A metaphor is a phenomenon very common in everyday language as well as in literature. When we speak of one thing as if it were something else, we are speaking metaphorically. "By common definition, and by etymology, a metaphor is a transfer of meaning, both in intension and extension." The all-pervasive nature of metaphor has, in recent years, engaged the attention of linguists, literary critics, psychologists, philosophers and even anthropologists. Poets and literary critics, however, have been particularly sensitive for many centuries to its appeal and utility. Aristotle, for instance, observed that metaphor lifted poetry above the commonplace and


2. This study is, however, devoted to the problem only as part of poetics.
heightened it and that its proper use was a sign of genius and that it depended on the poets intuitive perception. Therefore, he emphasized: "But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor".

Metaphor is not a mere decorative device; it is the fundamental form of figurative speech; it displays the basic pattern of semantic transference involved in other figures of speech such as simile, personification, allegory, synecdoche, metonymy and "conceit". It is at the root of poetic symbol and myth and is the matrix of myriad varieties of poetic expression. Its importance in the study of poetic style, therefore, is obvious.

Metaphor is a distinctive characteristic of poetic language. The connotativeness of poetic language springs from its metaphorical nature. Metaphor is valuable also because it contains the poet's apprehension of truth and his way of expressing it. The problem of metaphor thus

3. The Poetics, Ch.22
4. ibid. Bywater's tr.
comprehends within its scope (a) poetic language and style and (b) the meaning of poetry. The approach to this problem has differed according to the emphasis put on either of these aspects. Broadly speaking, there are three main approaches to this problem:

1) The Classical.

2) The Romantic.

3) The modern linguistic.

The chief expositor of the classical view is Aristotle. His observations on metaphor in the Poetics and the Rhetorics were the basis of all discussion of this subject till the advent of Romanticism in the late 18th Century. In the Poetics Aristotle considers metaphor as part of diction, and looks upon it as a superadded decorative device. He mentions it together with "the strange word ... and the ornamental word" which "save language from seeming mean and prosaic"; it is only "an added extra" to language or "seasoning of the meat".

5. ibid. p.59

Metaphor consists, according to Aristotle, "in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else". Thus, "Youth is a flower" is a metaphor. Metaphor is not literally true since it transfers the name of something to a different thing. There are four kinds of transference involved in metaphor: from genus to species; from species to genus, from species to species; and a transfer made on the basis of analogy. Of these four, only the last one concerns us here, since the first three are considered nowadays as different figures, and Aristotle himself has discussed the last one at some length describing it as a sign of genius. Analogical metaphor contains four different terms related in such a way that "the second (B) is to the first (A) as the fourth (D) to the third (C)". This analogical relationship makes it possible to use (D) metaphorically as the name of (B),

7. The Poetics, Bywater's tr. p. 56

8. "It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars". Poetics, Ch. 22, Bywater's tr. p. 62

9. ibid. p. 57
and vice versa. Suppose our terms are the following:

\[
\begin{array}{ccccc}
| & Life & youth & year & spring & |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | B | C | D |
\end{array}
\]

Here youth (B) is to life (A) as spring (D) is to year (C).

Out of these terms, we get a metaphor when we express this relation by "deletion - substitution" method e.g.,

"life's spring" (A and D) ; "year's youth" (C and B)

This formula of metaphor is very frequently seen in poetry, for instance, Keats describes autumn as "close bosom friend of the maturing sun", or Tennyson describes experience as "... an arch wherethro/ Gleams that untravell'd world".

An important subject which Aristotle discusses in connection with metaphor is that of decorum. Strange words, ornamental words, metaphors and other figurative expressions are deviations from ordinary modes of speech. Aristotle defends their use in poetry because they give it distinctiveness. But he cautions against their abuse.
A too apparent use of these licences has certainly a ludicrous effect, but they are not alone in that; the rule of moderation applies to all the constituents of the poetic vocabulary; even with metaphors, strange words and the rest, the effect will be the same, if one uses them improperly and with a view to provoking laughter. 10

Decorum is governed by the general function of poetic diction, especially of metaphor. A metaphor must unite the unfamiliar with the familiar, and have distinctiveness (i.e. non-prosaicness) and clarity, and charm. In addition, a good metaphor gives us something fresh.

Aristotle's assumptions about the nature of metaphor were to influence generations of critics and rhetoricians. They were based upon his view of the relation between

10. ibid. p.60

11. ibid.

language and reality. Language and reality, according to him, are completely distinct. Language can describe reality in a number of ways, but the manner of describing cannot alter or significantly condition reality. Figurative language, accordingly, is meant to please the hearer; it is only a superadded element or “seasoning of the meat” and not part of the reality it is describing. Metaphor, in short, is a separable element. A true description of reality requires clear and unambiguous language. "Nobody uses fine language while teaching geometry". In scientific use, metaphorical language, has no place. Only in poetry deviations from ordinary speech are allowed for certain effects they produce on the hearer. This view of language and reality was reflected later in the attitude of the members of the English Royal Society in the 17th Century.

13. For a full treatment of this subject see Richard McKeon's 'Aristotle's Conception of Language' (Critics and Criticism - Ancient and Modern, pp.176-231). McKeon points out that Aristotle distinguishes three different uses of language, namely (a) the logical use to analyse things, and to test statement and argument, (b) the rhetorical use to express a normative rule of action and (c) the poetic use for style and pleasure. (ibid. pp.193-194)
They have therefore been most rigorous in putting in execution, the only Remedy, that can be found for this extravagance: and that has been, a constant Resolution, to reject all the amplifications, digressions, and swellings of style: to return back to the primitive purity, and shortness, when men delivered so many things, almost in an equal number of words. They have exacted from all their members, a close, naked, natural way of speaking; clear senses, a native easiness: bringing all things as near the Mathematical plainness, as they can. 14

We shall examine this view in greater detail while dealing with the Romantic and the modern linguistic theories of metaphor.

After Aristotle there is no real theoretical development in respect of metaphor until we reach the Romantic Age. There is, of course, a great deal of systematization and classification of figures. But the classical conception of metaphor as a deviant form of speech used for stylistic purpose remained in essence the view of the Middle Ages and of the Renaissance.

Mistrust of figurative speech was the natural corollary. For instance, Puttenham (1589) described figures as "abuses", "trespasses in speech ... to deceiue the eare and also the mind"; he characterised metaphor as "an inversion of sence by transport". But it contributed to the pleasures of poetry and hence in poetry it was praiseworthy.

... all his (poet's) abuses tend but to dispose the hearers to mirth and solace by pleasant conueyance and efficacy of speech, they are not in truth to be accompted vices but for vertues in poetical science very commendable. 16

Deviation must not, however, go beyond the ambit of propriety or decorum. It must be governed by considerations of "cause" (i.e., poetic subject and discourse). The foul, the indecent and the disproportionate was, according to Puttenham, indecorous, and produced effects undesirable in poetry.

16. ibid. p. 178
17. ibid. p. 178
Puttenham's discussion is a more or less complete Renaissance account of metaphor, but theoretically there is nothing new in it. But the Renaissance is important in the history of metaphor for its poetic practice. The Elizabethan and metaphysical poets discovered new potentialities of metaphor. Their unconventional use of figurative language, and especially of metaphor was an outcome of their view of the function of poetry. In keeping with the medieval scholastic tradition which they inherited, they regarded poetry, logic and rhetoric as sister disciplines. Reasonableness and persuasion were their essential common characteristics. Puttenham described the poet as a kind of pleader, though in a different sort of court. But the links of poetry with logic were more vital.

It was considered to be 'grounded in' logic in that it was thought of as reasonable discourse, arranging thought in an orderly manner.

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18. ibid. p.178
The conception that a poem is essentially a logical discourse presenting a thought in a neat shape naturally led to the idea that the parts of the poem are units of the thought. Images are a necessary part of a poem, and in keeping with its nature, they must be logical and related logically/related to it. Since medieval logic and popular pseudo-science consisted chiefly of statements deductively derived from universally accepted truths, a similar method was inevitable in the poetry which drew freely upon these disciplines for its imagery. This explains the subtlety of much of the "metaphysical" imagery.

As our blood labours to beget
Spirits, as like soules as it can,
Because such fingers need to knit
That subtile knot, which makes us man.

- John Donne, The Extasie

Here Donne speaks of the perfect union of the lovers' souls which makes them one personality. Behind the metaphorical expressions "that subtile knot" and "makes us man" is the medieval physiological idea of

20. These often had a strong theological bias.
"spirits" or rarefied substances in the blood which brought about the union of soul and body and "made us man". The spirits of the lovers bring about the union of their souls and "makes both one, each this and that".

On the question of imagery, the metaphysical poets thought very differently. Their chief concern was not to give a sincere expression to what they believed, but to convince the reader by argumentative subtlety and efficacy. This was responsible for the terseness, strangeness and obscurity sometime of the metaphysical metaphors. It discovered hidden potentialities of metaphor, but roused the hostility of the 18th Century thinkers and critics who looked askance at this "licence".

The 18th Century attitude to figurative language was chiefly an outcome of the influence of the empirical philosophy of Hobbes and Locke. The mother of all poetic ornaments, according to Hobbes is fancy, the fancy-

faculty which discerns likenesses in things that rational judgement distinguishes: "Judgement begets and strength and structure and Fancy begets the ornaments of a poem." Fancy without judgement or the discriminating faculty is only madness. Judgement gives steadiness and direction to fancy. This is true also of poetic fancy:

In a good poem, whether it be epic, or dramatic; as also in sonnets, epigrams and other pieces, both judgement and fancy are required; but the fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the extravagancy; but ought not to displease by indiscretion. 23

Hobbes recognises the uses of fancy, but condemns its offspring, metaphor. A simile may be incidentally useful "in demonstration, in counsel and all rigorous search of truth", but metaphors are utterly excluded ... they openly profess deceit; to admit them into counsel, or reasoning, were manifest folly. 24


24. ibid. p. 44
Hobbes, in fact, lists metaphor among the sources of error. Its mischief is that it plays with the language, obscures the sense and confounds the hearer.

... Metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui; and reasoning upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities. 26

The standard of speech is clarity, "perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity". This attained in science where terms are "some (same?) certain and infallible".

Hobbes allows, however, figurative speech because it serves "to please and delight ourselves and others, by playing with our words ... innocently". Locke does not make even this allowance. Theoretically there is not much difference between the two. Locke makes metaphor a working of wit, which is the opposite of judgement.

Wit consists in

25. ibid. p.28
26, 27, 28. ibid. p.30
29. ibid. p.19
the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, where can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy.  

But it is the enemy of all truth. Locke takes the abuse of language by fancy so seriously that he devotes Book III of his Essay to the discussion of words and their work; he recommends only one signification for one word and strict definition of every meaning. Naturally, he condemns metaphors as perfect cheats. Both Hobbes and Locke esteemed the clarity and definitiveness of scientific discourse as the standard of linguistic expression, and condemned the suggestive use of language as in literature. They were especially against metaphor perhaps because it was the most connotative of all figures of speech.

Another influence which considerably shaped the 18th Century attitude to language was the Royal Society


31. ibid. III . xi (pp.148-164)
of London. This learned body of scientists aimed at objective truth and discouraged subjective attitude and opinion in scientific studies. It sought to reduce language to a strict system of verbal signs with a fixed semantic value attached to each sign. Its members desired to deliver "so many things, almost in an equal number of 32 words".

The Royal Society carried to its logical extreme Aristotle's dichotomy between language and reality. But Aristotle only thought that the mode of language could not alter the reality under description; it was only "the seasoning of the meat". The Royal Society was apprehensive that language could seriously distort reality and hinder knowledge. It advocated, therefore, mathematical plainness in language.

The influence of the Royal Society is discernible in the neoclassical stress on clarity and distinctness

as great qualities of style. Dryden, for example, accorded highest praise to Shakespeare for his copious genius but found fault with the verbolessness and obscurity of his style and excessive use of figures:

He often obscures his meaning by his words, and sometimes makes it unintelligible ... to say nothing without a Metaphor, a Simile, an Image or description, is I doubt to smell a little too strongly of Buskin. 33

Dryden considered bombast as a trick-in-trade for mediocre writers who had no worthy meaning to convey; their business was "to ply the ears and to stun their Judges by the noise". 34

Pope expressed a similar opinion about style. Style was the "dress" of thought and therefore it must be neat


34. ibid. p.226
and correct. It was necessary to eliminate unnecessary
trappings from it. Even great English writers failed in
this respect. There was much to learn from the French:

Exact Racine, and Corneille's noble fire
Show'd us that France had something to admire
Not but the Tragic spirit was our own,
And full in Shakespear, fair in Otway shone,
But Otway fail'd to polish or refine
And fluent Shakespear scarce effac's a line.
Even copious Dryden wanted, or forgot,
The last and greatest Art, the Art to blot.35

For a representative statement of the 18th Century
thinking on figurative language we may turn to Johnson.
Words, according to Johnson, are only tools; they have no
value beyond their use in communication; they must not be
allowed to tamper with the reality they describe. In the
preface to his Dictionary he observed,

... words are the daughters of earth, and ... things are the sons of heaven. Language is only instrument of science, and words are but signs of ideas ...
He believed, accordingly, that style was an acquired skill of expression, an outcome of the imitation of best writers. There was nothing subjective or organic about it. It changed according to the subject of description; therefore, "all polished languages have different styles; the concise, the diffuse, the lofty and the humble." The most important common quality desirable in all varieties of style was clarity or perspicuity.

Johnson considered ambiguity the enemy of all good writing. It frustrated the first aim of writing, namely to be intelligible. Johnson recognised that clarity and obscurity were relative terms and that sometimes "hard words" were necessary to convey deep and subtle

36. *Boswell's Life Johnson* III.280
38. *The Idler* (No.70), *The Yale Ed.* II .217-219
meanings but he never compromised with unresolved ambiguity or obscurity. In this he was only voicing the opinion of his Century.

"perspicuity" was a duty of society. It was not so much a doctrine of style as a philosophy of conduct ... To the Augustans language was primarily a social instrument and the test was intelligibility. 39

Johnson criticised many a writer for his failure in this social duty. He found fault with Shakespeare for "a disproportionate pomp of diction and a wearisome train of circumlocution", for a negligence of "the equality of words to things", and "quibbles". He was especially displeased with the metaphysical poets also for their obscurity and excesses of style. Metaphysical wit, according to Johnson, was only

discordia concors; a combination of dissimilar images, or discovery of occult resemblances in things apparently unlike. The most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together; nature and art are ransacked for illustrations, comparisons and allusions ... 41


The cause of all badness of metaphysical poetry was mainly metaphor, that untrustworthy poetic device which vitiated meaning. Johnson defined metaphor as

the application of a word to an use to which, in its original import, it cannot be put: as he bridles anger; he deadens the sound; the spring awakes the flower.

He recognised the usefulness of simile, but opposed metaphor because it was highly compressed and swift and tended to be either "broken" or "mixed". The most serious fault of metaphor was that the writer had no

42. A "broken" metaphor, is one in which the metaphorical term is totally inapplicable. (Lives III.265) Johnson explains and illustrates this from Addison's letter from Italy thus:

"'Fir'd with that name
I bridle in my struggling Muse with Pain,
That longs to launch into a nobler (bolder) strain,
To bridle a goddess is no very delicate idea;
why must she be bridled? because she longs to launch;
an act which was never hindred by a bridle: and whither will she launch? into a nobler strain;
she is in the first line a horse, in the second a boat; and the care of the poet is to keep his horse or his boat from singing." (Lives, II.128)
control over the terms in it, this could easily led to a confusion of reality with unreality because the same words were in so condensed a form of expression, expected to serve at once as literal and metaphorical; in the simile, however, it was easier to keep the "tenor" and the "vehicle" distinct. 43

The reasons for Johnson's disapproval of metaphor will be clearer if we take into account his conception of poetic diction. In a language there are different kinds of diction "scholastic and popular, grave and familiar, elegant and gross" all mixed up as it were in a heap. Poetic diction is nothing but a careful choice of words from this heap. The poet has to choose words which are neither too familiar and gross, nor too obscure and unintelligible:

43. Jean H. Hagstrum, Samuel Johnson's Literary Criticism, p.120
Words too familiar or too remote defeat the purpose of a poet. From those sounds which we hear on small or coarse occasions, we do not easily receive strong impressions or delightful images; and words to which we are nearly strangers, whenever they occur, draw that attention on themselves which they should transmit to things.

The question thus boils down to the associations of words. Familiar words have all sorts of unmanageable associations and unfamiliar words are opaque. Metaphor can have both these disadvantages. There is nothing in a metaphor to control the associations it evokes; an obscure metaphor, on the other hand, can be a puzzle. In both cases it militates against the spirit of poetry; either it fails to rouse delightful impressions or is unintelligible.

The 18th Century conceptions of metaphor ignored the inherent strength of figurative language and especially

44. Lives of English Poets, I.420
of metaphor to deal with reality. The basic mistake was that of applying the norms of demonstrative science to poetry, and making a sharp division between language and reality. All the assumptions underlying the 18th Century conceptions regarding language-reality relationship were soon to be called into question.

The notions of the nature and function of metaphor, based chiefly on Aristotle's view of the relationship between language and reality, were challenged even in the late 18th Century with the advent of Romanticism. Romantic thinking on this subject was also based on the consideration of the relation between language and reality, but it was opposed to the classical point of view. It was influenced in this respect by the German school of idealism and its epistemology. It rejected the

45. For a more detailed discussion of the subject see pp. 263-268.
dichotomy between subject and object, thought and thing, and also the view that reality was something that man could perceive. Objectively, distancing himself from the world. It maintained, on the other hand, that the knowledge of a thing "as it is in itself" was an illusion, since knowledge was what the thinking subject made of the impressions received from the world without.

Romantic The Romantic writers, in keeping with this philosophy, looked upon the imagination as the chief instrument of knowledge and regarded language as an active and dynamic force shaping the materials of experience. This view was held in common by Coleridge, Wordworth and Shelley.

Metaphor, according to this view, as an essential characteristic of language, is not a mere decoration, but plays a vital role as the expression of the faculty of the imagination. It is organic to the nature of language.

Coleridge's theory of metaphor is an off-shoot of his theory of the imagination, which is, in fact, his
theory of knowledge. Knowledge results from the action of the mind on sense impressions. The mind is an active, self-forming, self-realising system, and shapes and moulds the facts of experience received from without. The imagination is its chief instrument in the process. The primary imagination, possessed by all human beings, is the prime condition of knowledge; the secondary imagination, possessed by artists, is the cause of aesthetic creation. The secondary imagination treats the materials of experience in its independent light, combining or separating them in order to create a new reality out of them. It also unifies the mutually incompatible elements in experience and idealizes the experienced reality. The creative faculty of the imagination can no doubt operate in a number of media, but so far as poetry is

46. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to re-create or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events struggles to idealize and to unite. Biographia Literaria, Vol. I, p.202
concerned, it manifests itself through language: "Poetry can act only through the intervention of articulate speech, which is so peculiarly human".

But there also its mode of operation is distinctive; it works often by association and unification of ideas which generate metaphor. Metaphor, in short, is the imagination in action.

It must be noted that Coleridge makes a distinction between the unification of ideas and the association of ideas, and accordingly, gives two types of metaphor. He uses the verbs "unify", "fuse", the nouns "one" and "unity" only while describing the imagination. The expression "association of ideas" occurs in his definition of the fancy.

47. *On Poesy or Art*, (Shawcross, Vol. II, p. 254)

48. *Vide* his definition of the secondary imagination. pp. 189-191
Fancy ... no other than a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and space ... the Fancy must receive all its materials ready-made from the law of association. 49

The two types of metaphor are i) metaphor of imagination, and ii) metaphor of fancy. Coleridge has discussed these two types in his Shakespearian criticism, lecture notes and fragments. He explains the imaginative process involved in the first type of metaphor in the following words:

Imagination - power of modifying one image or feeling by the precedent or following ones. So often (is this) to be illustrated that at present I shall speak of only one of its effects namely that of combining many circumstances into one moment of thought. 50

... Imagination or the power by which one image or feeling is made to modify many others and by a sort of fusion to force many into one. 51

49. Biographia Literaria, I.202


51. ibid. p.188
Cleridge gives this example of the metaphor of imagination:

Look! how bright a star shooteth from the sky,
So glides he in the night from Venus's eye,

(Shakespeare's *Venus and Adonis*, lines 815-816).

Comments on this:

How many images and feelings are here brought together without effort and without discord — the beauty of Adonis — the rapidity of his flight, the yearning yet hopelessness of the enamoured gazer — and a shadowy ideal character thrown over the whole. 52

We may give another example of the metaphor of this kind:

Thir inward state of Mind, calm Region once
And full of Peace, now toss't and turbulent 53

Here Milton brings together several images and ideas by means of the single metaphor "region". Adam and Eve's minds were, before the temptation, like countries properly governed by a single right authority. After the

52. ibid. p.189

temptation they became like countries suffering from
the ill effects of rebellion, usurpation, anarchy and
turmoil. They are like a ship caught in a storm on a
turbulent sea, and violently tossed. All the images
combine to show the terribly pitiable condition of Adam
and Eve's state of mind.

On the other hand, the Metaphor of fancy answers,
more or less to the traditional account of metaphor:

... fancy, considered as the faculty of bringing
together (images dissimilar in the main by some
one point or more of likeness distinguished) 54

Fancy being merely "the aggregative power", different
things are brought together in a metaphor of fancy for
purely accidental likeness. Coleridge's example makes
this amply clear.

54. Shakespearean Criticism, I, 188
55. ibid. p. 191, also Biographia, Vol. I, p. 193
Full gently now she takes him by the hand,
A lily prison'd in a gaol of snow,
Or ivory in an alabaster band;
So white a friend engirts so white a foe.

(Shakespeare's *Venus and Adonis*, lines 361-364)

The fair complexion of Adonis and Venus and the whiteness of lily and snow are the only point of similarity between them, and it is purely accidental.

Coleridge's concept of the metaphor of imagination is his chief contribution to this subject. The traditional theory of metaphor takes into account only how the various elements in it are related to each other; it is interested in the structure of metaphor. It can account only for metaphors of fancy. But Coleridge considers this problem from the angle of the effect that metaphor produces on the hearer. For this he takes into account the imaginative process involved in responding to a metaphor. He finds that metaphors based on a purely accidental point of resemblance do not carry the hearer far. They remain only external ornamental devices. Images become
proofs of original genius

only as far as they are modified by a predominant passion; or by associated thoughts or images, awakened by that passion; or when they have the effect of reducing multitude to unity or succession to an instant; or lastly, when a human and intellectual life is transferred to them from the poet’s own spirit. 56

Only the metaphor of imagination can do this, because it is so integrated with the subject matter that it is not felt to be something superadded. It acts as to make the reader “almost lose the consciousness of words to make him see everything”.

But paradoxically enough, the appeal of the metaphor of imagination depends on the way it uses language. The words in a language are not mere signs for things; They are units of thought. The imagination

56. Biographia Literaria II.16

brings them together and combines them into images and metaphors in keeping with the supreme principle of unity. In combination they naturally interact and express "intellectual purposes, thoughts, conceptions and sentiments which have their origin in the human mind".

Coleridge's conception of language as an instrument of the imagination capable of re-shaping reality or giving a new meaning to it, was responsible for his completely new theory of metaphor. After his enunciation of the new theory, the age-old Aristotelian theory came to be all but discarded. His concept of the metaphor of imagination brought about a complete change in the ideas about the nature of poetic language. It was on the lines indicated by his thinking that important subsequent investigations of this problem, especially those of T.E. Hulme, I.A. Richards and William Empson, came to be conducted.

What strikes one most about their thinking on this subject is that they reject the Aristotelian theory of metaphor in favour of some modifications of the Romantic approach to the problem. They consider that metaphor is organic to poetic language. T.E. Hulme, for example, distinguishes poetic language from the language of prose and science on the ground that it is metaphorical. "In prose as in algebra", he observes,

concrete things are embodied in signs or counters which are moved about according to the rules, without being visualized at all in the process.\[59\]

This language has obvious limitations. It can never do what poetic language performs. Poetic language "endeavours to arrest you, and to make you continuously see a physical thing, to prevent you gliding through an abstract process". The language of prose is "opaque"; that of poetry is "transparent". Its transparency is


\[\text{60. ibid.}\]
the outcome of its metaphoric nature. It is very vivid
and hands over sensations bodily. Metaphor plays a
vital role in it because "visual meanings can only be
transferred by the new bowl of metaphor". Ordinary
speech is inadequate; it is incapable of any real
communication because it cannot make one see "the exact
curve" of the thing. Only metaphor is capable of
doing this. It is, in short, the word which offers the
most apt description of the thing. Hence metaphor is not

merely decoration added to plain speech. Plain
speech is essentially inaccurate. It is only
by new metaphors, that is by fancy, that it
can be precise. 63

T.E. Hulme's concept of metaphor does not constitute
a complete break with the past, but it makes a new
beginning. It recognises that poetry uses language
intensively and that metaphor is essential in the poetic

61. ibid. p.135
62. ibid. p.132
63. ibid. p.137
apprehension of truth. It points out the depth and grasp of poetic language. But Hulme does not altogether reject the traditional view. His theory, in fact, is a rather timid extension of it. He looks upon metaphor as a kind of deviation, and a device "which heightens a thing out of the level of prose? Moreover, he is aware mainly of visual metaphors which involve comparison. The language of poetry, he insists, "is not a counter 65 language, but a visual concrete one".

The basic assumptions of the traditional view of metaphor came to be challenged in the writings of I.A. Richards and William Empson. They carry further the arguments of the Romantics and justify the ambiguity inherent in language. They reject the classical view that

64. ibid. p.136; Also 'That is the avoidance of conventional language in order to get the exact curve of the thing". ibid. p.137

65. ibid. p.134
reality is independent of our mode of describing it. Reality is a relative term, and it depends on what man makes of what he perceives. And this depends very often on how he uses language. There is not just one way of using language. And it is a very flexible and highly sensitive medium. Words in it do not by themselves "mean"; we "mean" by them. What we mean by words depends on the discourse of context in which we use them. Their meaning, therefore, is not fixed and unchanging; it is, on the other hand, very fluid and expansive. Ambiguity, according to this view, is not a vice, but a necessary characteristic and a great virtue of language. Metaphor as a linguistic device must be considered in the light of these facts.

I.A. Richards attacked in The Philosophy of Rhetoric the basic assumptions of the Aristotelian theory of metaphor, namely, that the eye for resemblance necessary for metaphorizing is a rare gift, that
consequently the gift of metaphor is exceptional and cannot be imparted, and that metaphor is deviation from normal speech. He points out that the eye for resemblance is common to all human beings, though it is true, in some individuals it is very keen. We acquire our command of metaphor from others chiefly through the language which they and we use in common. And language itself cannot help us to learn anything except through the command of metaphor it imparts. Metaphor, in short, is not a deviation of language, but "the omnipresent principle of all its free action".

Richards' concept of metaphor is based on his view of the nature of language. He discards the traditional notion of plain speech in which one word has one and only one true meaning, because "outside the technical languages

of the sciences, it is not possible". A word is a much more complex affair in daily parlance, and especially in poetry. "There are many more possibilities here than the theory of language has yet tried to think out." Words always interact and as a result the meaning of a whole utterance in which they occur, moves. This is discernible even in a prosaic sentence like "The cat is on the mat" where we begin with the cat and end with the mat. This is the progression of thought in a simple sentence in which we pass quickly from the meaning of one word to another, and then the meaning of the whole sentence, distinguished from the meanings of separate words in it stands out before us. But with the movement of the meaning of an utterance, the meaning of individual words in it expands. This is especially seen in poetry. While describing the "unreproved pleasure free" of the happy man, Milton uses the expression - "Sport that

67. ibid. p.72

68. ibid. p.48
69 wrinkled care derides. Here the meaning of "wrinkled" cannot possibly be exhausted by its dictionary meanings. The associative meanings of words leading to the "interinanimation" is the active principle underlying all metaphor:

... a word is normally a substitute for ... not one discrete past impression, but a combination of general aspects. Now that is itself a summary account of metaphor. 70

Metaphor, accordingly, is not merely a matter of giving a thing a name that belongs to something else. It is bringing together in a lively way in a single word or phrase the thoughts associated with two things. Matthew Arnold, for example, employs the following metaphor to describe old age:

It is to add, immured,  
In the hot prison of the present, month  
To month with weary pain 71

69. L'Allegro, line 31.

70. The Philosophy of Rhetoric p.93

Here the metaphoric expression "the hot prison of the present" brings together in a single phrase the ideas of the heavy weight of time, helplessness and discomfort associated with old age and imprisonment. But metaphor is not a mere verbal matter, a juggling with words. It is inherent in our process of thinking, since comparison is the active principle in it. The ultimate source of metaphor is the element of comparison in thought. The skill in metaphor is the skill in thought, since fundamentally a metaphor is "a borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts".

This concept of metaphor disposes of the traditional view that metaphor is a detachable ornamental device.

I.A.Richards recognises, however, the co-presence of two inseparable elements in metaphor, namely, the "tenor" and the "vehicle", as he calls them. The "tenor"

72. The Philosophy of Rhetoric, p.94
is the principal subject, and the "vehicle" is the figure. (In the example quoted above, old age is the tenor and hot prison is the vehicle.) It is incorrect to say that the tenor is more important than the vehicle. The tenor is certainly not the "meaning"; it is only the subject. The vehicle is not a mere embellishment because it is essential to complete the "meaning". The "meaning" is the outcome of the co-presence of these elements in a metaphor.

Another important contribution of I. A. Richards to this subject is his division between metaphors of resemblance and metaphors of attitude. ("The division is not final or irreducible of course.") The traditional

73. Richards is aware that the respective contribution of the tenor and the vehicle to meaning may vary in different examples. "At one extreme the vehicle may become almost a mere decoration or colouring of the tenor, at the other extreme, the tenor may become a mere excuse for the introduction of the vehicle." (ibid. p.100). Their inseparable co-presence is, however, an unchallengable fact.

74. ibid. p.118
theory and even T.S. Hulme were aware only of metaphors
of resemblance. Richards criticizes Hulme for restricting
the scope of poetic language to the purely visual, barring
the abstract altogether from its sphere. Poetry does not
always make us see or "hand over sensations bodily".

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting
The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar:
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God who is our home
Heaven lies about us in our infancy.75

The visual element in these lines (life's star setting,
and trailing clouds) is very weak, and there is no
question here of handing over sensations bodily. The
language in these lines is quite abstract (Our birth is
but a sleep and a forgetting etc.) But these lines are
great poetry.

75. Wordsworth, Ode on Intimations of Immortality
from Recollections of Early Childhood.
The language of greatest poetry is frequently abstract and it is deliberately so. Words are not mere signs for things and sensations; language is not and cannot be a substitute for real experience. But it can do what sensations themselves cannot do. It can give a meaning to sensations which they originally lack and bring together and combine regions of experience which can never combine in sensation. Language is not a mere signalling system. "It is the instrument of all our distinctively human development, of everything in which we go beyond the other animals".

This view of language explains Richards' concept of the metaphor of attitude. It is, in every sense, "a borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts". Its central point of interest, accordingly is not resemblance, but contrast.

76. ibid. p.131
77. ibid. p.94
"We must not, with the 18th Century, suppose that the interactions of tenor and vehicle are to be confined to their resemblances. There is disparity of action too." 78

Richards' theory of metaphor constitutes a departure from the traditional thinking on this subject. His definition of metaphor as a "borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts" shows his deep insight into the problem. Before him Shelley and Coleridge had expressed similar views and he quotes them frequently for corroboration. But Richards is original in giving the form of a theory to what was implicit in the words of the great Romantics. His approach however, is strictly linguistic. His concept of metaphor of attitude and his investigation of the nature of language as combining various regions of experience recalls Coleridge's definition of the imagination. The concept of metaphor of attitude helps us to understand the nature of

78. ibid. p.127
what is called the cerebral quality of poetry, especially modern poetry with its strange images, and metaphors. After Richards' investigation, the problem of metaphor could not remain what it had been for over 2000 years. His thinking on the subject has directly and immediately encouraged more recent linguistic and formal studies of metaphor.

The same approach to language is discernible also in William Empson's theory of ambiguity.

An ambiguity, in ordinary speech, means something very pronounced, and as a rule witty and deceitful. Empson uses the term in an extended sense and treats as relevant to the subject any verbal nuance, however, slight, which gives room for alternative reactions to the same piece of language.

Words are not mechanical and lifeless signs, or mere collections of meaning. In a discourse, they are living and growing entities expanding in meaning.

Nor shall Death brag though wander'st in his shade, When in eternal lines to time though grow'st

Here Shakespeare uses the phrase "to grow to" while praising the immortality of his friend with his eternally pleasant and sunny nature. "To grow to" means to coalesce or become incorporate in, as a graft coalesces with its parent stock. The phrase, in short, means that because of this poem which is eternal and above the rule of all-killing time, his friend has been, as it were, grafted on to time, and has become part of eternity and hence he will "grow to time", despite physical death. The meaning of the phrase "to grow to" thus expands in this context much beyond its usual sense.


81. Editorial note on sonnet 18, ibid. p. 44
The living growing and expanding nature of words is the cause of the ambiguity which is inherent in language. Because of this characteristic an utterance becomes capable of being effective at once in a number of ways.

William Empson’s concept of metaphor is based on his theory of ambiguity. The source of metaphor is the capacity of words to be at once effective in a number of ways, or their ambiguity. But metaphor is also the source of ambiguity, because it brings words together in a startling way and causes their meaning to expand. Metaphor, thus is the principle of the growth of a language;

... metaphor, more or less far fetched, more or less complicated, more or less taken for granted (so as to be unconscious) is the normal mode of development (sic) of a language.

82. Seven types of Ambiguity, p.2

83. The fundamental situation, whether it deserves to be called ambiguous or not, is that a word or a grammatical structure is effective in several ways at once. ibid. p.2

84. ibid. p.2
This gives an account of metaphor altogether different from that given in the traditional theory. Empson does not give his own definition of metaphor, but quotes with approval Herbert Read's following definition:

Metaphor is the synthesis of several units of observation into one commanding image; it is the expression of a complex idea, not by analysis, nor by direct statement but by a sudden perception of an objective relation. 85

Herbert Read was perhaps not fully aware of the revolutionary nature of his definition for he immediately proceeds to offer a more or less traditional exegesis of Aristotle's well known remarks on metaphor. But Empson, it seems, was. But he did not develop a full-fledged theory of metaphor in "Seven Types of Ambiguity." For a more elaborate theory of metaphor we have to turn to his "The Structure of Complex Words" (1951) which very closely analyses the nature and behaviour of words. A word is a bundle of senses, implications, emotions and moods. It is a solid entity or a compacted doctrine, and is capable of directing opinion.

85. English Prose Style, (London, G. Bell and Sons 1928) p.25
The word "inflation", for example, carries with it in an economic discourse, a whole economic theory, and this meaning is a unified one. "The complexity of the word is simply the complexity of the topic." This kind of use of words is common in scientific discourse and is concerned with making "existence-assertions" (i.e. "A is B"), and the meaning of words in this kind of usage is fixed. There are, in addition, four other kinds of uses, based on the "A is B" pattern (existence-assertion); they are 1) "A is part of B", 2) "A entails B", 3) "A is like B" and 4) "A is typical of B". Of these four, No. 3 ("A is like B") is the basic formula of metaphor. The principle underlying metaphor is false-identity ("first imputing and then interpreting"). In metaphor a simple transfer of meaning does not take place because of false-identity, and there is a feeling of resistance. The A metaphor must be distinguished

86. *The Structure of Complex Words* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1951) p. 40

87. ibid. p. 43
88. ibid. p. 42
89. ibid. p. 341
from a simple transfer of meaning. When we come across a metaphor, we are immediately aware that a false identity is being established between two entities and initially at least our reaction is to resist the identity. But this reaction soon gives place to an awareness of the possible interpretations of the word and an appreciation of the new ways of thinking about the matter which the metaphor has opened out. Such a use of words in metaphor, Empson calls "pregnant".

"Pregnancy" is to be distinguished from ambiguity. Ambiguity is any verbal nuance, however slight which gives room for alternative reactions to a simple piece of language, whereas pregnancy involves an expansion of meaning as a result of the importation that metaphor brings in. It is the richness of the meaning of a word that makes metaphor possible. Ambiguity is not unrelated to metaphor. Metaphors may either be typifying or qualifying. In "Richard I was a lion", the pregnancy of/metaphor is a typifying one because the metaphor rests on courage being the typical property of lions. But we can also take the sentence as "Richard I was like a lion and lions are brave" in which case the pregnancy will be the qualifying one. The interpretation of metaphor can go further, for instance, if we take magnanimity or cruelty as being implied. Metaphors are rich because they
can carry both typifying and qualifying pregnancies.

Empson also recognizes that in a metaphor two ideas may give rise to a third more general idea which supersedes the two. This happens in the following passage from Shakespeare:

What custom willed in all things should we do it
The dust in antique time would lie unswept
And mountainous error lie so highly heaped
The truth could not o'erpeer.

In this passage it is the abstract idea common to all the processes which are compared, Empson calls this kind of metaphor mutual metaphor. Tenor and vehicle become examples in it of some wider concept which transcends them and upsets the ordinary scheme of interpretation.

It will be seen from this brief account of Empson's ideas that they are essentially a modification of Richards' views on metaphor with the additional concept of pregnancy.

Metaphors, I suggest, are not transfers, and also do carry equations, if and only if they imply a pregnant use of the term for the vehicle. 92

The Ricardian basis of this definition is apparent.

90. ibid. p.342
91. ibid. p.347
92. ibid. p.333
Notable among the recent linguistic investigations of metaphor is Miss Christine Brooke-Rose's *A Grammar of Metaphor* (1958). Miss. Brooke-Rose rejects the traditional "idea-content" analyses of metaphor seeking to explain the mental process involved in calling one thing another. Her approach to the problem is strictly grammatical since metaphor is expressed in words, and a metaphoric word reacts on other words to which it is syntactically and grammatically related. The effect of this interaction varies considerably according to the nature of this grammatical relationship. 93

Metaphor according to her is "any replacement of one word by another, or any identification of one thing, concept or person with any other". It is not merely the perception of similarity in dissimilarity, it is the changing of words by one another, and syntax is rich in methods of doing this, each with different effects". Miss. Brooke-Rose's

94. ibid. pp.23-24
95. ibid. p.93
concern, accordingly, is to show how this happens on the plane of grammar. For this purpose she proceeds to analyse metaphor in terms of the grammatical parts of speech which play a vital role in this process. These are nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, pronouns, possessive adjectives and prepositions. According to Miss Brook-Rose's observation, noun metaphors generally abound; verb metaphors stand next in popularity; the remaining elements in language "are rather weaker in metaphoric use". Her approach to the problem will be clear if we take into account her analysis of noun-metaphors. She lists five main types of noun-metaphors:

1) Metaphor by simple replacement: In this type the thing about which we speak or the "proper term" is altogether replaced by the metaphorical term. We have only to guess what it is, but there is no difficulty in guessing, because the context is amply clear. Thus, in a given context, we have no difficulty in guessing that

96. ibid. p.238
the metaphorical term "the flower" points to the
proper term "the lady". Keats has used this type of
metaphor to describe his experience of great literature.

Much have I travell'd in the realms of gold
And many goodly states and kingdoms seen :
Round many western islands have I been
Which bards in fealty to Apollo hold.

ii) Metaphor by pointing formulae : - In this type the
proper term is mentioned separately; then the metaphor
term occurs but in a different metaphor; it points back
to the proper term and metaphorically changes it. An
example given by Miss Brooke-Rose and her explanation
thereof will make this type clear :

And sweare
No where lives a woman true and faire.
If thou findest one, let mee know,
Such a pilgrimage were sweet ...  

It is not the woman who is the pilgrimage but the
journey to her, strictly speaking unmentioned,
though clearly understood : but the woman is by
means of the demonstrative, indirectly changed into
an enshrined saint. 97

97. ibid. p.69
iii) The Copula: In this type the proper term is linked with the metaphoric by the verb "to be". This is the commonest type of metaphor. The copula is more varied than would appear from its simple formula "A is B":

Folly is an endless maze
Octavia is a blessed lottery to him
An aged man is but a paltry thing,
A tattered coat upon a stick.

iv) The verb "to make": This type is not much different from the copula. It states "the actual process of changing the proper term into metaphor, as well as the agent who performs or causes the change". Instead of "make", other synonymous verbs are also used:

So I her absence will my penance make.

v) The Genitive Links: This type covers all other metaphorical relationships between two nouns. The most

98. ibid. p.132.
important genitive link is the preposition "of" and its equivalents. But it includes "other grammatical tools besides the genitive case". In this type the proper term is linked to the second and the third term (the metaphorical term) by "of" \((A = C \text{ of } B)\). Thus it is possible to speak metaphorically of the sun as the "lamp of heaven": \(\text{sun}(A) \text{ heaven}(B) \text{ lamp}(C) \text{ house}(D)\).

Th' expense of spirit in a waste of shame
Is lust in action.

O sages standing in God's holy fire,
As in the gold mosaic of a wall,
Come from the holy fire, perne in a gyre
And be the singing masters of my soul.

vi) Verb Metaphors: The chief difference between the noun metaphor and the verb metaphor is that the verb metaphor is based on an implicit comparison between two actions. But in the process, even the nouns are changed metaphorically.

Swift has sailed into his rest.

99. ibid. p.146
Here the metaphorical verb "sail" not only implies a change in peaceful passing away, but metaphorically/Swift into a ship, and rest, into the harbour of destination. Verb metaphors are more subtle, because the resemblance they imply is not just one point of similarity. They work by extending the meaning of the metaphorical verb. Thus, "melts" in "Authority melts from me", extends to something becoming fluid and shapeless and hence slowly slipping out of hand.

Since even according to Miss Brooks-Rose's observation metaphors which depend on other parts of speech such as adjectives, adverbs, pronouns etc. are comparatively rare, we need not go into their details. We may, instead, try to estimate her contribution to the subject.

This bare outline of Miss Brooke-Rose's "grammar of metaphor" given in this section can hardly give an

100. *Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra* III.vi-61

adequate idea of the range, variety, depth and richness of her analysis. Though her strictly grammatical approach is new, the question of its usefulness remains. Putting the various elements in metaphor in neat grammatical categories can hardly enhance our enjoyment of poetry, or even help us to understand better metaphor as a poetic device. Miss Brook-Rose discards the old "idea-content" approach, favours a strictly structural approach, but does not explain how mere structure can help us in distinguishing a banal metaphor from a poetic one. The most serious defect of her theory perhaps is that it leads us away altogether from the plane of poetry to the plane of grammar (which is not to deny the role of grammar in poetic effects).

A far more balanced linguistic approach is that of Mrs. Winifred Nowottny. In her book The Language Poets Use she accepts the importance of the "idea-content" analysis of metaphor, though her approach to the problem is structural. The principle on which her discussion proceeds is strongly reminiscent of I. A. Richards' theory of the interanimation of words. A consideration of the
language of poets, Mrs. Nowottny observes, may well lead ... to a recognition of the fact that the various elements of poetic language interpenetrate one another with an intimacy which is of first importance in any consideration of how poetry "works". 102

In order to probe the nature of this interpenetration, it is necessary to study, among other things, the effects gained by the use of metaphor. Metaphoric configuration of words is a special characteristic of poetry. "One reason why metaphor is common in poetry is that metaphor vastly extends the language at the poet's disposal". The great power of metaphor can be understood only on the background of simple linguistic facts involved in it.

Metaphor is not merely a compressed simile. The natures of the two are vastly different. The comparison in a simile is explicit. It is based on the formula "A is like B". There is a special word like 'as' 'like' etc.


103. ibid. p. 67.
to mark the similarity between two things. Words are used literally in it. "By the literal sense of a word we may mean the sense which a word has in other contexts". Thus, in a simile like "His new house is like a palace", both "house" and "palace" are used in the sense which they have in other contexts also. By "other contexts" is meant here normal (non-figurative) usage of language.

Metaphor is far more complex than simile. The relationship between the elements in a metaphor (i.e. "tenor" and "vehicle", as I.A.Richards calls them), raises a host of questions. Metaphorical relationship arises out of the way of "speaking of X as though it were Y". It not only indicates that X and Y are in some way similar, but also by the same act points to their disparity. The fact of their disparity gives rise to the "distance" or "tension" between them. The metaphor in "The ship ploughs the waves" not only shows

104. ibid. p.52

105. ibid, p.49
that the action of the ship to the waves is in some way similar to the action of a plough to the soil, but brings to mind that the two actions are also dissimilar, and sets the mind thinking about the extent of their similarity and dissimilarity. It is the presence of this element that makes metaphor so difficult to analyse. At present we do not have a suitable term to describe briefly this peculiar "Yes/No relationship" of simultaneous similarity and dissimilarity. The peculiarity of a metaphor is that this "unnamed something", is present in the situation it describes, but it is not verbally specified in the metaphor itself. But the strength or weakness of a metaphor depends on this factor which, for want of a better term, Mrs. Nowottny calls 'x'. The 'x' comes in a metaphor in an instant in the form of a figurative word or phrase. This gives us a sense of gap between the two members of the relationship ("ship" and ploughs" in the given example). This affects the frame of a sentence, since it leads to complexity, and implies at semantic level two different sentences: 'The ship does something to waves', 'The plough ploughs the soil'.

106. ibid. p.53
To get the sense of the parallelism between the two actions (i.e., the ship's and the plough's) we will have to write a number of different sentences (e.g., The ship goes through ...; The plough goes through etc.) but this is actually never done. The implicit sentences function simultaneously to provide a parallel action (or in a different example like "the lamp of heaven", a reflected image). This simple example will serve to show how a metaphor works. It involves linguistic inferences at a deep level. "A metaphor is thus a set of linguistic directions for supplying the sense of an unwritten literal term." But this unwritten literal term showing the peculiar "Yes/No relationship" between the two members in a metaphor in fact, does not exist in language. It is, therefore, that language has to use metaphors.

The use of the word "term" should not mislead us here. "We should note that metaphor directs us to

107. ibid. p.56
the sense, not to the exact term*. The literary value of metaphor depends on this semantic fact. The meaning of a metaphoric word or phrase is open to interpretation; it is not fixed and delimited.

Metaphor indicates how to find out or to construct the target, but does not contaminate the mental image of the target by using any one of the literal terms available in ordinary language for referring to such a target. The reader pieces out the metaphor by something supplied or constructed from his own experience, according to the specifications given linguistically by the utterance in which the metaphor occurs. 109

The expansive sense of metaphor is the result of the associations and suggestions it evokes. Figurative words do not altogether lose their literal sense; they bring, on the other hand, "diffused aura of their literal use". What a metaphor means in a given context depends on the reader's word-associations and associations in life-experience.

108. ibid. p.59
109. ibid. p.59
110. ibid. p.64
The usefulness of metaphor is that it helps to bring in a close relation normally unrelated phenomena, experiences, and emotions, and shows thereby what common language is unable to say about them. There is no single word in common language to express the feeling, for example, in a simple metaphoric utterance like "The Secretariat Building stared at me". Here the metaphoric verb "stared" not so much describes the building as it does the mind of the speaker. The appearance of the building and its effect on the speaker's mind are combined in one word "stared". Metaphor is particularly useful in dealing with shades of private emotions and unnamed experiences. The reason why metaphor is widely used in poetry is that it extends the range of the words at the poet's disposal and solves the major problem of diction.

Mrs. Nowottny's concept of the "structure" of metaphor is her contribution to the subject. The structure in question is nothing but placing a figurative word or phrase within a sentence and causing thereby a new awareness. Though it is called the "linguistic form", it works on semantic grounds. This also shows the
limitations of metaphor. It is not possible in every case to speak of "X as though it were Y". "Not all analogies can be made to work linguistically". Free "linkage" of all words is not always possible. An attempt, therefore, is made in recent linguistic studies of metaphor to investigate this problem.

The Romantic view of metaphor and poetic language (also favoured by modern critics like Richards, Empson, Brook-Rose and Nowottny) seems to be set aside by modern linguistics. In it, there is clearly a stress on the deviant nature of poetic language and of metaphor. Jan Mukarovsky, the author of the theory of "foregrounding" very clearly states this in his 'Standard Language and Poetic Language' (1950)

Poetic language is ... not a brand of the standard. This is not to deny the close connection between the two, which consists in the fact that the standard language is for poetry the background against which is reflected the aesthetically intentional violation of the norm of the standard.112

111. ibid. p.68
The function of poetic language, like that of standard language, is not mere communication. It is "foregrounding", or de-automatization of meaning. Standard language reduces an event to a scheme; poetic language violates the scheme by means of "foregrounding". It pushes mere communication in the background, imparts intensity to an expression, makes it valuable for its own sake. It is used "in order to place in the fore-ground the act of expression, the act of speech itself". 114

Foregrounding is achieved in a number of ways including the use of metaphor. Mukarovsky does not in this connection explicitly mention metaphor, but his words clearly point to it:

The deautomatization of meaning in a certain work is consistently carried out by lexical selection (the mutual interlading of contrasting areas of the lexicon), in another equally consistently by the uncommon semantic relationship of words together in the context. 115

113. ibid. p.244
114. ibid. p.243
115. ibid. p.244
Mukarovsky does not, however, indicate the limits of foregrounding. Though he admits that the foregrounding of all the components of poetic language is impossible, he insists on "the maximum foregrounding of the utterance". But deviation, in order to be meaningful and intelligible, cannot stray far from the standard language. It must have some definable limit. An attempt was made by J.R. Firth in his "Modes of Meaning" to define the extent of deviation in poetic language. His approach to the problem is strictly semantic. "Meaning" in poetry, as in everyday speech, is not something fixed. It varies from context to context.

The use of the word 'meaning' is subject to the general rule that each word, when used in a new context is a new word. 117

But the meaning in poetry is not merely contextual; it depends on the collocation of words. The rule of collocation

116. ibid. p. 243

is applicable also to everyday language. The meaning of the word **ass** in the following sentences is by collocation:

1) An ass like him might easily say that.

2) He is a silly ass.

The commonest collocations of the word *ass* are "silly" "obstinate" "stupid" "awful" etc. They are never "wise", "beautiful" etc. It must be made clear, however, that meaning by collocation is altogether different from contextual meaning, "which is the functional relation of the sentence to the processes of a context of situation in the context of culture".\(^\text{118}\) The meaning of the English words "rapid" and "rabid" and the sentences "he lies" and "the book lies on the table" depends on the context and not on collocation. But only context can indicate the meaning of a phonetic sequence in English like *en*im (a, an, aim, name).

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\(^{118}\) ibid. p.195
The possibilities of collocation are not unlimited. The word "time", for example, is likely to be collocated with words like "passes", "spent", "wasted", "flies", "frittered away". It is not likely to be collocated with a word like "stone". A collocation like "time spent" "time saved", "time wasted" gives the additional meaning of something valuable like wealth.

But the meaning by collocation does not involve the separate determination of each individual word. It is instantaneous and operates at a deep semantic level. It is "an abstraction at the syntagmatic level and is not directly concerned with the conceptual or idea-approach to the meaning of words".

Firth's theory of collocation and collocability of words sounds very plausible. But the distinction he makes between contextual meaning and meaning by collocation is very thin. He takes the word "context" in a very narrow sense. But often it is context that determines collocation. His theory, therefore, does not carry us far.

119. ibid. p.196
Another linguistic analysis of metaphor is offered by Geoffrey N. Leech. He argues that for a poet, language is not a mere code of rules to be obeyed or violated mechanically or ignorantly. His code is deliberate choice, which frequently leads to linguistic deviations. This may be shown by a reference to Dylan Thomas' phrase "a grief ago". The word "ago" occurs in normal language paradigmatically with other words showing time, as for instance, "a week ago", "a year ago" etc. But in the poem, it occurs in the same paradigm in an "especial" or deviant form. Metaphor is also a pattern of deviation.

"The newly minted poetic metaphor violates the usage recorded in the dictionary by creating an unorthodox sense of a word or expression". But metaphorical expressions are not merely eccentric. They always follow the rule of the transference of meaning or "particular mechanisms for deriving one meaning of a word from another". One common rule of metaphor is "F = like L" i.e., the

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121. ibid. p.148
figurative meaning F is derived from the literal meaning L in having the sense 'like L', or 'it is as if L'. As an example, Leech quotes the following lines:

Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
and then is heard no more.

* (Macbeth, V. v)

Here we do not get a series of definitions of life, though it appears so. We know that life is not a "walking shadow". We have to take, therefore, this expression figuratively by applying the metaphorical rule 'F = like L'. But this is only on the level of analysis; in practice, F and L are as seen/identical.

With this we may pause to evaluate the approach of modern linguists to metaphor. Our brief account of the views of some of them is not exhaustive but it is fairly representative. The linguists themselves are clearly aware of the limitations of their grammatical approach. Their

attempts to reduce metaphor to a linguistic formula yield nothing more than analytical trivialities. But the formal peculiarities of metaphor which they discuss are not new either. The significance of metaphor is more semantic than formal and the science of linguistics is not yet adequate to deal with its semantics.

A brief but far more penetrating is the philosopher M. C. Beardsley's investigation of metaphor. His approach to the problem is semantic-logical. He distinguishes between poetic discourse and logical discourse. Poetic discourse according to him, is "self-controverting". Its essential principle is that the speaker or writer utters a statement explicitly but in such a way as to show that he does not believe what he states, or is not primarily interested in what he states, and thereby calls attention to something else that he has not explicitly stated. 123

When a man says, for example, "If he wins, I will eat my hat", he does not literally mean what he says but draws our attention to his attitude to an eventuality. Self-controverting

expressions like this are a common characteristic also of poetic language. Sometimes we get directly contradictory expressions like "idly-busy" "eloquently silent" etc. as in the figure of speech oxymoron. The modifiers "idly-busy" or "eloquently-silent" can be meaningfully attributed to a subject like "man". Here the reader knows that the contradiction is deliberate and meaningful and tries to construe it. But there is also indirect contradiction as in the utterances like "Life is but a dream", and "argumentative windows" and "metaphysical streets". Life has as its part not only dreaming, but also waking and deep sleep; arguments belong only to human beings, and streets are physical. But the indirect contradiction suggests that the "subject" life or the windows and the streets have some characteristics connoted by the modifier. Life has something of the momentariness and unreality of a dream, windows look deliberate like an argumentative person, and streets are endless like a metaphysical discourse. This kind of contradiction is the principal stuff of metaphor. Another kind of its stuff is an attribution obviously false in the context, but pointing to a characteristic
in the subject connoted by the modifier. "The university is a fish market" is an utterance of this kind. The university is a seat of learning and not a place for buying and selling of fish, but the modifier "fish-market" connotes noise and disorderliness characterising the subject "university".

The really difficult thing about a metaphor is the medi connotations of the modifier in the given context.

The more difficult it is to work out connotations of the modifier that can be attributed to the subject, the more obscure is the metaphor — but this obviously depends upon the power of the reader.

Beardsley's "controversion theory" as he prefers to call it, offers the framework of all metaphors. He claims that it better explains the capacity of metaphor to create new contextual meanings and the tension between the subject and the modifier. This theory does away with

124. ibid. p.143
the age-old idea of implicit similarity between the subject and the modifier, and offers instead the new concept of contradiction leading to the connotation of the modifier which can be attributed to the subject.

The divergence between the explicit statement and the implicit meaning in metaphor is central also to Ina Loewenberg's recent study of the subject. In her paper "Identifying Metaphors" she considers the problem from the point of view of truth value. She argues that metaphors are identifiable by their semantic form; they are all assertions with an element of ambiguity as to their truth value. "A metaphorical utterance is ambiguous because it can be taken as a false assertion or as a metaphor." An utterance like "I was a morsel for a monarch" cannot obviously be true unless one is speaking of a cannibal king. But it is clearly not the case since


126. ibid. p.335
the words are from Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra* (I.v.30), and refer to Cleopatra and Caesar. When an utterance falls as an assertion, it is either dismissed as false or taken as metaphorical. When the hearer judges that in an utterance the speaker is not making a truth claim about the referents in it but only inviting him to understand or view them in a peculiar way, it is a metaphorical utterance. This is a semantically "non-standard" way and leads to a "non-standard" interpretation of words.¹²⁷

Metaphors according to this view are devoid of truth-value. Truth value is central to their identification only inversely, since metaphors are ambiguous, and may be taken as false statements. We can only say that this is a very narrow view of truth. Lowenberg seems to have in mind the truth of referents in scientific terminology.

¹²⁷. ibid. p.335
when she speaks of the truth of referents in metaphor.
A metaphorical utterance, as Lowenberg herself explains, is a "proposal about a way to view, understand, etc., those referents." But this proposal cannot be false since it calls for an intuitive agreement between the speaker and the hearer based on the truth of their experience of what a metaphor describes. It is true that there are no neat logical referents to describe it, but that is exactly the reason why we have metaphors.

In this brief study we have traced in outline the growth of the concept of metaphor in Western criticism from Aristotle to our own times. That, which to Aristotle and to many centuries after him, was only a decorative device and small part of diction, appeared to the great English Romantics the governing principle of the growth of language and thought. That is also the secret of the poet's power to deal with experiences which ordinary language cannot deal with. But metaphor has not yet revealed its secret to investigators. It is yet an open question and is likely to remain so.

128. ibid. p. 335
SECTION II

INDIAN VIEWS OF METAPHOR:

In Section I we considered metaphor from two different points of view, namely, as a particular figure of speech and as a basic mode of poetic use of language. We shall follow the same procedure in this section also, since we are interested not in a particular figure of speech per se, but in the basic issues of poetics involved in metaphor. There is nothing arbitrary in this, since it is usual with Sanskrit poeticians to put the question of poetic figures in the wider context of the whole phenomenon of poetry. It is very common with them, for example to speak of the "body" and the "soul" of poetry. The body is the structure of poetry, and it is the outcome of the words and their meanings; the "soul" is the rasa or the aesthetic experience which accrues through the structure. This "body-soul"

129. sabdārthaśarīram tāvat kāvyam. (Dh. L. Ch. I)
analogy has a deep significance. It points to the interdependence of and the cohesion between the structure and the effect of poetry. The soul cannot exist in isolation from the body; without the soul, the body is dead. Aesthetic experience is inconceivable without the structure through which alone it is available; the structure incapable of affording aesthetic experience exists in vain; a defect in structure may adversely affect rasa; a serious defect may prove fatal to it. Sanskrit poeticians, therefore, carefully take into account the factors that constitute the "body" of poetry, and its embellishments. Traditionally, these are style and diction (riti), poetic qualities (guna), and figures of speech (alankara). Part of this consideration is the question of decorum (aucitya) which must be observed, and a discussion of defects (dosa) which must be avoided.

Of all these factors, figures of speech claim most of the attention of Sanskrit poeticians, for they play a very important part in heightening the effect of poetry.
They constitute its most obvious beauty. They are like ornaments which decorate a person. According to Vamana and Bhamaha (8th Cent. A.D.), poetry attracts primarily on account of figures.

Poetic figures are deviations from normal speech. Another common Sanskrit term for poetic figure, vakrokti (deviant speech style) clearly refers to its deviant nature. The nature of deviation in figures can be

130. sarīrinopi upakārakā harādaya jvalāmkarāh KP.Ch.VIII p.46; also alāmkarasabdah sarīrasya sobhātisayakāritvāt kaṭakādisu vartate. tatkāritvasamānyad upacārad (Kuntakā's Vakroktijīvita with Acharya Vishveshvar's Hindi Commentary, ed. Nagendra, New Delhi, Atmaram and Sons, 1955) p.8

131. kāvyaṃ, grahyam alāmkarat (Vamana's Kāvyaalāmkarasutra, I.1.1, ed. N.R. Acharya, Bombay : Nirnayasagar, 1953, p.1) also na nitāntādinātreṇa jayate cayuṭa girāṃ vakrābhīdheyasabdottirīṣṭā vacām alāmkṛtih (Bhāmahas Kavyalamkara I.36)
The function of language, in poetry as also in everyday life, is semantic. But language performs this function in these two spheres (i.e. in poetry and in life) at different levels. Poetry exploits the semantic possibilities of language to the fullest extent, and produces a kind of effect peculiar to itself. But the basic semantic function of language, as will be shown, remains the same. Sanskrit poeticians, therefore, have based their analysis of poetic figures on their semantic analysis of language.

The most obvious semantic level is the denotative. Meanings of words are fixed at this level strictly by convention (saśketa). The dictionary rule "this is the word, this is the meaning" is always valid here. The denotative function of language is most convenient in scientific discourse and logical argument because it helps to define terms precisely. It is also the normal

132. In Sanskrit, asmāt padāt ayamartho boddhavyah.
mode of expression in everyday speech. The function of language at this level is called, in Sanskrit, abhidhā.

Abhidhā is the normal mode but not the norm of expression in every context. Its limitations are the limitations of a strictly denotative language. There is no word in such a language to describe, for example, the bovine qualities of a man or the moon-like appearance of a lady. Here the merely denotative language fails, and we have to resort to a deviant mode of expression to convey the desired sense. The deviation consists in using words not in their primary denotative sense, but in their secondary associative senses. Thus, to convey the bovine qualities of a man, we describe him as "an ox". Here we use the word "ox" not in its primary sense, i.e., a kind of animal, but in its associative senses of slowness, heaviness, dulness etc. The function of language at this semantic level (i.e., the level of associative meanings) is called, in Sanskrit, lakṣāna. Lakṣāna, as will be shown, is the matrix of poetic figures.
The semantic function of lakṣaṇa operates only under certain conditions. The conditions are that in the given context the denotative sense must be inapplicable (mukhyārthabādha), the associative sense must be in some way connected with the primary denotative sense (tadyoga), and the speaker must have a purpose (prayojana) in using an expression in an other than denotative sense. Thus, the expression, "a fish out of water" operates only at the denotative level if it refers to a fish, but at the level of lakṣaṇa if it describes a man. The denotative sense is inapplicable in the latter case because a man cannot be a fish. But the expression is allowed since it points to the condition of being out of congenial surroundings, common both to "a fish out of water" and the man in question. An expression like this is used because the speaker seeks to suggest through it the helplessness and agony of a man in hostile surroundings.

133. We are not considering here rudhilaksana or fossilized metaphorical expressions like "the arm of a chair", "the hand of a clock", etc. because they are of no interest to our study.
Laksana can assume various forms depending on the relationship between the denotative sense of an expression and its associative senses. The relationship can be that of similarity as in the example "a fish out of water". It can also be that of proximity as in the expression "The cowherd's hamlet is on the Gaṅga", where 'Gaṅga' means the bank of the river. Sometimes it is opposition as in the expression "a capital idea" in the sense of a foolish idea. Some other relationships like the thing possessed and the possessor (e.g. 'lances' for 'lancemen'), cause and effect ("food is energy") are also at the root of laksana. For the study of metaphor and other figures of speech, however, only the laksana based on similarity or comparison is important.

Laksana either extends the meaning of an expression or altogether substitutes a new meaning for it. In the expression "Lances are coming", "lances" is extended to mean soldiers with lances; in "The cowherd's hamlet is on the Gaṅga", the meaning "bank" substitutes the usual meaning "current". This is observable especially in respect of the standard of comparison
in the laksana based on comparison, as in the example "a fish out of water".

But both the object and the standard of comparison may not always be distinctly mentioned. When they are distinctly mentioned, and the standard of comparison is the predicate (as in a copula), we get attributive (sāropā) laksana as in the expression, "This boy is a stone". Sometimes only the standard of comparison is mentioned, the object of comparison being swallowed up (nigirna) by it, as it were, as in the expression "This is a stone", where "this" stands for the boy. This kind of laksana altogether substitutes the object by the standard of comparison, and may therefore, be called substitutive laksana.

Of these two varieties of laksana of comparison, the first, namely, sāropā (attributive or the copula),

134. technically called "gauni-laksana".

135. in Sanskrit, sādhyavasāna gauni laksana.
is strictly speaking, the formula of metaphor. The second variety, namely, sadhyavasana (substitutive) also gives rise to metaphorical expressions. But on the basis of stylistic variation, Sanskrit poeticians use a different name for it. But since here also the basic linguistic phenomenon is the same, we may treat them only as variations of metaphor.

On the background of this semantic analysis of laksana, a study of metaphor becomes easier. The Sanskrit word for metaphor is rupaka. It is defined by most Sanskrit poeticians in terms of simile, for according to them, it is a compressed simile. Mammata, for instance, defines it as the identification of the subject and the standard of comparison on account of their extreme similarity. One more important characteristic of rupaka, according to Mammata, is that in spite of the identification, there is no attempt in it to conceal the difference between the object and the standard of comparison. 136

136. tadrupakam abheda ya upamanopameyayoh
atisamyat anapanhutabhedayoh abhedah. KP.Ch.16, p.593
Thus, in the description of a lady as "moon-faced" there is identification of the moon and the face, but the difference between the two remains patent. This factor is responsible for what the Western critics call "the tension" between the object and the metaphorical term. It is responsible, according to Indian poeticians, for the element of suggestion which alone justifies the use of laksana.

Rūpaka, must, however, be carefully distinguished from laksana which is only a linguistic formula with a semantic function. Rūpaka is the exploitation of that formula for poetic purposes. It is, in other words, an alaṃkāra, and must have the essential characteristics of the alaṃkāras (poetic figures).

As ornaments (for that is the literal meaning of alaṃkāra) figures of speech must beautify poetic language.

137. yasya pratītimadhātum laksana samupāsyate/phrase
sabdākagamyetra vyañjanāt nāparā kriyā KP.Ch.II,p.58
They must have intensity and produce a heightening effect. They must excel ordinary expressions and present those experiences and meanings which ordinary speech cannot convey. Their ken is always what transcends the commonplace (lokatikrāntagocara). This is called *atisaya* (surpassingness, excellence, transcendance, intensity etc.). *Atisaya* is the justification of poetic figures. It saves them from being mere variations of mechanical formulae. Another important characteristic of poetic figures is that they bring about a complete transformation of meanings. As Kuntaka puts it, words and meanings come, as it were, to throb with life, and give rise to a transcending meaning which no other expression in language can ever convey.

138. Bhamaha II.81
139. KP Ch.VIII, p.465
140. *śabdo vivaksitārthai kavyācakonya śatsvapi arthah sahrdayāhādakārisvaspandasundarah* (Vakroktijivita, I.9, p.38)
The power of suggestion in words animates a figure of speech. This power is released because of the peculiar deviant mode of expression in figures. In rūpaka (metaphor), for instance, it is the formula of sāropā-gauni-lakṣaṇā (i.e. attributive lakṣaṇā of comparison; e.g. "This boy is a stone"). It is applicable also to poetic expressions:

She is all States and all Princes, I, Nothing else is. 141

The expressions "She is all states", "I am all princes", are obviously deviant, but are acceptable on account of the similarity between the terms identified. The beloved and the states have the common quality of splendour; the lover and the princes have in common the pride of possession. The beloved is the lover's most treasured possession. In her he has all the royal splendours and kingly joys. But she is not just one state but "all states"; she is a world apart, and besides her "nothing else is". She is, in fact, his real world, full of royal splendour and joy.

The linguistic formula underlying rūpaka sometimes undergoes variations and gives rise to different styles of expression. In one such variation (sadhyavasāna gaunī laksana) the object is substituted by the metaphorical term as in the example "the eye of heaven" (instead of "the sun is the eye of heaven"). It is clear that these are all metaphorical expressions, since transference of meaning is common to them all. But Sanskrit poeticians have a different nomenclature for each of them, and thus, each is a different figure of speech. We need not, however, go into these subtle ramifications, for our interest is in the general linguistic phenomenon of metaphor and not in a close classification of minute stylistic variations.

In his discussion of poetic figures, Anandavardhana points out that figures do not have any value in themselves. Their value is in their subservience. They must be controlled by the total meaning of a work

142. This man is a mountain (rupaka).
This is a mountain (atiśayokti or exaggeration)
This is not a man, but a mountain. (apahnuti).
of art, or by rasa, in other words. They must flow naturally and easily, and without any inordinate extra efforts on the part of the writer. They must not distract the reader's attention, but must contribute to his experience of rasa.

This is, in brief, the Indian poeticians' view of metaphor. In the next section we shall compare this with the Western theories of metaphor.

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143. \textit{rasabhāvīditātparyamāśritya viniveśanam alamkṛtīnām sarvāsām alamkāratvāsādhanām} (Dhvanīloka II.6)

144. \textit{aprthagyatnanirvartya} (ibid. II.17)
SECTION III

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE WESTERN AND INDIAN VIEWS OF METAPHOR.

Like poetry, metaphor is also a universal phenomenon and that is only natural since metaphor in its generic sense is an essential characteristic of poetic language. There are many striking similarities, therefore, between the Western and the Indian theoretical investigations of this linguistic phenomenon. Both recognise, for instance, mastery of metaphor as a hallmark of genius. Aristotle described it as "the greatest thing by far"; Indian poeticians looked upon it as a manifestation of pratibba (poetic imagination). Both agree that figures are deviant modes of expression, and that they beautify poetic language, make it more intense and more effective. So far as metaphor is concerned there is much general


146. See p.214 above.
agreement about its nature, though its analyses are
different in both the traditions. Aristotle's analysis,
(which is the basis of all subsequent investigations in
the West) is almost mathematical as is apparent from
the name he gives to the most important variety of
metaphor (i.e., "proportional" or "analogical" metaphor).
The four terms in it are so related that the second (B)
is to the first (A), as the fourth (D) is to the third (C),
and therefore, (B) and (D) can be each other's
metaphorical names. The Indian approach, on the other
hand, is semantic; it is based on the study of
linguistic deviation in figurative expressions; its
core is the concept of laksana. It is more comparable
to the modern linguistic analyses of metaphor in the West.
We shall go into more details afterwards. The deviant
nature of figurative expressions raises some important
questions about the relationship between normal speech
and poetic speech, and that between language and reality.
Aristotle's view (and this view prevailed till the
advent of the Romantic Age) was that figures were an
"added extra" to normal speech, that they were "a
seasoning of the meat". A corresponding view is the
Indian concept of figures as ornaments which decorate the body. The norm of expression, according to Aristotle, was the ordinary denotative speech with 1:1 correlation between word and meaning. Language was only a means to describe reality, and could describe it in a number of ways, but the way of describing could not alter reality. Language must subserve only to give a faithful account of reality, and therefore, it must avoid metaphorical effulgence since ambiguity was always its attendant vice. Only in poetic discourse could metaphor be welcome, for it contributed to peculiar poetic effects. This distrust of figurative speech is seen in its extreme in 18th Century English literature and science.

With the advent of the Romantic Age, these tenets of the Aristotelian thinking came to be challenged. Coleridge and Shelley, for instance, maintained that metaphor was inherent in language and that it was the principle of its growth. Ambiguity was not a weakness of language, but its strength, because it pointed to the essential aspect of reality, as it was experienced by man.
Reality, accordingly, could not be purely objective, or something existing apart from the experiencing subject. It was what man with the help of the imagination created out of the impressions he received from without. In this process language as an instrument of the imagination played a vital role. Language, in other words, could reshape and mould reality. Since metaphorising was a basic and necessary linguistic activity, metaphor played an essential role in man's apprehension of reality. The Romantic concept of metaphor was deeply influenced by the epistemology of German idealism.

Important modern critics like I. A. Richards and Empson do not speak of epistemology, but retain the essential tenets of the romantic theory of language and of metaphor. They look upon language as a living and growing organ, and consider ambiguity as its strength. A word is a far more complex affair, and it cannot have only one sense. In combination, words give rise to meanings and experiences which are not available in actual life. Richards and Empson reject the old Aristotelian view of metaphor as deviant expression.
In modern linguistic studies, as those of Mukarovski, Firth, Levin etc. the concept of deviation is resuscitated, but the stress is on the suggestive strength of metaphor. Structural analyses, as those of Miss C. Brooke-Rose etc. have not led to any remarkable results. Modern philosophical studies of metaphor, like those of Beardsley and Ina Lowenberg, also stress the element of suggestion in metaphor, though they use a slightly different terminology.

The Indian approach to metaphor appears, on this background, altogether different. It is purely semantic, and is free from epistemological controversies. It does not enter into any discussion of the relationship between language and reality. It concentrates on the study of language and its functioning at different semantic levels—denotative (abhidha), indicative (laksana) and suggestive (vyanjana). By semantic analysis, it arrives at the basic formula underlying

147. "The principle of controversion" (Beardsley);
"Explicit statement and implicit meaning" (Lowenberg).
metaphorical expressions. Indian poeticians recognise that the metaphor is deviant in nature, but stress that this kind of deviation is inherent in language, and that in a given context, any word can function on different semantic levels. They carefully distinguish the formula from the figure of speech; the formula is only laksana, the figure of speech is alamkāra. Alamkāra must have a literary value, it must be controlled by the total context of a work of art. It must, in its own way, by its suggestiveness, contribute to heighten and intensify the total meaning of a work of art. It must be, in short, a manifestation of pratibha (poetic imagination).

The approach of Sanskrit poeticians thus combines into one comprehensive theory of metaphor the various elements that lie scattered in the classical, Romantic and modern philosophic and linguistic studies of metaphor.