Chapter 5

The India-Pakistan Rivalry: Afghanistan – A New Battlefield?

5.1 Introduction

The main thrust of this chapter is to study the nature of relationship between India and Pakistan from the time of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 to the present context. The study would examine the factors that have led to the straining of ties between them since 1947 and the major agreements reached upon to resolve the disputes. It would also study how and why these two countries are considered very important to achieve the peace process in South Asia. Afghanistan is becoming common strategic leverage point for India and Pakistan. The relationship and intimacy with Afghanistan is taken as a strategic advantage, and the chapter would delineate on extension of “New Great Game” of India and Pakistan over Afghanistan.

Since their inception as free-standing entities following the end of the British colonial rule, India and Pakistan have shared culture, history, and a long border. They, however, have witnessed highs and lows in their bilateral relationship. Both are caught in a bitter hostility that has characterised their ties. This antagonism has led to wars between these two South Asian countries on four occasions 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999 (in Kargil), decades of skirmishes and low intensity conflicts. It has been argued that their animosity has stalled the overall development in the region and prevents it from realising its full potential. The historical assessment proves that it is the incoherent relationship and unsettled issues between these two countries that have prevented them to harmonise their relationship.

Periodically, however, these two countries have engaged multiple times in pursuing peace with each other through negotiations and intended to reduce differences and resolve their controversial issues. They have shared some serious issues including Kashmir dispute, arms race, differing ideologies, and terrorism, which have marred the process of bilateral cooperation between them.
This chapter emphasise that in order to understand their ongoing relations it is salient to examine the nature of past relations between the two countries. This will assist to give the basic backdrop of the current state of affairs and peace process on diverse problems. So, this chapter falls into two phases. The first phase has started after the partition in 1947 and ended before the nuclear test in 1998. The phase has been marked by three major wars and low-intensity conflicts and the vituperative rhetoric of mutual antagonism, there has always been a subterranean current of amity between the two states. The second phase started after the nuclear test in 1998 and it continues. This period saw the nuclearisation in the region, subsequently following the Kargil War in 1999, border clashes 2001-2, Mumbai terror attacks in 2008, and attacks on Uri and Pathankot in 2016. In spite of their antagonistic history there has been some major elements that have tend to bring both countries closer or at least averted them from escalating or spreading conflict, particularly in the shadow of nuclear weapons. So, this chapter would also examine the negotiation process between these two countries.

5.2 First Phase: India-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1999

The section would examine the relationship between these two countries before the 1998 nuclear tests. The section would scrutinise the major agreements between the two countries. It would also examine the problems faced by these two countries in the given period.

Immediately of the partition it was expected that they would cooperate with each other for mutual benefit. The first Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru said on Independence Day that India’s stand is: “I want to say all nations of the world, including our neighbouring country that we stand for peace and friendship with them” (cited in Gupta 1959: 39). On the other side, the first Pakistani Governor General Mohammed Ali Jinnah also proclaimed on the same day in Lahore: “We want to live peacefully and maintain cordially friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and the world at large” (cited in Hamid 1986: 233). Their relation, however, remained persistently under strain since their independence.
The relationship between them have been spoiled by issues that are attributed to historical acrimony, governance, territorial division, and diplomatic disparity which are largely responsible to convert the region into the most complicated, and tense one. Some of the issues and problems are: First, the complex issue of the Indian princely states and their integration with either of the two new dominions; Second, the issue of religious minorities in either dominion, communal violence, and significant loss of life, and large-scale migration; Third, boundary disputes; Fourth, river water disputes; Fifth, the issue of evacuee property, both movable and immovable assets, left behind by the leaving citizens in both states, the serious question of compensation or recovery for it; and, Sixth, trade ties between these two states.

The security dilemma triggers rivalry and mistrust between them. Many scholars and authors have focused on two major factors to explicate the continuation of Indo-Pak hostility are its “territorial” aspect and the divergent “national identities” of the two countries (Jalal 1995: 25-28). Both founded two different theological and ideological foundations. India formed a secular state whereby religion would play no role in body politics and civic nationalism, while Pakistan established a Muslim or theological state whereby religion plays a dominant role and ethnic nationalism (Ganguly 2001: 5). The issues which have been preoccupying both states are primarily political and are caused by their incompatible ideologies vital differences in interests, outlook and their relative power position in the region. So, their conflict shows an “enduring rivalry”, that seems to be true with regard to origin, violence, failure in conflict management and persistence (Paul 2005: 80).

They take various measures to ensure their security, stability, and interests. These included: First, they fortified their military power, which triggers the arms race in the region. Second, in order to attain balance of power, both states have had build alliances with the external major powers. They made strategic partnerships with them. Third, Islamabad encourages and supports insurgency in India, and vice versa. Fourth, they compete in a third state – Afghanistan – to exploit their interests (Mukherjee 2009). So, their conflict is not only over a territory, but also a rivalry over regional power.
dominance. The territorial issue seems to “be a manifestation of the multi-dimensional power struggle between India and Pakistan over regional dominance” (Paul 2013: 223).

However, alliance politics, capability, and strategy are the three major variables that have been largely disturbing factors for regional equilibrium. These factors have remained barriers to a permanent solution in India-Pakistan issues. Since the initiation of economic reforms in 1991, India’s economy growth has considerably changed, while Pakistan has got a label of “failing state” which widened the power gap in terms of economic capabilities (Paul 2013). Thus, the economic element has also affected the power asymmetry between the two countries. One of the leading historians, Geoffrey Blainey, has argued that “Wars usually end when fighting nations agree on their relative strength, and wars usually begin when fighting nations disagree on their relative strength” (cited in Stein 1990: 62).

A number of elites in Pakistan believe that both states are geopolitically coequal and they also perceive “relative parity” in diplomatic and military terms, while the Indian elite see India as emerging, rising major power in Asia along with China. They perceive that both are unequal in geopolitical and strategic terms, but “a country destined to remain a regional power” (Paul 2014: 104). So, Islamabad has worried that India’s dominance in the region will severely affect its power position and security. Consequently, the power politics are endemic to their enmity. All the three major steps to war have been present in India-Pakistan rivalry. These are: “recurrent disputes, outside alliances, and arms racing” (Vasquez 2005: 68-69). “Seeking outside allies against each other has been India’s and Pakistan’s most consistent policies for over fifty years, and one of the most important ways in which they have constructed their relationship” (Ganguly 2003: 41).

The September 2001 terror attacks have changed the geopolitics of South Asia. Although the changes that have been taken place in India-Pakistan competition are minimal and not profuse to change their power position, and therefore, the conflict dynamics (Paul 2013). Consequently, their relations have posed a serious threat to harmony, stability, security, and peace in the region. The South Asian region is often recognised as a high risk conflict zone because of a long history of hostilities due to
border skirmishes and large or limited scale wars between these two states. They have remained in hostility, animosity, and fear, which have affected all aspects of inter-state and inter-societal relationships. Russel J. Leng has argued that if any rivalry in which enmity begot greater enmity; it is Indo-Pak enmity. He argues “the lessons drawn from one crisis led to misperceptions of intentions and miscalculations of comparative military power in the next crisis” (2000: 260). The internal problem in Pakistan has often impacted India and Kashmir. It has marred the peace process between the two countries. According to some analysts students of the bilateral relations, (e.g. Harrison et al.), the relationship between India and Pakistan begs for reassessment at the level of policies (1999: 18).

A bitter controversy emerged between the two countries immediately after the independence about the division of assets and also regarding the demarcation of boundaries. The antagonism between India and Pakistan compelled them to reconsider their hostile policies with each other and, as a result, they have taken some notable initiatives to enhance their relationship. Since their independence, amidst periodic phases of conflict and heightened tensions there have been extended phases of constructive engagement between the two towards fulfilling common goals and aspirations through dialogue processes. The two countries engaged in dialogue processes in the past to make meaningful improvement towards achieving peaceful resolution of disputes. Another purpose of these dialogue processes is to create stable and conducive peaceful environment and build trust with each other. The peace process between these two countries is vital for the development of whole South Asia. The peace process is the viable instrument to facilitate solutions for their disputes.

5.2.1  **Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)**

The question arises how New Delhi and Islamabad engage to resolve their main conflicts despite antagonistic environment? There are different ways to de-escalate the rivalries. In order to resolve their disputes, these two South Asian countries introduced Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to enhance their relationship. They were introduced in order to lead the way for effective and meaningful arms control, which can raise stability and thereby diminish threats of nuclear war. The purpose of these measures is to prevent any
conflict escalation as well as ameliorating the tense situation. They have also used these mechanisms to develop communication, cooperation, and transparency. They can make an environment conducive in which the conflicting parties agree to have a discussion and build trust that facilitates conflict resolution.

These are modest steps and also flexible in nature. These measures are emerging as a significant element in international politics. Confidence Building Measures may be unilateral actions, informal understandings, or first steps within a more official agreement. Michael Krepon defined these measures as mutually agreed actions taken by states, which move states from the condition of mutual hostility to diminished hostility or escalated accommodation (1993: 2-3). These are included military, non-military strategic initiatives such as political, social and cultural, for the improvement of relationship between adversaries. These mechanisms are supposed to handle and assist the process of “problem-solving” and to increase mutual understanding on issues. These measures have played a significant role in managing or resolving the conflict process between adversaries. For example, the USA and the Soviet Union had engaged in a number of CBMs during the Cold War. On the basis of the experience of these super powers, scholars and practitioners believe that CBMs can guide and ameliorate ties between the two adversaries in the South Asian region.

In India and Pakistan context, the major aim of these CBMs is to manage the bilateral ties as both parties work for enduring stability and peace in the region through the resolution of major issues. In the past, these two countries have removed the restrictions on magazines, newspapers, films, liberalised the issuance of visa and sought to lessen delays and humiliation of travellers at the Wagah-Attari border (Hassan 2010: 25).

The negotiating process that has taken place between these two countries since their independence till the nuclear tests of 1998 has included: political, commercial, cultural, communications and military as well. In the following parts of the chapter, we shall extensively review the agreements and issues between independences of the two countries and the 1998 nuclear tests.
5.3 Major Agreements in India-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1998

The need for CBMs in bilateral relations was felt almost since the first months of the independence of India and Pakistan. Although the Liaquat-Nehru Pact was the first major example of CBM, there were agreements preceding it. Thus, an agreement between the representatives of these two countries was signed in Karachi for providing permanent air services between the two on 23 June 1948. This was followed by another agreement, which was signed on 19 August 1948 in Karachi, and related to the interchange of prisoners, and joint organisation for the evaluation of urban property. The agreement also dealt with “preparation of revenue records” and the evocation of moveable property between the two states (Mirza 2009: 10).

5.3.1 Liaquat-Nehru Pact

After independence, many communal riots broke out in various parts of India and Pakistan. Due to these riots, a huge number of Muslims migrated from India while Sikhs and Hindus migrated from Pakistan. These post-riot migrations had an impact on the status of minorities in both countries.

In order to de-escalate the crisis, talks between the Indian Prime Minster Jawaharlal Nehru and his Pakistani counterpart Liaquat Ali Khan began in New Delhi on 2 April 1950. They discussed their concerns in detail and arrived at an accord on several points regarding the minorities of east and west Bengal and Assam. The discussion continued for six days and on 8 April 1950 the pact for minorities was signed in New Delhi by these two prime ministers. They assured each other that no one would violate the pact. Both countries agreed that “each shall pledge to the minorities throughout its territory complete equality of citizenship” without any discrimination, “irrespective of religion, a sense of security in respect of property, life, culture and personal honour” (Hassan 2010: 21). They also concluded that there must be no restrictions of movements within each country and ensuring liberty of speech, occupation and freedom of religious worship, subject to law and morality (ibid).

The agreement guaranteed fundamental rights to the minorities, such as freedom of speech, worship, occupation and movement. The Pact is considered the first major
effort to produce an environment in which the two countries could resolve their differences and improve their relationship.

5.3.2 *Trade Relations*

The delegation of these two countries started talks on trade in Karachi on 19 February 1951. These talks continued for six days. On 25 February 1951, they signed an agreement based on trade. The agreement marked the end of the trade deadlock between these two countries as well as permitted the movement of goods to each other. After the agreement, they signed trade agreements on 5 August 1952, 20 March 1953 (three year trade agreement) 21 March 1960 (two year trade agreement) and these were followed by the new and comprehensive agreement on 23 January 1975. Their genesis was in the first agreement and these agreements were proposed to enhance their relationship in the subcontinent. Trade has been considered as the most notable step to resolve the disputes and promote friendly relationship between disputants.

5.3.3 *Agreement of Property Disputes Related to Partition*

The two countries signed an agreement at Karachi in April 1955 wherein they sought to resolve the dispute of immovable property. In January 1956, they agreed “for the transfer of evacuee Bank Accounts, Lockers and Safe Deposits” (Jayapalan 2003: 136).

5.3.4 *Indus Water Treaty*

The water sharing agreement was signed by the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the then Pakistani President Mohammad Ayoub Khan and mediated by the World Bank President W. A. B. Iliff on 19 September 1960 after eight years of talk between these two countries. It gave New Delhi the full right to utilise the water of three rivers, Ravi, Beas, Sutlej, and recognised the right of Islamabad to utilise the water of Jhelum, Indus and Chenab. The accord ended the long pending problem between these two countries on the use of the waters of the Indus river system for hydropower and irrigation. It provides one of the salient and comprehensive mechanisms of conflict resolution. The World Bank played a major role in resolving the Indus water dispute.
The accord not only determined the privileges and rights of these two countries in regard to the sharing of river water but also formed an apparatus for conflict management and resolution in case of water conflicts arise in the future. This treaty has gained reputation throughout the globe as a successful instance of conflict resolution. In the context of the treaty, it has been widely noted that despite the grim political relations between these two countries it has been working fairly or sensibly well (Iyer 1999, 2002: 1509, 2401). The treaty also created a Permanent Indus Commission and Indus Basin Development Fund. However, the treaty has not fully resolved water issues between these two countries. The recent issues like Tulbul Navigation Project and the Kishanganga Project have brought the sustainability of the water sharing agreement under intense scrutiny.

5.3.5 Rann of Kutch Dispute

The root causes of this dispute go back to the period immediately after the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 which caused skirmishes between the forces of these two countries in 1956 and in 1965. Perceptions on the dispute varied as Pakistan claimed it as ‘boundary dispute’, while on the other side India referred to it as a ‘territorial matter’. The situation worsened significantly in January 1965 when armed skirmishes broke out between these two countries into the borders of West Pakistan in which both countries fully deployed all their weapons including aircraft and tanks (Zaman 1969: 127).

By middle of the year 1965, conflict turned into a wider war involving Jammu and Kashmir as well. The matter became so serious that, when on 9 January 1965 these two countries attacked each other’s police posts, the British Prime Minister intervened and mediated a cease-fire. The dispute over the Rann of Kutch resulted in numerous diplomatic negotiations between these two adversaries. The official approval of the cease-fire agreement came from both governments on 29 June 1965. The agreement was signed in New Delhi on 30 June 1965 under the auspicious of the United Nations. In

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The word Kutch comes from “Kaccha”, which means marshy land (Kutch is the name of a district in Gujarat) and the word Rann comes from Sanskrit word Irana, which means desert or desolate place. The Rann of Kutch is a marshy landmass with salty and infertile stretches. It is divided into two parts: Greater Rann, which occupies more than fifty (50) percent of the area of Kutch and one-eighth of Gujarat and Little Rann, which is in the south east. It is 75,000 square miles area between West Pakistan and the Indian state of Gujarat.
In accordance with the terms of the cease-fire agreement, these two countries “agreed to demarcate the Gujarat-West Pakistan boundary as specified by the Indo-Pak Western Boundary Case Tribunal Award”, which was formed following the cease-fire agreement (Untawale 1974: 827). The Tribunal met in Geneva, Switzerland from 16 to 19 February 1968. After several rounds of talks, the Tribunal announced its decision on 19 February 1968 and the new boundary came into effect on 5 July 1969.

The agreement produced peace between the two countries and appeared to solve one of the main disputes between them. It was also seen as an example of how states resolve their conflict. However, as we shall see below, the dispute arose again in the 1980s. Experts argue that resolving the Rann of Kutch dispute is a necessary precondition for resolving other disputes between the two countries.

5.3.6 **Tashkent Agreement**

After the 1965 war, they signed a peace agreement in Tashkent, Soviet Union. The talks between the then Pakistani President Ayub Khan and India’s Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, chaired by then the Soviet Primer Aleksey Kosygin, began on 3 January 1966. The meeting continued for seven days. After much argumentation by both sides, and interchange of drafts between each other, an agreement was reached on 10 January 1966 which was called the Tashkent Declaration.

The Agreement laid down the major principles that were to govern their future ties. The declaration, more generally, committed both parties to settle their disputes through peaceful means; “non-interference in the internal affairs of each other”; endorse the development of friendly relations and these two countries agreed that bilateral talks would continue (Malik 2002: 123).

The President of United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, welcomed the Agreement and hoped that it would lead to further steps “toward peace” between these two states. Prisoners-of-war were repatriated and the forces of India and Pakistan had withdrawn to their pre-5 August 1965 positions. In implementation of Tashkent provisions, trade, diplomatic, economic and communication relations of India and Pakistan were resumed.
5.3.7 Simla Accord

After the war in 1971, the Simla agreement between India-Pakistan was another attempt to normalise their relationship. The leaders of these two countries met in order to restore their relations in the aftermath of the war. It was the first India-Pakistan dialogue at the highest level since the Tashkent declaration and first agreement that was signed through bilateral negotiations. The accord opened the era of bilateralism between these two countries. The two leaders, the then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto met with diametrically opposite views (Ali 1972: 58; Kheli1973: 74).

It has been argued that Kashmir is the major impediment to harmony in the subcontinent. Despite their different approaches, these two countries put initiatives in order to end the hostilities and conflict that stained their relationship. They agreed to work for the promotion of amicable and harmonious ties for the establishment of stability and peace. Both countries signed an accord on 2 July 1972 which opened a new chapter in the India-Pakistan relationship. The accord reduced tension, allowed for the resumption of diplomatic activity, and improved communication. The accord converted the 1949 “Ceasefire line” brought into effect through the mediation of the UN, into “Line of Control”. The key aspects of the agreement include:

(a) Both parties would “respect the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971” (Dixit 1995: 321; Noorani 1994: 2); neither would unilaterally change it irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations;

(b) They would resolve pending disputes or problems through bilateral talks or “any other peaceful means” (ibid);

(c) The United Nations Charter would govern ties between them;

(d) The representatives of the two sides would meet to discuss normalisation of relations including the final settlement of the Kashmir issue.

The two countries persuaded the propagation of such information that would promote the development of harmonious ties between them. They also agreed to normalise, step-by-step, trade, social and cultural ties with each other. Like Tashkent Agreement, the
Simla Accord represented a significant alteration of relationship in the sub-continent from confrontation to cooperation. Like Tashkent, it also left the settlement of basic issues for future negotiations between the two governments. Although it has not led to enduring peace between these two states and it has not attained any acceptable outcome to the “core” issue of Kashmir.

5.3.8 Salal Dam Agreement 1978

The talks between the officials of these two countries at Delhi produced an agreement, regarding the Salal Hydroelectric Plant, on 14 April 1978. The agreement, signed by External Affairs Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and from Pakistan side by Aga Shahi, Adviser on Foreign Affairs, ended the 30 years old dispute between these two countries. Through the agreement, India secured the right to build Salal Dam and power project on the Chenab River in Kashmir valley. The talks “further gave strength to the acceptance of bilateral negotiations as the best means for promoting bilateral relations”, and provided new importance to the concept of “beneficial bilateralism” between these two countries (Jayapalan 2003: 181).

5.3.9 Joint Commission 1982

The process of establishing a joint commission to strengthen cooperative relations started in late 1982. Both countries finally signed an accord on 10 March 1983, setting up a joint commission in the presence of Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi and President Zia-ul-Haq. The agreement was signed for the purpose of fortifying understanding and cooperation with each other in a variety of fields such as health, science, technology and communication etc. The main objective of the agreement was to standardise bilateral relationship.

The two countries agreed that they had to work for the progress, establishment of peace and to generate favourable environment for bilateral relationship. On 1 June 1983, the first meeting of India-Pakistan joint commission began in Islamabad which continued for four days. The press conference of Foreign Ministers of both states declared that “progress had been achieved during the four days’ session” (Mirza 2009: 298-299). After
the Simla agreement, this was considered a major step towards the purpose of securing friendly and cooperative relationship.

5.3.10 Cricket Diplomacy

Cricket has been considered an important means for improving relations between Pakistan and India. It has an enormous following in both states and assists in bridging the segregation. The cricket matches also presented a huge opportunity for their officials for a discussion and meeting which had not been seized before.

In 1987, these two states were very close to a war and cricket was used as a CBM. At that time, Pakistani President General Zia-ul-Haq came to Jaipur, Rajasthan, to watch a cricket match with his Indian counterpart Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and grabbed an opportunity for face-to-face conversation. Later, President Pervez Musharraf came to watch a match in Delhi in April 2005. These talks have been termed “a part of the composite dialogue between the two countries” (Croft 2005: 1039-1041).

5.3.11 Track II Diplomacy

Joseph Montville, the USA diplomat, who coined the term “Track II diplomacy”, which implies unofficial and informal interaction and contacts aimed at lessening misperceptions among countries and exchanging ideas and opinions that could, potentially, help manage or resolve conflicts. We observe a new trend in bilateral relations during the last two decades. The arrival of the Track II process.

The purpose of this mechanism is to influence the policies of the governments of both these South Asian states at the higher official level with the intention of making them friendly neighbours. It is an unofficial dialogue and involves efforts to promote greater understanding between the two states through exchanges and discussions. There are three major objectives of Track II diplomacy: to make endeavours to solve continuing differences; to deter and avert the emergence of new issues and disputes; and, to make endeavours to bring closer two alienated communities, societies, and states by introducing CBMs (Cheema 2006: 213).
The most important Track II diplomacy, generally known as the Neemrana initiative, is represented by a group of influential former diplomats, retired army personnel, representatives of NGOs, and editors of some newspapers, academics of major institutions from both sides who enjoy the confidence of their respective governments. The group met first time in Neemrana (an ancient fort in Rajasthan) in 1992. These interactions are private, nongovernmental efforts at peace. This has gained momentum and new ideas are been incorporated in order to promote the goodwill atmosphere between these two countries.

It has been highlighted that the private initiatives in the 1990s played an important role in generating a conducive environment for mutual understanding, which led to the visit of former Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to Islamabad in 1999 and declared the historic Lahore declaration, which is discussed in the next phase.

Important military and diplomatic CBMs between them can be briefly mentioned:

- An agreement was signed between military officials of New Delhi and Islamabad in Karachi regarding the establishment of Ceasefire line in the state of Jammu and Kashmir on 27 July 1949. The accord was signed under the auspices of the truce-subcommittee of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) in the interest of ameliorating the environment and promoting peace in the region.

- A hotline between the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs) was formed after the war in 1971 for the purpose of establishing reliable direct channels for communication. Hotline between Prime Ministers was started in 1989 during the terms of Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto; Nawaz Sharif and Chandrasekhar in 1990 and Nawaz Sharif and I. K. Gujral in May 1997 (Mattoo 2001: 205). These hotlines were established to build trust and promote friendly relations with each other.

5.3.12 Mechanisms to Prevent Nuclear War

In the 1980s, the two countries introduced a series of CBMs related to military and diplomatic arenas in order to enhance their relationship. Prior to the 1990 crisis, in 1984 and 1987 there were situations when both states were on the brink of a major war. They
typically conducted large scale military exercises in 1986-87. Following the Brasstacks Operation, India and Pakistan established measures to keep the doors of communication open to move towards substantial conciliation (Hilali 2005: 200).

The hotlines were used for lessening fear and tension and clarifying the situation. Their leaders strongly asserted their commitment to enduring stability and peace and promotion of affable bilateral ties based on mutual trust. They also established CBMs with respect to nuclear programmes and policies.

The three bilateral agreements were signed by Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto on 31 December 1989. The agreements included not attacking on each other’s nuclear facilities and material storage places; avoidance of double taxation; and cultural collaboration which were ratified and implemented into force on 27 January 1991. In January 1993, they also extended their communication channels to include sector commanders along the LoC in the Poonch-Rajauri and Baramula-Muree areas. Their main purpose had been to interchange communication on manoeuvres, air space violation, advanced notice on military exercises, movements of troops to reduce tension and resolve disputes along the borders (Hilali 2005: 200).

5.3.12.1 Agreement on Prevention of Airspace Violations

The Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shaharyar M. Khan and his Indian counterpart Muchkund Dubey signed an agreement on prevention of airspace violation in New Delhi on 6 April 1991. It was ratified in August 1992. The agreement forbids both countries from flying armed combat aircraft within ten kilometres of the international border and unarmed transport and logistics aircraft within one kilometre of the border. India and Pakistan agreed to “take adequate measures to ensure that air violations of each other’s space do not take place” (Hilali 2005: 201). They formally declared to not hold any military training and exercises near the borders without prior report or notifying their army counterparts (ibid).

However, if any accidental or unintentional violation does take place, it will be investigated instantly. The headquarters of the other air force would be “informed of the results without any delay through diplomatic channels” (ibid). The agreement superseded
all earlier understanding in so far as air space violations, over flights and landings by military aircraft were concerned. However, this accord was violated, and failed to de-escalate tension during the Kargil crisis. The downing of the aircrafts of each other (Pakistan shot down two Indian aircrafts and India downed one Pakistani plane) near the international border were major violations of the agreement during the Kargil crisis in 1999 (Pathania and Saksena 2012: 81; Hilali 2005: 201-202).

5.3.12.2 Agreement on Advance Notice of Military Exercises

The military CBMs of India and Pakistan are concerned with promoting good neighbourly relations. These two countries signed an agreement in 1991, which was ratified in August 1992, on Advance Notice of Military Exercises, Troops Movements and Manoeuvres. It does not permit military manoeuvres of their land, naval, and air forces in close proximity to each other. The two countries agreed that information had to be transmitted regarding deployments of forces and major military exercises in advance to the other side within a specified time. They put 15 days in advance for air exercises, and ninety or sixty days in advance for army exercises, depending upon the nature of exercise (Mattoo 2001: 206; Hilali 2005: 202).

It has been argued that they violated the spirit of the agreement during the Kargil war; they brought army formation very close to the international border without the advance notification of 15 days to each other. The agreement played an important role in reducing tension on both sides of the LoC till the recent skirmishes.

5.3.12.3 Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

In 1992, they signed a major agreement on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in New Delhi. They agreed not to acquire, produce, develop or use chemical armaments against each other. The Agreement also entrusted both countries to become regional signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). After CWC was enacted, both governments signed and ratified it. India signed it on 14 January 1993 and ratified it on 3 September 1996, and Pakistan signed it on 13 January 1993, ratified it on 28 October 1997.
However, differences occurred between the two countries when India declared possession of chemical weapons as required by the CWC. Pakistan appeared to be against such stockpiles and alleged the violation of bilateral agreement against chemical weapons. They reaffirmed their pledges to establish enduring peace and progress of harmonious and friendly ties; conscious of the role of CBMs in promoting and encouraging bilateral cooperation based on mutual goodwill and trust. Further, through MoUs in August 1993, they agreed on a code of conduct for treatment of diplomats, and resumption of the weekly hotline communication between DGMOs signed. Hotline between their air forces was also established (Pathania and Saksena 2012: 83).

5.3.13 Composite Dialogue Process (CDP)

During the 1990s, India-Pakistan ties became intense and crisis-ridden once again. The decade started with the large scale military standoff between their armed forces. Pakistan’s support for the insurgency in Kashmir valley also became the major cause of violence and tension in South Asia. Both made Kashmir an extremely important issue and “ensured the dispute’s continued relevance even during times of improved Indo-Pakistani relations” (Kapur 2011: 63). This worrisome development led to regional instability and altered the strategic environment of South Asia. Indeed, it marked the beginning of a new era of regional rivalry and conflict. Specifically, two major factors altered Indo-Pak relations in the 1980s and 1990s. These were: First, insurgency in Kashmir; and, Second, acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons capability.

The major reason that vitalised the Pakistani army to assist and encourage the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir was that “they believed that their incipient nuclear capabilities had effectively neutralised what every conventional military advantages India possessed” (Ganguly 2001: 92). Islamabad got deeply involved in the Kashmiri insurgency, committed to provide arms, financial resources, training and logistical support to the militant groups. This help became a vital element of Pakistan’s security policy. More intrinsically, it shaped the nature of the insurgency and Kashmir conflict (Kapur 2011).
On 28 March 1997, Foreign Secretary level talks started in New Delhi after a gap of almost three years. The talks continued for four days and were aimed at reducing tensions. A joint statement issued after the talks on 31 March 1997 in New Delhi noted that “the two Foreign Secretaries discussed all outstanding issues of concerns to both sides in a frank, cordial and constructive manner” (Mirza 2009: 478-79). Both countries agreed to release all prisoners from each other’s states, set up a hotline between them and review foreign secretaries’ meetings.

After some time, their leaders I. K. Gujral and Nawaz Sharif met on the sidelines of the SAARC at Male, Maldives on 12 May 1997 to resume talks which was considered a new era of cooperation and friendship. They initiated the idea of Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) and agreed to discuss all pending issues simultaneously. Pakistan agreed to include terrorism in the agenda of dialogues, India agreed to include Kashmir. It was a compromise from both the sides. Kashmir issue and terrorism are the two major irritants in India-Pakistan relationship. Eight issues were explicitly identified: “peace and security, including confidence-building measures; Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation project; Jammu and Kashmir; Siachen Glacier; Sir Creek; terrorism and drug-trafficking; economic and commercial cooperation; promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields” (Wirsing 2003: 17).

During the decade of 1990, India moved towards recognition of the importance of establishing military CBMs with Pakistan, to promote nuclear stability between these two states. Their relationship attained a new chapter with the 1998 nuclear tests, which demonstrated that they had acquired nuclear weapons. The next section will discuss the relations in the aftermath of the tests and trace in the contemporary period.

5.4 India-Pakistan Relations Post-Nuclear Tests

Since 1990, India and Pakistan have continued their bilateral talks, although major disturbances have been also witnessed in their links and negotiation processes. Prior to the 1990s, there were situations when India and Pakistan were about to fight with each other; these include the 1984 Siachen conflict, the 1986-87 Brasstacks crisis, and the Kashmir crisis of the 1990s. The two countries have agreed to implement as many CBMs
as possible to reduce the prospect of military confrontation. These CBMs included the establishment of direct hotlines between prime ministers, foreign secretaries, people-to-people contact, and DGMOs. During his visit to South Asia in June 1990, Robert Gates, the then USA Deputy National Security Advisor, “had proposed to India and Pakistan to undertake CBMs which would lessen hostility and chances of accidental war” (Ganguly 1996: 12).

The important agreements which they signed before nuclear tests in 1998 have been discussed in the previous sections. When these two countries tested nuclear devices in May 1998 at Pokhran and Chagai, they entered into a new era of stability-instability paradox, which created a nonconductive environment for substantial dialogue. However, Zachary S. Davis has argued that the nuclear tests in 1998 “did not mark the beginning of South Asia’s nuclear era” (2011: 1). Both these countries possessed nuclear weapons long before 1998. India conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974. During the late 1980s, both countries were considered “opaque nuclear powers”, neither state owned fully operational nuclear armory till May 1998 (ibid).

India conducted nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 of fission bomb, a low yield nuclear mechanism and a thermonuclear bomb at Pokhran, Rajasthan. Pakistan responded immediately after over two weeks of diplomatic activity, conducting nuclear tests on 28 and 30 May 1998 in Chagai district of Baluchistan of Pakistan. Since then on, they have started brandishing nuclear weapons openly.

When they declared themselves as nuclear powers after the successful nuclear tests, they became seventh and eighth countries in the world that possessed nuclear weapons. These tests were a turning point in the South Asian region. They have profoundly affected the strategic landscape of the region and global nuclear politics. It is very significant to mention that these tests were the first that were conducted by any non-nuclear weapon countries since the Non-Proliferation Treaty entry into force in 1970. They created further bitterness and increased tension as well as posed major challenges to the peace process between them. After the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the period witnessed the Kargil war in 1999, the border confrontation crisis (December 2001-October 2002), the Agra Summit (2001) and Mumbai attacks in 2008. In the aftermath of
each of these events, there were major efforts on both sides to restart the peace process to enhance their ties.

Since then, they have adopted a number of steps towards the diminution of nuclear threat. Agreements between these two countries had been placed since before nuclear tests on such matters including, not targeting one another’s nuclear facilities, establishment of communication links, trade, and transit.

In the following parts of the section, we shall extensively review the nature of India-Pakistan relations between nuclear tests in 1998 and 2001. Although the Lahore Summit of 1999 was the first major agreement after the nuclear tests, there were agreements preceding it.

- The first agreement was signed when the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries, K. P. Menon and his counterpart Humayun Khan, met in Islamabad on 31 December 1998. The Accord was related to the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities. The two states’ themselves to promote peace process forward and build cordial relationship. They pledged to supply information to each other on 1 January every year about the latitude and longitude of their nuclear installation and facilities through diplomatic links, under bilateral accord on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations of 1988.

- This was followed by the bus service agreement which was signed at a ceremony in Islamabad on 17 February 1999, which was finalised earlier in December 1998. The Pakistan Federal Secretary of Communication, Mohammad Akram Khan and the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, G. Parthasarthy, signed an accord on behalf of their respective countries. The bus service from Delhi to Lahore was part of the CBMs. The route for the bus service was re-opened after 51 years, which was suspended because of hostility (Wheeler 2010: 326).

5.4.1 Lahore Summit, 1999

The two Prime Ministers Atal Behari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif, respectively, met at Lahore in February 1999 to revitalise the peace process. The relations of these two South Asian rivals eased after their Foreign Secretaries signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) on 21 February 1999 which was ratified by the parliament of both countries in the same year. The accord is also known as Lahore Declaration and it came out as a result of political will from the leadership of both countries. Smruti Pattanaik states that the agreement strengthened mutual security and minimised uncertainty (1999: 86). They agreed on the need for constructive talks to settle all major issues peacefully. The declaration included eight mechanisms for fostering a stable atmosphere of security and peace between them. The following are the agreed mechanisms:

(a) They shall engage in bilateral talks on nuclear doctrines and security concepts, with a view to developing measures or techniques for building confidence in the conventional and nuclear sectors, aimed at prevention of concerns and conflicts.
(b) They agreed to adopt national mechanisms to diminishing the threats of unauthorised or accidental use of nuclear armaments under their control. They agreed that for any accident they should earlier notify each other and establish communication channels for this purpose.
(c) They agreed that for any ballistic missile tests, they should provide advance notification to each other. They also concluded a joint agreement in this regard.
(d) They shall “periodically review the existing CBMs” and their implementations. They also set up consultative or advisory measures to supervise and to guarantee effectual implementation of these CBMs.
(e) They agreed to continue their moratorium on conducting further nuclear explosion experiments.
(f) They agreed to review their “existing communication links, with upgrading and improving them”.
(g) They also agreed to engage in dialogues on non-proliferation, disarmament and security concerns (Chari 2005: 214; Pattanaik 1999: 86).

The statements given by their Prime Ministers showed an interest to solve their disputes, including the Kashmir issue. The Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that “the ice has been broken” and the Kashmir issue was one of the most vital part of the Lahore Declaration. While on the other side, Vajpayee expressed his Pakistan visit as
“brief but substantive” and argued that one of the issues discussed within the framework of CDP was Jammu and Kashmir (Kumar 1999: 169; Behuria 2009: 438).

In the period between post-nuclear tests and the pre-Kargil episode, they arranged some events privately. The events included matches of hockey and cricket, three days conference mixing nearly hundreds of the Pakistani and the Indian parliamentarians, and even founding of a joint India-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry to increased cross border contacts (Wirsing 2004: 69-70) to alter the narrative of competition. But after some time, a horrible incident erupted between them in the Kargil area of Jammu and Kashmir, which is known as the Kargil conflict.21

In fact, both sates haven’t fought a major conventional war since they developed nuclear capabilities in 1998. Although low-intensity conflicts directly or indirectly have increased as is seen in Afghanistan, Balochistan, and Kashmir. They made the region unpredictable and unstable zone.

5.4.2 Kargil Conflict

Three months after the Lahore Declaration, a conflict broke out between India and Pakistan which deteriorated their relationship. When the Pakistani military intruded the LoC and seized many Indian positions in the Kargil district in Jammu and Kashmir, it turned their amicable relations into the rivalry once again. The Kargil conflict which erupted along the LoC lasted from 6 May to the end of July 1999. This incident led to the real risk of nuclear escalation, which started after their nuclear explosions in May1998. The conflict interrupted the peace process between the two countries. The LoC was respected by both countries since 1972 to the Kargil war. After the peace accord of 1972 at Simla, Kargil conflict was considered as a largest conflict between them. J. N. Dixit has argued that the Kargil episode “was not a skirmish, a border incident, or a marginal intrusion; it was a war” (2002: 25). He has further argued that it was launched by Islamabad “with definite and clear strategies, territorial and political motives, with

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21 The Kargil area contains rocky mountains and is about 14,086 kilometres. The height of mountains varies from 8,500 to 18,500 feet. The area is bounded by Zojila pass on the west, LoC on the north, Shyok river on the east, and villages like Mulbek, Zojila, Parthapur, and Sanko on the south. The Kargil area is thinly populated.
premeditated planning and detailed preparation” (ibid). It was an outgrowth of India-Pakistan dispute over the Kashmir issue (Cheema 2009: 42) which showed that the valley of Kashmir became the flash point of conflict once again between the two neighbours.

What actually made the Kargil conflict different from other crisis of India-Pakistan was the overt manifestation of nuclear weapons in the previous year. The Kargil conflict violated the Lahore Declaration. It proved that without resolving the Kashmir issue, no talks could be successful between them. During the Kargil crisis, it was the immense pressure from international community on Pakistan that led to a dialogue between Nawaz Sharif and the USA President Bill Clinton on 4 July 1999. Both leaders signed an accord which is also known as Washington Declaration, under which Pakistan agreed to withdraw its forces from the captured areas of Kargil and each side would respect the LoC. They also agreed that necessary “steps would be taken for the restoration of the LoC” (Mahmood 1999: 39; Cheema 2013: 94).

On 11 July 1999, the DGMOs of India and Pakistan met at the checkpoint of Attari border where the Pakistani DGMO agreed to remove their forces sector-by-sector on the following day. The deadline for the vacation of intrusion was on 16 July which was later extended by one day at Pakistan’s request. On 26 July, New Delhi officially declared that the LoC was restored. Before the relations between these two countries could be mended, a military coup overthrew the Nawaz Sharif government in Pakistan in October 1999.

5.4.3 Dialogue Towards the Agra Summit

Immediately after the Kargil crisis, the then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, speaking in a press conference on 23 July 1999, said, “Pakistan will have to recreate the atmosphere of trust it had destroyed by intruding into Kargil. Only then can the dialogue process be revived” (Wheeler 2010: 336). The Indian government took an important step when it initiated a new peace process in November 2000 by “declaring a unilateral ceasefire”, while “Pakistan offered a truce along the LoC”. They completely pulled back troops along the borders of Kashmir. Suddenly after three months, India ceased the ceasefire and urged Islamabad for assistance to make favorable environment for recommencement of
dialogue process. The Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee took another major initiative, invited Pervez Musharraf at Agra for summit level talks in July 2001 (Wirsing 2004: 59-61).

The two-day Agra summit (15-16 July 2001) took place at Agra, for the purpose of resolving all the concerns including Kashmir. Prior to the summit, President Musharraf argued that the “Kashmir issue” would be the core issue which they want to discuss in the summit. On the other hand, India was said to have been “looking forward with hope and expectation” to a successful summit between these two countries (Mohan 2001a: 1). Abruptly, it ended in the late evening on 16 July without reaching any agreement on the wording of a declaration or joint press conference statement, and without any final handshake (Wirsing 2004: 62). The reason of the failed summit was the fundamental difference over the cross-border terrorism and the Kashmir issue between them (Mohan 2001b: 1).

It failed to produce any satisfied result because of their fundamental difference about the agenda of talks. On one hand, the Pakistani President Musharraf wanted Kashmir to be at the top of the agenda, while on the other side, India wanted CBMs and trust enhancing measures to be at the centre of the talks (Gull 2007: 56). Both sides expressed their desires to continue the dialogue process and more debate and discussion on the issues in the future (Khan 2006: 174-175). After the failed Agra summit, Prime Minister Vajpayee asserted “the need for a framework to address the difference between us on Jammu and Kashmir, which would have to include the cross-border terrorism in its ambit. We can also look at other CBMs to further encourage this process” (Vyas 2001:1). Following the Agra summit, India followed an approach of CBMs, while Pakistan took an initiative of conflict-resolution approach to the conversation between the two countries (Jalalzai 2003: 138-139). The Indian side called it the “beginning of a journey”, while the officials from Pakistan called it “inconclusive” (Behuria 2009: 439).

5.4.4 Post-Agra Summit

The enmity did erupt again when terrorists attacked on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001. It came over a month after an attack by terrorists on the Legislative
Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir. India held Pakistan responsible for the Parliament attack but did not provide any evidence (Cheema 2006: 216). These attacks led a period of strained relations between them; they deployed more military troops along the LoC border during the winter of 2001-2002. Vajpayee government introduced “Operation Parakram” with the main intention of taking strong action against militant training camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). These events created intense hostility, which prevailed for more than 18 months and war seemed like a possibility. The deployment of heavy forces was one indicator of the seriousness of the crisis (Khan 2006: 160).

During the phase, all the diplomatic ties and on-going peace process were severed. However, there was no war and the crisis had been de-escalated without any major confrontation. Both states decided to pull back their forces from the brink of a war. The Kargil war of 1999, the failure of the Agra summit in 2001, terror attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001 and subsequent mobilisation of military on the borders contributed to the complex phase in their bilateral relationship. These incidents led them to resume various CBMs to promote cooperation.

In early 2003, several attempts were made by President Musharraf’s government to persuade India of his intention to forward the peace process. Finally, these efforts led to the way of peace process when the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee offered and extended his “hand of friendship” towards Islamabad at Srinagar on 18 April 2003. At the end of Vajpayee’s visit to Srinagar, while expressing his aspiration for repeated peace and amity with Islamabad, in a press conference, he said, “We want to tread the path of friendship but a lot depends on Pakistan’s response. I reiterate that only talks can resolve all the issues” (Bukhari 2003: 1). This was a new beginning to negotiations with Pakistan on the basis of the CDP which resumed after a gap of six years. Pakistan responded to a large number of CBMs. Later in the year, in November 2003, both parties agreed to bilateral ceasefire on the LoC (Behuria 2009: 440).

It is evident from above that CBMs have improved and created favourable atmosphere for negotiations. The past records depict the way these mechanisms ameliorate the deteriorated atmosphere between the two countries at various times. A close critical observation of the crisis, including the Brasstacks operation 1987, Kashmir
insurgency 1989-90, Kargil war 1999 and border crisis 2001-2002 clearly recognises the varied contributions made by CBMs (Cheema 2006: 215). These mechanisms have also extensively facilitated the resumption of transportation and communication links, as well as provided enormous opportunities of people-to-people contact. During the 12th SAARC Summit in Islamabad in January 2004, the two countries agreed to resume the CDP. In the Summit, all the countries signed an accord on the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) which was a principal landmark.22

The summit also revived the bilateral talks between India and Pakistan. The joint statement made by Vajpayee and Musharraf on the side-lines of the summit eased the beginning of the dialogue process (ibid). Both leaders greeted each other for the steps taken towards the normalisation of relationship. President Musharraf “reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he would not allow any area under Pakistan’s control to be utilised to support terrorism in any manner” (Ministry of External Affairs 2004). They agreed to commence the CDP in February 2004 later reaffirmed by the foreign secretaries of both states. The foreign secretaries talks between the two countries in February 2004 agreed to the basket of eight issues including: Sir Creek; Siachen; terrorism; drug trafficking; Tulbul Navigation/Wullar Barrage; economic and commercial cooperation, peace and security including CBMs, Jammu and Kashmir and promotions of friendly exchanges in diverse sectors to seek resolution in these controversial issues to the satisfaction of both states.

5.5 Major Agreements in India-Pakistan Relations Since 2001

The withdrawal of troops from the common border area in 2001-02 eased tension between them. Therefore, the diplomatic and transportation links were restored. After the border confrontation in 2001-02, these two countries adopted more CBMs to solve their long standing issues peacefully. They agreed that CBMs can produce a favourable environment to discuss on the conflictual issues. With the environment of amity in the

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22 The SAFTA is an accord signed by seven foreign ministers at the 12th SAARC Summit on 6 January 2004 in Islamabad, Pakistan. On 1 January 2006 it entered into force. The trade liberalization programme commenced from 1 July 2006. This was meant to stimulate trade and economic growth in this region by reducing tariffs for intra-regional exports. Its aim is to encourage and increase economic co-operation and mutual trade by reducing impediments to trade, fair competition in the free trade area, ensuring mutual benefits to all.
past through the process of CBMs, both states have expressed their “willingness and determination to move ahead” (Javaid 2010: 346). They adopted mechanisms regarding diplomatic and military links to avoid emergence of crisis and managing the escalation of crisis. They signed agreements for the purpose of achieving peace, stability and to make military capabilities more transparent. The bilateral agreements are mostly declaratory in nature. Major agreement between them included:

- On 26 November 2003, both countries agreed to ceasefire along the International Border (198 km), LoC 778 km, and the Actual Ground Position Line (150 km).
- The bus-service between Delhi to Lahore was resumed on 11 July 2003 after 18 months of suspension. It was begun in 1999 but was halted because of the Kargil war and the border crises.
- They signed an accord in New Delhi in December 2003 to restart the Samjhauta Express services from 15 January 2004. Despite the bomb blasts in 2007, it has continued to run since.
- The air links between them were restored on 1 January 2004 after remaining suspended for two years, with a PIA flight carrying passengers from Lahore to New Delhi.
- They resumed freight and passenger train service between Attari and Lahore in 2004.
- The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) signed a MoU in New Delhi on 25 February 2004 to strengthen technological, trade and industrial cooperation (Mirza 2009: 676).
- During a three-day-discussion, J. S. Gill, the BSF Inspector General, and his Pakistani counterpart Major General Hussein Mehadi in Lahore on 25 to 27 March 2004 signed a concord to restrain drug trafficking, cross border smuggling and illegal immigration. In the midyear 2004, they agreed to identify the problems regarding anti-drug trafficking measures (ibid: 680). This was an important step to ameliorate and enhance the bilateral cooperation, because these ailments add to the tensions between the two neighbours. On 22 March 2006, they agreed to form
a Joint Study Group (JSG) to ensure quick intelligence cooperation to fight mutually against illegal immigration, counterfeit currency, and human trafficking.

- The Foreign Secretaries meeting was held on 19-20 June 2004 in which they agreed to generate more CBMs including hot line talks at the respective ministerial level.

- On 24 September 2004, Pervez Musharraf and Manmohan Singh met in New York. They issued a joint statement which reiterated their pledge to continue their mutual talks to re-establish their cooperation in the spirit of the statement signed by Vajpayee and Musharraf in Islamabad on 6 January 2004. They also recognised Kashmir as an issue and agreed to seek suitable options for peaceful resolution of the issue in a sincere spirit, “purposeful and forward looking manner” (Mirza 2009: 701; Cheema 2006: 222). They also agreed to implement all categories of CBMs under their discussion to keep in mind the practical possibilities.

- The Joint Business Council and Joint Economic Commission were reactivated in 2004 to endorse good commercial activity as well as better environment to forward the peace process. The JSG was set up in August 2006 to discuss trade and economic issues. The JSG constituted two sub-groups to study issues concerning:
  (a) Non-tariff barriers
  (b) Custom, cooperation and trade facilities.

  The foremost purpose of these commissions is to increase trade rapidly.

- On 7 April 2005, they agreed to commence a bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad. This was jointly announced in Islamabad by External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri on 16 February 2005.

- The meeting between Pervez Musharraf and Manmohan Singh in New Delhi on 17 April 2005 agreed to enhance people-to-people contact across the LoC and assured to work towards finalising various CBMs to develop their relationship. The dialogues were held in an amiable and constructive environment. Their mutual statement issued on 18 April stated 17 points out of which one refers to
the Kashmir dispute (Baruh 2005: 1). They also agreed to restore JBC to improve economic ties.

- Pervez Musharraf and Manmohan Singh expressed their commitment in a joint statement on 16 September 2005 in New York to resolve all concerns including the problem of Kashmir in a sincere and resolute manner. They agreed to continue CBMs process and put the peace process forward without any obstructions (Khare 2005: 1).

- An agreement was signed after the two days technical discussion between the officials of the two states in Delhi on 28 September 2005 regarding the bus service. They also issued a joint statement to begin the Lahore-Amritsar bus service from November 2005.

5.5.1 Nuclear/Missile Management: The External Affairs Ministers Khurshid Kasuri and Natwar Singh signed an agreement in Islamabad on 3 October 2005. They agreed to provide advance or pre-notification at least 72 hours before any ballistic missile tests within a 40km radius of LoC and the International Boundary. They adopted a mechanism of MoU to diminish the threats of unauthorised or unintentional use of nuclear arms and with the major goal of fostering an environment conducive for peace, stability, and security in the region. The establishment of MoU for communication links between the Indian Coast Guards (ICG) and the Pakistani Maritime Security Agency (MSA). The link was established to provide earlier information on fishermen who got lost into each other’s territorial waters or land by mistake or unconsciously (Reddy 2005).

5.5.2 Disaster Management: The Pakistani government accepted the humanitarian aid like food, tents, medicine and other resources from India after the earthquake hit in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) on 8 October 2005. Later, foreign ministers met and discussed new and existing Kashmir-specific CBMs. They also agreed to open the LoC at five places for trade, meetings between divided families and cultural interactions. These points were opened and comprehensively utilised for transporting earthquake relief materials. These points included:

1. Rawalakot-Poonch on 5 November 2005;
2. Chakothi-Uri on 9 November 2005;
3. Nauseri-Tithwal on 10 November 2005;
4. Tattapani-Mendhar on 15 November 2005;

- The first Lahore-Amritsar bus service started on 20 January 2006. The route was connected through a surface transport system for the first time since the partition in 1947.
- On 1 February 2006, they signed an agreement for the commencement of the Khokhrapar-Monabao rail route linking Rajasthan with Sindh from 18 February 2006. After 40 years, the train service was resumed between the two countries.
- Fibre optic link between Amritsar and Lahore became operational on 27 February 2006. The link was useful for transmitting information regarding security.
- India and Pakistan have resumed night bus service from border areas of Ferozepur and Fazilka to Ludhiana-Chandigarh in Punjab on 7 March 2006.
- The official level negotiations between these two states held in New Delhi on 8 March 2006 decided to enhance their relationship by expanding the existing airline services.
- The first bus service between Amritsar and Nankana Sahib was formally launched on 24 March 2006. This was another step to improve the relations between them.
- At the end of two days talk on intra-Kashmir trade in New Delhi on 3 May 2005, the officials reached an agreement to initiate trade links in order to ease trade and commerce relations across the LoC. They also agreed to initiate truck service for trade between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad in July and to revive bus service from Poonch in Jammu region and Rawalakot in Pakistan from 19 June 2005 (Mirza 2009: 763).

5.5.3 India-Pakistan Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism: Pervez Musharraf and Manmohan Singh met in Havana, Cuba, meeting on the sidelines of the 14th NAM Summit on 16 September 2006, agreed to revive the peace process. They agreed to set up an institution of Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism (JATM) to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigation and agreed to resume foreign secretary level talks soon. The agreement is also known as the Havana Declaration.
The first meeting of JATM was held in Islamabad on 6 and 7 March 2007. This meeting defined the agenda of the measures and agreed on “specific information to be exchanged for helping investigations on either side related to terrorist acts and prevention of violence and terror acts in the two countries” (Anant 2011: 273). It was also agreed that while the JATM “would meet on quarterly basis, any information which is required to be provided on priority basis would be immediately conveyed to the respective heads of the mechanism” (Misra 2007: 516-517; Fayyaz 2009: 1). Other meetings of JATM were held on 22 October 2007 and in Islamabad on 28 June 2008. Both states exchanged fresh information about terrorist attacks, including the 2007 Samjhauta Express bombings. The joint statements of all the three meetings reiterated the indispensable need to tackle terrorist elements, although no tangible resolution of any terrorist attacks was recorded. Notably, this mechanism failed to prevent attacks in Mumbai in 2008.

5.5.4 New Protocol on Shipping: On 14 December 2006, these two countries signed a shipping protocol replacing the old protocol which was signed in 1975. The agreement restored the direct shipping links between the two neighbours after a lapse of 35 years. The 1975 protocol did not allow shipping companies of both states “to pick up transshipment cargoes for a third country party”. The new agreement permits lifting of third country cargo by the Pakistani and the Indian vessels from each other’s ports. The protocol also lifted the “restriction that the cargo destined for the other country can be carried only by an Indian or a Pakistani vessel” (Alam 2010: 56-57). The aim for the agreement was to improve the links, means for achieving a stability and confidence between them. While these protocols did not prevent the daily capture of fishermen on either side, while, these protocols have been used when the two governments decided to free the fishermen and other prisoners’.

5.5.5 Agreement on Nuclear Related Confidence Building Measures: On 19 October 2007, the negotiations were held on nuclear and missile related CBMs. The

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23 The 1975 agreement was related to the resumption of shipping services between the two countries. But it had restricted Indian and Pakistani vessels from loading or dumping cargo of third countries from each other’s ports.
officials agreed to review the implementation of existing nuclear CBMs to boost confidence and improve their relationship. They agreed to continue with them to keep away from anxiety, mistrust and any skirmishes. The officials also discussed the concerns related to disarmament and non-nuclear proliferation.

5.5.6 Agreement on Military Related Institutions: On 4 February 2008, a major accord was signed between the Pakistani state run Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) and the India’s military funded Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). The aim of the agreement was to exchange the information to build understanding about the requirements of stability, peace, and security.

- On 21 May 2008, the then India’s External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and the Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi met in Islamabad and expressed their dedication to take peace process forward and agreed to resolve all issues including Kashmir. They also agreed to enhance trade and economic development for the purpose of economic prosperity of the two countries. They signed a concord to provide consular access to prisoners in each other’s jails (Mirza 2009: 803).

- The Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met on the sidelines of the 63rd United Nations General Assembly session on 25 September 2008. They agreed to work jointly on their shared goals of prosperity, security and peace and to combat the factors that derail the peace process. They also had the same opinion that trade would commence in the next month through the Poonch-Rawalakot and Srinagar-Muzaffarabad across the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir.

They also agreed to open the Wagha-Attari road route and Khokhrapar-Monabao rail route to increase and promote all permissible two-sided trade between them. On 2 October 2008, the Pawan Kotwal Bridge, in Uri sector, was opened for trade across LoC after sixty years. It ensures that the route would help to strength confidence between these two countries and increase people-to-people contact, especially between separated Kashmiris.
5.6 Agreements the After 2008 Mumbai Terror Attacks

On 26 November 2008, the terrorist incidents in Mumbai ruined the peace process between these two countries. Since 2004, the peace process had acquired a degree of stability and continuity and through these the two countries signed agreements. But the whole process was derailed after the terrorists’ attacks in Mumbai in 2008. In its aftermath, India suspended all the secretary levels talks on Siachen, Sir Creek and trade. Despite their grim relationship, the leaders of the two countries met on various occasions and explored ways to further boost confidence building along the LoC to resolve the decades-old concerns that continue to be a source of friction between the two neighbours. After the Mumbai incidents, the important agreements signed between them included:

- After the Mumbai terrorist attacks, the two Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Yousaf Raza Gillani, met on the sidelines of the 15th NAM Summit in Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt, on 16 July 2009 and issued a joint statement in which they agreed for the recommencement of dialogue process and de-link action on terrorism from dialogue. They also agreed that terrorism is the major menace to both states. They stated the need to carry forward the dialogue process.

- On 6 February 2011, the then Foreign Secretaries of both states, Salman Bashir and Nirupama Rao, met in Thimphu, Bhutan, and decided to carry forward the obstructed peace process. They also agreed to implement some CBMs to strengthen their relationship that could build trust between them (Kaul 2011: 1).

- The Prime Ministers of the two countries, Manmohan Singh and Yousaf Raza Gillani, met during the semi-final of the cricket world cup on 30 March 2011 and used cricket diplomacy to revive the dialogue process. It was a positive move to improve the strained relations. The result of their meeting was in the form of new beginning of peace dialogues between them. They discussed how the bilateral relationship could take out of the trust deficit. It was agreed that stable, normal and harmonious relations between them were in the interest of both state and the entire region. On 18 July 2012, the then Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari argued that the recommencement of cricketing relations with India as a substantial CBM and away forward to promoting people-to-people links.
On 27 July 2011, the Foreign Ministers of these two states met in New Delhi and agreed to develop additional CBMs related to cross-border trade, people-to-people contact, and terrorism to promote friendly links and reduce their animosity (Dikshit 2011: 1).

These two countries announced normalisation of bilateral trade on 29 September 2011 when India invited the Pakistani Finance Minister to visit India. After 35 years, a Pakistani Finance Minister visited India. They came to a decision of normalisation of trade process, which was hampered by terrorist attacks in Mumbai. They agreed to dismantling of non-tariff barriers and implementation of commitment under the SAARC agreement on SAFTA (Mahmood 2013: 24).

The Prime Ministers of these two countries, Manmohan Singh and Gillani, met on the sidelines of the 17th SAARC Summit in Addu City, Maldives, on 10 November 2011. They announced trade-related CBMs to facilitate trade and travel across the LOC to improve strained bilateral relationship. They also agreed to liberalise the visa regime.

5.6.1 Track II Diplomacy: On 23 to 26 February 2012, a group of senior opinion-makers from India and Pakistan met in Bangkok to improve their relationship. The meeting was included retired ambassadors, intelligence chiefs, bureaucrats, foreign secretaries, army chiefs, academicians, and strategic policy analysts.

The main emphasis of Track II diplomacy was to exchange ideas, proposals and suggestions with each other. There were a number of concerns discussed in the Bangkok meeting including the existing CBMs and their status. Their discussion mainly focused on two important issues, Sir Creek and Siachen Glacier. It was also agreed in Bangkok that beyond crisis management, a CBM should be agreed whereby both sides, including their respective military establishments, should frequently meet to converse about their respective doctrines and concepts with a view to elaborate mechanisms to construct assurance in the nuclear and conventional grounds. They agreed that an interlocking CBM should be developed for the following purposes:
a. To avoid military activities which could be interpreted as planning for an offense, and follow the existing CBM, which would be helpful at the time of crisis;
b. Requirement of a political assurance that the officials and diplomats of both sides would come collectively at the beginning of the crisis for negotiations on ways to resolve the issue;
c. Negotiations should begin on new CBMs relevant to the conditions.

The other suggestions which the group made regarding terrorism includes restoration of an effectual JATM at a higher level; greater maritime collaboration on terror at sea; hotlines between the interior ministries on terror issues; and exchanges of views between the immigration, border services and customs authorities (The Dawn 2012).

- On 8 April 2012, the former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari met in New Delhi and agreed to continue with step-by-step approach to resolve issues including Kashmir. They reaffirmed the need to carry forward the dialogue process.

- The Interior Minister of Pakistan Rehman Malik and India’s Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna signed an agreement in Islamabad on 8 September 2012 about the new visa regime in order to ameliorate the bilateral relationship and CBMs related to promoting people-to-people contact. They replaced the 38 years old visa agreement which was signed in 1974 (Joshua 2012: 1).

The Home Minister of India, Sushil Kumar Shinde and his Pakistani counterpart Rehman Malik, signed a new visa agreement at Delhi on 14 December 2012. The purpose of the agreement was to make the cross-border travel easier on both sides and re-build their relationship. As a result of this agreement, travellers can visit five places instead of three. They also discussed some issues like counter-terrorism, India’s fake currency problem, management of border, and coordination among investigation agencies.
In September 2013, the former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif met in New York and agreed to end the tension in Kashmir. This was the first face-to-face dialogue between them since the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was elected in May. They also agreed to put the peace talks forward. Shiv Shankar Menon, the former National Security Adviser of India, has declared that the meeting was “useful and constructive”. He further argued that “They were both agreed that the pre-conditions for forward movement in the relationship which they both desire is an improvement of the situation on the Line of Control where there have been repeated cease-fire violations” (*The Dawn*, 29 September 2013: 1).

On 12 February 2014, both states agreed to release some trucks seized in their respective boundaries. So, that ended a three week stalemate between them.

On 25 May 2014, Islamabad freed 151 Indian fisher men from its custodies. This was a goodwill gesture ahead of Narendra Modi swearing-in ceremony. Both the prime ministers met and agreed to initiate new period of bilateral ties. Although their relations have worsened since 2014.

The persistent attacks on the Indian soil derailed their peace process and a new beginning. On 18 September 2016, a group of four well-armed terrorists launched an assault on the Indian military brigade headquarters in Uri, near the LoC, which led to the death of eighteen Indian soldiers. This was considered the worst attack on an army installation in Kashmir since the last two decades. These attacks were seen as a direct attack on the India-Pakistan peace process. The current border skirmishes have also hindered the progress of dialogue process.

On 27 September 2016, India turned down to attend the 19th SAARC summit which was scheduled to be held in Islamabad in November 2016. The announcement was made by the India’s spokesperson Vikas Swarup which read, “Increasing cross-border terrorist attacks in the region and growing interference in the internal affairs of member states by one country have created an environment that is not conducive to the successful holding of the 19th SAARC summit in Islamabad” (*The Indian Express*, 27 September 2016: 1). Like 2008, the attacks on Uri, Kashmir and Pathankot, Punjab brought both
countries close to war. Their ties have slipped catastrophically to the lowest point. The year 2016 has drastically changed their relations. In October 2016 and again in November 2016, they did expel diplomats from each other’s territories that heightened mutual distrust and recriminations between them. The tensions and hostility persistently remains high till the present day.

These two countries made conflict resolution mechanisms useful after the incident but not during the crisis, like Siachen episode in the 1980s and the Kargil Crisis in 1999. When the crisis erupted during the hijacking of the plane in 1999, the hotline between the two countries did not work. The communication links did not prevent terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008, while the attacks devastated the intact an on-going peace process. After the failed Agra summit and the border crisis in 2001-2002, CBMs were designed to enhance India-Pakistan connectivity and contacts, while mistrust and limited contacts hindered CBMs role to resolve the concerns till date. It took another three years after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks to restore the dialogue process between them. The two states have met several times to discuss cooperative efforts in trade, economic collaboration and security. The process of CBMs would be easily disrupted if the political relationship deteriorates. Since last two decades, the political relations between these two countries have made progress but also failed at crucial moments. The CDP is a desirable approach but remains vulnerable to disruptions when efforts are made to find suitable solutions to complex and old problems. The biggest impediment has been the trust deficit and mutual suspicion between the two countries. The next section would discuss how both countries engage with Afghanistan.

5.7 India-Pakistan Engagement in Afghanistan

Is Afghanistan a new arena for the India-Pakistan hostility? This section will try to answer this question. It would also study their major interests in war-ravaged Afghanistan and how Afghanistan navigates their competition to protect and advance its own objectives and interests. Regional political enmities continue to exacerbate the security situation and heighten tensions. The regional dynamics of Afghan conflict and politic can’t be entirely comprehended without a study of India-Pakistan’s role there. India and Pakistan have historical claims and significant influence and engagement in the war-
ravaged Afghanistan. So, their rivalry for influence and power in Afghanistan is not a new or recent phenomenon. It is as old as the partition of the subcontinent. Since then, they are grappling their influence and both have deep strategic interests there. Both have undertaken diverse activities there.

Afghanistan sits astride the principal geostrategic fault lines of Central Asia and Northern South Asia; it clutched the key to the region’s stability, harmony and peace. The country is already caught up in a power struggle involving China, Russia, the CARs, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. But the most significant competition is that between New Delhi and Islamabad. Both countries perceive Kabul to be their extended hinterland. It has been argued that a stable and a peaceful Afghanistan would significantly diminish the menaces of terrorist activities and extremist violence destabilising the region. Regional dynamics were distorted by the USA occupation of Afghanistan in 2001.

5.7.1 India’s Afghanistan Perception

Afghanistan shares tense ties with Pakistan whereas it has a strategic partnership with India. Historically, India has enjoyed a cordial relationship with every Afghan government except the Taliban regime. India’s geographical distance from Afghanistan in 1947 presents a major geopolitical dilemma. There were concerns that physical barriers and vested interests would render New Delhi’s presence very difficult. However, they have signed a Peace and Friendship treaty in 1951 to institutionalise its historical relations. After the Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan, India has recognised the Burhanuddin Rabbani government in Afghanistan. India was opposed the role played by the USA, Pakistan, and the UAE, who were used radical Islam as a tool against the Soviet Union-backed Afghan government, because of the broad implications such a policy for the entire region.

During the early 1990s, it has continuously supported the government despite the fact that the Taliban controlled 90 per cent of Afghanistan. It has supported and encouraged the Northern Alliance to check the Taliban’s advance. Subsequently, New Delhi has always diplomatic presence in Afghanistan and has maintained its consulates in Heart, Kandahar, Mazar-e- Sharif, Jalalabad except for the brief period between 1996 and
2001 when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan. Their relationship worsened the Taliban regime. The era after 2001 India has maintained close ties with Afghanistan.

Since 2001, New Delhi has adopted a policy of high-level engagement with Kabul characterised by political, economic ties, infrastructure development, humanitarian, capacity building schemes and other various development activities. It is the largest non-Western donor and has invested in various flagship projects in this war-torn country that includes training of the officer corps of Afghan National Army. India is a leading partner in the on-going reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. It has also reopened its consulates. It has adopted “soft power” approach of “reviving the traditional role of Afghanistan as a land bridge, connecting South Asia with Central Asia and West Asia” (Roy and Wagner 2017: 171).

It has been argued that India’s major objectives were met when a broad-based interim government was installed in Afghanistan. However, C. Christine Fair argues that “India’s interests in Afghanistan are not only Pakistan-specific but also, equally, if not more important, tied to India’s desire to be, and to be seen, as an extra-regional power moving towards great power status” (2010: 5-6). Given India’s growing aspirations, the country “is following a multi-pronged strategy in Afghanistan”, and the war-ravaged Afghanistan is a “test case” of its rising power aspirations in the contemporary world (Pant 2010: 2-5).

India’s endeavours were focused towards the installation of a government that could avert its territory from being used for terrorism. As Yadav and Barwa have argued that “By drawing Afghanistan away from its economic and geo-political dependence on Pakistan, India hopes to weaken the resource base of the Taliban” (2011: 116). India competes for geopolitical dominance in the subcontinent. It endeavours to enhance its position and “give it leverage against China and Russia, Pakistan is obsessed by balancing India’s influence” (Wasi and Khandekar 2012: 3). India’s policy towards Afghanistan relies on some important factors. These included: First, to install a government which is not dominated by fundamentalists and extremists like the Taliban; Second, no export of extremism and terrorism from this war-ravaged Afghanistan; Third, emphasis on reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan; Fourth, no outside
interference and no sanctuaries; and, Fifth, to fortify Afghanistan’s police and its national army.

India has wider interests in the region. The major objectives of India in Afghanistan are: First, to curb extremism and terrorism; Second, to support and encourage democratisation and pro-India regime which will restrain the revival of the Taliban and other extremist groups; Third, to attain favourable position in the region to restraint and diminish Pakistan’s influence and interests; Fourth, to build strong economic and strategic relations with the rich energy states of Afghanistan and the CARs. Afghanistan is the vital corridor of India through which it can project and expand its influence well beyond the region; and, Fifth, aspiring to a major power status, New Delhi envisages its endeavors to stabilise this war torn country as a means to “harness international recognition as a global force for peace and progress, seeking external validation for its role as purveyor of regional security” (Norfolk 2011: 4).

The objectives listed aforesaid – stability, security, status, influence - constitute the indispensable conditions for India’s engagement in this country. Both states signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2011 to extend their security. India also pledged to fortify the capabilities of Afghan national security forces. This marked the consolidation of their traditional bonds.

5.7.2 Pakistan’s Afghanistan Perception

Afghanistan and Pakistan haven’t enjoyed cordial and peaceful relations since 1947 despite their geographical proximity. They have shared some serious issues including the Durand Line, Pashtunistan and terrorism. No Afghan regime has ever recognised the legitimacy of the border. Barnett R. Rubin and Abubakar Siddique have argued that “The long history of each state offering sanctuary to the other’s opponents has built bitterness and mistrust between the two neighbors” (2006: 8). Islamabad’s policies towards Afghanistan have sturdily affected its ties with a number of states like Russia, Iran, and India. Although at times it enabled Pakistan to acquire vital partners and benefactors (Weinbaum and Harder 2008). The Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan gave Pakistan an opportunity to intervene directly in Afghanistan and built a strong foothold
there. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan allowed Pakistan to alter Kabul into Islamabad’s ‘strategic depth’ towards India. It also set the base of new ties between them.

When the Taliban regime controlled Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001, it allowed Pakistan to play an influential role in Afghanistan that led to increasing tensions with the USA, India and Iran. The September 2001 terror incidents on the USA gave an opportunity to Pakistan to rethink its Afghan policy. Pakistan did another U-turn policy towards Afghanistan only to regain the USA’s trust and support. It also ended Pakistan’s international diplomatic isolation. It revived the USA-Pakistan partnership.

Most of Pakistan’s objectives in ties with Kabul are viewed through the prism of New Delhi. The major objectives of Pakistan in Afghanistan are: First, to diminish India’s influence and presence in Afghanistan; Second, to counter the demands of separate and independent Pashtunistan; Third, Pakistan perceives Afghanistan as a ‘strategic depth’ against India’s dominance; Fourth, to set up a friendly and pro-Pakistani regime in Afghanistan; Fifth, to use Afghanistan to attract economic and diplomatic assistance of regional and extra-regional countries; and, Sixth, to exploit the rich energy Afghanistan and the CARs.

When India began reopening its consulates in Afghanistan, it bounded apprehensions to Pakistan. The Pakistani officials have expressed “deep” concerns about New Delhi’s actions along “Af-Pak” border. They have started blaming the Indian consulates “of having less to do with humanitarian aid and more to do with India’s top-secret intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing” (Baldauf 2003: 7).

In 2003, the then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf reaffirmed the threats for New Delhi’s intents and argued “India’s motivation in Afghanistan is very clear, nothing further than upsetting Pakistan. Why should they have consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar, what is their interest? There is no interest other than disturbing Pakistan, doing something against Pakistan” (Rashid 2008: 220). The Pakistani official has declared publicly that Islamabad had collected “all required information about the involvement of India in fomenting unrest in North and South Waziristan” (Grare 2006: 12). He further
argued that “the Indian consulates in Southern Afghanistan have been supplying money as well as arms and ammunition to the militants that has added to the trouble and violence in the tribal belt” (ibid). On 26 March 2011, former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has argued that India is still formed the “existential threat” to Pakistan and accused it for Islamabad’s nuclear weapon programme. He also said that “the orientation of 90 per cent of Indian troops is against Pakistan. We cannot ever ignore India, which poses an existential threat to Pakistan” (The Indian Express 2011: 1). In order to secure its own soil and counter and undermine India’s hegemonic nature and its influence in the entire region, Pakistan has established a strong relationship with China and a strategic partnership with the USA. The Pakistani foreign policy adopts the approach of balance-of-power. Thus, the region is still dominated by realistic power politics and is “largely a story of securitizations about military power, weapons, and political status” (Buzan and Waever 200: 124).

5.7.3 India-Pakistan’s Rivalry and its Impact on Afghanistan

With their divergent interests and strategies, India and Pakistan are fighting a “proxy war” in Afghanistan. The proxy war is going on between Afghanistan-India-Pakistan in the region which affects the entire region. Both India and Pakistan are trying to gain much influence and power in Afghanistan to destabilise the other. Sumit Ganguly and Nicholas Howenstein argue that “Indian and Pakistani competition in Afghanistan long precedes the advent of the Hamid Karzai regime” (2009: 127). Afghanistan provides a ground in which both compete economically and politically. As one of the leading scholars on the subject, Ahmed Rashid argues in his book Descent into Chaos, “Kabul had suddenly become the new Kashmir – the new battleground for the India-Pakistan rivalry” (2008: 110).

They have been engaged against each other in this war-torn country and have extended the “New Great Game” in the region. Their long-pending disputes and Pakistan’s apprehension of India’s regional engagement, particularly in Afghanistan, have badly affected the security situation in the region. They have turned Afghanistan into a center stage for enhancing their regional status. As a result, Afghanistan became
another playground for India and Pakistan either to retain their influence or to restrain their rival.

Barring this rivalry, the ethnic division, the competition between extremists and forces of modernisation has also significantly contributed to instability. Their rivalry injects instability in Afghanistan, thereby making the entire region unstable and volatile. These two players have made use of ethnic divides to export their interests in this country, because Afghan state has always been heavily influenced by the identity politics. India has developed a strong patronage ties with the non-Pashtun groups like Tajik, Baloch and Hazara, while Pakistan has always developed a relationship with the Pashtun population and its leaders. Since 2001, India has initiated a new phase of engagement, intended to generate an outcome favorable to its interests. David Miliband, the former British Foreign Secretary, has argued:

Given the scale of the geopolitical challenges in this region – Including the long-running tensions between India and Pakistan and the presence of Iran – It can seem that Afghanistan is fated to remain the victim of a zero-sum scramble for power among hostile neighbours. The logic of this position is that Afghanistan will never achieve peace until the region’s most intractable problems are solved (cited in Ved 2010: 684).

Islamabad’s interests in Afghanistan and its support with the extremist groups including Taliban didn’t end with the demise of the Taliban regime in 2001. Pakistan continues extremely apprehension about India’s growing political and economic presence in Afghanistan. Geopolitical contestation persists to determine Islamabad’s reaction to the growing friendly ties between New Delhi and Kabul. Islamabad perceives Afghanistan as the vital ‘strategic depth’ and having faced “strategic reversal” with the dismissal of the Taliban regime is very anxious to retrieve lost grounds by giving safe-haven to the militant groups including the Taliban and its allies. Islamabad’s problems with New Delhi have so far been marked by mutual suspicion, distrust, and hostility towards each other. For Afghanistan, India’s presence in Afghanistan counterbalances the Pakistan factor. Though attacks on Indian personnel, projects, and facilities have increased between 2001 and present-day.

Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan don’t perceive each other through the prism of bilateral ties but through the triangular perspective. That heavily influences their strategies and policies. They seek to advance highly diverse interests through their
respective engagements with one another. So, their interests are overriding with one another. Geopolitically, it is a struggle for control over South and Central Asia landmass. India’s policies deeply influenced by the security and undermine Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan, while Pakistan’s policy remains always Indian-centric. Meanwhile, Afghanistan uses India-Pakistan cards in a similar way to Afghan leaders balancing the two empires Britain and Russia during the “Great Game”. From the Cold War through present-day, Afghanistan has varied in its policies and proximities to New Delhi and Islamabad (Khalil 2016).

Afghanistan is accepting aid from India while developing and encouraging a security and economic partnership with Pakistan. An example is the speech given by former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, he says “Pakistan is a twin brother, India is a great friend. The agreement that we signed yesterday with our friend will not affect our brother” (The Dawn, 5 October 2011: 1). So, Afghanistan accepts both states to continue garnering support and aid from both players. However, Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have moved towards disarray rather than peaceful and harmonious since 2001. Since being elected Afghanistan’s President in 2014, Ashraf Gani has tried to re-establish amicable relations with Islamabad, but it hasn’t worked out. On the other side, Afghanistan-India relations re-gained its earlier status.

Thus, India-Pakistan’s mutual concerns and distrust have had an aggravating impact on the triangular relationship. It has been argued that the enmity between India and Pakistan impinges on the relations and interests of all the three countries and also restricts opportunities in the region. Shahram Akbarzadeh (2003) has argued that India and Pakistan try to outpace each other along three lines of competition in Central Asia. These are: first, access to gaining “geostrategic advantage point” in relation to Russia and China; Second, hydrocarbon reserves; and, Third, enlisting the support of Muslim Central Asia to their respective positions in Kashmir.

During his visit to China on 15-18 November 2009, the former USA President Barack Obama’s administration underscored the required for improvement in India-Pakistan relationship to achieve the major objectives of peace, stability, and development in the South Asian region. The joint statement states: “They (US and China) support the
efforts of Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight terrorism, maintain domestic stability and achieve sustainable economic and social development, and support the improvement and growth of relations between India and Pakistan” (Dasgupta and Bagchi 2009: 1). The path to trilateral collaboration in Afghanistan lies through Indo-Pak cooperation, greater trust and active engagement in conflict resolution (Hameed 2012).

To sum up this chapter, South Asia is the most volatile region in the world, which contains two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, and a fragmented state, Afghanistan. These are the main states in South Asia. The regional stability and harmony are largely dependent on them. However, they have been in a state of perpetual conflict and tension. India and Pakistan have witnessed highs and lows in bilateral relations since their inception as sovereign states. Since their independence, they have signed agreements on a number of issues including trade and commerce, communication and transportation, demarcation of borders, and minority rights. Also, many bilateral accords of both military and civilian nature, aimed at producing confidence and abatement of tension, fear and animosity have been signed. Major agreements between the two include: the minorities pact (1951), the water sharing treaty (1960), the Tashkent Agreement (1966), the Rann of Kutch (1968), the Simla Accord (1972), and the Establishment of Joint Commission (1982). All of these agreements were products of a war or a crisis except the Joint Commission of 1982 (Cheema 2006: 14). After the Brasstacks Operation and Siachen conflict, India and Pakistan signed various agreements related to military, prevention of attacks on nuclear installations, complete ban on chemical weapons, and non-violation on air space, and Hotline between the Prime Ministers of the two states, CDP, and Havana Declaration in 2006, etc.

They have achieved their limited objectives in India-Pakistan relationship. These include people-to-people contact, cricket diplomacy, educational and cultural exchanges, bus services, humanitarian aid like the agreements on the question of missing prisoners and fishermen. These are important political gestures which put the peace process forward. These were helpful in improving overall relations, but these gestures have not led to big breakthroughs on core issues. It has been said that the beginning of people-to-people links could play a major role in building the much needed domestic support for
stability and peace and dispersing mutual public mistrust and mindset (Baba 2007: 211). It could assist them to move from a condition of mutual antagonism and reduce enmity that could enhance further security and stability in the region. It would also remove the mental barriers erected by the division of the subcontinent. The longer these two countries remain estranged from negotiation on the issues, the more mistrust would be built up and both sides could expect the worst from each other.