CHAPTER - III

SINO - PAK RELATION AND INDIAN SECURITY DILEMMAS

Disenchantment with the West and continued tension with India have been prime factors in giving turns to Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the early Sixties. Along with these facts other influences have also been at work, such a desire for enhanced Security, diversification of Commercial connections and profit; an assessment that the Chinese threat to Indo-Pak subcontinent is remote, increasing domestic political stability permitting a greater degree of independence from Western aid givers, especially the United States in shaping her foreign policy; the general thaw in cold war and the view in Rawalpindi that the United States herself may eventually ease her relations with the Soviet Union.¹

Moreover in the words of Norman D. Palmer "Pakistan was a disgruntled ally, feeling abused and neglected; it believed that its whole security was being jeopardised by a stronger and more militant India supported by Pakistan's own allies".² Such feelings and factors contributed largely in revising Pakistan's foreign policy, giving it greater self-assertion which resulted in the disenchantment with the west and warming up of relations with China.

But certainly it was not in Pakistan's interest to forgo opportunities to establish mutually advantageous relations with a neighbouring great power until the United States thought the time

for such a course of action had arrived. Therefore, it was claimed by Pakistani leadership that it knew already, that there were many circles in the United States itself, urging openings to China, such a cultural exchanges, trade and her admission to the United Nations. The two countries could not remain isolated for ever. On November 1, 1963, in a broadcast to the nation, President Ayub Khan gave his estimate of the winds of change. He said:

Last month, I spoke of normalisation of our relations with China, our great neighbour. There have been criticism and disapproval of it in certain countries. There is now a move for the normalisation of their own relations with China. The New York Times has urged it. The United States President has admitted that there will be no real disarmament, unless China is a party to it. And I see in some American newspapers, that the State department has approved that the Westcoast business will develop trade relations with China. Therefore, the foundation is being laid to normalise relations with China. We are doing just that.(3)

Well-known Pro-West Pakistani politician Mohd Ali Bogra, also became an advocate of new interaction patterns with China. On November 2nd 1962, in his speech to the National Assembly of Pakistan he observed,

I want to assure the House that we shall exploit and explore all possibilities in the economic, commercial and other fields in the best interests of Pakistan that should give clear indication of the positive independent line. We are adopting the criterion what is in the interest of Pakistan, not what fits others. There is no eternal friendship in international relations and there is no eternal enemity. As the situation changes, enemies become friends and friends can become enemies. But the most important and eternal fact is the question of national interest, national safety, national integrity and security and that is of paramount importance. (4)

4. The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 3 November 1962.
For security reasons, a small country like Pakistan obviously has to combine different approaches and has to follow a balanced foreign policy. It should be instructive to recall observations of Ayub Khan at a Rawal Pindi Bar Association meeting on July 16, 1963, that laying in between three very powerful countries the USSR, China and India, we have to make sure that we attain a certain measure of security against the incursions of any of these three countries. Therefore, for Pakistan it was important to pursue bilateral foreign conduct giving equal importance to all the big powers and in this arrangement China was no exception.

The limits within which Pakistan's relations with China have been developing can be fully understood in the light of two factors, which have been influencing the development structurally:

(a) The Chinese felt that Soviet Union and the United States were collaborating to draw a line of containment to isolate her. If Pakistan had joined any such arrangement either with the Soviet Union or with the United States of America, the development of friendly relations would have retarded. Despite of her adherence to western oriented pacts Pakistan convinced the Chinese that she was not in the market for any such deal.

(b) The possibility of India and China coming to an understanding was remote. The Indians have been sending emissaries and using the good offices of third countries to

explore the possibilities of rapprochement with China.

In this context Pakistan did not foresee the restoration of "Bhai, Bhai" situation between India and China in the near future for several reasons:

(I) Pakistan conceived that the Chinese could not trust the Indians in a hurry, as India had joined a mutual friendship and cooperation treaty with Russia and which has military stipulations in case of war with either of the signatories.

(II) Pakistan often felt that India and China would always remain at distance because they were competitively advancing themselves for the leadership of Asia. Particularly because of India's victory in Bangladesh crisis and soon after that the explosion of a nuclear device, at po hran, it was suggested that India would try further vigorously to influence the small states of Asia and particularly of Southern Asia, which could provoke bitter differences between China and India.\(^6\) Pakistan's perception about India was that, she would never offer any real challenge to China, because they felt that India had a slower pace of economic development, "population explosion", less mechanized armament industry, multifarious socio-economic problems, and absence of national cohesion. In a relatively straightforward comment on India, President Ayub Khan said:

> Far from playing a leading role in the affairs of the world, she (India) will always be dependent on some major power, even for her survival. The Indians realize the limitations of their social, economic and political

\(^6\) Rasul Bux Rais, China and Pakistan: A Political Analysis of Mutual Relations (Lahore, 1978), pp. 36-38.
structure and what can happen in a break down of the structure due to growing frustration within the Indian Society. (7)

From the above mentioned Pakistani views it becomes quite clear that anti-Indian feelings, and unfriendly relations between China and India due to the border conflict have been a major source of encouragement for Pakistan to develop her relations with China. According to veteran politician of Pakistan Main Mumtaz Dualtana:

...the situation of the China-India dispute ultimately gave a radical turn to Pakistan's Foreign Policy .... The rivalry for Asian domination which both China and India consider to be their manifest destiny, the ethnic and historical ties of the disputed areas with China, the stringent Chinese ideological emphasis on "conflict", rather than "co-existence" as the operative springs of communist dialectics, the austerities of the Chinese internal situation, the reckless wooing of India by the west, point to a deeper alienation. (8)

CHINESE SECURITY POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA

Pakistan came to be cultivated by China mainly for two reasons, in the conduct of its global policies: (1) Pakistan was looked upon as a link to the Middle East and (2) in the regional initiatives, Chinese strategy was to forge closer links with South Asian countries to create a sub-regional balance to counter the Indian pre-eminence in South Asia. The Chinese were able to project two contradictory stands in pursuit of their long-term and short-term policies. It was able to convince its special friends, that despite its potential resources, China would never behave like a superpower and within the regional context it was able to project an image of

a weighty neighbour, particularly in South Asia. And Pakistan has sought precisely the kind of countervailing authority that China had willingly provided. 9

China's choice of external alignments have been largely determined by its national interest. China's foreign policy and security relations have actually and largely hinged on its relations with the two superpowers. When its relations with one or two of them changed, its relations with many other countries varied accordingly.

The onset of 1970s was marked by a new constellation of power which envisaged a change in the geopolitics at the international level and also altered the political complexion of South Asia. The rigid bi-polarity of 1950s and 1960s when international power was dominated by the United States and Soviet Union, had started giving way to a less rigid, but also less stable political order. Following the admission of the People's Republic of China (PRC) into the United Nations in 1971, had changed the international political pattern from a bi-polar to tri-polar. 10 According to Seyom Brown, the cold war coalitions which were "the dominant ordering structures of international relations in the quarter century following the Second World War had gradually weakened and by the beginning of 1970 became much significant". 11 The resultant impact was that the old alignments and antagonisms had started shifting grounds and

structures premised on them had started crumbling as well.\textsuperscript{12} By 1970 the global politics had become one "of superpowers, blocs and peripheries...a loose bi-polar world".\textsuperscript{13} Thus the politically complex and fluid world of the 1970s had become a "multi-polar one" with the possibility of becoming an evolving polyarchy -- a place without a dominant structure of co-operation and conflict, "in which nation states, sub-national groups and transnational special interests and communities would also be vying for the support and loyalty of individuals and conflicts would have to be resolved primarily on the basis of \textit{ad hoc} bargaining in a shifting context of power relationship".\textsuperscript{14}

This period also envisaged a détente between Washington and Moscow on the one hand leading to negotiations for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and Sino-US rapprochement on the other. These new alignments had their impact felt on the geopolitics of South Asia as well. Pakistan played a significant role in Sino-US rapprochement and in return it reaped good dividends from Beijing as well as Washington. During 1970s Pakistan was drawn closer to China.

\textbf{CHINA'S POSTURE DURING EMERGENCE OF BANGLADESH}

The people of Bangladesh were successful in securing their independence on December 16, 1971 which was not a sudden development but had a long history of economic, linguistic, political,

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, p.11.
\textsuperscript{14} Brown, n.11, p.186.
regional exploitation and denial of constitutional rights. Following the partition of Indian subcontinent Pakistan emerged as a sovereign and independent country comprising East Pakistan having borders with Assam, Tripura and West Bengal provinces of India and West Pakistan having borders with Punjab, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Jammu-Kashmir province of India. Thus Islamabad had no direct land or aerial access to its Eastern Wing but through India.

From the very beginning, the political and administrative leadership had virtually remained in the hands of West Pakistan which rendered "East Pakistan" being subjected to the "bizarre" experiments of the political adventurists. The people of East Pakistan had to play the role of loyal and subordinate colony of West Pakistan in the name of Islam. Consequently, political denial of equal rights, economic exploitation, racial chauvinism and linguistic fanaticism of Eastern Wing by the Punjabi dominated Western Wing not only made the fusion difficult but also impossible in the foreseeable future. The factors that caused frustration among the people of Eastern Wing of Pakistan were of political, economic and cultural nature but by the end of 1960s economic factors had become more predominant. West Pakistan, with about 45 per cent of country's total population, received 77 per cent of total development expenditure, while East Pakistan with about 55 per cent of population received a bare 23 per cent. West Pakistan's total


foreign exchange earnings were 41 per cent but it was allocated 70 per cent of these earnings. On the contrary, East Pakistan contributed 59 per cent and received only 30 per cent. Thus the people of East Pakistan were reeling under the burden of economic miseries. In East Pakistan the intellectuals, the students, the workers and the grief stricken peasants had become conscious of the great injustice meted out them. The students organised at a large scale and started protesting against the existing regime. The students of Dhaka University, in fact moved ahead of their political leaders and projected the national flag of Bangladesh in February 1970.

President Yahya Khan decided to settle the socio-economic, political and constitutional problems of the country by establishing a constitutional government. As an important step towards the achievement of this goal, he decided to hold general elections in the country on the basis of "one man one vote" and to this effect a legal framework order (LFO) was promulgated on 30 March 1970.

While the political parties had become active in the wake of general elections to be held in December 1970, some political parties accused China of meddling into the internal affairs of Pakistan at that stage. Such an accusation was resented by China and consequently the Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad lodged a strong protest with Pakistan Government. In October 1970, the

17. Ibid, p.38.
Chinese Embassy in Pakistan in a statement denied the charge of Chinese interference in the Pakistan. The statement further added that Beijing was unnecessarily being dragged "by some elements into the internal affairs of Pakistan.... We would like to make it categorically clear that we have no interest in the internal politics of Pakistan".  

Elections were held in December 1970, and Awami League Party of East Pakistan led by Shiekh Mujibur Rahman captured 167 out of 169 seats in East Pakistan thus registering a clean sweep. Thus in the 313 - member National Assembly of Pakistan, the Awami League attained an absolute majority.

The Awami League Party had contested elections on six-point programme which envisaged autonomy for East Pakistan. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) led by Z.A. Bhutto emerged as the second largest party in the National Assembly. It won 85 seats out of 144 allotted to West Pakistan.

The outcome of the elections was contrary to the expectations

22. Ibid.
of the military regime in Islamabad. In January 1971, Yahya Khan held talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and described him as "the future Prime Minister of Pakistan".\(^{25}\) Political parties of West Pakistan especially the powerful PPP led by Z.A. Bhutto was opposed to granting autonomy to East Pakistan and wanted to share power with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on the basis of equality. This was not acceptable to Mujibur Rahman. A political settlement was necessitated by the circumstances in the wake of the intransigence of Bhutto and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. After persistent demand of Awami League, Yahya Khan decided to have a session of the National Assembly from 3 March 1971. On 1 March 1971, Bhutto proposed Yahya Khan to postpone the Assembly's session which was scheduled to begin on 3 March 1971 and also warned him of grim consequences, if he did not oblige. Under mounting pressure Yahya Khan accepted his proposal instantically.\(^{26}\)

Consequently, President Yahya Khan postponed the proposed National Assembly session, and removed the Bengali Governor of East Pakistan and promulgated Martial Law in that province.\(^{27}\) The Awami League strongly reacted to this move and launched a non-cooperation movement in East Pakistan. It organised itself on the lines of a parallel government in East Pakistan. As a result complete chaos followed. Strikes were observed throughout the East Pakistan. In order to control the situation President Yahya Khan appointed Lt. General Tikka Khan as a Governor of East Pakistan. At a Press

\(^{25}\) P.K. Sharma, China and the Contemporary World (Delhi, 1972), p.156.

\(^{26}\) Dawn (Karachi), 2 March 1971.

\(^{27}\) Naik, n.16, p.14.
conference Sheikh Mujibur Rahman announced that a complete hartal would be observed in Dacca on 2 March 1971 and another hartal would be observed all over the province on 3 March 1971. On 26 March 1971, a broadcast over "Voice of Independent Bangladesh" declared that, "The Sheikh Mujibur Rahman has declared the 75 million people of East Pakistan as citizens of sovereign Independent Bangladesh". The refusal of Yahya regime to transfer power to the elected representatives of the people compelled the people in East Bengal to launch the freedom struggle in East Bengal which took violent form following the arrest of most of top leaders of Awami League. The Martial Law Administrator in East Pakistan, Lt. General Tikka Khan, issued a series of Martial Law orders to crush the "freedom movement". With the arrest of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the course of history took a different turn, as possibilities of reconciliation between the army rulers and Awami Leaders ended. The Pakistani troops resorted to wanton destruction of life and property in East Bengal to crush the freedom movement. Lakhs of people in East Pakistan were butchered ruthlessly by the West Pakistani troops.

The heavy influx of refugees into India and proclamation of "an independent and sovereign Republic of Bangladesh" by the powerful Awami League and formation of parallel government internationalized the issue whereby the outside power had to take stand depending upon their perceptual proclivities and dictates of national interests. However Beijing had so far been maintaining studied silence over the developments in East Pakistan perhaps owing

28. The Times of India (New Delhi), 27 March 1971.
to the apprehension of being accused of interfering into the internal affairs of Pakistan. G.W. Choudhury, a Pakistani scholar, who accompanied Yahya Khan during his visit to China in November 1970 has claimed that the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had asked Yahya Khan to find out a rational solution for defusing the crisis. The author has further claimed that after the elections were over, Premier Zhou Enlai sent letters to both Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Z.A. Bhutto urging them to reach an amicable settlement but none of the two took Zhou Enlai's advice seriously. Thus at this stage Beijing favoured unity among the leaders of Pakistan.

During March 1971, the developments in East Pakistan took serious turn especially when Pakistani troops started a crackdown on 25 March 1971. The repressive measures adhered to by the Yahya regime attracted worldwide condemnation. However China remained silent until 4 April 1971 when Radio Beijing and the official New China News Agency (NCNA) reported that Pakistani troops had moved into East Pakistan. The NCNA also quoted President Yahya Khan having lodged protest against an alleged Indian interference in Pakistan's domestic affairs. Beijing also sent a protest note to the Indian Government on 29 March 1971 charging India with a "flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan". The news coverage by the Chinese media about the developments in East Pakistan was without any comment and Beijing regarded the affair being an internal

30. Ibid, p.211.
affair of Pakistan.  

As already described, the military crackdown in East Pakistan had invited international criticism of Yahya regime. On 2 April 1971, the Soviet President Podgorny in a letter to President Yahya Khan urged the latter to take urgent measures to prevent the bloodshed and repression against the innocent people in East Pakistan and to adopt peaceful means in defusing the crisis. However President Yahya Khan instead of caring for Soviet advice, replied back justifying his policy in East Pakistan and rather urged the Soviet President to use his influence with India to "prevent her from meddling in Pakistan's internal affairs".

In the wake of this development, Beijing seized the opportunity to launch a veiled attack on Moscow and New Delhi to win the sympathy of Islamabad. An article published in the People's Daily on 11 April 1971 justified the action of West Pakistan's military crackdown in East Pakistan as appropriate measures undertaken by President Yahya Khan and charged India for making "inflammatory" statements over the situation inside Pakistan. The article while accusing India of plotting for international intervention "in league with the two super powers" against Pakistan, reiterated Chinese support to Islamabad. On 12 April 1971, Premier Zhou Enlai in a letter addressed to President Yahya Khan while expressing

34. Dawn, n.26, 6 April 1971.
concern over the developments in Pakistan, laid emphasis on the unification of Pakistan. The Chinese Premier further suggested that the "broad masses of the people" should be differentiated from "a handful of persons who want to sabotage the unification of Pakistan". The letter further noted China's concern over the exploitation of internal strife inside Pakistan by India and the two super powers. Zhou Enlai while recognizing Bengali uprising as Pakistan's internal affair which could be settled by the people of Pakistan and brooked no foreign intervention, also reiterated Beijing's support for Pakistan in its "just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence".

The Chinese Premier's letter to Pakistan's President as analysed above, did not receive much coverage in the Chinese media. In early May 1971, a two-member delegation from Pakistan visited Beijing with a view to secure Chinese assistance in case of outbreak of Indo-Pakistan hostilities. The visit of the delegation was deliberately not given much publicity in Pakistan's media. The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai reportedly warned the visiting Pakistani delegation of serious consequences in case the political solution of crisis in Pakistan was not quickly found. China also expressed its "displeasure" over military action in East Pakistan.

Following the Sino-US thaw achieved during the visit of US President Richard Nixon to China in July 1971, the Yahya regime nursed high expectations both from Washington and Beijing in case...

37. Ibid.
of outbreak of armed hostilities between Pakistan and India. On the other hand India was also apprehending threat to its security in the wake of deteriorating situation in East Pakistan which was further accentuated by the growing entente between Washington, Beijing and Islamabad.

The Soviet Union was equally apprehensive of the motives behind the Sino-US rapprochement. In view of the Sino-Soviet schism, Moscow perceived growing Sino-US entente as a danger to the security of small nations particularly in Asia. Thus both India and Soviet Union were alarmed over the Washington-Beijing-Islamabad axis. Consequently, both India and Soviet Union held negotiations to devise means to thwart the sinister designs of both United States and China to create "sphere of influence" around India and Soviet Union.

The resultant impact of these developments was the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between India and the Soviet Union in August 1971. The Indian objective behind signing the treaty was to deter China and the United States to intervene on behalf of Pakistan in an eventuality of war with the latter. Under Article 9 of the said treaty the two countries were to consult each other in an event of a war with the third country.


41. Surendra Kumar, ed., India-USSR, Friends in Peace and Progress (New Delhi, 1982), pp.73-74.
The Indo-Soviet treaty raised the question whether Moscow would help India in facing the East Bengal crisis or in the liberation of Bangladesh. The Government of India asserted that the treaty did not prevent it from helping the people of Bangladesh. Discounting the interpretation that the treaty had restricted India's sovereign right to take such action as it might deem fit in East Pakistan crisis, India's Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh pointed out that "these were our own sovereign rights, and there was nothing in the treaty which restrained India from exercising its sovereign rights in any manner". 42

The Indo-Soviet Treaty was viewed with serious concern by Islamabad. Reports indicate that Z.A. Bhutto held secret meetings with the Chinese diplomats in Karachi during August-September 1971. 43 A report published in Nowa-i-Wagt, a pro-government Urdu paper of West Pakistan indicated that the purpose of these meetings was to prepare a ground for Bhutto's visit to Beijing and Islamabad was also planning to conclude a defence treaty with China. 44 However on 21 August 1971, Pakistan's Foreign Office in Islamabad denied that Pakistan was planning to conclude a defence treaty with China. 45

**Bhutto's Visit to Beijing in November 1971**

In the first week of November 1971, a high-level Pakistan delegation headed by PPP's Chairman, Z.A. Bhutto including Foreign

43. *The Indian Express* (New Delhi), 7 November 1971.
Secretary and three Services Chiefs of Pakistan, went to China. It was widely speculated that the delegation's visit to China was aimed at latter's support for Pakistan's security against India. While commenting on the visit of Pakistani delegation to China, a spokesman of Pakistan's Foreign Ministry said that the chinese might raise the question of India's activity on Pakistan in the UN Security Council "as a possible threat to peace". In a welcome address in honour of the visiting Pakistan delegation, the acting Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Pengfei said: "Our Pakistan friends may rest assured that should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese Government and People will, as always, resolutely support the Pakistan Government in their just struggle to defend their state sovereignty and national independence". This statement makes it clear that China only assured Pakistan of the "moral support" and did not commit itself to hold Indian forces by diversionary action on India's northern borders. In reply to a question after his return from Beijing, Bhutto while ignoring the diversionary action by China as being superficial matter, said: "we are not interested in diversions, we are interested in the heart of the matter. We want peace".

G.W. Choudhury has opined that Bhutto's mission to China was a failure because as regards Beijing's help and cooperation in the case of a war between India and Pakistan, "the Chinese left Bhutto with no doubt that Pakistan had better not expect any such help or intervention as China promised and was serious in implementing during the war of 1965".

47. The Times (London), 8 November 1971.
48. Ibid.
49. Choudhury, n.29, p.182.
During the last week of November 1971, a 12-member Chinese delegation led by Li Shui Ching visited Pakistan. The fact that the Chinese delegation's visit to Lahore, Karachi and Rawalpindi was an indication that Chinese wanted to assess the situation at first hand in different parts of the country. In his statement Li Shui Ching repeated everything which had been said by the Chinese leaders earlier and did not say anything new. But the visit of the Chinese delegation was to have the effect in assuring the Pakistani populace and instilling some confidence in the morale of army and the people of Pakistan, the visit of the Chinese delegation showed that at the time of crisis in the Indian subcontinent Pakistan had a greater stake in its friendship with China. 50

**China and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971**

The Chinese support to Pakistan and denunciation of Indo-Soviet "collusion" became more pronounced during the outbreak of Indo-Pak hostilities. This was apparent from the speeches of the Chinese representative made in the United Nations. While extending support to Pakistan, China consistently emphasized the principles to which it adhered on the Indo-Pakistan conflict in the debates held in the Security Council and the General Assembly.

China not only supported Pakistan's "hegemony" over East Pakistan in official meetings of the two countries but also

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enthusiastically raised the issue in the United Nations. Fu Hao, the Chinese delegate in the United Nations asserted on 19 November 1971 that East Pakistan's question was an internal affair of Pakistan which would be settled only by the people of Pakistan themselves and no country had the right to interfere in it under any pretext. 51 The Chinese delegate further added that the so-called question of refugees from East Pakistan came into being and developed to "the present state due to a certain country's intervention in Pakistan's internal affairs". 52 This reference to a certain country was directed against India.

President Yahya Khan declared a state of emergency on 25 November 1971 and said that Indian armed forces "launched a large scale offensive" in the Jessore sector and other places in East Pakistan. This news was reported by the NCNA under the title, "Indian Armed Forces invade East Pakistan - President Yahya Khan declared a state of emergency". This report merely repeated what had been claimed by Associated Press of Pakistan. 53

According to another report given by the NCNA, the Pakistan Ambassador in Peking, K.M. Kaiser had a "cordial and friendly" meeting with Premier Zhou Enlai on 24 November 1971, when he presented a letter to Premier Zhou Enlai from Yahya Khan. The letter expressed "concern over India's military provocation along the East

52. Ibid.
Pakistan border in the previous few days. 54

On 26 November 1971, Chiao Kuan Hua, Vice Foreign Minister of China declared in the United Nations, that China would support Pakistan in latter's just struggle against foreign aggression. He criticized the Indo-Soviet Treaty and denounced the USSR for encouraging India to launch an armed aggression against Pakistan. 55

Speaking at a reception given in Beijing on 24 November 1971, by the Albanian Ambassador, the Chinese Vice-Premier Li Hsien-Hien said that India supported and encouraged by Soviet Union, had been carrying out "subversive activities and military provocations" against East Pakistan leading to the aggravation of tension in the region. 56 He said that Chinese Government and people were greatly concerned over the present Indo-Pakistan conflict and wanted two sides to settle the matter through consultations and negotiations and not by resorting to force. He reiterated that Chinese Government and people resolutely supported the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle against foreign aggression and in defence of their state sovereignty and national independence. 57 He further opined that in order to ease the present tension, "serious considerations should be given to President Yahya Khan's reasonable proposal for the armed forces of India and Pakistan to withdraw respectively from the border and disengage". 58

54. Peking Review, 3 December 1971, p.5
55. Ibid.
57. Ibid, p.188.
It was reported by Radio Tokyo that China had resumed airlifting of arms supplies to Pakistan. A commentary in People's Daily entitled "Indian Ambition to Annex East Pakistan" of 3 December 1971, had this to say about the situation in the subcontinent.

The Indian Government, backed and abetted by social imperialism, is plotting to create a "Bangladesh" in East Pakistan in an attempt to divide Pakistan and realise its expansionist ambitions to annex East Pakistan. In fact, the so-called "Bangladesh" is entirely a sinister means of the Indian Government to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan, to divide and subvert Pakistan. The Chinese People are quite familiar with such Indian Government insidious tricks as creating "Bangladesh"... It was precisely the Indian Government which engineered a rebellion in China's Tibet region... created the so-called "Tibetan refugee" issue and energetically antagonised China.(60)

When the Indo-Pakistan conflict took the shape of a fulfledged war from 3 December 1971, Beijing wholeheartedly supported Pakistan without caring for the effects on its relations with India and the emerging Bangladesh. According to J.P. Jain, the following four reasons weighed with China's strategists while supporting Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis.

Firstly, any success for India in solving the problem of Bangladesh to its satisfaction could be regarded as a victory for the Indo-Soviet treaty that would have enhanced the Soviet image and influence in the region thus undermining the Chinese stakes.61

Secondly, despite a friendly posture by India, which could

59. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 5 December 1971.
60. Xinhua News Agency (Beijing), 3 December 1971.
61. Jain, n.50, pp. 179 ff.
be regarded as the outcome of tactical considerations on the part of New Delhi in the context of explosive and seriousness of Bangladesh problem, the fundamental contradiction and competition between China and India persisted. Thus any increase in India's prestige and strength resulting from Islamabad's defeat was not regarded by Beijing as conducive for its interests.62

Besides Pakistan was also vital as an outlet for Chinese goods to Indian Ocean region.

Lastly, Pakistan was a vital link in Beijing's strategy towards the Arab and Muslim world with which Islamabad had cordial relations.63

There is no denying the fact that the Indo-Soviet treaty played a decisive role in hardening the Chinese attitude towards India and bringing China closer to Pakistan. With the flow of Russian arms to Delhi, in pursuance of the treaty, Chinese moral and martial help to Pakistan also became more pronounced and active. Other reasons for China's opposition to "Bangladesh" were its apprehensions that its creation as an independent state near its border under Soviet influence, would weaken its security on its Western and Southern frontiers.

Not content with verbal declaration, China also made certain military related moves. Undoubtedly the alertness of the Chinese

63. Ibid, p.203.
troops in Tibet, and passing the weather data from locations in Tibet and along the Sino-Indian border, and the assurance to Pakistan as revealed by President Yahya Khan that, within 72 hours they would move towards the border, created concern in India, as was apparent from the statements of its leaders. Observers differ, however, about the moves in Chinese decision-making during the Indo-Pak crisis.

**Chinese Support for Pakistan**

China played a key role in voicing concern and espousing the cause of Pakistan in the United Nations. China was the only country to vote against the Soviet draft resolution. On 4 December 1971, China's acting Foreign Minister, Chi-Peng Fei strongly condemned India for its "intensified subversion and aggression" against Pakistan and stated that his government firmly stood by President Yahya Khan's policy. For the first time Radio Beijing attacked Russia by name and accused India of systematically acting against Pakistan for which more and more facts have proved that aggression plans and actions of Indian Government are approved and supported by the Soviet Government. Mrs. Gandhi mobilised the nation for war and openly incited the Indian people to carry out long term war against the Pakistan people.65

China's own draft resolution, submitted in the Security Council on 5 December 1971, was the strongest on the subject. It accused

65. *Indian Express*, n.43, 6 December 1971.
India of launching "large scale attacks on Pakistan". It strongly condemned India's act of creating a so-called "Bangladesh". India was asked to withdraw its armed forces and personnel sent by it from Pakistan's territory immediately and unconditionally and called upon the Government of Pakistan to withdraw the armed forces. It ignored completely Yahya's repression and atrocities in East Bengal. This draft resolution was partial and one sided.66

On 5 December 1971, United States submitted a resolution which was whole-heartedly supported by China, calling upon India and Pakistan for a cease-fire and military withdrawal. The resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union and supported by eleven members of the Security Council, Chinese Ambassador Huang Hua while accusing India of invading Pakistan expressed his deep concern over the developments. He further added: "China supported Pakistan's just struggle against Indian Government and aggression".67 Huang Hua also said that India was making the untenable claim that it was acting only to help the repatriation of refugees. India was using the situation in East Pakistan as a pretext for aggression. He also remarked Bangladesh is a creation of India and described the Soviet proposal to invite a representative of Bangladesh to participate in the Security Council debates as "a glaring interference in Pakistan's internal affairs".68

Radio Beijing on 5 December 1971 also accused India of creating the "Bangladesh Government" to launch subversive activities against Pakistan with India as a base. The radio further stated: "The Indian Government continuously interfered in Pakistan's internal affairs and plotted the independence of East Bengal. In mid-October the Indian Government made use of some separatists in Pakistan to create a so-called provisional Government of Bangladesh".69 The Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi announced on 6 December 1971 in Parliament the recognition by India of Bangladesh Government. But Chinese Government considered the Provisional Government as a "puppet regime" and declared Indian Government as the naked aggressor.70

Soviet Union backed India and vetoed a US-sponsored resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces. The eight-power resolution was backed by China. China in the meanwhile, tabled a resolution seeking to condemn India for its role in the Indo-Pakistan conflict. The Chinese resolution accused India of launching a large-scale attack on Pakistan, urged all the people to support Pakistan. It also called for a cease-fire and withdrawal of troops from the India-Pakistan border.71

The commentary in People's Daily of 10 December 1971 described the UN General Assembly's resolution calling for a cease-fire and troops withdrawal by both India and Pakistan as reflecting

69. The Times of India, n.28, 6 December 1971.
70. Ibid, 7 December 1971.
71. Ibid.
"The common desire of medium and small nations and people of various countries to safeguard state sovereignty and territorial integrity". It called the USSR as the protector of Indian "expansionism" and accused Moscow of "greed of expanding its share of influence in the sub-continent and the Indian Ocean".72

On 7 December 1971, Chinese representative Chiao Kuan Hua remarked in General Assembly that "Indian Government is an outright aggressor and the Soviet Government is a boss behind the Indian aggressors. India and Pakistan are close neighbours of China and the Chinese Government and people are seriously concerned over the armed conflict between India and Pakistan".73 He further said that the UN must condemn India's aggression against Pakistan and "thoroughly expose the shameless support given by the Soviet social-imperialists to the Indian aggressors" and must call upon all countries to support Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle against Indian aggression.74 China also maintained that "UN must call upon the Indian Government to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Pakistan's territory the armed forces and armed personnel sent by it and called upon the Pakistan Government to withdraw the armed forces which it sent into Indian territory for counter-attack."75

When China participated in the deliberations of the United Nations on 15 December 1971, the Chinese representative Huang Hua

74. Ibid, p.31.
75. Ibid, p.43.
criticised the Soviet veto which supported India's position. Before this, on 13 December 1971, the Soviet representative accused China for exploiting the tense situation in the Indian subcontinent. The Chinese representative refuted this accusation and in turn made a serious attack on Soviet's expansionism and held it responsible for creating unhealthy armament race in the region.  

During the India-Pakistan hostilities, Beijing not only rendered moral support to Pakistan by espousing Pakistan's stand in the United Nations but rendered military assistance to Pakistan as well. As early as in June 1971, about 100 crates of Chinese arms and ammunition including machine guns, automatic rifles and long-range mortars, were reported to have reached Chittagong port to enable West Pakistan army to meet the threat posed by the freedom fighters of Bangladesh. In October 1971 more than 200 Chinese guerrilla warfare experts were reported to have reached Pakistan to train Pakistani military personnel. On 15 January 1972, Col. Osmany, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bangladesh armed forces disclosed that uniformed Chinese soldiers operated alongside the Pakistan army during the war in training army advisory and engineering roles. It was also reported that during the war a hundred of lorries loaded with military supplies for the ordnance depots of Peshawar and Rawalpindi were arriving daily in Gilgit from Sinkiang. The Soviet daily  

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76. Cited in Jain, n.50, p.198.  
78. The Statesman (New Delhi), 30 October 1971.  
Pravda, while reporting about the Chinese role in India-Pakistani war wrote in December 1971:

International observers paid attention to the fact that Pakistan's 10-day notice on a possible beginning of war with India coincided with the stay in Pakistan of a Chinese delegation led by the Minister of Machine Building Industry, Li Sheu-Ching. The notice expired on December 3 and on the same day the Pakistani Air Force made a bombing strike on Indian Airfields.(81)

While the forces of Pakistan were about to surrender in Dhaka, the Chinese support for Pakistan was reiterated on this occasion as ... the Chinese people resolutely support Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle to defend state sovereignty and territorial integrity and to counter aggression. 82

During the last days of the war in East Pakistan, when it seemed certain that the Pakistan army could not hold on for long because of the difficult situation created by naval blockade and lack of air protection, it was reported that the Chinese rescue ships had been assembled in the Ganges delta for the evacuation of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. While it could not be said for certain that the Chinese submarines and other ships were assembled for the purpose of evacuation of Pakistani troops keeping in view the press reports. The Chinese posture remained friendly after the surrender of Pakistani forces in Dhaka and cease-fire in the West Pakistan. Some of the gestures of Chinese goodwill for Pakistan at this stage were closure of Chinese consulate in Dhaka, criticism of India and rebel troops for "savagely slaughtering the innocent people of

Pakistan" in the East Pakistan and the letters in Security Council urging the UN to end the killing of Pakistanis in Bangladesh. 83

**Bhutto's Visit to China**

When Z.A. Bhutto assumed the Presidency in Pakistan, he called on the Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad first of all, casting aside the diplomatic conventions of calling on Ambassadors of Soviet Union and the United States. 84 This showed Bhutto's preference for China. On 22 December 1971, the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai sent a message congratulating Bhutto for assumption of Presidency of Pakistan. President Bhutto's desire to cultivate close relations with China were manifested when within a couple of months of his assumption of power, he paid a four-day official visit to China from 31 January to 3 February 1972. This was Bhutto's first major visit abroad after assuming power. 85 During his visit President Bhutto met Chairman Mao Zedong, Premier Zhou Enlai and other Chinese leaders. Premier Zhou Enlai, while reiterating Chinese support for Pakistan said: "The Chinese Government and people resolutely support the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle in defence of state sovereignty and territorial integrity against foreign aggression and interference and resolutely support the people of Kashmir in their just struggle for the right of self-determination." 86 He also publicly denounced India for "scorning United Nations resolutions and called

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86. Ibid, pp.48-49.
for withdrawal of Indian troops from Pakistan territory and predicted that India would suffer an ignominious defeat.\footnote{Ibid, p.50.} The joint communique issued at the end of Bhutto's visit envisaged that the friendship between the two countries was based "on principles that are in accord with the fundamental interests of both the countries".\footnote{For text of the Sino-Pakistan joint communique, see Pakistan Horizon, n.19, vol.15, no.1, 1972, pp.160-61.} The joint communique also called for the immediate repatriation of Pakistan's prisoners of war (POWs) stranded in India in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. It was also mentioned in the joint communique that Beijing had agreed to convert four past loans $110 million into grants and deferred the repayment period of a 1970 loan worth $200 million for 20 years.\footnote{Ibid, p.63.} However, Beijing refused Bhutto's request for a defence pact but promised to provide military assistance to Pakistan.\footnote{Samina Yasmin, Pakistan's Relations with China, 1947-79 (Islamabad, 1980), p.36.} The Chinese reluctance to conclude a defence agreement with Pakistan was perhaps governed by the fact that it did not want to get involved in the Indo-Pakistan confrontation and thus avoid super power interference in the region.\footnote{Mira Sinha, "Where Does Pakistan-China Friendship Stand Now?", Assam Tribune (Gauhati), 18 February 1972, p.9.}

The significant outcome of Bhutto's China visit was that the latter agreed not to recognize Bangladesh.\footnote{Ahmad, n.68, pp.61-65.} Bhutto had been making hectic efforts to see that Bangladesh could not get recognition. Thus Chinese assurance was a morale booster for Pakistan. The importance of Bhutto's China visit, in political terms was a significant landmark because it reiterated the closer Sino-Pakistan relations and China's
commitment to help the truncated Pakistan in every possible way in meeting the diplomatic challenges from India in the post-war period. Bhutto's special preference for China was further discernible when he sent Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, then Education Minister of Pakistan, as his special envoy to China in March 1972. Again in early May 1972, Aziz Ahmed, General Secretary of Pakistan's Foreign Ministry visited Beijing. 93

**China's Attitude During Bangladesh's Admission into the UN**

Soon after Bangladesh's emergence as a sovereign state in December 1971, its leader Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman proclaimed in London on 8 January 1972 that Bangladesh was an "unchallengeable reality and called for the recognition of admission of the country into the UN". 94 As soon as a new country emerges as a political entity, its membership of the United Nations becomes inevitable for its sovereign and independent existence. Therefore, accordingly Bangladesh applied for membership into the UN on 8 August 1972. When the application for the membership of Bangladesh came before the Security Council on 25 August 1972, the Chinese representative Huang Hua vetoed Dhaka's entry into the UN. He claimed to have taken this stand on what he called "in defence of the resolutions of the UN", "the principals of the Charter" and "in the defence of the

people of Indo-Pakistan subcontinent". He further pointed out that Dhaka could hope to join the UN only when the relevant UN resolutions had been truly implemented and, only after a reasonable settlement of the issues between India and Pakistan and between Pakistan and Bangladesh.

China's position was clarified by Chiao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister of China, when he visited Pakistan on 28 August 1972. He declared that the "Chinese veto was a just veto... cast to uphold justice" and expressed his government's intentions of using it again if necessary. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary in his statement on 28 August 1972 appreciated the principled stand of the Chinese delegation. President Bhutto also assured the visiting Chinese Vice Foreign Minister of Pakistan's continuous friendship with China. He further added that if such a condition was imposed that Islamabad's relations with other countries would be at the cost of its friendship with Beijing "We will forsaKe all agreements and conditions. This is a position of the Government of Pakistan". This manifested Pakistan's unconditional support for China to beget latter's support.

Subsequently, when the issue of Bangladesh's admission came

96. Ibid. Also seeDawn, n.26, 26 August 1972.
97. Pakistan Times, n.4, 30 August 1972.
98. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary's Speech Welcoming Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Shiao Kuan-hua, 28 August 1972, see Jain, n.50, p.217.
up before the General Assembly in October 1972, the Chinese delegate Chiao Kuan Hua recalled:

The General Assembly at its 26th session adopted by overwhelming majority of 104 votes a resolution calling for cease-fire and troops withdrawal by India and Pakistan. Subsequently, the Security Council also adopted by 13 votes in favour and two abstentions, a resolution demanding ceasefire, troops withdrawal and release of prisoners by all those concerned. However, while the relevant resolutions of UN were not yet implemented, in disregard of reasonable demand of many countries to postpone the consideration of the question, they insisted on a vote to compel China to use veto. China cherished friendly sentiments for the people of East Bengal and has no prejudice against Mr. Mujibur Rahman. (100)

The Chinese leaders, however, clarified that they harboured no permanent objections to Bangladesh's membership of the UN. Speaking in the Security Council on 20 November 1972, Huang Hua maintained that Chinese support to Bangladesh's admission was conditioned upon the latter's willingness to implement the UN resolutions and upon "a reasonable settlement of issues between India and Pakistan including Bangladesh". (101)

In response to the criticism in the Western Press about the Chinese veto having been cast to further certain strategic or political interests, the Pakistani permanent representative maintained, "China has no strategic or political interests in vetoing Dacca's


application. He added that "It acted on principles and in the interests of the sub-continental reconciliation. There is very important difference between this and previous uses of the veto by other powers." In short the Chinese stand aimed at the full implementation of UN resolutions before Bangladesh could be admitted to the UN. Beijing in fact impressed upon Dhaka the need to hold direct negotiations with Pakistan, desist from proceeding with trial of Pakistan's prisoners of war and to arrive at an amicable settlement with Islamabad particularly over the question of release and repatriation of Pakistan's prisoners of war.

Pakistan's President, Z.A. Bhutto, tried to give personal touch of warmth and cordiality to Islamabad's relations with Beijing. In July 1972, Bhutto's children paid a fortnight's visit to China where they availed of Chinese hospitality. In February 1973, Begum Bhutto also visited China. Beijing attached political importance to these visits. In the early part of the second half of June 1973, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chi Peng-fei, paid an official two-day visit to Pakistan. He carried a message of goodwill and best wishes from Chiarman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai for President Bhutto. While speaking at a reception hosted in his honour, Chi Peng-fei said: "China and Pakistan are friendly neighbours and there exists a profound traditional friendship between our two people. The Chinese

103. Ibid.
104. "Interview with Pakistan's Permanent Representative at the UN", Pakistan Times, n.4, 2 October 1972.
Government and people have always devoted themselves to strengthening and developing friendly relations with Pakistan.\textsuperscript{107} The assertion and assurance of Chinese support for Pakistan was of tremendous significance for the latter especially at a time when the question of admission of Bangladesh into the UN was still pending because of Chinese veto.

The Chinese stand on the question of Dhaka's entry into the UN did not undergo any change during 1973. Pakistan's Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmad, shortly after his return from a visit to Beijing, stated in Islamabad on 13 September 1973 that "Pakistan and China would oppose admission of Bangladesh into the UN until it dropped the trial of 195 Pakistani POWs (Prisoner of War)".\textsuperscript{108} The Chinese stand was reiterated by its Vice-Foreign Minister, Chiao Kuan-Hua during the general debate in the General Assembly on 3 October 1973. He said that "the question of admitting Bangladesh to the UN could be considered only after the full implementation of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the Indo-Pak War 1971. He implied that China would not hesitate to use the veto once again to block Dhaka's admission to the UN until all POWs (including the 195 held for trial) were repatriated to

\textsuperscript{107.} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{108.} It is interesting to note that Aziz Ahmad left for Beijing immediately after the signing of the Indo-Pakistan agreement (on 28 August 1973) which dealt with the three way repatriation of Pakistani POWs in India (except for the 195 wanted by Bangladesh for trials), Bengalis in Pakistan, and a "substantial number" of Pakistanis in Bangladesh. See The Times of India, n.28, 14 September 1973.
On the Indo-Pakistan agreement of 28 August 1973, envisaging a three-way repatriation, he declared: "This agreement has come much too late, but its ultimate conclusion is to be welcomed." The Chinese Foreign Minister also alleged twice in his speech that Pakistan was a country which had suffered at the hands of the Soviet Union.

Significantly, the Chinese veto in the Security Council blocking the entry of Bangladesh was exercised at the first available opportunity. The Chinese action was widely condemned by a large number of countries and the Western media accused China of having vetoed Bangladesh's entry so as to serve its certain political and strategic interests. Through its action China vindicated the earlier US stand of blocking Peking's membership of the UN for certain political interests. As a matter of fact China was caught on the horns of a dilemma to choose between the principles which it held so clear for the past two decades and its strategic interests to support Pakistan by blocking Dhaka's entry into the UN. While choosing the latter course, China practised realm pure and simple. Aware of their principled stand and its world-wide criticism, the Chinese representatives in the Security Council and General Assembly were at pains to explain the rational of their opposition to Bangladesh's entry. They categorically stated that China was not "fundamentally opposed" to the entry of Bangladesh into the United Nations. They

110. Ibid.
112. "Chinese delegate Chiao Kuan-hua, Speech at the UN General Assembly on 3 October 1972", *UN Doc*, 2051.
further maintained that China did not harbour any "permanent objection" to the admission of Bangladesh. The Chinese opposition to Bangladesh stemmed from the non-implementation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations as a precondition to Bangladesh's entry into the UN.

Whatever, the explanation the Chinese representatives offered, the fact remains that the Chinese opposition to Bangladesh's membership of the UN was determined by its strategic interests in South Asia. Beijing sought to bolster the then truncated Pakistan in its negotiations with India and Bangladesh over a number of issues thrown up by Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. By blocking the entry of Bangladesh, China also wanted to create a psychological pressure of urgency on Dhaka and New Delhi to be "reasonable" with Islamabad in the negotiations. This helped Pakistan to some extent, to bargain from a position of strength. Psychologically, Pakistan at that period of its history was passing through a crucial phase of demarcation of its boundary in Kashmir. Since China had vital stakes in geostrategic location of Pakistan, it even went out of way to help Pakistan vis-a-vis India and Bangladesh. The strategy of China becomes clear from the fact that China successfully blocked the entry of Bangladesh till such date when most of the outstanding issues between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were not sorted out. Perhaps,

113. Speech of the Vice-Chairman of the Chinese delegation Huang Hua, at the 27th Session of the UN General Assembly, regarding "Bangladesh's entry into the United Nations", as reproduced in Pakistan Horizon, n.19, vol.25, no.4, 1972, pp. 152 ff.
it was due to this reason that Pakistan's "style of negotiations" and stand did not show any nervousness of demoralization and that she negotiated as an equal partner, despite its defeat in the war, occupation of its territories and the POWs.

The exercise of veto by China was not the result of a sudden decision, but was a calculated move already decided at the diplomatic level between the two countries. On 10 August 1972, President Z.A. Bhutto said: "China will veto the Dacca's entry into the UN unless the UN resolutions of December 8 and 21 of last year are first implemented".114 From Chinese side, Huang Hua had asserted that Bangladesh did not qualify for membership of the UN and he also reiterated his country's opposition to Bangladesh's entry into the world body under prevailing circumstances.115

The issue regarding the recognition of Bangladesh was finally resolved at the Islamic Summit meeting in Lahore in February 1974, when Pakistan recognized Bangladesh.116 As a result of this on 10 June 1974, the Security Council unanimously passed a resolution for the admission of the Bangladesh to the world body.117 China which had earlier vetoed the admission of Bangladesh into the world body, now supported the move. Its representative expressed his
government's desire to develop good neighbourly relations with the countries of the subcontinent. The Chinese decision to exercise its veto earlier was governed by political considerations whereby it sought to strengthen the bargaining position of Pakistan with India and Bangladesh. The change in Chinese stance on Bangladesh issue was again keeping in tune with Beijing's relations with Islamabad. Ultimately, in September 1974, Bangladesh was formally admitted in the United Nations after the General Assembly approved the resolution in this regard.

**CHINA'S ROLE IN INDO-PAKISTAN DETENTE:**

In the aftermath of Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, when Z.A. Bhutto assumed the presidency of Pakistan, he was faced with multiple tasks both internally and externally. Besides having to set in order a truncated country which had been humiliated at war, Bhutto had to get back the Pakistan territory under Indian occupation and the release of over 90,000 Pakistani Prisoners of War (POWs). These objectives he could achieve only by normalizing relations with India and not by confrontation. In an interview with Dilip Mukerjee of Times of India, in the middle of March 1972, President Bhutto admitted: "There was a time when we thought in terms of confrontation - military and political. It was to the advantage of Pakistan. Today the situation is not there. It is a qualitative change. I cannot now pursue the policy of confrontation. I want to return to consultations and negotiations" 119


However, India had made it clear to Pakistan that the mutual problems could be solved on bilateral level without the interference of any third party. The then Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, while addressing a press conference at New Delhi on 31 December 1971 had said that "overall Indo-Pakistan relations in future would have to form part of bilateral negotiations between the two countries without the help of third-party good offices". Thus under the given circumstances, Bhutto had no option but to negotiate with India directly to get release of Pakistani POWs and vacation of Pakistan's territory under Indian occupation.

As it has been mentioned earlier, Bhutto had been in close touch with the Chinese leadership since his assumption of power. The developments in the subcontinent invariably remained on the agenda of talks as and when Pakistani leaders visited Beijing or Chinese leaders came to Islamabad. Aziz Ahmad, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan had visited China before the signing of the Shimla Agreement and the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Chiao Kuan-hua had visited Pakistan soon after the conclusion of the Shimla Agreement.

The conclusion of the Shimla Agreement in July 1972 was the triumph of Indo-Pakistan diplomacy and credit for this goes to Mrs. Indira Gandhi who took initiative and also to Bhutto who positively responded with the conviction that "he had nothing to lose by doing so, since confrontation had failed".

120. The Statesman (New Delhi), 1 January 1972.
Article 1 of the Agreement envisaged that:

... the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of a durable peace in the subcontinent so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people. (122)

The Shimla Agreement was certainly a landmark in Indo-Pakistan relations and it could have envisaged an era of entente cordiale if it had been implemented sincerely.

With a view to allay any suspicion that Sino-Pakistan relations would be downgraded in the wake of Shimla Agreement, President Bhutto said on his return from India that Beijing had always stood by Pakistan and "we are grateful to her". He also made it clear that Islamabad's relations with Beijing would not be affected by any improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations. The visit of the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in August 1972 to Pakistan was at a time when Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed was in India to follow up Shimla Agreement. The Chinese Foreign Minister was reported to have urged the Pakistani leadership to keep away from rapprochement with India. Bhutto had realized that the Chinese pressure had been instrumental in making India soften its attitude,

124. Ahmad, n.68, p.62.
hence he lost no opportunity in assuring Beijing of Pakistan's continuous friendship. 126

Beijing chose to applaud Bhutto singularly for concluding the Shimla Agreement. On 29 August 1972, the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Chiao Kuan-hua said in Islamabad: "Not long ago, a partial troop withdrawal agreement was reached through consultations between India and Pakistan to which His Excellency President Bhutto made a positive contribution". 127

On 28 August 1973, India and Pakistan signed an agreement in New Delhi for the return of Pakistani POWs, including 195 against whom there were serious criminal charges. 128 At this juncture, Aziz Ahmad, who had by then become Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence: visited Beijing in August end - early September 1973. The objective of his visit was to brief China about the outcome of the New Delhi Agreement and to seek Chinese support for barring Bangladesh entry into UN. 129

China gave credit to Pakistan for contributing to the process of normalization of relations in the subcontinent. While speaking at a banquet hosted in honour of Aziz Ahmad, the Chinese Foreign Minister said on 30 August 1973: "The Government of Pakistan upheld principles and adopted a series of constructive measures in the talks enabling the talks to yield positive results. Thus favourable

128. Jain, n.50, p.93.
conditions have been created for a detente in the South Asian region and the normalization of relations among the parties concerned.\textsuperscript{130}

BHUTTO'S VISIT TO CHINA IN MAY 1974

During the second week of May 1974, Z.A. Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, visited China. Within few hours of his arrival in Beijing, Bhutto was given an audience by Chairman Mao Zedong for about 90 minutes.\textsuperscript{131} As a matter of practice, the visiting foreign dignitaries were not allowed to meet Chairman Mao on the first day of their arrival. In case of Bhutto, this practice was set aside which reflected Chinese preference for Prime Minister Bhutto. During his sojourn in Beijing, Prime Minister Bhutto had series of talks with Premier Zhou Enlai and the Vice Premier, Deng Xiaoping on bilateral, regional and international issues. The Chinese Vice Premier, Deng Xiaoping while reiterating Chinese support to Pakistan on Kashmir, also welcomed the agreement concluded between the countries of the subcontinent. He said: "We are glad to see that agreements have been reached among the countries concerned of the subcontinent... and thus have created favourable conditions for the normalization of relations among the countries of the subcontinent."\textsuperscript{132} While expressing his country's desire to develop friendly relations with South Asian countries, Deng Xiaoping further added: ... the Chinese people have always cherished profound sentiments for the people of the South Asian countries. We are ready to develop good

\textsuperscript{130.} \textit{Peking Review}, no.37, 14 September 1973, p.7.
\textsuperscript{131.} \textit{Dawn}, n.26, 12 May 1974.
\textsuperscript{132.} \textit{Peking Review}, no.20, 17 May 1974, p.7.
neighbourly relations with the countries of the subcontinent on the basis of the Five Principles of peaceful Coexistence. 133

Prime Minister Bhutto while speaking on 13 May 1974 at a banquet hosted in his honour in Peking said: "Our present visit has opened a new chapter and vigorous phase in our relations. It has further consolidated the existing cooperation between us and strengthened our common resolve to continue efforts for peace and the cause of the Third World". 134 The Joint Communique issued on 14 May 1974 at the end of Bhutto's visit expressed China's desire to "develop good neighbourly relations". 135 This change in Chinese policy towards South Asia could be attributed to new geopolitical situation in the region in the wake of normalization of Indo-Pakistan relations and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Islamabad and Dhaka. 136 Thus Beijing was anxious to develop cordial relations with Bangladesh and augment its strategic interests in the region.

**INDIA'S PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION (PNE)**

India conducted its first peaceful nuclear explosion on 18 May 1974 at Pokharan in Rajasthan. It was an underground explosion, a spin-off of India's peaceful nuclear programme. 137 The explosion produced "an apparent crater of average radius of 47 metres and

133. Ibid, pp.9-12.
depth 10 metres below ground surface in agreement with observation made on tests elsewhere. New Delhi advanced the claim that it constituted an integral part of India's efforts to find ways of using underground explosions for constructive purposes.

The PNE was acclaimed by India as a rare achievement of scientific research in tune with the declared objective of harnessing nuclear technology for the economic betterment of the people. In an interview with News Week, the then Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi had said on 27 May 1974 that a country of India's size could not be technologically dependent on other countries. The Prime Minister of India further added that the PNE of 18 May 1974 was a continuation of research work of the Atomic Energy Department spanning over two decades. A similar stand was reiterated by the Foreign Minister of India, Sardar Swaran Singh, who said on 21 May 1974 that the experiment was significant because it "represented our resources of energy for the benefit of our people through our own efforts."

India's PNE demonstrated that it had developed sophisticated technology in a very important phase of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Indian Government was, perhaps, alive to the fact that its peaceful nuclear explosion would evoke criticism from certain quarters. Consequently it issued statements to clarify its position on the issue. A Press Note issued by the Government of India on 18

139. Ibid, p.7.
141. Ibid.
142. The Times of India, n.28, 22 May 1974.
May 1974 stated that as part of the programme of peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, India had "undertaken a programme to keep itself abreast of developments in this technology, particularly with reference to its use in the field of mining and earth moving operations". The Press Note further reiterated that India "had no intentions of producing nuclear weapons and reiterated its strong opposition to military uses of nuclear explosions.  

PAKISTAN'S REACTION TO INDIA'S PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

Pakistan's reaction to India's nuclear explosion of 18 May 1974, both by its leaders and the media, was sharp, critical and full of doubts about India's "sincerity". Pakistan's representative to the Disarmament Commission said on 19 May 1974 that:

... his country was not surprised at India's nuclear test. We have been warning the United Nations particularly the nuclear weapon powers and the international community for a decade that India's ambitions of nuclear programme aimed at equipping itself with a nuclear option was being undertaken to carry out a nuclear weapon explosion and stake a claim to the status of a nuclear weapon power. (145)

While refuting India's contention that it had no intention of going nuclear, Pakistan's representative further added ... any state which explodes a so-called peaceful nuclear device stands as much in violation of the NPT as the one which tests it for military purposes. Hence India's disapproval is lacking in credibility". On 19 May

143. Nuclear India (Bombay), June 1974, p.2.
144. Ibid, pp. 5 ff.
146. Ibid.
1974 the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Z.A. Bhutto, sharply reacted to India's PNE. In a statement, Bhutto said that "given the brutal fact of 18 May explosion, Pakistan cannot be expected to rest on technicalities and protocol.... We are taking steps to secure a political insurance against India's use of nuclear threat". 147 The "Political insurance" which Prime Minister Bhutto sought included measures to mobilise international public opinion in favour of Pakistan by raising the bogey of nuclear threat from India.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, while addressing the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) on 23 May 1974 said that India's PNE had precipitated a grave situation for Pakistan and the countries of South Asia. He further averred that India's nuclear test had demolished the barrier to nuclear proliferation and there was no difference between the nuclear weapons and nuclear explosion devices manufactured for nuclear purposes. 148

India again tried to allay Pakistan's fears about its nuclear policy. While replying to Pakistan's unfounded allegations, India's representative to the CCD, B.C. Mishra, pointed out that the UN resolutions "make a clear distinction between peaceful nuclear explosions and weapon tests by adopting the terminology nuclear weapon tests". 149 India also exposed Pakistan's duplicity in warmly applauding Chinese nuclear weapon tests while decrying and distorting

148. Ibid, CCD/PV, 638, 23 May 1974, pp.30-34.
India's PNE. India also refuted Pakistan's contention that India's PNE was a threat to the detente which had emerged on the Indian subcontinent. 150

Pakistan's media was equally vocal in criticising India's PNE. Pakistani Press advanced the argument that apart from the impact of India's nuclear programme in South Asia, it had wider implications because Soviet Union and France had been cooperating with India in latter's nuclear programme. 151

However, India tried to dispel the misgivings of Pakistan with regard to India's commitment to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. On 7 June 1974, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi wrote to her Pakistani counterpart to allay the fears expressed by the latter of a security threat and nuclear blackmail by India: "I am sorry that you should have assumed, in spite of our categorical declarations that the nuclear test which our scientists have conducted entirely for developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and economic uses, somehow poses threat to Pakistan's security". 152 The Prime Minister of India further added: "I should like to assure that we

150. Ibid.

151. Mussawat, a leading Urdu daily published from Lahore in its editorial warned the United States that the balance of power which has tilted in favour of India had resulted in India's supremacy and hegemony which in other words meant "Soviet Hegemony" in South Asia. See Mussawat (Lahore), 17 September 1974. Morning News (Karachi), in its editorial dated 23 May 1974 wrote: "Against the backdrop of reconciliatory efforts in the otherwise hostile subcontinent, the atomic explosion is certainly a most ill-timed exhibition of strength".

152. Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), vol.20, no.6, June 1974, p.194.
remain fully committed to our traditional policy of developing nuclear energy resources entirely for peaceful purposes. The recent underground nuclear experiment conducted by our scientists in no way alters this policy". 153

Regarding India's determination to resolve all the issues in accordance with the Shimla Agreement, Mrs. Gandhi further said: "There are no political or foreign implications of this test. We remain committed to setting all our differences with Pakistan peacefully through bilateral negotiations in accordance with the Shimla Agreement". 154

Z.A. Bhutto, in his reply to the letter of Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, said that "it was a question not only of intentions but of capabilities. As you know, in the past we have received many assurances from India which regrettably remained dishonoured". 155 However Bhutto discounted India's assurances and suggested that (a) India should undertake the obligation, along with other nuclear states; and (b) if it wished to foresake the development of nuclear weapons, it should do so through one or more concrete and binding agreements. 156

During 1974, Pakistan continued to harp on India's nuclear might and its threat to Pakistan. While addressing Pakistan's National

Assembly in early June 1974, Bhutto declared that India was "brandishing a nuclear sword to extract political concessions from Pakistan to assert its hegemony on the subcontinent." \(^{157}\)

The one discernible impact of Pakistan's successful diplomacy in capitalizing on India's PNE was that Pakistan succeeded in winning the sympathy of the West and acquired conventional armaments. \(^{158}\) Another successful diplomatic move mooted by Pakistan in September 1974 was to introduce a proposal in the UN General Assembly to establish South Asia as a nuclear weapon free zone.

**CHINA AND INDIA'S PNE**

There was no strong Chinese reaction to India's PNE of 18 May 1974. The Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiao-ping was quoted as having said that China would not make an issue of India's recent nuclear test which was regarded as being discouraged by the Soviet Union. \(^{159}\) The Chinese Vice-Premier further added that the Indian test would not be able to 'cow down' the people of Pakistan, Bangladesh or Afghanistan. \(^{160}\)

**IMPACT OF PNE ON SINO-PAK RELATIONS**

In the aftermath of India's peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE), Pakistan's Premier, Z.A. Bhutto, sent his Foreign Secretary to Beijing

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157. Pakistan, National Assembly Debates (Islamabad) vol.9, no.7, 6 June 1974, p.300.
159. The Hindustan times, n.59, 7 June 1974.
160. Ibid.
for consultations over India's nuclear test and to persuade the Chinese leaders to condemn India.\textsuperscript{161} As there was no immediate Chinese reaction to India's PNE, Bhutto personally called on the Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan twice and through him solicited Chinese leader's immediate condemnation of India on the PNE issue.\textsuperscript{162} On 26 June 1974, the Foreign Office of Pakistan claimed that Beijing had promised to support Pakistan against Indian "nuclear threat".\textsuperscript{163} It further claimed that the Chinese offer "approximated to the Chinese nuclear umbrella to Pakistan".\textsuperscript{164} However a commentary published in the \textit{People's Daily} spelt out China's general support to Pakistan and other countries "in their just struggle to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty against intervention from outside including nuclear blackmail and threat".\textsuperscript{165}

The above analysis makes it clear that Pakistan reacted sharply to India's peaceful nuclear explosion of 18 May 1974 and succeeded in capitalising the issue by procuring increased conventional armaments from the west. However, its efforts to enlist Chinese support in condemning India and thus be hoodwinked in Pakistan's diplomacy against India could be partially met. However the lukewarm Chinese reaction to India's PNE did not affect the pattern of Pakistan's relations with China.

\textsuperscript{161} \textit{The Economic Times} (Bombay), 7 June 1974.
\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Motherland} (New Delhi), 5 July 1974.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
KARAKORAM HIGHWAY THREAT TO INDIA'S SECURITY

The Kara-Koram highway, built entirely with Chinese assistance, is symbolic of Pakistan-China relations and their relevance to Pakistan's Political-Security needs. It links the strategic parts of Pakistani occupied Kashmir by metallic roads along with Indo-Pakistan and Indo-China borders to the Sinkiang region of China. The Karakoram highway links the Gilgit area of Pakistan with the town of Kashgar and Yarkand in Chinese region of Sinkiang then passing through Morkhun and the Minataka pass. There are varied estimates about the length of Karakoram highway. According to some reports, its length is 418 miles while others place its length between 450 to 456 miles. \[166\] There is another road which is 200 miles in length. It links Quila Nabi with Mor Khun after passing through the Kunjerias Pass. The construction of these roads have linked China and Pakistan.

Plans for an all-weather road between Pakistan and China were originally drawn up in 1959. \[167\] However Pakistan remained reluctant until the conclusion of the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 2 March 1963. It was thereafter that the construction work of these roads commenced. While Beijing and Islamabad tried to maintain close secrecy about the construction of these roads whereas reports in this regard had started in Indian and some Western newspapers in March 1964. \[168\]

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168 The Hindustan Times, n.59, 5 March 1964, Dawn, n.26, 6 March 1964
On 16 February 1971, a ceremony was held at Baltit in Hunza area in Pakistan which was attended by Chinese and Pakistani officials at which the Karakoram Highway was declared open and said to have replaced the old caravan silk route.\footnote{The Indian Express, n.43, 18 February 1971.} From Gilgit to Baltit, there was a rough road about 35 miles to the northeast usable by jeeps and from Baltit the Chinese border post in Sinkiang was marked by a 100 mile long pony track. Pakistan's Minister of Works Rana Abdul announced on 30 September 1964, that a second all-weather road from Rawalpindi to Gilgit was under construction.\footnote{The Times, n.47, 1 October 1964.}

The Gilgit-Kashgar road redeveloped and reconstructed with the Chinese assistance on both sides after Kashmir-Sinkiang border roughly follows the old caravan route between Kashgar town of Sinkiang and Gilgit town of Pakistani occupied Kashmir through the Mitaka Pass. This road begins from the Chinese garrison town of Kashgar about 50 miles south of the Soviet border and passes through 24 border posts at intervals between 6 and 28 miles, goes southward to Gilgit in Pakistani occupied Kashmir. It is an all-weather road suitable for heavy vehicular traffic. A part of the road extending between the Minataka Pass and Gilgit- the Pakistani section of the road, is jeepable and was completed in 1968 with Chinese assistance.\footnote{The Statesman, n.120, 14 May 1968.}

The Quila Nabi Khunjerab Pass - Morkhun Road envisages a
direct link between the Chinese road network in Sinkiang and Tibet and Pak-occupied Kashmir. It runs roughly perpendicular to the earlier highway built by China in 1954-56, through Aksai-Chin thus linking the Morkhun 90 miles southeast of Gilgit on Gilgit-Kashgar Road with Quila Nabi in eastern Sinkiang, adjoining Western Tibet, on Lhasa-Aksai Chin-Kashgar highway, across the Indian territory of Ladakh, through the Khunjerab Pass on the Kashmir-Sinkiang border. This Quilla Nabi Khunjerab Pass – Morkhun Link road was occupied by 1968. 172

The Karakoram Highway as a whole was formally inaugurated in May 1978. The Chinese Vice-Premier, Keng Piao, in his speech at the inauguration of the highway, summed up the significance of this Sino-Pak joint project: "We will make unremitting efforts to further develop the friendly relations and cooperation between our two countries. Now that the Karakoram Highway is open to traffic, we have a land route as well as an aerial bridge between us. Our two countries are closer and the ties of our friendship between our two countries stronger." 173

Both Pakistan and China have claimed the economic significance of the Karakoram Highway. But there is more than what meets the eye. Geopolitical considerations seemed to have outweighed the considerations both of Islamabad and Beijing while keeping in view the strategic importance of the highway and hitherto joint venture. Islamabad is assured of continuous Chinese arms supplies through Karakoram highway in an eventuality with Indis. While Chinese have

got a direct link between Sinkiang and Tibet thus to facilitate its troop and armament movement along the Sino-Soviet border. Besides, the Chinese have strengthened their strategic and political position to have military advantage over the Soviets. Karakoram highway is of immense politico-strategic advantage to both Pakistan and China. In case of a Sino-Pakistan military tie-up against India, the latter is faced with serious strategic disadvantages in Ladakh and Kashmir region. "The construction of the Karakoram Highway and the Khunjerab Pass Road were demonstrations of China's firm commitment to consolidate and perpetuate its close ties with Pakistan, which posed a more serious threat to India's security than the actual supply of armaments". 174

SIACHEN GLACIERS

Another major concern for India, from both China and Pakistan, is the glaciated region of Siachen. This area lies in one of the most inhospitable regions of the country. It is located in the Karakorams, which house some of the highest peaks in the world and is one of the most glaciated sub-polar regions. "Among the larger glaciers here is Siachen which is 74 km. in length and varies in width from 2 to 8 km." 175

This glaciated region has always been of strategic importance.

West of Siachen is Pakistan-occupied part of Kashmir and to the east is the disputed Indian territory of Aksai Chin, at present under Chinese control, and north of it is the area ceded to China by Pakistan. The Pakistani perception is that if Siachen comes under their occupation they would be in an advantageous position, for its possession would lead to their domination of Nubra valley, sandwiched between Siachen Glacier and northern Ladakh and the routes going down to Leh. The Chinese interest in the region is that it would provide a cushion to Chinese positions in the area. Secondly, any de facto occupation of Siachen by Pakistan would weaken any future Indian negotiations on border issues with China.\textsuperscript{176}

The Indian thinking is that the strategic Xizang-Xinjiang road passes through Aksai Chin and with the Karakoram Pass in the North, both Pakistan and China, if in possession of Siachen, would always be threatening Ladakh, through Nubra Valley. In view of the threat to Siachen, the Indian Army, today, occupies a commanding position in the region. The positions are well sited and defended to thwart any adventurism either by China or Pakistan. The possible Indian motives for holding Siachen may be one or all of the following:

1. Indian presence there would lead to effective control over the Nubra Valley and routes leading to Chinese territory.

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid, pp. 61-65.
2. Given the nature of terrain, it would require only a small force of Indian troops to keep a large force at bay, though the severe logistics problems would have to be overcome.\textsuperscript{177}

Since the glaciated region of Siachen is significant for China and Pakistan, both may wish to annex it. To help its annexation by Pakistan, China may blackmail India with a threatening military posture in future. India will have to deal firmly in this glaciated region and be careful to avoid any Chinese contingency in the northeast. Indian defence planners must also consider the possibility to threaten Aksai Chin, if China tries any aggression in the northeastern sector.

CHINESE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

Between 1971 and 1981, China emerged as the single largest source of arms supplier, equipping all the three branches of Pakistani armed forces. The military heavy losses in terms of military hardware and ammunition suffered by Pakistan during the Indo-Pak war of 1971 were virtually replaced by Pakistan. In February 1972 when Prime Minister of Pakistan, Z.A. Bhutto, went to Beijing to discuss Pakistan’s defence requirements and to procure Chinese arms, the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai was reported to have told Bhutto: "We are not ammunition merchants. Whatever your defence requirements are, they will be met gratis".\textsuperscript{178} During his visit, Pakistan Premier tried to raise the issue of signing a defence

\textsuperscript{177} Vasant Kumar Verma, \textit{Indo-Pakistan Relations: A vision For the Future} (Delhi, 1989), p. 37.

pact with China but he was told by the Chinese leadership that Beijing disfavoured a formal alliance and he was further told that what really mattered was a "common interest and not defence pact". 179

Between 1974 and 1976, Bhutto made two more visits to procure arms assistance from Beijing. By 1976 he was able to persuade the Chinese leadership to increase Pakistan's defence requirements in China's long-term defence production plans. 180

The following table shows the Chinese arms assistance to Pakistan between 1971-1981.

Table - 1

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Source: SIPRI, Year Book of World Armaments And Disarmament 1977-80 (Stockholm)

179. Bhutto's interview with C.L. Sulzberger of the New York Times, 14 February 1972. Also see The Hindu, n. 44.

In 1976 Pakistan asked Beijing for the supply of 60 F-6 Shenyang fighter planes, the Chinese version of Mig-19. By 1977, Islamabad received their deliveries. In 1979 Beijing got an order from Pakistan for the supply of 65 F-6 Bis fighter planes and their deliveries were completed in 1981. Besides, China regularly supplied T-59 MBT tanks to Pakistan with an average 50 per year.

It is evident from the above analysis that between 1970 and 1979, China had emerged as the single largest supplier of arms to Pakistan followed by United States and France. It was only after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that United States was able to reach number one as arms supplier to Pakistan in 1981 and onwards followed by China as shown in the succeeding fifth Chapter. Chinese arms transfers between 1966 to 1980 came to more than $680 million and constituted more than one third of the overall value of arms transfers to Pakistan in that period.181

The foregoing assessment makes it clear that China and Pakistan became closer to each other especially after the Indo-Pak war of 1971. Beijing emerged as the single largest supplier of arms to Pakistan and accounted for 75 per cent of Pakistan's Air Force and other military hardware. The US embargo on arms Sales to Pakistan in 1971 which was lifted in 1977 and reimposed by President Carter in view of Pakistan's ambitions for nuclear

programme could have deprived Pakistan from acquiring sophisticated weapons. It was China which continued unhindered supplies of weapons to Pakistan. Beijing also provided moral, diplomatic and political support to Pakistan against India. Pakistan was drawn closer to China and by the time Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred in December 1979, both countries had been further drawn nearer to each other. Pakistan's close relations with Beijing and Washington and the growing rapprochement between Beijing and Washington assumed the form of a US-China-Pakistan axis which further accentuated in the wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The implications of this axis for India are analysed in the fifth Chapter.

NUCLEAR COLLABORATION BETWEEN CHINA AND PAKISTAN: THREAT TO INDIA

The China-Pakistan strategic linkage forced in 1963 is and will remain a major cause of concern for security planners in New Delhi. In today's strategic environment, India is rated as an influential and dominant power in South Asia, China, through Pakistan wishes to extend the sphere of her influence in South Asia and the only stumbling block is India. This may be one of the reasons of the special relationship between Beijing and Islamabad. This relationship today has attained a new dimension owing to the extent of involvement of China in Pakistan's search for nuclear weapons programme. The nuclear association between China and Pakistan became known to the world in 1982, when several US intelligence reports leaked to the American press said, that China
has made available the designs of an atomic test to Pakistan. Around the same time the Reagan Administration supplied a shipment of krytrons, the electronic triggering device for nuclear weapons to Pakistan and this supply confirms the above theory. It is also reported that Chinese scientists have helped Pakistan to develop ultra-centrifuge technology at Kahuta. Recently China has agreed to provide a slightly modified version of F-7, also known as J-7, aircraft frames which will be fitted with either Pratt and Whitney 1120 or General Electric F-404 engines from the US. This jet, envisaged as Pakistan's Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), will also carry American avionics and armaments. This was believed to have been discussed and agreed upon by Casper Weinberger during his 1986 visit to Pakistan.

The suspicion that China is helping Pakistan to reach nuclear capability can be traced back to June 30, 1966, when an agreement was signed by the two countries for "economic and technical assistance". Pakistan's Commerce Minister Ghulam Tariq told reporters that an atomic power station would be built at Ruper in Panna district of East Pakistan with Chinese help. This was the first hint of the nuclear collaboration. However, the credit for preparing a programme for rapid nuclear technology for Pakistan and giving it clear direction should be given to Bhutto. Bhutto's visit to Beijing in May 1976 was of great significance, because two


183. R.R. Subramaniam, "India's Relations with Nuclear China", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol.IX, no.8, IDSA, November 1985, pp.761-62.
agreements emerged from it: (1) scientific cooperation and (2) military cooperation. For the first time a joint China-Pakistan Military Committee was established. In the nuclear field, China agreed to supply heavy water to Pakistan. There was reported to be cooperation between the two countries in plutonium reprocessing and collaboration on uranium enrichment through the centrifuge method. When the French government informed the Zia government in 1978 that it was unable to proceed with the Chashma deal unless Pakistan agreed to revise the original agreement providing for co-processing of spent fuel, the Chinese came to Pakistan's rescue. 184

It was on September 15, 1986, that a formal agreement on cooperation in the nuclear field between Pakistan and China was established, during the visit of Pakistan's Prime Minister Junejo to Beijing. The agreement was stated to be for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and has safeguard provisions against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with the ones laid down by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Yet India cannot put it beyond these two countries to collaborate in the production of nuclear weapons if circumstances demand it. 185

From the Chinese point of view, a nuclear Pakistan may have a Soviet angle, in that Pakistan could one day fill the gap in South-West Asia in the nuclear containment of the USSR. NATO and China cover two Soviet flanks, the USA the northern flank while Israel

covers a part of the southern flank. The South-Western gap would remain vulnerable without a Pakistani nuclear capability. What matters in the long run is the common security perceptions of the Chinese and Pakistani leadership and the pooling together of resources in a mutually beneficial manner to enhance the leverage of each in their respective dealings with other states.  

There is a view that there is no real nuclear collaboration between Pakistan and China, since there is no record that any country has passed nuclear secrets to another. Furthermore, a nuclear Pakistan would try to maintain a posture independent of Beijing. Lastly, by helping Pakistan to go nuclear, it could provoke India to go nuclear, which China would otherwise attempt to prevent.

But one cannot overlook the fact that some time in the future there could be an inter-nuclear partnership between the two countries. China is in possession of nuclear weapons. Its nuclear weapon programme has reached the stage where its SLBM, the CSS-N-3, can be deployed aboard (the nuclear-powered Xia-class submarines) in large numbers. These missiles have a range of 2,800 Km and can pose a threat to the Indian land mass; however in the late 1980s when these submarines started entering the waters of the Indian Ocean India faced an immediate threat. The Chinese nuclear submarines entering the Indian ocean would need rest and the Karachi port has excellent facilities. Once again, a collaborative

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role between the two countries cannot be ignored.\footnote{Dinesh Pahwa, India's Role in the context of Indian Ocean Security (Bombay, 1988), pp.27-28 ff.}

The involvement of China in Pakistan's nuclear weapons and other modernisation programmes, indicates the level of commitment to Pakistan's security. This commitment and involvement of China leads one to believe that in the event of an Indo-Pak conflict, Chinese would align with Pakistan, so long as it remained convinced that neither the US nor the USSR would intervene. This possibility may pose serious security threats to India and the emerging scenarios may be one or more of the following:

1. A military threat from Pakistan in conjunction with some collusion from China;
2. A politico-military threat from China in conjunction with some collusion from Pakistan;
3. A combined military attack from China and Pakistan;
4. Possible rapprochement: between Russia and China, in the next decade, this may force a Sino-Indian nuclear contingency.
5. A nuclear blackmail threat by China through her "IRBMS/MMBMS, located in the mountainous terrain of Xizang".\footnote{Hari R. Gupta, China and the Peace of Asia (New Delhi, 1985), pp.35 ff.}
6. Chinese troops themselves intervening through Aksai Chin and the area ceded to China by Pakistan and threatening the Siachen Glacier area to relieve pioneer pressure on Pakistan;
7. China may use the Karakoram all-weather highway to resupply Pakistan with military hardware.

**COMPLICATIONS OF SINO-PAK ALLIANCE FOR INDIA**

Sino-Pak military collaboration has been growing steadily through the decades of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s because of the
identical perceptions they held about India's role and position in South Asia. The Sino-Pak entente serves particularly China's strategic and political interests in the South Asian subcontinent. It enhances the Chinese position in the Himalayan region where India is considered to be dominant, besides giving China the necessary foothold to serve as a counterforce to the USSR in this region. India stands as the major obstacle in Chinese progress towards acquiring the status of a great Asian power. Therefore, friendship with Pakistan from its very inception contributes to making India hostage to Sino-Pak diplomatic, political and military events. Chinese commitments to Pakistan seem to be integrated to serve one underlying purpose to isolate and neutralise India.

It was the Indo-Pak War of 1971, which exposed the Beijing-Islamabad axis. From then onwards India has had to contend with the dangerous trends in the subcontinental environment which arise from the two-pronged security threat. India's victory over Pakistan in 1971 marks a watershed in her history. The outcome did not suit the Sino-Pak strategy of neutralising and isolating India because the war enhanced the position and status of India.189

Pakistan by itself cannot be a major threat, which is why it is constantly attempting to acquire allies. Even in a war with India neither USA nor UK is prepared to support her openly. India's main security problem arises from China's known bellicosity, her desire to neutralise India and extend her hegemony and China's convivialing with Pakistan to perpetuate an unstable and horrible regional environment.

In the nuclear field China has about a 15 year lead over India. India does not "possess a nuclear targeting doctrine and there is the need for its formulation so that India does have the capability to deal in the future with a joint Sino-Pak threat". A Sino-Pak nuclear collaboration against India is not an improbability in the future. In order to deter a joint Sino-Pak aggression India has to become self-reliant. If India were to decide to acquire nuclear weapons the main reasons for it would be (a) to deter a Sino-Pak attack, (b) to deter a Sino-Pak nuclear attack and (c) to repulse any Chinese conventional attack should it occur. 190

Any comprehensive security policy for India would have to take into account the objective to contain the Chinese threat. After examining in detail the Chinese involvement, the former Defence Secretary P.V.N. Rao provided a valid reappraisal in these words:

"....The dislike of Asian Powers to the continued presence of the American forces in Asia can be justified only if these countries can work out an alternative arrangement to preserve their independence from Chinese aggression. India is vitally interested in the problem, in its own interests and must take a leading part in organising such an arrangement". 191 Accordingly China is keen to exploit the differences between India and Pakistan and a part of the Sino-Pak objective can be achieved if they can set India on a course of spending substantial resources on defence, thus

190. Ibid, pp.83 ff.
accelerating the pace of self-exhaustion.

Against this background of Sino-Pak collaboration it is hardly surprising that India has to contemplate the exigencies of both war and peace by evaluating risks, costs, and benefits of alternative strategic paradigms.