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In the previous chapter Kairon’s efforts and his contribution in making Punjab a modern state has been discussed. But during the same time, on the other side faction politics was on high rank in Punjab so the present chapter attempts to examine the nature and concept of factions, its gradual ripening in the Indian Congress Party on a state level with particular reference to Punjab and the various conditions which were responsible for the growth of factions and their subsequent outcome. The pivotal point of this study will be Partap Singh Kairon. Hence the said chapter deals with the issue of factionalism and whether based on the ego of leaders in the power struggle or the ideological clash of each faction within the party. Since, Punjab is mainly an agricultural state so the question arises whether these factions were born because of the rural or urban leadership, the younger recruits or the old members, well educated modern thinkers or backward thinkers or the central government’s interference in the state level functioning?

Nature of Factionalism

The term factionalism is derived from faction, a 14th century French word and the Latin word factio, which means, “political party, class of persons, or a making or doing.” Before that, it appeared in ancient Rome, where it meant, “one of the companies of contractors for the chariot races in the circus (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2016).” According to Cambridge Dictionary a faction is, “a group within a larger group, especially one with slightly different ideas from the main group.” Merriam Webster Dictionary defines factions as, “a party or group (as within a government) that is often contentious or self-seeking.” It can be a group within a larger group with different ideas and opinions than the rest of the group.

“Faction” refers to social groups of dynamic complexities with an opposition to similar groups. Harold Lasswell (1931, p. 49) defined a faction as “any constituent group of a larger unit which works for the advancement of particular persons or policies.” He also noted that, “the term itself drops out of usage when certain lines of
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cleavage have become rather permanent features of the political life of a group; these divisions are accepted as Parties (Boissevain, 1964, p. 1275).” Sartori defines faction as, “Faction, which is by far the older and more established term, derived from the Latin verb ‘facere (to do, to act)’ and faction soon came to indicate, for authors writing in Latin, a political group bent on a disruptive and harmful facere, on ‘dire doings.’ Thus the primary meaning conveyed by the Latin root is an idea of hubris, of excessive, ruthless and thereby harmful behavior (Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, 1976, pp. 3-4).”

The term “faction” refers to opposite social aggregations and divisions, focused on turbulently achieving their personal goals instead of focusing on the society as a whole. Firth pointed out that they are loosely ordered groups with structurally diverse bases of recruitment activated on specific occasions only. He stated that structural units of a sub-society might be regarded as factions by the society at large (Firth, 1957, pp. 292-293).

According to Jones, “It is a collection of individuals within an organization or institution which operates together in politics long enough or with sufficient regularity to become recognized as a discreet group (Jones, 1974, p. 71).” Myron Weiner defined “faction” as a group with coherent goals, operating within a larger organization without the approval of the parent body. It is generally characterized by a uniformity of goals and basic values and has varying member strength with a capacity to develop a sense of identification among them. There is little movement into and out of the faction. Except in its formative stages, it does not generally recruit members openly (Weiner, 1957, p. 237). It is a group of households within a caste or sub-caste, which rally together for rites, rituals, ceremonies, community activities and stay together in conflict, cooperation and neutrality (Singh B., 1961, p. 4). Factions, thus, are sub-groups within groups.

“Factionalism is overt conflict in a group which leads to increasing abandonment of co-operative activities (Seigel, 1960, p. 399).” A faction represents a restricted interest based on caste, kinship or other social relations. Sometimes, factions
comprise of different castes. It is relatively unstable, temporary and loosely aligned (Rastogi, 1975, p. 32).

Factionalism competes for limited means and abilities. It occurs in various forms and is globally prominent. On a rural level it defines power structure (Dube, 1968). In terms of political parties factionalism is the conflict among several groups to capture the party organization with the objective of power. Thus factionalism refers to antagonism between groups and is an intrinsic part of political life. In many societies factions have become endemic with a range of cultural and symbolic trappings and thus there is a need to understand what is a faction? The definition of a faction is a group of people elected on the grounds of personal ties by a leader.

**Theories on factionalism**

Many Indian and foreign scholars gave their interpretation about factionalism. Famous among them are:

One of the most sought after anthropologist, Ralph W. Nicholas, in his work, *Segmentary factional political systems*, discussed political factionalism keeping subgroups in sight. Nicholas stated, “I regard factionalism as primarily a political activity or phenomenon. By ‘political activity’ I mean organized conflict over public power (quoted in Swartz, 1966, p. 52).” He drew an analogy between politics and a fighting arena where factions wrestled to dismantle the system (Swartz, 1966, p. 54) (Factionalism). He (1965:27) listed five characteristics of the factions: conflicting groups, political groups, Non-corporate groups, the followers of the leader, and the members of the same ideology or principles. According to Nicholas (1967:27), “It is during the social conflict that factions emerge out of a sociologically undefined background to give the observer a view of their personnel, i.e., factions emerge to achieve something through conflict.”

There are two views about political character of factions. Firth (1957), Epstein (1952) and Nicholas (1965) consider factions as political groups that emerge only during political activities. Epstein (1962:129) further says, in the form of mutual oppositions, these factions may be referred to as political units. Factions become active in all situations of influence and prestige. Firth (1957:292) says that factions emerge
largely under political effect. However, in other fields they operate to pressurize social order. Thus they are not social but political groups.

Firth (Firth, 1957, pp. 292-293) defines factions as “groups or sections of the society in relation of opposition to one another, interested in promoting their objects rather than those of the society as a whole.” He says that political parties are the chief fields of operation for the factions.

Bernard Seigal and Beals (Seigel, 1960, p. 399) in their paper “Pervasive Factionalism” define it as, “factionalism is overt conflict within a group which leads to the increasing abandonment of co-operative activities.” According to this definition, factionalism is the failure of the community to achieve common goals due to the failure of other members of the group to conduct them properly.

In the words of J. Siegel and A. R. Beals, factionalism is an, “overt, unregulated (unresolved) conflict, which interferes with the achievement of the goals of the group (Siegel & Beals, 1960, p. 108).” Further the definition was split into two groups: one inter-personal and the other political. The way in which these factions came under stress was observed and its influence on the group’s activities noted (Siegel and Beals, 1960, pp. 108-116) (Factionalism). On an attitudinal level, factionalism failure is attributed to non-conduct of its members. The individual feels that he would not benefit even if the enterprise succeeds. The pervasive factionalism suggested above is a socio-cultural phenomenon. Thus, its roots lie in external pressures, which either create conflict or re-channel it along the lines of pervasive factionalism. Yet many communities subjected to different kinds of external pressures do not develop pervasive factionalism.

J. S. Yadava (Yadava, 1968, p. 907) gave his opinion on factionalism as, “factionalism to a greater extent is disruptive and is a hindrance in the achievement of the specific goals of the community. Still, it has some ancillary positive functions. It helps in breaking down the traditional caste boundaries and promotes inter-caste relations on an equal basis and thereby improves the prospects of establishing a democratic socialistic pattern of society in India.” He tried to show how factionalism cuts out caste limitations and tries to promote a democratic set up. He further says, “the
leaders of the factions recruit the members and make coalition and alliances with other factions having similar interests in order to oppose another faction or group of factions on specific issues. Thus the leaders have links and this result in forming action sets of varied complexities (Yadava, 1968, p. 908).” While others felt that factions have political field of operation only, J. S. Yadava found that their political operation is influenced by social and economic interactions. He did not agree with Firth (1957) and Nicholas (1965) and others who maintain that factions “operate for the most part in the political field or with political effects in other fields (Firth 1957:292).” Yadava’s contention is that factions are “quasi-groups” that operate at social and economic levels too, though their boundaries become evident only in conflicts that give these social constellations a political realm. Thus these “quasi-groups” become ego-centered “action-sets” (cf. Mayer 1966:97-121). On a community level conflict, these smaller action-sets merge into major action-sets of varied complexities centered round the village leaders. So, according to Yadava faction has a flexible composition with not only a political field of operation, but also a social and cultural one.

Paul Brass, in discussing the subject of Congress politics in post-independence Uttar Pradesh, writes: “...fractional loyalties provide the link between the parochial units of Indian Society-family, village, caste-and the political parties. Factional loyalty is an intermediate, perhaps a transitional, form of politics. It is something ‘more’ than parochial politics-a politics based on language, caste, tribe, or religion-and something ‘less’ than party politics in the European and American sense, involving an impersonal allegiance to a party as an institution or as an ideology (Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pardesh, 1966, p. 114).” In the words of Paul Brass, the factions and factional conflict made both constructive and destructive changes in the Congress Party organization in U. P. but the destructive changes were more prominent than the constructive.

In another book, according to Paul Brass, “At every level of the system, factionalism, personalism, and opportunism rather than ideology, party ties, nationalism, or communalism have structured routine conflict and alliance patterns. Factional conflict are sometimes suppressed or attenuated at the bottom and the top of the system; at the bottom, when one local leader or leaders have overwhelming power;
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at the top, where it is hard to maintain the links in the chain of support that lead to a leader’s local structures of power. At the middle levels, particularly at the provincial level factionalism is generally rampant. (Brass, The New Cambridge History of India IV.1 The Politics of India since Independence, 1994, p. 24)

Joyce Pettigrew (Pettigrew, 1978) argues that factions are based on the mutual protection of each other’s area of influence and not just an ideological commitment, the roots of which can be found in the medieval history of Punjab. The author feels that in a Jat society, factionalism divides it into vertical units on the basis of village residence, clan, caste and class. At state level, members of a faction justify their actions for the “public good” while those of the villages and local areas relate their actions to izzat (prestige). She says that factions try to control resources, material goods, offices and personnel of the whole unit within which they operate. Moreover, personal, professional, religious and politico-economic ties or any combination of these are the basis of factions. Pettigrew reveals that the vertical association between the leaders of the faction at the state or local level is the desire to acquire and maintain power. Thus, factions depend on vertical relations and where factions are strong, horizontal ties are evidently lacking.

Giovanni Sartori (Sartori, Party and Party Systems: A Framework for analysis, 1976) highlights that factionalism is based on the importance of personalities. Its ideologies are highly mixed with interests and experiences. This is an effective camouflage to legitimize a power-seeking group, which cannot be uncovered by the observers. The author believes that a faction may be clientele based, which determines whether a group is in or out of power. It is related to broad cultural styles and in a minor way to creed.

B. K. Nagla (Nagla, 1984) sites that factions are not an independent phenomenon but are structurally linked by divergent groups such as caste, leadership, land-owners and political parties. The author, maintains that socio-structural base of factions has remarkably changed, from being socio-cultural, accommodating and primordial to politico-economic in nature, based upon legal and rational principles. Its nature is determined by regionalism, diversity, homogeneity and interest configuration.
Ranvir Sharma (Sharma, 1977) considers factionalism as a means to gain power, mostly with personal ends, or to implement policies, mostly as a negative epithet to overrun political adversaries. Factionalism rouses people’s interest as it leads to the rise or fall of a glorified or hated political leader. The author says that personality clash remained the most and ideology the least important. The external relations of party and the frequent intervention of the Central High Command caused Factionalism and also the differences over the implementation methodology of various schemes and projects.

Satya M. Rai (Rai S. M., 1965) argues that Congress High Command’s partial attitude towards Punjab led to factionalism in the Punjab Congress. The power-struggle remained the background factor. Moreover, the weak and immature leadership of the leftist parties forced the Congress to alliance with the communal forces, leading to factionalism.

So, most of the scholars view Factionalism as a political activity or conflict over political and economic power during political activities. Some say that Factionalism controls organizations like panchayats, while others consider it as a conflict for acquiring village power. Yet others call it a socio-economic activity among kinship groups.

**How factionalism emerges and works?**

Factionalism has become an evident strategy to gain position, prestige and social status. They signify a state of dispersal with respect to a former group in which they have existed. Factionalism has its nucleus within the capsule of intra-group conflict (Narayan, 1969, p. 162). Interaction among individuals of similar privileges promotes an encompassing corporate identification but spurs conflict among differently privileged individuals leading to the formation of two or more opposing groups (Michael, 1978, p. 297). Such groups are capable of association and disassociation, harmony and disharmony. Due to intra-familial, intra-class, inter-clan or inter-ethnic reasons, conflict in a group is a normal phenomenon and isn’t totally disruptive.

Factionalism is born through monopoly over official and unofficial positions (Nagla, 1984, p. 5). It has three aspects: requirements, duration and activity. These three criteria can be used in analyzing factionalism at various levels. The socio-cultural
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Factors like religion, language and caste play a very important role at different stages. The emergence of factionalism within a group indicates a change in-group relationship dynamics. If it is seen as a system output, then the question of system input arises, which can come from only two sources: first the external environment and second the internal elements i.e. individuals. Both the inputs may act conjointly according to the environment. This would intend a system-state in which the up rise of factionalism is associated with the terms of major alterations in the group’s environment (Seigel, 1960, pp. 414-415).

Factionalism is an intra-group development. In terms of political parties, factionalism refers to the struggle amongst several groups to withhold the party organization. The reason behind such conflicts is always power. One faction seeks to overpower the other, achieving power at the stratum of ladder where it is located. Factionalism runs vertically. It may run from the top to the bottom or from the bottom to the top. If there were a state level conflict in a political party, it would percolate to the lower units like districts, blocks and villages. The state level factional leaders would then tend to mobilize resources in order to support both state and lower levels. This they would do by manipulating fundamental loyalties like communalism, language, casteism and regionalism. They would try to woo the party members by distributing gifts or promising various benefits. Factionalism may take the reverse gear at times. If a Congress Party village unit, for example, suffers from factionalism, the rival groups would tend to win the support of the prominent leaders the said party. Rarely would be the party at a higher rung of the ladder be broken due to the split at a lower point. But if there are differences at the higher level, the lower level shall suffer its blows. In other words, it would be easier for the leaders of village factions to gain the alliance of higher-level leaders who are already placed in charge of rival factions. It is thus evident that factionalism would tend to run faster from the top to the bottom than the other way round. Factionalism has a tendency to spill over horizontally too. Every political party in India has different organizations meant to perform different functions at national, state, district and local levels, each having some affinity, direct or indirect, with the power structure of the party. If supposedly a factional conflict starts in the Congress
Party at the state level, it would not remain confined to that unit for long. Sooner or later, it will percolate to other organization of the Party at that level. Prominent political leaders try to gather majority through groupism and tend to use these groups to quiet their rivals within the party, and to seek complete control for personal benefits and self-applaud (Mohapatra, 1985, pp. 2-4).

Several factors cause the growth of factionalism in a political party. They are inter-related and may include ethnic disorders, cultural cleavages, societal schisms, political upheavals and prevalence of multi-party system, where factional fights become irreconcilable leading to political splits. In a two-party system, factional differences are reconcilable to avoid loss of power from one party to another. In a one-party dominant system, intra-party factionalism is not uncommon. Caste, landowners, leadership and political parties too generate factions. Earlier, only the socio-cultural factor caused changes and was both accommodating and primordial. Now, it is, the politico-economic factor, based upon rational and legal principles that cause changes. Factionalism is influenced by several factors such as diversity, regionalism, homogeneity and interest configuration (Singh D. A., 2008).

A group of people subscribing to an ideology is called a political party but there can be a variation in adhering to it. At times, these differences are so deep that they can lead to an intra-party crisis. Thus, a faction can be termed as a ripple, rising within the waves of a political party that wants to control the organization and capture the seat of power in the state. Hence, it remains in a flux condition because of the dynamic change in combinations. This in turn causes disasters in the government programme, outdating various laws and encouraging antipathy among the people of the same party. In simple words, factionalism is a deal-breaker within an organization. Thus, faction is a group within a group that is in conflict over a particular issue. The main causes of emergence of these groups can be personal, ideological, institutional, political and social factors.

**Factionalism in Indian National Congress**

Established in 1885, Indian National Congress was at the top of the political hierarchy. It was the forerunner of nation’s freedom movement against the Britishers and helped spread nationalism. But, soon differences emerged within the party and were
evident even before it took form. Surendranath Banerjee (First President of INC) convened a national conference of the Indian Association at Calcutta. The timing clashed with the conference of the Indian National Union, the precursor of the INC, scheduled to meet and discuss almost the same issues (Zaidi, 1984, p. 19). According to Pattabhi Sitarammaya (Sitarammaya, 1946, p. 61) the Congress Party’s journey from 1885 to 1905, “was one even much based on a firm faith in constitutional agitation and in the unfailing regard for justice attributed to the Englishmen.” Basically, the Party seesawed between fighting against the British and chasing its own interests. Later in the 20th century the conflicts intensified as the movement widened.

Soon, the party broke into the moderates and extremists group. The moderates accelerated the basis of INC. They saw British rule with different perspectives. Surendra Nath Banerjee, Pheroze Shar Mehta, Madan Mohan Malaviya, G. K. Gokhale, Rash Behari Ghosh, Dadabai Naroji, W.C. Banerjee, Bishan Narayan Das, Nawab Syed Mohammed, R.N. Madholkar, Bupendrananth Basu, Satyender Prasad Sinha were prominent moderates (Misra, 1976, p. 3). The famous extremists were Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Bipan Chandra Pal and Lala Lajpat Rai. The extremists condemned the moderates for trusting Britishers and demanded complete political freedom. According to Aurbindo Ghose, “Political freedom is the life-breath of a nation, to attempt social reform, educational reform, industrial expansion, the moral improvement for the race without aiming first and foremost at political freedom, is the very height of ignorance and futility (Mehrotra, 1995, p. 123).” Congress, thus had goals and ideologies that were poles apart. Factions, invisible initially, became distinct at the Banaras Congress Session in 1905, where the extremists opposed the welcome ceremony of the Prince of Wales by the moderates and boycotted his visit. Moderates attempted to forge bonds but failed. Dadabhai Naroji came from England to preside over the 1906 Calcutta Session on the request of the moderates to counteract the election of Tilak as president of INC. They felt that Tilak’s president ship could portray Britishers that the extremists dominated Congress. The moderates used “self-government or Swaraj” as the official slogan to keep the extremists in place. The trouble erupted again when the term “Swaraj” was removed from the official resolution of the 1907 Surat session of
Congress. According to the moderates, “Swaraj” meant self-government under the British rule. But the extremist viewed “Swaraj” as self-government with complete independence (Sitarammya, 1946, p. 60). The factionalism widened and caused the split of 1907, when the extremists refused to accept Dr. Rash Behari Ghosh (a moderate) as the Congress President. The other reason of split was the shift of venue for annual session from Nagpur, where Tilak (an extremist) had a full majority, to Surat, which was Pherozeshah Mehta’s community (Mehrotra, 1995, p. 128).

Thus, the split in 1907 divided both moderates and extremists and weakened the cause for India’s independence. Thus, factionalism was the main reason behind Surat split. Mrs. Annie Besant made many futile efforts to reunite the moderates and the extremists, but the former feared the domination of the latter, once they entered the Congress. There was bi-factional between the above said groups, they being equally competent, but one of them always dominating the other. The moderates flourished till 1915, after which the extremists controlled the INC, during which, Tilak dominated with his Home Rule Movement.

Then arrived the Gandhi era, which united the INC with rapid changes from being an upper middle class organization to becoming a mass organization. Initiation of the mass movement, religious revivalist forces, modernization, industrialization and economic growth led to coalition of various classes in the Indian society, which impacted the INC. The upper middle classes opposed actions like Gandhi’s Non-Cooperation Movement. They preferred assisting the British in administration and economic development and pressurized Gandhi to suspend his Civil Disobedience. After Gandhi’s arrest the Swaraj Party declared abolishing the British rule and press for “Swaraj.” Leaders like G. S. Kharphade, Vithalbhai Javerbhai Patel, C.R. Das, Motilal Nehru, N. C. Kelkar, S. Srinivasa Iyengar and Jamnadas Madhavji Mehta, all belonged to the legal profession. They were called as “Swarajists” or Pro-changers (Misra, 1976, pp. 216-220).

In 1922, the Non-Cooperation Movement was halted, which laid the foundation for the rightist and leftist elements, the Socialist and Communists, in the INC. Cross-fertilization between Marxist and Gandhian ideas created Socialist factionalism whereas the terrorists turned as Communists (Misra, 1976, pp. 223-224). The revolutionary group further split in 1930’s, due to mass action and socialism. One group lined with
the Communists Party of India and the other formed the Congress Socialist Party in 1934. Thus socialists stood for complete Independence. The prominent socialist within Congress were Sampurnanand, Jayaprakash Narayan, Acharya Narendra Deo, Abdul Bari Purushottamdas, C. C. Banerjee, F. H. Ansari, A. K. Pillai, Ram Manohar Lohia, A. Patwardhan, Faridul Hug, Mrs. Kamala Devi Chatopadhyaya, M. R. Masani, Jawaharlal Nehru and others.\(^{141}\)

Another leftist faction within INC was the Communist led by S. V. Ghate. They showed no respect for private property and believed in armed revolution. Prominent Communists included B. T. Ranadive, S. V. Deshpande and G. M. Adhikhari. They were against Gandhi and his idols and were fighting to capture INC and change it into a revolutionary movement. They worked within the Congress and influenced it in the 1930’s and 1940’s (Williamson, 1933, pp. 109-111).

By the end of 1930’s, two more factions emerged under Subhash Chandra Bose and Jawaharlal Nehru; both believed in socialism but for Bose, the main appeal of socialism lay in its concern for the upliftment of the poor while Nehru saw it as a revolutionary change in the social structure ending vested interests in land and industry. Nehru’s opposition to Bose’s re-election as Congress President and his consequent rise in status as leader of the leftists led to the formation of Forward Bloc by Bose in 1939. Bose felt that the Congress ministers, after their electoral success of 1936-37, focused on enjoying the offices instead of wrecking the councils.\(^{142}\) Thus, power motivation between the two leaders created another party of the leftists. The Forward Bloc wanted to uplift the poor and it stood for complete independence of India through an anti-imperialist warfare with the help of other countries.

After this time, the radical democrats formed another faction, led by M. N. Roy, known as the “Royists.” Socialism, Communism and Marxism influenced this faction, which wanted to co-operate with the British government in its war effort. Revolutionary Socialist Party was another ALL-India United Front of revolutionaries that was formed during the March 1940 Ramgarh Congress Session. Their agenda was the collection of arms, provision of shelter to underground workers, the particulars of personnel, the collection of information regarding government and commercial installation and the

\(^{141}\) Home Department, Political, File No. 4/4/34, 1934, p. 17.
number of arms the police and other sources owned. They aimed to establish a socialist republic and a classless communist order. Their leaders were arrested at the end of 1940.¹⁴³

In general, all the parties and groups were united against British imperialism. When the Congress ministries resigned they were welcomed by a long-awaited opportunity to organize a resistance movement for national independence and use it as a revolutionary instrument of political and social change.

Again in 1940, Congress was split into three factions, one supporting parliamentary programme and the second, especially the socialists and radical elements, initiating a Civil Disobedience campaign to achieve independence. While such leaders as Sathyamuthi, Rajaji, Asaf Ali and Bhuabhai Desai represented the first; the second faction included the leaders of Congress Socialist Party, Forward Bloc and the CPI. A third factional group, led by Nehru and Maulana Azad, opposed the extension of non-violence to defense issues. But, it did not develop to the level of splitting the INC. Gandhi ably manipulated these factions, during the “Quit India Movement.” Thus multifactionalism, caused due to social and economic aspirations, personality clashes and organizational competitions were evident in the Congress for the first time in the 1930’s. It led to constitutional, peaceful or outright violent activities. Despite all, Gandhi held all the factions together, while no single faction could control the organization. After independence, factionalism arose in the INC during 1947 to 1967 due to leftist, rightist and centrist ideologies of power acquisition.

The sole aim of the Congress in its early years was attaining independence. It was a well-integrated organization as it lacked competitors. But as the Congress entered elections at various levels, they became increasingly gripped with the lure of power, which became intense in the post independence period. People with conflicting interests and backgrounds joined the Congress Party to gratify private interests. The party became an open system to improve its prospect in elections. Heterogeneity and incongruity became prominent. Mutually hostile and incompatible interests were born, which reduced it to a conflict system in which different groups competed for dominance. Although, the freedom struggle was the common goal, the lure of power created divisions, which led to the generation and growth of factionalism. As Ray points

¹⁴³ Home Department, Political, File No. 38/1/44-Poll (I), 1944, p. 78.
out, that although “personal ambition” is the prime motive force of forming intra-party alliances, still factional leaders exploit affinities like casteism, communalism, regionalism, of which the caste is the most important (Roy, 1966, p. 708).

**Factionalism in Punjab Congress**

The development of Congress factions related to the particular social basis, within the framework of historical events. With the awakening of three major communities’ viz. Hindu, Muslims and Sikhs marked a beginning of political mobilization which led to radical changes in a politically passive Punjab. Almost no feedback into an institutionalized national movement occurred and the Congress Party continued to be basically a paper organization unfit to the momentous events of 1920-21 (Mitra, 1922, p. 116). The early sign of factionalism can be seen from 1916. One of the important communal issues which developed and contributed to the development of factionalism in the Punjab Congress arose from the Lucknow Pact in 1916. Lala Lajpat Rai always opposed separate electorate and strongly criticized the pact (Mitra, 1922, p. 116). At that time there were two main factions: one was led by Lala Lajpat Rai and other by Satypal.

After the passing of Lala Lajpat Rai, the province was divided into small groups and parties each trying to have power and influence for its followers. For some time the two main groups were led by Dr. Satypal and Dr. Gopichand Bhargava (follower of Lala Lajpat Rai). Dr. Satypal was followed by the labour and student world, while Dr. Gopichand has at his command rich aristocrats and capitalists. Things went on like this for some time when ultimately various other groups were formed. But, with all this Gopichand Bhargava successfully maintained his position, being in possession of the Lajpatrai Bhavan with the workers of Tilak school of politics. Satyapal suffered the fate of the poorer class of Congress workers and had to go into oblivion for domestic reasons. The result of all this was that Punjab presented a very poor spectacle in politics although the workers were sincere and sacrificing. The sins of some leaders led the province into a dark abyss.¹⁴⁴

The position of Congress Party in 1937 election was very weak in Punjab. There was no organization of Congress in many districts of Punjab. There was a lack of

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finance of the Congress in the Punjab which was to play an important role during elections were in a very poor shape.\footnote{145}{The Tribune, 13\textsuperscript{th} April, 1936.} As discussed above, leaders of the Congress were divided on personal basis into two groups, Satyapal and Bhargava. Every leader was trying to strengthen his position in the Provincial organization by taking the support from the main leaders of All India Congress Committee (here after AICC). The differences in these factions groups were not based on any ideology and this was the result of factionalism that Congress loosed 1937 election of Punjab Province very poorly.

In a note on Punjab politics, AICC itself agreed that there were wide gaps between the High Command and the lower strata workers of Punjab. Whenever, any members of the High Command visited the province, he was captured by some of the chiefs and things were managed so carefully that people who were not desired by them were kept finely away for the time. The report on Punjab politics stated as, “The Council and Assembly seats are the main objects for which the groups fight. That best Congress men should be elected for the seats is no business of these men. ‘Our men should be elected’ is their goal.”\footnote{146}{Punjab Politics, AICC, File no. 16, 1945-46, p. 259.}

Factions in Punjab politics was a big worry for High Command. Nehru also agreed with the fact that Congress in Punjab was in a sorry state for all the previous years and during the general elections there was unsavoury that came out. Nehru was very much surprised to know about Satypal’s decision of resigning from Congress. Nehru in a reply to Lala Duni Chand’s letter expressed his feelings as, “I am not concerned with his (Satypal) motives but by the fact that at a critical stage he deserted the Congress, went completely against our declared policy and jointed the military when we were asking men not to do so.”\footnote{147}{Nehru to Lala Duni Chand, 26\textsuperscript{th} August, 1946, AICC, P-16/1945-46, p. 39.}

Before 1946 elections, when Dr. Satypal left the Congress and joined as a doctor in the military during the Second World War, therefore, his faction was being led by his followers and to some extent by Bhim Sen Sachar. In fact, one of his followers, Kedar Nath Saigal, was considered to be the leader of the Satypal group. There was also a group of Akali leaders led by Master Tara Singh, which was against the Satypal group.
but had good relations with Dr. Kitchlew and Gopi Chand Bhargava. Although, there existed two groups, Bhargava’s and Dr. Satyapal’s, there was a third group in the Congress, which was called the Kitchlew group. But in Kitchlew group, there were people who were also in the Bhargava group and theirs was practically one group in the Congress, since, Dr. Kitchlew and Bhargava were of the same view. Then at the same time, Mian Ifīkharuddin came on the scene. He was pro-communist. But when the Akalis joined the Congress, and Partap Singh Kairon became General-Secretary of the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee before 1946, Mian Ifīkharuddin became President. These groups also had their association with the leaders of Congress High Command as Dr. Bhargava was follower of Patel and Sachar was of Maulana Azad and Nehru.

As discuss above, Congress was a faction ridden party even before independence and factional fights for power in organization continued more strongly after independence. Gopi Chand Bhargava became first Premier of East Punjab as Sachar remained in Pakistan for his volunteered services. When Sachar returned back to India, both leaders tried to increase their support for political power. Now, they were making associations with Akalis for their own profit. After Sachar’s arrival in East Punjab, he also started dreaming about Premiership of the said Province.

After Sachar’s return to East Punjab, in April, 1949, he sponsored a motion of no-confidence against Bhargava by proving to High Command that Bhargava was a weak administrator. Some people also believed that Sachar took the assistance of Giani group of panthic members, on the promise of more representation in the cabinet and share in power otherwise. Bhargava resigned from the leadership of the party before the motion could be considered. So, in this way, Sachar first time became the Chief Minister of Punjab with the board suggestion of a composite cabinet (it was called composite ministry because it included members from both factions of Congress) with Bhargava as its minister. But this composite government did not work smoothly due to factions politics because now Bhargava started criticizing the working of ministry. Partap Singh Kairon was not included in this ministry. The Congress High Command

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148 Lala Jagat Narain, Oral History Transcript, NMML, p.69.
149 Gopi Chand Bhargava’s Statement, 23 June, 1951, AICC 2nd Installment, Sr.no 1865/ 1951, p. 4.
advised to establish composite ministry because it was necessary for East Punjab to save it from factional politics. But, unfortunately, it failed to fulfill the dream of High Command. Nehru in addition expressed his feeling as, “I understand now that though there is this composite ministry, it hardly functions together or as a team, and in fact there is even told that you and Dr. Gopi Chand are not on speaking terms with each other. This is an extraordinary state of affairs. How can a ministry function in this way and how can a Premier function if he does not take his colleagues into his confidence?” According to Nehru, it was the responsibility of the Premier to deal with ministry’s function. He stated as, “Even if the error happens to be on other side, nevertheless the responsibility of the Premier remains and he has to demonstrate that he is big enough to hold his ministry together as a team and make it function affectively.” On his reply to Nehru, Sachar assured Nehru that administration of Punjab was improving fast and also denied that he and Bhargava were not on speaking terms. Sachar wrote that, “It is quite untrue that Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava and I are not on speaking terms. I think at least thrice during these two months Dr. Gopichand has taken tea or lunch at my place and I have also responded to his invitation to a dinner. Reports made to you are suggestive of the petty-mindedness, if not malice, of the persons reporting. There is no difference on fundamentals.” Here in letter Sachar assured Nehru that he and Bhargava had cordial relations but in reality they didn’t want to see an eye to eye each other.

Sachar was very much upset with Bhargava about his role in his composite ministry. Nehru through a letter asked to Sachar that why he approached to Parliamentary Board to dissolve the composite ministry? Because on this issue, Nehru also received information from Gopichand Bhargava through a letter that Sachar was not cooperating with him and also trying to dissolve the composite ministry. Nehru wrote to Sachar that this was a wrong step for him to suggest any such thing and advised him to take his colleagues into full confidence and discuss everything with them. If there was any report that reached his ear, put it to them as it will be the right course always.

150 Nehru to Sachar, 23rd June, 1949, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB/5, p. 18.
151 Ibid.
152 Sachar to Nehru, 30th June, 1949, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB/ 5, p. 21
153 Nehru to Sachar, 1st October, 1949, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB/4, p. 30.
disruption of the ministry at that stage would have serious consequences for all concerned.

In response Sachar regretted that Dr. Gopichand’s information that he (Sachar) requested the Central Parliamentary Board (hereafter CPB) to dissolve the composite ministry was incorrect. Sachar argued that he simply asked a sincere cooperation. He also awared Nehru about persistent signature campaign for a no-confidence motion against him was being indulged in by some prominent members of the Assembly Party directly under the influence of Dr. Gopichand. On this issue, he wrote to Nehru that, “I have more than once brought this fact to the notice of Dr. Gopichand and have implored him to restrain these harmful activities of his friends, but I am very sorry to say that my request have met with no response at his hands. I should feel very grateful if the Chairman of the CPB could be asked to issue a directive to these gentlemen prohibiting the promotion of such a campaign, as it is obvious that, so long as the composite ministry lasts, such an activity on the part of a member of the party is completely out of order. In fact it should expose the member to disciplinary action.”154

In above said letter to Nehru, Sachar denied the charges leveled by Bhargava that he wanted to dissolve the composite ministry. But, his letter to Chairman of Congress Parliamentary Board cleared that he had an idea somewhere in his mind to drop Bhargava from the Ministry. As he wrote that, “The experiment of a composite Government can succeed only if either the Leader is free to change his colleagues if he finds them not loyal to him or the Parliamentary Board is prepared to take the action which, left to himself, the Leader would take.”155

So, it is clear from the Nehru-Sachar conversation that Nehru was very much distressed from the factional politics among Punjab Congress leaders and he often wrote letters to made healthy relations between them so that government’s work could not suffer. Nehru also made clarion call to end personal differences during his tour to Punjab from September, 17 to 19, 1949, because he was not happy with everything

154 Sachar to Nehru, 2nd October, 1949, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB/5, p. 38.
155 Sachar to Pattabhi Sitaramayya, 27th August, 1949, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB/5, p. 39.
except the party squabbles. Nehru had viewed that Sachar and Bhargava were responsible for the absence of unity in the political life of the province.\footnote{Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB/4, p. 31.}

**Factions: Congress leaders criticize Congress Government**

Due to internal strife and factional fight, there was lack of co-ordination between the organizational and administrative wings of the Congress. The policies of the government were criticized by the Congressmen. The Punjab Provisional Congress Committee (hereafter PPCC) appointed an anti-corruption board on January 14, 1950 to look into the cases of corruption. Partap Singh Kairon along with A.C. Bali and Balwant Rai Tayal were appointed as members.\footnote{The Tribune 14\textsuperscript{th} January, 1950.} By this time Partap Singh Kairon had become a dominant figure in the Congress organization.

The faction groups were not hidden in Punjab and leaders of Congress themselves frankly spoke about their loyalties to different groups. For example, Lala Jagat Narain himself agreed in his interview that he belonged to the Bhargava group although there were no ideological differences between these factions and they were personal groups. According to Narain, “There was no ideology, you see, they were only personal groups as far as I can gather from their working.”\footnote{Lala Jagat Narain, op. cit, p. 70.} Even Bhim Sen Sachar in a letter to Mohan Lal Gautam, General Secretary of AICC called parties to his and Bhargava’s group.\footnote{16\textsuperscript{th} April, 1951, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB-56, p. 127.}

At the end, Sachar came to point which he was denying before Nehru and demanded permission from the board for a cabinet of his own choice. The board agreed to allow him to have it provide if he would obtain a vote of confidence in him from the party. It was in October, 1949, but Sachar failed to get a vote of confidence. And again, Bhargava became the commander of Punjab Government with the board’s permission to have a cabinet of his own choice. At this time, Nehru was out of India and Patel supported Bhargava in dropping of Sachar (follower of Nehru) and gained Chief Minister ship for him. On the other side, Sachar, thereupon, issued press statements attacking Bhargava, Congress Party and Parliamentary Board. He also initiated a campaign against the government throughout the state and made speeches against the
government on the floor of Legislative Assembly. All this was invariably reported to the board but no action was ever taken against him. He, therefore, continued to work and conspire against the government inside and outside the Assembly.160

Now, Bhargava was believed that other group of Congress was trying to weaken his position. When Partap Singh Kairon was not given a berth in cabinet of second ministry of Bhargava which was established on October 29, 1949, he joined hands with Sachar against Bhargava. In a statement, Bhargava gave his views that Partap Singh Kairon who firstly failed to win over the Giani group and Nagoke group, aligned himself completely with Sachar and they both turned their attention towards members in the Congress and were thus able to add a few to their folds. In this way, Kairon and his group sponsored a vote of no-confidence against Bhargava in March, 1951.161

A resolution was passed by Congress High Command to prevent faction in Punjab Congress. According to resolution, “the formation of special groups within the Congress, either on the part of majority or a minority is thus to be deprecates as they tend to create hostile factions and disrupt the organization.”162 But there was no affect on factions groups of this resolution and they continued with their factional politics.

Bhim Sen Sachar wrote a letter to Nehru in which he criticized Bhargava government and laid charges of corrupt practices in the administration. Sachar wrote as, “It is my submission that the continuance of Dr. Bhargava as Chief Minister would mean an increase of communalism and corruption, and in consequence general deterioration would set in heavily. That Dr. Bhargava has increasingly lost reputation during last one and a half year is not my personal opinion only but of the whole public of the province.”163 On other side, Kairon also bitterly criticized Bhargava government’s policies publically in Shahidi conference held at Rupar on Baisakhi Day. He appealed for communal harmony and constructive work in furtherance of the interests of the Congress. A resolution requesting the CPB to establish a ministry which enjoyed the complete confidence of the masses was also passed. The Conference

160 Gopi Chand Bhargava’s statement, 23rd June, 1951, AICC 2nd Installment, Serial no 1865/ 1951, p. 4.
161 ibid, p. 5.
162 The Tribune, Ambala, 20th April 1951.
163 12th April, 1951, AICC, 2nd Installment, Serial no 1865/ 1951, p. 173.
expressed the hope that the board would install ministry consisting of “honest, experiences and tried Congressmen, who could set right the disturbed conditions in the state.” Thus Sachar and Kairon group was fighting together against Bhargava at that time.

On the other hand, Bhargava’s group of Punjab Legislative Assembly members met with Parsshotam Das Tandon, President and Mohan Lal, General Secretary, of the Congress and explained that criticism by Partap Singh Kairon and Sachar against them was absolutely unjustified. So, it is clear that how one group was speaking against the others and blaming each other. The members of Dr. Gopichand Bhargava group brought various allegations against Partap Singh and Sachar and Sri Ram Sharma, who sponsored the no-confidence motion against Dr. Gopichand Bhargava. They also blamed that Surjit Singh Majithia financed Partap Singh and Sachar group and it is estimated that nearly fifty thousand rupees were spent in support of the group. In a letter to Kala Venkata Rao, Gopichand Bhargava blamed that Partap Singh Kairon delivered a speech in February, 1957 in which he stated that the Punjab Ministry was not a Congress Ministry and, therefore, he would not leave any stone unturned in overthrowing it.

The differences between the Pradesh Congress Organization and the Punjab Ministry created an unhappy situation in the state and the CPB on several occasions, met with Partap Singh Kairon, Gopichand Bhargava and other leaders in this connection and attempted to bring said leaders together. In this connection, Mohanlal Gautam (General Secretary of AICC) wrote a letter to Kairon and advised him that in the interests of the Congress organization, as well as of the state, the rift must not be widened. He wrote as:

Many public statement made by you or other prominent leaders of the state only accentuates the feeling. You will certainly agree with me that at this stage mutual acrimony and accusations, especially through public speeches and press statements, will not clarify the situation. Rather, it will worsen. We have received several complaints against the editorial

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164 The Tribune, 17th April, 1951.
comments of Shri Jagat Narain Lal, General Secretary of the Punjab Pradesh Congress Committee that comes out regularly in his daily paper criticizing the policy of the Punjab Government in bitter terms.\textsuperscript{167}

He therefore, requested Kairon and his friends to avoid this form of criticism of the Punjab Government.

In March, 1951, Bhim Sen Sachar and Partap Singh Kairon presented a memorandum to High Command which laid charges of corrupt practices against Bhargava and his failure to provide the state with an efficient and strong government.\textsuperscript{168} Before this, Bhargava survived no-confidence motion with margin of only four votes 35 votes favored him, 31 against him and four members were absent out of total 70 legislators forming the Punjab Congress Assembly Party.\textsuperscript{169} Kairon-Sachar group even ignored Kala Venkete Rao, General Secretary of AICC instructions\textsuperscript{170} that no Congressmen stand for or support the motion of no-confidence of which notice has been given by some opposition members but instead of this advice they were supporting it. The Sachar group leveled charges against Bhargava that questionable methods were employed by Bhargava to save his ministry during no-confidence motion. According to them, many members who were favouring no-confidence changed their loyalty to Dr. Bhargava at the eleventh hour because of tempting offers given by Bhargava ministry.\textsuperscript{171} The press also asserted that Dr. Bhargava avoided defeat only by using some questionable means and tactics. Partap Singh Kairon and Bhim Sen Sachar wrote in memorandum as:

They were firm view that the continuance of Dr. Bhargava’s ministry would spell certain ruin to the prestige of the Congress in Punjab. Corruption and inefficiency at the top are eating into vitals of the administration and thoroughly demoralizing the masses. With the present ministry in office it will be extremely difficult to face the electorate in the coming elections, as the ministry is very unpopular and intensely hated by

\textsuperscript{167} 1\textsuperscript{st} May, 1951, AICC 2\textsuperscript{nd} Installment, Serial no 1865/1951, p.159.
\textsuperscript{168} 12\textsuperscript{th} April, 1951, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB-56, p. 129.
\textsuperscript{169} Memorandum on Present Punjab Ministry, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB-56, p. 137.
\textsuperscript{170} Kala Venkete Rao to Partap Singh Kairon, 31\textsuperscript{st} March, 1951, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB-56, p. 153 and Proceeding of the Central Parliamentary Board meeting dated 31-3-1951, AICC 2\textsuperscript{nd} Installment, Serial no 1865/1951, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{171} Memorandum on Present Punjab Ministry, op. cit., p. 139.
the Punjab masses. We, therefore, submit that it is high time the Congress Parliamentary Board took a deeper interest in the Punjab affairs.\textsuperscript{172}

It was the result of constant demands of Partap Singh Kairon and Bhim Sen Sachar that CPB declared that the result of the no-confidence motion against Bhargava was indefinite and asked Bhargava to reshuffle his cabinet with consultation of Sachar-Kairon group on April 11, 1951. The High Command directed Bhargava to secure the election of a panel of ten members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly to enable the Board to select six ministers out of them. But Bhargava was in no mood to help expedite it, as he was not agreed with the decision of CPB of Congress Party. So, CPB advised Bhargava to resign from the post.\textsuperscript{173} On the June 11, 1951, Tandon called Gopichand Bhargava for an informal talk. According to Bhargava, in course of a conversation, Tandon suggested to him, at a personal level, to gave up the Chief Ministership of the state irrespective of the consideration as to what may happen thereafter. Bhargava explained that at this stage he (Tandon) did not, at all, disclose to him the fact of Jawaharlal Nehru having threatened to resign on the score of my continuation as Chief Minister.\textsuperscript{174} When Bhargava reached Shimla on the forenoon of the June 12, 1951, he got a telephonic message on the same afternoon from the Congress President directing that in view of the fact that Nehru did not like his continuing as Chief Minister of the state, he should resign straightway. He added that Nehru had, as a protest, against his continuation as such resigned from the Board and did not even attend the Board’s meeting on that day except by being present for a few minutes.\textsuperscript{175}

The Governor of Punjab, Chandulal Trivedi, went Delhi to discuss the situation in the state with Nehru, when no confidence motion against Chief Minister of Punjab, Gopi Chand Bhargava was defeated by four votes only. On this issue, parliamentary board was in delicate situation. Meanwhile, both the groups were adamant on their respective stands. According to a spokesman of the Bhargava group, ‘the Board has no

\textsuperscript{172} \textit{Ibid}, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{173} Sachar to Chairman of Congress Parliamentary Board, 2\textsuperscript{nd} May, 1951, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB-56, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{174} Gopi Chand Bahrgava’s statement, 23\textsuperscript{rd} June, 1951, AICC 2\textsuperscript{nd} Installment, Serial no 1865/ 1951, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Ibid}.
right to dump an undemocratic formula on him.” He said that if the Board’s directive was not reconsidered, “We will take up a stand against the Parliamentary Board and we will not resign so long as we have a majority.” Bhim Sen Sachar said that the board would now have to treat Bhargava’s stand as a challenge to its directive. According to him, the board’s directive did not violate the principal of democracy in as much as it was done by a higher body and in the interests of the Congress organisation.  

As Bhargava’s second ministry was dominated by the Akalis, and the Congress High Command was not happy with it. At the same time Sardar Patel who was the supporter of Bhargava passed away on December 14, 1950. Unfortunately, Bhargava could not get the confidence of Pandit Nehru and Maulana Azad. Patel’s death gave a fresh drive to the dissident inactive activities of Kairon-Sachar faction to dethrone Bhargava (Arora, Turmoil in Punjab Politics , 1990, p. 30). Then, the Congress High Command decided that although Bhargava’s ministry was in a majority, in view of the coming elections it should be thrown out and Governor’s rule must be imposed on the Punjab. The Congress High Command asked Bhargava to resign. Bhargava’s supporters did not agree with this but Bhargava told them that he could not disobey the Congress High Command, therefore, he resigned. On other side, Congress High Command gave order to Bhim Sen Sachar and Sardar Partap Singh Kairon that if the Governor called them to form a ministry because the Congress was in a majority in the Assembly, they should tell the Governor that they were not in a position to form it.  

So, when the Governor asked Sachar and Kairon to form a ministry they both told the Governor that they were not in a position to form a ministry and Governor’s rule was imposed on Punjab.

Soon after Bhargava’s resignation the lust for power gave birth to a new group. Among them one was dominated by Kairon-Jagat Narain and other was lead by Sachar and his group. But soon when Kairon-Jagat Narain group weekend the power of Sachar who became Chief Minister in 1952, conflicts emerged between Kairon and Jagat Narain. So the picture is clear, factional politics was so heavy in minds of politicians

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176 TOI, 14th May, 1951.
177 Lala Jagat Narain, op. cit, pp. 119-120.
that groups were taking birth within the groups or there were no permanent groups, they dissolved and emerge as a new group. The politicians were only behind political power.

After the elections of 1952, the question aroused who will be the next Chief Minister of Punjab. As Bhargava was angry with Congress High Command over the issue of allotment of tickets and resigned in protest. He fought as an independent candidate and lost the election. So, obviously he was out of race from Chief Ministership of Punjab. Most of the members of Congress Party wanted to elect Kairon as a Chief Minister. Jagat Narain describes it as:

We decided that we should see Pandit Nehru and Maulana Azad that Bhim Sen Sachar should not be foisted on us because he had no following-only some splintered groups like the Satypal group, were supporting him. Even, I may say, Dr. Satypal was also not in his favour. He was elected from Amritsar seat. Then the question arose, how to convince the leaders of our majority. So we got the signatures and placed them before the Congress High Command that more than seventy percent Congress MLAs wanted Sardar Partap Singh Kairon to be their leader and Chief Minister. But Pandit Nehru was adamant. He wanted a Hindu Chief Minister and he said that he had authorised Bhim Sen Sachar, about whom Nehru thought that he was a good administrator, therefore advised Jagat Narain to throw their weight in electing Sachar the leader. This created big disappointment in Jagat Narain’s camp.

The result of the general elections to the state legislature in 1952 also gave the impression that Sardar Kairon had a larger following among the members than any other single leader. He naturally hoped to be elected the leader of the party. But, it happened that, on the advice of the Congress High Command, Bhim Sen Sachar was elected as the leader and became the Chief Minister. Kairon was, of course, included in the cabinet. According to Sachar, in the interest of the smooth working of the cabinet, tried his best to accommodate Kairon in every possible way, the latter was throughout maneuvering to gather as much power as possible to become the leader himself. The only other minister who could compete with him in the matter of individual following,

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178 Ibid., p. 121.
179 Ibid.
both in the legislature and in the Pradesh Congress, was Jagat Narain, but by joining hands with Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir (the President of the Pradesh Congress), Kairon was able to secure a majority of seats in the elections to the Pradesh Congress Committee held in January, 1955. Soon after, the Congress Election Board was formed to nominate candidates for the local bodies and the District Congress Committees and, in these too; Kairon was able to secure a majority. Giani Gurmukh Singh Mussafir had thrown his full weight in favour of Kairon, because he was not very happy with Jagat Narain. In this way, Kairon at that time gradually increased his political power.

Before 1952, there were cordial relations between Sachar and Kairon and there were highly possible chances that the chair of Chief Minister brought sourness in their relations. Some members of Kairon group were not happy as Sachar being elected Chief Minister of Punjab so they took different measures. For example, Jagat Narain wrote an article in newspaper that Partap Singh Kairon was their leader not Bhim Sen Sachar.

In this way, differences started growing between Sachar and Kairon, as Sachar was thinking that it was happening on the signals of Kairon. For the personal benefits, group formation was changing as Sachar-Kairon group collapsed and then Jagat Narain who at one time was favouring Kairon for Chief Ministership became the biggest enemy of Kairon and levelled corruption and nepotism charges against Kairon in later stage. It is clear that there was no definite stand of any member of the Congress Party and they changed their stand according to situation favourable to them.

In a letter to Sachar, Nehru acknowledged that High Command choose Sachar as the leader of the Punjab Congress Legislative Party and advised him to make administration efficient and smooth working by putting down corruption and nepotism at all levels to make rapid progress. Nehru further wrote that:

Our success in elections is largely due to many good Congress workers and to the organization there and the leadership of Sardar Partap Singh Kairon. The Punjab of today, I rely more particularly on Sardar Partap

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181 Lala Jagat Narain, op. cit, p. 126.
Singh and you. It is necessary, that there should be fullest co-operation between you too as well as between both of you and others.\textsuperscript{182}

In the eyes of Nehru, Kairon was a strongest pillar of Congress Party because he played a very important part in the elections of 1952 for Congress’s won. He further advised Sachar that the question of the ministry in Punjab will be discussed with him and Kairon.\textsuperscript{183} But Sachar did not consult with Kairon regarding ministerial portfolio and this was the result of Sachar’s ignorance that Kairon was not satisfied with his ministerial portfolio in starting.

Sachar as Chief Minister took oath on April 17, 1952.\textsuperscript{184} As Partap Singh Kairon was not consulted before the allocation of portfolios, he was not satisfied and demanded “Revenue” to be included into his portfolios, which was allotted to Swaran Singh. On this issue, differences emerged between Kairon and Swaran Singh as both wanted this portfolio. Sachar tried to persuade Kairon to allow, ‘Revenue’ to Swaran Singh, as it can be too heavy for Kairon to manage but he did not agree. At the end, “Revenue” was allotted to Kairon with “Development” and two important portfolio, “Capital Project” and “Electricity” were given to Swaran Singh to satisfy both the leaders.\textsuperscript{185}

Sachar’s ministry did not run smoothly, as first there was dissatisfaction on the issue of portfolio between Kairon and Swaran Singh and then there was split among Jagat Narain and Ram Sharma. Now, Sharma and his friends were angry with Jagat Narain and Kairon that he (Sharma) was not given a square deal by them in Congress organization. On this issue Sharma’s group was dead set on a final trial of strength with Kairon and Jagat Narain at the earliest possible opportunity in the organizational setup. Sharma and his friends also believed that Sachar was prone to act in favour of Partap Singh Kairon and Jagat Narain. These views of Sharma’s group showed that their confidence in Sachar was declining.\textsuperscript{186} Sachar advised Ram Sharma to resolve the differences in an objective manner and to have friendly relations with Jagat Narain and Partap Singh.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{182} Nehru to Sachar, 26\textsuperscript{th} February, 1952, 1\textsuperscript{st} Instalment, PB-24, p. 12.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{184} Home Department, Political, 17\textsuperscript{th} April, 1952, File No. 2510-P-52/913, p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{185} Sachar to Nehru, 18\textsuperscript{th} April, 1952, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Paper’s, 1\textsuperscript{st} Installment, 1952-1956, serial no. 5, File no. PB/ 15, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{186} 8\textsuperscript{th} March, 1953, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB-7, p. 8.
\end{itemize}
Factionalism
Factions: Congress leaders criticize Congress Government

Sachar also informed Nehru about the disruptive activities in the Congress Party that the some members of the party in which main were Ram Sharma, Maulvi Abdul Ghani Dhar, Kedar Nath Sehgal, Bibi Shanno Devi and some members of Bhargava group jointly disturbing the smooth working of the Cabinet. Sachar also claimed that he wrote many times to Ram Sharma but he turned deaf ear to his advice.\(^\text{187}\) Nehru in response wrote to Sachar that:

Partap Singh briefly mentioned them to me also. I am quite clear that you should tell these people that these activities are not going to be encouraged and they must behave as disciplined members of the party. I am surprised also to read your correspondence with Shri Ram Sharma. It is quite absurd for ministers to work against each other.\(^\text{188}\)

Growing factions in Punjab Congress was a big headache for High Command. That’s why Nehru wrote a letter to Satya Pal about his participation and holding a meeting at his residence for forming a faction against the then present government. Nehru wrote that:

As you well know, faction has been bane of the Congress, as of other parties, in the Punjab, both undivided and divided. If we have to learn one lesson, it is this: that we cannot afford faction. Apart from this general rule, for a Speaker to be a party to it, is completely wrong. You will remember that when we had a talk last year, I referred to the necessity of avoidance of faction. It is a matter of distress for me that this kind of thing is beginning again in the Punjab. I would sooner wind up the Congress organization than permit this to grow.\(^\text{189}\)

But Satya Pal denied that any meeting held at his house or he ever attended any such meeting. According to Satypal, the report was false and malicious which was supplied by Sachar, the then Chief Minister to Nehru.\(^\text{190}\)

\(^\text{187}\) Sachar to Nehru, 8\(^{\text{th}}\) March, 1953, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, 1\(^{\text{st}}\) Installment, Subject File 23, p. 1.
\(^\text{188}\) Nehru to Bhim Sen Sachar, 14\(^{\text{th}}\) March, 1953, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, 1\(^{\text{st}}\) Installment, Subject File 23, p. 2.
\(^\text{189}\) Nehru to Satypal (Speaker of the EPLA and a Congress member), 15\(^{\text{th}}\) April, 1953, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB/ 33, p. 3.
\(^\text{190}\) Satypal to Kairon, 20\(^{\text{th}}\) April, 1953, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB/ 33, p. 13.
On this issue, Maulana Azad, member of the CPB, also warned the Punjab Congress Legislature Party that the Board was not prepared to tolerate recurrence of any factionalism and gave advise that no member, so long as he belonged to the party, had any right to carry on propaganda or try to create factions within the party. In a Press statement, Azad stated as:

For sometime past reports have been circulating in the Urdu press, that some of the members of the Punjab Congress Assembly Party are opposed to the intriguing for its downfall. There have been fantastic suggestions that some of these discontented members approached the High Command and sought its support. Sometimes ago, an Urdu appear reported that a meeting was held in Ludhiana where a member of the party announced publicly that the ministry had been given one month’s notice, and if the Ministry did not give satisfaction to these discontented members within period, a action would be taken to get the ministry replaced. The fact, however, is that the Central Parliamentary Board has never been approached by any Congress member of the Legislature, and is not aware of any discontent amongst members against the Ministry. Such talks, however unfounded and baseless, are apt to create misunderstandings and suspicion.  

Kairon with course of time progressively strengthened his hold on the masses with his developmental works, the State Legislative Party and in the Congress organization. The first major sign of the active groupism in Sachar ministry appeared in 1953, when two of the senior ministers in Sachar’s cabinet i.e. Ram Sharma and Jagat Narain fell out with each other. As Kairon and Jagat Narain were together at that time, Sachar also joined them. So, all of three got aligned against Ram Sharma and charged him of anti-party activities (Lal, 1984, p. 19). Ram Sharma was dropped from the ministry by Sachar in a dramatic manner. On July 22, 1953, Sharma refused to resign from the cabinet when Sachar asked him to resign. Therefore, Sachar resigned from his post and took oath again on the same day and dropped Sharma in reconstituted process.  

191 The Tribune, 24th April, 1953.  
192 Home Department Political, Notifications, 22nd July, 1953, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB-7, p. 4.
speech admitted that he had differences with Chief Minister which had arisen primarily because the Chief Minister interfered into the working of his portfolios without justification and unconstitutionally. He also accused Sachar for sending a baseless CID report against him to the Prime Minister that he along with other 25 MLAs had met at the house of the then speaker and decided to overthrow the Chief Minister. He also led charges on Jagat Narain of misusing his position to collect funds for his newspaper “Hind Samachar.”

Maulvi Abdul Ghanı Dhar critised Sachar’s act of dropping Ram Sharma from Cabinet in press statement as, “The Punjab Cabinet has not only been deprived of an able statement and a most popular and experienced Minister with the removal of Pt. Shri Ram Sharma, Minister for Local Self-government but the Cabinet has also lost stability.”¹⁹³ Now Ram Sharma group openly showed his sourness towards Sachar, Chief Minister of Punjab, for example, some anti-Congress activities of Maulvi Abdul Gani Dhar and his friends were reported at Ludhiana, where Sachar was attending oath taking ceremony of newly elected Panchs. When the procession of newly elected Panchs which was led by prominent Congress workers reached Chaura Bazar, some hooligans, mostly associates of Maulvi Ghani’s group, accompanied by some local Communist workers, burst out in anti-Congress and anti-Sachar slogans and attempted to break through the procession by force.¹⁹⁴

**Differences between Kairon and Sachar**

But soon numerous differences developed between Kairon and Sachar and a great struggle for control over the party organization culminated in a victory for Kairon. Kairon’s personality, attitudes, and style of leadership influenced profoundly all aspects of the functioning of the Indian political system. One time differences were aroused so much between Sachar (Chief Minister) and Partap Singh Kairon (Development Minister) that it became a big news in Punjab politics. An important factor said to be responsible for sharpening of the differences between the two leaders was their

¹⁹³ The Tribune, 24th July, 1953.
¹⁹⁴ Harbhagwan Moudgull (D.C.O, Urban Ludhiana) to General Secretary AICC, Musaffir President PPCC, Sachar Chief Minister, Punjab, Kairon Deputy Leader of Punjab, 2nd September, 1953, Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, PB/ 33, p. 32.
divergent attitude towards the recommendations of the SRC regarding Punjab. While Sachar wanted implementation of the Commission’s recommendations, integrating Punjab, PEPSU, and Himachal Pradesh, Kairon was reported to be in favor of leaving out Himachal Pradesh. Till this time, Kairon developed a good association with Jawaharlal Nehru because of his hard work in the field of development of state. At this time, Jagat Narain who previously favoring Kairon, united with Sachar because Sachar favoured him at the time of rift between Ram Sharma and Narain when after exit of Ram Sharma, his friends openly leveled charges of corruption against Jagat Narain. The episode of allegation against Narain by Sharma group also created rift between Kairon and Jagat Narain as it was rumored that Kairon encouraged allegations against Narain because he wanted to gain more power and to weaken Narain politically.

The Congress Working Committee in a meeting on July 19, 1955 criticised Sachar’s lenient attitude towards handling the Punjabi Suba agitation led by Akalis. Sachar assumed that Partap Singh Kairon was responsible for his dishonor. He sought permission of the Congress High Command to drop Kairon from his Cabinet. He requested approval from High Command to drop Kairon from his cabinet, but High Command rejected his idea by saying that there is no thought of displacing Kairon and replacing Kairon. Nehru was not happy with the rift between Sachar and Partap Singh Kairon and saw it as fatal for Punjab. Nehru in a letter to Sachar wrote that, “The government of Punjab was essentially based on two persons, namely Sachar and Partap Singh Kairon. The other really did not count very much.”

Although, Sachar was Chief Minister during 1952 to 1956, but in the eyes of Nehru, Kairon was more indispensable of the two. Nehru assumed that Sachar failed to win Kairon’s confidence and asked him to cooperate fully and win the confidence of Kairon.

The demand for Punjabi Suba was also rising at that time and a raid was conducted on July 4, 1955 to Darbar Sahib, Amritsar and a ban was also laid on slogans of Punjabi Suba by Sachar. But Sachar left the ban on slogans, holding of meetings, demonstrations and processions in Amritsar and also apologized for the entry of police in the premises of Darbar Sahib without consulting any of his cabinet colleagues. As a

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195 Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 16th December, 1955.
198 Ibid.
result, the executive committee of the Punjab Pradesh Congress Committee passed a resolution disapproving the decision of the state government. Differences arose so high within the party that forty one members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly presented their requisition notice to the Congress High Command to call a meeting to discuss the situation arising out of the lifting ban on linguistic slogans. An emergency meeting of the Central Congress Parliamentary Board was held at the residence of Pandit Nehru to consider political crisis. The high command stressed that Punjab Congress should sort out their differences and start functioning unitedly. The dissident M.L.A.’s were advised to support Sachar in the interest of the Congress organization and avoid a show down.

So, various efforts were made by High Command to resolved Sachar-Kairon differences. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (Union Education Minister of those times) intervened to resolve the problem and he gave an interview to Tribune that:

I am glad to say that all the differences between Mr. Bhimsen Sachar and S. Partap Singh Kairon are resolved. Complete unanimity is re-established between these two valuable leaders of the Punjab. Mr. Kairon has solemnly declared to support Mr. Sachar and the later agreed to take the entire Cabinet members into confidence regarding all important administrative matters.

But efforts of Maulana Azad proved as artificial patch up because fundamental differences always remained between them. The election of office bearers for the reception committee of the Indian national Congress’s annual session were supposed to be held on December 25, 1955. Prabodh Chandra (who as the first lieutenant of Sachar had resigned as a protest against certain activities of Partap Singh Kairon and since then announced to challenge the strength of the Kairon group in the reception committee elections) was announced as a candidate from Sachar-Narain group and other hand Mussafir-Kairon group was expected to put up their nominee. Hindustan Times stated on the situation that:

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It seems the two leaders had a serious of conferences since they together met Maulana Azad here a few days ago to achieve unity of hearts but the differences continue still. Their meeting took place in Amritsar yesterday. Mr. Kairon has reportedly set himself against the return of Mr Prabodh Chandra to his former post of Chief Parliamentary Secretary, Mr Prabodh Chandra resigned in protest against the Development Minister’s “overbearing” attitude during the Punjab Assembly’s debate on the S.R.C. report last month.\(^{202}\)

Several political observers were convinced that the affairs of the state Congress cannot be improved without drastic changes in the party leadership at that time. An interesting feature of the Punjab Congress leaders’ disputes was that they were entirely the result of personal factors and almost always connected directly or indirectly with the leadership of the Legislature Party. Immediately after the 1952 elections, Sachar was nominated Chief Minister by the High Command even though Kairon had the largest following. Four years after his nomination, Sachar derived his strength largely from Delhi and his following within the party consisted to a considerable extent of those, who, for some reason, were unable to be with the development minister. Political observers hold the view that the only permanent solution of the Punjab Congress dispute was either to encourage the emergence of a fresh set of leaders or to allow the contending groups to have a showdown.\(^{203}\)

With the passage of time, Sachar lost confidence of High Command as he failed to handle Akali agitation, administration’s handling and internal rift in his ministry etc. by the end of 1955, Kairon strongly criticised Sachar for his weak and soft policies towards the Akalis, and assured the Centre from time to time that if he would had in authority, he would have crushed the Akalis by this time. The Central Government wanted this and decided to give him a chance to prove his claims. So Bhim Sen Sachar was replaced by Partap Singh Kairon as Chief Minister. On January 14, Bhim Sen Sachar resigned from the leadership of Punjab Congress Assembly Party after his differences with Nehru. On January 21, a general meeting of the Punjab Congress

\(^{202}\) Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 29\(^{th}\) December, 1955.

\(^{203}\) Statesman, Delhi, 2\(^{nd}\) January, 1956.
Legislative Assembly Party was held at 3.00 p.m. at Chandigarh to elect a new leader to fill up the vacuum caused by Sachar’s resignation. On the same day Partap Singh Kairon was elected leader of the party. On January 23, 1956, Partap Singh Kairon became Chief Minister of Punjab and formed his ministry.

Kairon Indispensable

Nehru felt that Kairon was indispensable for Punjab and got him (Kairon) elected in place of Sachar. Nehru in order to clear decks for Kairon sent Sachar outside Punjab on a gubernatorial assignment (Governor of Orissa) (Arora, Turmoil in Punjab Politics, 1990, p. 58). With Kairon being Chief Minister, a change came into Punjab politics at first time a rural-oriented Sikh Jat became Chief Minister of the state and also who had full control over the ministerial wing and the organizational wing. There was a shift of power from a Hindu to a Sikh-Chief Minister. Nehru believed in the saying that iron cuts iron. That’s why he made Kairon Chief Minister of Punjab to suppress “Punjabi Suba” agitation in the region which was led by Sikhs. In turn, Kairon proved successful leader because being a Sikh himself, Akalis were not able to said that they were suffering in hands of a Hindu Chief Minister. Nehru believed in the saying that iron cuts iron. That’s why he made Kairon Chief Minister of Punjab to suppress “Punjabi Suba” agitation in the region which was led by Sikhs. In turn, Kairon proved successful leader because being a Sikh himself, Akalis were not able to said that they were suffering in hands of a Hindu Chief Minister of Punjab as they were saying in the case of Sachar. Kairon during his Chief Ministership suppressed the “Punjabi Suba” agitations led by extremist Akalis successfully, because being a Sikh and former Akali himself, he knew Master Tara Singh (the mastermind behind the demand of Punjabi Suba), and Akali diplomacy closely.

When Kairon became Chief Minister of the state, Sachar made allegations against Kairon that he had played a conspiracy against him to become Chief Minister of Punjab. Sachar had views that to undermine his position, Kairon and his supporters started maligning, rightly or wrongly, his three ministers, Jagat Narain, Chaudhari Lahri Singh and Chaudhari Sunder Singh. So far as Jagat Narain was concerned, this would also mean the removal of a very strong political adversary of Kairon in the Congress. Sachar had opinion that when the opposition made allegations of corruption and maladministration against his ministry, Waryam Singh of Kairon’s group made a violent speech against Jagat Narain and also while they criticized the other government departments for alleged corruption, not a word was said against Kairon’s department-

Since, the general election of 1956, there was continuous agitation in Punjab and also inner conflict in Congress Party. Certain communal elements started in Punjab in which Hindi agitation, Punjabi Suba agitation were main. Thus, Punjab became a battleground of communal forces and the whole atmosphere of the state was vitiated. The government had to deal with a very difficult situation. During this said period, a number of Congress members of the Legislature gave their full support to government but some even encouraged the forces which were attacking government, so very regrettable incidents took place in the course of this agitation. Partap Singh Kairon faced this serious situation with courage and determination. Although, Kairon was not personally responsible for the above said regrettable incidents, they resulted in adding to the communal bitterness in the state and were utilized for the purpose of attacking the Chief Minister. Kairon emerged from this long trial of strength with credit and enhanced reputation, so far as the administration was concerned.

The first instance was in 1958, when Prabodh Chandra’s faction led charges of malpractices against Kairon. About Prabodh Chandra it was well known that after a brief period of initial support, he opposed Kairon and also sought to get him removed from the Chief Ministership. According to AICC, a group gather round Prabodh Chandra as something in the nature of a vendetta was carried on against the Chief Minister. This was the reason that Punjab Legislative Assembly became a scene of unseemly conflicts between rival groups. Repeated efforts were made by High Command to put an end to this rivalry and conflict, but they did not succeed.

Prabodh Chandra was annoyed with Kairon on the issue of election of President for PPCC, where Kairon supported Devi Lal who won the said post and Prabodh Chandra lose. Besides this Prabodh Chandra was a member of Sachar group and during Sachar’s Chief Ministership, he resigned as protest against Kairon’s attitude on State

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204 Bhim Sen Sachar’s Papers, 2nd Installment, Subject File No. 53, p. 4.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
Reorganization Commission report and wanted to remove Kairon from the Chief Ministership. The then Congress President, U.N. Dhebar enquired in to the charges and submitted his report to the CPB which gave its finding on May 19, 1958.\textsuperscript{208} There were in all twenty five charges preferred against the Chief Minister. They are divided into three categories.\textsuperscript{209} In regard to charges in category first, that was related to some kind of corruption, none of them have been substantiated and some have been completely disproved as charges of this kind were brought without any justification. In the second category, were charges relating to some action in the interest of his family or others connected with him. Normally, one can not consider himself of such responsible for failings of some members of his family, but a person in his high position cannot rid himself of such responsibility. The third category related to irregularities in administration in which referred the various charges against Partap Singh Kairon and indicated High Command’s views with regard to them. As a result of investigation, High Command reached on the conclusion that:

There was no basis at all for any corruption but in some charges relating to his family members or others associated with him, certain improper ties were committed. While Partap Singh might not have been personally aware of these, a person in his position must be deemed to be constructively responsible. There were certain procedural irregularities also committed in administrative matters were the views of High Command on the above said issue.\textsuperscript{210}

The enquiry let it for Congress Party in the Legislative Assembly to decide whether they had confidence in Kairon as Chief Minister or not. Thus, the opinion of the Congress Legislature Party was obtained by a secret ballot and Sardar Partap Singh succeeded in getting the vote of confidence of the party by an overwhelming majority.

A feeling someway prevailed among the high-ups in the centre that Kairon did not recognize any other leader in Delhi in spite of Nehru. On November 20, 1958, Kairon announced Darbara Singh as his candidate, which was not accepted to other groups in Congress so they approached to High Command to not put Darbara Singh as

\textsuperscript{208} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{209} \textit{ibid}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{210} \textit{ibid}, pp. 1-6.
President of PPCC and High Command agreed with their demand. But the circle closed to Kairon got very distress and a deputation meet to Nehru who had no objection in Darbara Singh’s candidature but he advised them to meet with Dhebar (President of AICC) in this connection. According to Mohan Lal (who was minister in Kairon’s Cabinet at that time), when the deputation met with Dhebar on above said issue, his reactions were like, “Today, Kairon recognizes only one person in the country and that is Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. A day will come when he will not even recognize Pandit Ji (Lal, 1984, p. 44).” He was obviously expressing to them the general feeling among the central leaders other than Pandit Nehru, and wanted to convey it to Kairon. Darbara Singh was allowed to contest, and the election took place at Patiala as per schedule. The rival group adopted Brish Bhan as their candidate and most of opposite groups joined together to support Brish Bhan in which main were Gopichand Bhargava, Giani Gurmukh Singh Mussafir, Giani Jail Singh, Giani Kartar Singh and Com. Ram Kishan. But Kairon’s candidate, S. Darbara Singh, won by a margin of 94 votes having polled 133 votes against 39 obtained by Shri Brish Bhan. It clearly established the dominance of Kairon in the Congress organization, but it also led to an increase of his opposition in state as well as at the centre (Lal, 1984, p. 44).

In another case, the differences between Partap Singh Kairon and Gian Singh Rarewala taken such a turn that it forced High Command to intervention to resolve. Kairon even took over the portfolios of irrigation and power to found out as to how a tube well in village Rara was bought by the engineers without any proper authority and against the policy of government. The matter for tube well sale was examined in the office of the chief engineer in March, 1958, and it was pointed out to the chief engineer by his office that such a deal would have to be approved by the state government, that is, the administrative department in consultation with the finance department, as well as by the Government of India, as the tube well was being acquired under the TCM programme, 1952, without referring the matter to the Punjab Government or Government of India.

Partap Singh Kairon who took over the portfolio of “Irrigation and Power” from Gian Singh Rarewala, in a press statement explained that he had taken this step to
facilitate an independent enquiry into the allegation of the sale to the irrigation department of a tube-well belonging to Gian Singh Rarewala. But Rarewala was firmly viewed that the manner in which the enquiry was made and the way various persons-officials and non-officials- were interrogated led him to believe that there were political motives behind the enquiry. Rarewala criticized the way in which the portfolio was taken away from him. In the eyes of Rarewala to hold a secret enquiry against a cabinet minister was an unheard of event in parliamentary system. He alleged that an unsuccessful attempt was also made to implicate him in a murder case in Ludhiana district. In response to Rarewala’s statement that enquiry was a camouflage for political victimization, Kairon, Chief Minister at that time gave another press statement that the enquiry was not directed against anyone. It was an attempt to assess the truth in the allegations and to found out how the ‘deal’ had come about- a deal which “neither the Government nor the Finance Department nor even the Secretary of the Irrigation Department knew anything about.” Continuing the Chief Minister said that he had not fixed the responsibility on anybody. Rarewala was still a member of the Cabinet and enjoyed the Chief Minister’s confidence. Justifying his step which he had taken in taking over the Irrigation portfolio, Kairon explained that it was necessary so that officers could speak freely. Kairon also showed pressmen, a letter of Rarewala to him in which Rarewala wrote that, “He would not mind parting with Irrigation Portfolio if you think that it is necessary in the interest of such an enquiry.”

The rivalry between Kairon and Rarewala went so high that they were issuing press statement against each other, which compelled Prime Minister Nehru to interfere in this matter and he issued a note on the tube well case that the Chief Minister of Punjab, Partap Singh Kairon felt that some irregularities had been committed in this transaction and drew the attention of Gian Singh Rarewala to them. It was particularly

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214 Rarewala to Kairon, 4th June, 1959, Gian Singh Rarewala Collection, File No. 21, Group-I, p. 4.
216 Chief Minister Kairon’s Statement dated 24th June, published in various newspapers on the 25th June, 1959.
217 ibid.
alleged that the price paid for this tube well was somewhat in excess of the real price. The matter reached to the Prime Minister Nehru, at the instance of Gian Singh Rarewala who suggested that Prime Minister should enquire into this matter further so that any reflection on him in regard to this transaction might be removed. Nehru agreed and referred to this matter to his Law Minister, Asoke Sen. The Chief Minister of the Punjab also agreed to this and sent Nehru a note on the facts of the case which was forwarded by Nehru to the Law Minister. The Law Minister sent Nehru his views on the basis of said note. The opinion was that some irregularities had been committed, though they were not of a major kind. He suggested that the best course would be for Gian Singh Rarewala to take back the tube well from the Punjab Government. But Gian Singh Rarewala, while expressing his willingness to take back the tube well if this was considered necessary, stated that Law Minister had come to his opinion on the basis of a note sent by the Punjab Government and without a fuller enquiry. The conclusion, based on the evidence produced, was that the price of the tube well, as paid by the Punjab Government, appeared to be a fair price, and that there appeared to be nothing improper in the transaction. Certain minor aspects might be open to criticism, but they were of no importance, according to Law Minister. On Nehru's advice that the opinion of Law Minister accepted and the matter ended. But now Rarewala became an opposite of Kairon because of this enquiry.

In 1962’s general election, Congress won by a large majority under the command of Kairon. But Kairon himself won by only 34 votes from Sarhali constituency against Akali opponent Mohan Singh. With the support of Nehru, Kairon once again became Chief Minister of Punjab on March 14, 1962. The charges were made against Kairon that he won the election because of questionable methods which were adopted by Kairon on the advice of Nehru, that he must won the election.

All the agitations were suppressed by Kairon with a very strong hand. Thus every political party felt humbled, and, became very bitter against him. They wanted to get rid of him at any cost and through any means, fair or foul. Many a leaders of opposition parties also bore personal animosity towards Kairon. Within Congress Party also, the number of disgruntled leaders swelled. The reasons for this hostile attitude

\[219\] Note on Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala’s case by Jawaharlal Nehru, 22\textsuperscript{nd} July, 1960, Gian Singh Rarewala’s Papers, File no. 20-21, p. 105.
\[220\] Statesman, 2\textsuperscript{nd} March, 1962.
FACTIONALISM
Absence of manifestations of corruption

were mostly personal, to be more particular, non-fulfillment of personal ambitions. Some of the prominent people who raised a tirade of vilification against Kairon included Gurdail Singh Dhillion, Devi Lal, Prabodh Chandra, Gian Singh Rarewala, Giani Kartar Singh, Hardwari Lal and several others. They worked in collaboration not only amongst themselves, but did not even hesitate to join hands with opposition leaders. Some of them even left the Congress to oppose him openly. Some central Congress leaders also encouraged anti-Kairon activities. (Lal, 1984, p. 47). For example, Gian Singh Rarewala and his group left Congress in 1963 and made a new party named “Praja Tantar Party” and conducted a strong propaganda against Kairon. They also circulated charge sheets containing several type of allegations against Kairon. But when Kairon resigned following Das Commission’s report they dissolved the said party and requested AICC to accept their return back entry into Congress fold.

In 1960, another charge sheet was leveled against Kairon by Parbodh Chandra, Ram Chandra, Ram Piara, Balwant Rai Tayal and Abdul Ghani Dhar who all were belonged to Congress in which political corruption was the major charge. The Congress being a divided house, their cleavage came again to the surface by the end of 1963. These dissidents engaged themselves in the ouster of Kairon. Three charge-sheets were presented during the year 1963 i.e. one by Comrade Ram Piara, second by Gian Singh Rarewala, Hardwari Lal, Virendra, Gurdial Singh Dhillion and Kanwar Lal Sharma and last by the opposition leaders of Punjab. Devi Lal, to whom one time Kairon was supporting as a candidate for the post of President of PPCC against Parbodh Chandra, submitted another charge sheet against Kairon leveling wide range of charges. It was Devi Lal, who had a big hand in Das Commission’s enquiry against him.

Absence of manifestations of corruption

One would wonder if Kairon could have done any kind corrupt politics or any kind smuggling than why his property was so low. He had one house on half sharing basic with his brother, approximately value of 30,000 and furniture of 15000, which was constructed in 1930 at village Kairon, Amritsar, half share in multipurpose Chakki and Peddy Husker, he had around 20 acres ancestral property and his wife had

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221 Misery of Punjab, Charge sheet presented to Congress President by Abdul Ghani Dhar.
222 Ibid.
223 Historic Enquiry after Warren Hastings- Joinder Affidavit No. 1 to 22 before Shri S. R. Das Commission on Enquiry, New Delhi.
approximately 6 kanals, half share in a tube well and share in cold storage, Amritsar worth rupees 10,000.\footnote{224 Property Statement by Partap Singh Kairon, June, 1962, AICC 2\textsuperscript{nd} Installment, Serial no. 2166, p. 9.} It can be said that Kairon on his level did not do any corruption. On March 6, 1956 early days of Partap Singh Kairon’s Chief Ministership Kairon gave a strong speech against corruption. He stated as:

Here corruption’s reference is given. I assured you that we will dissuade it. Either we will survive or corruption. Here some friends mention and congrats me for stopping corruption in consolidations works. I am thankful to you for this. I received some complains so I visited many time in consolidations works. I did this to bring enthusiasm in the minds of officers and they work hard. I have seen many big and small officers who ministration the people whole heartily without any corruption. The work which we have done to root out corruption from consolidation work was done with the help of all of you. I request you to help me in future in this regard, I am hoping and assured you that leftover 2-4 department in which we are receiving complains of corruption eradicate all small and minor shortcomings from these and others departments. I want to see that day, when the works of people will be done with only one application, they don’t be need to come Chandigarh for their work, let us see when that day will come in five years or ten years? I am hoping that the spirit and zealous which bring forth in consolidation department, same will be happen in others department too.\footnote{225 Speech of Chief Minister Kairon, 6\textsuperscript{th} March, 1956, PVSD, Volume I—No. 4, Chandigarh, 1957, pp. (4) 95- (4) 96.}

The Akalis had found that Partap Singh Kairon was the main obstacle in their path for achieving Punjabi Suba. Arya Samajists had no love for Partap Singh as he had dealt very strongly with the Hindi Raksha Samiti agitation a few years earlier. The Communists could not raise their heads as, during the Chinese aggression, he had swept them off the board. In the Congress circles itself there were influential voices in the centre who supported the splinter group of Darabara Singh against Partap Singh Kairon. Thus, a combination of various forces raised their head against Kairon and these groups went on submitting complaints, memoranda and petitions to Prime Minister, Home
Minister and President. Even amongst Parliamentarians there was a criticism that the Prime Minister was shielding his favourite and was not paying any heed to the numerous irregularities and the acts of high-handedness which were being indulged in by his sons under his protection. Kairon’s enemies in the Congress had hoped that Kairon might go as a result of the Kamaraj Plan. But this did not happen, causing further heart-burning among them. And so they also carried on a vicious propaganda from inside the Congress and thus further vitiated the atmosphere (Mullik, 1972, p. 458).

A large number of delegations from Punjab met with Nehru and complained against Kairon. These people came to propagate against Kairon to the President, members of Parliament and to Nehru and demanded that he should drop Kairon from Chief Ministership of Punjab. According to Nehru:

They were the heterogeneous groups with no common interest between them excepting their bitterness against Partap Singh. In their blinding jealousy they do not recognise the many sterling qualities which Partap Singh Kairon possesses and they shut their eyes to what he has done for the uplift of Punjab. It is probably true that his sons have filled their pockets using their father’s name; but that made little difference to the people of Punjab who, after the partition, have made the most remarkable economic recovery in history, which could be compared even to the recovery made in Japan and Germany after the last war. When I asked them who they would suggest to be appointed the Chief Minister in place of Kairon, they had no name to offer. They do not realise that there will be nobody to hold Punjab together. I have told them to offer their co-operation to Partap Singh Kairon and thereby make him mend his ways if he was doing anything wrong; but they went me to dismiss him not realising that this would be suicidal for Punjab (Mullik, 1972, pp. 458-459).

And this is what actually happened. This opposition not only succeeded ultimately in destroying Partap Singh Kairon, but in the process destroyed Punjab itself.
The members of Kairon’s own party leveled charges of corruption, abuse of governmental authority against Kairon and members of opposition group of Kairon also blamed Nehru for discountenance in all these charges and turning down the repeated demand for a judicial enquiry. The opposition members wrote to Nehru that if, “Mr. Kairon will stay as Chief Minister during the judicial enquiry and will be free and able to tamper with official files or to cause them to appear untraceable and to intimidate or even whisk away the possible witnesses against him. If you seriously believe that a fair enquiry will be possible with Mr. Kairon’s staying as Chief Minister, you do not know his limitless capacity to create or destroy evidence according to his needs.”

They also put various charges against Kairon, and cursed Nehru for Kairon’s favour. When the opponents of Kairon strongly demanded the resignation as according to them it was necessary for independent and fair enquiry. On this issue, Nehru issued a press statement as following:

Any change in the leadership in the Punjab might well result in producing confusion and putting a stop of the great progress that Punjab is making, and encouraging fissiparous and communal elements to gain more prominence. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon has been largely identified with this progress in many directions and, more especially, with the steps taken to meet the emergency. He is a popular figure in the Punjab both in the civil and army circles, and to remove him would greatly disturb the people in the Punjab as a whole. He further wrote that it would be undesirable, I think, in the inquiry that is being suggested by me, that the Chief Minister of the Punjab, Sardar Partap Singh Kairon, should be asked to resign in the course of this enquiry. That would imply that prima facie there was some truth in the charges made. I do not think we can proceed on that basis. Also, his resignation would not, I think, be in the public interest and might well create a situation which would be against the public interest, as I have stated earlier in this note. There is no reason to believe that his

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226 Gian Singh Rarewala and et al. to Nehru, 12th November, 1963, Comrade Ram Chandra’s Papers, Subject File no 8. pp. 6-16.
continuance as Chief Minister during the course of the enquiry will affect the inquiry itself.\textsuperscript{227}

Nehru was not willing to drop Kairon as Chief Minister of Punjab but he agreed to set an enquiry after the repeated demands of dissidents groups. By a notification issued on the November 1, 1963, the Central Government appointed a Commission under the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, consisting of Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das, as the sole Commissioner to inquire into and report on the allegations against Sardar Partap Singh Kairon contained in the memorandum.\textsuperscript{228} Besides, the enquiry was going on, dissidents’ members of Congress again moved a no-confidence motion against Kairon, which was not passed as over 89 votes were casted in favour of Kairon and 41 in favour of no-confidence. It was also alleged that certain vested interests- princely families, feudal cliques and big Sikh businessmen had always been actively financing the anti-Kairon campaign in Punjab. These vested interests were sore with Kairon because of his efforts to make a transition from a semi-feudal economy to a socialist one- the breaking of outmoded landed relations, rapid industrialization and strengthening of the public sector (Arora, Turmoil in Punjab Politics, 1990, p. 62).

The Das Commission classified its finding under four categories:\textsuperscript{229}

1. Abuse of influence and power by the former Chief Minister for his own benefit i.e. in case of H.S. Dhillion.

2. Similar conduct personally and or by or thorough his colleagues or subordinates to help his sons or relations in their business transactions i.e. in cases of Neelam Cinema, Chandigarh, Nandan Cinema and Punjab Cold store, Amritsar and sale of surplus lands in villages Ramgarh Dhani and Madhar Kalan.

3. Exploitation of Kairon’s position and power by his kith and kin for securing undue favours or advantage from Government officials in their business dealings i.e. in cases of National motors, Capital Cinema, Patiala, Elite Cinema, Hissar, Neelam Cinema, Faridabad and New India Spinning & Waving Mills Ltd.

\textsuperscript{227} Jawaharlal Nehru’s Press statement regarding Kairon affair on 25\textsuperscript{th} October, 1963.

\textsuperscript{228} Statement of Ram Kishan, Chief Minister, Punjab in Vidhan Sabha, 24\textsuperscript{th} September, 1964.

\textsuperscript{229} Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Government of India, New Delhi, 11\textsuperscript{th} June, 1964.
4. Cases where the charges have been held not to have been proved or found to be untenable i.e in cases of Amritsar Cooperative Cold Store Ltd, Kairon Brick Kiln Society, Parkash Cinema, Amritsar, Mukut House, Teg Cols Storage, Ludhaina Cooperative Cold storage, Unknown assets since discovered, Sangrur Court of Wards Estate, Sandhu Bus Service, Favoritism and Nepotism, Wheat Seeds, Sarai Naga Brick Kiln, creation of new posts of Assistant Commissioner and appointment of favourites, Weighment of Prime Minister in Gold, National Defense Fund, Medicines, Napco and Malicious Prosecution of two officials.

The commission held Kairon’s guilty on two counts abuse of authority and exploitation of his position for personal gain and no charges were leveled against Kairon. However, the Commission gave Kairon the benefit of the doubt.\(^{230}\)

The report was submitted on June 1, 1964 and made public on June 11, 1964 few days after Lal Bhadur Shastri was sworn in as Prime Minister of India after Jawaharlal Nehru passed away. Two days after the death of Nehru, Kairon openly announced his support for Shri Morarji Desai in the battle of succession to Prime Ministership of India. However, Lal Bahadur Shastri was elected as leader of the Congress Parliamentary Party unopposed after Kamraj took consensus of the party members and announced it in Shastri’s favour. Kairon paid a heavy price for the hectic canvassing he and his colleagues did for Morarji Desai (Lal, 1984, p. 227). So, Patel had no soft corner for Kairon because of his act of support of Deasi. In one another incident, when Kairon reduced the size of ministry during Chinese aggression he dropped Ram Kishan with other important members. Lal Bhadur Shastri wanted Ram Kishan to be in ministry but Shastri’s advice brought no fruit as Kairon did not pay attention to this and later when Kairon resigned following Das Commission’s report, Ram Kishan became next Chief Minister of Punjab, who had no strong group in Punjab but with the support of Lal Bahadur Shastri from the centre level.

Prabodh Chandra submitted two charge sheets against Kairon to the Congress President one in 1958 and second in 1960 and gave wide publicity to the charges and the enquiry. When he became the Education Minister in Ram Kishan Cabinet, and

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Kairon was humbled on account of Das report, Chandra started, rather crudely a campaign for De-Kaironisation. On July 10, 1964 he gave a press statement that step shall be taken to remove all traces of Kairon. He passed orders that every complimentary references to Kairon in the school text books and other government publications, be scored out forthwith. It was further ordered that every signboard in state, with a photograph of Kairon or his message be withdrawn and reprinted other messages. The spirit licenses granted by the previous government were cancelled and the various adviser appointed by it were removed (Lal, 1984, p. 241). Instructions were issued that no non-official, who had filed an affidavit before the Das Commission in favour of Kairon, should be appointed as a member of any government committee. The nomenclature of institutions, parks, playgrounds etc. named after Kairon were changed. Independence Day titles, awarded by the Government of India were withheld from such persons who had filed affidavits before the commission. Prabodh Chandra went from place to place to proclaim, that the main Kairon had been exterminated, but miniature Kairons, who were his pocket editions, were still surviving in the towns and villages, in streets and mohallas, and he was determined to finish them also. Although, opponents of Kairon get success in throwing Kairon out of Chief Minister’s chair but they did not get success in erasing the name of Kairon from the history of Punjab as it will remain alive in the history of the development of Punjab after partition.

While addressing the district officials of Jullundur, on August 16, 1964, Parbodh Chandra declared, that so long as Lal Bahadur Shastri and Gulzari Lal Nanda were at the centre, Kairon and his colleagues would never come back to power. The De-Kaironisation process reached the climax, when on the night in between 5 and 6 October, 1964 at the ancestral house of Kairon was searched at village Kairon, in a most clumsy manner. It was done in Kairon’s absence, when he was at Chandigarh, in connection with Assembly session and the only member presented in house was his aged mother. All house was thoroughly searched and even the floor bricks were removed and the earth underneath dug out to find smuggled gold, hidden under the
ground, or elsewhere in the house. However, nothing objectionable was recovered. It caused a stir. There was a wave of resentment and indignation in Kairon group. The issue was also raised in the Assembly. Kairon made up his mind to leave the membership of the legislature, as well as the Congress Party. He wrote to the Congress president, a letter of protest and offered to resign if the High Command was not inclined to take notice of the De-Kaironisation activities of his opponents. The executive committee of PPCC discussed this matter, condemned it and directed its president to convey their feeling to the High Command. Most absurdly, Prabodh Chandra, in a press statement dated October 16, 1964, on the issue of Police raid on Kairon’s house stated that Kairon himself arranged the raid through one of the police officers of his confidence to win popular sympathy. He also stated that he received information about the impending raid a fortnight, before it actually took place. Irresponsibility of a responsible minister could go on further (Lal, 1984, p. 243).

Following Union Home Minister Gulzarilal Nanda decision to relieve Kairon from caretaker Chief-Ministership of Punjab, Kairon resigned, with the publication of the Das Commission’s report, finding the former Chief Minister of the state as having conceived at illegal and improper amassing of wealth by his sons and relatives. Kairon was a powerful factor in Punjab Congress politics, is entirely without question and in spite of a very substantial section of opinion having been violently opposed to him both within and outside the party in the Legislature, he continued to wield almost absolute power over the government of the state. There have been complaints and accusations within the party in the past and once the Congress High Command was even obliged to depute former Congress president, U. N. Dhebar, to investigate the complaints and report. The Dhebar report was frankly an indictment of the conduct of the former Punjab Chief Minister. Nevertheless, Kairon not merely continued to survive in his office, but continued to wield almost absolute power over party and state; such was the powerful support he was able to gather both within the Party High Command and the central government. It is doubtful if any other leader would have survived in public life,

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231 TOI, 7th October, 1964.
let alone in the highest state office, after having faced the accusations and the indictments that came his way.

Conclusion

As Pettigrew in her book, argues that factionalism divided society into vertical units. So in this context it can be said that factionalism emerged on a high rank in Punjab because of same party at centre and level and state level. The Congress Party who was ruling in centre since independence was also divided into factions, so the leaders of centre at some were level also responsible for factions in Punjab Congress as they were trying to boost their support and group stronger than the other. So, it can be seen that factionalism politics was emerged because of ego, struggle for power and personal advantage like ministerial birth not on the basis of ideology. If the ruling party same at centre and state level then the chances of centre’s interferences increase as it happen in Punjab, because centre level leaders at those time were also divided in factions and they want their support and lobby more stronger than the others.

One point clear from the above discussion is that all political leaders were playing factional politics not because of any ideological differences but because of their own profit. They all were simply playing politics to gain a more prominent seat in ministry. There were no fixed rule that a person will remain in the same group whenever, wherever they found profit for themselves like any ministerial birth, they leave their group and join hands with other. As all the party was divided in factions and all members of Congress Party were divided into faction groups, one person who was there for a long period was Partap Singh Kairon because of his ideology, principles and determination for nations cause.

Here the finding of Paul Brass’s study entitled ‘Factional Politics in an Indian State, the Congress Party in U.P.’ stand fit on Punjab’s factional politics that due to absence of powerful opposition party or parties, lack of internal consciousness on ideological issues led to factional politics in Punjab Congress. One can see that many leaders or groups of factions emerged in post partition Punjab. But one group which remained in power was group under Kairon’s supervision. The reason for this was, Kairon was a true nationalist and he always fought for the nation’s cause and that’s why
he made many enemies. The centre especially Nehru was favouring Kairon because of his being a true nationalist. Partap Singh Kairon’s reputation, during his long career of public service, was of a man of personal integrity and of complete freedom from communal bias. He was a man of people, simple in his life and devoting his great energy to the work for which he was responsible. His virtues to some extent became the defects. His constant tours, more especially in the rural areas, led to a lesser degree of time and interest being given to the moral work of administration, and his anxiety to deal with problems on the spot and with speed led sometimes to his bypassing normal administrative procedures.