CONCLUSION
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On the basis of preceding arguments so far presented in this work, it can be said that the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles are result of a persistent nationalist struggle committed to overthrow an illegitimate foreign power. The constitution is the lengthiest in the world and it has been created after a long and careful deliberation of each and every provisions.

It is also true that the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles were a single whole until the Constituent Assembly separated them into different parts and subsequently making them enforceable and non-enforceable rights. The Fundamental Rights are generally negative injunctions to the state to refrain from doing certain things which are inimical to the freedom of individual. Their main concern is to preserve the rights and liberties of individuals by putting restraints upon the actions of the state and its organs. These rights are available in every liberal democratic state. The Fundamental Rights are comprehensive in their scope and include all those rights and liberties that are essential for an individual to lead a meaningful life. Again, it was seen that the Fundamental Rights in the form of certain negative instructions to the state closely resemble the classical liberal tradition. The right to equality, the personal freedom, the religious freedom that is reinforced by the adoption of a secular state are largely advocated by classical liberals. It is true that liberalism, both as a philosophy and a way of life emerged as an opposition to absolutism and tyranny. And it is this liberal opposition to absolutism and tyranny which makes the relationship between classical liberalism and the Fundamental Rights more real. That the Fundamental Rights share the abhorrence with the classical liberalism is well evident from the
constitution makers' insistence upon the incorporation of a set of rights in a written constitution as a form of safeguards against both state and private individual. But at the same time the existence of the group rights within the Fundamental Rights makes it impossible for a blanket characterization of them as the embodiment of classical liberalism. Because as we saw the classical liberalism contained certain uncompromising individualistic assumptions. This individualistic aspect of liberalism made susceptible to the criticism that it neglects the social and cultural aspects of individual life. Moreover, the existence of the requirements of social justice in the form of special care for the backward section of the population makes such a characterization extremely difficult. But the existence of these provisions notwithstanding, most of the Fundamental Rights, it could be said here, resemble the rights and liberties found during the classical liberal tradition.

The Fundamental Rights are shaped much by the liberal ideology, but it should not be taken to mean that the liberal rights and ideology was non-existent in India because of the absence of an environment congenial to the liberal culture. As we saw a distinct liberal stream existed in India and it was kept alive by the Indian liberals. It is true that these people were influenced a lot by the western liberal ideals and they could not contribute intellectually to this liberal tradition with the same regularity with which their Western counterparts did. But nevertheless they were successful in keeping alive the Indian liberal tradition through their actions. And even if it is true that they were influenced a lot by the western liberal thought and they often cited quotes from Mill and Gladestone, they as is evident from the discussion of chapter III, did not implanted these ideas unaltered into the Indian situation. The similar
could be said about the Directive Principles also. Though these provisions were borrowed from the constitutions of different countries the constitution makers did not implanted these provisions in the constitution in the raw form in which they were originally borrowed. Instead they modified them suitably to meet the requirements of the Indian situation. This is evident from the separation of the Directives from the Fundamental Rights. Because this separation was effected by taking into consideration certain practical considerations. It was not done with a view to place the directives in a subordinate position as is generally supposed. Certain practical considerations were taken into consideration while putting the directives in the category of non-justiciable rights.

We saw that the Directive Principles aim at establishing a welfare state and redistribution of the common resources of the community in a way that would sub-serve the common good. This welfaristic and redistributive schemes take these Directive Principles to closer to the new liberalism which is also identified by these attributes. It can be equally true that the Directives can be said the embodiments of the precepts of socialism but if we take in to account the words of Austin according to whom the Directives make people free in the positive sense we can see a link between the Directive Principles and new liberalism. Because when liberalism underwent a transformation due to necessity of survival, and the new liberalism which came into existence it reformulated the key liberal concepts like liberty and equality. The term liberty was widened and it represented a shift from the negative concept, absence of restraints to a positive one defining freedom in terms of power or ability to do certain thing worth doing. This conceptual link between freedom and power ended to some extent the hitherto existing liberal hostility to the state and
accommodated the concept of an active state with the liberal ideology. The Directive Principles of the constitution rely upon such concepts of liberty and they want to make people free really by creating these conditions which are essential for the meaningful exercise of other kinds of freedoms. Hence in principle they call for an active state. This constitute a strong link between them and the new liberalism. But while it is true that the Directives represent a new version of liberalism, here also a blanket characterization of them is as impossible as it is in case of the Fundamental Rights, due to the fact that there are certain provisions which are said to be strains of classical liberalism. The article 44 dealing with the universal civil code is in close resemblance with the classical liberalism than with the new liberalism. Hence the same thing also can be said about the Directive Principles that the new liberalism is predominantly present within the Directive Principles.

On the face of it a strict interpretation of the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles as two kinds of liberalisms seems untenable. Further it was also the case that the new liberalism also made its way into the Fundamental Rights through the various provisions of social justice. This overlapping of liberalisms, however, could be seen as incidental rather than a deliberately designed project. When I am saying that it is incidental this is not to say that the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principle incidentally represent two kinds of liberal traditions. Because it has been observed in chapter third that the both the leaders of the Indian National Movement as well as the framers of the constitution were guided by liberal ideology. Rather it the manner of their existence that appears incidental. It is also clear that the two provisions, namely Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, are of different nature.
and embody different policy implications. The Fundamental Rights are mostly negative obligations upon the state while the Directives call for an active state. This difference in the policy implications explains the conflict between them, even if some observers think otherwise. Because the Directives are comprehensive in their scope and wider in application. Therefore while fulfilling the positive obligations the state has to made polices that might come into conflict with the Fundamental Rights. The numerous act that have been enacted after the independence in order to give effect to the agrarian policies and subsequent challenge to these acts in the courts from time to time suggests that this has been the case.

This conflicts between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles could be seen to some extent as a conflict between classical liberalism and the new liberalism, even if they appear at prima facie conflicts between certain provisions of the constitution. Because even if there is some continuity between the two liberalisms dealt with here there are certain areas over which there are considerable disagreements. These disagreements are resulting from the shift in emphasis, while preserving the key liberal values. Here the new liberalism with its commitment to a scheme of redistribution and social justice came into conflict with the classical liberal ideal of preservation of property rights within the framework of a minimalist state. This conflict has been well exemplified in the Indian case in the conflict between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles resulting from government’s introduction of numerous Acts. The Golaknath case, the Keshavananda case and Minerva mills case and numerous such cases well illustrate this point. But at the same time it could also be said that they are the conflict between the
Rights and the Directives. These conflicts could be seen as well when the
government introduced other welfaristic legislations and they were challenged
on the grounds of violation of Fundamental Rights. The case dealing with the
medical insurance is well illustrative of this point.

Turning to the conflicts between the rights and the Directives it could be
said that the apprehension by the critics who criticized the Directives on the
basis of their non-justiciable character proved to be unfounded. It is true the
attitude of the judiciary initially reflected that the Directives were subordinate
to the Fundamental Rights and the latter would prevail in case of a conflict. But
later on the Judiciary adopted an approach of harmonious interpretation and has
tried to give due regard to the fact that they are Fundamental in the governance
of the country. In this regard the statement of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar that these
Directives have political sanction behind them seems to be right if one looks
into the cases of their implementation. Even the scope of some of the
Fundamental Rights is decided by taking the Directives into consideration.

The constitution has been amended successfully to modify the
Fundamental Rights in order to give effect to the goals envisaged by the
Directives. For instance the first, the fourth, the seventeenth, the twenty-fifth,
the forty-second and the forty-fourth amendments were effected with a view to
implement the agrarian and economic reforms as envisaged by the Directive
Principles. Article 40 has been implemented by the seventy-third amendment to
organise village panchayats. Similarly the provision for education has been
shifted to the category of Fundamental Rights recently. The prohibition of
drugs enjoined by article 47 has been implemented in many states. The
implementation of the programmes ensuring minimum wages, working
conditions have been taken by the government in pursuance of the welfaristic ideals underlying these Directives. In this respect, it could be said that the gradual implementation of the directives was the goal which the constitution makers had in mind while separating the directives from the Rights. They were optimistic that the government would not ignore these principles and make policy for their gradual implementation. But while it is true that there are indeed conflicts between the Directive Principles and the Fundamental Rights, it is also equally true that they are complementary to each other in certain respects. Hence many see the conflicts between these provisions, not as conflict over the end but over means only. Therefore we can say with Granvile Austin that they together aim at social revolution. Their complementary nature is what led Suba Rao, the former Chief Justice of India to ignore their conflicts. He instead saw them as political and socio-economic rights, complementary to each other.

Last but not least it could be said that the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles can not be confined to the two kinds of liberalisms discussed here. It is different to say that they represent two kinds of liberalism from to say that they are confined to two kinds of liberalisms. Their comprehensive and diverse character can well resemble other variants of liberalism as well. Similarly, it could also be said about liberalism that there is no compartmental divisions within liberalism, each identifiable with a fixed set of criteria. Even though there are certain key conceptions and values common to, and constitute a link between different variants of liberalism, there is no agreements on these concepts themselves among the different strands of liberals. As for example even tough the liberals and libertarians converse on
certain commitments, still there is a little cleavage lies between them as has been clear from account of Alan Ryan. This disagreement is not only limited to the field of key values and concepts, it well extends to the field of credibility as well. In other words there is a tendency on the part of the adherents of one strand or the other to claim that their version of liberalism is authentic and the other variants is something else entirely. Thus on the face of it, this could be said that the attempt to define liberalism is always accompanied by the question, liberalism or liberalisms? Again liberalism is taking different forms with changing times to adapt to the new situations. As we saw the liberalism of Hobbes, Locke was highly individualistic in nature, while the new liberalism adopted a variation in the concepts to accommodate social welfare. Similarly, the contemporary liberalism is pluralistic in its assumption allowing for free play of different cultures without imposing any conception of good never the less it favours an egalitarian distribution of burdens and benefits, with a simultaneous emphasis upon the preservation of rights and liberties of the individuals, as is the case with Rawls. This has put liberalism in a dilemma; on the one hand it has to respect the rights and liberties of the various individuals and groups by being neutral with regard to the different conceptions of good different conceptions of human nature; on the other hand it has to redistribute the benefits and burdens in an egalitarian way which may, as some liberals argue, well amount to favouring one conception of good over other and result in violation of the principle of neutrality. Moreover, the equality, freedom and the numerous provisions for the ideal of social justice within the Fundamental Rights may well imply that apart from classical liberalism, the Rawlsian version is also present within the Fundamental Rights. The similarity of Rawls with the welfare liberalism may well mean that there are other versions of
liberal strands at work. Further, the existence of numerous minority rights within the Fundamental Rights well indicates the existence of the recent multicultural liberalism within the Fundamental Rights.

Similarly there are other versions of liberalisms at work within the Directive Principles. As we saw the provision of universal civil code postulates the legal equality that was the hallmark of classical liberalism. The welfaristic programmes and the commitment to social justice should be taken to mean the existence of recent welfaristic liberalism found in Rawls and in others. Thus liberalism has changed a lot in course of its journey from a version that put individual of its center to a version that focuses the social and cultural aspects of the life of the individual, allowing for different cultures to flourish.

There is, however, another strand of liberalism that seeks to revive the precepts of classical economic liberalism. The exponents of this liberalism, Robert Nozick and F.A. Hayek stress on the property rights of the individual and consider that the inviolability of these rights puts a limitation on the state to interfere with these rights. Many consider that this is the rebirth of classical liberalism. They strongly attack the redistribution through the state as an illegitimate interference with the individual liberty. These theories contribute to the development of recent liberal market theories committed to the ideal of free market and globalization. This strand has come to be known as neo-liberalism today. The Right to practise, trade, business or occupation guaranteed by article 19(g) of the constitution can be taken to mean supporting this market liberalism.

Hence there are different variants of liberalism. Even though they can be well distinguished from other system of thoughts say Socialism or Marxism, by
virtue of sharing some common features they nevertheless exhibit different views of human being and society. But there are overlapping between them, for instance the Rawlsian liberalism's simultaneous espousal of respect for individual liberty grounded in a contract theory and an equal commitment to an egalitarian distribution to a point where inequalities is justified by an appeal to the benefits of the worst-off. This then indicates that though the different variants of liberalism touch the center ground they tend to pull in different directions.

And if the characteristics outlined above are true of liberalism then the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles cannot be confined to the classical liberalism and new liberalism respectively. There is presence of other versions of liberalism, even though it could be said that the two liberalisms discussed in this work are predominantly present within them.

Therefore on the basis of the preceding arguments it could be said that the presence of classical and new liberalisms in the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles respectively appears to be incidental rather than a deliberate design.