Chapter II

Naipaul, Clash of Civilizations and Resurgence of Empire

Resurgence of Empire

The basic idea that I explore in this chapter by looking at V. S. Naipaul’s construction of the binary between ‘Islam’ and ‘West’ is that far from living in an after – or post-imperial world, the political and economic relations between different nation states are still determined by the hegemonic power structures whose foundations were laid during nineteenth century scramble for colonies. I argue that those unequal coercive power relations are underlined by the continuing presence of colonial discourses about different cultures in general and about Islamic world in particular. The conceptual framework discussed in the previous chapter provides a valuable tool to trace the affiliation of Naipaul’s Islamic travelogues with the imperial ideology of late twentieth century Euro-American Empire. Though the mid-twentieth century national liberation movements of Asia and Africa succeeded to end the direct Western domination of the major portions of the non-Western world, settler colonialism intensified in other parts exactly at the time when we were supposed to have entered the postcolonial era. Along with settler colonialism, neo-imperialism, particularly in the form of neoliberal economic policies of international financial institutions headed by the United States of America, has engulfed the poorer countries once again. After the Second World War America donned the imperial robes of a sole super power as heir to the nineteenth and early twentieth century European empires. The countries of the ‘Third’ world, though politically independent, are in many ways as dominated and dependent as they were when ruled directly by various European colonial powers. I point out that many of the imperial attitudes and structures of feeling underlying colonial relations not only continue in various cultural forms like media and Hollywood, but have in fact intensified in the wake of America’s increasingly militaristic interventions in the Muslim lands after the Second World War. In this
context there is a need to theoretically relook at the relevance of the term ‘postcolonial’, considering the increasingly hostile attitude of the only super power, USA, towards the world in general and Islamic world in particular.

The Second World War ended, as all wars end, with a disaster. Millions of soldiers were killed on sides of the imperial divide. Holocaust, based on the racist colonial ideology of Aryan supremacy, left a deep wound in European collective body politic and showed the hollowness of modernity’s dream of universal progress. The very rise of Hitler to power on the bandwagon of electoral democracy and his expansionist policies based on totalitarianism left the critical voices like Jean Paul Sartre and Bertrand Russell dumbfounded. Theodore Adorno lamented ‘to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric’ (Adorno 34) and Walter Benjamin declared that “every document of civilization is at same time a document of barbarism” (Benjamin 256). During the war two rival ideologies of Capitalism, represented by America and Britain, and Communism, represented by USSR, came together to defeat the totalitarian regimes of Hitler and Mussolini. Also and because of the same imperial war Britain’s greatest and richest colonies in Asia, Middle East, and Africa gained independence as a result of two things: long and popular national liberation movements, and war torn economies of Europe. However, the same historical moment of world anti-colonialism paradoxically also laid the foundations for the new imperial configurations and fault lines to emerge. The establishment of Israel as the national home of world Jewry by the Euro-American colonial powers and Zionist organization renewed the occupation of Arab lands, Palestine, and with it resurfaced the old Western stereotypical perceptions of Islam and its culture. Similarly, new imperial rivalry between two new super powers, USSR and USA, emerged from the debris of Second World War. Both these contenders for world domination, based on two opposite ideologies, began to spread their spheres of influence to all the continents of the world. Cuba, Indochina, Congo and Afghanistan became the new battler fields for imperial domination during the Cold War. Both the two powers competed in a dangerous game of nuclearization of their respective spheres of
influence. This hunger for ever more military power and world domination resulted in a precarious Cuban missile crisis which enhanced the threat of third world war in which nuclear weapons would have been used from all sides.

America’s involvement in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Palestine, and after 1975 in Africa and Afghanistan became flashpoints in new struggles for world domination. 1975 was the year of the American defeat in Indochina, and of the collapse of Portuguese rule in the colonies of Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea, the last European empire in Africa. “In retrospect, it was the year that the focal point of the Cold War shifted from the Southeast Asia to Southern Africa” and America used all tricks in the imperial trade to out-wit USSR’s influence (Mamdani 63). European empires were ending, but at the same time new imperial conflicts and configurations were forming with America as the new colonial centre.

The rapid decline in colonialism stimulated the rise of alternative means of domination by the more powerful sates, especially America, after the Second World War. Harry Magdoff like many other theorist of imperial phenomenon has done an excellent study of imperialism in its various forms. According to him:

Control and influence by means other than outright colonial possession is hardly a new phenomenon. Indeed, informal empire has been an important ingredient throughout the evolution of capitalism as means to secure markets and access to raw materials. Along with outright colonialism, informal empire helped shape and sustain the international division labor between the advanced manufacturing nations and those supplying raw materials and food. But the spread of informal empire as a substitute for formal colonial rule and the introduction of new mechanisms of control have been so pervasive since World War II as to give rise to the term neocolonialism. . . While conventional thought in the United States and Western Europe generally rejects the validity the term,
in the former colonial world the existence of the phenomenon of neocolonialism is commonly recognized and discussed. (Magdoff 73)

In the neocolonial situation Euro-American states and multinational corporations has enabled the bourgeoisie once again to steal the economies and natural resources of the geographical areas called ‘Third world’. The imperialist tradition in the world is today maintained not only by the military bases spread throughout the globe but also by the international bourgeoisie using the multinational using the multinational corporations. In this context Ngugi Wa Thiongo has been very apt to maintain throughout his illustrious career as a writer of African consciousness that this neocolonial situation political, economic and cultural domination has been enforced through “police boots, barbed wire, a gowned clergy and judiciary; their ideas are spread by a corpus of state intellectuals, academic and journalistic laureates of the neo-colonial establishment” (Thiongo 2). Imperialism as such is a real exploitative condition that, in its forms and methods, is still shaping the cultures, economies and political relations between different nations. Imperialism, as Lenin made clear in his book \textit{Imperialism: The Last Stage of Capitalism} is the rule of consolidated finance capital which is supported and made possible by military hardware and technologies. This parasitic economic situation has affected and still is affecting the fate of billions of people. The Western finance capital working in the form of multinational corporations continues stealing from the countries and peoples of poorer countries in Asia and Africa. This imperialism, today protected by conventional and nuclear weapons, is led by the USA, which “presents the struggling peoples of the earth and all those calling for peace, democracy and socialism with the ultimatum: accept theft or death” (Thiongo 3).

The condition which Ngugi describes and criticizes in \textit{Decolonising the Mind} is, as said above, termed as neocolonialism. What is usually meant by it is the existence of considerable foreign influence of a major world power in the
economic and political policies of a nominally independent nation. The relationship is designed and often supported by International Monetary Fund to benefit American hegemonic position in the world. This means a high degree of American influence on the economic policies and affairs of its client states. This also entails influence over political and military policies of those nations, especially in Middle East and Africa. Many ideological and cultural traditions have been carried over from colonial times. Similarly, “the continued membership of the former British and French colonies in the currency zones of the mother countries, for instance, facilitated the perpetuation of existing trade relations” (Magdoff 73). In the post-Second World War these trade and cultural relations were restructured by America to its own benefit and former imperial powers like Britain had to play second fiddle to the vastly expanding American empire. Most important of all is the continuity of the basic economic structure that had evolved during the European colonial enterprise. Coming out of the World War II as the most powerful economic and military power, the United States assumed the mantle of the non-communist bloc and began to manage that part of the world. During this period of imperial transition from Europe to America “a high priority was therefore given to keeping as much of the world as possible economically and politically hospitable to the continuation of traditional patterns of trade and investment” (……74). As part of this strategy America built of a vast military infrastructure around the world, many of them located in the former colonies. This was supported by many military interventions and proxy in places like Vietnam, Columbia, Nicaragua, Congo, Balkans, Iran-Iraq War, and, most importantly, in Afghanistan. The war in Vietnam, which almost completely destroyed the country, was the most drastic of these direct military actions before imperial wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. An equally outstanding instance of intervention, though non-military, was the overthrow of the democratically elected prime minister of Iran, Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953. Similarly, in the following year military was used to overthrow the Guatemala regime that had nationalized America’s banana plantations. These American military interventions continued during the Cold War years and later on culminated in what came to be known as ‘Afghan jihad’.
The contemporary imperial formation headed by United States is quite unprecedented. The great global empires of nineteenth and twentieth centuries bear little resemblance with the military and economic power of American empire. This empire heads the world which is so integrated, its operations are so geared to one another, and there is the enormous power of a constantly revolutionized technology in economies, and above all, in military force. Technology is more decisive in military affairs than ever before. According to Eric Hobsbawm, the current American empire is quite different from previous empires. This imperial project is in different from all other colonial enterprises in that “all other great powers and empires knew that they were not the only ones, and none aimed at global domination” (Hobsbawm, Globalisation, Democracy 156). Although the British Empire in the nineteenth century did operate across the entire planet, yet it did not achieve the dominant military position as achieved by America today. Commenting on the difference between British and American empire, maintains that

The US has never actually practiced colonialism except briefly during the international fashion for colonial imperialism at the end of nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. The US operated instead with dependent and satellite states, notably in the western sphere, in which it had virtually no competitors. Unlike Britain, it developed a policy of armed intervention into these in the twentieth century” (157).

Not only did American empire inherit and expand the economic and military policies of the former British Empire, it also inherited its ideology though with certain changes based on the idea of American exceptionalism. British Empire was British in identity, though some of its propagandists also tried to give it an altruistic hue in the form of bringing civilization to the ‘less civilized’ cultures of the world. As compared to this the present American empire traces its roots of exceptionalism back to its revolutionary war of independence and
presents itself as a universal alternative. Therefore, it believes that the rest of the world should follow it or it should even liberate the world and make it safe for democracy. Hobsbawm has made this clear at another place in his book *The New Century* where he has argued that America is a revolutionary power, based on a revolutionary ideology. “Like revolutionary France and Soviet Russia, America is not just a state, it is also a state dedicated to the transformation of the world in a certain manner. In this sense, American cultural hegemony has a political dimension which British hegemony never had” (Hobsbawm, *The New Century* 48). One of the important characteristics of American empire is that it has always wanted to convert the rest of the world to its own political and economic ideology, and this has given a strange messianic color to it. Though British hegemony too was culturally, economically and militarily very strong, but it never sought to attempt the organization of the whole world. Britshers did what they could to regulate the world according to their own interests, but not to dominate it entirely. America on the other hand has created a massive military-industrial complex that has given it power to claim world hegemony. “However, few things are more dangerous than empires pursuing their own interests in the belief that by doing so they are doing humanity a favor” (Hobsbawm, *Globalisation Democracy* 158).

There are so many other scholars in addition to Hobsbawm and Ngugi who have maintained through their theoretical and philosophical interventions that the world is hardly in any ‘post-colonial’ era. Scholars of the history of empire and its enabling discourses like Noam Chomsky, Arundhati Roy, Terry Eagleton, Samir Amin and Edward Said etc. have also talked about the ascendancy of American empire in the late twentieth and early twenty first century. Roy’s *An Ordinary Persons Guide to Empire*, Samir Amin’s *Eurocentrism*, Terry Eagleton’s writings on Marxism and rising religious Right in Europe and America, Tariq Ali’s *The Clash of Fundamentalisms*, and Noam Chomsky in a number of historical surveys have reiterated what Edward Said argued throughout his writings on Palestine, Israel and American interventions in the Middle East. According to him:
Imperialism did not end, did not suddenly become ‘past’, once decolonization had set motion the dismantling of the classical empires. A legacy of connections still binds countries like Algeria and India to France and Britain respectively. . . Also the end of Cold War and of the Soviet Union has definitively changed the world map. The triumph of the United States as the last superpower suggests that a new set of force lines will structure the world, and they were already beginning to be apparent in the 1960s and 1970s. (Said, *Culture and Imperialism* 341)

Quoting Michael Barratt-Brown Said puts forward the case that exploitative imperial relations and economic structures are still the most powerful cultural, economic, political and military features of what has been called a New World Order. The less economically developed lands are still subjected to the power of economically developed and militarily advanced countries. Meanwhile, the rift between “rich and poor is being driven deeper and the battle to control the world’s resources is intensifying. Economic colonialism through formal military aggression is staging a comeback” (Roy 302). Roy in her non-fictional essays has especially focused on the economic policies forced by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to argue that the structural adjustment programs are new ways of keeping poorer countries forever indebted to US economic and military interests. Like Roy Said too has talked about the immense rift between poor and rich states, and a relationship of unequal power-sharing in decision making within monetary and financial institutions. In this context Noam Chomsky concluded that during the 1980s

the ‘North-South’ conflict will not subside, and new forms of domination will have be devised to ensure that privileged segments of Western industrial society maintain substantial control over global resources, human and material, and benefit disproportionately from this control. Thus it comes as no surprise
that the reconstitution of ideology in the United States finds echoes throughout the industrial world . . . but it is an absolute requirement for the Western system of ideology that a vast gulf be established between the civilized West, with its traditional commitment to human dignity, liberty, and self-determination, and the barbaric brutality of those who for some reason – perhaps defective genes – fail to appreciate the depth of this historic commitment, so well revealed by America’s Asian wars, for example. (Chomsky 84-85)

An important feature of the Cold War period was America’s policy of containment of Soviet influence in the world in general and in Islamic countries in particular. Rather, as writers like Mahmood Mamdani have argued, Muslim countries of the Arab and non-Arab world were singled out for a special place in Cold War politics as a bulwark against godless communism. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began to operate covert actions in countries deemed hostile to American interests. Coupled with the Cold War exigencies was the continuing American military and financial support to Israeli occupation of historical Palestine. In 1967 Israel occupied rest of Palestine and extended it rule to the Golan Heights in Syria and Sinia in Egypt. Gaza became permanently a besieged territory. Israeli aggression against Lebanon in 1982 gave rise to armed groups of resistance, Hamas and Hezbollah. These groups overtly flaunted their Islamic identity as a result of which Israeli and American mainstream media began talk in terms of Islam’s supposedly inherent lack of progress and its conflict with what the Post-Second World War Orientalist Bernard Lewis called ‘Judeo-Christian Civilization’. In 1953 CIA and England’s intelligence agencies orchestrated a coup in Iran and installed Reza Shah as a dictator whose years of misrule and corrupt policies estranged Iranian people who finally overthrew him during a long resistance which culminated in the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. Reza Shah’s dictatorship was made possible by American support for his regime, and this angered Iranian people who saw it a sign of imperial double standard. One the one hand American politicians were talking of ‘making the world safe for
democracy’, and on the other hand, they were actively supporting dictatorships in the Arab world. This simmering discontent resulted not only in the overthrow of dictatorship but, since America supported it, also the capture of American Embassy by university and college students in Tehran. This event also brought ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ into the consciousness of American people. ‘Islam’ became news. As Edward Said has reminded us in his book *Covering Islam*, almost all the mainstream news channels and radio talk shows beamed images of ‘angry’ Muslims on the screens. ‘Experts’ on Islam like Lewis and his ilk began to give a “sustained diet of information about a people, a culture, a religion – really no more than a poorly defined and badly misunderstood abstraction – always in case of Iran, represented as a militant, dangerous, and anti-American” (Said, *Covering Islam* 83). Said continues thus:

One expert was quoted as saying that “the loss of Iran to an Islamic from of government was the greatest setback the United States has had in recent years”. Islam, in other words, is by definition inimical to United States Interests. The Wall Street Journal had editorialized on November 20 that “civilization receding” came from the “decline of the Western powers that spread these (civilized) ideals”. (84)

Arguments like ‘Militant Islam, ‘the Islam explosion’, and ‘the Muslim hatred of America’ gained common currency during and after this standoff between Iranian students who seized American embassy and the United States government. ‘The rage of Islam’ and ‘Clash of Islam’ thesis, as propounded by Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington and V. S. Naipaul, became a favorite theme of scholarly and media debates. All such debates tried to prove that Islam was one unchanging thing that could be grasped over and above the remarkably varied history, geography, and social structure and culture of a number of Islamic nations and more than one billion Muslims who live in Asia, Africa, Europe and North America. Islam as a civilizations began to be pitted against what they called a
‘universal’ Judeo-Christian civilization (the centuries old persecution and pogroms of Jews in Europe did not bother the proponents of Judeo-Christian civilization).

Along with Iranian Revolution and seizure of American embassy some other important events happened in the same years which would make binary oppositions between ‘civilized West’ and ‘backward Islam’ a common theme in Euro-American cultural landscape. One was the broadcasting of a movie named *Death of the Princes* which was run by the Public Broadcasting Service in 1980. It created a diplomatic feud between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia. Then after the disintegration of USSR, the first Gulf war and the subsequent rise of Taliban in war torn Afghanistan, which upto then had been America’s main allay against the communist regime, amplified the negative stereotypes of Islam and Muslims in the Western cultural forums. Taliban’s takeover of Kabul and NATO’s unrelenting bombardment of Iraq fueled the nineteenth century old Orientalist representations of Islam and Arabs. Sadam Hussein and Mulla Omer, who until then were America’s main allays against Iran and USSR respectively, came to be treated as representing ‘true Islam’. There was hardly a prime-time television show without several episodes of patently racist and insulting caricatures of Muslims. Islam and Muslims tended to be represented in unqualified categorical and generic terms. One Muslim came to represent all Muslims and Islam in general. During those 1970s, 80s and 90s new geopolitical-intellectual setting the public image of Islam in West was invariably presented in a confrontational relationship with Western, ‘our’ civilization and culture. It is in this context that Edward Said has argued that

Such representations of Islam have regularly testified to a penchant for dividing the world into pro- and anti-American (or pro- and anticommunist), an unwillingness to report political processes, an imposition of patterns and values that are ethnocentric or irrelevant or both, pure misinformation, repetition, an avoidance of detail, an
absence of genuine perspective. All of this can be traced, not to Islam, but to aspects of society in the West and to the media which this idea of “Islam” reflects and serves. The result is that we have divided the world into Orient and Occident – the old Orientalist thesis pretty much unchanged – the better to blind ourselves not only to the world but to ourselves and to what our relationship to the so-called Third World has really been . . . one is that a specific picture – for it is that – of Islam has been supplied. Another is that its meaning or message has on the whole continued to be circumscribed and stereotyped. A third is that a confrontational situation has been created, pitting “us” against “Islam”. A fourth is that this reductive image of Islam has had ascertainable results in the world of Islam itself. (Said, Covering Islam 44)

Naipaul, Clash of Civilizations Thesis: Enablers of Empire

It is in this historical and political context that V. S. Naipaul set out to explore non-Arab Muslim countries to find out what he thought was happening in that part of the world. The historical moment was dominated by apocalyptical images of an eternal conflict between ‘West’ and ‘Islam’. As argued earlier in this chapter, stereotypical representations of Islam and its culture were beamed on people on a daily basis. Writers like Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington were talking in terms of a civilizational clash. Muslims and Islam had replaced communism and USSR as a ‘threat’ to the ‘freedoms’ and ‘liberties’ of the Western world. Ayatollah Khomeini, Sadam Hussein and Taliban had become new Hitler and Lenin in Euro-American policy circles and cultural forms like Hollywood and mainstream media. Experts of area studies like Lewis had begun to talk of a “return of Islam” as a threat to what he called a Western modernity and Judeo-Christian civilization. Idea of ‘West’ as some kind of ‘Universal civilization’ had begun to be touted not only by mainstream journalists but also by scholars like Huntington and Fukuyama. Francis Fukuyama even declared an ‘end
of history’ and final triumph of Western neoliberal economic and cultural policies. Western history almost became synonymous with the History. These popular and academic debates about ‘Islam’ and ‘West’ were full of clichés and stereotypes about Muslims and Islam. Ever since the demise of the Soviet Union there had been a rush by some scholars and journalists in the United States to find in an Orientalized Islam a new empire of evil. “Consequently, both the electronic and the print media have been awash with demeaning stereotypes that lump together Islam and terrorism, or Arabs and violence, or the Orient and tyranny (Said, *Orientalism* 347).

There was this particular kind of ideological consensus among media, military strategists, Middle Eastern area studies experts, and governments that Islam is a threat to Western civilization. Naipaul too participated in this corporate business of creating negative images of Islam which continue to be very much more prevalent that any others, and “that such images correspond not to what Islam is . . . but to what prominent sectors of a particular society take it to be” (Said, *Covering Islam* 144). My point is that those actors like V. S. Naipaul and Lewis had power and privilege to propagate that picture of Islam. According to Said:

Much in current representations of Islam is designed to show the religion’s inferiority with reference to the West, which Islam is supposedly hell-bent on opposing, competing with, resenting and being enraged at. Moreover, important journals of opinion such as the New Yorker, the New York Review of Books, and Atlantic Monthly never carry essays (or even literary works) in translation by Muslim and Arab authors but rely on experts such as Viorist to interpret political and cultural actualities shaped not by the facts but by unexamined presuppositions such as the above. Very rarely do critiques of these practices stray into the mainstream to challenge their hegemony. (Said, *Covering Islam* xxvi)
One of the arguments of my thesis is that though Naipaul’s earlier novels gave expression to postcolonial identities and aspirations, especially of the diasporic communities, a marked shift occurred in his ideological orientation. According to Patrick French, V. S. Naipaul stopped writing about postcolonial societies from the perspective of the subaltern nations. This ideological shift occurred during the 1970s and 1980s when, according to Edward Said, erstwhile radical writers and philosophers like Foucault began a conservative turn (Said, *Culture and Imperialism* 29-30). It is the same period when neoliberal economic system and political liberalism of western democracies intensified its war against Soviet communism, enlisting the support of authoritarian and unpopular Arab monarchies in the process. Western cultural and political onslaught, under the leadership of United States of America and through international institutions like International Monetary Fund, World Bank and NATO, began to reassert its global power. From Latin America to Korean Peninsula, and in Sudan, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Libya, American military industrial complex began to attack the nation states which had gained independence from European colonialism after the devastation of the Second World War. During the period of Afghan Jihad, Iranian Revolution and first Gulf War, the area studies experts and mainstream media think tanks in the Euro-American academic world began to publish their analysis of Islam’s relationship with the Western world. Western scholars like Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington, Samia Hamady, Raphael Patai, Harold Glidden and other American Arabists began to marshal their academic standing in the power centers to explain the so-called “Arab mind” to the world. The idea is that if you peel off the external and secondary influences of history and personal experience, an unchanging and transhistorical category called “Muslim” and “Arab” will show itself in its true colour. In other words, Arabs and Muslims are treated as fixed, stable, in need of investigation, and even in need of knowledge about themselves. These Western think tanks and mandarins resort to age old and hackneyed Orientalist clichés to account for the causes of the immanent political conflicts between Muslim nation states and Euro-American powers. I argue in my thesis that it is in this context that V. S. Naipaul has written his two travelogues titled
Among the Believers and Beyond Belief about four Muslim majority nations during the later three decades of the twentieth century. I argue that instead of presenting a dispassionate picture of the social, economic and political changes occurring in these Muslim countries, Naipaul uses the Orientalist tropes and images to formulate his theory of what he calls “parasitism” of “Islamic” and of Muslims. He also develops the idea of a “Universal Western Civilization” as opposed to the non-West, particularly Islam. Like the nineteenth century Orientalists writing about Islam, he also uses water-tight binaries like ‘us’ vs. ‘them’, ‘West’ vs. ‘Islam’ in order to formulate his own version of clash of civilizations. I maintain that Naipaul has many ideological similarities with Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, two other proponents of clash theory. I locate his interventions within this clash of civilizations paradigm, and therefore, I argue that these formulations about Islam and Muslims act as contemporary versions of nineteenth century Orientalist colonial discourse which were used to justify and perpetuate colonial intervention in Muslims and Arab lands.

Therefore, I think it will be apt here to discuss Lewis and Huntington, other two proponents of clash theory, in some detail.

Bernard Lewis published his famous article “The Roots of Muslim Rage” in September 1990 issue of The Atlantic. In this article Lewis posited the thesis that ‘Muslims’ throughout the world resent ideologically secular and technologically advanced, and, thereby, historically superior, ‘Judeo-Christian Western civilization’. He purports to explain this ‘bitterness’ by finding the so-called ‘roots of Muslim rage’. The insidious title itself suggests Lewis’ ideological location and perspective of seeing the world historical experience in reductive binary terms. He formulates the perspective that ‘Muslims’ reject western civilization not because what it does but because what it is, and the values and principles (democracy, secularism, science, human rights) that it professes and practices. By positing a ‘holy war’ ideology at the heart of Islam’s relations with the non-Islam, Lewis gives rise to the thesis of ‘clash of civilizations’, a clash, according to him, in which ideologically motivated hatred bred by ‘Islam’ is
supposed to be against a well-meaning and liberal ‘West’. The ‘clash’, according to Lewis, began with “the advent of Islam, in the seventh century, and has continued virtually to the present day”. Lewis, in a way, invents the category of ‘the Muslim’ dominated by cultural, i.e. Islamic influences, and shorn of the multifarious historical and personal experiences that characterize human beings. Other social, political, economic and intellectual choices of Muslim societies are given no weight in considering their relationship with the Euro-American world. We are made to believe that the global religious revival of Islam in the form of ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ alone determines the contours and structure of the Muslim response to the colonial experience of the past and present. In this way Lewis lays the causes of the ‘clash’ at the door of ‘religious revival’ in the Muslim world without taking into consideration other possible causes and influences that otherwise shape human behavior and history. In explaining the Muslim response to the West he does not take into account the support provided by the liberal Western governments to the authoritarian dictatorships around the world. He does not consider it worthwhile to look for the causes of ‘Muslim rage’ at other places like European and American imperial and exploitative economic policies; rather he uses his supposedly objective scholarship and knowledge of Islam to explain the rise of religious elite hell bent upon destroying the ‘universal’ Judeo-Christian civilization’. As he infamously puts it: “This is no less than a clash of civilizations – the perhaps irrational but surely historical reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both” (Lewis 60)

According to Lewis ‘the West’ was able to advance in all spheres of life as against Islamic world because it was able not only to separate but also to make a distinction between the spheres of religion and politics: “render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s and unto God which are God’s”. So instead of explaining the unequal power relations between ‘the west’ and ‘Islam’ by looking into diverse and historically contingent factors like imperialism, capitalism, slavery, racism, colonialism, and neo-colonial and neoliberal economic policies,
Lewis resorts to the common Orientalist cliché of culture being the main source and fountain of inferiority or superiority between the two diverse peoples, in this case ‘Islam’ and ‘West’. He suggests, speaking in sweeping terms, that it is the ‘Islam’ that has ‘inspired’ hatred directed against ‘us’, i.e. ‘the west’. In explaining “this surge of hatred” nowhere does he take stock of the continuing American imperial meddling into the affairs of countries like Iran, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, or the unconditional support given by successive western, and especially American, governments to the settler colonialism of Zionists in historical Palestine. Instead of formulating a critical appraisal of the American policy vis-a-vis the part of the world largely populated by Muslims, Lewis expresses his happiness that “there is still an imposing Western presence – cultural, economic, and diplomatic – in Muslim world”. In this way he exonerates from any blame in one go the centuries old experience of colonial pillage and stereotyping of colonized other.

This Orientalist perspective of cultural determinism formulated by Lewis was later on adopted by Samuel Huntington and elaborated extensively in his book *Clash of Civilizations* to account for the post-World War Second “pattern of conflicts”. Following Bernard Lewis and V. S. Naipaul, Huntington claims to account for the current and coming world conflicts. According to him the coming wars will not be fought for economic or ideological reasons. Rather, the source of global conflagration will be culture, and in particular the culture of Islam. The shape of the wars will be determined by the supposedly homogeneous and ahistorical characteristics of cultures, especially of Islam. The conflicts will be nothing short of a clash of civilizations. As Huntington puts it in his article “The Clash of Civilizations?” published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993: “The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future”. This article itself is the product of the Olin Institute’s project on “The Changing Security Environment and the American National Interests”. The very title of the project reveals Huntington’s priorities to serve American national interests, rather than to provide a dispassionate and
intellectual analysis of the events occurring in the world. He divides the world into
different civilizational blocks like Western, Islamic, Chinese, Japanese, Hindu,
Latin American, and African, each characterized by homogeneous markers of
identification and with different levels of cultural and scientific advancement. The
factors differentiating one civilization from another are language, culture,
tradition, and, most importantly, religion. He argues that in the post-Cold War
world differences based on ideology, political and economic systems will wane,
and the differences characterized by civilizational consciousness will increase in
all the disparate cultural blocks of the world. According to him, “The Velvet
Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant
dividing line” in the world” (Huntington 31). After providing a reductively
cursory view of relations of the Muslim world with other cultures, Huntington
triumphantly claims that “Islam has bloody borders”. He mainly holds ‘Islam’ or
‘Islamic fundamentalism’, treated as a transhistorical phenomenon, responsible for
the continuing violence between Western and Muslim world, spoken of in
sweeping and homogeneous terms. Islam and the peoples it represents are spoken
of as fixed and inert categories devoid of any change across history and
geographies. This has become a dominant ideological trope that recurs ceaselessly
in the mainstream writings about Islam in the Western area studies departments.

One of the contentions of this thesis is that Naipaul, like Lewis and
Huntington, too operates within the overarching ideological narrative of
Orientalism and the ‘clash theory’. His chief contribution to this new kind of late
twentieth century imperial discourse is his development of the idea of ‘West’ as a
‘Universal Civilization’ and Muslim ‘parasitism’. Both these ideological
constructions run deeply throughout his travel narratives about Muslim countries
and his discourse about ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. These ideas were
developed during the end of Cold War era when, paradoxically speaking, political
Islam itself was the most important ideological ally of Western countries led by
USA to defeat Soviet communism. All the Muslim countries Naipaul writes about
and denounces as merely “parasitic”, except Iran, in his travelogues were staunch
supporters of USA, and ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ was not only funded but also materially supported by Western countries to bring a downfall of Soviet Union. It was also done, as Tariq Ali has demonstrated in his book of interviews titled *Speaking of Empire and Resistance*, to defeat nationalist and anti-colonial liberation movements with the Muslim world. Shah of Iran and General Zia of Pakistan, along with Sadam Hussein and Afghan Mujahidin, later called Taliban, fought against Soviet Union on behalf of their Western allies headed by USA. This sordid history of USA’s contribution to the development of what Naipaul calls ‘Muslim aggressiveness’ (*Naipaul, Beyond Belief* 84) is brilliantly demonstrated by Mahmood Mamdani in his important work on the development of Political Islam called *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim*. Writers like Ali, Mamdani, Chomsky and Said complicate the simplistic binaries between ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and ‘Western Universal Civilization’ which is created by V. S. Naipaul and others. Naipaul’s idea of ‘Universal Civilization’ was developed clearly against what Islam and its culture stands for, and, therefore, it is full of Orientalist clichés and binaries between ‘developed West’ and ‘backward looking Islam’. This idea of ‘universal civilization’, which he perfected in *Among the Believers*, was later on given a shape in the form of The Wriston lecture delivered by Naipaul at the Manhattan Institute of New York, on October, 1990, and published on the Op-Ed page of The New York Times as “Our Universal Civilization”, where

It keeps company with a perfectly supplementary William Safire essay on “Stopping the Saddam Bomb”. A decade back, during the Iran hostage crisis, Naipaul had first perfected his orientalist opposition between a generous “civilization” and a parasitic “barbarism. In 1990, we find recurring in a depressingly unadjusted mode, both his terms for explicating a Western-Islamic crisis and the public appeal to Naipaul as an expert on Islam. (Nixon 152)
In *Among the Believers* this idea of “our universal civilization” is closely developed in relation to “Islam’s” “parasitic” dependence on the “West”. Almost all his encounters with different peoples of different backgrounds are capped with the suggestion of an Islamic hypocrisy, as he formulates it. Muslims are said to depend on the technology and “goods of Europe” (Naipaul, *Among the Believers* 401) in order to survive in the modern world, which itself is presented to have been created mainly by Western industry and knowledge. According to V. S. Naipaul, Muslims remain reliant on Western technologies and goods but at the same time are hostile to it. For example, while touring through Malaysia Naipaul concludes one of the sections with the following observations:

The pleasures of money in Malaysia were simple. Money magnified the limitations of places like Malaysia, small, uneducated, and coming late to everything. Money – from oil, rubber, tin, palm oil – changed old ways. But money only turned people into buyers of imported goods, fixed the country in a dependent relationship with the developed world, kept all men colonials. (Naipaul, *Among the Believers* 266)

The insinuation is that the Malaysians do not deserve the money they have, while there is absolutely no discussion of the processes and technologies that Malaysians may have created to make this money. The impression that is given to the Western readership, for whom these books were written, is that the Muslims throughout the world are merely consumers. They do not create anything and therefore do not deserve the benefits of modernity. Modernity as a historical process from past to the present developed form of civilization is purely a Western process, and rest of the peoples, especially Muslims, have no contribution to this development. Naipaul comes to the same kind of ‘conclusion’ about Indonesia too. In a section where he writes about his dialogues on “Islamization” of Indonesia with Imaduddin, a Muslim and Sumatran, Naipaul argues that the “international community, the universal civilization: providers of tape recorders,
and psychological games and higher degrees in electrical engineering; and now, guardians of Indonesian art and civilizations” (Naipaul, *Among the Believers* 375). The apparent idea clearly is that the Muslims and their culture are not parts of “international community”. They are not contributors to the world culture and civilization. They have not and still are not creating anything. They are just borrowers, parasites on the world civilization. Their ideas and technology and science are all taken from other cultures. And what is more “they” are ungrateful. Naipaul seems to suggest that so far as social, political, economic, and technological institutions are concerned they are purely “Western” inventions and rest of the world is only dependent on what the ‘West’ has created. This is a typical nineteenth century Orientalist trope according to which the civilization is a product of Western engagement with nature and its processes whereas the Oriental Arabs (Muslims) are purely ‘religious’ and whose actions can only be understood in terms of their mysterious and superstitious religious doctrines. The point is that Western ways of thinking and feeling are alien to Muslims who are thought of as some kind of essentialized beings for whom the normal processes of history are quite immaterial. West is dynamic, creative, original, and rational; Muslims are static, uncreative, imitative, and irrational. In this mode of thought nothing about Muslims can be understood without taking into consideration the pernicious influence of ‘Islam’ which, according to Naipaul, makes “imperial demands on people” and which “was a complicated religion. It wasn’t philosophical or speculative. It was a revealed religion, with a Prophet and a complete set of rules. To believe, it was necessary to know a lot about the Arabian origins of the religion, and to take this knowledge to heart” (Naipaul, *Among the Believers* 7).

About such kind of Orientalist representation of Islam Edward Said comments that:

For Orientalism, Islam had a meaning which, if one were to look for its most succinct formulation, could be found in Renan’s first treatise: in order best to be understood Islam had to be reduced to “tent and tribe”. The impact of colonialism, of worldly
circumstances, of historical development: all these were to
Orientalists as flies to wanton boys, killed – or disregarded – for
their sport, never taken seriously enough to complicate the essential
Islam. (Said, *Orientalism* 105)

For Naipaul this figure of parasite is very important, and as Rob Nixon
teaches us, Naipaul applied this to Trinidadians, Argentinians, Uruguayans,
Indians, Iranians, and Pakistanis. However, it is in *Among the Believers* that this
figure appears persistently in relation to Islam’s relation to the “our universal
civilization” created by West. For Naipaul this “parasitism” is most pervasive in
“colonial” societies, uninventive cultures lulled by their dependency on “Western
civilization”. Islam and its culture is presented as one of these “colonial” cultures
which are said to be held back principally by habits of self-destructive
dependency. According to Nixon “Naipaul expresses this sentiment tersely in an
essay on Trinidad, where he pronounces against the new politics, the curious
reliance of men on institutions they [are] yet working to undermine” . . . of the
Uruguayans he observes:

[They] say that they are European nation, that they have always
had their back to the rest of South America. It was their great error,
and is part of their failure. Their habits of wealth made them,
profoundly, a colonial people, educated but intellectually null,
consumers, parasitic on the culture and technology of others.
(Nixon 144).

From this it is abundantly clear that Naipaul had already developed this
idea in relation to other previously colonized nations and societies. In such an
analysis no serious consideration is given to the centuries long imperial and
colonial policies of economic loot which these countries suffered at the hands of
Western imperial powers. Colonialism at its simplest form is an organized theft of
the natural resources of the colonized peoples, and while discussing the current
situation of once colonized countries one cannot afford not to take into account
the continuing unequal power relations between these countries. Their histories are interdependent, and one’s development cannot be understood without also taking into consideration how those colonized nations were underdeveloped during colonial era.

However, in *Among the Believers*, when he writes about Islam and Muslims, ‘parasitic’ and its other equivalents are his routine epithets. It occurs many times during his conversations with Muslims from Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran and Malaysia. The underlying assumption of all those observations is the mutual incompatibility of “Islam” and the modern Western world, and “Islam’s” chronic technological and scientific dependence on West. In a section titled “the Rule of Ali” Naipaul concludes his discussion with a taxi driver as

>The hotel driver could be helped through the evening traffic jams by the Koranic readings on his car radio; and when we got back to the hotel there would be mullahs on television. Certain modern goods and tools – cars, radios, televisions – were necessary; their possession was part of proper Islamic pride. But these things were not associated with any particular faith or civilization; they were thought of as the stock of some great universal bazar. (Naipaul, *Among the Believers* 33)

This and such other statements recur throughout this book. They show an essentialized understanding of human civilization by treating civilizations as separate and water-tight compartments. Naipaul’s treats cultures and civilizations only in antagonistic terms. In his worldview there is no place for confluence of processes and histories which actually have given rise to human civilization. Civilizations have developed through give and take processes. They have never developed in isolation. As Ranjit Hoskote and Ilija Trojanow have argued in their scholarly history, *Confluences: Forgotten Histories from East and West*, that all cultures have borrowed from each other and that the current “modernity” is by no means a European invention. They argue that mingling and confluence of different
and dissimilar cultures is lifeblood of civilizations; no culture has ever been isolated, pure and monolithic. They question such ideologies of purity as are constructed by thinkers like Lewis, Huntington and V. S. Naipaul, who

. . . believe that societies can only function when they boast of a homogeneous, home grown culture that has developed from the core of a certain nation: one tradition, one religion, one people. They define difference as static and unbridgeable. They are oblivious to the concealed entanglements of an ancestry and the local variations of transcontinental narratives. Theirs is a flawed conviction, for it is blind to history. (Hoskote and Trojanow 1-2)

In this context, they argue that the writers like V. S. Naipaul have presented Islam as a regressive, intolerant religion, and thus have “popularised the idea that contact with Islam has been catastrophic for other cultures – that Islam has wiped out all signs of the cultures it has supplanted, that Islam is an unfinished project that is only waiting for an opportunity for world domination. This is no more than a projection of the aims and methods of European colonialism” (186). In other words, the late twentieth century discourse about the conflict between “Islam” and “West”, a discourse which runs deeply throughout Naipaul’s travel narratives, functions as an ideology that justifies the imperial interventions of USA in different Arab and Muslim nations. Naipaul’s ideas about West as a ‘universal civilization’ and “Islam” as parasitic help create cultural ideas and ideologies that lend a legitimacy to American global expansionism. Empires do not live by force alone. They need beliefs, visions to survive and earn popular support. What redeems empires is an idea: ‘universal western civilization’ bringing democracy and human rights to ‘parasitic’ Muslim ‘fundamentalists’.

This idea that Islam is dependent on West while at the same time rejects it is further made explicit in a section called ‘The Disorder of the Law’. He argues here that though Islamic revivalists denounce the West, they remain reliant on
Western technologies and goods to a degree that compromises their principled hostility. Naipaul writes:

The West, or the universal civilization it leads, is emotionally rejected. It undermines; it threatens. But at the same time it is needed, for its machines, goods, medicines, warplanes, the remittances from the emigrants, the hospitals that might have a cure for calcium deficiency, the universities what will provide master’s degrees in mass media. All the rejection of the West is contained within the assumption that there will always exist out there a living, creative, civilization, oddly neutral, open to all to appeal to. Rejection, therefore, is not absolute rejection. It is also, for the community as a whole, a way of ceasing to strive intellectually. It is to be parasitic; parasitism is one of the unacknowledged fruits of fundamentalism. (Naipaul, *Among the Believers* 168)

This comparison with Islam is central to Naipaul’s construction of ‘universal civilization’. He operates in Manichean terms. One can argue that in order to develop an image of an “open” and “tolerant” West he needed a “dependent” and “aggressive” Islam. One the one had there is, for Naipaul, the creative, living, open “universal civilization”; and on the other, the resentful, parasitic and inert cultures of Islam. It is in this context that Rob Nixon maintains that

... in choosing Islamic bad faith as the high theme of his book, he assumes, without question, the good faith of the West in its dealing with his four Islamic societies. The West is constantly portrayed as exploited by lesser societies resentful of benign, or at worst, neutral, creativity. Indeed, Naipaul is so decided in his distribution of moral and cultural worth between the cultures of anarchic rage and the “universal civilization” that he ends up demonizing Islam.
almost as routinely as the most brittle-minded of his Islamic interlocutors demonize the West. (Nixon 148)

The same theory of West as a “universal civilization”, developed against the “imperial demands” of Islam, finds a fuller and a kind of a personal exposition in the fourth annual Walter B. Wriston lecture in Public Policy, sponsored by the Manhattan Institute. The Institute describes itself as an “important force in shaping American political culture and developing ideas that foster economic choice and individual responsibility . . . Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, at the NYPD’s request we launched a policy division to advise police on the development of counterterrorism strategy” (Manhattan Institute). It is clear from the Institute’s website itself that this institute has been deeply involved in planning and advising the American government. In other words, it is not a neutral institute of knowledge creation; rather it is an enterprise which has deeply embedded itself in the American economic and political policy making. This kind of nexus has been central to supposedly ‘objective’ analysis of other cultures; a nexus between power and knowledge of which Edward Said writes in Orientalism. It supports neoliberal economic policies and American military interventions in the Muslim lands. It is in this Institute that in 1990 Naipaul gave his lecture entitled “Our Universal Civilization”. Naipaul claims that it this Western ‘universal civilization’ that gave him ‘both the prompting and the idea of the literary vocation; and also gave the means to fulfill that prompting; the civilization that enables me to make that journey from the periphery to the center . . . I couldn’t have become the kind of writer I am in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union or black Africa. I do not think I could have taken my gifts even to India”. Naipaul goes on to say

But I have never formulated the idea of the universal civilization until quite recently – until eleven years ago, when I traveled for many months in a number of non-Arab countries to try to understand what had driven them to their rage. That Muslim rage was just beginning to be apparent . . . what they spoke of more was
“the revival of Islam”. And that, indeed, to anyone contemplating from a distance, was a puzzle. Islam, which had apparently had so little to offer its adherents in the last century and in the first half of this – what did it have to offer to an infinitely more educated, infinitely faster, world in the later years of the century. (Naipaul *The Writer and the World* 507-508).

The thoughts which he had been expressing in his travelogues are given full exposition here. The binary opposition between “West” and “Islam” is at the heart of this formulation. West leads to art, culture, science, literature, technology, in short, to history; Islam is inert, incapable of giving anything to its adherents, dependent, and what is more, Islam leads to “rage”. Three hundred years of West’s colonization of the poorer countries of Africa and Asia is forgotten because it enables Naipaul “to make that journey from the periphery to the center”. Since ‘our universal civilization’ helps Naipaul to shun his culture in order to move to the “centre”, slavery of Africans, genocide of Native Americans and Aboriginals, the ravages of World War I and II, and the Holocaust, all part of the story of Western civilization, can be condoned. These dirty truths about Western imperial and exploitative civilization are hidden under the rug in order to create a positive picture of a ‘universal civilization’. “The rage of Islam” trope is straight away taken from Bernard Lewis’s formulations about Islam and Muslims. The cornerstone of this kind of typical Orientalist thought is that it is the culture of “Islam” that makes these people incapable of negotiating with the challenges of “modernity”. In this way of thinking Islam is divorced from history, economics, and political exigencies. Normal processes of development are denied to it and to its culture. The diverse and heterogeneous cultures and societies are spoken as one essentialized and homogenous entity. This cultural discourse borders on racism and Islamophobia. This is what Chomsky calls ‘reconstitution of ideology’, and according to Said, whose elements include
notions about Western Judeo-Christian triumphalism, the inherent backwardness of the non-Western world, the dangers of various foreign creeds, the proliferation of ‘anti-democratic’ conspiracies, the celebration and recuperation of canonical works, authors, and ideas. Inversely, other cultures are more and more looked at through the perspectives of pathology and/or therapy. (Said, *Culture and Imperialism* 367)

It is because of such attitudes towards other cultures like Islam that phrases like “rage”, “nihilism”, “fantasy” and “neurosis” abound in Naipaul’s observations about Islam and Muslims. His lecture about Islam is a perfect example of attributing pathological tendencies to another culture. His observations are an exercise in othering. This ideological construction gives less than human attributes to the other. “Islam” is an “alien faith” and therefore, Muslims of Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran and Malaysia are colonized by it and removed from themselves. They are “converts”, and Naipaul talks as if the people belonging to “our universal civilization” are not “converts”. This conversion is not specific to Islam. Whole of Euro-American world is a converted society. But, for Naipaul, only Muslims are converts, and therefore, they suffer from “neurosis”. Accepting Islam as a spiritual and social way of life is considered a “colonization”. Naipaul continues:

I was soon to discover that no colonization had been so thorough as the colonization that had come with the Arab faith. Colonized or defeated peoples can begin to distrust themselves. The Muslim countries I am talking about, this distrust had all the force of religion. It was an article of the Arab faith that everything before the faith is wrong, misguided, heretical . . . (Naipaul *The Writer and the World* 508)

In Naipaulian discourse no agency is given to the Muslims themselves. No attention is paid to what they might have to say about “conversion”. What is
important for Naipaul is that it very nicely fits his definition of ‘universal civilization’. “Islam” colonizes; “West” liberates. “Islam” destroys history; “West” creates one. “Islam” leads to neurosis and rage; “West” leads to understanding and tolerance. “Islam” defaces one’s personality; “West” gives a sense of individualism and personal vocation.

Such creation of binaries is fundamental to the clash of civilizations theory, according to which “Islam” is “West’s” enemy. This ideological understanding of human civilization has been criticized by many theorists and historian. They argue that if one believes, as Naipaul does, that the civilization of the West is superior, and the civilization of the “other” is inferior, one is committing a mistake, because the so-called universal or Western civilization is, in reality, the culmination of the “plundering of the rest of the world” (Nandy ix). The modern Western civilization cannot be thought of without also taking into account the centuries of genocides of Natives, slavery of Africans, loot and plunder of Indian subcontinent, scramble for Africa, and the continuing unequal and exploitative relations fostered by World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Today what ‘our universal’ civilization stands for is the result of the centuries of exploitation and plundering of the rest of the world. Naipaul’s clean account of Western progress itself suffers from ‘a loss of history’. He had to commit a historical erasure in order to construct a “tolerant”, “open”, and “dynamic” image of West. Roger Garaudy, in the foreword to Ashis Nandy’s *Traditions, Tyranny, and Utopias* (1999), has aptly maintained that the Western modal of growth is characterized by blind production of things, whether useful or useless, including destructive weapons. Such growth in the Western world was possible only by plundering the rest of the world. In addition to this, Western scramble for natural resources continued with the race for the possession of oil in the Middle East and created the mess and violence that one witnesses. Garaudy observes that ‘underdevelopment’ is not a condition of backwardness; rather it has been created by the growth of the West. While constructing the neat narrative of Western progress Naipaul’s discourse too suffers from the historical amnesia that
he associates with “Islam”. It is in this context that Ania Loomba has said in *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* that the representations of the ‘Orient’ in European literary texts, travelogues and other writings, contributed to the creation of a dichotomy between Europe and its ‘others’:

. . . a dichotomy that was central to the creation of European culture as well as to the maintenance and extension of European hegemony over other lands. Said’s project is to show how ‘knowledge’ about non-Europeans was part of the processes of maintaining power over them. (Loomba 43)

Writing in another context about Joseph Conrad, but concerning similar issues, Edward Said argues that writers like V. S. Naipaul, Graham Green and others “deliver the non-European world either for analysis and judgment or for satisfying the exotic tastes of European and North American audiences. For if it is true that Conrad ironically sees the imperialism of the San Tome silver mine’s British and American owners as doomed by its own pretentious and impossible ambition, it is also true that he writes as a man whose Western view of non-Western world is so ingrained as to blind him to other histories, other cultures, other aspirations . . . Few readers today, after Vietnam, Iran, the Philippines, Algeria, Cuba, Nicaragua, Iraq, would disagree that it is precisely the fervent innocence of Green’s Pyle or Naipaul’s Father Huismans, men for whom the native can be educated into ‘our’ civilization, that turns out to produce the murder, subversion, and endless instability of ‘primitive’ societies. (Said, *Culture and Imperialism* xxi)
Works Cited


