Continent Size: 44,579,000 sq km (17,212,000 sq miles) Percent of Earth's Land: 30%
Population: 3,879,000,000 (2005 EST.) Map No. 7: Political Map- Asia¹
OVERVIEW:

'Given its size, history and ambitions, India will always march to the beat of its own drummer.'

- Ashley Tellis, Asian Strategic Expert,

“India- United States relations would not be hostage to United States relations with any other country and that India was viewed as a 'key player in global affairs in the 21st century and as a vital contributor to overall Asian regional peace and stability’.”¹

- Karl Inderfurth,

Asst. Secretary of State, South Asian Affairs, Clinton administration

India’s pursuit of closer ties with United States is intended to enhance India’s own power in Asian Region (See Map 7). The United States, of course, is the key external actor in the Asian Region and has a more significant military presence there, in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Singapore, and Diego Garcia, than it did even a few years ago. This developing relationship has been encouraged by common concerns about international terrorism, piracy in Indian Ocean, nuclear threat, religious extremism, and the rise of
hegemonic China. It also is a fundamental departure from the past pattern of Indian foreign policy of idealism toward Realist National Interest as supreme goal.

The important factor that has contributed to the upswing in our bilateral strategic relations is the growing profile and contribution of Indian-Americans in United States. Not only has their number gone up rapidly over the past two decades, but also their achievement curve has become remarkably steep in recent years, which. Reflecting the diversity of India, the community enjoys the distinction of being one of the highest earning and best educated in America. They are loyal Americans, but they retain strong socio-cultural links with India and Asia. They have contributed massively to improvement of India-American strategic relations, by networking with governments and political establishments in both countries.

Since then President Clinton’s visit to India in 2000 (the first visit by a president in decades) and, more recently, the realization by the Washington of the importance of a rising India, since Pokhran II and 9/11 attack on the United States, the two nations have initiated on a broad program of cooperation in a variety of fields, especially security and defence. This cooperation is comprehensive in nature include:

- Nuclear proliferation by Iran;
- combined military exercises;
- American warship exercises in Indian Ocean;
- a dialogue on missile defense in South Asian region;
- Indian naval protection of United States shipping in the Malacca Strait in 2002;
- a close partnership in responding to the 2004 tsunami in South Asian region;
- American approval of India’s acquisition of Israeli-built Phalcon airborne warning and control systems (in short AWACS);
- And an offer to sell India a variety of military hardware, including fighter aircraft and P-3 maritime patrol planes.

India-United States strategic relationship has bright future and major Asian states play as determinant factor influencing this relationship. The intensity of terrorist attacks on civilians in different countries, in Asia irrespective of their forms of government, and the resulting causalities of innocent civilians lend urgency to the need
for the India and United States and also international community to unite and fight the threat from **international and trans border Pan-Islamic terrorism** and to censure those states that give arms and financial support and sanctuary to terrorists living on borrowed time. Anger is the root cause of all terrorism. It is often caused by domestic or external factors. While India and United States (India in particular) may not have much control over external factors, it should be able to detect in time sign of anger due to domestic regions and take action to address them. Unaddressed anger at the domestic level drives the angry into the arms of transnational organization such as Al Qaeda or Laskaer-e-Toiba.
INDIA-UNITED STATE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP -THE PAKISTAN FACTOR:

"We have an ambitious agenda with India. Our agenda is practical. It builds on a relationship that has never been better. India is a global leader, as well as a good friend. ... My trip will remind everybody about the strengthening of an important strategic partnership. We'll work together in practical ways to promote a hopeful future for citizens in both our nations."

President George W. Bush, February 22, 2006,

During his visit at New Delhi

“Pakistan would not try to match India in respect of the numbers of missile produced, but would retain just enough missile capacity to reach anywhere in India and destroy a few cities, if required.”

: - Pervez Mushraff

The time tested India- United States strategic Relations are based on mutual trust and understanding have survived the post cold war period, and moved into a new, era of global politics. Since such facts are based on hard facts of national interests rather than sentimental attachments, it alert us to the simple fact that Pakistan is important factor, which may influence the smooth flow of strategic relationship between India and United States (See Map 8). United States has been taking keen interest in South Asia since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and its role as
Map 8: POLITICAL MAP OF PAKISTAN
pacesetter in defusing the India-Pak crisis, has led to many negotiations to settle the decades-old Kashmir issue and in Nov 2008, successful election was held in state of J&K. It is also pertinent to note that most of the terrorists involved in heinous crime of 9/11 tragedy were trained in Pakistan Jehadi Camps.

Pakistan had been a receiver of a United States 'bend' in its favor since the 1971 war with India which led to the creation of Bangladesh. Lt. General Niazi, of East Pakistan was forced to signs the Instrument of Surrender in the presence of Lt. General JS Singh Aurora, in Dhaka on 16 Dec’ 1971 (See Photo 7, Page No 249). Subsequent to the 1971 war, India emerged as the pre-eminent power in the region. This was further demonstrated by the fact that the Simla Agreement (July 1972) with Pakistan was arrived at without the involvement of any external power including Russia and United States. The two countries agreed to resolve any future problems bilaterally and work towards the development of responsive relations. This bending of United States towards Pakistan was even during the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Soviet interference in Afghanistan in December 1979.

Kargil and After: Challenges for Indo-US Strategy:

The Pakistani forces were only discovered by India’s intelligence services in the spring of 1999, which led to considerable condemnation from the BJP government. India’s intelligence services received vital cooperation by CIA and subsequently, the Indian army mounted a counter-offensive, defeated the Pakistani forces, and drove them back across the LoC into Pakistan-controlled territory. India won the battle for Kargil, but it seems that Indian nuclear weapons had not deterred Pakistani forces from crossing the LoC. At the same time, Indian forces did not cross the LoC (See Map 9: Kashmir Region: Topography of Kargil) in any significant way to punish Pakistan. Thus, it appeared that India had been deterred from counterattacking across the LoC by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Kargil, being a high altitude and rugged
Map 9: KASHMIR REGION- TOPOGRAPHY OF KARGIL.

Kargil, the Need for Strategy, and “Limited Conventional War” (in short, LCW) In the winter of 1998-1999, Pakistan mounted an operation combining regular and guerrilla forces that crossed the Kashmir Line of Control (in short, LoC) in a hilly area, thereby starting what became known as the Kargil War.
region with thin population the intrusion was first detected by local shepherd, who happened to be army informer in the Battalik sector?

The Army sent out its patrols in the area and found that the intrusions extended not only to the battalik sector, but also to the drass, Mushkok and Kaskar sector. The infiltrators were found heavily armed and had entrenched themselves in at heights of 16000-18000 feet along a 150 kilometer stretch on Indian side of the LoC, and threatening the strategic Shrinagar-Leh highway that lay below. The Pakistani strategic aims for the intrusion had multiple dimensions, “shift the LoC eastward to gain territorial advantages, cut off the Ladakh, Siachin and disrupt the India’s communication facility in this remote region, internationalize Kashmir and provide a new Philip to the dying insurgencies in Kashmir”.9

The Cabinet Committee on Security (in short, CCS) concluded that adequate troops along with artillery and other equipment should be moved to attack locations along with LoC. Finally 26th May 1999, the Indian Army launched the counter-offensive, which was code named ‘Operation Vijay’. LK Advani, the then Home Minister of India stated in his Autobiography stated that Pakistan’s objectives for the Kargil incursion code named ‘Operation Badr’, were fivefold:

- To Choke the Srinagar – Leh Highway, since it was the main delivery line for Indian troops;
- To force Indian troops to withdraw from the Siachin Glacier;
- To use the crisis to strengthen its own bargaining position so that India could be compelled to negotiate a settlement of the Kashmir dispute on favorable terms;
- To force use the Kargil war to further incite militancy in Jammu and Kashmir;
- And to internationalize the Kashmir issue, projecting Kargil as international trigger for nuclear show down.10

The difficulties faced by the IAF arise are: a) the location of the encampments at high altitudes endangering the safety of fighter aircraft and thereby makes operation more difficult; b) And the delivery by the Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (in short, ISI) to the invading force of the Stinger shoulder-fired (American
supplied), heat-seeking missiles and other sophisticated American made anti-aircraft weapons, which the ISI had received from the United States Central Intelligence Agency (in short, CIA) for use against Soviet aircraft during the Afghan war\textsuperscript{11}.

The use of a Stinger by the invaders against an IAF helicopter has discredited past United States assurances, discounting the dangers of the likely use of this weapon by the insurgents and terrorists in Kashmir because of the limited life period of their batteries and the non-delivery (as claimed by the United States) of any fresh batteries to the ISI after 1988. The difficulties of the Army were due to the continuous heavy artillery support provided by the Pakistan Army to the invaders, high ridges occupied by the invaders and continuous reinforcement of the encampments by the Pakistani Army and ISI rear bases located in Pakistani-controlled territory. To avoid an unwise escalation, the Indian Army and the Air Force have to give up the legitimate right to hit at the rear bases\textsuperscript{12}.

Reports available so far have identified the composition of the invading force consists of Pakistani Army and Jehadis, who were trained at PoK under supervision of ISI (directly and indirectly dependent upon American Government or CIA), consist of the following:

- Pakistani army regulars:-
- Mercenaries of the Al Badr, which consists of many Afghans;
- Mercenaries of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the militant wing of the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad;
- Members of bin Laden's Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islamic also known as Tehrik-e-Jihad and also as Al Qaeda (The Base).
- And Mercenaries of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which was declared as an international terrorist organization by the United States in October, 1997

At the same time, despite the independent, authentic evidence available with western media, the United States and other Western powers are not prepared to go to the extent of condemning Pakistan, declaring it a State-sponsor of International Terrorism, suspending the execution of the IMF's rescue package for the Pakistani economy and re-imposing the other economic sanctions which were lifted or eased by
the Clinton Administration after Nuclear test conducted by Pakistan in 1998. The Nawaz Sharif Government also seems to be reasonably confident that while the United States might exercise political and moral pressure on it, which it could withstand, it would not go to the extent of taking any punitive action against it. This confidence arises from the ISI's role in Kosovo on the behest of United States.

It is not widely known that the working relationship between the ISI and the CIA continues to be strong, though possibly not as strong as during the Afghan war. During Mrs. Benazir Bhutto's second tenure as Prime Minister from 1993 to 1996, the CIA had used the ISI for training the Bosnian Muslims and for acting as a medium for the delivery of arms and ammunition to them. The supplies were made from the surplus stocks of the Afghan war weapons left with the ISI. Many retired ISI officers, including Lt.Gen. Hamid Gul, DG of the ISI in the late 1980s, were deputed to Bosnia to act as advisers to the Bosnian Muslims. India won the Kargil debacle and the promise India kept by not crossing LoC thus avoided Nuclear escalation helped India to gain her confidence by United States, China and other western countries.

The political dimension of Kargil debacle relates to the questions whether it was wise to have started a comprehensive and composite dialogue process with Pakistan at Lahore. At the same time, there is a valid case for avoiding over expectations from any dialogue with Pakistan because of the mindset of its leaders. While continuing to maintain a dialogue with Pakistan, we should keep in view the fact that in the history books for Pakistani children, it is not Akbar, but Aurangazeb who is projected as an ideal ruler to be followed. We should be wiser by the post-Lahore events and avoid walking into another trap which is as follows:

- **CAPTURE OF INDIAN AIRLINE PLANE IN 1999:** The hijacking in Christmas 1999 of an Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar, Afghanistan, and subsequent submission of the BJP government to hijacker demands brought protests, particularly from Hindu right wing politicians, against the indecisiveness of the Indian government.

- **CHINESE UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT TO PAKISTAN:** The intense foreign policy behavior of China makes the Indian government suspicious of unpredictable threats. Persistently Chinese nuclear and missile support to
Pakistan intends with the motive to eliminate the rising strength of India by getting New Delhi’s resources diverted to contain the inflating Pakistani ambitions against India both militarily and strategically.

It is pertinent to note that a few days before the 9/11 attacks, the US State Department had placed China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (in short, CPMIEC) and Pakistan’s National Development Complex (in short, NDC) under sanctions, triggered by the transfer of parts for the nuclear-capable Shaheen-I and Shaheen-II missiles. The Chinese transfers, of items covered under Category II of the Annex of the MTCR, violated its commitment to abide by the MTCR guidelines. NDC was already scanned and put under sanctions, triggered by the transfer of parts for the nuclear-capable Shaheen-I and Shaheen-II missiles. These transfers were spotted by a United States satellite on May 1, 2001 as the convoy crossed the Sino-Pakistan land border.

Pakistanis considered that there should be more humane treatment of the Kashmiri people, even if they do not join Pakistan or become independent; Indians will remove a blot on their democracy; and the Kashmir is, of course, will recover an appearance of normal life. The nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan were very long in development, and they are reliably reported to Pakistan have acquired, and perhaps deployed, more than forty nuclear weapons, and also India must have acquired, and perhaps deployed, more than two hundred nuclear weapons. These weapons are large enough to destroy or permanently cripple five or six major cities on each side. In strategic terms, Pakistan is in a state of MAD – mutual assured destruction.

After the events of 9/11, Pakistan again emerged as a frontline state when the United States began operations in Afghanistan. In spite of divided domestic public opinion it offered bases and other packages to United States forces. In return, the United States lifted a wide range of sanctions, offered a generous economic packages and limited military packages in the form of provision of spares and training as well as sensors for border surveillance and a few helicopters for the same purpose. This appears to be for a number of reasons including the speed, range and depth of strategic meeting with the United States, the type of United States military aid being provided.
does not threaten India, as India’s major combat components of the armed forces is superior to that of Pakistan (See Table 12).

Table -12: The major combat components of the armed forces of India and Pakistan (relying on American Military aid) are given in following table\textsuperscript{19}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INDIA</th>
<th>PAKISTAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armory divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry divisions</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent armored brigades</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps independent artillery brigades</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain divisions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent infantry brigades</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army aviation squadrons</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air defence brigades/groups</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Para brigades</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAVY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle surface combat vessels</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(including 2 Indian Aircraft Carriers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol and coastal</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inshore/Offshore</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>consisting of</em> :</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter ground attack squadrons</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter air defence</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reconnaissance squadrons | 1 | 2  
Naval air combat aircraft | 64 | 4  
Helicopter (armed) | 75 | 10

And the crackdown on terrorists operating from Pakistan or Afghanistan would have a beneficial impact on the level of terrorist activities in India. In July 2008, there was a blast in Indian Embassy at Kabul. Highest levels of Pakistan's security apparatus, including the army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, were seems to be involved in plot to bomb the Indian embassy in Kabul. United States intelligence and security officials believe, as per the media report. The attack was aided by Pakistan's infamous intelligence agency, ISI\textsuperscript{20}. American intelligence agencies were quoted as saying that senior Pakistani national security officials favor the use of militant groups to preserve Pakistan's influence in the region, as a hedge against India and Afghanistan.

Pakistani Army did little to help the United States in its hunt for bin Laden and, Ayman al-Zawahiri his No.2. According to the United States, they were operating from the Pakistani tribal belt, but they avoided acting against them due to fear of violent repercussions in Pakistani territory. Criticism of their double-talk and half-hearted action proves the fact that they did try to help the United States in its war against terrorism through a number of other ways such as the following:

- Post-9/11, for some months, they placed two bases of the Pakistani Air Force in Baluchistan at the disposal of the United States for mounting search and rescue operations in Afghan territory;
- They placed the Karachi port at the disposal of the United States navy for bringing logistic supplies for the NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan and allowed their transportation by road to Afghanistan through Pakistani territory;
- They allowed Pakistani naval ships to join the NATO’s naval task force patrolling the seas in the Gulf to prevent sea-borne operations of Al Qaeda.
Coordinates: 34°56′N, 76°46′E

Map 10: The areas shown in green are the Pakistani-Occupied Kashmir (in short, POK). The area shown in orange is the Indian Jammu and Kashmir, and the diagonally-hatched area to the east is the Chinese-controlled area known as Aksai Chin.
The United States has been urging both sides to reduce tensions while continuing to maintain that it would play no role in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute (See Map 10, a vast portion of Kashmir are occupied by Pakistan and China). The United States has had discussions with India 'about the need to be balanced and Measured.' United States - Pakistan discussions focused 'additionally on the need to stop cross-border terrorism.' This view has also been echoed by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. She said 'we've been very clear with Pakistani Army that Washington expect to see Pakistan, stop supporting to extremists we are working very closely with India because we have a larger future with India'. Dr Rice also had a warning note for Pakistan, adding that 'we have made very clear to President Musharraf that we expect that he will carry through on his promise to hold parliamentary elections in October that are consistent with international standards and we've made very clear that the parliamentary elections are not the end but the beginning of putting Pakistan back on the democratic path'.

Again then United States President George W Bush bluntly had asked Pakistani then President Pervez Musharraf to hold elections in January 2008, as planned and quit as army chief as patience in Washington wore thin. Ultimately Musharraf was forced to resign on 18th October 2008. US military officials said they believed that much of the American money was not making its way to frontline Pakistani units, even repeatedly stated by Obama Administration. Money has been diverted to help finance weapons systems designed to counter India, not Al Qaeda or the Taliban, the officials said, adding that the United States has paid tens of millions of dollars in inflated Pakistani reimbursement claims for fuel, ammunition and other costs (Detailed data analysis is at Appendix B, INT. Q.4.).

Pakistan’s nuclear programme present three different kinds of challenges to India and American policy which are as follows;

Firstly, there is the ever-present possibility of a nuclear exchange between the two states. This could come about in several ways as follows:-

a) it could be the result of misunderstanding or bad intelligence, leading one side or the other to launch without cause;
b) It could be the end-point of an escalating conventional war;
c) Or nuclear war could come about as a result of a desperate last-minute attempt by one side or the other to punish the other.

Secondly, there is conclusive evidence that Pakistan is the source for *proliferation* of nuclear weapons and missile technology. There is strong evidence of Pakistani nuclear leakages to Libya, Iran, North Korea, and perhaps other countries over a number of years.

Thirdly, the region’s nuclear programmes are important to the United States because of the risk that some fissile material or even assembled nuclear devices might fall into the hands of non-state or terrorist groups. The chief problem here also is Pakistan, and the proximity of radical Islamist groups to a fledgling nuclear arsenal is cause for concern. Mutually, these three linked nuclear problems present a grave potential threat to vital American interests, but Washington must cast aside any hope of coercing Pakistan into abandoning their weapons, and adapt a two-part strategy.²⁵

Pakistan Government directed his intelligence agencies to pick up informally Pakistani nationals suspected by the United States to be Al Qaeda sympathizers and secretly hand them over to the United States agencies for interrogation at detention centers in places such as the Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Diego Garcia, Bagram in Afghanistan and Morocco. The due process of law was not followed in these cases such as informing their relatives, producing them before courts etc. According to allegations in Pakistan, about hundreds such Pakistanis were rounded up and illegally handed over to the United States. The whereabouts of many of them are not known till today. Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry ordered the Pakistani Government to find the fate of missing citizen and inform the court accordingly. It is pertinent to note that Justice Choudhary was dismissed by Musharraff Government but again reinstated by the present Pakistani Government. He ordered for enquiries into these missing cases which initially annoyed the ISI and Army and American as well (Detailed analysis is at Observation 7 in Appendix B).
Since the United States forces have been into action against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan territory since 2001, presently using Drone (UAV), there was considerable anger against Pakistani Army among the people, particularly the Pashtun tribal’s, for co-operating with the United States. Since May 2009, United States Military for the first time provided Pakistan with a broad allay of Surveillance missions along with the Pakistan- Afghanistan border, but the American intelligence operatives who fly the armed Drones inside Pakistan opposed to the joint operation with Pakistan’s ISI, since the past attempts met with failures as matter was leaked to the terrorist. It is pertinent to note that lower hierarchy of Pakistani Army is active sympathizer of Taliban or Al Qaida. There was anger amongst Pakistani population and this anger was aggravated by the deaths of a number of tribal children during the Predator air strikes in the tribal areas and by the commando raid ordered by Pakistani Army into the Lal Masjid in Islamabad from July 10 to 13, 2007. A large number of Pashtun girls from the FATA studying in a madrasa attached to the Masjid were allegedly killed during the raid. Anti- United States and anti-Pakistani Army anger reinforced each other leading to a wave of suicide terrorism, mainly by the tribal’s, since July 2007 in the tribal and non-tribal areas and the spread of the virus of Talibanisation across the tribal belt, even in city of Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar.

It is obvious that India and Pakistan are showing higher levels of defence spending than other low-income countries or the world as a whole. Where the size of the military population is considered, the Indian figure is lower than the global average while for Pakistan it is larger since major portion is being financed by United States. In arms imports, Pakistan spends relatively much more than what the low-income countries do. On the whole, the message that comes through from these figures is that India and Pakistan give considerably more importance to defence than other countries that are at roughly the same level of development.

With respect to averages of low-income countries and of the world as a whole, India and Pakistan allocate considerably more resources to defence. Table 13 (Defence Spending-GDP %) presents statistics for India, Pakistan, averages for all low-income countries and for the world. It is pertinent to note that Pakistan spend 4.8 % of GDP on defence services, while India spent only 2.5 % of GDP on Defence Sector. The
probabilities of active friendship between India and Pakistan are better now than in past.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 13: INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE REST OF THE WORLD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Spending-GDP (%) 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Spending-Central Gov. Expenditure (%) 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel-Labor Force (%) 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Imports-Total Imports (%) 1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Development Indicators Database (World Bank, 2003)

India and United States can therefore scale down its perception of threat to India from Pakistan, but it must do so without lowering its watch. India should maintain its own capabilities-military, strategic, diplomatic, economic, and political – at a level which discourages Pakistani.

The timely offer of a treaty of peace and friendship with Pakistan by the Indian Prime Minister is in accordance with these changing times and reflects strategic positivism, but also indicates that it’s high time to get rid of the politics of hate, intended to unite and fight against the global terrorism, intended to create a strategically stable Asia. Differences remain, including over the development of India’s nuclear and missile programs, and the pace of India’s economic reforms. But now United States has a view of India as a growing power with which they have common strategic interests. Through a strong partnership with India, they can best address any differences and best shape a dynamic future. Three elements stand out as foundations for future India- Pakistan-United States relations, which are as follows:
the shared value of democracy on which future political relations, including prospects of joint promotion of political freedom abroad, can rest;
• convergence of strategic interests that should evolve into cooperation; and
• Common interest in expanding the free flow of commerce and a mutual preference for open market economics and defence trade.

While India believes Pakistan is a source and supporter of terrorism, the United States views Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally in the fight against terror. Differences over Pakistan’s role need to be resolved before serious global cooperation against terror. Both India and Pakistan need to realize that the United States can have good relations with both countries and that cooperation with one South Asian power need not inhibit cooperation with the other. As former Indian Ambassador to the U.S. Lalit Man Singh had stated, “In a strategic partnership, there should be an element of trust. I am afraid that there was a perception that this was breached when after talks in India, within 48 hours, we were surprised by the announcement of Pakistan becoming a major non-NATO ally.”

The Global War on Terrorism (in short, GWOT), after 9/11, has become one of the most expensive wars in United States history. GWOT covers three military operations:

• Operation Enduring Freedom (in short, OEF), which broadly covers Afghanistan;
• Operation Noble Eagle (in short, ONE), which is meant to provide better defense for United States military bases and enhanced homeland defense;
• Operation Iraqi Freedom (in short, OIF) which began with the build-up of troops for the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

An FBI office has been opened at New Delhi and Indian Navy and US Navy are doing cooperation on regular basis e.g. Joint investigation and intelligence sharing. A Joint India-United States of America initiative to counter the growing danger of cyber terrorism that would also deal with to internal security and way to disrupt the funding of terrorist organization.
The cost of aforesaid operations has surprisingly increased over the years. Various estimates put the initial cost of the war in Afghanistan at United States $14 billion for the first financial year of the operation, i.e., FY 2001. The cost jumped to $81 billion in FY 2003 with the launch of the Iraq invasion, and by 2007 it has further increased to $170 billion. So far, the cumulative cost of GWOT stands at $804 billion, including $195 billion war requested for FY 2008. With this, the War on Terror has become more expensive than either the Korean or Vietnam Wars which cost, in 2007 prices, $460 billion and $650 billion respectively. Considering that the War will prolong for some time into the future, the cost is going to rise further. The Congressional Budget Office (in short, CBO) estimates that depending on the size of troops deployed in operational areas, the total cost of GWOT is likely to reach between $1.2 trillion and $1.17 trillion by 2017.30

The possibility of nuclear clash between India and Pakistan was the main strategic concern for America. State Department of United States, strongly believe that this is the mostly likely area in which a nuclear weapon will be used. Because of this threat of a nuclear clash, any long-term relationship between India and the United States must address nuclear nonproliferation and crisis management efforts. In 1998, both India and Pakistan seemed willing to join the CTBT, but eventually backed down on one pretext or other. However, India has a clean record of enforcing international restrictions on the export of sensitive nuclear and chemical material. Pentagon wants to embrace India as a strategic partner. Until the United States government comes to a consensus on how to deal with India’s nuclear capability, the Indian government will have to continue to remove American fears with its friendly behavior.

Pakistan, on the other hand, remains a nuclear danger. As A. Q. Khan's network was exposed, it became clear that Pakistani scientists have tried to sell nuclear secrets to North Korea, Libya, and Iran, among others. India and the United States must work in partnership to tighten Pakistani borders and keep pressure on the Pakistani government to rein in rogue elements of their nuclear program in order to prevent the spread of nuclear secrets and sensitive material.

Stephen Cohen has admitted that “the United States - Pakistan alliance is widely believed to have militarized Pakistani politics and foreign policy through the connection
between Pakistani Army and United States, making it impossible for Delhi to come to accommodation with Islamabad on Kashmir issue”\(^{31}\). As an Australian strategic analyst candidly admitted, “the west has collectively made a mess of its policy towards India partly because of its foolish cold war bias to Pakistan\(^{32}\).” But more than the Nuclear winter Scenario of 1998, it was the Kargil Spring of 1999 that led to the clear abandonment of the even handedness, and even a pro India tilt, in the American Policy circles\(^{33}\). Even anti India-American press displayed rare change in their position. For Example, the New York Times, New York in its editorial of May 27, 1999 considered that “India has been right to demand the withdrawal of the militants before any further negotiations on Kashmir”.

Regarding the final solution of Kashmir, as the above analysis elucidated, it is increasingly clear that use of force to redraw the existing boundary in Kashmir will not be tolerated by the International Community, and no other viable avenue to redrawing the boundary remains\(^{34}\). The conclusion from this is that the eventual solution of the boundary lies in the political negotiation. The details required to be worked out between government of India and Pakistan without any external mediation as per the Shimla Agreement. It is time the political leadership in India makes a sustained attempt to generate national consensus around the final settlement of Kashmir border dispute, and accordingly take a pro-active approach on the matter. A reactive approach, in the face of persistent Pakistani use of international media, is unhelpful and ultimately it may backfire on them. Even under present circumstances India and United States affirmed its support for Pakistan's sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity. The US Home Department had stated, "The United States is dedicated to providing Pakistan with the training and equipment it needs to fight terrorism, including support to enhance Pakistan's counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism capabilities and increased cooperation with Pakistani security forces”\(^{35}\).

The United States in the pursuance of its ISI-centric and Pakistan Army-centric policy formulations landed itself in a strategic mess where both the above said entities were working at cross-purposes with United States core strategic interests in Asia. In the last two years or so, hundreds of United States and NATO soldiers lost their lives in Afghanistan as a result of direct acts of omission and commission by the Pakistan Army in not preventing Taliban access into Afghanistan. For far too long United States
strategic formulations have given an exaggerated over-sized strategic importance to Pakistan in their strategies. The future of United States-Pakistan relations could turn for the better if United States downsizes Pakistan to its true strategic worth in its formulations and converge its strategic relationship with India for mutual benefits and their own national interest alone.
INDIA-UNITED STATES STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP- THE CHINESE INFLUENCE:-

“When the fighting developed, the Nixon administration ‘tilted’ toward Pakistan. The tilt involved the dispatch of the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to try to intimidate the Indian Government. It also involved encouraging China to make military moves to achieve the same end, and an assurance to China that if China menaced India and the Soviet Union moved against China in support of India, the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union. China chose not to menace India and the crisis on the subcontinent ended without a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.”

:- Claude Arpi

(An expert on the history of the China and the subcontinent)

Resurgent Asia:

India's emergence as an economic, political and military power has left China and its defence forces worried, even as the two countries in the recent years have increased their economic and military cooperation, a report released by Pentagon, stated "The PLA (People's Liberation Army) remains concerned with persistent disputes along China's shared border with India and the strategic ramifications of India's rising economic, political, and military power,". The Pentagon stated in its Congressional
mandated annual report on China's army. It is pertinent to note that China has been a significant factor in India's Strategic policy since independence. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's belief in a 'resurgent Asia' envisaged friendship between the two giants of Asia. It was Nehru and the Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai who, in 1954, first drafted the policy of panchshila embodying the five principles as follows:

- non-aggression;
- peaceful coexistence;
- strive for equality and mutual benefit;
- non interference in each other's internal affairs;
- And mutual respect for each other's integrity and sovereignty.

China is haunted by three Ts domestically (Tienanmen, Taiwan and Tibet), its relationship with New Delhi is also defined by three Ts (Territorial disputes, Tibet and Trade), with the first two issues stuck and the third helped China to favor Balance of Payment to her advantage. Adopting its exploitative commerce, Beijing primarily buys iron ore, coal, jute and other raw materials from India and sells industrial goods while reaping a ballooning trade surplus. Such trade cannot be considered as a 'proof of progress in bilateral ties.' Also a growing trade does not necessarily signify political warmth. If it is so, China and Japan would be best friends taking into account the trade between them, (with at least eight times higher trade than with India). In today’s market-driven world, trade is not constrained by political differences, unless political barriers have been erected.

India-USA-China: – Key Geostrategic Players:

Brzezinski identifies India and China amongst five "key geostrategic players" that are actively pursuing geopolitical interests such as greater regional hegemony, which might conflict with the interests of the United States. Still India and China shares one of the longest disputed borders in the world. This was the cause of a short border war in 1962. Subsequently, Sino-Indian hostility deepened as India moved closer to the Soviet Union and China became Pakistan's main arms supplier and diplomatic supporter. The signing of the 20 years India -Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1971, the United States -China convergence and their 'tilt' towards Pakistan during
the war that aggravated the matters. However, China, while providing diplomatic support, did not intervene militarily in the 1971 war. The United States aid during 1962 conflicts was restricted to only small arms, ammunition and communication equipments. India suffered setback during 1962 war and lost huge territory (see Map 1).

Even the United States Ambassador in New Delhi discouraged India from escalating the conflicts by using of Air power. United States and European Country thought that use of air power by India may escalate war to major cities and may cause huge causalities. Certainly it was a wrong perception based on faulty opinion. The State Department continuously put pressure on India against supporting China at UNO or elsewhere. Also, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had 'consistently declared that India's doors were open for normal peaceful relations with China, and in 1976 ambassadors were re-exchanged after a lapse of fifteen years'. In February 1979, the then Indian Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China, the first high-level visit by either side since 1962. India viewed the normalization of United States-China relations in 1971 with grave misgivings. This was the result of a secret trip by Henry Kissinger to China which had been facilitated by Pakistan.

High level contact continued to be maintained between India and China, over the years and in 1989 a JWG, consisting of diplomatic and military experts was constituted. It was regular meetings of the JWG that resulted in two confidence building agreements as follows:

1. the Agreement on Maintaining Peace and Tranquility in the Border Areas along the Line of Actual Control (1993) and ;

After the outburst of the India- Pakistan war on 4 December 1971, which eventually led to the creation of Bangladesh, details were revealed of a United States 'tilt' towards Pakistan. The United States believed that the Soviet Union would come to the aid of India and that the war would lead to the dismemberment of Pakistan.
Map 11: The McMahon Line marks boundary between Chinese-held and Indian-held territory in the eastern Himalayan region. The line was the focus of a brief war in 1962, when Indian and Chinese forces struggled to control a disputed area (shown in red), much of which is a high altitude wasteland.¹
Kissinger, mistakenly, believed that the Chinese would come to Pakistan's help by putting pressure on India's northern borders and indicated to the Chinese that if they were threatened by the Soviets, the United States would not stand idly by. In the event China did nothing of this sort. President Nixon on the other hand, authorized the dispatch of a task force of eight ships including the aircraft carrier Enterprise from off the coast of Vietnam to the Bay of Bengal. By the time the task force reached its destination, Pakistan's forces in erstwhile East Pakistan had already surrendered and the two countries had agreed to a ceasefire.

After China's Tiananmen crackdown on student activists in June 1989, the United States imposed sanctions that included a suspension of arms sales. The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 ending in the Tiananmen Square Massacre (See Photo 10, Page No 250)- referred to in China as the June Fourth Incident to avoid confusion with two other Tiananmen Square protests - were a series of demonstrations in and near Tiananmen Square led by labor activists, students, and intellectuals in the PRC between April 15 and June 4, 1989. In Beijing, the resulting military crackdown on the protesters by the PRC government left many civilians dead or injured. The reported tolls ranged from 200–300 (PRC government figures), to 300–800 (The New York Times), and to 2,000–3,000 (Chinese student associations and Chinese Red Cross). The violent suppression of the Tiananmen Square protest caused widespread international condemnation of the PRC government.

India's dilemmas were thus increased by the United States changing its policy from one of non-recognition of China to one of giving it great power status in its own strategic considerations. Further, China gained a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. India's threat perceptions were also guided by the strategic understanding between the United States and China. The visit of United States Defence Secretary Harold Brown in 1980 and Secretary of State Alexander Haig a year later caused concern, raising anxieties that the United States would help in the modernization of China's armed forces at the same time as it was helping Pakistan.
Policy of “Containment and Engagement” of China:

“India’s defence planning has not in any way lagged behind China”.

George Fernandez,
India’s Ex- Defence Minister

Presently the United States is not interested in any forcible change in the status quo in Asia because this is likely to disrupt its strategic calculus as well as its economic links with the region. China, however, has clearly signaled that it may use force if Taiwan continues to ask the formal independence. Beijing has also flexed its military muscles in relation to the disputed islands in the South China Sea, thereby threatening to change the territorial status quo by force. Its earlier invasion of Vietnam in 1979 and its threatening posture against Taiwan are further testimony to its inclination to use force to threaten its neighbors. In this context, its military modernization plans, and its attempts to steal nuclear secrets from American nuclear establishments, appear very worrisome to United States strategists, policymakers, and legislators engaged in formulating and overseeing United States policy toward East Asia. Even if the United States administration is not willing to admit these concerns publicly for fear of driving China into an openly confrontational attitude, it makes strategic sense for Washington to plan for the contingency of China emerging as America’s principal strategic competitor and, if possible, to forestall such an eventuality.

A swift action in this direction has been taken by the then Indian Prime Minister, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, at the UN Millennium Summit while calling the world community to see through "Orwellian mockery of truth" and upholding the Indian stance that "dialogue and terrorism just cannot go together". The Indian commitment to the global body was reassured with a desire for the expansion in the UNSC’s membership. Still, India has a long way to go to convince the world of its neighborhood policies and compulsions that restrict her otherwise from several constructive engagements. The tough task ahead is to build and maintain better India-United States relations in future and equally look into Sino-Indian relations with a positive attitude.
'The rationale for United States-PRC during the Reagan Administration stemmed from the Cold War, the end of which in 1991 removed the strategic basis for United States arms sales to China. Since then the political relationship between the United States and China has been marked by periods of tension especially over the Taiwan and Tiananmen Square issue and United States allegations that China is exporting missiles and related technology to Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, although economic relations have flourished between them.

There have been irritations in the bilateral relationship. India has continued to express its opposition to China supplying Pakistan with missiles and related technology. China expressed its 'strong condemnation' of India's nuclear tests in May 1998 maintaining that these would harm China's interest. Surprisingly, on Pakistan's tests it expressed 'deep regret' implying they were inevitable. As has been observed, 'the Chinese Government tried to balance outright condemnation with insistence that the Indian government maintain stable relations with China'.

India also took resentment at a Joint Announcement issued by the Foreign Ministers of the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council on 4 June, 1998, maintaining that the 'clandestine transfer of nuclear weapons technology and fissile material is well known. Nevertheless the P5 have declined to take any action to address a serious violation of a Treaty provision to which all of them were party'. After 1999, the bilateral relationship began to return to the pre-nuclear tests level. The postponed JWG meeting was held March 1999 followed by Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh's visit to China in June. During the visit the two sides agreed to initiate talks on the demarcation of the LAC as well as begin a security dialogue, the first meeting of which took place in March 2000. Chinese official gave the statements, "Having signed the nuclear Test Ban treaty in 1995, we have been consistently opposed to nuclear tests. We knew there was a great possibility that Pakistan would follow [India's testing] because of the internal pressure its leaders face. But this is a rather difficult situation for China. We have a friendship with Pakistan, but we still have a strong stance against nuclear proliferation".

The then Indian President K. R. Narayanan visited China in May 1999. Bilateral relations were also helped as a result of India's conduct during the conflict with Pakistan in the Kargil sector of Kashmir as a result of an attempted invasion by
Pakistan-backed Islamist guerrillas. India refused to cross the LoC, and China, being increasingly concerned by the growth of political Islam in its west distanced itself from Pakistan. India's strategy in not crossing LoC during Kargil debacle led to rapid improvements in relations with the United States and China. During his March 2000 visit to India, President Clinton 'responded positively to Indian aspirations for an expanded UN Security Council. While in Beijing, Narayanan sounded out China on the same possibility and received similarly positive indications'. Since then, relations both at the political and economic level have continued to make progress. Then United States Ambassador Blackwill, perhaps had China in mind when, at a speech delivered in Mumbai in September 2001, he said, 'India-United States relations will stand on their own during the Bush Administration. They will not be directed against any third party'. It was a indication of the change in China's policy towards India that at a time of heightened military tension between India and Pakistan in May-June 2002, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated 'It is known to all that China, as a friendly and close neighbor of India and Pakistan, China is concerned over the tension between New Delhi and Islamabad'.

Bilateral trade between India and China has also grown rapidly after a slow start in the 1990s. The value of bilateral trade grew from United States $1.16 billion in 1995 to United States $3.5 billion in 2001. Over the years, three border trade centers have been established on the India-Tibetan border. Additionally, the last few years have seen an increasing amount of investment in joint ventures by businesses in both countries and the potential remains large, especially after China's accession to the WTO. India has also been granted Approved Destination Status for Chinese tourists. As Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh stated during his visit to China that he agreed with Premier Zhu Rongji that 'very determined action' should be taken to improve bilateral trade and what the two countries needed was a 'comprehensive knowledge of each other'. Surprisingly India has given MFN status to China and even to Pakistan, surprisingly China and Pakistan did not oblige it by offering same status to India.
Sino Indian trade increased from $1.4 Billion in 1996 to $18.7 Billion in 2005 and in 2015 expected to be $100 Billion, share major portion of Sino South Asian Trade (See Table 14).

Table 14 Bilateral Trade between China and South Asia (in US$ billions)\textsuperscript{60}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sino-South Asian Trade</th>
<th>Sino-Indian Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>$2.3</td>
<td>$1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$4.1</td>
<td>$3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>$3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$7.7*</td>
<td>$4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$18.6*</td>
<td>$13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$23</td>
<td>$18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$25</td>
<td>$20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$28</td>
<td>$20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 (projected)</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As far as India- United States relation is concerned, towards its realization of the "Common Vision" based on converging grounds and aims, India and United States have been heading forward to a new era of friendship and cooperation. Simultaneously Sino - United States relation has also taken a new turn. Two important events took place since 2003, which are as follows:

First, President Bill Clinton signed the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (in short, PNTR) bill to make it into law and,

Second, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, General Henry Shelton visited China in the month of November, 2007. The India and United States move reflects the policy of engagement, of China, which has long term international implications.

The Anti-Satellite Test (in short, ASAT) conducted by China on 11 January 2007\textsuperscript{61} is matter of great concern since China shot one of its own satellites to demonstrate its anti-satellite capability. The ASAT demonstration sent shock waves in various world capitals including in New Delhi and Washington. The old Chinese
satellite was monitoring weather since 10 May 1999, and its destruction created hundreds of shrapnel, of varying sizes, that are now also orbiting the earth and posing tremendous dangers to satellites. The ASAT demonstration has brought the issue of weaponization of space to the forefront and has shown that what a country, with destructive technological superiority, can do in Space. United States ‘concern’ over China’s anti-satellite test has now come to color their defence-related engagement with India.\textsuperscript{62} Considering all these aspects the need for a focused attention on the various aspects of the Space Security is not farfetched. It clearly projects that it is right time for India to pursue ICBM technology with the assistance of United States at an earliest to counter Chinese strategy. In fact in 2008, United States on the pretext of shooting down faulty satellite, repeated same game, what Chinese did in Jan 2007. India’s Moon Mission in Jan 2009 was pure civilian in nature, though it projects India’s superiority in space technology (See Photo 13, Page No 252).

Chinese Defence Capability:

Though China constantly reiterates that its rise will be peaceful, Beijing’s actions on the ground suggest a different message. Several United States and Russian analysts believe that China’s reorganization of missile facilities in Delingha in July 2007 have repercussions for India, Russia, and Japan and may be some of the Central Asian states too. China has been busy reorganizing its missile facilities near Delingha in the northern parts of central China. This site is believed to be one of China’s missile bases. Based on commercial satellite images available from Google Earth, the Analyst states that the images reveal that the previously used liquid-fuelled missiles deployed in this region have been replaced with newer solid-fuelled missiles.

It is exposed that China is believed to have deployed some 125 long range (1700 km or more) nuclear armed ballistic missiles. It is reported that China is having some 150 bomber-deliverable nuclear weapons and 120 tactical nuclear weapons deliverable by short range missiles or artillery. Further, the development of CSS-5 missiles (range 1700 km) is clearly intended to hit aims of adjoining regions of China. Also, policy analysts do not completely rule out Chinese attack against India, such as disarming the so called first strike against India.\textsuperscript{63}
According to his analysis, the launch sites for the older Dong Feng-4, ICBMs underwent upgradation to fit them for the new DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles. The DF-21 missiles have a range of approximately 1,330 miles and are capable of carrying a single warhead with a yield of 200 to 300 kilotons. It is believed that two versions of this missile are deployed and some could have been modified to carry conventional warhead. The latest United States government’s annual report on China’s military power reported that the China might have 40-50 such missiles on 34-38 launchers, whereas the 2006 report put the number of these missiles at 19-50 on 34-38 launchers. The DF-21 launch sites, at a height of 10,000 feet (3,000 meters), are located on the slopes of mountain range north of Delingha.

These developments appear to be part of a larger pattern of aggressive military expansion, rising military expenditure, and a general confusion about China’s military programmes and ambitions. For example, SIPRI, an independent and well-respected Swedish think-tank, reported Chinese military expenditure, if calculated in PPP (in short, purchasing power parity) terms, shows that Beijing spends almost US $200 bn every year. China is also one of the world top arms importers. China’s ASAT test in January 2007 is another indicator of its ambitions that go well beyond its borders. China has increased its Military expenditure 165% more between 1996 to 2005, while during same period India and United States of America increased its Military Expenditure by just 82% and 50 % respectively (See Table 15). There are two features of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region after the end of Cold War:-

1. The United States has become the only superpower in the world today. It is also the most important external power in Asia, and plays a key role in Asian security;

2. China and India are emerging powers. Each has a population of over a billion; possess nuclear weapons and numbers among the fastest growing economies in the world.

Relationship amid these three countries will undoubtedly dominate the course of events within the Asia-Pacific region in near future. Their interactions and how they deal with the triangle will, to a large extent, influence future peace and stability in the region.
China and India, the two largest developing countries in the world, have a commonality of history, culture, economy and social characteristics. Each applies itself to internal economic development, carries out an independent foreign policy and strives for a peaceful international environment. China and India have exceptionally bright prospects.

Table 15: SIPRI’s 2005 data also shows that while in raw dollar amounts some nations are increasing spending at large amounts, their percentage increases may vary:

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Samuel Huntington\(^\text{65}\) pointed out both of the countries as "core states of seven civilizations." Brzezinski, famous scholar, described India and China as "five geo-strategic players"\(^\text{66}\) and Henry Kissinger, the late United States President, described India and China as the "six big powers".\(^\text{67}\) China is a rising star in East Asia while India is a giant state in South Asia. Both are world power, having global influence.

What is more likely is the emergence of a "soft balance of power" system among the three countries.\(^\text{68}\) Our border regions are politically neglected and underdeveloped. The delay in border settlement will make the cross border disparity deeper. With the railway coming in, the Tibetan economy seems to be booming with 13.2 % growth rate as compared to the subsidy based rationed economy on this side of India. P Stobdan, Defence Analyst of IDSA, rightly stated that Chinese have since long initiated a
stabilizing programme while building a transport network and infrastructure in areas they occupied in 1962. In the last two years the Chinese have moved closer to the LAC, stepping up activities along the entire Khak –jung area across Demchok, Fugtse, Dumtsels, chushul, spanngur, Phobrang and hot springs. This indicates that the Chinese are applying the “settlement principle” to consolidate their position.69

India needs to take United States assistance in investing more in improving the logistics infrastructure along the border with Tibet, in hi-tech intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems for early warning and in generating land- and air-based firepower systems to counter China's numerical superiority. India also needs to raise and suitably equip four to six mountain strike divisions to carry the fight into Chinese territory if it ever becomes necessary. All of these capabilities will require a large infusion of fresh capital. India's growing economy can easily sustain a 0.5 to 1 per cent hike in the defence budget over a period of three to five years, especially if the government simultaneously shows the courage to reduce wasteful subsidies70.

India all the time viewed close United States -China relations with suspicions and feared that they might negatively affect her interests.71 Three factors dominate this evaluation:

1. During the 1971 India- Pakistan war, the United States and China jointly supported Pakistan. The United States had sent its Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal to threaten India;
2. In India’s perception, the United States was guilty by oversight of ignoring China’s actions in actively building up Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence against India through the nineteen eighties, because both China and Pakistan were United States allies in fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan;
3. Soon after India’s nuclear tests in 1998, the United States and China issued a Joint Communiqué to condemn these.72
Prospects of India-US-China Triangle cooperation:

“China knows that it must prepare for an eventual US-Indian alliance, which would put China at a strategic disadvantage.”

Michael Krepon

Chinese Nationalism is territorialism:

China was a unified state through 2000 years of history and become weak only in the 19th century when it starts losing out to western powers. India never did have a unified kingdom or state till the British defined India’s boundaries. The Chinese have a long run ambition of restoring their previous boundaries which they feel were taken away by imperial powers. Taiwan remains an fascination, and while Hongkong is back in the bag, the old British-drawn borders with India still preoccupy China.

India, United States and China are pursuing their foreign policy goals more assertively as each country tries to position itself as the major political and economic force in Asia. It's the start of the realignment of the balance of power in Asia. On one hand, India & United States see China as a major strategic threat, while at the same time a growing economic relationship is bringing the these countries into increasingly closer contact. The economic growth has kept the bilateral relationship, with its potential for conflict, generally positive thus far. There's a sense right now that they're both rising, and it's not a zero-sum game yet. Right now it's still win-win-win situation.

Four of the major elements of the relationship between India, United States and China are as follows:-

1) Security- Indian officials said at the time of India's 1998 nuclear test, they needed nuclear weapons to deter China, an assertion that disturbed Beijing and Washington. There are suspicions on the military side, but both leaders have kept it in check. India is suspicious of China's longstanding relationship with its rival Pakistan, including Chinese assistance for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and China's role in a project to upgrade a Pakistani deep-sea port at Gwadar. India requires United State’s assistance since the nuclear threat from
China and Pakistan is combined, since China has built up Pakistan's nuclear and conventional capabilities.

2) **Power**- India and China are two fastest-growing Power consumers in the world. India imports app. 75% of its oil needs, while China imports app. 33% of its oil. United States also import major proportion of oil from Asia-Pacific. Their combined demand helped drive oil prices to record highs, prompting the three nations to try to lock down sources of energy around the world. Both countries are also exploring alternate Power sources, factor behind the nuclear deal India is negotiating with the USA. 

3) **Trade**- Joint trade between China and India has gone from $332 million in 1992 to $13.6 billion in 2005. Trade between the two nations has grown at over 30 percent per year since 1999. India accounts for nearly 80 percent of South Asian economic activity and is a critical gateway to the region's economy. There's this idea that India does software and China does hardware, and the two of them together could make a new Asian market. But some experts say India is worried it will be forced into the role of supplier of minerals and low value-added goods to China, unless it can leverage its expertise in services and higher value-added manufacturing into the bilateral trade relationship. India requires United States assistance to counter Balance of Payment against China;

4) **Borders**- The two nations have a very old territorial dispute in the Himalayas that led to a border war in 1962. Negotiations over the 2,000-mile border are ongoing. During war United States assisted India by providing logistic supply. Among the areas of contention, India says China is illegally occupying Indian Territory—Aksai Chin. Even China has claimed the rights to land in Arunachal Pradesh. The prospects of relationships spans a range of issues, including counterterrorism, joint protection of critical sea lanes, and close cooperation on security investigations. The principles of "Caution and moderation" are best suited to the Indian policy-making. Recent world’s recognition of India as an emerging IT giant should be stimulated with maximum possible support policies. Perhaps then that China will also come forward and strengthen the hands of unity and prosperity with India. The dimensions and general features of the
arena in which India will act are clear. It is a triangular space with China, India, and the United States at the corners.

The view that a rising India will be the axis of balance in Asia is now increasingly common. The 2005 India–United States Nuclear deal was interpreted by many observers to be an obvious United States effort to draw India onto the United States side. In the real world, of course, actors including China are motivated by power, wealth, and prestige. Explaining the future direction of Indian strategy within the China-India-United States triangle has brighter prospects.

**KEY STATES IN ASIA AND PROSPECTS FOR INDIA-UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COOPERATION:**

Central Asia Regions (in short, CARs):

India's decision to join the “Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline project” in 2006 reflects New Delhi's concern that the proposed Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline is becoming too controversial as Iran continues to ignore international demands to halt its nuclear weapons program. Indian strategic planners are cautious about China's gaining a greater foothold in Central Asia. The SCO (in short, Shanghai Cooperation Organization) -which includes Russia, China, and the Central Asian states, is a Chinese-inspired organization to counter terrorism and expand economic cooperation, but Beijing is also trying to use the SCO to counter American influence in the region. India gained observer status in the SCO in July 2005 but avoided sending its prime minister to the SCO summit in Shanghai in June 2006. Among the other observers, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan were represented by their heads of State, then Presidents Pervez Musharraf, Mahmud Ahmadinejad and Hamid Karzai. Chinese officials suspected that the Prime Minister's decision not to go was actually due to the United States suspicion that one of the objectives of the SCO was to counter the United States influence in the Central Asian region.

Here the United States objectives are to enlist cooperation from India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in severing the complex relations between extremist outfits across Central Asia. In this context, the United States government closely monitors the
statements and actions within the SCO, comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as its newest member (in 2001).  

**Interests in Central Asia:** India and United States interests are two pronged.

(a) *From the security view,* it would like to encourage the development of stable and secular regimes in Central Asia; unstable states will become bases for terrorist, separatist and fundamentalist elements, which could link up with counterparts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. On the role major powers in the region, India is watchful of the possible impact of developments in Central Asia on the Xinjiang region of China that would have a direct bearing on India's security interests.

(b) *Commercial Significance-* India’s should require to gain access to the region's rich natural resources, such as oil and gas, uranium and diamonds etc. and to acquire, if possible, some specialized defence technologies and defence production facilities. India does not pose to Central Asia any direct threat, whether demographic or territorial. India's "soft power" has the potential to be a powerful influence on this region. India's technical-economic assistance programmes like Indian Technical Economic Cooperation (in short, ITEC- is a bilateral programme of assistance of the Government of India), particularly in areas like information technology, are seen as very relevant and useful for Central Asia. India is also the nearest large market for products of the region. Even though the Central Asian countries, as an expression of their sovereignty and independent identity, seek to distance themselves from Russia, they can neither ignore nor do without Russia, whose clout in Central Asia remains considerable despite the growing influence of China and the United States.

Under such circumstances, the Central Asian countries continue to have some expectations that India would play a much larger role in Central Asia, consider India as a potential balancing factor to the other major players in the region. India's major dilemma and constraint is how to access Central Asia. Given the situation in Pakistan's unwillingness to offer transit facilities to India. India could, however, explore the possibility of establishing links with Central Asia via China, since that is the only other overland route to Central Asia from India. Country like Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan Army Cadets were trained at National Defence Academy, Pune, who after
completing their respective training and were conferred Degree from Jawahar Lal University, got commissioned in their respective countries [See Photo 18, Page No 254, Cadets from 116th Course from Tazikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazikistan with Faculty member (Scholar himself) at NDA Pune].

India aspiring to be an influential global power has to be a player in the unfolding "Great Game" in Central Asia, on an equal footing with the other major players like the United States, if it is to successfully protect its vital national interests in Central Asia. India needs to not only make significant oil and gas investments in Eurasia, but also leverage its position as a major existing and potential consumer of imported energy, and as a key transit country for Eurasian oil and gas to global markets.

Afghanistan - Strategic Dynamism:
The Taliban power stands revived is a fact now. At the same time, the 'war on terror' is also showing signs of fatigue. It has already come to a halt in the north-western tribal expanse of Pakistan, the cradle of the Taliban’s restoration. US led NATO-led forces, which were meant to have acted as an effective deterrent against the Taliban, are proving to be a mere buffer force between the Taliban in the south and the mujahedeen factions in the north. In 2008 only more than 250 soldiers from United Stated Armed forces were killed in Afghanistan, shows the failure of United State strategic decision to enter Afghanistan without UNO’s Banner, as advocated by India. Even in July 2008, a blast was conducted at Indian Embassy, killing a senior Foreign Service Officer and an Army Brigadier. Indian Intelligence Agency shared proof it has with CIA that the blast at Kabul was conducted by the ISI. Even the Pakistani Prime Minister Mr. Geelani has promised in an Interview, that he would order for an Inquiry regarding Kabul Blast. The five-year old political process and the inconsistent 'war on terror' have failed to transform the political dynamics in Afghanistan. With the levels of violence breaking all previous records, and effective institutions of governance still a dream, Afghanistan seems to be racing backward.

Ironically, post-2001 Afghanistan has witnessed the revival of both the mujahedeen factions and the Taliban, the two prime actors in the Afghan civil war. With Pakistan determined to regain its share of influence in Afghan politics. The
western and American forces engaging the anti-Kabul forces are finding the exercise costlier day by day, both in terms of expenditure and human casualties. About 40,000 international forces present in Afghanistan today appear to be clueless in developing an effective counter-strategy against the Jihad forces. President Obama is even planning to send 17,000 more Combat soldiers to Afghanistan. Needless to say that the kind of mobilization that has taken place in the vast rural Pashtun tribal belt from NWFP in Pakistan to south-western Afghanistan was ignored by the campaigners of the 'war on terror' in favor of the United States war in Iraq. No wonder, the Taliban have been shifting their battle lines further close to the urban centers in the southern and eastern provinces around Kabul and frontier Pakistan.

United States requested India to send its troop to Iraq. As United States put it, “Upon further examination, with regard to the Middle East, India should rethink its participation with regard to peacekeeping in Iraq. This was not suggested “as a favor to the United States, but because it is in India’s interest for the pursuit of stability in the region.”

The refusal to send Indian troops was publicly attributed to a number of factors as follows:-

- the lack of a UNO mandate;
- domestic political opposition;
- And finally, the need for Indian troops in Kashmir.

India turned down Washington’s request citing the absence of a U.N. mandate. Another reason cited later was the clear domestic opposition to such a move. It was not lost on observers that national elections were at the time slated to be held by Oct’ 04, and that the ruling party would pay a high political cost if any Indian soldier died in Iraq.

India apparently argued that its troops were too tied up fighting militancy in Kashmir. It was the first time officials in New Delhi linked India’s ability to help in Iraq or Afghanistan with violence in Kashmir. Soon after India’s decision against sending troops, a high level Indian official indicated in a candid statement that while India fully agrees with the need to fight terrorism, the dominant belief among Indian policymakers is that America’s current strategy in Afghanistan or Iraq is likely to produce more terrorists.
Given the changing scenario, a new political configuration may also emerge in Kabul. In this context, it may be worth considering whether it is time to revive something on the lines of the earlier 'Six-plus-Two' Group. Perhaps, a 'Seven-plus-Two' Group, including India, could be formed to monitor, discuss and analyze the Afghan situation on a regular basis and to engage various Afghan factions more meaningfully with the objective of resolving the Afghan conflict. However, as of now, the fact remains that Afghanistan is years away from stability and peace and India and United States has to play important role jointly to solve Afghanistan crisis and it is only possible with assistance of India.

Japan– India and United States relations:

India followed a "Look east" policy since 1991 following its adoption of economic reforms and the end of the Cold War, but this policy has gained steam since 2003. Establishing better relations with Japan is a master key of India and United States campaign to broaden its strive for quality democracy. United States and Japan’s strong condemnation of India's 1998 nuclear tests and temporary halt of overseas development assistance to India because of the tests were a setback to relations. Eleven years later, however, India is the largest recipient of Development Loans from Japan, and the two countries are seeking to create a geopolitical partnership. Japan, India and United States, all sides share an interest in highlighting their democratic forms of government, securing energy resources by protecting sea lanes, and fighting international terrorism. India has reorganized its naval command to create an Andaman and Nicobar Island command at Port Blair to exert influence over the Indian Ocean sea lanes, combat piracy, and guarantee the smooth entry of ships into the Malacca Straits.

Approximately sixty percent of China's oil supply and eighty percent of Japan's oil supply passes through the Straits of Malacca. Although many Indian, United States and Japanese security experts have long advocated development of a strategic relationship, Japan– India and United States ties are taking time to bear fruit. Growth in India's economic relationships has been slower with Japan than it has been with China. Overall trade is only about $4.35 billion compared to $20 billion with China.

India has reportedly been receptive to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's recent proposal for a four-sided or Quadrilateral strategic dialogue among Japan, India,
Australia, and the United States. The joint India–Japan statement on December 15, 2006, indirectly references such a dialogue: "The two leaders share the view on the usefulness of having dialogue among Japan, India and other like-minded countries in the Asia–Pacific region on themes of mutual interest." In a recent article on Japan–India and United States relations, Indian foreign policy analyst Brahma Chellaney noted that a close strategic relationship with Japan fits India's vision of a "dynamic, multi-polar Asia." 

In an interview with The Hindu news work, Japan's Ambassador to India Hiroshi Hirabayshi stated that Japan welcomed the new security arrangement between India and the United States that would make shipping through the Malacca Straits safer. Ours relations were poised for a quantum leap in the security, economic and political spheres. In the past there had been no systematic security dialogue between India and Japan although there had been informal contacts between military officials of the two countries.

During Prime Minister Singh's visit to Japan in December, 2007, and August 2008 (G-8 meeting), the India, United States and Japanese leaders agreed to start talks on a bilateral free trade agreement within two years and to increase cooperation between their navies and coast guards. Another key Indian goal was to secure Japanese support for lifting international restrictions on civil nuclear trade with India. Japan is part of the 45-member NSG, which must develop a consensus approving civil nuclear transfers to India. Japan was obliged to support India in NSG meeting intended to support India-United States Nuclear Deal.

India decided to upgrade its presence in the Andaman’s and set up its first tri-services command, the “Far Eastern Strategic Command” in August 2001. Its military presence already includes air force helicopters, three naval Fast Attack Craft (in short, FAC) and Offshore Patrol Vessels (in short, OPV). Eventually, India is expected to have a full strength army component and an air base in the Andaman’s. This will give India strategic depth to compliment its ability to protect maritime traffic bound for the South China Sea and Australia. An instance of this is the escort provided to a US vessel in 2004. Reaction to this activity has been favorable. For example Malaysia's Defence Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak said 'We also conduct monitoring in our waters in
the Straits and will offer assistance to anyone. They (users of the Straits) need not rely on the patrolling team only’. He went on to say that any nation had the right to escort their ships to ensure security without the need to seek permission from Malaysia or Indonesia as this did not violate international law.97

India had better historical relations with Vietnam and its growing strategic ties with Japan, which could help United States strategically. India and United States are playing vital role in the evolving security structure in the wider Asia-Pacific region. This trend would be underscored by the growing strategic and military ties with the “United States Pacific Command”. It is an historical anomaly that India is within the geographical area covered by the “United States Pacific Command” while Pakistan comes under the jurisdiction of the “United States Central Command”.

Engagement with Russia:

In addition to building new relationships with United States, India is reaffirming its long-held ties to Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanovo’s visit to India in late January 2007, demonstrates that India and Russia continue to share a special relationship that was solidified during the Cold War, especially during the 1970s and 1980s. Putin was impressed during his stay in India, which included serving as the chief guest at India’s Republic Day function in 2007, a rare honor symbolizing the continuing importance that India attaches to its relationship with Moscow.

India, signed a huge 960 million Dollar (Rs 3,840 Crore) Contract with Russia on 29th Feb 2008, to upgrade its five Squadrons of MIG 29 fighters inducted in the mid 198098. The upgrade of the 69 Indian Mig-29s, apart from extending their life from the present 25 years (2500 flight hours) to 40 years (3500 hours), will turn these superior fighters into far more lethal all weather multi-role jets. While the Indian Air Force is inducting Phalcon AWACS other force multipliers and Hawk AJTs, India, is trying to speed up the deliveries of 230 Sukhoi-30 MKIs contracted from Russia in a project worth 8.5 Billion Dollar. It will take at least five years for the deliveries to begin in the new gigantic Rs 42000 Crore project to procure 126 medium multi role combat aircraft for the IAF.
The Singh–Putin meeting in 2007 gave way to comprehensive agreements on civilian nuclear energy, space, and defense, science, advanced technology, energy, trade, and culture. Both leaders signed nine bilateral documents, including a memorandum of intent on construction of four nuclear power plants in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, which place tough competition before United States for bagging nuclear contracts. In light of the United States–India civil nuclear agreement, Moscow is positioning itself to be a primary supplier of new Indian nuclear power stations. United States, French, and even some Japanese companies also hope to win nuclear power deals from India over the next few years. Despite the strength of their strategic relationship, India–Russia trade remains low at around $2.7 billion, as India got new Business partner from western countries and United States.

A primary goal of Putin’s trip was to reestablish Moscow’s position as India's principal arms supplier. About 80 percent of India's existing military equipment is of Russian origin and Russian arms sales to India total about $1.5 billion annually. During the January, 2008 visit, the two countries signed agreements for licensed production of Russian aircraft engines in India, joint development of a new transport plane, and co-development of the fifth-generation jet fighter, a major step in expanding their aerospace cooperation. Russia offered its MiG-35 combat jets for an Indian tender for 126 fighter jets, a deal potentially worth about $10 billion. The United States has also offered F/A-18 and F-16 fighters to fill this tender. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had stated that he sees no ideological grounds for a war with the United States or the NATO alliance despite Russia’s war with United States ally Georgia in August 2008.

India’s defence market - one of the fastest-growing in the world, has become a key leverage point for New Delhi in cultivating relations with the major powers including Russia and United States. According to a United States Congressional Research Service report, India was the largest arms purchaser in the developing world from 1998 to 2005, striking agreements worth $20.7 billion. The United States is hoping to break into the Indian market in 2008-2009 and start selling as much as $6 to 8 billion of conventional military equipment (Detailed data analysis is at Appendix B, INT. Q.3. ).
INDIA’S PROSPECTIVE ROLE IN ASIA & UNITED STATES SUPPORT:

A new primary change in the India’s ambitious relationship with United States has been newborn cooperation with Asian Countries. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, Asia has been viewed by United States as a region of strategic importance to our future. It is the region from which the United States was attacked by al Qaeda. It is home to Pakistan, sarcastically the most important United States partner in the struggle against Jihad and also supporter of global terrorism through ISI, Pakistani Intelligence Agency. And it is home to the United States' friends and partners Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Israel and Japan.

India has been a reliable supporter of the United States and participated in over 50 UN peacekeeping operations. But India’s long-term objective is to become a permanent member of the UNSC. India has refused to sign the NPT or CTBT, but at the official level has refused to assist in the proliferation of nuclear weaponry or its associated delivery systems. Similarly India has joined the Antarctic Club and is a Pioneer member of the Law of the Seas treaty thus signaling its commitment to international law yet ensuring that it would influence decision making in both bodies.

More specifically, United States is bound to help India in following manners, if she wants to play a prospective role in Asia:-

- Nuclear nonproliferation: One of the United States key justifications for extending civil nuclear cooperation to India was that bringing New Delhi into the nonproliferation mainstream would strengthen overall global nonproliferation efforts.
- Convergence of National Interest: Such as democratic development, and energy security and trade while engaging on policy differences to improve understanding of the reasoning behind each side's decisions. Indian
government should use public diplomacy to convince the Indian mainstream that economic freedom and close United States ties are in India's national interest.

- Stress the defense trade: Strong military-to-military ties and healthy levels of defense trade that lead to interaction amongst the forces and co-production agreements are decisive to develop the strategic relationship. In March 2005, the United States laid out a new framework for South Asian Policy that included supporting India's emerging power status and an unusual offer of F-16 and F/A-18 fighters with the potential for co-production arrangements. Indian Defense Industrialists and government have long complained that questions about United States reliability as a supplier, due to past nuclear sanctions, has discouraged them from buying American military hardware. Recent passage of United States legislation and IAEA allowing civil nuclear cooperation with India opened the door for a major boost in defense trade.

- Chase Missile Defense Programme with India: India on 4th June 2008, successfully test-fired its 3,000 km range surface-to-surface nuclear capable Agni-III missile for the second time giving the country a capability to hit targets as far as deep inside China. This is a commendable step for India. Especially in light of recent provocations in the region including North Korea's missile tests on July 4, 2006, and China's anti-satellite (in short, ASAT) ballistic missile test on January 11, 2007. After the Chinese test, a senior Indian defense official said that New Delhi would take the necessary steps to counter Chinese ASAT capabilities. The India and United States have engaged on the issue of missile defense since it became the fourth plank of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership in early 2004.

- Trilateral cooperation: India, Japan, and the United States: Although there are informal efforts to promote such trilateral relations, India and United States should establish an official forum to bring United States, Indian, and Japanese officials together to develop common policies that promote their mutual strategic interests in various vital fields like economic development, democracy, energy security, and the science &
technology sectors. Such trilateral meetings could begin with ground-level officials and gradually progress to the ministerial level. The United States should also support Prime Minister Abe's recent proposal for a four-sided or Quadrilateral strategic dialogue among Japan, India, Australia, and the United States of America.

- Encourage the robust Indian role: United States should support stable relations between India and China to avoid an arms race. An Armed race could destabilize the region. However, United States should understand that any efforts to build a China–India–Russia axis are certainly not with intent to counter Washington’s power.

- Asian Counter Terrorism Forum: This forum will brings together terrorism officials from across the region to develop policies to counter extremist movements and to improve technical cooperation to disrupt international terrorist travel. Such a forum could focus on practical cooperation to prevent future attacks and on engaging in the ideological battle between moderate and radical forces within Islam.

The prospective India-United States strategic partnership will need to involve close engagement on developments in Asia and greater coordination of policies, both bilaterally and through regional multilateral arrangements. As the world's largest democracy, India's increased political and economic involvement throughout Asia will help to stabilize a region with nearly half of the world's population.

The India and United States share a particular interest in defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan and in helping to support that country's emerging democracy. India has made important contributions there. It has pledged over $750 million for reconstruction, making it the largest South Asian donor to the government of President Hamid Karzai. India’s contributions in Afghanistan are as follows:-

- It has helped renovate and build hospitals, granaries, and schools;
- it is training Afghan parliamentary officials in governance and parliamentary processes;
- And it has committed to building dams, roads, power projects, and a new parliament building.
India's continuing involvement in Afghanistan is essential to that country's stabilization and long-term success and cooperation between the India and United States in Afghanistan has been close and encouraging.

As India is both a rising power and a democracy, United States view its growing influence in the world as broadly convergent with United States interests. Both countries seek to promote democratic principles and institutions around the world because we know that stable democracies are largely peaceful and better able to manage the consequences of globalization. The India and United States have worked hard to come together on global issues in general and Asian issues in particular, in recent years. Prime Minister Singh and then President Bush jointly launched the UN Democracy Fund in 2005 and are its largest contributors. The fund is already having a real impact, having awarded more than 100 grants to civil-society organizations in countries that are democratizing or strengthening their democracies. Both nations are also active leaders in the Community of Democracies, a group of over 120 nations committed to assisting other countries on their path to democratization.

There are problems that the India and United States need to overcome before they can attain a true global partnership in Asia. The two countries need to work more effectively to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, and nuclear proliferation in Asia. Progress so far has shown how effectively we can work together to settle past differences and meet future challenges. If it is sustained, we will have an even greater opportunity to put American and Indian principles and power together and shape a more stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asian community. In this situation India is likely to face greater challenges in the coming year. India needs to restructure its Asian Policy and build political and strategic relations with all these countries. It also needs to further strengthen with Central Asian and South East Asian countries.

Both India and United States are quiet concerned about China’s growing military prowess and its strategic moves in the Indian as well as Pacific Ocean, rapidly expanding trans border military capabilities, Its move to acquire aircraft Carriers, expansion of its submarine fleets and modernization of PLA and its capabilities for nuclear, space and cyber warfare. Emboldened by its growing maritime power, China even suggested to the United States, that it could look after Eastern Pacific and while
Washington should concentrate of Western Pacific, which was rejected by Admiral TJ Keating, US Pacific Command Chief\(^{106}\). Admiral Keating visited India in mid May 2009 and discussed with national security advisor, MK Narayanan on the issues of three pending pacts- End-Use Monitoring Agreement (in short, EUMA), Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement (in short, CISMOA), and Logistic Support Agreement (in short, LSA). LSA envisages Indian and American militaries providing logistic support, refueling and berthing facilities for each other’s war ships and aircrafts on an equal value exchange basis.

China and India today are in that position, when it may be more in China's interests to woo and win over India as a “strategic partner”. “China needs to recognize the strategic reality that if India is forced into an all-embracing strategic relationship with the west, it would be due to China’s policies and actions or even the lack of appropriate policies and actions towards India” (Detailed data analysis is at Appendix B, INT. Q.2. ) . The onus for a strategic breakthrough in relations with India and United States lies squarely on China and China alone. India and United States would be more than willing to welcome a reorientation in China’s policies. China's leaders must develop the vision and determination to strike a dramatic strategic breakthrough in relations with India and United States.

It is stated that Pakistan is relying namely on “three As”, namely Allah, Army and America\(^{107}\). United States has made India instead of Pakistan as a reliable partner to counter terrorism. Pakistani Army is helpless if America does not provide military assistance to it. Despite these challenges, the strength of strategic relationship between India and United States lies in the continuing complimentarily of interests. Neither India nor United States can tolerate state sponsored terrorism in the global community and also in the South Asian region. State sponsored terrorism are realities with which the India and United States has already come to terms. As both India and United States grow stronger, their mutual interest in countering state sponsored terrorism in Global and Asian soil will only bring them even closer.
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