CONCLUSION
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Existing trend of imperial historiography tends one to believe that search for a natural boundary on the impregnable heights of the Himalayas for the security of the empire drove the strategic planners of imperialism in London to establish political control over the vast expanses of the tribal belt in India’s north-east frontier, known today as Arunachal Pradesh. To substantiate this dominant discourse in London the Forward School was always ready with the xenophobic hatred against Russian advances from the other side of the Himalayas. Even acceptance of China as an ally by natural choice because of its continued weaknesses to hold on to its vast empire in the eastern Himalayas was brushed aside in the first quarter of 20th century as useless due to resistance from Chinese nationalism to growing British imperial stakes in Tibet.

Colonial discourse, on the other hand reiterates the importance of political and economic developments in the Brahmaputra valley from 1826 onwards as the main determinant behind the penetration of British rule over Arunachal Pradesh. The imperial policy of non-interference has been busted from time to time to suit the needs of the Colonial State in Assam. The contemporary trend of historiography on colonization of the north-eastern region also harps on the significant role of trade and commerce as a powerful colonial instrument that shaped the direction of colonial penetration.

However, between the two discourses an apparent gap is visible to explain the points of intersection between the dynamics of imperialism and colonialism. It is in this context the present study has made use of inter-disciplinary approach
to comprehend the dynamics of interactions between the two, which resulted in the integration of Arunachal Pradesh into the sub-set of Colonial State in India. At the macro level imperial dynamics still exhibited its dominant characteristics as the main set, while colonialism at micro-level acted as the sub-set to absorb Arunachal Pradesh within its fold as an effective deterrent to keep China away from its borderline in India.

i. MAJOR FINDINGS AND SUGGESTIONS

In the first chapter of this thesis a broad framework of the march of imperial dynamics to India's north-east frontier in the 19th century has been presented with special focus on the logic of power, which acted as the main driving force behind the strategic shift of imperial expansion from Europe to the Asiatic theatre. Effectively checkmated in the European theatre, Russia expanded aggressively on its Asiatic border throughout the 18th and 19th century, adding vast expanses of the tribal territory to its empire. The logic behind the inclusion of the semi-savage tribes to its frontier was to ensure security for the regulated provinces, but once the same was achieved, it was found that the new converts to civilization had been exposed to attacks from more distant tribes. Thus, imperial expansion of the Russian empire was carried out in the East to include more distant tribes. In this process the Russian empire reached up to the great arch of the Himalayas in the early 19th century, which alarmed the imperial strategists in London to expand from India up to the lofty heights of the Himalayas in the north to counter the Russian threat.
However, after the first set of forward moves in the northern frontier it was soon realized that the two expanding empires should not share common frontier on the freezing heights of the Himalayas. Search for suitable buffer between the two empires as a strategy for peaceful co-existence brought a temporary halt to frenzied forward move in the great arch of the Himalayas in the north and north-western frontier. But in the north-eastern frontier the problem was compounded by the presence of China in between. Before the advance of Russia and Britain to this side of the frontier, China had already left its foot-prints on the entire stretch of the Eastern Himalayas as a great political power in the past. However, China's continued political weaknesses under the Manchus was taken for granted as a factor of stability in India's north-eastern frontier, which gave a temporary break to British imperial pursuits in the Ladakh-Tibetan frontier.

Meanwhile, political crisis in Assam since the last quarters of 18\textsuperscript{th} century compelled the colonial masters in India to keep a watch on the security threat to Bengal frontier bordering Assam in the east. Temptation to intervene in the affairs of Assam was often brushed aside by the imperial policy of non-interference in force since 1793. But when it was found that the Burmese had tactfully exploited the political turmoil in Assam to expand their empire up to Bengal border in India, Lord Amherst strongly pleaded for forceful intervention in Assam. Thus, for the sake of imperial security Britain was involved in the 1\textsuperscript{st} Anglo-Burmese war (1824-26) which led to the extension of Bengal's frontier up to the natural frontier of Assam in India's north-east. David Scott, who played the key role as the Agent of the Colonial State in north-east India in those formative years, did everything from 1826-31 to
consolidate colonial polity and economy in Assam. In that process he led the state apparatus to the distant Khamti and Singpho frontier, and thus became the first agent of imperialism to establish contact with the Arunachal tribes in a dominant form. Threat to security in Assam’s frontier, the vision of trans-boarder trade with Tibet, Burma and China through the traditional trade routes in Arunachal Pradesh and the need of revenue reforms and settlement in Assam guided the march of British imperial forces from Assam to Arunachal Pradesh in the first half of 19th century.

Discussion in the second chapter shows that the involvement of the Colonial State in the affairs of Arunachal tribes was gradual and linked to the past relations of the tribes with Assam on matters relating to posa, slavery, border trade, territorial claims in the plains of Assam and their contribution to preservation of peace and security in the Assam-Arunachal frontier. Physiography of the state, its flora and fauna, mountains and rivers, mineral and forest resources and the ethnic and cultural divide of its people played an important role in shaping the policy of the Colonial State towards Arunachal tribes. The colonial bureaucracy, the whims of the men, their temper, class attitude and their tenure and clique formation also determined the pattern of imperial policy from time to time.

David Scott’s imperial vision was carried further by Captain Neufville in the Sadiya frontier. But untimely death of Scott in 1831 and Neufville in 1830 created a vacuum that was difficult to bridge up for a long time. However, the task of consolidating British rule in Assam, which was seriously pursued by both Robertson and Jenkins in the later years, warranted that posa claims of the Arunachal tribes in the Assam’s northern frontier be settled to the satisfaction of the
Deputy Commissioners of Darrang and Lakhimpur districts. Scott's policy of status-quo was thus reversed by commutation of posa into cash payment. The policy of demarcating the revenue frontier and liberation of slaves from the clutches of the hill tribes led to resistance first from the Singphos in the Sadiya frontier, which was later on followed by the other tribes.

It is quite interesting to note that the involvement of the Colonial State in the consolidation process in Assam affected only a few tribes of Arunachal Pradesh, who inhabited the foot-hill zone, e.g. Akas, Monpas, Sherdукpens, Nyishis, Adis, Mishmis, Khamtis and Singphos. The tribes inhabiting the central and northern zone still remained far away from the operation of colonial dynamics in the Assam-Arunachal frontier. It also appears quite clear that there was no common format and time scale for the surge of resistance movement among the tribes against the British operating in their jealously guarded domain. This was mainly because of the heterogeneity among the tribes and the differences in their pattern of historical and cultural interactions with the forces of history in Assam in the past. The Khamtis and Singphos were the first to be exposed to the operation of imperial dynamics in their frontier because of the strategic importance of their tract (Sadiya) as the gateway to Burma both for trade and security initiative on a trans-Patkai format that enjoyed the backing of the Forward School in London.

The description and analysis of the third chapter suggest that in the post-Scott years the consolidation process of British rule in Assam led to active engagement in the tribal frontier of Arunachal despite the fact that the proclaimed policy of non-interference still guided the basic parameters of state policy towards the frontier tribes. The need of administrative and
revenue reforms certainly called for delimitation of revenue frontier and commutation of posa claims of the tribes to cash payment. The economics and strategic importance of Assam in Bengal's eastern frontier dictated that it should be administered with a separate establishment with focus on managing the frontier affairs with priority. For this purpose a new office was created in 1834 known as the Commissioner and Agent to the Governor General for Assam and north-east of Rangpur. Francis Jenkins was nominated to be the new incumbent in that office.

Jenkins' pioneering role in transforming the revenue management of the state since 1834 was accompanied by the discovery of tea bushes in the Sadiya tract in the wild habitat. With his enterprising zeal Jenkins played a proactive role in promoting tea plantation in Assam in a commercial scale. The objective of this enterprise was to bring the British capital and entrepreneurs to Assam in a big way so that Assam can serve truly as the "Tea Bowl of the British Empire." Services of C.A. Bruce were hired and the first manufacturing operation from Assam (headquarters, Jaypore) was started in 1837. Twelve boxes of tea was despatched to Calcutta for onward submission to London. In the following years planters, flocked in hordes to Assam. The waste-land grant scheme was liberalised to lure more private investment in the tea industry of Assam. By the year 1843, the Assam Tea Company, which was established in 1839, was able to declare a maiden dividend of three percent to its shareholders.

Success of the imperial enterprise in Assam's tea industry warranted that the provincial administration should take care of the law and order situation in the state, which was witnessing turmoil in the tribal frontier because of the growing popular perception among the tribe that the operation of the
Colonial State in their frontier was causing them more economic losses than gains. To avenge the loss of the low lands and slaves most frontier tribes resorted to violent raids on the plains of Assam. To stop this practice of unilateralism on the part of the tribes, police outposts were created along the frontier, negotiations were carried out for commutation of posa and treaties and engagements were signed to formalise security arrangement along the tribal frontier. However, the new colonial regime was still viewed as restrictive and expansionist which gave rise to organised rebellion in the Khamti and Singpho frontier first, and then in sporadic form across the whole frontier. The imperial military might was often used to suppress the rebellion and resistance movements among the tribes of Arunachal. Meanwhile, imperial victory in the second Anglo-Burmese war in 1851 made the colonial penetration process stronger and bolder in the later half of nineteenth century. The entire process led to beginning of a new phase of forward thrust into the domain of the Arunachal tribes mainly because of the imperialistic vision of Henry Hopkinson, the new Commissioner of Assam since 1861.

In the fourth chapter it has been our observation that the penetration of the Colonial State into the affairs of the frontier tribes of Arunachal had been in an organised form as the undefined Outer Line hold the potential for trans-border trade movement to China through Tibet and Yunan. Booming tea industry in Assam brought in its wake not only European planters to Assam, but also migrant labourers, Marwari traders, Bengali babus etc., whose area of operation shifted from the urban centres of Assam to the hill tribes’ frontier, where most of the tea gardens were located. To support the tea box industry demand for timber drove the trading class to the foot hill zone
in the tribal frontier, leading to a new beginning in the collection of blackmail from the traders and at times conflict and violence for refusal to meet the demand of the tribes.

The planters’ lobby, which held influential positions in the local and district bodies after the introduction of Local Self Government in Assam, called for immediate halt to the end of violence in Assam’s tribal frontier, where colonial economy was actively engaged in the tea industry. As a response to this call Inner Line was drawn in 1873 to prohibit unrestricted movement of the plainsmen into the tribal frontier in pursuit of either trade or for extending the territorial limit of the tea gardens into the sloppy land of the foot hills, often considered as the domain of the tribes. Thus, it appears from the progress of events in the foot hill zone from 1851-73 that the planters’ lobby called the shots in influencing the policy of the Colonial State in a major way.

Drawing of Inner Line however, did not mean imposition of a self-proclaimed regime of isolating the hill tribes from the colonial dynamics of the time. Fulfilment of imperial designs in Burma after the third Anglo-Burmese war in 1881, when Upper Burma was annexed, fired the imagination of the imperial strategists in London to explore and operationalise the trans-border trade routes through Arunachal Pradesh. The colonial strategy to build the commercial highways between Assam and China was thus carried forward with support from the state apparatus and planters’ capital inundating Assam since the 80’s. But to facilitate this task it was felt very urgent to take the tribes of Arunachal into confidence. Hence, J.F. Needham was specially appointed for this purpose in 1882 with assignment to act as the chief interlocutor between the Colonial State and the tribes of Arunachal Pradesh. With this began a new phase of
deep penetration into the interior hills as far as Tibetan and Burmese border, which created jealousy and mistrust, especially in the Adi frontier, leading to Bordak massacre in 1894 and resumption of hostilities across the whole frontier.

The attitude of the Colonial State being ruthless suppression of resistances in the hill frontier, there was no halt to imperial drive inside Arunachal, which was dashingy taken up by Noel Williamson when Needham took retirement in 1905. A new dimension to this policy of forward thrust was added because of unprecedented surge in imperial activities in Tibet from Russia and Chinese side in the 1st decade of 20th century. Effective checkmating of Russia in Tibet by the British imperial strategists was completely undone by the rise of China as an Imperial power under the command of the nationalist. Chao Erh-Feng’s military adventure in Tibet in 1909 was hence seen as the beginning of a new phase of insecurity to India’s eastern frontier from the Arunachal side. Lancelot Hare, the new Lt. Governor of Assam, sensitised the protagonist of the Forward School in London about the urgent need to extend British political control over the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. As a preparatory measure towards this end Noel Williamson was sent on a fact-finding mission to Mishmi and Adi frontier. It was only a sheer coincidence in history that imperial urge to explore and colonise Arunachal Pradesh was resisted by a powerful rebellious movement in the Adi frontier, which resulted in the murder of Noel Williamson and his party in 1911. It is our observation that the chance intersection of the colonial and imperial dynamics in the Adi frontier in 1911 cleared all roadblocks to the penetration of Colonial State over the whole of Arunachal Pradesh at one fine stroke.
Finally in the fifth chapter discussion and analysis of the Tibetan crisis (1909-12) and its aftermath leads us to emphasize that this set of political development alone in the neighbourhood of Arunachal’s northern border changed the operational dynamics of imperialism in an affirmative fashion. What could not be achieved in the process of the gradual penetration of the Colonial State from Assam into the hill tribes’ domain of Arunachal Pradesh in the last nine decades (1824-1914), was achieved by the progress of events as a prelude to the Simla Talks and its aftermath.

Had there not been the Tibetan crisis from 1909-12, murder of Noel Williamson and his party in the Adi frontier in 1911 which had no connection with the political developments in Tibet would have ended at best with a punitive military expedition into the Siang frontier. But it was mainly because of the fear of China approaching at the neighbourhood of India after its occupation of Tibet, that imperial strategist in London made best use of the military expedition in 1911 to explore the so far unknown interior of Arunachal as far as the Tibetan border. The objective was to ascertain exactly where a border line could be drawn with Tibet that would draw its legitimacy from history and suit the military needs of a strategic border line in the east in the true sense of the term.

Of course, China under nationalist leadership was quick to grasp the British imperial designs in Tibet, and hence refused to ratify the draft agreement of Simla Conference. But as it was passing through political instability due to the after-shocks of the revolution of 1911 it was not in a position to take an offensive position against Britain in principle. The very fact that Britain’s political recognition to the Nationalist Government in China was considered very essential for gaining legitimacy for
the new Government in international politics, China did nothing in the negative since the deadlock at Simla to pursue its imperial vision in Tibet till the outbreak of Second World War. But towards the end of the war China's emergence as a great power in Asia alarmed the imperial strategists in London to establish effective political control over the whole of Arunachal Pradesh between 1943-45 with the object to convert McMahon Line from a *de jure* border line to that of a *de facto* border line between India and Tibet. J.P. Mills, appointed as Advisor to the Governor of Assam to oversee this process of integration in 1943, simply played the role of the last mile actor to fulfil that visionary dream of David Scott which drove the Colonial State apparatus to the impregnable heights of Arunachal Pradesh.

**ii. SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

The theory of colonial penetration into Arunachal Pradesh driven by market, mint, trade and security, which has been studied in great details by past researchers, besfits inclusion in the present thesis as a sub-set to the main set of British imperial advances across the Himalayas to counter imperial expansion from Russia and China to the same point. There was nothing like a permanent Forward School or a permanent Moderate School in London to influence the imperial strategy on a sustained basis. Forward thrust in British imperial dynamics over the Himalayas was determined by two factors from time to time; one, aggressive imperial advance from Russia and China in the Himalayan states, and two, the party in power in London which guides imperial strategy to acquire and protect British colonies across the continents. When Conservatives are in
power in London, the protagonists of the Forward School normally enjoys ample freedom to pursue the imperial goals of the British Empire on a truly expansive scale. But when Liberals are in power in London the Moderate School emerges to the centre stage to give a definite halt to the expansive strategy of the British Empire in its colonies. Consolidation thus gains credence over expansion and non-interference gains credence over colonial penetration into independent states with the Moderates in the helm of affairs at London and in Colonies too.

Success and setback to the policy of imperial expansion also determines the next course of action which differs from colony to colony across a broader format of time and space. For example, triumph in the first Anglo-Burmese war determined the next phase of forward moves in Assam leading to its annexation. But in contrast, diplomatic setback in Simla Conference led to the beginning of a phase, when withdrawal symptoms of imperialism could be vibrantly seen in the establishment of loose political control over Arunachal Pradesh from 1914-1943. It thus appears from the analysis of the progress of events in Arunachal frontier from 1824-1914 that every action of the Colonial State in Assam to promote and protect British imperial interest in Arunachal’s tribal frontier was shaped by the determinants of imperial dynamics postulated in London from time to time. Exceptions to this rule of the game are very few and far at the colonial level, like Needham and Williamson’s adventurism in the Adi hill section, or David Scott’s adventurism in Assam, or, Col. White’s adventurism in Sadiya, which costed the Colonial Government very dearly. But on a broader format such exceptions are normally moderated by harping on adherence to policy framework without any further lapse.
These underlying determinants of imperialism, which remote controlled colonial penetration into Arunachal from 1824-1914, leave ample scope for further research. Archival sources in Britain, Russia and China of the same time, if studied in greater details, can bring into focus new facets of imperial dynamics which played a key role in the integration of this strategically important hilly state into the mainstream of Indian sub-continental culture of the imperial era. It is pertinent to note here that even today as we step into the 21st century with the vision of a great India in the world politics, Arunachal Pradesh is still viewed as a significant entity of the Indian Union for its strategic importance as a border state, not for its economic importance as the proverbial goldmine for India's ongoing economic boom. The same perception also guided British imperial dynamics in the pre-independence era without any substantial change in its basic contour lines.