "If the war is to defend the status quo, imperialist possessions, colonies, vested interests and privileges, then Indians can have nothing to do with it. If, however, the issue is democracy and a world order based on democracy then India is intensely interested in it."

The Committee invited the British Government to declare in unequivocal terms what their war aims were and how these aims were to be given effect to in India and to be given effect to in the present. The British Government did not yield to the congress demand for immediate establishment of responsible Self-governmen, and the Working Committee asked the Congress Ministries to relinquish office, which they did by December 1939. Jinnah welcomed the resignations and declared that the Congress Ministries must never come back, he fixed December 22 for celebration as a 'day of deliverance and thanksgiving'. It was celebrated by the League organizations throughout the country with more enthusiasm in the congress provinces than elsewhere, 'as a mark of relief that the congress governments have at least ceased to function.'
The Congress and the League now entered the decisive phases of their careers, the one for freedom and the other for Pakistan.

THE DEMAND FOR PARTITION

The separate electorates, which they had so far regarded as their Magna Carta, precluded them from influencing the results of the elections in the non-Muslim constituencies while the Congress could, if it tried, and as the 1937 elections proved influence the results of the elections in the Muslim constituencies. The writing on the wall was clear. And it read: Muslims as a community could not be sure of dominating even the Muslim majority provinces in India. 'The creation of a Muslim India (with) in India was impossible.

Soon after the elections - on 28th May 1937, Iqbal was writing to Jinnah...the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim State or States...it is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim States with absolute majorities. Don't you think that the time for such a demand has already arrived.'33 But Jinnah was no visionary like Iqbal and apparently decided to wait until the Muslims were 'sufficiently organised and disciplined'. As a practical politician he knew that before demanding the creation of a 'Separate federation of Muslim (majority) provinces' he should have a strong and united Muslim party and some definite prospect of British withdrawal from India.

33 Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah (Lahore 1956) Page-17-19
The League dominated by princes, landlords, industrialists and stooges of the British was a highly reactionary body with no constructive programme and followed the old legal maxim "no case, abuse the other party's advocate." The League skillfully exploited every act of omission or commission by Congress governments to build up the image of the Congress in the eyes of the Muslims as that of a party of the tyrannical Hindu majority bent upon oppressing the Muslims, denying them their due rights and privileges and destroying their religion and culture. Reviewing the Lucknow session of the League (Oct. 1937), a competent Muslim observer — Dr. Mahmudulla Jung wrote:

"The Muslims were told that they were disunited and were about to be crucified by the Hindus. Religious fervour was raised to a degree where it exhibited itself in blind fanaticism. In the name of Muslim solidarity Mr. Jinnah wants to divide India into Muslim India and Hindu India."  

Mr. Jinnah steadily succeeded in achieving his objective of making the League, the most powerful organization of the Muslims, but in the very process of doing so he ruined all the chances of reaching an amicable settlement with the congress. The more he tried to rally the Muslims under the banner of the League by appealing to their communal hopes and fears, the more he had to succumb to and identify himself with those communal hopes and fears.

34 H.H. Doldwell "The Cambridge History of India" Vol. VI Page 620
35 Pioneer, 7th Nov. 1937
A clearer picture of the aims and intentions of the Muslim League emerged at the Sindh Provincial Muslim League conference held in Karachi in the second week of October 1938. The conference was presided over by Jinnah and attended by many prominent Muslim leaders from all over India.

Mr. Jinnah accused the Congress of trying 'to destroy the Muslim League, divide the Muslims and dominate them,' and he added in warning: 'this will result in India being divided.'

The Chairman of the reception committee of the conference, Sir Abdullah Haroon, hinted at the possibility of an independent federation of Muslim States. Fazlul Haq, the premier of Bengal, was greeted with 'a wild burst of cheering' by the audience when he remarked:

"If Muhammad bin Qasim, an eight year old lad, with 18 soldiers could conquer Sindh then surely nine crores of Muslims can conquer the whole of India." 37 Sheikh Abdullah threatened "that if the congress did not concede Muslim rights, Muslims would have no alternative but to fall back upon the Pakistan Scheme' and that 'nothing would prevent Muslims, from Karachi to Calcutta, to march to their own self-determination.'

As long as congress ministries remained in office, the League derived and extended its power by resistance to and negation of congress rule, but when congress ministries resigned,

36 Leader, October 11, 1938
37 Times of India, Oct. 11, 1938
39 Statesman, October 12, 1938.
in Oct. 1939 over the war issue, negation alone left the League static. The circumstances were quite favourable: The congress was out of office, the British Government was engaged in war and was in search of friends, the federation was shelved, and there was a clear prospect of the transfer of power at the end of the war. In March 1940, at its Lahore session, the All India Muslim League formally demanded the partition of India and the creation of a separate independent Muslim State. The Muslim League resolved:

"It is the considered view of this session of the All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Mussalmans unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north western and eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute "independent states" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."39

The resolution later came to be known as the Pakistan Resolution.

THE LEAGUE'S DEMAND AND THE CONGRESS

The Muslim League's demand for Pakistan was open and in fact subjected to many obvious criticisms. It was a great blow to the ideal of an united India which generations of Indians had cherished and laboured for. It was considered to be retrograde, impracticable and dangerous. "If religion were to be acknowledged as the criterion of nationality and each nationality allowed to

39 Sisir Gupta "Kashmir-A Study in India-Pakistan Relations"
have a separate homeland for itself, it would mean the Balkanization of India. If the non-muslims were to continue staying, as most league leaders assured, they would, in the areas claimed for Pakistan, how would these areas be different in political composition and power from what they were at present and in what sense would they become Islamic? If Hindus and Muslims were two separate and antagonistic nations in India, how would they become one peaceful nation in Pakistan? Similarly, if democracy was not suited to India, how would it become suited to Pakistan? The division of India would not improve the position of the minorities; it would, in fact, worsen their position by converting them into hostages. Smaller minorities would be subjected to the domination of bigger majorities. Instead of solving, the creation of Pakistan, would perpetuate and even aggravate communal differences. It would not bring peace but the sword. The Muslims in India would raise the cry of oppression at the hands of Hindus and the Hindus in Pakistan would raise a similar cry, and there would be retaliatory wars. The creation of Pakistan would be detrimental even to the best interests of the Muslims for it would permanently divide and weaken them, these and similar other weighty objections were raised against the Muslim League demand for Pakistan.

The nationalist leaders of India reacted sharply to the suggestion and the Congress leaders expressed total opposition to the idea of dividing what they considered a single

40 S.R. Mahrotra 'Towards India's freedom and partition' Page 206
nation and a single country. Gandhi declared that India's partition could occur only over his dead body. In the same week of March 1940 in which Jinnah put forward the demand for Pakistan on the basis of the two nation theory, another Muslim leader Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, reiterated the creed of Indian nationalism at the Rangarh session of the congress.

"It was India's historic destiny that many human races and cultures and religions should flow to her, finding a home in her hospitable soil, and many a caravan should find rest here. One of the last of these caravans followed the footsteps of its predecessors, was that of the followers of Islam. This came here and settled here for good. This led to a meeting of the culture currents of two different races. Like the Ganga and Jamma, they flowed for a while through separate courses, but nature's immutable law brought them together and joined them in a Sengam. This fusion was a notable event in history.

"Eleven hundred years of common history have enriched India with our common achievements. Our languages, our poetry, our literature, our culture, our art, our dress, our manners and customs, the innumerable happenings of our daily life, every thing bears the stamp of our joint endeavour. This joint wealth is the heritage of our common nationality and we do not want to leave it and go back to the time when this joint life had not begun...whether we like it or not, we have now become an Indian nation, united and indivisible. No fancy or artificial scheming to separate and divide can break this unity." 41

41 Leafer, 21st March 1940.
Gandhi called the two nation theory 'an untruth' and wrote -

"As a man of non-violence I can not forcibly resist the proposed partition if the Muslims of India really insist upon it. But I never can be a willing party to the vivisection. For it means the undoing of centuries of work done by innumerable Hindus and Muslims to live together as one nation. Partition means a patent untruth. My whole soul rebels against the idea that Hinduism and Islam represent two antagonistic cultures and doctrines...But that is my belief. I can not thrust it down the throats of the Muslims who think that they are a different nation. I refuse, however, to believe that the eight crores of Muslims will say that they have nothing in common with their Hindu and other brethren. Their mind can only be known by a referendum made to them duly on that clear issue."

The congress did not formally express its attitude to the demand for Pakistan until April, 1942, and then, too, indirectly, but there is reason to believe that Gandhi's views, quoted above, were shared by a great majority in the congress. As a nationalist organization, which had unfortunately failed to secure the confidence of the Muslim community, wedded to democracy and non-violence, the congress could not afford to resist the demand for Pakistan by force, especially while it was still engaged in fighting the British for the political freedom of India. The congress, however, could not accept the two nation theory. It could not be a willing party to the division of India.

42 D.G. Tendulkar, Mahatma (Bombay 1952) Vol. V, Page-336
Mr. Nehru was reported to have remarked that "if people wanted such things as suggested by the Muslim League at Lahore, then one thing was clear, they and people like him could not live together in India. He would be prepared to face all consequences of it but he would not be prepared to live with such people."^43

There were some in the congress, however, who thought that it was essential for them to agree with the Muslim League regarding the future constitutional pattern of India in order to successfully negotiate with the British for a peaceful transfer of power. The veteran congress leader from the South C. Rajagopalachari adopted this attitude and tried to persuade the congress to consider seriously the Muslim League's proposals by evolving a formula for compromise. Nevertheless, the congress Working Committee in April 1942, rejected the proposals of the Cripps Mission and adopted a resolution which stated:

"The congress has been welded to Indian freedom and unity and any break in that unity, especially in the modern world when people's minds inevitably think in terms of larger federation, would be injurious to all concerned and exceedingly painful to contemplate. Nevertheless they can not think in terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain

^43 Leader, April 15, 1940
in the Indian union against their declared and established will.44

The reaction of congress leaders to Jinnah's demand for Pakistan must have convinced him that though congress leaders might not willingly concede it, at least not on principle, they would not forcibly resist it, and that all that he really needed to do in order to achieve his objective was to produce evidence of overwhelming support for the demand among the Muslims and to persuade the British government to agree to it. This he could easily do. The cry of Pakistan swept the Muslims off their feet.

In fact, the idea of Pakistan proved to be a catch all. It made tremendous appeal to the hopes and fears of the Muslims. The desire to have undisputed place and power, the attraction of a separate 'home land' and an Islamic State, probably forming part of a future pan-Islamic federation, fear of Hindu competition and domination, anxiety about the preservation of their communal way of life and annoyance with the congress made a steadily growing number of thinking Muslims favour the idea of the separation of Muslim India from Hindu India. While most of them took up the idea enthusiastically, at least a few accepted it rather regretfully as offering an easy and perhaps the only practicable solution to the chronic and extremely intractable Hindu-Muslim problem. It was, however, not until elections of 1945-46 that Jinnah could effectively

establish his claim that the vast majority of the Muslims supported the demand for Pakistan.

**BRITISH ATTITUDE TO THE DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN**

Though few Britons never believed that India could be governed as 'one and indivisible' by their brown successors, the prospect of the partition of India could not be pleasing to those who took pride in the creation of the administrative and political unity of the subcontinent as being one of the greatest of British imperial achievements. On the other hand, as the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, publicly affirmed on 8th Aug. 1940, 'the British government' could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life.'

It had not been British policy in the past "to expedite in India constitutional changes for their own sake, or gratuitously to hurry the handing over of controls to Indian hands" and the British government saw no reason to alter that policy at a moment when it was 'engaged in a battle for existence.' Faced with conflicting claims and lacking a plan of its own, the British government adopted the not uncomely attitude of giving its ear to all and its mind to none. To many Britons in India, who found the congress

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either incomprehensible or irritating, the demand for Pakistan appeared to be a condign punishment to the congress for its impudence in asking the British to quit India. They regarded the partition of India as inevitable and not entirely unwelcome, commenting upon the Lahore resolution of the Muslim League, The Statesman of Calcutta wrote:

"Partition, we have to recognize, is becoming a live issue. If India receives Dominion Status, partition seems the inevitable result in view of the attitude which the Muslim community appears disposed to adopt. If that really represents their position, neither the congress nor the Hindu Mahasabha would be able to hold them. There would probably be fighting, but in any case there would be partition." 46

The failure of the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps to negotiate a basis for the settlement of the Indian problems in 1942 led to the congress decision to launch an all out struggle against the British Government based on the slogan "Quit India". Before the struggle could be organized, the nationalist leaders were imprisoned and it was only when the defeat of the Axis powers became a certainty that they were released. The Muslim League regarded the congress movement as "directed not only to coerce the British Government into handing over power to a Hindu oligarchy but also to force the Mussalmans to submit and surrender to the congress terms and dictation," thus keeping itself aloof from the "Quit India" movement.

The Muslim League and its leaders applied themselves

46 The Statesman, 26th March 1940
to the task of creating a rift between Hindus and Muslims in
order to lend a semblance of validity to the theory that the
Muslims were and always had been a "nation" and that the
Hindus and others had no place in it. The incarceration of
Mahatma Gandhi and other congress leaders in 1942 for nearly
three years gave the League a providential chance to fill the
political vacuum. By the time the congress leaders were released
from gaol in 1945, the League had strengthened itself.
"undoubtedly with the support of the ruling power" 47 to such
an extent that it could obstruct any direct negotiations
between the congress leaders and the alien rulers for the
attainment of the country's freedom.

THE DIRECT ACTION

In a bid to improve further its bargaining power, the
League took up a posture of near belligerence and threatened
violent communal strife. A pledge to be read by all Muslim
members was drawn up at the convention of the Muslim League
Legislators, held in New Delhi in early April 1946 which said,
"I pledge myself to undergo any danger, trial or sacrifice
which may be demanded of me." 48 In July 1946, the League
resolved at Bombay: "Now the time has come for the Muslim
nation to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan." On 16th
August, a public holiday was declared, and an unprecedented
holocaust started in the city of Calcutta. More than 5,000 lives

(Proceedings of the Muslim League Legislators' Convention)
were lost and over 15,000 persons were injured besides 100,000 being rendered homeless. While communal riots were not new to Calcutta, the scale on which this one took place and the planned nature in which "action" started in the city indicated that it was not just one more of those accidental outbursts. In fact, 16th August 1946 marked the end of any hope of communal unity over large parts of India, fear of the other community now began to transcend all other political urges in the minds of the millions who were directly affected by the events which followed from that day onwards.

Scenes of devastation were enacted on 10th Oct. 1946 in the countryside of Noakhali and Tipperah, two districts of East Bengal. On 24th October, the province of Bihar reacted brutally to the tales of suffering of the Hindus in Bengal by organised violence on a vast scale. In November 1946, disturbances broke out in U.P. and from there violence spread to Punjab, the hotbed of Indian politics. Northern India was aflame. In the meantime, the British Government was duly impressed, whatever meagre chances there were of maintaining the unity of India were drowned in the communal blood bath of the Hindus and the Muslims. On 20th February 1947, the British

49 Governor Twynham of C.P. who happened to be in Calcutta during those days put the figure between 4,000 and 10,000 dead and four times that number for the wounded - Indian Annual Register Calcutta, 1946 Vol. II, Page-77
Prime Minister, in his statement in the House of Commons, declared the firm intention of His Majesty's Government to transfer power to responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948 and if necessary power would be transferred to Indian provinces — in case no agreement should be reached.

**PARTITION OF INDIA**

The Communal killings, the unhappy experiences in the Interim Government, the complete collapse of mutual confidence between the two sets of Indian political leaders, and the British statement threatening to hand over power to the provinces were factors in the light of which the Mountbatten plan was evolved. The plan conceded a separate sovereign Pakistan but also wanted Bengal and the Punjab to be divided. From the Congress point of view the Mountbatten plan was somewhat similar to the Rajagopalachari formula of 1946; from the Muslim League's point of view it would create Pakistan however "moth-eaten."

The partition of India was agreed upon by the parties involved in the Indian constitutional tussle primarily because it appeared to be the only way to solve the problems created by the collapse of disciplined politics in the country. Once mass killings had started, the political processes collapsed completely and the issue was literally taken to the streets for decision. Therefore, it should be remembered that the political decisions in 1946-47 were taken by the leaders of the subcontinent under highly unnatural circumstances.
With the consent of both parties, His Majesty's Government announced on 3rd June 1947, a scheme by which the country would be divided into two parts, India and Pakistan, on the basis of contiguous Muslim majority areas constituting parts of Pakistan. On that basis, power was transferred to Indian hands on 15th August 1947 in terms of the Indian Independence Act 1947.\textsuperscript{50}

But the partition of the subcontinent solved few problems. For India, it left behind the problem of cultivating the secular way of life. For Pakistan, it created a fundamental problem of identity. Did it or did it not represent all the Indian Muslims? Partition had ended the unity of the Indian Muslims and it was not easy to define who a Pakistani was. The problem of identity in Pakistan was more complicated by the fact that fifty five percent of the state's population lived in a territory 1,000 miles away, separated by the entire breadth of India. (It is no wonder, that the former East Pakistan is now a separate sovereign State of Bangladesh). Above all, the partition left behind for the two new states the prickly problem of their relations with each other.

In the first place, inter communal antagonism of the pre-partition years tended to become an international dispute after the creation of Pakistan. The bitterness, the jealousy, the rivalry and the sense of animosity which marked the relationship between the Muslim League and the Congress began to be...
be the predominant features in Indo-Pakistan relationship.
The intense status conflict between the two parties was transformed into a status conflict between India and Pakistan.

Secondly, it has not been easy for the present generation of Indians and Pakistanis to forget the past and to evolve a normal attitude towards the neighbour. It is against this background that India and Pakistan began to function as sovereign states and found themselves engaged in conflicts over many issues of which the minority problem, the evacuee property, canal water dispute, trade problem and Kashmir were the main.

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