CHAPTER-9

INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN - RETROSPECT & PROSPECT
INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH
PAKISTAN-RETROSPECT
AND PROSPECT

On August 15, 1947, when the two new states of India and Pakistan joined the family of nations, there were many who looked forward to a bright future for them. These, unfortunately, were not the best informed. There were others who noted the dangers and assessed the difficulties. Particularly when they thought of the possible relations between the twins in the years to come, caution deepened almost into gloom. There were very good reasons for this, we are concerned with them because they provide the background against which the story of Indo-Pakistan relations unfolded itself.

In the 1941 census, the last that was taken in undivided India, the Hindus numbered 270,197,283, the Muslims 94,446,544 and the Sikhs 5,691,447 only. The other religious communities are not enumerated since their part in the political division of India was not important. The opposition to India remaining undivided, came from a large section of the Muslim community and it was on their insistence that the country was ultimately divided.

Over a period of one thousand years, Islam has been one of the main ingredients of the culture and

1. Kingsley Davis 'The Population of India and Pakistan'
   Princeton, 1951, page-179
civilization of India. This integral culture found its finest exponents in monarchs like Akbar, saints like Kabir, and savants like Amir Khusro. The spirit of being one undivided people and 'esprit de corps' was a stark reality among the Hindus and Muslims till almost the 19th century.

The memory of India's first struggle for liberation from the British yoke of thraldom in the historic revolt of 1857 was then still fresh in the minds of the people. The heroes of this uprising were Hindus and Muslims alike - Nana Sahib, Tantia Tope, Maulvi Ahmadullah, Rani Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi, Begum Hazrat Mahal and others and, strangely enough, all of them fought under the banner of Bahadur Shah 'Zafar.' Though the British succeeded in quelling this popular revolt, they realized that the unity among Muslims and Hindus was a threat to their rule in India. Therefore the policy of 'divide and rule' was applied which resulted in the partition of the country in 1947.

PRE-PARTITION REVIEW

In Indian nationalist history after the rising of 1857, the birth of the Indian National Congress in 1885 was the most significant event. Among its founders and leading lights were eminent public men from all parts of India and of all religions - Hindu, Muslim, Christian,

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Sikh, Jain, Parsee. Of the 702 delegates who attended the annual session of the congress in 1890, there were 156 Muslims. The growing influence of the congress was a potent threat to the British in India. Hence the British Government lent encouragement to the organization that opposed the claims of the Indian National Congress and the Government found in Muslims an easy tool to be used against the Congress movement.

In order to promote Muslim Separatism the province of Bengal was partitioned in 1903 and East Bengal was carved out as a predominantly Muslim unit. Lord Curzon himself admitted that one of his objects in partitioning Bengal was to "create a Muslim Province in which they would have a preponderating voice." This action was strongly resented by Congress and by nationalist opinion all over India, with the result that the Viceroy had to annul it in 1911.

It was against this backdrop that the Muslim League came into existence in 1906. It began as a forum for promoting the material well-being of Muslims, but soon it became the rallying point of reactionary and communalist forces among the Indian Muslims. These forces were further strengthened when the Government conceded their demand for separate electorate and lent

4. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, 'India Divided' Bombay 1947, p-110
weightage to Muslims under the Morley-Minto Reforms in 1909. This heralded the birth of the communal politics which culminated in the partition of India and the carnage that followed in its wake. The policy of division was carried further in 1921 when the Rulers of the Indian States were also politically organized by a Royal Proclamation in order to provide still another counterpoise to Congress.

However, it goes to the credit of Congress that during 1920 and 1930 when Mahatma Gandhi launched his historic non-violent movement for freedom from foreign rule, the incubus of communalism did not at all come in its way and the Muslim masses largely responded to the Congress' call for non-co-operation against the alien rulers. The Muslim League for sometime suffered eclipse, Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, then, came to the rescue of the League.

The avowed policy of the Muslim League was to preach violent hatred against the congress and against the Hindus in particular by rousing the religious ire of the Muslims. The League wanted to proclaim itself the sole representative body of the Indian Muslims as against the Congress which it branded as Hindu. It was, thus, in 1942, that the Congress' call to fight found no significant

response from the masses of the Muslims. By that time Muslim communalism had been transformed into Muslim Nationalism and the fight was carried on by the Muslim leaders in terms which the masses could understand—Pakistan. 7

Muslim India had now an ideology, a homeland and a faith for which to fight and die, like wild fire the idea of 'Pakistan' spread. The basis of the demand was a new found 'two-nation' theory which tried to prove that the Hindus and the Muslims are two different nations inhabiting the British Indian Empire and that the country should be divided between Hindustan and Pakistan to allow the two different civilizations to find their own salvation. Was Pakistan a feasible proposition? The question was debated furiously at that time. The 94 million Muslims of India were scattered all over the country, but out of 435 districts of India, 76 contained a majority of Muslims and accounted for 60 percent of the entire Muslim population. By an accident of geography and history, all the 76 Muslim majority districts were grouped together in two clusters. 8 One was in North-West India and the other in North-East India. Consequently, the two clusters, embracing some 56 million Muslims, provided Pakistan with her geographic and demographic base. It is understandable

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8. Kingsley Davis, op.cit., page-196
that a division, attended as it was by a considerable blood bath, would generate feelings of hostility of one towards the other and unfortunately this psychological limitation, apart from specific historical disputes, has hindered cooperation between the two nations.

PAKISTAN AND AFTER

India and Pakistan began their separate existence on 15th August, 1947. On this occasion Sri Jawahar lal Nehru in a broadcast to nation observed:

"All of us, to whatever religion we may belong, are equally the children of India. We can not encourage communalism or narrow-mindedness, for no nation can be great whose people are narrow in thought or action."

With the vivisection of the country, Indian leaders hoped that inter-communal peace and unity would be restored and the work of drafting the new constitution on the basis of secularism, democracy and equal opportunity was soon taken up by the Constituent Assembly of India.

Pakistan, however, continued to display the Muslim League's characteristic, if somewhat, pathological animosity towards the Congress which was now in power in free India. The strong conviction that Pakistan, as a political entity, owes its birth to the unbenfing determination of the Muslim masses and that it had to be wrested

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9. quoted by K.C. Saxena, op.cit., page-7
from the unwilling hands of the 'Hindus', made a deep psychological impression on the Pakistanis. The agreement of Indian leaders to divide the country was therefore interpreted in Pakistan as an outgrowth of the Indian belief that Pakistan would ultimately collapse. The extent of India's influence in the comity of nations is presented as India's obvious ambitions in terms of influence, if not of territory. The Afghan support for the Pakhtoonistan movement is looked upon as Indian sponsored, even Indian neutrality in the cold war becomes 'fencemanship'.

Sri P. V. Narasimha Rao, Minister of External Affairs India addressing the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi on June 11, 1981, clarified the same point:

"May I, therefore, submit very sincerely that those who are still trying to see, or make others see,

11. 'The fundamentals of Pakistan's Foreign Policy', A Group study, Pakistan Horizon, March 1956, Page=40.
13. Mr. Hamidul Huq Chowdhury, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan in the National Assembly of Pakistan on March 25, 1956.
sinister designs in our two countries, aimed at each other’s existence are, to say the least, wasting their time. India should at least be credited with the perspicacity to know that there is not a single problem which will come anywhere near solution by the undoing of Pakistan. And as for the fantastic fear that India wants to gobble up Pakistan, I can only say that those who are plugging this line are doing injustice to Pakistan and India both. 14

SEARCH FOR ALLIES

As the aims and objectives of the two countries clashed, it is natural that this clash should be reflected in their foreign policies, and it is also natural that both should compete to win adherents. India’s activities lay in the direction of fostering Asian solidarity-Pakistan’s in Pan Islam. The battle of winning the heart of Asia, however began even before independence. When the First Asian Relations Conference opened in New Delhi in March 1947 with 28 Asian countries participating in it, the Muslim League of India refused to participate on the ground that it was a thinly disguised attempt on the part of the Hindu Congress to boost itself politically as the prospective leader of Asiatic peoples. 15

After the partition, India's Prime Minister was gradually emerging as a leading world figure and Pakistan needed allies for the diplomatic battle of Kashmir. She wanted to exploit to the full, her ideological weapon in order to wean West Asia away from the Indian orbit of influence. Mr. Jinnah in numerous speeches, had emphasized Muslim solidarity all over the world. Mr. Liaquat Ali followed them up by suggesting that 'the underlying idea behind the creation of Pakistan was the realization of the goal of Pan Islam.' If the Western democracies can enter into pacts to protect their way of life, if the Communist countries can form a bloc on the basis that they have an ideology, why can not the Muslim peoples get together and show to the world that they have an ideology and a way of life which ensures peace and harmony of the world?17

But the Muslim powers of West Asia seemed disinclined to throw their lot in with Pakistan. When the Pakistan Government invited Prime Ministers of Twelve Muslim countries to attend a 'Conference', they were unwilling to make a choice between India and Pakistan, if anything, they would prefer Indian support to that of

Pakistan.\textsuperscript{18} Pan Islam failed to provide Pakistan with the much needed forum for gaining political allies in her disputes with India.

Pakistan then turned to the Western bloc and succeeded in attracting the attention of the United States. A very successful tour of the U.S.A. by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan followed. 'The gambit was a rather crude one, but it worked.'\textsuperscript{19} On February 25, 1954, President Eisenhower announced that the U.S.A. had decided to give military aid to Pakistan. On April 2, 1954, the Pakistan Turkish Agreement was signed. On May 19, the Pakistan United States Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was concluded. On September 8, 1954, the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, of which Pakistan became a member, was signed in Manila, and on September 23, 1955, Pakistan formally acceded to the Turco Iraqi Pact of Mutual Co-operation which came into existence on February 24, 1955.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} The Secretary of the Arab League while commenting on the proposed Conference opined that the Karachi Conference might deprive the Arab World of the valuable support of countries like India and Philippines. (Tabor Mendes, 'South East Asia between two worlds,' London, 1955, page 221)

\textsuperscript{19} F.M. Innes, 'The Political Outlook in Pakistan,' Pacific Affairs, 1953, page 311.

By these agreements and pacts Pakistan succeeded in forging strong links with the Western powers and also a few West Asian powers. But in the process, she antagonised India considerably because India was forced to counter Pakistan's additional military strength by augmenting her own defence arrangements concurrently with her heavy financial commitments in nation-building projects.

**PAKISTAN'S DREAM OF SHARING**

**KASHMIR BY FORCE SHATTERED**

With the transfer of power on 15th August 1947, paramountcy also lapsed and the princes were given freedom to arrive at such arrangements as they liked best with India and Pakistan. The Kashmir ruler asked for a standstill Agreement both with India and Pakistan pending the final decision of accession.

Pakistan concluded the agreement but immediately there came the invasion of Kashmir by tribesmen, aided and abetted by Pakistan's regular army. The State of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India on 26th October, 1947, and its defence became her responsibility. Regular units of Pakistan army later, openly entered the fighting thus making the invasion of Kashmir an act of direct aggression by Pakistan against India, only two months after the partition.
The U.N. Commission proposed a cease-fire and truce on August 13, 1948 when the invaders were on the run and the state was about to be cleared of them. The Cease-fire agreement proved a blessing in disguise to Pakistan and she never did withdraw its troops from nearly half of Jammu and Kashmir which it had illegally occupied. Kashmir's accession to India was legal and final, but Pakistan started demanding a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir to determine the people's wishes with regard to accession.

Here one should not fail to note the fact that "when India challenged Junagadh's right to accede to Pakistan, Pakistan retorted back by emphasizing the Ruler's exclusive right to decide about accession, but when the question was revived in the case of Kashmir, Pakistan promptly challenged the Ruler's right to accede to India." 21 According to Chacko, the legal character of the accession is beyond doubt: "in case of the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir the lease of British paramountcy served as an unavoidable and immediate reversion to his full sovereignty in international law "devoid of all legal and political trammels"... 22 and he concludes that "If this act of accession is questioned on the ground of its

possible illegality, then all accessions whether to India or Pakistan would be open to similar objections.\textsuperscript{23}

The largest political party of the State led by Sheikh Abulillah approved the accession and the Kashmir Constituent Assembly which by and large represented the people of Kashmir, reaffirmed the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. Nor was Kashmir ever completely cleared of the invader. Therefore the question of plebiscite does not arise because the first condition of complete evacuation of the aggressor from the Kashmir territory could not be fulfilled. Secondly, it was a pledge to the people of Kashmir and India by holding 7 general elections in the State has kept the pledge. Today, Kashmir is enjoying full autonomy with in the Indian Union and a democratic set up as well. On the contrary, Pakistan attempted thrice to 'liberate' the people and in her attempt liberated the people from life. Kashmir was invaded by Pakistan in 1947, 1965, and again in 1971 but every time the master plan to annex Kashmir by force failed miserably. At present, Kashmir is the main, or perhaps the only problem, causing tension and conflict between the two countries.\textsuperscript{24} However, 'India is in a happy position that her claims have the

\textsuperscript{23} Cheeko, Op. cit., page-211.

\textsuperscript{24} Nikhil Chakravartty, 'Indo-Pak accord-miles to go'- 'The Illustrated Weekly of India' March 14-20, 1962, Page-8.
backing of initial formal authority, on the other hand, the Pakistani title to "Azad Kashmir" acquired through use of force continues to remain disputable."

**ATTACK IN KUTCH**

On February 13, 1965, Pakistani forces equipped with light machine-guns, sten-guns and rifles occupied the Indian territory of Kanjarok in platoon strength. In the early hours of the morning of April 9, the Indian border post of Sardar in Kutch (Gujarat) was attacked with heavy mortar and medium machine-gun fire. Thereupon India took defensive action and Indian army units reoccupied the Sardar post on April 10, after throwing back the Pakistan army battalions. Pakistan continued these attacks for a number of days.

'To make the armed aggression conform to territorial claims, Pakistan invented a brand-new international boundary with India's Kutch district. This she described facetiously as running "along the 24th parallel" and she sought to enforce it by the use of arms." A fortnight after the commencement of the conflict, some countries, the principal being Britain, had offered their good offices to bring about an end of the hostilities.

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25. Surya P. Sharma, 'India's Boundary and Territorial Disputes' 1971, page-162.

26.Ram Gopal, 'Indo-Pakistan War and Peace 1965' P-2
In the meantime, Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan met informally in London on the occasion of the Common Wealth Prime Ministers' Conference on June 17, 1965. In London, prolonged negotiations resulted in a tentative accord on the broad principles of an immediate cease-fire and of the Kutch border demarcation by peaceful negotiations. Finally an agreement was signed between the two governments on June 30, for an immediate cease-fire and restoration of status quo ante in the area of the Gujarat-West Pakistan border. Within two months of the Cease-fire, the whole question was to be studied at a joint meeting of the two governments on ministerial level. 27

THE WAR AND PEACE
(1965)

A few months earlier, Pakistan Foreign Minister Mr. Bhutto, had said that Pakistan had a "Master Plan" for Kashmir and that they proposed to follow this plan step by step. 28 It now appears that the aggression in Kutch was one of the 'first steps', a smoke screen for her pre-planned invasion of India in Kashmir.

It is obvious that the method and technique of the new aggression as well as Pakistan public postures were the same as in 1947. In 1947, Pakistan violated the

28, P.M.K, Benzei, op. cit., page 265.
standstill agreement with the government of Jammu and Kashmir; in 1965, it violated the cease-fire agreement. Until Ist September the waves of invaders were in full flow as they were in the early phases of the invasion in October 1947; on September 1, all pretense of non-involvement was given up and the Pakistan army, with its armour and air power moved into the Chamb Jaurian sector of the state, both across the cease-fire line and the international border. Denials were followed by admissions. The same stories were related for world consumption— an internal revolt by desperate people, India's military threat to Pakistan, Islam in danger etc. On 10th August, Bhutto said, "The responsibility for whatever is happening in Kashmir could not by any stretch of imagination be attributed to Pakistan." 29 But independent observers rejected this profession of innocence. "There is no indication of any armed revolt by the people from the Indian side as announced by the Pakistan Radio", said the London Times Correspondent. 30 The New York Times correspondent in Srinagar said: "Reports from Pakistan that the trouble in India held Jammu and Kashmir is a popular revolt against Indian rule appear to be without foundation."31

On the night of August 13, the so-called 'freedom fighters' started a fire in Batmalu, a suburb of Srinagar, resulting in the destruction of 300 houses. A Pakistan Radio broadcast admitted that the outrage was committed by Pakistan infiltrators, and a leading Pakistan newspaper featured this report on its front page. According to the Washington Post (14th August) at least 1,500 Pakistan officer commandos had crossed the cease-fire line since August 5.

Strangely, while all this was going on and being widely reported in the World Press, the Security Council was stricken with paralysis. As the tempo of fighting rose, there appeared a flutter at Lake Success. On September 4, the Security Council called upon the two countries to cease-fire which could come into effect from 3.30 A.M. on September 23, 1965.

THE TASHKENT AGREEMENT AND ITS VIOLATION

Soviet Prime Minister Mr. Kosygin invited Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan to take part in a Conference at Tashkent to find out a road to peace. After six days of mutual discussions and consultations with Mr. Kosygin, the Tashkent Agreement was signed on 10th Jan. 1966 (Details in the 8th Chapter).

The reactions in America and Britain on the Tashkent Conference were dubious. It must have been painful to them to see that India and Pakistan, who had fought largely with their arms, chose to prefer Soviet mediation in the conflict. It was, therefore, with the purpose of slow-poisoning the Tashkent spirit that U.S. Vice President Humphry visited Pakistan. Generally, the signing of the Tashkent Agreement and Soviet Premier's role behind it evoked extremely positive response from the World Press. 'A positive episode,' a good and persistent mediation,' a significant achievement of Soviet diplomacy' such for instance, were comments.

Here arises a natural question as to why the Tashkent Declaration, after earning so many epithets and so much renown, ultimately failed to deliver lasting results? A survey of the Indian and Pakistani press reports regarding the official response to the Tashkent Declaration in both countries shows that from the very beginning, it got overwhelming support from the Indian government where as

from the Pakistani Government it did not. There were reasons for it.

First, the Pakistani leaders failed to bring home the significance of the Tashkent Agreement because of their long association with the 'Hate India Campaign.' Secondly, they gave various misinterpretations of the Tashkent Agreement which created more problems than they solved. On January 14, Ayub declared that the Tashkent Declaration did not harm Pakistan's stand on Kashmir, because "he has not signed a non-war pact with India." On March 4, Information Secretary of Pakistan said that cease fire line was just a 'temporary arrangement and the freedom fighters had right to be where they were.'

Thirdly, the Chinese leader Liu Shao-chi who visited Pakistan in the end of March 1966, encouraged Ayub's detractors and his pro-Peking colleagues by re-asserting China's unswerving stand on Pakistan's side and committing China's resolute support and assistance in her 'just' struggle. Supply of Chinese arms to Pakistan was accelerated after this.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto picked up the Chinese threat and galvanised the anti-Tashkent forces against Ayub. The first shot he fired at his political mentor was his charge against the President that by

signing the Agreement, Ayub "betrayed the nation and capitulated at the dictates of Great Powers." This, in short, is how the end of the Tashkent spirit began.

Despite the aforesaid violent reactions in Pakistan, India sincerely took the Tashkent Declaration as a bright beginning, a great act of her beloved Premier whose last message was: "We fought in this (India-Pakistan) war with all our strength. Now we have to fight for peace with all our strength." In a speech on 12th January the late President Dr. Rajendra Prasad said: "Either to perish or to change, that was the advice which Tashkent document gave." 41

In truth, the Tashkent Agreement was meant for a change, change of hearts, a call for conversion, conversion to peace. It was meant for a capitulation, capitulation to the dictates of cooperation, conciliation and co-existence. But this was against the interests of China and U.S. and they very successfully supplied the 'fuel' to keep the fire burning.


41. President Rajendra Prasad's speeches and writings, 2nd series, New Delhi, 1969, page 367.
Pakistan consisted of two separate entities, geographically, culturally and linguistically; and one half - and that the lesser half - started lording it over the other. 'West Pakistan began to treat East Pakistan as a colony and exploit it to its heart's content. The bulk of the foreign exchange in Pakistan was earned in East Pakistan and spent in West Pakistan. In the third Five Year Plan, the amount allowed to the eastern wing was less than half of that allowed to the western wing, though the population of East Pakistan was twenty percent more than that of West Pakistan.'

The Administrative services as well as the armed forces were dominated by the Punjabis. It was a revolt against this racial and political arrogance that Bangla Desh was born. The West Pakistan military regime, supported by the USA and China, was determined to strangle it at its birth. In the middle of 1971 West Pakistan seemed to be having its way not only in Bangla Desh itself but vis-a-vis India, whose security was imperilled by the events on her eastern border, and whose economy was undermined by the influx of millions of refugees.

It was at this critical moment that the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and cooperation was signed. Even the signing of this Treaty did not deter West Pakistan from attacking India. 'Desperate men resort to desperate remedies.' In the beginning of December, President Yahya Khan, realizing that his position was desperate in Bangla Desh, launched a precipitate attack in the west, in the hope of making some gains there which he could set off against his losses in the East.\(^{43}\) Within thirteen days, however, the war ended in the total defeat of Pakistan. During the war, and throughout the crisis leading to the war, the Indo-Soviet Treaty, signed on August 9, 1971, was a sheet-anchor for India, calling on imperialism to cease meddling in the affairs of the sub-continent (Indians can hardly forget the '7th Fleet' Terror). In the severest crisis which faced India since her independence, the Soviet union stood by her like a rock.

**THE SIMLA PACT**

The end of the war was followed by a radical change in the internal politics of Pakistan. President Yahya had to resign in favour of Bhutto. As far as India was concerned, Bhutto in power did not seem to be propitious for negotiation. In the beginning, he seemed to follow a policy of "confrontation." – In his first radio

\(^{43}\) K.P.S. Menon, op.cit., page-135.
broadcast to the nation as the President of Pakistan, he promised that he would bring back Eastern Pakistan. He offered a military pact with China, but he failed in this attempt. He also tried the revival of the military pact with the United States, but there too he was disappointed. He appeared to be, to some degree, serious about the negotiation with India since March onwards.

Two more significant events might have forced Pakistan to negotiate. In the end of January, Great Britain and Australia informed President Bhutto of their decision to recognize Bangla Desh. More unfavourable to Islamabad was the recognition of Bangla Desh by the United States on 5th April 1972. Against this background, Bhutto accepted the offer for bilateral talk with India.

A summit meeting between President Bhutto and Mrs. Indira Gandhi was arranged at simla from 28th June 1972, the summit meeting lasted five days and an agreement on bilateral relations was signed at 0.40 A.M. on 3rd July 1972. The text of the Agreement is as follows:

"The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation which have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of

45. Indi February 16, 1972.
46. Times (London) January 31, 1972
48. The Hindustan Times, April 10, 1972."
durable peace in the sub continent, so that both countries may hence forth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people. In order to achieve this objective the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:

(i) That the principles and purposes of the charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries.

(ii) That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them, penning the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations.

(iii) That the pre-requisites for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and, durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful co-existence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

(iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be
resolved by peaceful means.

(v) That they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality.

(vi) That in accordance with the charter of United Nations, they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.

Both Governments will take all steps with in their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them.

In order, progressively, to restore and normalize relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that,

i) Steps shall be taken to resume communications postal, telegraphic, sea, land including border posts and airlinks including over flights.

ii) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country.

iii) Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible.

iv) Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted.

In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to workout the necessary details. In order to initiate the process of
establishment of durable peace, both the Governments agree that -

1) Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border.

2) In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.

3) The withdrawal shall commence upon entry into force of this agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof.

This agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, and will come into force with effect from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

Both Governments agree that their respective heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meantime while, the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the
modalities and arrangements for the establishment of
durable peace and normalization of relations including
the question of repatriation of prisoners of war and
civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and
Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations. 49
(Diplomatic relations between the two countries were
broken off by President Yahya Khan on December 6, 1971
in the wake of India's recognition of Bangla Desh.) 50

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AGREEMENT

AN ANALYSIS

The Simla Agreement was formally ratified by
India on 28th July. Mr. Swaran Singh, the External Affairs
Minister said:

"We have kept our promise which we had made
before, during and after the last war, that we do not have
any designs on Pakistan's territory. We hope that Pakistan
appreciates this and will reciprocate by adhering faith-
fully to the letter and spirit of this Agreement. The
Agreement is only a first step, a beginning in the process
of establishing peace, friendship and cooperation." 51

49. Select Documents on India's Foreign Policy and
50. Asian Recorder 1976, page-13190
51. Asian Recorder, 1972, page-10923
At that time India had under its occupation 5,139 square miles of Pakistan territory in Punjab, Sind and Kutch. Sixty nine square miles of Indian territory in Punjab and Ganganagar (Rajasthan) were under Pakistan occupation.

At Simla both the sides had recognized that third party involvement had made the solution of problems between India and Pakistan extremely difficult. It was therefore, agreed by both that they would settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. The idea of providing for a 'self executing machinery' which would automatically involve third parties or outside agencies had been given up.

On July 15, Pakistan's National Assembly ratified the Agreement. Defending the Agreement as the best that Pakistan could have secured under the circumstances, Mr. Shutto told the House that even if he wanted another war, 'I can not fight with in the next five, ten or fifteen years, let future generations of Pakistan decide whether they wanted war or peace'. But he would prefer, for the time he was in charge of the nation's affairs, to look for a 'modus vivendi' so that India and Pakistan could share the subcontinent in peace. On the Kashmir Issue, he delved into the history of U.N. involvement to show that, Pakistan had not benefitted from it at all.

52. Asian Recorder 1972, page-10925
Answering the opposition taunts recalling his declaration after 1965 war that Pakistan would fight for 1000 years, he explained that he was enunciating "a metaphysical concept", he did not mean that the country would engage in an unending shooting war, but that it would never surrender its right inz-a-viz Kashmir, not withstanding the odds. 53

The agreement that India and Pakistan reached was a compromise - a product of concessions made by both the sides. Reportedly, Pakistan insisted on bringing in the U.N. resolution on Kashmir but it was not accepted by India. India urged bilateral negotiation on Kashmir. 54 They reached a compromise which seems to be more in accord with the Indian view point than Pakistan's. The provision that the two countries resolve to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiation was similar to India's position. But the very admission of India that Kashmir was a problem between the two countries marked a tactical gain for Pakistan, because India so far had been denying it. However, the agreement on broad principles like renunciation of force was a positive achievement of the Simla Pact.

SINO - PAK AXIS AND INDIA

When India was exploring the possibilities of improving her relations with Pakistan after signing the

53. Asian Recorder 1972, page-10925
Canal Waters Treaty, Pakistan Government made the dismal announcement of concluding a Sino-Pak Border Pact. The official announcement stated:

"Complete agreement in principle has been reached between Pakistan and the 'People's Republic of China with regard to the alignment of the border between China Sinkiang and contiguous areas, the defence of which is the responsibility of Pakistan. The Pakistan Foreign Minister today said he was grateful that the legitimate interests of Pakistan had been fully safeguarded. He also said he was confident that similarly the interests of the People's Republic of China have also been safeguarded." 55

India's position in respect of the Sino-Pak border was made clear on May 3, 1962, when Pakistan and China agreed to enter into negotiations to locate and align the portion of the India-China boundary, west of the Karakoram pass presently under Pakistan occupation. On 10th May 1962, Government of India informed China that the sovereignty over the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir was vested on India and hence any agreement on the boundary of Kashmir with Pakistan would be illegal. 56

The protocol of the 'boundary' agreement which was signed in March 1963, is one of the most blatant opportunistic deals in Asian history in modern times. This puts a seal on the Sino-Pak collusion against India in

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Kashmir. In a protest note to both China and Pakistan, India pointed out "such illegal arrangements involving Indian territory between parties that have no legal or constitutional locus standi, is invalid and inadmissible."

Islamabad has openly indicated to its northern neighbour that the latter's natural recourse may well be very useful for and are indeed needed by, "Pakistan to fulfil its extensive defence programme which includes the building up of military bases, the rearmament of the Pakistani armed forces, a nuclear weapon project, and the expansion of cooperation between the Chinese and Pakistani armed forces in all aspects." Recently, New Delhi has been gravely concerned over the growing militarization of the Karakoram high ways. This has opened up for the Chinese forces, a way to the heart of the subcontinent. The Chinese who are unable to raise enough money to build schools and hospitals at home, have spared no money and effort to build the 790 Kilo metre-long Karakoram highway.

A Pakistani intellectual in Australia has explained the position: "Both China and Pakistan worked on the old saying that enemy's enemies are friends and it was in that atmosphere that the construction (on the highway) started. It was surely a declaration of intent on the part of the Chinese that they were going to play an increasingly active role in the politics of the sub-continent and..."

Karakoram Highway in Pak-Occupied Kashmir
an increasingly anti-Indian role in the politics of the sub-continent."  59

THE KARAKORAM HIGHWAY

Plans for this road were mooted some time around 1963, soon after China and Pakistan entered into an Agreement in accordance with which 2,100 square miles of Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistan's illegal occupation was handed over to China. Construction of the portion of the road between Gilgit and Mor Khun was undertaken in accordance with an agreement reached in 1966 and was completed in 1969. The portion of the highway from Mor Khun to Khunjerab has been built following an Agreement between the two countries which was signed on October 21, 1969. The road became fully operational on June 18, 1978.  60

The 500 mile all weather road stretches from the border of China's Sinkiang province to a few miles north of Pakistan's capital of Islamabad. The new twisting highway, carved out of the walls of mountains, climbing 15,000 feet over the Khunjerab Pass and crossing swirling torrents fed by surrounding glaciers will speed goods and equipment towards the port at Karachi for transhipment.  61

61. Ibid, page-14478.
There are reports to indicate that Chinese have kept building strategic roads in the region around the Karakoram highway. Although these roads are shorter, they will be of great strategic value, making it easier for the Chinese to get access to the adjacent areas. The Karakoram highway is reportedly controlled by Chinese soldiers. "According to a study by the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, the highway has reinforced concrete covering and strong bridges designed for heavy tanks."62 They ensure a smooth traffic of both civil and military vehicles, which have long replaced camel caravans that used to travel along the "Silk way" from time immemorial. Now the "granite link" as the Pakistani generals call the Karakoram highway is splendidly serving the needs of the Chinese and Pakistani forces. Unconfirmed but highly reliable reports say that the Chinese missile units have been deployed in the Gilgit region.63

Neither Peking or Islamabad has ever denied newspaper reports estimating the costs of arms supplies from China to Pakistan to beef up the Pakistani forces at more than two billion dollars. It is, thus Islamabad's policy which has resulted in creating a very dangerous environment for Indian security in the neighbourhood and it was one of the main reasons that India signed the Indo-Soviet friendship Treaty.

63. Ibid.
U.S. SHADOW OVER INDO-PAK RELATIONS

From the very beginning, united Pakistan, as it existed till 1971, was of considerable significance to America. Geopolitically located with in its "Forward Defence Area" close to both the Soviet Union and China, its Western wing bordered West Asia and its Eastern wing opened out to the land-routes of South-East Asia, through Burma and Thilani, all the way up to Indo-China. 64

The strategic significance of Pakistan became critical to American foreign policy after non-aligned India's refusal, followed by its active opposition, to the policy of global "Containment". On the other hand, Pakistan had many special problems to begin with: absence of a national identity, inter-wing rivalry, Bengali Nationalism demanding provincial autonomy, absence of democratic institutions and a pliable political leadership. Already, while Jinnah was still alive, there were language riots in East Pakistan, and, in July 1948, a police mutiny in Dacca, discontent and distrust with in the Army, leading to an abortive military coup in March 1951. 65 Under such circumstances "in Pakistan the need for an external diversionary symbol to hold together, a spiritless body politic is, if anything, more conspicuous.

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than in the case of India. The indeterminate character of her own nationalism leaves Pakistan with India as the indispensable rallying point for diverse regional and social groups. "66

In any case, in the context of the history of partition of the sub continent, the unsolved problems between the two countries, the Kashmir war, India's vast size in its immediate neighbourhood, if nothing else, was bound to cause some legitimate concern to Pakistan's security. According to a Pakistani scholar, "the fear of India always dominated Pakistan's foreign policy....The immediate and continuing danger seems to come from India. Pakistan believes that Indian hostility poses a far greater problem to them than Chinese expansion or Soviet threats, neither country having a dispute with Pakistan."67

The Pakistani leadership and a number of scholars, have justified Pakistan's alignment with U.S.A. primarily on grounds of its perceived "threat from India;" also its need for Western support on Kashmir, and need for economic aid."68

Since the signing of the military pact between America and Pakistan in 1954 the former had not only involved the latter in the aggressive network of the CSNTO and

the SEATO, but also poured at least $4 billion worth of arms and sold dangerous hardware like the F-16 fighter aeroplanes threatening national security and defence of India. The apprehensions that the new military arrangements might be used against India are not baseless. On previous occasions also arms were supplied to Pakistan to keep off communists, but they were used against India during the 1965 and 1971 wars.

Pakistan and the US started negotiating an arms deal in January 1980 immediately after the Soviet lurch into Afghanistan. Whether the military junta ruling Pakistan will be better able to fight the Soviet menace in particular and communism in general with this large quantum of arms is doubtful, considering how Gen. Zia is unable to still the political and social unrest in his country, but "the induction of sophisticated arms into this region would lead to an arms race" this was mentioned by Mrs. Gandhi to the US representative to the United Nations, Mr. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick when he visited India and Pakistan. 69 And now the United State's proposal to make available Harpoon over-the-horizon-cruise missiles to the Pakistan Navy will represent a new level of sophistication in armaments in this region.

Expressing shock and surprise at this information, a Foreign Office spokesman observed that there was

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no question of such weaponry having any bearing whatsoever on the situation in and around Afghanistan. When India and Pakistan are at a fortunate conjuncture in their history forging new relations of friendship and cooperation in the sub-continent, the U.S. Government must give the most careful thought to this proposal before taking a step that will necessarily de-stabilise the entire region.

NO WAR PACT PROPOSAL

"The trouble with non-aggression Pacts" said American Writer Dorothy Thompson, "is that they are only aimed at avoiding war which is not the same thing as achieving peace." That cardinal distinction is of great importance in the matter of President Zia's September 15, 1981 offer of a no-war pact. The move obviously took New Delhi by surprise. And no wonder, beginning with Nehru's suggestion in 1949 to sign a non-aggression pact, India had offered a series of proposals to successive Pakistani regimes, aimed at bringing about peace and unity on the sub-continent. The Pakistani reaction to all these proposals had ranged from indifference to hostility!

70. The Hindustan Times, August 3, 1983.
71. Hindustan Times, October 29, 1981.
Many in New Delhi are understandably intrigued at President Zia's persistence in proffering the pact even while he is doing his best to acquire sophisticated offensive weaponry from the United States. As Mrs. Gandhi rightly pointed out, Pakistan is most unlikely to unleash its newly acquired muscle on Afghanistan or on Soviet Union. It is India that has borne the brunt of Pakistani aggression in the past. India's suspicions are further aggravated by President Zia's penchant to blow hot and cold at the same time.

In a recent interview, he warned that if India wished to treat Pakistan "like Bangla Desh, Nepal and Burma" it would have to "break the bones of 84 million people."73 Those are hardly the words of one offering the olive branch.

Similarly incomprehensible is his charge that Mrs. Gandhi "has not reconciled herself to the existence of Pakistan." It was India, it might be recalled, which unilaterally ended the hostilities begun by Pakistan in 1971 and voluntarily handed back over 5,000 square miles of captured Pakistani territory and 90,000 prisoners of war. There is thus no reason for India to wish Pakistan ill, if only for the fact that an unstable neighbour will aid to India's problems.

73. The Hindustan Times, Editorial, October 29, 1981.
However, India has expressed its willingness to sign a no-war pact with Pakistan on the basis of principles which are essential elements of the Simla Agreement. One of the major suggestions to Pakistan is that it revert to the principle of bilateralism on resolving all issues - as provided for in the Simla Agreement. India has also suggested steps which would in effect, mean that Pakistan puts a brake on the arms race and does not raise bilateral issues, such as Kashmir, at international forums. 74

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has radically altered the power equation in South Asia leading to the re-emergence of the cold war between the Super Powers. 75 President Zia is aware of the fact and he appears to be determined to exploit it to the maximum extent possible to achieve his cherished goals, namely, nuclear weapons-capacity and an Islamic Pakistan with himself as the Pakistani Ataturk. If Pakistan is really interested in peace and friendship, this quest for more and more sophisticated arms must come to an end simultaneously with the no-war offer.

According to some scholars, "Kashmir will pose the biggest problem for the no-war pact negotiations." 76 In other words, Kashmir may still trigger the final war between Pakistan and India. If a no war pact is to insulate

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74. The Hindustan Times, December 29, 1981.
75. India quarterly, Vol. XXVIII No.s, 3 & 4, July-Dec, 82, P-32
Kashmir from another war, Zia will have to recognize the 'dejure' character of the 'line of control', and India might offer to help him with cosmetic changes to mollify Pakistani sensibilities. Alternatively, a no-war pact may just incorporate the relevant clauses of the Simla agreement, adjuring force to settle the Kashmir dispute, leaving a solution to the next generation of sub-continental leaders.

CONCLUSION

The ominous nature of the Indo-Pakistani conflict has not diminished over the past thirty years. These wars have not yet purged the fear and furore from the sub-continent, as even more perilous threats have arisen. Rampant paranoia, heightened by nuclear proliferation and Super Power rivalry continues.

Pakistan fears India's strength, which outclasses it in nearly every comparison of power. To confront this threat, the former has placed a tremendous emphasis on developing its defence structure, and now seeks nuclear capability. In contrast, India fears Pakistan's weakness. Pakistan's instability threatens the security of India. Indians fear Zia, as an unpopular leader heading an exceedingly unpopular government confronted with massive economic and ethnic problems, he could start a war to keep himself
in power. "Pakistan is one of the poorest countries, yet billions of dollars are spent on both its military and nuclear development programmes. The impoverished nation is further strained by the presence of two million Afghan refugees. Ethnic problems culminated in civil strife from 1973 to 1977; the government fought separatist Baluchi tribes strung along the Iran and Afghan borders. Confronted with such economic and political crises, Indians fear that Zia may externalize his country's internal problems upon the traditional enemy India." 77

Super power rivalry on the sub-continent continues; the pattern of outside interference regarding the prospects for peace in India and Pakistan. For over thirty years the United States alternately has wooed, argued and reconciled with Pakistan. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. has maintained close relations with India. China has sent all forms of aid to Pakistan since the Sino-Indian border war in 1962. A facile interpretation leads to Sino-Pakistan, American and Indo-Soviet alliances such an interpretation, however, is not wholly accurate. The United States maintains reasonably friendly ties with India, the Soviet Union sends considerable amounts of aid to Pakistan to compete with Chinese influence, and any alliance which exists between China and the United States is only of a temporary nature.

None the less, if these perceived alliances were to become established, a dangerous position would emerge; Pakistan would become wedged between the Soviet Union and India and India between Pakistan and China. The Soviet Union would be surrounded by American Allies Pakistan and China, and China by the Soviet Union and India. Each member fears encirclement, an ineluctably threatening situation for all.

The source of continuing conflict mutual paranoia, fans its own fire, accordingly, therefore, Indians and Pakistanis can resolve their conflict peacefully, if, and only if, this mutual paranoia is extinguished.

PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE

(1) Mutual paranoia will subside, if India and Pakistan realize common interests and demonstrate non-aggressive intentions. A no-war pact must pledge Pakistan not to explode a nuclear device; in return India could offer to cooperate with Pakistan in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

(2) The two countries must also agree to limit their military expenditures, they can ill afford to spend billions upon billions of dollars to acquire new generations of aircraft, tanks, and missiles while the sub-continent remains the home of two thirds of the World's entire pauperized humanity. The following tables give
details of the Pakistani and Indian defence expenditures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Expenditure</td>
<td>Percentage of Total Expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-48 *</td>
<td>236.0</td>
<td>65.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948-49</td>
<td>461.5</td>
<td>71.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>625.4</td>
<td>73.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>649.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951-52</td>
<td>792.4</td>
<td>54.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>917.7</td>
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<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>1957-58</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>996.6</td>
<td>50.9</td>
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</table>

* 15th August 1947 to March 1948

Source - Adapted from Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Lahore) 1976, page 56-57.
# Table II

## Defence Expenditures of Pakistan and India during 1960-79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pakistan Defence Expenditure (in Million Rs.)</th>
<th>Pakistan Defence Expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product</th>
<th>India Defence Expenditure (in Million Rs.)</th>
<th>India Defence Expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product</th>
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<td>3.7*</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
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<td>6.1</td>
<td>16737</td>
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<td>20043</td>
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<td>6.1</td>
<td>23823</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>7952</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>25793</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>8697</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>27174</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<td>9780</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>28966</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>10850</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>31910</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Imputed values, with a high degree of uncertainty.

** Information not available or not applicable.

Source: This table is prepared on the basis of information of world military expenditure available in "World Armaments & Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook (Cambridge & Mass.,) 1974 to 1981."
According to Defence Minister of India R. Venkataraman - "India was keeping a close watch on weapons acquired by Pakistan and was matching them item to item. These matching equipments were being either indigenously produced or acquired from abroad." 80

Pakistan's military Government gave itself an 8.5 percent increase in defence spending in the new budget. 7 Defence expenditure for fiscal year 1983-84 will total $1,939 billion, up from $1,786 billion last year. 81 The arms race has increased the financial burden on the people of both the countries at a time when the limited resources available should have been used for meeting the needs of the people. Mrs. Jehanir rightly said at a news conference in New Delhi.

"The two countries faced similar economic problems and should use their energies for development which was possible only if there was peace and mutual trust." 82

This is very important that the military expenditure must be reduced bye and bye with mutual agreements. For this purpose "two military heads should also meet" as suggested by Gen. Zia in an interview. 83 Pakistan ambassador Abdul Sattar said in an interview.

80. The Hindustan Times, October 16, 1982
81. Ibid, June 12, 1983
82. The Hindustan Times, July 11, 1981
that "Pakistan can't afford war" and even President Zia sounded very much alike when he said, "If India attacks, we will defend ourselves, but we will never attack. India on our own, I can give it in writing." If the intentions are as clear as the words, then there is hope that Pakistan will soon realise that as long as India has not normalised its relations with China and there is active collusion between the US and China, both the Soviet Union and India have reasons to be on the alert.

Pakistan is today a member of the non-aligned bloc. If it lives up to the expectations of this growing family of nations, those immediately affected by the developments in Afghanistan might still be able to bring enough pressure on Moscow to let the Afghans decide for themselves what is best for them. But, if this consummation is desired, Islamabad should also take steps to assure both Moscow and New Delhi that it will play no part in forming an axis with China and America to encircle the Soviet Union or pose a threat to India.

(3) Economic cooperation which unites the fates of India and Pakistan would reduce the likelihood of the two going to war. In this direction the agreement on

84. PrObE, India, October 1981, page 27.
setting up of joint commissions is a step which must be appreciated. More trade facilities and relaxations are now needed to explore the possibilities of joint ventures in third world countries especially in the Middle Eastern region.

(4) A settlement on Kashmir, the subject of dispute and war since partition, is a pre-requisite for peace on the sub-continent. Once accord is reached on this contentious issue, the spirit of cooperation would move forward.

Once mutual fear has been put to rest, measures may be taken to eliminate nuclear proliferation and Super Power rivalry from the sub-continent. The most encouraging factor, today, is that the people on both the sides are conscious of the fact that the relationship between India and Pakistan should be good. There have been more visa and travel facilities between India and Pakistan in the recent past, frequent exchange of cricket or Hockey teams as well, in the cultural field Indian artistes visited Pakistan and Pakistani artistes came to India. The reception which they were given in either country is enough to show their close bond of relationship. According to a survey, the national will to fight each other is almost totally absent in Pakistan and India.86

Two hundred years of outside interference have exacerbated the bitter conflict between India and Pakistan; it can not be resolved in a matter of months or a year. However, this enmity can be overcome, or at least a 'modus vivendi' reached if proper efforts are undertaken by all concerned. History points to the examples of France and Germany, and Egypt and Israel, Pakistan and India can make peace too but only with cooperation, and without interference from outside.

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