PEACEKEEPING IN TIMOR-LESTE: ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED MISSION IN TIMOR (UNMIT)

ABSTRACT

BY

MONTGOMERY BLAH

SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE OF NORTH-EASTERN HILL UNIVERSITY SHILLONG 2017
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**Introduction:**

The United Nations (UN) was established on 24\textsuperscript{th} October 1945 in the aftermath of Second World War dedicated to save the “succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”\textsuperscript{1} The Security Council- the organ with the primary responsibility under the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security deployed UN peacekeeping operation to help reduced tension in trouble areas, keep opposing forces apart and create conditions for sustainable peace after a settlement has been arrived at.\textsuperscript{2}

The founders of the United Nations had not foreseen the possibility of engaging in peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{3} The most commonly suggested understanding of UN peacekeeping seems to have been derived from Hammarskjold-Pearson recipe\textsuperscript{4} for United Nations peacekeeping that found place under “Chapters six and a half”\textsuperscript{5} of the UN Charter. This implies that it falls between provisions of chapter six that provides for pacific settlement of disputes and chapter seven that relate to actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.\textsuperscript{6}

In the Review of UN Peacekeeping, published by the United Nations, peacekeeping was defined as, “an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the UN to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force or arms, thus contrasting them with the “enforcement action” of the United Nations under Article 42.”\textsuperscript{7}

By the mid 1990s there came a situation when the Security Council was not able to authorise sufficiently robust mandate or provide adequate resources and where warring parties failed to adhere to peace agreements or where peacekeepers themselves were not provided adequate resources or political supports.\textsuperscript{8} Faced with

\textsuperscript{1}See, The Preamble of the United Nations Charter.
\textsuperscript{6}See, Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter.
the setbacks the Security Council decided to limit the number of new peacekeeping missions and undertook a major exercise to examine the challenges to peacekeeping in the 1990s and accordingly introducing reforms.\textsuperscript{9}

In March 2000, the then Secretary General, Kofi Annan of the United Nations appointed a panel of experts under the chairmanship of Lakhdar Brahimi to examine the challenges to peacekeeping in the post cold war era and make recommendations for changes and strengthen the capacity of UN peacekeeping to effectively managed and sustain field operations.\textsuperscript{10} The Brahimi Report attempted to provide detailed, in-depth recommendations for how the organisation can learn from its failures and improve on peacekeeping missions in the future. Among other key recommendations, the Report calls for sustained support from the UN member states for each operation; an increased emphasis on the role of peace-building activities; clarification of mandates, including specification of operations’ authority to use force; reaffirmation of the key principles of peacekeeping (consent of the local parties, use of force only in self-defense, and impartiality) and timely deployment of the mission.\textsuperscript{11}

The beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century witnessed more focused, concentrated peacekeeping efforts. The end of Cold War saw political tension in the Security Council reduce considerably allowing the UN to become more responsive to conflicts in which United States and former Soviet Union’s interest had previously, on numerous occasions prevented its effective involvement.\textsuperscript{12}

The role of UN peacekeeping evolved over the years and the traditional role of UN peacekeeping that supported peacemaking effort moved to addressing civil wars and intra-state conflicts. As such, UN peacekeeping has gone beyond traditional peacekeeping to include intra-state conflicts as well.\textsuperscript{13} In this way new set of functions such as election monitoring, police training etc have been added.\textsuperscript{14}

Today’s multidimensional peacekeeping operations perform myriad role and facilitate the political process, protect civilians in war torn countries, assist in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. The

\textsuperscript{9}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., pp. 1-2.
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 105.
Security Council entrusted Peacekeepers to support the organisation of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law in countries that were plagued by internal conflict and where the state machinery failed to function in accordance with the constitution.\textsuperscript{15}

Timor-Leste\textsuperscript{16} is the world’s newest democratic country. After nearly 400 years of Portuguese colonial rule and 24 years of Indonesian military occupation, independence was formally gained on 20\textsuperscript{th} May 2002.\textsuperscript{17} The birth of Timor-Leste was both protracted and difficult.\textsuperscript{18} The declaration of the referendum results in which over 78 per cent of Timorese had voted for an independent East Timor saw violence break up\textsuperscript{19} This led to the establishment of the first UN peacekeeping mission known as United Nations Transition Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in October 1999. The mission was endowed with the overall responsibility for administration of Timor-Leste and empowered to exercise all legislative, executive, and the administration of justice.\textsuperscript{20} This mission ended in May 2002. Following the exit of UNTAET in 2002, the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) was established with the mandate to support the new country considering the security problems emanating from the militant groups who wanted the continuation of Indonesian rule.\textsuperscript{21} As a result UNMISET provided assistance to establish political stability and public security in Timor-Leste.\textsuperscript{22} The mission completed its mandate in May 2005.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{16}The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste is the official name of the independent state adopted in the Constitution in 2002. East Timor is known as Timor-Leste after 2002.
However, within barely a year of UNMISET exit, the country was ripe with another problem. In order to address the situation and find a solution, the President and Prime Minister of Timor-Leste wrote to the UN Secretary-General requesting the Security Council to establish a United Nations peacekeeping mission. On the 25th August 2006 the Security Council adopted a resolution to establish United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) with a far-reaching mandate to address the intra-state conflict in Timor-Leste.

Statement of the Problem:

UN peacekeeping was originally developed to deal with inter-state conflicts. Since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping was increasingly applied to intra-state conflict as well. Although the military remained the backbone of the peacekeeping operations, today’s peacekeepers undertake a wide variety of complex tasks including conflict prevention, building sustainable institutions, support humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. The UN peacekeeping mission in Timor-Leste is one such example.

The 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste began when six hundred soldiers refused to return to the barrack because of the complaints about living conditions and more importantly the discriminatory policy regarding army recruitment and promotions. The pretext for the crisis came from the management of the dispute within the military of Timor-Leste when soldiers from the western part of the country claimed that they were being discriminated against, in favour of soldiers from the eastern part of the country. The Lorosae (term used for easterners) formed the largest part of the Forcas Armadas da Libertacao Nacional de Timor-Leste or the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL), the guerrilla resistance movement that had resisted the Indonesian authority and which in turn after independence in

24Ibid., para. 8.
27Ibid.
2002 formed the largest part of the military. In contrast the Loromonu (term used for westerners) were less prominent in the resistance, and had less presence in the military structure. There was tension between the military and police forces as well. The political motive behind those initiating the violence and killing declared loyalty to the then President Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao and wanted to replace Prime Minister Mari Alkatari. In addition, the single party that had dominated politics since 2001 rested its claim to continue in power without facing the election. Moreover, the institutional failure also contributed to the crisis.

Responding to the crisis the Security Council constituted the peacekeeping mission—United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) with a lengthy and comprehensive mandate. UNMIT completed its mandate on 31st December 2012 after the Security Council and the Government of Timor-Leste reviewed the ground situation and the effective strength of the national police force to take over the maintenance of law and order in the country.

The UN peacekeeping mission was entrusted with the responsibility to prepare and implement the presidential and parliamentary elections. It was given the mandate to assist in further strengthening and protecting of human rights. Recognising the immediate need for maintaining public security, the Security Council also mandated UNMIT to maintain law and order.

The mandates to maintain law and order, protections of human rights and supporting the Government of Timor-Leste in the preparation of the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections have been taken up for the study since Timor-Leste is the most recent instance where the UN peacekeeping mission was entrusted with the

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31Ibid., p. 12.

32Ibid.


35Ibid., para. 3.


37Ibid.
responsibility to prepare and implement the presidential and parliamentary election, protect human rights and provide assistance in restoring the law and order after successive crisis in that country since 1999. The analysis of the above mandates are important to understand in what way the UNMIT responded to assist the country to establish democracy, protect human rights and create conditions for law and order.

Therefore, the present research work attempted to study the role of UNMIT in peacekeeping in Timor-Leste by examining whether the UNMIT has been able to carry out its mandate in conducting and supervising the 2012 election, protection of human rights and its consequences in terms of restoration of law and order.

**Review of Literature:**

In his work, *Dimensions of Peacekeeping* 38 Aniel Warner brings together the papers presented at a conference on 'New Dimensions of Peacekeeping' which was convened at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva in March 1994. The papers address the new role of peacekeeping (including peacekeeping and peace enforcement) which is now emerging and also places an emphasis upon the role of the 'newcomers' in peacekeeping, specifically Japan and Germany. Many distinguished scholars in the field, actively discuss both the strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations peacekeeping efforts in meeting the increasing demands placed upon it due to the enormous upsurge in ethnic, religious and other local conflicts. 'The 1990s have seen wide swings in public opinion towards United Nations Peacekeeping. The euphoria and high expectations regarding what the United Nations can deliver have been replaced by the rude shocks and deflated assessments of its capacity to successfully cope with conflicts.

Esref Aksu, in his book, *The United Nations, Intra-State peacekeeping and Normative Change*39 explores the normative dimension of the evolving role of the United Nations in peace and security and, ultimately, in governance. The study looks at the UN through the window of one of its most contentious, yet least understood practices, active involvement in intra-state conflicts as epitomized by UN peacekeeping. Drawing on the conceptual tools provided by the "historical structural" approach, the study seeks to understand how and why the international community continuously reinterprets or redefines the UN's role with regard to intra-state conflicts.

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The study concentrates on intra-states "peacekeeping environments," and examines what changes, if any, have occurred to the normative basis of UN peacekeeping in intra-state conflicts from the early 1960s to the early 1990s. Stephen Ryan, *The UN and International Politics*\(^4^0\) traces the origin of the UN to the experiences of the Second World War, inspired by a liberal internationalist approach that believed in the possibility of progressive change in world politics. He argues that the UN has often disappointed those who believed it could play a central role in promoting a more peaceful, secure and just world--Rwanda, Mogadishu and Sarajevo being recent cases in point. This book explores how the UN has influenced world politics, looking at why it was created, how it was affected by the Cold War, and how successive secretary-generals struggled to find a role for themselves.

Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*\(^4^1\) discusses that peace operations are now a principal tool for managing armed conflict and building world peace. The book provides a comprehensive and up-to-date introduction to the theory, practice and politics of contemporary peace operations. Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping*\(^4^2\) opined that United Nations has undergone a sea change in its approach toward peacekeeping. Originally a stopgap measure to preserve a cease-fire, peacekeeping since the waning of the Cold War has become a means to implement agreed political solutions to conflicts between antagonists. Placed inside war-torn states, UN peacekeepers have encountered new challenges as they oversee elections, protect human rights, and reconstruct governmental institutions. In this study, Ratner offers a comprehensive framework for scholars, policymakers, and all those seeking to understand this new peacekeeping. He sees the UN as an administrator, mediator, and guarantor of political settlements.

John Terrence O’Neill and Nicholas Rees in their work, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*\(^4^3\) is of the view that the improvement of relations between the East and the West in the late 1980s have certainly witnessed a number of success in peacekeeping, including the successful resolution of conflicts in central America, Africa and Middle East, while the early 1990s were marked by a

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significant increase in the number of authorizations of new missions. R.E. Utley’s edited book, Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspective, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention argue that the reasons for the failures of the United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s is because they were established with inadequate or inappropriate mandates, which often did not reflect the situation on the ground. Lack of resources such as personnel and equipment to implement the mandates have further constraint the peacekeeping operations because those with the military capacity lack the political will to take part in robust UN peacekeeping whereas those with the will lack the means. Norman Bowen in his article, “The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping” contend that United Nations peacekeeping will continued to play a significant role in promoting and maintaining peace provided that the United Nations and the contributing member states sustain current efforts to resolve longstanding problems. Jane Boulden in her book, Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia and Bosnia provides an in-depth and excellent overview of peace enforcement operations. She states that the impact of the cold war prevented the charter’s intent of enforcement action from becoming a reality. With the end of cold war there was renewed optimism on the UN’s security arrangements.

Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel in their edited book, United Nations, Peacekeeping Operations: Adhoc Mission and Permanent Engagement maintain that peacekeeping has always been one of the most visible symbols of UN’s role in maintaining peace and security since its inception. But it was the world’s disappointment with the performance of the UN peacekeeping operations over the years that followed, which became so symbolic of the UN’s failure to emerge from the ashes of the cold war as a rejuvenated key player in international and increasingly internal peace and security. Boutros Boutros Ghali in his article, “Empowering the United Nations” argued that peacekeeping operations invariably include military

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personnel with civilian elements often have an even more important role. This is especially true when the task is to help implement comprehensive and complex settlements as was the case in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique. In the article “The United Nations Records on Peacekeeping Operations”\(^{49}\), Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis expresses that United Nations peacekeeping is engaging in multi-dimensional management of complex peace operations, usually following the terminations of a civil war designed to provide interim security and assist parties to make those institutional, material and ideational transformations that are essential to make peace sustainable. According to Mark Malan in his article, “Peacekeeping in the New Millenium: Towards Fourth Generation Peace Operations?”\(^{50}\) state that the purpose of UN peacekeeping was thus redirected towards helping to end internal conflicts. With the proliferation of such conflicts, peace operations have become a global activity. The Security Council also began to react not only to requests for assistance in ending internal conflicts but also international demands to intervene in a number of complex emergencies which have created humanitarian crisis of immense proportion.

Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur in their edited book, *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations*\(^{51}\) investigates the unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations on individuals and groups of individual, on the host society and economy and on the troops contributing countries. It also analyse the degree to which the United Nations has tried to manage some of these side-effects, as well as the United Nations accountability in the context of the international legal framework. In his article “UN Peacekeeping in the Post Cold War Era”\(^{52}\), Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz evaluates the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the post cold war era in terms of its strength and shortcomings. Particular attention is devoted to internal strife that dominates the Cold War period as the principal sources of current conflicts. In coping with such conflicts, the utility of UN peacekeeping is underlined.

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The study draws attention to the need for overcoming the present weaknesses of UN peacekeeping to make it efficient tool of international peace and conflict resolution.

In their book *Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence*\(^{53}\), Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee discusses the role of United Nations Transition Administration in East Timor from 1999-2002. The authors highlight the experience as well as the failures that attracted criticism from East Timorese leaders, members of the mission itself and a range of observers. Sven Gunnar Simonsen in his article “The Role of East Timor Security Institutions in National Integration and Disintegration”\(^{54}\) highlights the consequences that followed in the aftermath of the 2006 crisis. It throws lights on the disintegration of the military and police forces that led to the massive displacement of civilians.

In their book *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*\(^{55}\), Oliver Rasbotham and Tom Woodhouse analyses the conflict resolution theory in the light of the challenges faced by the UN peacekeeping. Won Jeong in his book, *Conflict Management and Resolution: An Introduction*\(^{56}\) examines how to manage and resolved conflict through various strategies and laid emphasized on the method of communication in overcoming the differences along with the efforts to minimise the harmful aspects of struggle to prevent the conflict from escalating into violence. Peter Wallensteen in his book, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*\(^{57}\) provide a comprehensive guide to understanding of conflict resolution in today’s global world. He also analyses the three major types of international conflict such as inter-state, internal and state formation conflict. Besides, he also discusses on the role of the United Nations in managing the conflict at the international level through various approaches and strategy. I. William Zartman in his book, *Negotiation and Conflict Management: Essay on Theory and Practice*\(^{58}\) examines how international security could be achieved through conflict management. He laid stress on the strategy of negotiation that allowed for both the parties to have a constructive

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interaction and discussion in order to resolve the conflict amicably. He argued that it was only through the diplomatic channel of negotiation that conflict could be resolved mutually and that force and military power would not bring peace and stability but would only complicate matters.

In the paper “UN Peacekeeping: Expectations and Reality”, Terence O’Neill examine the reasons for the failure of UN peacekeeping to achieve the expected result in the aftermath of the culmination of the Cold War era. Nicholas Lemay Hebert in his work “UNPOL and Police Reform in Timor-Leste: Accomplishment and Setbacks” contended that although UNPOL succeeded in restoring security in Timor-Leste, yet it fell short of effectively assisting in rebuilding, reconstruction and reform process (RRR) which posed a threat of renewed conflict in the country. Damien Kingsbury in his article “Timor-Leste: The Harsh Reality After Independence” pointed out that prior to the outbreak of the 2006 conflict there were signs of discontentment and rumbling within the Falintil-FDTL especially when the higher ups did not paid heed and addresses to their grievances.

Annemarie Devereux in her work Timor-Leste’s Bill of Rights: A Preliminary History examines in detail the history of human rights discussion as enshrine in part II of the constitution which entitle Timorese the fundamental rights, duties, freedoms and guarantees. In the paper “Evaluating the Timor-Leste Peace Operation” John Braithwaite applied the model developed by Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman to evaluate peace operation in Timor-Leste which culminated in 2012. Joseph Nevins in his article “Timor-Leste in 2006: The End of Post-Independence Honeymoon” highlighted the Indonesian occupation as the primary reasons for the outbreak of the socio-political violence in 2006. For 25 years Indonesia imposed a repressive regime against Timorese which left Timor-Leste impoverished with deleterious economy after independence. Jose Cornelio Guteress in his work “Timor-Leste: A Year of

Democratic Elections”65 discusses the first democratic election in the Timor-Leste which took place in 2007 in the aftermath of the 2006 conflict. Both the Presidential and Parliamentary elections are conducted successfully without any major untoward incidents. The United Nations Missions in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was given the mandate to supervise the national elections to ensure fair and fair and transparent conduct of polling. In the article “Building the State in Timor-Leste”66 Selver B. Sahin argue that the 2006 conflict which involved the armed forces and the police forces were mainly due to the internal power struggle and regional differences. The emergence of regional differences could affect the aimed and objectives of creating a democratic state. Michael J. Butler in his paper “Ten Years After: (Re) Assessing Neo-Trusteeship and UN State-building in Timor-Leste”67 challenges the premise that the imposition of neo-trusteeship or “post-modern imperialism” in countries such as Timor-Leste was mainly to foster liberal hegemonic design. He contended that the return of neo-trusteeship via UNMIT was not intentional but it was the efforts and obligation on the part of the UN to maintain peace and security in conflict torn countries.

In his book East Timor: The Price of Liberty68, Damien Kingsbury gave a detail description of the chain of events which took place during Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste. The annexation began way back in 1975 after the Portuguese exit which culminated in 1999 after the successful conduct of the UN sponsored referendum. James Cotton in his book East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: Intervention and its Aftermath in Southeast Asia69 examines why East Timor defied the regional pattern and received independent. The second part deals with the Australian policy towards East Timor whereby successive Australian leaders had supported President Suharto as a statesman and ignoring his repressive rule against East Timor. Finally, the third part highlighted how ASEAN as a regional forum created for maintaining regional order overlooked the Timorese causes and avoid entanglement with Indonesia. John R. Ballard in his work Triumph of Self-

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Determination: Operation Stabilise and United Nations Peacekeeping in East Timor\textsuperscript{70}, describes the chronological events of the Timorese struggle for independence and the role of the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) deployed in 1999 with the mandates to supervise the East Timor referendum and its quest for self-determination. It also gave brief description on the role of International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), a non United Nations force led by Australia which provided public security and humanitarian relief for Timorese. In her book Torture, Truth and Justice: The Case of Timor-Leste\textsuperscript{71}, Elizabeth Stanley examines how torture has been used during the Indonesian occupation, to find out the role of the transitional justice institutions in providing truth and justice for the torture victims and above all highlighted the experience of the torture victims in the aftermath of the violation.

Abraham Joseph and Takako Hamaguchi in their book Timor-Leste: The History and Development of Asia’s Newest Nation\textsuperscript{72} is a study of how a small Asia-Pacific nation came out from the protracted conflict which navigated successfully into the path of durable peace and sustainable development. Today, Timor-Leste had made a turnaround and continues to advance towards the goals of long term stability and prosperity by leaving behind the past history of destruction. Louise Olsson’s Gender Equality and United Nations Peace Operations in Timor-Leste\textsuperscript{73}, examines how UN operations affect gender relations within the host country. She cited the case of Timor-Leste in which the UN operation from 1999-2006 have impacted the gender relation. Matthew B. Arnold in his article “Timor-Leste 2010: The Window for Normal Future”\textsuperscript{74} discusses Timor-Leste post-conflict situation and the significant contribution of energy resources to the country’s revenue source. In his paper “Timor-Leste 2009: Cup Half Full or Half Empty”\textsuperscript{75}, Geoffrey C. Gunn highlighted the political events in the post 2007 general elections and the role of UNMIT in policing responsibility and monitored the village council election in October of 2009. He


briefly examines the economic conditions and the international issues which Timor-Leste was facing for instance the unsettle border issue with Indonesia, ASEAN membership etc.

Dennis Shoesmith in his work “Timor-Leste: On the Road to Peace and Prosperity”\textsuperscript{76}, discusses the political instability and bickering within the coalition government of the Parliamentary Majority Alliance (AMP) led by Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao during the period of 2007-2012. The wide spread corruption, nepotism and collusion and misuse of revenue generated from energy sources to fund for various development programmes was visible that cause political instability and pose serious challenges to poor country like Timor-Leste. In the paper of Anthony L. Smith, “Timor-Leste: Strong Government and Weak State”\textsuperscript{77}, provides a through description of the first national election held on 30\textsuperscript{th} August, 2001 in which the Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste Independente or the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) party emerge victory and Mari Alkatiri was sworn in as prime minister. He further highlighted that the UN was still assisting the Timorese government in maintaining security in the country. After independence in May 2002, the UN set up the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) through the resolution 1410 (2002).

From the above review of the existing literature it is evident that although work has been done on UN peacekeeping however not much work has been done on UNMIT. Therefore, there is sufficient scope for further research. Hence, the proposed study attempted to work in that direction.

**Objectives:**
The objectives of the study are:
(a) To examine UNMIT’s role in the conduct of the Presidential and Parliamentary election in Timor-Leste.
(b) To assess the role of UNMIT in the protection of human rights and the restoration of law and order in Timor-Leste.

**Methodology:**
The methodology adopted for the study has been descriptive and analytical based on both primary as well as secondary sources. The primary data has been

\textsuperscript{76}Dennis Shoesmith, “Timor-Leste: On the Road to Peace and Prosperity”, *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2011.
collected from publications reports and relevant Documents of the United Nations such as Security Council Resolutions, General Assembly resolutions, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation, UN Year in Review, UN Department of Political Affairs, Reports of the UN Secretary-General and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The secondary sources included Books, Journals, Magazines and Newspapers and UN News Letters. The data and information collected from the above sources has been analysed qualitatively to study the UN Peacekeeping in Timor-Leste (2006-2012).

Chapter-I

The first chapter is an introduction of the role of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping as enshrined in the UN Charter, followed by a brief discussion of the historical background of East-Timor.

Peacekeeping has been one of the most visible tools at the disposal of the UN to deal with armed conflict.\(^78\) Peacekeeping is guided by three basic principles: (1) Consent of the parties (2) Impartiality and (3) Non use of force except in self-defense of the mandate.\(^79\) UN peacekeepers perform two different functions: (1) observing and (2) peacekeeping. The observers are unarmed military officers sent to the conflict areas in small numbers simply to watch and monitor cease-fire, elections etc and report back to the United Nations. On the other hand lightly armed soldiers under the aegis of the United Nations carry out peacekeeping. They can interpose themselves physically between warring parties to keep them apart.\(^80\)

UN played a vital role in peacekeeping that had originated as simply the inter-position of international lightly armed forces between warring parties to maintain ceasefire and prevent a resurgent of hostilities as well as to create a more secure condition while diplomatic solution to the underlying conflict were being look at. This style of traditional peacekeeping was design mainly for armed conflict between state and rarely used in the context of intra-state conflict.

The most relevant mandates for intervention are found in Chapter VI\textsuperscript{81} of the UN Charter, Article 99 of Chapter-XV\textsuperscript{82} and in An Agenda for Peace 1992.\textsuperscript{83} Article 42 of Chapter-VII contains a clause which states that UN can use all necessary means to mitigate a threat to international peace and security.\textsuperscript{84} All peacekeeping operations since their inception have remained dependent on member states’ willingness to participate in the endeavor. This structure leads to the inevitability that while, in principle, UN capabilities to act, fund, cooperate, and coordinate are vast, each individual peacekeeping mission depends on both the political will of the member states and the organizational capacity to conduct an ad hoc mission, despite the absence of a UN army. With the lack of a standing UN army, however, capabilities to act will always depend on the readiness of individual member states. Moreover, there is a problem with troops from various countries acting together within the same peacekeeping mission. These issues stem from the following: contingents reporting not only to the mission’s head, but also to their national headquarters; contingents not being able to communicate in the same language; and countries sending troops without logistics and ammunition and thus having to rely on other countries’ supplying such resources to have fully operational missions. United Nations Security Council resolution on international peace and security was limited in the scope of application as a corollary to superpower rivalry during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War UN Secretary General Butros Butros Ghali issued a policy statement which offered a new classification of peace operations. The policy statement clearly differentiated between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{85}

Peacemaking as a method refers to actions to bring hostile parties to agreement, via peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.\textsuperscript{86} Article 33 of the UN Charter provides for the parties engaged in dispute to resolve their differences through negotiation enquiry, mediation, conciliation,

\textsuperscript{81}See, Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.
\textsuperscript{82}See, Article 99 of the United Nations Charter.
\textsuperscript{84}See, Article 42 of the United Nations Charter.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangement or other peaceful means of their own choice.\textsuperscript{87} The agents of peacemaking include envoys of Government, groups of states, regional organisations or the United Nations.\textsuperscript{88} Therefore, this is a diplomatic effort that aims at addressing violent conflicts by peaceful means.\textsuperscript{89}

Peacekeeping is an instrument devised to keep peace through deployment of United Nations armed forces as well as civilian personnel and consented or agreed by all the parties involved in the conflict.\textsuperscript{90} It is one of the prominent instruments utilised by the UN to maintain peace and security.\textsuperscript{91} Peacekeepers support in ushering sustainable peace, implementation of ceasefire or peace agreement\textsuperscript{92}, protections of human rights, provides public security and political supports.\textsuperscript{93}

Peacebuilding aims to promote sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of violent conflict and support indigenous capacities for peace management.\textsuperscript{94} It includes a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening the national capacities at all levels.\textsuperscript{95} It also focuses on disarmament and reintegration of the former combatants to ensure stability in the post-conflict period.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{87}See, Article 33 of the United Nations Charter.
\textsuperscript{88}An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, A/47/277, 17, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{90}An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, A/47/277, 17, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 58-59.
\textsuperscript{95}\textit{UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation}, United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, September 2010, p. 5.

The advent of the Carnation Revolution\footnote{\textit{Chega: The Final Report of the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR)}, November, 2013, p. 154. Carnation Revolution originate from the fact that no shots were fired and when the population took to the streets to celebrate the end of the dictatorship and war in the colonies, carnation were put in muzzles of rifles and on the uniforms of the army personnel.} on 25\textsuperscript{th} April 1974 ended the Portuguese authoritarian regime that resulted in decolonisation of East Timor.\footnote{Edalina Rodrigues Sanches and Ekaterina Gorbunova, “Portuguese Citizens’ Support for Democracy: 40 Years after the Carnation Revolution” \textit{South European Society and Politics}, Vol. 21, No. 2, March, 2016, p. 211.} On 7\textsuperscript{th} December 1975, the Indonesian annexed East Timor. The operation was marked by extreme violence, forced displacement, torture, and other human rights violations.\footnote{Luiz Vieira, “The CAVR and the 2006 Displacement Crisis in Timor-Leste”, \textit{The International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the Brookings-LSE Project on internal Displacement}, New York, p.5, available at <www.ictj.org/our-work/research/transitional-justice and displacement and www.brookings.edu/idp>, (Accessed on September 21, 2016).} The overthrow of a popular and briefly Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) led government ignited a violent occupation in which approximately 100,000 to 180,000 East Timorese civilians were estimated to have been killed or starved as a direct result of the Indonesian military invasion and occupation.\footnote{Joel Hodge, “The Catholic Church in Timor-Leste and the Indonesian Occupation: A Spirituality of Suffering and Resistance”, \textit{South East Asia Research}, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2013, p.152. See also, \textit{Chega: The Final Report of the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR)}, November, 2013, p. 2266.} They resorted to detention, tortured, execution and forcibly disappeared tens of thousands of Timorese. Social, political or religious activities that challenged the illegal Indonesian rule were ruthlessly repressed.\footnote{Doe V. Lumintang, “Atrocities During Indonesian Occupation of Timor-Leste”, \textit{The Centre for Justice and Accountability}, California, available at < http://cja.org/what-we-do/litigation/doe-v-lumintang/>, (Accessed on September 21, 2016).} The Santa Cruz cemetery massacred on 12\textsuperscript{th} November 1991, whereby an estimated 270 people were killed was one of the heinous acts committed by Indonesia.\footnote{Geoffrey Robinson, “East Timor 1999 Crimes Against Humanity: A Report Commission by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)”, \textit{University of California}, July, 2003, Los Angeles, p. 20.}
President B. J. Habibie yielded to international pressure that called for
Timorese liberation by holding a ‘Popular Consultation’ to determine Timorese future
status. The ‘Popular Consultation’ was held on 30th August 1999. The ‘Popular
Consultation’ registered 78 per cent which opted overwhelmingly for independence of
East Timor and rejected the autonomy status within Indonesia. By the turn of the
21st century, Timor-Leste was the world’s newest democratic country. Timor-Leste
formally gained independence 20th May 2002 and enrolled as the 191st member of

Chapter-II

This chapter is an examination of the circumstances, which led to the eruption
of violent conflict in 2006 in Timor-Leste that in turn called for to the formation of

The conflict that grew out of the so called “petitioners protest” in March
culminated in May 2006. The aggrieved soldiers from the battalion I numbering
591 went on strike on 8th February 2006 at the Presidential Palácio das Cinzas. Their
grievances were centred on alleged discrimination, particularly concerning
promotions and accommodation as mentioned in the petition signed by 159 soldiers
and submitted to then President of Timor-Leste Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao. The
aggrieved soldiers were subsequently sacked after they refused to retreat to the
barrack. The existence of division within the Falintil-Forcas de Defesa de Timor-

105 Luiz Vieira, op. cit., p. 5.
106 Ibid.
107 Peter Van der Auweraert, “Dealing with the 2006 internal displacement crisis in Timor-Leste”,
<https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Brookings-Displacement-Timor-Leste-CaseStudy-2012-
108 The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste is the official name of the independent state adopted in the
110 Ben Dolven, Rhoda Margesson and Bruce Vaughn, “Timor-Leste: Political Dynamics, Development,
and International Involvement”, Congressional Research Service, p.1, available at
111 Michael Leach, “The Politics of History in Timor-Leste” in A New Era?: Timor-Leste After the UN,
(eds.,) Sue Ingram, Lia Kent, Andrew Mc William, ANU Press, 2015. See also, End of Mandate:
Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations Office in Timor-Leste, S/2006/251, April 20, 2006,
para. 3, p. 2.
112 Damien Kingsbury, “Timor-Leste: The Harsh Reality After Independence”, South Asian Affairs,
2007, p. 366.
Leste (F-FDTL) between members who had participated in the independence struggle also contributed to the east-west conflict.  

As the conflict escalated the Timorese Government requested the assistance from the Governments of Portugal, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia. Australia was the leading donor and major contributor to Timorese development activities. Portugal who was the former colonial master and shared close affinity contributed personnel to UNTAET and UNMISET. New Zealand had also contributed to the security and defence of Timor-Leste since 1999. Similarly, Malaysia had also participated in the UN led mission. The request made by the Governmental of Timor-Leste (GoTL) led to the deployment of Australian-led International Stabilisation Forces (ISF) on 25th May 2006 as a step to quell the rising unrest. The objectives of the ISF were to assist in restoration of public order, providing security and safety to people and safeguarding property and intimidation in Timor-Leste.

The dismal performance by the ISF mission necessitated the establishment of an ‘integrated mission’. The UN Headquarter brought together the military, political, civil and humanitarian sections with one-mission objective. Similarly, in

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113Ibid., p. 367.
118Malaysia has contributed troops and police to support United Nations peacekeeping operations in Timor-Leste, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, June 2006.
123Ibid.
the field operations such as military, political, civil and humanitarian components were integrated under a single leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG).124

On the 25th August, 2006 the Security Council adopted the resolution S/RES/1704 to established United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).125 UNMIT consisted of an appropriate civilian component, including up to 1,608 police personnel and an initial component of up to 34 military liaison and staff officers.126

The Security Council entrusted UNMIT with the mandates of supporting the Government of Timor-Leste in consolidating stability, enhancing democratic governance and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders to foster cohesion.127 The UN police (UNPOL) was authorised to support in restoring law and order.128 The attempt to assassinate the President and Prime Minister prompted the UN to extend the mandates of UNMIT in 2008 and reaffirmed their commitments to continue in strengthening the national institutions.129

The UN initiated this step to prevent any incident, which might impact the security of Timor-Leste.130 The UN mission helped in reviewing the Timorese armed forces, police forces, defence ministry and interior ministry.131 UNMIT coordinated with other international partners to impart expertise and further strengthen the capacity of different Government institutions in the country such as the justice sector.132 In addition, UNMIT was also mandated to protect human rights133 and to facilitate in providing relief and recovery assistance for the internally displaced

124 Ibid.
128Ibid., para. 4 (c).
129Ibid., para. 4 (d).
132Ibid., para. 4 (e).
133Ibid., para. 4 (f).
134Ibid., para. 4 (g).

Chapter-III

This chapter examines the role of UNMIT in the preparation of Presidential and Parliamentary election in 2012 and its outcome.

The role of UNMIT in the 2012 national election is extensive. The preparation activities undertaken by UNMIT for the presidential election also included for the parliamentary election. The Timorese election commission and UNMIT organised a programme on 24th February 2012 to strengthen peace and stability in which 12 presidential candidates and 22 political parties attended the meeting and signed the national agreement to adhere to electoral laws and regulations. Programmes were also organised at the grassroots level to ensure peaceful election. Efforts to enhance women’s participation in political and electoral processes were also made. UNMIT in collaboration with UN-Women, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) imparted civic education for women, youth, and first-time voters. A team of 170 personnel from UNMIT and the UNDP provided support to the Technical Secretariat and Electoral Administration (STAE) and the National Election Commission (CNE). In addition, 130 United Nations Volunteers were employed in operational planning; impart voter and civic education, capacity-building and provide logistical support to the STAE and CNE.

UNMIT also instituted the steering committee to monitor and update with election process under the chairmanship of the Special Representative of Secretary General. Various working committee under the steering committee were formed which included the working group on electoral process, working group on security

134Ibid., para. 4 (h).
137Ibid., para. 10, p. 4.
139Ibid., para. 11, pp. 3-4.
140Ibid., para. 12, p. 4.
142Ibid., p. 136.
which dealt with security affairs, working group on logistics for providing air and land transportation of electoral materials, deployment of United Nations Volunteers (UNV) as electoral advisors, Political Party/Candidate Teams Resource Centres for imparting training to candidates and Observers Support Centre which dealt with national and international observers during the national election.

Similarly, in the parliamentary election the acting SRSG to Timor-Leste, Finn Reske-Nielsen, handed over election materials to the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE). These election materials comprised of 5,000 bottles of indelible ink, 2,000 T-shirts for the National Observers, 2,000 vests for the International Observers, 2,000 vests for polling staff, voter education posters and billboards. The Director-General of STAE Tomas Cabral opined that STAE together with the UN aimed to deliver transparent and impartial elections. UN police were stationed in all thirteen districts of Timor-Leste along with UN vehicles to enable their movement and patrols. Additional support included logistical support and providing transportation to election officials. On the other hand UN police extended vital support in providing public security in all the districts during the election by working together with the Timorese police. The Timor-Leste’s Technical Secretariat and Electoral Administration (STAE) and the National Election Commission (CNE), with the support from UNMIT conducted the election.

143Ibid.
144Ibid., p. 138.
145Ibid.
146Ibid., p. 139.
147Ibid.
149Ibid.
151Ibid.
Chapter-IV

This chapter examines the mandates of UNMIT in providing protection to human rights and the role of United Nations police in restoration and maintenance of law and order.

Human rights team working under the UN peacekeeping mission contributes to the protection and promotion of human rights through immediate and long-term action.\(^{154}\) They monitor, conduct investigation, support accountability, empower the population to assert and claimed their human rights.\(^{155}\) In the context of Timor-Leste, the Human Rights and Transitional Justice Section (HRTJS) was established within UNMIT to monitor, protect and promote human rights.\(^{156}\) The role performed by HRTJS includes: providing human rights capacity development assistance and advice to ensure that Timor-Leste’s laws, regulations, policies and programmes comply with international human rights standards. It also monitored important State institutions in subscribing to the international standards on civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.\(^{157}\)

On October 2006, the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Unit (ESCR) was established within HRTJS.\(^{158}\) The ESCR unit monitored economic, social and cultural rights in Timor-Leste.\(^{159}\) The HRTJS provided training to the Provedoria on monitoring economic, social and cultural rights. UNMIT collaborated with the Government of Timor-Leste, United Nations agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to monitor food security situation so as to prevent further deterioration.\(^{160}\) HRTJS also fostered for protection of disabilities rights.\(^{161}\)

During the presidential election in 2012, the HRTJS monitored the exercise of the right to political participation and accessibility to vote for all persons on an equal


\(^{155}\)Ibid.


\(^{157}\)Ibid.


\(^{159}\)Ibid., p. 12.

\(^{160}\)Ibid.

basis, including security forces and vulnerable groups such as women, elderly, persons in hospitals and persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{162} HRTJS monitored the situation at 70 polling sites in 11 districts on 17\textsuperscript{th} March 2012\textsuperscript{163} and on 16\textsuperscript{th} April 2012, it monitored 127 polling sites across 12 districts in 37 sub-districts including referral hospitals and prisons. The HRTJS observed that overall human rights and security situation was calm, though there were some incidents of intimidation by supporters of both candidates.\textsuperscript{164}

With regards to the mandate of maintaining law and order, the role of United Nations Police (UNPOL) included protecting civilians, strengthening the rule of law to ensure peace and stability.\textsuperscript{165} Both male and female police personnel were responsible for reinforcing and to establish security by patrolling, worked closely with host police services, assisting in a wide range of activities to restore and promote public safety and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{166}

UNPOL was also given the mandate to act as interim law enforcer to help reduce lawlessness.\textsuperscript{167} UNPOL maintained public security, assisted the government of Timor-Leste in reforming, restructuring and rebuilding the Timorese National Police and also in strengthening the Interior Ministry.\textsuperscript{168} The total number of police personnel deployed were approximately 1,600 from more than 40 countries serving with UNMIT.\textsuperscript{169}

In a bid to strengthen law and order UNMIT deployed UNPOL personnel in 12 districts as of November 2006.\textsuperscript{170} The level of violent incidents that were witnessed during the first half of 2007 dropped down.\textsuperscript{171} UNPOL also assisted in safeguarding the three border districts with western Timor to maintain peace, law and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{162} Compendium of the 2012 Elections in Timor-Leste, op.cit., p. 38.
\item \textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{165} United Nations Police on Duty for Peace 2008-2012, United Nations Police Division Department of Peacekeeping Operations, p. 13.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Ibid., p. 14.
\item \textsuperscript{167} UN Fully takes over Policing role in Timor-Leste after agreement with government, UN Police Magazine, December, 2006, p. 13.
\item \textsuperscript{168} Ibid., p. 14.
\end{itemize}
order in the frontier region. Moreover, UN police officers were also deployed in internally displaced persons’ (IDP) camps in collaboration with screened Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) officers and closely supported by the international security forces in the first six months of UNMIT.173

Chapter-V

Summary of Major Findings

Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most important tools at the disposal of international community for ameliorating violent conflict. The UN Charter stated that maintaining international peace and security would be the primary responsibility of the UN and that the UN and its member states will strive collectively in accordance with the stated objectives as laid down in the UN Charter to ensure better and secure atmosphere and to root out any threat. The Security Council is the apex organ of the UN entrusted with this responsibility to oversee and initiate measures to solve conflicts through peaceful means. The fact that the record of United Nations Peacekeeping Operation is mixed, indicates UN’s inability to deal with certain kind of civil war and that there are a combinations of capability and contextual factors that can lead to the success of the UN peacekeeping mission in intra-state war.

With the end of Cold War, the once limited tasks of peacekeeping referred to as Blue Helmet operations went beyond the traditional peacekeeping operation to include expanded and large-scale operation. It became clear that peacekeepers were not limited only to the usual principles of monitoring ceasefire or peace agreement that is generally accepted by the belligerent. Instead peace operations became more robust that involved in several tasks including deterrent, protective engagement of civilians, peace-enforcer, supervising and overseeing of election and reconstruction etc. The post Cold War period, saw peacekeeping missions deal with intra-state conflict also where the host government is one of the parties in the conflict. The aim of these operations was to implement a political solution following or accompanying an end to military hostilities and establish basic state institutions.

Peace keeping missions therefore, involved monitoring of ceasefire, disarmament and demobilising, as well as creating and training of a new integrated national army or police forces, supervising or conducting national election with the aim of

173 Ibid., para. 30, p. 9.
instalment of new government. The peacekeeping in Timor-Leste is one such example.


Reacting to the humanitarian catastrophe as a result of the intra-state war in Timor-Leste, the UN sanctioned the deployment of ISF. However, the violence continued. Responding to the grave situation the United Nations Secretary General through resolution S/RES/1704 of August 2006 recommended the establishment of a multi-dimensional integrated mission (UNMIT). The UNMIT was to support the Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) to bring about a process of national reconciliation that gave it a multi-dimensional character.

The UN mandates was vast and aimed to reconstruct the state institutions as well as enhance their capacity to assist the government and the institutions to enhance their democratic culture, maintaining law and order, protections of human rights, facilitates humanitarian relief, to assist the GoTL in preparing the 2012 national election etc.

Unsurprisingly the fragile situation on the ground remained due to an unsecure violent environment that included gang violence and an attack on the President and the Prime Minister. As a result the UNMIT mandates was given additional tasks to strengthen the national institutions such as the justice sector, review the future role of security sector, including the Ministry of Interior, Policía Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL), Ministry of Defence and Falintil-Forcas de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) etc.

The UN objective to deploy UN mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was meant to address the situation in Timor-Leste and the robust mandate given was crucial for UNMIT to establish perpetual peace, stability, democratic culture and facilitate political dialogue. Apart from facilitating dialogue and reconciliation between the groups engaged in the conflict. The deployment of UNMIT was in line with the request put forward by the Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) to the UN.
UNMIT was successful in carrying out the mandate in supporting the Presidential and Parliament election that passed off peacefully and followed by the smooth formation of government. More than 70 per cent of the population went to the poll to vote in both the Presidential and Parliamentary election. Through a quota system women comprised 38 per cent of the parliament in 2012 election which was the highest representation in the Asia Pacific parliament.

The high voter participation and the fact that the result was widely accepted by all political actors demonstrated that United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) had been successful in bringing about considerable progress in dialogue and reconciliation. In this way the efforts made by UNMIT and Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) paid dividend, which ultimately saw the ushering of democratic governance in Timor-Leste.

While overseeing the election, assisting the GoTL and the Timorese electoral bodies in preparing the 2012 national election, UNMIT was able to provide public security, prevent the use of force against vulnerable groups, provided logistical support, helped in updating the voters list and in imparting training to Timorese electoral officials.

In the sphere of human rights, the Human Right and Transitional Justice Section (HRTJS) monitored and provided human rights protection especially for Internally Displace Persons (IDPs), women and children were sheltered in relief camps. The provision of human rights served as the fundamental responsibility to ensure that basic human rights are respected, promoted and supported by all groups engaged in the conflict.

UNMIT was also able to help in instituting the human right watchdog of Timor-Leste known as the Provedor for Human Rights and Justice (PDHJ). In addition, UNMIT was successful in imparting training to the national police forces on the essence of human rights protection as law enforcers. In terms of performance the PDHJ had maintained its independent and autonomy. In this regard, the PDHJ is accorded with ‘A’ status as per the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) accreditation released in May 2017. The PDHJ had consistently maintains the status since 2008 and retained the rank in 2013 during the re-accreditation.

Another important aspect was the deployment of women peacekeepers in February 2009. This step was taken in line with the UN Security Council resolution
S/RES/1325. UNMIT women peacekeepers were deployed in Internally Displace Person’s (IDPs) camps, Vulnerable Person’s Unit (VPU) of PNTL, etc to aid Timorese officials in addressing their grievances. Together with UNMIT’s tough stance and zero tolerance on issue relating to misconduct helped in maintaining strict adherence to the UN code of conduct and discipline.

Maintaining law and order was one of the top priorities for the UN mission in Timor-Leste. The presence of UNMIT police helped in creating cordial and amicable milieu that provided conducive environment for the transportation of relief materials, essential items and speed up reconstruction work. The presence of UNPOL with an executive police mandate for the restoration and maintenance of public security was successful and in further strengthening of the national capacity for monitoring and promotion of human rights. With the restoration of law and order, and oversee the displace people returning to their home. With significant Timorese participation the UNMIT was able to contribute to the restoration of security in the country. Similarly the close relationship between UNMIT and the GoTL contributed to the success of the mission especially in the security sector. Over all UNMIT’s success can be largely attributed to the timely support of resources such as financial, troops and logistic and its ability to properly assess and respond in a timely manner to specific realities within the context of the UNMIT’s mission. The joint effort of UNMIT and the UN countries team were instrumental in providing coordinated policy, political, technical and financial support and aided Timor-Leste in accomplishing its goals.

However, UNMIT also had its share of shortcomings. Its failings cannot be attributed to the lack of resources but rather to the contextual factors and the inability to adeptly, delegate responsibilities. What was also missing in this age of information and technology was that UN was not able to use technology as an educative tool to enable people to exercise their franchise while electing their representatives.

Similarly the UNMIT’s efforts to monitor human rights protection faced a setback during the declaration of the State of Siege from February-May in 2008. Due to the lack of local knowledge, unfamiliarity with the city etc hampered the effectiveness of the UNMIT police unit in maintaining law and order during the initial period of deployment.

The other important limitations relates to solving of un-accounted cases involving minor crimes, which were subjected to settlement within the traditional system of justice. The most serious incident that indicated failure during UNMIT
period was the inability to prevent the assassination attempt of the then President Jose Ramos Horta and Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao in 2008. Finally, the UN attempts to reconstruct Timor-Leste by delegating responsibilities to the bureaucrats and soldiers who were not qualified to involve in the process of peace-building lead to a number of inadequacies, among them the failure to create internal security structures that contributed to the violence of 2006.

A unique aspect of the UNMIT was the high level of support for the UN mission, from the people of Timor-Leste. Just as the lack of opposition from the United Nations Security Council permanent members proved that the Security Council politics was not a major impediment in enforcing peacekeeping in Timor-Leste. In September 2011, the GOTL and UNMIT signed a transition plan to guide planning for UNMIT expected withdrawal by the end of 2012. The plan was first of its kind in peacekeeping that mark out the priorities and objective until UNMIT departure. It identified 129 UNMIT’s activities to be completed by the end of December 2012.

It may be concluded that the UN was in a large measure successful when evaluated by criteria that measure humanitarian assistance, resettlement of the population, electoral assistance, building security and defence institutions in and in creating a secure environment. Beyond its border, Timor-Leste has transitioned from receiving peacekeeping assistance to contributing personnel to UN peacekeeping operation in other parts of the world.

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