CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPTION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF
And the Evolution of the Institution
In the History of Defence Planning in
Europe and the East.

THE BASIC ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT.

Every human organisation, whether political, economic, religious or social, if destined to attain its objective, must be supported by an effective three-wheeled mechanism. It must have, first and foremost, the planning and policy-making cell to direct and guide the institution. Secondly, it should have the necessary personnel or manpower to work it, and, thirdly, it must be adequately provided with necessary paraphernalia by way of funds and equipment to enable it to discharge its duties.

In military institutions, this three-fold basis is classified as follows. The planning and policy-making cell is known as the General Staff, whereas the manpower and discipline aspects come under the functions of the Adjutant General. Lastly, the problem of logistics, which stands for the availability of necessary paraphernalia, is broadly the function of the Quartermaster General. This three-fold classification is not peculiar to the Army alone but to the other two Services, the Navy and the Air Force, as well. The General Staff which holds the key to all operational undertakings is known by that very designation in the Navy and the Air Force, the simple distinction being instead of Army Staff, it ...
it is the Chief of Naval Staff and the Chief of Air Staff. Such is the practice throughout the English speaking world. In France he is known as Chef d'Eq H Guerre which comes to the same thing. In regard to the other two functionaries dealing with manpower and equipment, various designations are in vogue in different countries but basically it is the same idea which underlies the duties of the Chief of Personnel (Navy) or the Air Member of Council for Personnel (Air Force) taking the U.K. machinery as the pattern. Similarly, the Chief of Material and the Air Member for Supply and Organisation are the equivalents of the Quartermaster General on the Navy and the Air Force side respectively, taking again, the U.K. as example. Even in ancient Indian history this three-fold classification is clearly discernible. For example, the military organisation under the Imperial Guptas had three important departments functioning directly under the mahasenaapati or the Commander-in-Chief. The first department was headed by the mahayadnyaapati who may be said to correspond to the Chief of the General Staff of the modern army organisation. The second department was headed by the ranaabhanda-garadhibakara and controlled problems connected with logistics. The manpower aspect was probably tackled by the Commander-in-Chief himself who had under him the Infantry Commander (pattyaadhyaksha), the Cavalry Commander (mahavagati) and the Commander of the Elephant Corps (nastyadhyaksha). It is the planning ...
planning cell which holds the key to the rest and is accordingly entrusted to the chosen few who constitute, as it were, the "brains trust" of the institution. It is immaterial whether this institution is civil or military. For example, in a commercial concern, it is the Board of Directors which formulates the policy in regard to the running of the business. Similarly, in a political organisation, it is the Cabinet of the Prime Minister or the President or the Dictator which lays down the policy and directs the machinery of State. On the same analogy, in the military sphere, it is the organisation of the Chiefs of Staff which is the planning body. This basic origin of the Chief of Staff concept is, therefore, as old as the birth of the human institution itself. In fact, according to the Vedic conception of the birth of society based on the four varnas, Brahmans constituted the head of the social fabric while the Kashatriyas furnished the manpower aspect. According to Purusha Sukta of Rig Veda, the Brahmans class can broadly be said to have performed the functions of the Chiefs of Staff in relation to the Vedic society. Thus the policy-making organ is not only a sine qua non of every human institution but the success of the latter depends upon the efficiency of the former.

In the context of the assessment of strength of an institution like the State and its organs, Kautilya, in his Arthasastra, has mentioned three kinds of bala or power:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Kali}, \text{Karma}, \text{Bhumi} \\
(\text{\linebreak \text{रिव, जर, आम्ल, और, अर्थसास्त्र इत्य्यादि})
\end{align*}
\]
Of these, the first and highest power is

(वार्ता ४२, अं दू, अतिरिक्त एवं, अद्वा वस्त्रभ) or the strength which comes from knowledge, i.e., intellectual strength, which, in terms of statecraft, must come to mean the proper planning/policy to guide the ship of state. The second source of strength is श्रेष्ठ शक्ति, which comes from धन or a full treasury and दण्ड, or a fully equipped armed force

(वार्ता ४३, अं २, अतिरिक्त एवं, अद्वा वस्त्रभ) Kautilya’s analysis thus conforms to the threefold basic conception mentioned at the outset since his third factor of strength is ज्ञान तन्त्र or manpower strength. Again, Sukra in his नैसारिक describes six kinds of force e.g., physical force, spiritual force, armed force and intellectual force or व्यक्ति तन्त्र. It is the last one which guides and controls every other kind of force and is, therefore, of the very essence for the successful working of an institution. It is this very ज्ञान तन्त्र which is symbolised by the Chief of Staff concept.

What good would be a fully equipped and trained armed force led by competent Generals if the overall planning of its employment in an operational role was improper or left something to be desired? On the other hand, there are instances of a small army, comparatively ill-equipped, excelling a superior force merely because of the ज्ञान तन्त्र of its planners. Thus the Chiefs of Staff concept is literally the ज्ञान तन्त्र मंत्रालय of the entire armed forces organisation.

If

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1 वार्ता ५२, अं २, अतिरिक्त एवं, अद्वा वस्त्रभ
If the above represents the theoretical origin of the fundamental principle of this institution, its earliest existence as an organ of the State can be traced to the Greek city States in the West and to the Vedic monarchy of Aryavarta in the East.

Greek city States and the Roman Empire

The organs of government in a Greek State were (1) the Magistrates; (2) the Council of the Five Hundred; and (3) the people exercising power as an Assembly. The most important of the Athenian magistrates were the generals. They were chosen only by election and, as late as the battle of Marathon, the Athenians had gone into battle in tribes, each led by a General elected by itself. There were ten Generals equal in rank and they had official quarters in the market place and acted as a form of General Staff Board in military affairs with general powers of control over all questions of defence. This General Staff Board was clearly the Chiefs of Staff Committee in its very moment and crude form.

A study of the history of the Roman Empire would reveal that the Emperors did consult their Generals before embarking on a campaign. This consultation primarily amounted to planning but at the highest level. Such consultations in a modern democracy could be termed equivalent to the deliberations of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. However, as the head of the State in ancient imperial structures, was quite often, both in theory and practice, the Supreme Commander in Chief ...
Chief, his close association with the Generals in this respect could be considered as planning in the military sphere as distinct from the modern democratic practice of political approval of the plans of the military chiefs by civil dignitaries. From the days of Julius Caesar, consultation with Generals for the purpose of military planning has been a recognised feature.

However, it is essential to emphasise at the very outset that the ancient practice of planning by military chiefs could not be said to represent the modern practice of coordination among the three Services in an operational role which is achieved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. This must essentially be so because war in the air was not known in that age. Nevertheless, ancient military planning was based on coordination as much as in modern times though it had to be restricted to the armed forces of those days which consisted of infantry, cavalry and elephant corps, and, sometimes, a naval force.

THE THREE BASIC STAGES OF PLANNING.

However, amphibious operations are by no means a modern feature only. We have the very fine example of a sea-borne expedition of the 6th century A.D. when the Thracian military genius Belisarius was placed in supreme command, both on land and sea, and given "boundless power of acting according to his discretion, as if the emperor himself were present". The expedition was directed from Constantinople by Emperor Justinian who defined the task of Belisarius as the conquest of the old Roman province of North Africa which was then held by the Vandals. Belisarius planned ...
planned his operations in such a way as to avoid a naval encounter which he did by taking a southward course and landed at Caput Veda, 150 miles from Carthage, in spite of the fact that the Council of War had planned a direct assault on Carthage. This incident, if closely analysed, reveals that there are certain principal stages of military planning which are so fundamental that they are inevitably present in the operations of ancient days as much as in modern times. For example, the existence of a 'Council of War' indicates that there is the recognized necessity of planning at the highest level whenever a military expedition or campaign is undertaken. Thus the conquest of Carthage by Emperor Justinian must have involved two stages of planning at Constantinople inasmuch as before the Emperor could have deliberated with his military chiefs and Generals, it must have been necessary for the latter to hold consultations amongst themselves to prepare the basic expert plans for submission to the Emperor for his approval. Hence, once Belisarius was appointed as the supreme commander with a certain defined task, the day-to-day planning of the military operations undertaken by him was also necessary particularly when he was given a wide discretion. Thus military planning for any operation is marked by three distinct stages. The first is at the highest level when the political power of the State irrespective of whether it is wielded by a civilian or a military dictator or an effective emperor of ancient and medieval days,
takes part in discussing, modifying or approving plans of the trusted military chiefs of the State. This policy planning at the highest level is not necessarily first in order of sequence since it visualises an earlier preparation of plans wherein the trusted military chiefs are required to formulate in detail the plan of operations as well as the strategic appreciation of the steps to be taken. It is this essential groundwork of expert planning done by the militarists which forms the basis of discussion at the highest level when the approval of the final authority of the State is obtained. The third stage of planning is essentially at the command level to guide the day-to-day operations in the actual theatre of war for which the commander has also to be assisted by an appropriate planning organisation. We are primarily concerned here with the basic expert planning which holds the key to the subsequent stages and is undertaken by the trusted military chiefs with a view to (a) obtain the approval of the supreme final political authority of the State at the top; and (b) implement the approved plan by issuing directives to the commanders in the theatre of operations. The fine art to which this key planning by the military experts has been reduced in modern times was certainly not discernible in the earlier stages of the evolution of the political machinery of the State. However, in any imperial expedition or warlike endeavour, consultation and formulation of plans ...
plans with the assistance of expert military dignitaries was a very well-established feature from the earliest days of recorded history. The Chiefs of Staff Committee is, therefore, by no means in its fundamental concept a modern one, since the Vedic monarchies offer us the earliest examples of recorded history. We may examine the position of military planning in the tribal concept of the Vedic State which gradually evolved to become territorial in the later Vedic period of ancient history.

Military Planning in Vedic Monarchies of Aryavarta

The Vedic king was first and foremost a cupress general of the armed might of the State. In the vaijayeya sacrifice, which was an essential part of the coronation ceremony, it was necessary for him to undertake a symbolical chariot race in which he had to come out first. This emphasises the fact that military capacity for leadership which had to be tested by the chariot race was a necessary sine qua non of kingship. This was essential because according to Rig Veda the king was "pre-eminently the protector of his people" (गृहोपरं प्रवृक्तिभावं). However, in the discharge of the defence function of the State, the Vedic king was assisted by a council of ministers which, apart from the king's relations such as the queen and the crown prince as well as the purohita or the royal chaplain, was composed of the following important military dignitaries:

(1) ...

1 Rig Veda - III. 43-5.
(1) senani or the commander-in-chief; (2) suta or the commander of the Chariot Corps and (3) rathakara or the chariot-maker. There were, of course, others like granguni or the village headman, semgrahita or treasurer, but the senani and suta as well as the rathakara must have essentially constituted the body of military dignitaries responsible for basic planning at its very initial stage. There is no doubt that the senani and suta could not have planned without the Vedic king who was always the effective supreme commander personally guiding the conduct of battles undertaken by him. It is, therefore, possible the king may have been associated with the initial stages of the planning. However, it is more than likely that the military dignitaries of the State, apart from the king, must have held consultations amongst themselves before meeting the king and this expert deliberation must have represented the first stage before their considered advice was submitted to the monarch, who with the purushita and other ratnaing must have finalised the line of action to be taken. Thus the deliberations of the Council of ratnaing must have represented planning at the highest level. If the Vedic king was himself the highest military expert, the planning by senani and suta must have been less important, but it must nevertheless have been present in some form or shape. The third stage of planning, which is at the command level, must have been entrusted to a General in the sole and rare event of the king not being able to attend the battlefield personally. Thus, in the tribal concept...
concept of the State, when the king was the effective keystone of the State arch, he may have reduced all the three stages of planning into a single one. However, with the growth of ancient civilisation and the development of imperial structures, composed of an expanded organisation of the armed forces, the three stages of military planning were further evolved and elaborated which is examined below.

MILITARY PLANNING AND THE FORMULATION OF DEFENCE POLICY IN THE MAURYA AND GUPTA EMPIRES.

Maurya Empire (322 B.C. - 200 B.C.)

As the Maurya and Gupta Empires stand out as the most prominent imperial structures evolved on a proper centralisation of the political and military machine with an attendant civilisation befitting any Empire of contemporary world history, it is intended to study this period of Indian history from the viewpoint of military planning. In the Mauryan imperial organisation, the armed forces constituted the most important power of the State machine. The three stages of military planning, namely -

(1) policy planning
(2) expert planning and
(3) command planning

which were present in a crude form in the Vedic monarchy, were developed to such an extent as to become separate and distinct spheres of the political machinery of the State. For example, the formulation of defence policy, which needed the approval of the highest ...
highest political authority of the State, was, entrusted to the War Council. However, the basic plans were prepared by the Military dignitaries who came under the senapati. This may broadly be described as a function which in modern times is assigned to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Though the scanty literature available on the subject does not describe in any detail the planning organisation under the senapati, it must have provided the basis for discussions at the War Council. There is no doubt that the elaborate military organisation which existed both in the Maurya and Gupta Empires must have performed this essential function of primary military planning before policy decisions could be taken by the War Council. Though we are primarily concerned here with the military planning organisation of the senapati and the extent to which he aided and assisted the formulation of the defence policy of the State with the approval of the necessary political organs, it appears necessary to describe very briefly both the political and the military spheres of the Imperial State to appreciate fully the subject under study.

War Council and Policy Planning

The supreme organ of the war machinery was the War Council. All decisions of fundamental importance relating to war and peace were the subject of consultation with the ministers of the War Council. According to the Mahabharata, it was the function of the Council to examine and compare the resources of the State and its allies as against the resources of the enemy ...
enemy before finalising any policy, either of
offence or defence. This advice was scrupulously
followed by the Mauryas and the Imperial Guptas.*
All discussions relating to this particular subject
were called Nayavydaka and the policy followed was
based on niti. Thus Bhishma tells Yudhishtra that
victory depends on this important deliberation
which was an essential pre-requisite to success.1
Again, according to Kamandaka2, the power of deli­
beration of the War Council was decidedly superior
to that of mere brute force. The War Council in
the Mauryan days consisted of the mantrin, yuvaraja
and senapati with the king as the head. There is
also evidence to the effect that such War Councils
were held in the battle-field even during the course
of operations. It is revealed from the Gupta
inscriptions that the War Council had become some
sort of a permanent institution of the machinery of
imperial government which was required to undertake
long wars of an important nature. Even after the
Guptas, in the medieval Rajput period of Indian
History, the War Council was an important organ of
all confederal forms of defence.

The composition of the War Council must have
varied from time to time. For example, the importance
of the yuvaraja in the Mauryan administration appears
to have been greater than in the later period. Again,
such must have depended upon the personality of the
individual. ...

2 Kamandaka - Nitisara, Edited by Ganapati Sastri
in Sanskrit series.
individual. For example, the purohit occupied a
very important position in the Vedic State but a
study of the political organisation of the Guptas
reveals that he had ceased to be a member of the
inner cabinet. Whatever may be the position of the
War Council, there is no doubt that the most trusted
and the most important officials of the king, both
military and civil, constituted this small compact
body to frame the final defence policy of the State
and to approve or modify the military planning which
the senapati, in consultation with his commanders of
the Infantry, Cavalry, Elephant and Chariot Corps,
must have submitted from time to time.
The importance of this high level deliberation
is throughout emphasised in the political theory of
Ancient India. The need for ministerial consultation
is mentioned in Mahabharata when in Sahaparvan
Narada explains to Yudhisthira that the success of
the State was the direct outcome of the deliberations
of the Council of Ministers सत्यमेव जयामिनि राज्य
प्रत्ये भारत (Sahaparvan, Chapter 7, sloka 28).
Similarly, Shishma instructs Yudhishtra in Santiparvan
that the progress of the State was dependent upon the
wisdom of the deliberations of the Ministers. सत्यमेव
यज्ञो राज्यो राज्यो ज्ञानो निर्मिताएँ (Chapter 87, sloka 48).
Kautilya also supports this theory when he states
that the king without councillors can never work the
mechanism of State just as 'one wheel alone does not
move the carriage'. सहाय सहाय राजन् च चक्षुः स न उत्त्कुट्टे
(Book I, Chapter 3). Similarly, Sukra in his
Maitisara emphasises that as the king cannot know
everything, he must enlist the help of competent
ministers.
The senapati who was not only the commander-in-chief but also the Minister of War, ranking next to the yuvaraja in the Mauryan warrant of precedence, was assisted by a regular military organisation based on the principle of Boards. The armed forces of Chandragupta Maurya thus had a regular War office at the top composed of six Boards of five members each, accepted as collectively responsible for the efficient functioning of the military organisation.

There was thus a Commission of thirty members in charge of the following six Boards:

- Board No. I in cooperation with the Admiral - Admiredty;
- Board No. II Transport, Commissariat and Army service, including the provision of drummers, grooms, mechanics and grass-cutters;
- Board No. III Infantry;
- Board No. IV Cavalry;
- Board No. V War Chariots; and
- Board No. VI Elephants.

Full details of the organisation of these Boards are not available, but it appears that the commander of the respective Section must have been the chairman of the Board. For example, if the land forces are taken into consideration, there were the following four commanders who must have been in charge of their respective Boards under the overall control of the senapati:

- Pattvadayaksha - Infantry Commander
- Mahasvapati - Cavalry Commander
- Hastvadayaksha - Elephant Corps Commander (who was known as Mahapilupati in the days of Guptas).
- Rathadhipati - Chariot Corps Commander.

Though ...
Though there is no concrete evidence to indicate that a military institution of the type of the Chiefs of Staff Committee of modern times existed in the Mauryan set up, it may be presumed that the Commander-in-Chief frequently held meetings with the four commanders mentioned above and finalised his military plans in consultation with them. Thus expert planning which is the function of the modern Chiefs of Staff Committee may be said to have developed on proper lines in this age when the four commanders as heads of their respective Boards along with the Chairman of the Board of Transport and Commissariat and Army Services frequently met to prepare plans under the Commander-in-Chief for submission to the War Council.

Command planning

The third stage of military planning which becomes necessary at the command level may not have been present in the modern sense because in most of the campaigns of the Mauryas and Guptas the monarch himself was present in the battle-field. The varying conditions of the battle may have required a revision of the plan approved by the War Council and as the king was in effective control of the operations, this should have presented no difficulty though these alterations must be regarded technically as planning at the Command level.

Gupta Empire (320 A.D. - 606 A.D.)

The Political Organs and Policy Planning

The political organisation of the Imperial Guptas was also assisted by a Council of Ministers which ...
which according to an important sloka of Sukranitisara, consisted of the following in order of precedence:

1. Pradhana or Prime Minister
2. Sachiva or War Minister
3. Mantri or Foreign Minister
4. Pandita
5. Pradlivaka or Minister of Justice
6. Akatya or Minister of Revenue
7. Sumantra or Minister of Finance
8. Duta or Minister of Diplomacy
9. Pratinidhi or the Crown Prince
10. Puronita

The first three Ministers enumerated above, namely, pradhana or Prime Minister, sachiva or War Minister and mantri or Foreign Minister, in that order of importance, were charged with the responsibility of the defence of the realm. These officials may be said to have constituted the War Council responsible for the planning of the higher defence policy of the State. It appears that in the Gupta period the importance of the Foreign Minister was considerably emphasised because he not only appeared as the mahasandhivigrahika but was assisted by a regular organisation with the duties of the Minister of Diplomacy. It was the duty of the mahasandhivigrahika or the Foreign Minister to make full use of the four devices of ...
of *dana, danda* and *bheda* in dealing with matters pertaining to strategic planning. The composition of the War Council under the Guptas is best described in the chart given below:

![Chart of the War Council under the Guptas](chart.png)

**The raison d'être of the Council** was summed up by Sukra in one sloka as follows:

> "If the State, the People, the Army, the Exchequer and, lastly, proper Monarchy (sunitpatyam) do not grow, or the enemy is not broken through the policy of the Ministers, the Ministers do not justify their existence." Thus if the higher defence organisation of the Guptas was an improvement on the Mauryan structure, the basic military planning under the sanapati or the commander-in-chief also showed signs of considerable development under the Gupta military organisation.

*Expert* ...
Expert military planning under the Guptas

The senapati or the Commander-in-Chief was assisted by a number of sub departments or directorates to look after the four arms of the military organisation. On the Mauryan model, there was a department for each of the following:

- Infantry under Dattyaadhyaaka
- Cavalry under Mahavatapi
- Elephants under Hastyaadhyaaka (known as Mahapulaapati in the days of the Guptas)
- Chariots under Rathadhipati.

In addition to these four commanders, there were heads of stables working under the asvapani and rathadhipati called the Master of Stables or saheniyas. This applied to horses and elephants for which stables had to be maintained.

However, the principal contribution of the Gupta Empire to the evolution of the military machinery was the Headquarters organisation of the armed forces which was planned on modern lines. It had a chief of staff for framing policy, called mahavyayupati, a Quartermaster General in charge of logistics, called ranabhendagaradhikara and a Master General of Weapons and Equipment called ayudhabaradhyaksha. There was also an Inspector General of Forts since durges constituted the most important line of defence. This ancient military organisation at Headquarters, which is summarised as in Appendix 'A' to this chapter, may be briefly described as follows:

1. The mahavyayupati was the strategic adviser of the Commander-in-Chief and his modern counterpart...
counterpart is probably to be found in the Chief of the General Staff (C.G.S.). It is possible that under him there was a hierarchy of directors to assist him in the preparation of operational plans. The dandanayakas who figure conspicuously in Gupta inscriptions, particularly in Bhitai seals, were probably of the rank of Colonels or Brigadiers and functioned as Directors.

2. The *ranabhandagaradhikarana* was the quartermaster general who looked after the commissariat department and was in charge of the logistics of the armed forces. The development of this office is a feature of the Gupta period since it was under the Imperial Guptas that this particular designation was given to the officer dealing with problems of supplies and movements.

3. The officer in charge of weapons and equipment was known as *ayudhagaradhikshya*. Though Dr. Altokar mentions that this officer may have functioned under the *ranabhandagaradhikarana*, it is likely that as weapons were an essential item of war, the department of *ayudhagaradhikshya* must have been independently organised under the Commander-in-Chief.

4. As forts constituted the most important static formation of defence, there was an Inspector General of Forts at headquarters who commanded a number of forts each placed in the charge of an officer called *durgadhikshya* or *kottapala*.

The provincial administration of the Guptas had also certain military functions to perform. The Empire was divided into a number of provinces called ...
called desas which in turn were sub-divided into districts or pradesas. The desas were governed by officers called goptria or wardens of the serches who had, as their name implies, a defence responsibility to discharge in addition to the management of the civil administration of the province. Again, there were the vassal kingdoms within the Empire of which Tirabhukti or Tirhat in Bihar was one governed by prince Govinda Gupta who had almost a replica of the central machine under him. The Gupta prince was assisted by several civil dignitaries in addition to the following who had a defence function to perform—

1) dandansyaka or a Commandant,
2) bhatawanati who was the lord of the Cavalry,
3) ranabhandagaradhihara or the Chief of the War Department,
4) baladhikarana or Chief of the War Office.

This indicates that the vassal State which came to be ruled by a relative of the Emperor was fully equipped with the paraphernalia of a regular defence mechanism of a State. It is, however, significant that the overall military disposition of the forces was controlled by the imperial military headquarters which must have directed the positioning of the Infantry and Cavalry in one corner of the Empire according to military needs.

The above description of the military organisation under the Guptas has three significant features marking the culmination of the system of military planning in the Ancient World.
and foremost is the establishment of the office of the mahayuvapati who must have been the right-hand man of the Commander-in-Chief in the formulation of all plans of battles. Secondly, the establishment of the headquarters organisation with Principal Staff Officers like the quartermaster-General and the Master General of the Ordnance must have further developed the efficient functioning of the call of military planning under the Commander-in-Chief by giving due emphasis to the importance of logistics in the formulation of plans. Thirdly, the organisation of defence in provinces or in allied States must have considerably developed and strengthened the organisation at the Imperial Headquarters which controlled and guided the disposition of troops throughout the Empire. Though wars in those days were never three-dimensional, since different types of land forces decided the fate of battles, there is no dispute that the existence of mahayuvapati along with his colleagues at Imperial headquarters must have brought about effective coordination of the different arms of the forces, such as infantry, cavalry, chariots and elephants, and, what is more important, also brought about a certain amount of unity of planning. Thus the organisation of military planning under the senapati in the Gupta period may be regarded as the nearest approach to the modern system – Chiefs of Staff Committee.
The constitutional position of the senapati in the Gupta Empire.

The extent to which the senapati was a regular Minister of the Cabinet, though in uniform, is a matter of controversy. Dr. Jayaswal is of the view that the War Minister and the Commander-in-Chief were two separate offices, the former held by a civilian and the latter by a military official. However, Dr. Altekar has pointed out that the head of the military department was known by various titles such as sachiva according to Sukraniti senapati, mahabaladhirita and mahaprapanchandadandana-yaka, indicating that the War Minister was not separate from the Commander-in-Chief. There is, however, no definite proof on this point though it is of vital importance for the purpose of determining the existence of the principle of civilian control over the armed forces. However, it is significant that the word sachiva denotes a civilian cabinet minister whereas mahabaladhireta an official in uniform. Both these designations are said to have existed in the Gupta period. It is possible, therefore, that if sachiva was the War Minister, mahabaladhireta was the Commander-in-Chief. It is also possible, in that event, that the War Minister may not have been in uniform at some stage, if not throughout the political history of Ancient India. This is clearly supported by a passage in nityavakryanita which opposes the inclusion of the Commander-in-Chief in the Ministry. This indicates that the...

1 Jayaswal, Dr. 'Hindu Polity', p. 297
2 Altekar, Dr. 'State and Government in Ancient India' (1949), p. 122
that the War Minister must have been included in the Cabinet, but not the Commander-in-Chief. Thus, if the two offices were separate and the War Minister was a civilian and the Commander-in-Chief an official in uniform, the principle of civilian control over the defence forces must be said to have existed in some form or the other. The position is by no means definite. For example, Prof. Ray Chaudhuri believes that mahadandanayaka must have been the 'great commander of the Army' and that a manti or a Foreign Minister could also become a mahabaladhikrita, or chief commander of the forces. If a civilian could become a Commander-in-Chief, there must have been the possibility of a Commander-in-Chief holding any Cabinet portfolio in case the same was necessary. This is clearly brought out in the political theory of Sukra wherein he states that the transfer of Ministers from one portfolio to another was essential. Sukra advocates transfers every three years or after every five, seven or ten years because "authority should not be given in one's hand for a long time. A capable Minister should be put in charge of another work (department), and a new competent man should step into his shoes." This transfer of Ministers was practised even during the Mauryan period because Asoka mentions in one of his inscriptions a five-yearly transfer as a dharma or law to be followed without fail. This process of transfer was called anusamyana and it is possible that a Commander-in-Chief exchanged position with a civil minister who became ...

1 Hemchandra Ray Chaudhuri, Political History of Ancient India, 1953, p. 960.
2 Sukra, II. 110
who became the Commander-in-Chief. The latter must have been a difficult proposition, but, if it is true, it would serve to indicate that the 

sachiva must have been a War Minister and not necessarily the Commander-in-Chief also. A War Minister need not be a soldier though a Commander-in-Chief must necessarily belong to the armed forces. However, the position of Commander-in-Chief and the War Minister is not by any means clear from the accounts available and it is difficult to say if there were two dignitaries or only one. In this respect the position appears to be obscure throughout the period of Ancient Indian history.

Whatever might have been the position, there is no doubt that the Ancient State was based on the principle of dharma and the welfare of the people ranked highest since the objectives of artha and kama crowned the righteous State. Even if the senapati or the Commander-in-Chief in uniform was a regular minister of the Cabinet, there was no direct responsibility of Government to the electorate in the modern democratic sense which this practice could have violated. The Ancient State, both in theory and practice, subjected the use of danda or force to the law of dharma and, as Mahabharata has put it, regarded the very heavens to be centred in the ethics of the State.

THE EVOLUTION OF MILITARY PLANNING THROUGH SUBSEQUENT AGES.

With the end of the Ancient World and the beginning of the Middle Ages, the centralised machinery ...
considerable centralisation of administrative machinery and produced a civilisation befitting any imperial structure of contemporary history, there is no doubt that it did not go far enough to replace the fundamental feudal principle of the defence structure since the Moghal mansabdari system was essentially based on the concept of levies. Thus the modern conception of the Chiefs of Staff came with the British army and its military occupation which, though completed in the 19th century, lasted till about the first half of the 20th century. However, it had to be left to the dawn of Indian independence to give a proper shape to the Chiefs of Staff Committee by appointing the Naval and Air Chiefs as heads of their Services and thus no longer subordinate to the Army Chief who was also the War Minister before 1947. This new organisation had also to be properly fitted into the constitutional structure of republican India, as prior to 1947, the Commander-in-Chief as 'Supreme' was responsible through the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India and the British Parliament. Thus the developments during the Muslim rule can best be examined along with the Rajput period as a part of the Middle Ages for the purpose of this study.

(A) MIDDLE AGES

As feudalism was the key-note of the political organisation of the State in the Middle Ages, the strength and structure of the armed forces came to rest on the feudal barons or nobles. This was responsible ...
responsible for such strong centrifugal tendencies that the success or failure of any mediaeval undertaking, whether social, political, economic or military, was primarily coloured by a conflict between the central authority of the king and the refractory chieftains of his State. This made proper centralised planning of any kind whatsoever difficult if not impossible. Thus, military planning in particular suffered because feudalism as an institution of governance was primarily based on the conception of local defence of areas in times of peace within and the organisation of a feudal force contributed by vassals when the State was threatened from without. Hence military planning both at the expert and the higher policy level came to be entrusted to the feudal barons through the baronial councils in the West and the mahasamanta along with the council of samantas of the Rajput mediaeval monarchs in the East. The king was quite often a mere primus inter pares and as the baronial council would not meet unless the threat to the State was imminent, and even when it met the concentration of both energy and purpose was so short-lived, battles were rarely planned properly by the experts. The result was that the element of surprise played the most decisive part in determining the fate of battles. This is hardly the place where a detailed description could be attempted of either feudalism under the Norman kings of England, which had suppressed the right of war, or the continental feudalism which had its own special characteristics, or the Rajput feudalism of Northern India, which differed from both. It is enough to indicate that the basic trait common to all the varieties of feudalism was the institution of the feudal levy which provided a force of mounted men-at-
arms as well as the infantry. The period of service was neither regular nor continuous. It was often limited as under the Norman and Continental feudalism, with the result that the king often found his army melting away in the middle of a campaign since it was composed of barons who were often fond of giving orders rather than of taking them from anyone. This feature of feudalism was characteristic of the Rajput confederacies which were formed on more than one occasion to resist the incessant Islamic invasion of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni and of Moizuddin Muhammad Bin Sam of Ghor. Thus, when planning was entrusted to individuals who had divergent interests, let alone the development and progress of the technique of military planning and its organisation, there was not even the certainty of the production of a united plan, the proper implementation of which was always threatened with fissiparous tendencies. In the circumstances, no useful contribution can be had from the history of feudalism in the present context of study. The only fact worth emphasising is that despite this distorted political structure, quite often without an effective central edifice, the three stages of military planning being so fundamental were nevertheless present however crude and haphazard they might have been. This can easily be gathered from a brief study of the political organisation of the Rajput State in the 11th and the 12th century A.D. The position improved in the Sultanate period and more so under the Moghuls.

Military ...
The Rajput king was assisted by a council of severalas composed of feudal nobles among whom the territories of the State were parcelled out for the purpose of local administration. The binding link with the king was that they paid homage, swore allegiance and rendered service to him as the head of the feudal pyramid. The mahasamanta or principal feudal noble who controlled the body of jagirdars had a very important place in the cabinet of the Rajput king. There was also the senapati, who was often described as mahasenapati or commander-in-chief, who controlled the infantry, cavalry and the elephant corps of the Rajput State. Moreover, there is a reference to the office of mahasandhivigrahika or the Minister for War and Peace but he was certainly not common to all the kingdoms which flourished in the Northern India of 11th and 12th centuries A.D. In any case, the "inner cabinet" must have been composed of the mahasamanta, the senapati and the mahasandhivigrahika. The pradhana who was often the mahasamanta was at times assisted in the discharge of civil administration by amatis and there are instances of a civil official being raised to the rank of mantrin to advise the king. The higher defence policy of the Rajput State, must therefore have depended upon the deliberations of the king with the above-mentioned dignitaries. If this represented the highest stage of military planning, it is possible that the expert planning must have been done by the mahasenapati and the mahasamanta who were both primarily military officials. In some cases, the mahasamanta combined in himself the high office of senapati also.

If ...
If the military undertaking of the Rajput State was not dependent on a coalition, the expert planning should have been both feasible and satisfactory, taking into consideration what was possible in that age. However, when coalitions were formed, military planning had to be entrusted to several senapati and the commanders or senapati of the allied Rajput States, with the result that conflicting interests must have made it difficult to produce a coherent plan. Take, for example, the Rajput coalition planned against the invasion of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna in 1001 A.D., when the confederacy consisted of the kings of Kanauj, Sambhar and Jijhoti (modern Bundelkhand) as well as the Kachhwaha Ruler of Owalior and Marwar and the Pawar Raja of Dhar or Malwa. The senapati along with the senapati held primary deliberations amongst themselves which must be said to represent the expert military planning. Again, when they further deliberated their conclusions with the respective kings to finalise their plans, the latter must be described as representing the higher defence planning of the confederacy. Even the third stage of planning at the command level must be said to have existed because when Raja Visaladeva, king of Sambhar, was asked to lead the confederacy it should have been in theory possible for him to plan the day to day operations of the struggle had the warfare continued for a long time and taken place in a distant theatre. However, as battles in the Rajput period of Indian History were often decided within a few hours of actual struggle, planning at the command ...
The command level was not always put to test. It is known however that when put to test it was always found wanting because the supreme commander of the confederal forces was often powerless to enforce his orders inasmuch as not even the individual force of each contributory State was properly integrated being based on a system of feudal levies. The organisational chart of the Rajput State in the 11th and 12th century A.D. is given as Appendix 'B' to this chapter. It merely served to emphasise that even in the most decentralised structure of defence machinery, the fundamental concept of three-fold planning with the key position of the expert planner who furnished the basis for the political approval of the king and implementation by the commanders, was never lost sight of.

However, the importance of this three-fold concept of military planning cannot be said to be adequately emphasised by the mere fact of its presence in Rajput feudalism. The paramount fact, however, is that on the success of this planning depended the success of the Rajput arms to resist external aggression. The phenomenal success of Islamic invasions of the 11th and 12th centuries A.D. which brought about Muslim rule in the country for over six hundred years calls for an explanation from the student of Indian History. It is well-known that Sultan Mahmud was operating hundreds of miles away from his main base at Ghazna and though completely cut off for purposes of any reinforcement he could yet march right into the interior regions of India, as far down as Somnath and successfully operate in a hostile country, defeating his enemies one ...
one by one. The answer to this is to be found in the loose-knit military organisation of the Rajputs with special reference to their planning machinery which suffered from grave imperfection at all stages. As it is an established fact that success depends purely on the efficiency of military planning and, further, as the history of the Rajput confederacies furnishes the key to the correct approach to a dominating fact of Indian History which kept this country enslaved for hundreds of years, a further examination of the Rajput confederal planning would not be out of place here.

The planning and organisation of Rajput Confederacies

The difficulties in planning and managing a confederacy were innumerable starting from its very inception and becoming unsurmountable in the execution of the confederal plan. These inherent difficulties arising out of separatist tendencies were also responsible for the quick dissolution of the confederacy leaving behind no trace of a permanent machinery as soon as the object was either attained or lost. The fact that it took a long time for a confederacy to be formed is illustrated by the episode of 1014 A.D. when Mahmud attacked Thaneswar. King Jaipal of the Punjab had heard of Mahmud's intention to plunder Thaneswar as the Sultan had demanded a free passage through his territory. The Hindu king, therefore, left no stone unturned to organise a Rajput confederacy as quickly as possible and he, therefore, warned Bijayapala, the Tojaar Raja of Delhi, and summoned others to come to his assistance. Mahmud scented ...
scented trouble and was keen to upset the possible formation of a Rajput confederacy. He, therefore, moved with rapidity to Punjab and forestalled not only Dijayapala's preparations but also those of all other Rajput princes who were contemplating an organised resistance to save the shrine at Thaneswar. According to Uthi, one of the earliest authorities, there was some resistance offered by the Rajputs but there is not the slightest doubt that, by and large, the shrine was undefended and fell an easy prey to the Iconoclast.¹

Several examples can be given of the profound difficulties in executing the confederal plan in the battlefield. The failure of the most important confederacy organised by Raja Anandapala in 1008 A.D. as a result of his elephant taking fright and deserting the battle-field is an established fact in the military history of the Rajputs. It proves beyond doubt that there was no second-in-command to Raja Anandapala and there was no planning worthy of the name at the command level. There is no doubt that the necessity of even the slightest deviation in the pre-conceived plans of the Rajputs proved fatal since it made impossible a revised plan of coordinated action and thus left each command to act as it willed resulting in complete confusion. For example, in 1019 A.D., or, as some historians would have it, in 1021 A.D., when Mahmud led his expedition against the Chanaela Raja of Kalinga, two classic instances of this inherent defect in a confederacy came to light.

¹ See Cambridge History of India, Vol.III, p.18
Raja Bhimpal of the Punjab, known as the Fearless, had joined the confederacy and had selected a site on the banks of the Jumna as the most suitable to resist the invasion of Mahmud. As the river was in spate, Mahmud hesitated to cross it, particularly when he was required to face a big army of the Rajputs on the other side of the river. While he was thus required to wait, it appears that eight Muslim officers, probably without their king's permission or knowledge, crossed the river with their contingents and took the Rajput army by complete surprise. As the settled Rajput plans relating to the field of battle against the Sultan did not contemplate such an eventuality, the entire Rajput camp was thrown into confusion and the numerous feudal levies which had assembled under the individual command of their respective feudal chieftains, took to heels. The eight Muslim officers with their contingents therefore continued to advance and took possession of a city, which was probably Beri in the vicinity of Dholpur. Mahmud, therefore, safely crossed both the Jumna and the Ganges and came face to face with the vast confederal army which the Chandela Raja Ganda of Kalinjar had organised. It appears that Raja Ganda, or Nanda as Muslim historians mention him, had brought together the Rajas of Kurnuja and Bari, and, according to Farishta, the Rajput force consisted of 36,000 horse, 105,000 foot and 600 elephant. It is quite obvious that in an age when standing armies were an exception and feudal levies the normal method of raising a force, Raja Ganda's unmanageable confederal force must have resulted from the totality of the contribution ...

1 Muslim historians mention the name of Nanda instead of Ganda as the Raja of Kalinjar.
the contribution of feudal levies working under the supreme command of each Rajput prince or ruler who joined as a member of the confederacy. There being several such members of the confederacy, and each prince boasting of his equality with the other, it is possible that there was no apex to this feudal pyramid of defence and hence no planning at the expert or the policy level was either possible or attempted. Though it is suggested that in the confederacy of 1001 A.D. King Visaladeva, the Chauhan prince of Ajmer or Sambhar, had taken up the chief command, there is nothing to indicate as to who had the chief command of the confederacy organised by Raja Ganda of Kalinjar in 1021 A.D. Though the Chandela prince was the organiser of the confederacy, it is possible that as he belonged to the inferior clan of Rajputs, his confederates may have refused to accept his supreme command. The events which followed are, therefore, extremely significant to the student of Rajput history of this period. According to Muslim chroniclers, when Sultan Mahmud found that he was completely outnumbered, he regretted the hasty decision of leaving Ghazna with a comparatively small force. Uthbi records that after offering prayers, the Sultan summed up courage and prepared for battle on the following day. However, to the utter surprise of the Sultan - and to the perplexity of historians to this day - Raja Ganda secretly ran away at night leaving behind all his sinews of war along with his wealth to be plundered by the Sultan. The confusion which resulted in the Rajput ...

1 Elliot, Vol. 2, p.47
the Rajput camp on the discovery of Ganda's flight was taken by the Sultan as a stratagem to induce him to take the offensive. However, Mahmud soon came to know that the confusion was genuine and he allowed his army to plunder the camp. No suitable explanation is yet forthcoming for the cause of Ganda's panic. C.V. Vaidya in his "History of Medieval Hindu India" goes to the extent of doubting Ganda's flight at night on the sole ground that when he had such a large army at hand, there was no reason for him to be panicly. However, if a reason has to be found for the panic and flight of the Chandela prince, the most plausible one is the failure of the Rajput confederacy to evolve a consolidated military plan of action with the approval of all concerned. If the pitched battle was scheduled for the morning, and if at night a unified plan could not be evolved because of internal dissensions and conflicting opinions on the plan of the battle and the chain of command, it was obvious for the leader of the confederacy to feel hopeless and even helpless despite the tremendous numerical superiority of his forces. If Utbi's record is to be accepted, there can be no doubt about the fact that Ganda fled from the field. The confusion which followed, indicates clearly that there was no one second in command to take his place. If a unified plan with an agreed chain of command had been worked out and a lesson had been learnt from the disaster of 1008 A.D. by appointing a Rajput prince as second-in-command, the Rajputs would not have been defeated...

1 C.V. Vaidya, Medieval History of India, Vol. III, p.38
defeated without a battle, may they would have even won a decisive victory particularly as the Sultan's forces were small. Ganda, having no other alternative, must have deserted the entire endeavour at night.

Thus the inevitable conclusion is that the larger the force built on the basis of feudal levies, the more difficult was the preparation of proper plans and hence greater the danger of its being a heterogeneous mass incapable of being welded into a single homogeneous command. Thus if the origin and inception of a confederacy was difficult, its execution was almost impossible while its dissolution the easiest, the sole reason being the lack of proper planning at the various levels.

The mere fact that a confederacy had been formed once to meet an invasion did not mean that a permanent machinery of resistance had been organised. On the contrary, immediately after the emergency was over, the members were known to indulge in internecine warfare even though the confederacy had been defeated and the enemy was thundering at the gate. A classic illustration of this is to be found in 1018 A.D. when the Chandel Prince Vidyadara, son of Raja Ganda, attacked Rajyapala of the Punjab who was a fellow confederator in 1008 A.D. and slew him in battle. It was this incident which had aroused the ire of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna who organised his invasion against Kalinjar in 1021 A.D. Again, it was the complete lack of a regularly constituted machinery of confederal planning or collective defence...
defence which enabled Sultan Mahmud to repeat his
country freely enabling him to penetrate right into
the heart of Aryavarta. If the confederacy had
taken the form of a permanent pact or a treaty to
oppose any Islamic invasion, full advantage could
certainly have been taken of the few occasions when
Sultan Mahmud met with reverses. Thus, in 1015 A.D.,
when Mahmud failed in his invasion of Kashmir and
was forced to give up the siege of Loharkot and to
retire to his capital, the Rajputs should have taken
full advantage and annihilated the Sultan's army
which had lost its way in the unfamiliar highlands
particularly when its retreat had been interrupted
by flooded valleys. However, as there was no
permanent confederal machinery in existence, there
was no opposition to Mahmud who returned safely to
Ghazna. Similarly, no advantage was taken of the
difficult position in which Mahmud found himself
when traversing the desert of Rajasthan on his way
to Somnath in 1025 A.D. Each trooper was ordered
to carry with him fodder, water and food for several
days and Mahmud had, therefore, to hire in India
no less than 30,000 camels to transport water and
supplies through his desert march. That the Sultan
could cross the desert without any mishap and capture
a fortress on his way to Ahobilvara putting to flight
the army of Raja Bhimdeo, indicates that the confe-
deracy was so ill-planned that in actual fact it was
never in being except for the few moments that the
battle was being fought to be lost!
Muslim period (Circa 1200 to 1707 A.D.)

Though centralisation dawned to a considerable extent in the heyday of the Sultanate period and was certainly witnessed in the Moghul Empire that followed, military planning at the expert level still suffered, as already stated before, from the fundamental defects of the feudalistic basis of the defence system. In the days of the Lodi Sultanate, Afghan nobles were notorious for their insubordination since they preferred their own interests or of their clans to those of the State. The Lodi Sultanate employed different kinds of treatment to placate them. While Bahlul Lodi controlled them by conciliating their prejudices, Sikander Lodi adopted a stern policy toned by conciliation wherever necessary. As the defence organisation of the Lodi Sultanate depended upon these nobles, it is indeed interesting to note that Ibrahim Lodi lost his throne by alienating his feudal nobles, one of whom went to the extent of courting the invasion of Babur to put an end to the Sultanate itself. This clearly indicates that there were moments when the Sultanate, as late as the 15th century, suffered from defects which were inherent in the Rajput States of the 11th and 12th century A.D. However, the basis of military planning, both at the policy and the expert level, improved during the centralised military despotisms of Balban, Alaudin Khilji and Mohammad Bin Tughlak. The political organisation of the Sultanate along with its military machinery is described in the chart given as Appendix 'C' to this chapter.

THE THREE ...
The three-fold concept of Defence planning in the political organisation of the Sultanate.

The Sultan was assisted by the Naib-i-Nazim-i-mamlık, War Minister, who was in direct contact with the commanders of the infantry, cavalry and elephant corps. As the Crown was the central pivot of the machinery, these commanders had direct contact with the Sultan from whom all orders and commands emanated. In the formulation of the higher defence policy of the State, the Sultan must have been assisted by the following:

(i) Wazir, who held a key position in the civil administrative structure, and, as he controlled Finance, no planning was possible without him;

(ii) Arif-i-mamlık, who was a civil minister in charge of recruitment, payment and inspection of troops; and

(iii) Naib-i-Nazim-i-mamlık or the War Minister.

The above three officials must have constituted the inner cabinet in all defence matters.

It is difficult to state with any precision the extent to which expert military planning by the commanders either with or without the consultation of the Naib-i-Nazim-i-mamlık may have taken place. As military despots like Alauddin Khilji with their zeal for centralisation must have maintained close contacts with the military dignitaries, it is possible that expert planning was done in consultation with the king himself. Nevertheless, deliberations with the wazir, the War Minister, must have taken place before the planning...
planning of any military undertaking could be finalised. The importance of deliberation and consultation which was a feature of Ancient India, can also be noticed in the political organisation of the Sultanate. The Quran itself enjoins Muslims to "deliberate and mutually consult each other in conducting their affairs" (XLII, 38.). This verse was the basis of the introduction of democratic institutions like the Parliament in modern Turkey and Persia. Again, Mihyayat-ul-arab quotes a very appropriate Arab maxim "the bravest of men require arms, and the wisest of kings need ministers" which compares favourably with Kautilya's appreciation that the chariot of State cannot move without its essential deliberative wheel. The Sultan, therefore, had four principal ministers, namely, the wazir with his department of diwan-i-wazarat, as already mentioned, the sadr-us-sudur with his department of diwan-i-rasulat dealing with religious matters and the arid-i-mumalik with his department of diwan-i-ard who could be regarded as the Controller General of the Military department. In addition, there was the Barid-i-mumalik as the head of the Espionage department. The head of the Secret Services was not described as a minister of the State, but he performed an important function and ranked almost equal to the ministers mentioned above. Barid-i-mumalik must have played an important part in the defence mechanism of the Sultanate since he was supposed to be the very eyes and ears of the Sultan. There can be no doubt, therefore, as to the existence of political deliberation among the Council ...
Council of Ministers for the formulation and approval of defence policies including the undertaking of campaigns for fresh conquests. However, on account of the scanty literature available on this particular subject, it is difficult to make any categorical statement on the precise way the expert planners functioned towards the formulation of plans of military operations and the extent to which higher policy planning was based on the same.

The Moghul Empire

The Moghul Empire had an all-pervading military basis and it would, therefore, be difficult to state where the military machinery ended and the civil machinery started. Sir Jadu Nath Sarkar has appropriately summed up the essential characteristics of the Moghul State when he has said that "by its nature it was a military rule and, therefore, necessarily a centralised despotism." He has, moreover, gone on to add that the government "was military in its origin, and though in time it became rooted to the soil, it retained its military character to the last". It is well-known that every official who performed a civil function in the Moghul administration was accorded a military rank and given a mansab as a 'nominal commander of horsemen which determined his pay and status'. Thus even judges of canon law, clerks, accountants and even cooks of higher grades ranked as mansabdars and as such were members of the Moghul Army. Even the Kitchen Department was a part of the military system ...

1 Sarkar, J.N. Moghul Administration, p.48. Unlike Dr. Ishwarl Prasad, Sir J.N. Sarkar has not confused the essential feature of the Moghul State which was military first and theocratic later.
system as is revealed by Ain-i-Akbari which states: "In this department (kitchen), nobles, Ahadis and other military are employed and the chief of that department ranks as a commander of 600." The political organisation of the State which Akbar had planned on a Persian basis was, therefore, essentially military and "almost all important officials exercising civil jurisdiction were primarily military commanders". In this respect the civil powers were actually attached to and made dependent upon the military rank.

Again, all officials, whether performing civil or military functions, were paid by the Bakshi or the military Pay Master and all promotions were registered by an increase in the nominal command. There was no distinction between the civil and military treasury and the entire staff engaged in the military or the civil sphere was paid from the State treasury which came under the military Pay Master. In the circumstances, the conclusion may not be unwarranted that the Moghul State was essentially a military State and depended upon the authority of the monarch who wielded absolute power and in turn depended for conquest, consolidation and continuance of his State on the armed forces of which he was the "Supreme General".

Defence Planning at various levels

However, inspite of the military sphere which predominated and resulted in the absolutism of ...

2 Smith, V., Akbar the Great Moghul, p.357
of the Emperor, there was a "regular council of ministers". The wazir had emerged as the Chief Councillor of the Emperor and he was assisted by several high officials who probably ranked as Secretaries or Heads of departments. In the reign of Akbar, the Prime Minister was known as Vakil. It appears that subsequently he came to be known as wazir or the Finance Minister. There can be no doubt that in his capacity as 'High Dewan' the wazir must have been consulted in all matters concerning the defence of the realm. Though there were several other dignitaries like the Khan-i-Saman, Nazi-ul-Quzat and Sadr-i-Sadur, who had essentially civil functions to perform and must therefore have been consulted in regard to the civil affairs of the State, they held ranks according to their importance and therefore in a strict sense could be regarded as men in uniform. However, if we distinguish the functions of the various officials, it is not difficult to specify those dignitaries who had basically a military function to perform. The names of the military officials who may have been associated with one stage or the other of military planning, may be mentioned below:

(1) Mir Atish or Daroga-topkhanah in charge of Artillery.
(2) Daroga-i-Dak Chauki in charge of Intelligence and Posts.
(3) The Nazir-i-Buyuktat - Superintendent of the Imperial Workshop.
(4) Mir Bahri - Chief Admiral and Officer of the Harbours.

1 Sarkar, J.N. Moghul Administration, p.37
Policy planning and the functions of the Wazir and Baksht

It is possible that in the early days of the Moghul Empire, both Babar and later Akbar, on account of their genius for details must have guided military planning from its earliest stage and approved it themselves. However, consultation with the wazir or Prime Minister could not be ruled out. In addition, there was the organisation of the Imperial Baksht which provided the necessary machinery for giving civil assistance for the efficient functioning of the army. As there was no clear division between the civil and the military sections of the administration, the Baksht kept a complete record of all those employed by the State and thus an essential function of the modern civil ministry of defence was performed by him. In addition, he was responsible for recruitment to the army as well as for arranging supplies of all kinds for the successful prosecution of campaigns. As every civil officer was a mansabdar and had a rank in the imperial army, it was the duty of the Baksht to see that the mansabdars kept the required number of horses in proper condition. Thus it was the Baksht who supplied the central pivot of both the civil and the military functions of the administration. It is, therefore, more than likely that the Baksht was also consulted from time to time when plans were being worked out for a military campaign. The other dignitaries, like the Chief Controller of Artillery and Superintendent of Imperial Workshops, may have come into the picture...
the picture only when problems concerning them must have faced the military planners.

**Expert Military Planning**

It is essential to state at the outset that there was no headquarters organisation of the type developed in the Gupta age which witnessed an expert planning organisation consisting of the mahavysapatī (Chief of Staff) and the ranabhandagaradhikarana (Quartermaster General) with the ayudhagaradhyaksha (Master General of Ordnance).

In the Moghul Empire, as the entire machinery was essentially militaristic and even a dignitary of the type of Raja Todar Mal, who was an expert in revenue administration, could be appointed to lead a campaign, there was no expert staff as such to undertake the planning. The practice appears to have been for the Emperor to appoint a high mansabdar in charge of the campaign and it was then left to him to draw up his expert plans in consultation with his subordinate generals. The Emperor himself often interfered when the military operations met with failure and Akbar is known to have personally undertaken a march from his capital to the distant regions of the Empire to set matters right. It would, therefore, not be incorrect to state that in the over-centralised machinery of the Moghul Empire, the Emperor himself was the mainspring of planning in all its stages. He may have been assisted by a hierarchy of officials including the vazir but there was no scientific organisation of cells of military planning, as witnessed in ancient Indian History, or noticed in the modern State. This is hardly the place where any description ...
description of the mansabdar system, which was essentially based on feudal levies, need be attempted. It is enough to state that the high-ranking mansabdars and feudatory Rajas who remained the pillars of the Moghul Empire emphasized the loose-knit character of the Imperial organization and its planning.

No attempt has been made to describe the evolution of military planning in medieval Europe since the intention to describe the basic principles of evolution is equally well-served by examining the history of India which furnishes as good an example as could be had. European feudalism itself had basically the same problems as were characteristic of Rajput feudalism, and having stated the latter, a further elucidation of the former is hardly necessary, when the raison d'etre of this work is to describe the organisation of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in the various States of the world today. The evolution of this institution is, however, not without interest but it has to be confined to its broadest aspect. However, as Prussia and Great Britain have made a listing contribution to the institution, to give it the shape which it now has, these two further landmarks are discussed below.

(B) PRUSSIA

CHIEF OF STAFF: ITS HISTORICAL EVOLUTION.

It is possible to trace the conception of the General Staff to the 1st of July 1657 when

...
on the pay list of the Prussian Army, the Quarter­master General and certain other officers were described as "the General Staff of the Army". It is not quite clear if the system was borrowed from the Swedish organisation or it was introduced for the first time in the Brandenburg Army. However, one thing appears to be clear, namely, that it was the inevitable result of necessity. The mediaeval pattern of warfare was on a much smaller scale than what the modern age witnessed after the discovery of gunpowder and the rise of standing armies to protect the nation-state. A General commanding a large body of troops in a long drawn out war inevitably needed a number of assistants, collectively forming his staff, to relieve him of details and to assist him in many ways, because it was impossible for the mental and physical powers of one man to cope with the entire task of organising and guiding the fighting of a battle. These assistants constituted his 'staff' at the Command level. Again, with the increasing complexity of warfare from mediaeval to modern times it became necessary for a distinct portion of the staff at the Headquarters of the military organisation to be entrusted with planning and coordinating the movements of armies in the theatres of war and this particular work came to be generally distinguished by a special name. This particular branch of the staff at Headquarters of the armed forces of a State or with the General in the field came to be known as the Generalstab and became the nucleus of expert planning at the respective levels.
It inevitably grew in importance and strength with the numerical expansion of modern armies and the development of military training and arms. Thus, a hundred years later, in 1767, we find in the Prussian Army List not only the Quartermaster General but also 15 Lieut. Quartermasters under one Quartermaster assisting the General. They were described on the Pay List as coming under the head of "General Staff". It was a distinguishing feature of the Prussian Staff system when compared to the organisations of other European armies to have a specially trained set of officers earmarked for the work of planning, and it was not till 1785 that the General Staff officers came to be distinctly categorised as such. It was in the time of Frederick William II that the officers of the General Staff received a special uniform (light blue or white coat with red collar and facings, silver lace and white buttons) and became a distinct corps by themselves. In this connection it is of some importance to give the relevant extract from the printed Army List of 1789:

"PERSONAL STAFF OF THE KING"

1. 2 Adjutant Generals
2. 4 Flugel Adjutants.
3. General Staff, consisting of 2 Colonels, 1 Lieut. Colonel, 6 Majors, 4 Captains and 1 Lieutenant. (All these officers had a place at the Marshal's table at Potsdam).
4. 10 officers belonging to the Army.

As the General Staff was to assist the Supreme Commander-in-Chief who was the King, the officers mentioned above were rightly shown as on the personal...
the personal staff of the King. They steadily
grow in number during war and declined in peace, but
the nucleus always remained and gradually grew in
importance on account of the key function it perfor-
med i.e. of advising the King in matters of strategy.

Again, with the separate uniform and distinct
position with defined duties came the gradual
development of an extraordinarily hard training and
severe process of selection for officers of the
"Generalstab". A series of instructions were set out
for them and a start was given in 1801 by Colonel
v. Massenbach who prepared a special set of instruc-
tions in which he laid great stress on the importance
of reconnoitering and reporting on ground and field
engineering. Colonel v. Massenbach also formulated
a clearly defined charter of duties for the staff
officers based on scientific principle and expecting
and expecting "great and serious exertions on the part
of individual officers who were selected and belonged
to the General Staff."¹ These instructions included
a classified description of military positions" and
there was also a collection of papers known as "Plans
Operations" which was considered at that time to be
of great value, as it was intended to solve the
difficulties of the less gifted individuals.
Moreover, Col. v. Massenbach wrote the "Fundamental
Treatises" and submitted a memoir to the King in
1802 for regulating the work of General Staff in
peace. ...

¹ v. Schellendorff - The Duties of General Staff.
peace. These writings led in 1803 to the holding of an entrance examination in surveying, fortification, tactics and military art and history. This examination became compulsory for the appointment of young officers to the General Staff. It was, however, in 1870 that military training came under the General Staff and the Military Academy founded by Schan hors was turned into an exclusive military institution. This severe process of selection after a hard test gave a peculiar importance to the organization and a halo to its members who could rightly put on superior airs.

FORMATION OF THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF.

The next stage in the development of the Prussian Staff system came with the Napoleonic Wars of 1813-1815. These wars brought about a corresponding numerical increase in the General Staff and led to the employment of staff officers not only at the H.Q. of armies but also in Army Corps and Brigades. One or two General Staff Officers were attached to each of the formation. Again, a significant step was taken when these officers were attached to the Brigade itself and not to the person of its Commander and consequently were not affected by a change of Brigadiers. It is said that when the war came to a close after the Second Peace of Paris, the General Staff was further consolidated and a clear bifurcation resulted by which one portion came to be kept together in Berlin under its own special Chief as the "Great General Staff" and the other distributed as Army General Staff among Army Corps and Divisional Commands and was consequently closely connected with the troops. Thus were born the necessary cells of expert planning not only at Headquarters to guide and assist the
Political Authority of the State but also in the execution stage at the command level where planners were provided to work out the proper implementation of the plans.

Again, the high level framing of military policy by the head of the State on the expert plans of the military Chiefs was also present since the Prussian War Ministry existed to assist the king. The organisation of higher planning may thus briefly be described by the following chart:

```
    KING
     /\    /
    \  /  /
     \_\_/ 
     (A) Chief (B) Military Kabinett (C) Minister (D) Chancellor
       of Staff       (King's Personal       Cabinet for
                        Cabinet for War.         Personal Affairs)
                        of War.
```

The General Staff was at first under a War Ministry enjoying a subordinate position; but in 1821 when General v. Muffling was appointed the Chief of General Staff of the Army, this inferior position was brought to an end. By the Royal Decree of 25th January 1821 the General Staff was given an independent position directly under the King. From that date onwards the position held by the Chief of the General Staff was a matter of very great importance. It was claimed that it was essential for war purposes that the men who was charged with the necessary preparations in peace should alone be entrusted with the conduct of operations in war. The Prussian military organisation was in this sense superior to the corresponding organisations of other great European armies. From 1825 to 1867 the organisation expanded and contracted according to the danger of war and possibilities of peace which prevailed in Europe.

/THE CONTRIBUTION.../
THE CONTRIBUTION OF WILLLIAN AND MOLTKE TOWARDS
THE EVOLUTION OF THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF.

However, the organisation took its final shape
and form as a result of the relationship which developed
between William I and von Moltke. In 1864 even the
peace-time establishment of General Staff was increased
and brought on a permanent footing, and in 1867 came the
clear separation of a special establishment of the
General Staff for purely scientific purposes. Again, to
ensure continuity, specially qualified officers were
to be retained and exempted from the usual spells of
regimental duty. Thus was born the basic conception
of the system of having a permanent set of planners
irrespective of the need of getting field training from
time to time. Henceforward, the Prussian Staff system
formed a Corps by itself. The officers not only wore a
special uniform but their names did not appear later in
any regimental list. Their promotion was in the hands
of the Chief of Staff of the Army and advancement in
the General Staff was probably quicker than in the Army
generally. In 1867 came the formal inauguration by
virtue of a Royal Order of the 31st January, and the
organisation as it was conceived then, lasted with some
modifications right up to the date when Hitler was
defeated. It is necessary to state here the peculiar
circumstances in which the organisation was finally
consolidated in 1870 and 1871 when von Moltke as the
strategic advisor to the King laid down the line of action

which the ....
which the latter as the Commander-in-Chief ordered to be implemented without alteration.

In the war with Austria, it was made apparent to the King and von Moltke that the planning, operation and other details involved in a military campaign necessitated a whole-time person to devote his undivided attention. With his hands full of problems relating to the civil administration of the country, it was not possible for the King to take on himself the arduous duties of a Commander-in-Chief in addition to strategic planning. Furthermore, the military qualities so vitally essential in a Commander-in-Chief more often than not were lacking in the Sovereign. These considerations inevitably made it necessary to have a Chief of Staff to act as the Strategical Adviser to the King. This Chief of Staff was indeed the De facto Commander-in-Chief. The Prussian system was born, therefore, as a result of two great military personalities - Moltke and Bismarck - dominating the European scene with a Prussian King (William I) who appreciated their qualities and could repose complete confidence in them.

It is significant to note that the Chief of Staff was of far greater importance than a mere Military Assistant to a professional Commander-in-Chief. King William I had in Field Marshal Count Moltke such an expert Assistant that the victories of Prussia in 1866 and 1870 could in no small measure be attributed to the perfect understanding between the two, a relationship equally creditable to both. While Moltke,
as the Chief of Staff attributed to the King the responsibility for all strategical decisions, the King equally correctly regarded Moltke as the source. Nevertheless, William I had in him the supreme de jure authority both in the political and military arena. The secret of King William's military success lay in his selection of a single adviser and resolute adherence to the latter's proposals.

On the political side too, the Prussian King had in Bismarck, a trusted adviser, the counterpart of Moltke. In this way the King, occupying a central position, had a military and a Political Adviser to whom he could turn for advice as circumstances necessitated. Thus was secured the harmony between the political and military directions so essential for success in war.

The remarkable efficiency of the institution of the Chief of the Staff in war lay in the fact that von Moltke as Chief of the Staff was the de facto Commander-in-Chief under a King who had de jure control of the Prussian forces and success depended on the personalities and cooperation of the two individuals. The Germans themselves regarded this as accidental but it was really essential for success.

There was a general interest aroused after 1866 and 1870 by the fact that the great strategist von Moltke, to whom the two great victories are ascribed, was not the commander of the Prussian Army but merely the....
but locally the Chief of the General Staff of a

Local Commander-in-Chief. In 1700 a Royal Commission

was set up in England under the Presidency of

Lord Herlington to inquire into the methods of

national defence and the British system, which

was the pattern of the day, was often quoted as

suitable for being adapted to the British system.

In, however, the success of the British system was

the direct result of a successful combination of

the commensurate, it was not a system which could

incidentally be considered suit to the formation

of modern,

Many, os the success or failure of the British

Staff system depended upon the relationship between

the Commander and his Chief of Staff, it is essential

to examine how the machinery worked under different

conditions with that result. The two supreme

representatives of the system, Hindenburg and Jodl

expressly stated that the relations between the

Commander and his Chief of Staff were incapable of

definition or being laid down in advance. In fact,

the essence of the matter consisted in not defining

this delicate relationship, as it was best left open

to adjust itself in each concrete case in accordance

with the respective personalities of the holders of the

two offices. The official position under the Chief of

Staff was the sole responsible advice to the King and

nothing more. The latter could certainly refuse to

accept his advice as the Royal Commander alone was

officially responsible for the consequences of his

decisions.
decisions. However, the Chief of Staff by virtue of his peculiar confidential status had a definite share in the authority of the Commander. In the absence of the Commander he was entitled to issue orders on his behalf. The Chief of Staff thus enjoyed a unique and extraordinary position in the German Army as he was the only one who could share the general control with the Royal Commander-in-Chief, and he could, therefore, be described as the Commander's alter ego. In actual fact, both worked hand in glove and shared the key to the success of the organisation. Hindenburg has very rightly described his partnership with Ludendorff in the following terms: "I have myself frequently described my relations to Ludendorff as those existing in a happy marriage. One meets the other half-way in thought as well as in deed, and the words of one are frequently but the expression (formulation) of the thoughts and sentiments of the other". Similarly, Soest in his "Goldenen Ring Soldaten" has very aptly expressed the same relationship in the following words: "... The commander directs on his own responsibility alone and he has to bear the advice but of one can, placed at his side, his chief (of staff). Under four eyes the decision is made and then the two men charge it as one decision. They both have taken it together, the two are one. If their opinions diverged in the course of their deliberations, on the evening of this day of 'happy military marriage' neither spouse knew any longer the it was that gave way. The outside world and military history
hears nothing of a marital clash of opinion. In this fusion of the two personalities lies the security of the Command. Whether the order is signed with the name of the Commander, or whether the Chief, according to the German custom, signs it on the part of the Command, is of no importance."

However, the basic defect of the system lay in the human factor as temperaments will clash and opinions need not agree with the result that the partnership may have to be broken. The danger in the Prussian system lay in the hereditary principle on which one of the irremovable partners (the King) was wedded to a removable one (the Chief of Staff). If the Commander happened to be weak or incapable, the Chief of Staff would inevitably acquire an ascendency. Thus, if the proper Chief of Staff was not chosen or if a mistake had been made in choosing one, it was difficult to rectify it if one of the partners (the king) was incapable of performing his part of the duty.

The problems of the relationship between the Commander and his Chief of Staff created difficulties even at the level of Army Corps where the attached Chief of Staff often directed the Commander and took supreme responsibility. The tendency of many German Chiefs of Staff during the First World War was to dominate their Commanders and the fundamental relationship was thus distorted in favour of the chief on whom the responsibility was fixed. Accordingly,

On the Western front....
on the Western front it is reported that when a reverse took place it was customary to leave the Commander in his place but to remove his Chief of Staff thus indicating that the Chief Staff Officer was held primarily responsible for the wrong advice that he might have tendered. The Chief of Staff of the Army Corps was unique, therefore, in the fact that he found himself under a dual jurisdiction, i.e., that of his immediate Commander and that of the Chief of the General Staff at the Headquarters. It is of significance in the development of the staff system to know that during the First World War the local Commander was relegated to a secondary position and the Chief of Staff dictated strategy and operations.

In all these conceptions the German General Staff machinery did not conform to the established practice of other European armies. For example, in France the Chief of Staff was restricted to a far limited role as the basic emphasis was on a division of functions rather than on the intimate collaboration which constituted the essence of the German system.

THE ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE GENERAL STAFF IN THE PRUSSIAN ARMY.

The Great General Staff has been described as the keystone of the whole system of German military organisation responsible for the great efficiency of the German Army. It acted as the powerful brain of the military body to the designs of which brain the whole body was made to work. This great body of central thinking in the pre-Hitler set-up was the very basis of economy and efficiency in the German Army.
The Chief of the General Staff of the Army assisted by the Great General Staff, which was his special organ, was occupied during peace with preparations for the conduct of the army in war. In peacetime he was essentially engaged in a systematic and comprehensive study of likely complications in the event of a war, the possible theatres of operation, the peculiar features of neighbouring countries, statistics of fighting resources of other nations, etc. Material on these topics was constantly collected and digested in peace-time to such an extent that once mobilization took place and war was imminent, the actual implementation of plans to the minutest detail was perfectly carried out by the mere issue of orders, and the whole operation took place as if by clock-work within a specified number of days. For this purpose the Great General Staff was organised into three divisions to each of which a portion of Europe was assigned and full information on the respective countries concerned was collected and collated, and the military intelligence thus made available at its disposal was of immense value in war-time.

Thus the depth and breadth upon which the Great General Staff was built accounted for the fullness and knowledge at the disposal of its Chief when he formed a plan of operations. This easily explains the Prussian success in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870.

In all military operations, the one authorized adviser to the King was the Chief of the General Staff of the Army. As stated before, the General Staff's
organisation was a subordinate branch of the Ministry of War prior to 1815. In 1821, however, it was settled that the Chief of the General Staff should not be subordinate to the Ministry for War but should be directly responsible to the King. The Chief of the General Staff, thus being outside the purview of the Minister for War, came to be entrusted with the direction of the army in war and during peace to make such special preparations as might be necessary to this end. The business of the War Ministry was mainly confined to the raising, maintenance and administration of the army. This superior status of the Chief of the General Staff was not possible in a democratic set up as in U.K. However, in an Imperial structure which relied for strength both within and without on the superiority of its armed forces, the importance attached to the supreme planning cell and its Chief could be understood.

PLANNING AT COMMAND LEVEL.

The army was divided into convenient divisions, each of them under its own Commander and his Chief of Staff, so that the Chief of the General Staff himself had to devote his attention only to the major problems of campaigns, etc. The head of each division was aware of this fact and stuck to the share of work assigned to his force. He in turn regarded his Army, Corps or Division as so many units and, besides a statement of the object to be aimed at, gave only...
gave only such directions as the Corps or Divisional Commanders were not able to arrange for themselves. All the details of the movements were left in the hands of the Corps or Divisional Commanders and their special staffs. As already stated, each Army Corps had a Chief of Staff official attached to it and the organizational chart given below indicates the extent to which staff officers owing allegiance to the Chief of General Staff permeated the German Defence machinery.

The chart shows the structure of the German Army's General Staff and its various branches. Each Army Corps had a Chief of Staff (G.S.O.) under the control of the Chief of General Staff. The chart also includes Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery branches, with each having General Staff Officers (GSO) attached to them.

This brain of the German Army, the Great General Staff, was under the control of the Chief of the General and had the following duties:

1. .......

GSO - General Staff Officer
Bn - Battalion.
1. The preparation of the German Army and fortresses for war, the transport of troops during the mobilisation and concentration of the army.

2. Collection of information regarding foreign armies and navies and their progressive development in keeping with the military operations in foreign countries.

3. Training of officers for the General Staff including those for duty with troops and those attached to the Great General Staff for G.S. work.

4. Study of the latest quotations regarding fortifications, rifles and guns.

5. Arrangement of Imperial manoeuvres.


The War Minister closely followed the progress of military events as a member of the C-in-C's staff. As a rule, he was present at the interviews of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army with the King and was thus able by learning the plans and decisions of the Commander-in-Chief to give at once necessary directions to the War Ministry.

THE DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GERMAN STAFF SYSTEM.

As the Germans conceived their "Generalstab" as a distinct organisation on its own to be manned by a compact body of officers with exceptional 'esprit de corps', they prescribed a severe method of selection followed by intensive training; and hence these two outstanding characteristics must be described at some length:

Selection and training. In order to pick and choose the ablest in every respect an entrance examination ...
examination was prescribed for admission to the Military Academy. This examination included purely military matters as distinguished from general cultural subjects, as was the case in other countries. The examination was known to be stiff and in selection, not only the written work but the intelligence, initiative and integrity of the individual candidates was put to severe test. It is essential to state here that favouritism was completely eradicated and even the King was powerless, as merit alone was regarded as the qualification for admission. The military subjects prescribed for the examination were tactics, formal and applied, the nature and construction of firearms, fortification and surveying. The general subjects were history, geography, mathematics and French.

It is said that from 1870 onwards the Military Academy tended to become the sole means of access to the General Staff. In theory it may have been possible to be commissioned to the General Staff without passing through the Academy but in actual practice this was discouraged till it was completely stopped towards the end of the 19th century. In 1872, the institution was transferred from the control of the Inspector of Military Education to that of the Chief of the General Staff. In 1914, the only method of entry to the General Staff was through the Academy with the result that many hundreds competed for the few places which were open each year. The Military Academy imparted training for a period of...
period of three years. The teaching was done by officers of the Great General Staff who took on this work in addition to their normal duties. The initial training at the Academy was for a period of three years, though in France and Austria it was only 2 and in Russia 3 years. At the end of the third year there was another competitive examination at which the character, general education, manners, and personality were assessed in addition to credit being given for pure military merit. It is reported that out of those who gained admission to the Academy only 30% passed through the second test and entered the next stage of being accorded to the Great General Staff which was for a period of 2 years. Those who failed to qualify were given lesser posts including that of teachers in officers' schools, etc. However, those commanded to the Great General Staff and selected were distributed in various sections and received intense practical training. At the end of the 'period of command' there came a third and final examination as a result of which the very pick of officers were chosen and finally assigned to the General Staff. This method of selection and intensive training, a veritable Spartan system, tested the strength of character, gift for rapid decisions, concentrated effort over long protracted periods and ability to deal swiftly with masses of material upon which the peculiar efficiency of the General Staff depended. As a result of this long training, a young officer was admitted to the General Staff...
General Staff when he had reached the rank of Captain, this training was a feature of the whole career of the officer and did not end during his years at the Academy or after the probationary period at the Command. This continuous training was the peculiar fate of the General Staff Officer because according to Seeckt "his time of learning never ceases."

EXEMPLARY STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING AS THE RAISON D'ÊTRE OF THE GERMAN STAFF SYSTEM.

One of the most distinguishing characteristics of the German Staff system was specialization of its officers to become expert professionals in staff work alone. This was a significant departure from the prevailing opinion and practice in the armies of Continental countries. For example, this difference was clearly recognized by such eminent French military leaders as Bonnal in his 'Conditions de la guerre moderne'. He has stated that "in Germany the superior practical military instruction is given to the general staff officer almost without interruption from the grade of Captain to that of Colonel, whereas in France it is given to the future general staff officers only during the two years of their theoretical and practical courses at the Ecole supérieure de la Guerre. Again, Pech, in the introduction to his De la conduite de la guerre, significantly observes that the training at the Ecole supérieure was by itself insufficient. To quote his words "The duellist who wishes to present himself in good figure on the ground is..."

...
ground is not satisfied with two years of fencing school in all his life; he will keep constantly in exercise." However, this was a later development in the German staff system as the Corps of officers which constituted it did not originally present a closed corporation. There was in the earlier stages of development of the system the rule that regimental service must alternate with employment on the General Staff and hence the connection between the Army and the Staff was maintained and the practical competence of the staff officers was ensured. The first appointment to the Staff as well as the subsequent return thereto were dependent upon pure merit. It was usual for a Captain on the staff after 4 or 5 years work to be transferred to a regiment. It was possible that a year or two later he could have been selected for staff duties as a Major. There can be no doubt that this practice had considerable merit because it brought on to staff duties the latest regimental experience or firsthand knowledge of the battle-field. In the Chief of Staff organisation in UK also there is a constant interchange of officers and there is no separate water-tight compartment formed with the function of planning alone entrusted to it.

The Prussian system, however, visualised division of military task into two compartments. All that belonged to administration and discipline was put on one side of the dividing line and on the other side all that directly affected the plan for fighting which came within the domain of strategy and tactics. This conception of General Staff as distinct .....

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distinct from the command got very happily inter-
nigled when William I chose his Military Assistant
in von Moltke and trusted him to fight the national
battles. In that event the King being the supreme
military authority vested with powers of planning
(functions of Chief of Staff) as well as having the
control of command in battle (functions of C-in-C)
had delegated his two-fold functions to his Assistant
who was his Strategic Adviser. It was essentially
because the person responsible for making plans was
also responsible for their execution that the success
of the organisation was assured. Thus the theory of
separation of planning from executing powers was
completely negatived by the combination of William I
and von Moltke.

In England, the two duties of planning and
execution are separately performed by distinct
individuals but the personnel are not separated
permanently. The planners assisting the Chiefs of
Staff Committee are men of experience in the field of
operations who, after serving their period as planners
on the Chiefs of Staff organisation, go back to their
respective Services to further enrich themselves
with field experience. In the early stages, the
German Chief of Staff was not divorced from the
organisation for the execution of plans, which it
was his duty to prepare. It was Hitler who, at a
later stage, introduced a permanent Chiefs of Staff
organisation which was compartmentalised since its
exclusive duty was preparation of operational plans.

The members ....
The members of the Hitler's Chiefs of Staff organization were never required to take command in the field.

Writing in 1901, Lord Roberts made some prophetic remarks when he said that the German system could not work efficiently. He observed "had the orders not been uniformly judicious, had a check or reverse been experienced, and had one or more of the subordinate commanders possessed greater capacity and resolution than the Chief of the Staff the result might have been very different." Lord Roberts further went on to say "In military nations a Chief of the Staff of the German type may perhaps be essential, more especially when, as in Germany, the Emperor is the head of the Army and its titular Commander-in-Chief."

Another distinguishing characteristic of the Prussian staff system was its tendency to concentrate work in the very minimum of hands. In 1914 the number of General Staff officers in Germany was only 250 which was extremely small when compared to 950 staff officers employed by France and 500 by Austria while Russia had as many as 1,000 staff officers. This is an indication of the fact that pure staff duties were entrusted to those who had stood the severity of selection and training. This extreme concentration kept the General Staff officers strictly to their business and made them feel their importance and responsibility at every stage.

It is...

It is indeed not difficult, therefore, to understand that with the above background the German Staff system was looked upon with great respect and honour within and with awe and terror without. No wonder that in 1919 when the peace treaty was being signed, the German staff system was regarded as the principal culprit responsible for the "war crime". The Versailles Treaty, therefore, specifically mentioned the abolition of the Great General Staff and along with it the Military Academy.

If the above represents the organisation for expert military planning in the Prussian war machine, it is also necessary to briefly describe the other three pillars of the political structure which constituted the consultative organisation of the Head of the State for taking supreme policy decisions. These three pillars were the

(a) Militar Kabinett
(b) War Minister
(c) Chancellor.

(a) MILITAR KABINETT. The real control of the House of Hohenzollern over the army rested upon its unique relationship with the officer corps. To the officer, among the King was the great object of devotion and the fountain of fame and advancement which he could hope for. In 1849 Frederick William II reminded his Ministers that every officer saw in the King "his personal overlord who promotes him, cares for him and protects him." The King, therefore, continued to
retain command in his own hands, delegating to the
Minister for War merely the routine administration with
powers to issue administrative orders and regulations.
Thus when entries, appointments, promotions, pensions,
favours, came to rest in the hands of the King, it
became essential for the discharge of this voluminous
administrative work to have an Adjutant General's
office sufficiently large to meet this demand. In 1812
Ad's Office was, therefore, transformed into the
the/King's Personal Cabinet for Military Affairs or
the Militant Kabinett, the head of which was
currently Chief of the First Division of the General
Department in the Ministry of War. Thus an expert
Service officer in uniform was associated with the
Supreme political organ of the State in planning the
internal administration of the Army. It appears that
in subsequent years the Militant Kabinett as the
executive organ of the Royal Command freed itself from
the control of the Minister of War by a Royal Order
passed in March 1833. The Chief of the Militant
Kabinett was on the same footing as the Minister of War
and enjoyed complete and unqualified equality.
(b) MINISTER OF WAR. The position of the Minister
of War became most dubious when Frederick William II
granted a Constitution and yet wished to retain the
real source of power in his hands. Bismarck wrote in
1833 very firmly that "all other institutions can
better appear dependent upon the favour of Parliament;
in the case of the army, however, even the semblance,
as if its representatives were trying to curry the
favour of parliament by appeal and artificial manoeu-
vres, must in my opinion be strictly avoided." The
Minister of ...
Minister of War was the King's personal servant and his confidential Military Adviser, and, at the same time, he was the constitutional organ to obtain the consent of the 'Diet' to the Army Budget. In this respect, he was dependent upon the Reichstag and could not be regarded as a free agent of the Crown. He became, therefore, in the years after 1860, a mere parliamentary screen and administrative figurehead behind which the monarch and his Advisers preserved the Royal power of command free from any parliamentary influence. A clear cut division took place in 1861 by which matters coming under the Royal command were to be distinguished from those coming under parliamentary budget. The former were completely withdrawn from the "Minister's constitutional countersignature."

Again, complications arose because of personal friction between the members of the General Staff and the officers of the Ministry of War. The General Staff officers with their special training and qualifications looked down upon the Ministry of War and criticised the slowness of the Ministry's officials and their methods. Thus the Minister of War had his authority eclipsed not only by the King but also by the rise of the Chief of the General Staff to a position not only of equality but in time of war of clear dominance over the Minister. The victories of Moltke in 1864 to 1871 established his unique position, and at times neither the Minister of War nor the Chancellor participated in the conferences which Moltke...
which Moltke had with the King to take immediate decisions for the successful conduct of the war. However, after the war, the Minister insisted on reviving his position and though the Chief of Staff ranked next to the Emperor in the military hierarchy the former could only see the latter in the presence of the Minister.

The system of the three executives was not conducive to efficient planning as it could not work smoothly. There was confusion of responsibilities and functions. Theoretically, the Minister of War should have had the Chief of Staff and the Military Kabinett under him for the reason that it was the Minister of War who represented both those organisations before the Reichstag. As he had no de facto control over them, the position was, to say the least, most anomalous as he was even held constitutionally responsible for actions in the decision of which he had no voice. Thus the Prussian political system could hardly be described as constitutional monarchy in the strict sense as it is known in England today. More correctly, the country may be said to have an imperial political organisation with a distinct bias for a military regime.

(c) CHANCELLOR. William I was fortunate in having a great personality in Bismarck as his Political Adviser. However, in military matters because of the genius of Moltke, Bismarck did not play a prominent part in the battles of 1864 and 1870-71. He conducted the war politically and diplomatically but was not informed of...
informed of current operations, until they had been brought to a conclusion. However, the two outstanding personalities did clash and the King is reported to have taken the side of the Chancellor. But, the patriotic qualities of the two great Germans kept the system of the Triumvirate alive and functioning and both the Chancellor and the Chief of the General Staff worked efficiently under the supreme authority of the King. The political and military sides of the war were conducted in water-tight compartments and it is to the great credit of the mediator - the King - that the system was known in Europe for its efficiency. In this connection it appears necessary to state that the plans of the military experts were approved by the King as the supreme political authority though the deliberative political organs of the State such as the War Minister, Chancellor and the Parliament may not always have been aware of it. Thus in its fundamental principle the system accepted the theory of political approval being given to the expert military plans of the Chiefs of Staff.

The system of policy, expert and command planning which was consolidated in 1913 and worked till the collapse in 1918 can, therefore, be summarised as follows:

The Chief of the Military Cabinet was in charge of all matters concerning the officer Corps having an exclusive say in all cases of appointments which were...
which were not infrequently attacked by the Diet. The Minister of War was in charge of the organisation, equipment, training and mobilisation of the forces. The Chief of the General Staff was responsible for strategic manoeuvres and war plans. There was, in addition, the uncertainty of the monarch's influence and his unpredictable interference in army matters. The responsibilities of the three executives overlapped and there was the obvious weakness resulting from contradiction in the supreme coordination and direction of the German military machine when Kaiser William II came to the helm of affairs, to conduct the first World War. William I may have succeeded in solving the clash of personalities between Bismarck and Moltke but Kaiser William II found the scene too complicated and, therefore, relegated himself to a secondary position. The friction continued though every decision was only theoretically his own, as he had failed to make his de jure authority a de facto one. In theory, he was supposed to have assumed the entire direction of war as Oberste Heeresleitung or OHL. He had under him, therefore, the two Chiefs of General and Admiralty Staffs as his advisers responsible for land and naval operations respectively. The Chancellor was the head of the entire civilian administration including the diplomatic conduct of the war. In this set-up which was daily growing anarchic, the supreme position of responsibility came to rest on ....
to rest on the Chief of the General Staff. In the first World War, the importance of this high office waxed and waned according to the incumbent's ability and success in war. For example, the younger Moltke broke down completely after the collapse of his plans in the battle of the Marne, six weeks after the outbreak of the conflict, and Falkenhayn who succeeded him, despite his ability, could not maintain his supreme position in the face of more able and popular Generals like Hindenburg and Ludendorff. In 1916 Hindenburg became the de facto head of the CSH and his age and prestige at once brought him into prominence. He became so popular that even the authority of the sovereign appeared to be overshadowed. It soon became clear that Kaiser could not dismiss Hindenburg as he had succeeded in removing Moltke and Falkenhayn. Thus a virtual military dictatorship exercised by the combination of Ludendorff lasted till 1918. Though Hindenburg continued, the fate of the country was sealed for many reasons not the least important of which related to the arbitrary and anarchical set up of the Triumvirate. There was no coordination between strategy and supply and the bureaucratic machinery of the Ministry of War was not prepared to cope with the wholly new industrial warfare accentuated for Germany by the allied blockade. Thus came to an end a system which lacked harmony and coherence and caused serious confusion of responsibilities which could only end in disaster.

However ....
However ill-fated the German system of military planning with the Chief of the General Staff as its central pivot may have proved in practice, it laid the foundation of the modern principle of expert planning which England carried to perfection with great success in the battlefield while Hitler over emphasising and compartmentalising its expert aspect and yet rejecting its advice brought catastrophic ruin to his country.

(C) GREAT BRITAIN : THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEFENCE MECHANISM FOR THE FORMULATION OF NATIONAL AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE POLICY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EXPERT PLANNING UP TO THE END OF WORLD WAR I.

As expert military planning and formulation of Defence policy come within the sphere of the defence machinery of the State it would not be out of place to examine the evolution of the Defence organisation of Great Britain along with the conception of Commonwealth defence upto World War I. As Great Britain often played the role of "l'naissance mediatrice de l'Europe", the evolution of the planning machinery of this great Power furnishes the best example for a detailed study. Apart from readily available literature on the subject, as Great Britain remains the central pivot of Commonwealth defence and the prime mover of the world strategy to defeat the unbounded ambitions of two Germans in quick succession - Kaiser and Hitler, we may select England among democratic countries for a detailed study as Germany could be selected among dictatorships.

THE POLITICAL....
THE POLITICAL ORGANS AND DEFENCE POLICY.

After the Napoleonic wars, a state of confusion prevailed in defence matters in England. In times of peace the army was regarded as a painful necessity, rather than an essential safeguard with the result that there was a lack of reforming spirit. Parliament regarded the diversity of authority which existed for the control of the army as a useful safeguard against encroachment by the military upon the sphere of civilian authority. The Crown's views were affected by the fact that any re-organisation might result in limitations upon the royal prerogative. Thus a medley of authorities continued to exist in the War Office till after the Crimean War.

The Master General of Ordnance headed the oldest department, reflecting the time when the maintenance of forts and garrisons had been the undisputed prerogative of the Crown. This department provided guns and munitions, and also provisions for the Navy. In the eighteenth century, such was the importance of this Department, that the Master General was for a time a Minister of Cabinet rank. As the Commander-in-Chief of the Artillery and Engineers, he presided over the Board of Ordnance. With the advent of responsible government the Master General lost his high position, though he still continued as the head of a separate department which was independent of the War Office. In 1855, the Board was abolished as an independent authority and its powers were transferred by Statute to the Secretary of State for War.
SECRETARY OF STATE AT WAR.

In matters of army administration, the Secretary of State at War expressed the royal will to the Parliament. His responsibility to the Parliament was vague and undefined until 1783, when he was required to prepare the army estimates for Parliament to transmit to the Paymaster General the money voted for the Army and to settle the annual accounts of expenditure. But in 1793, when the King surrendered his position as Commander-in-Chief, the latter replaced the Secretary at War as the channel for the communication on all matters of internal regulation and discipline.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

In 1794, the powers of the Secretary of State at War were further affected by the appointment of a Secretary of State for War. The latter now relieved the Secretary at War of all work of a political character, with the exception of those connected with estimates, the Mutiny Bill, the control and execution of military law and the safeguarding of the rights of the civil population against the military, which were left to the Secretary-at-War.

After the Crimean War, the offices of the Secretary-at-War and the Commander-in-Chief, after a long struggle to delimit their respective functions, were both combined in one person. This continued until 1953, when the office of the Secretary-at-War was formally abolished.

The Secretary of State for War had, from the first, ...
first, taken over all matters concerned with the principles of employment, size and disposition of the army. As a member of the Cabinet, he provided Parliament with a Minister who was responsible to it for the conduct of the army. From 1801, however, he also handled colonial matters, to which his War Office functions became subsidiary. His responsibility was further divided by the fact that the Secretary of State for Home Affairs was responsible for all issues of Home Defence, since only in 1854 were the latter functions placed under the Secretary of State for War. At the same time, the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies was created, which left him free to concentrate upon the problems of defence.

The main obstacle to a unified control lay in the independent position enjoyed in practice by the Commander-in-Chief, though his actions had to be defended in the House, if the occasion arose, by the Secretary of State for War. After 1861, however, the supplementary patent which had reserved to the Commander-in-Chief the responsibility for military command and discipline and the appointment and promotion of officers, subject to the formal concurrence of the Secretary of State for War, disappeared. In 1870, the complete subordination of the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State for War was clearly stated by an Order in Council.

EXPERT MILITARY PLANNING.

ARMY COUNCIL
In 1895, the Commander-in-Chief was replaced by the Chief of Staff, who was to advise the Secretary of State for War on all technical military problems, including plans for defence and offence, military intelligence, appointments and promotions. The Adjutant General took over discipline, education, training and enlistment; the Quarter Master General administered all matters relating to supply, food, fuel, transport and the non-combatant forces; the Inspector General of Ordnance assumed responsibility for forts, barracks, military railways and War Office lands. These officers sat together as the War Office Council to consider all matters of army concern and constituted the cell of expert planning.

In 1904, was also formed the Army Council to which was transferred all the authority of the Secretary of State for War and of the Chief of Staff. This Council consisted of the Secretary of State for War, his Parliamentary Under Secretary, the Financial Secretary, the four military members mentioned above, and the Permanent Under Secretary of State for War who acted as Secretary to the Council. This Council could not, however, take any decision against the rulings of the Secretary of State for War who was the final authority on all army matters. Subject to Parliament's control, he was the highest authority advised by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (as the Chief of Staff was later known), on all technical matters. Thus

foundations...
foundations of higher defence planning were also being well and truly laid.

ADIRALTY.

During the nineteenth century, a similar reorganisation took place in the Admiralty too. The Board of Admiralty was exercising a general control over naval affairs since 1628, but by the end of the Napoleonic wars, there were no fewer than thirteen scattered civil departments dealing with various aspects of naval administration on a semi-independent basis. In particular, the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty controlled only the appointment and promotion of officers, the movement of ships, and general naval policies. The Navy Board dealt with pay and stores; the Victualling Board was responsible for the supply of meat, biscuits and beer; the Treasurer of the Navy handled the monies supplied by the Treasury, as directed by the Navy Board. In 1832, these two Boards were abolished, and in 1838 the Paymaster General assumed the duties of the Treasurer. Further, the relations among the Lords of the Admiralty were unsatisfactory. The First Lord was a member of the Cabinet, and was thus in a different position to the other members of the Board. If they disagreed with him, he could take the dispute to the Cabinet and secure the appointment of a new Board from which he could omit those who had opposed him. In 1863, an Order in Council made it clear that in future the
First Lord of the Admiralty would be responsible to the Crown for all naval matters and that the other 'levels' would be responsible to him for matters entrusted to them by him.

In 1904, by an Order in Council, the First, Second and Fourth Sea Lords were made responsible to the First Lord for such general work of the Navy as he assigned them; the Third Sea Lord and the Controller became responsible for all material problems; the Parliamentary Secretary took over finance; the duties of the Civil Lord and Permanent Secretary were left undefined. The First Sea Lord was to be consulted by the other Sea Lords on matters of great importance, though they were given the right of access to the First Lord, who was to decide all disputes and was to be the political head responsible to the Cabinet and Parliament for all naval matters. Thus the principle of civilian control over the armed forces was established and no military plan could be regarded as final until the appropriate political authority of the State had approved the same.

At the beginning of this century, therefore, much had been done to put the two Services on a sound organisational basis. Furthermore, the theory of Cabinet responsibility was well understood. The final decisions of policy on all matters of defence had to be submitted to the Parliament; the executive, in accordance with the policies prescribed by the Parliament, exercised supreme control over their implementation...
implementation. The Cabinet undertook the co-ordination and delimitation of the activities of the various departments of State, and owed a collective responsibility to the Parliament. Its decisions were in the nature of advice to the King. Although, in theory, the Crown conducts diplomatic negotiations, directs the armed forces and declares and ends war, these functions are in fact exercised by responsible Ministers, acting collectively as a Ministry. This convention was well-established.

**IMPERIAL DEFENCE; HIGHER DEFENCE POLICY PLANNING FOR THE COMMONWEALTH.**

Although the constitutional responsibility was clear, the machinery of co-ordination was weak at the beginning of this century. The Cabinet, of some 20 members, had no experts to advise it on the formulation of defence policy. There was no organ which could effectively coordinate the efforts of the Service Departments and of the other departments which exercised defence functions, including the Foreign Office, the Treasury, the India Office and the Colonial Office. In theory, the Ministers of these departments could make their views effective in the general policy of the Cabinet. In practice, the Cabinet had no means of bringing all these scattered elements into focus in matters of defence.

As early as 1890, Lord Randolph Churchill had suggested, in the report of the Hartington to© War Office Commission, that the Admiralty and should be combined ...
combined in a Ministry of Defence. This had been rejected by the Government which, instead, set up in 1835 a "Defence Committee of the Cabinet" to study defence problems. In December 1902, this Committee was reconstituted tentatively as a "Committee of Imperial Defence", as yet without any permanent organisation. The Prime Minister attended the said committee regularly and took the chair himself from November 1903 onwards. This Committee may be said to represent the budding organ for determining the higher defence policy of England and the Empire.

Esher Committee's Recommendations and the Birth of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

In January 1904, Lord Esher's War Office Reconstruction Committee issued its first report, devoted mainly to the question of Imperial defence. The report said, "The British Empire is pre-eminently a great naval and Colonial Power. There are nevertheless no means for coordinating defence problems, for dealing with them as a whole, for defining the proper functions of the various elements, and for ensuring that on the one hand peace preparations are carried out upon a consistent plan, and on the other hand that in time of an emergency a definite war policy, based upon solid data, can be formulated." The Report went on to recommend the reconstitution of the existing Cabinet Committee as a Committee of Imperial Defence to which was to be entrusted the supreme defence policy of the realm.

This new ....
This new Committee, which came into existence under a Treasury Minute dated 4th May, 1934, was carefully designed by its founders, so that it should not in any way run counter to the current conceptions of Cabinet government and would not interfere with the individual and collective responsibility of Ministers to Parliament.

The Committee was, therefore, established as a purely advisory body with the Prime Minister as the Chairman and the only permanent member, to ensure that its recommendations carried proper weight. It was an extremely flexible body, since the Prime Minister had absolute authority to summon whomever he wished to its meetings. This flexibility enabled him to ensure the attendance of the best experts in every field of defence policy. In practice, a semi-permanent nucleus was formed, consisting of the Prime Minister, as Chairman, the Secretary of State for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, India and the Colonies, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Lord President with the Service Chiefs (the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the First Sea Lord) as members. Other Ministers and experts were invited according to the particular business before the Committee.

A permanent Secretariat was also formed which proved to be of great importance in collecting and coordinating information on all aspects of defence, in preserving records of all sessions, and in preparing memoranda and documents for the Committee.

To study ...
To study various detailed aspects of defence, sub-committees were set up, numbering as many as thirty, during the period 1909 to 1914 with a membership of some 120 experts in every field. The reports of these committees were collected and coordinated by the Secretariat, and published in the famous War Book which laid down in the greatest detail the steps which should be taken by each government department in the event of war.

As has been stated earlier, the Cabinet must, as head of the executive, decide all questions of major defence policy. The fact, however, that the Committee remained an advisory and consultative body, became a source of strength. As the Committee could only recommend, it was encouraged to extend the range and depth of its investigations and these researches were so thorough that the advice which it tendered was difficult to reject. In the case of a dispute, the Cabinet was to be asked to give a binding decision.

The existence of this reserve power at the highest level assured that most issues would be amicably settled at the lower levels.

THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE AND POLICY PLANNING FOR AN EMPIRE

The Committee of Imperial Defence had no power to impose any obligations upon Dominions and this was an essential safeguard if they were to send representatives to it. The fact that decisions upon its advice were matters for the governments of the Dominions....
Dominions concerned, acted as an incentive to them to send representatives. It made them feel that they were sharing as partners in the great problems of Imperial Defence.

Since 1862, at least, it had been recognised that each Dominion should undertake its own local defence, whilst external defence was conducted by the British Navy. The granting of self-government in internal affairs necessarily placed on each Dominion the duty of making its own provision for the maintenance of internal order. Imperial troops, therefore, were withdrawn from the Dominions save in so far as they were necessary to protect naval bases, for which purpose they remained in Canada until 1906 and in the Union of South Africa till 1914.

Constitutionally, the Crown remained the head of the various forces throughout the Empire, but the practice of granting the title of Commander-in-Chief of local forces to the Governor General of each Dominion came into vogue. Dominion forces, however, were wholly under the authority of their local governments and legislatures. The Imperial Government made no effort to obtain control over these forces.

Similarly, there were no difficulties, constitutional or legal, to retard the growth of naval forces in the Dominions after the Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865 was passed which empowered the Dominions to provide local flotillas for harbour and coastal defence. However, in the international sphere...
sphere it was thought that the lack of extra-territorial powers on the part of the Dominions might prevent them from laying down a code of discipline for ships outside their territorial waters. Nevertheless, the creation of Dominion fleets was accepted in principle at the Imperial Naval and Military Conference of 1909, held as a result of the uneasiness created by the growing naval strength of Germany. In 1911, the legal and international difficulties involved in the maintenance, in peace time, by the Dominions, of units not under direct Imperial control were removed by the Naval Discipline (Dominion Naval Forces) Act passed by the Parliament in that year. This Act expressly reserved to the Dominions the right to legislate for such forces without any danger of such statutes being held ultra vires.

In the event of any Dominion wishing to employ its forces overseas, the Dominion had ample powers to make necessary provision for their control, even before the Statute of Westminster in 1931, which gave every Dominion the right to repeal Imperial Acts relating to it. The Dominion could either keep close and independent control over its forces during a war, or cooperate more completely by putting them under a British Commander in the field, whilst sharing with the British government, through some form of War Cabinet for the Empire, the supreme control in regard to the employment of such forces. That this latter system was adopted in two wars is a great tribute...
great tribute to the mutual trust which existed between the Imperial and the Dominion governments.

IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF AND EXPERT MILITARY PLANNING.

After the Colonial Conference of 1907, and the subsidiary Naval and Military conference of 1909, it was agreed that an Imperial General Staff should be created to deal with matters of military policy and to collect and distribute military intelligence. This Imperial General Staff was to act in collaboration with the General Staffs of the Dominions. These Dominion Chiefs of Staff, though under the control of their own Government, were to prepare plans for the war organisation of the military forces of the Dominions on an Imperial basis, in conjunction with the Imperial General Staff. No obligation was, of course, accepted by the Dominions to supply troops in war time. Little was done, however, to plan action before the war, except in such matters as armaments and manuals and the exchange of staff officers.

Such detailed examination of the problems and plans of Imperial Defence, as was carried out, was done by the Committee of Imperial Defence, acting in practice as a form of advisory Imperial General Staff. The Colonial Conference of 1907 had formally agreed that the Committee should advise on any local questions of defence, if so invited by the Government of the Dominion concerned.

Dominion ....
Dominion representatives were to be summoned to its meetings where local questions could be discussed, if the Dominion government so desired. Its recommendations were not binding on a Dominion, which could accept or reject them. In fact, the Dominions made considerable use of the Committee which was able to command great resources for the investigation of any defence matter, on a scale beyond the dominion government's approach.

The conception of expert planning and that of higher defence policy were both inter-mingled and as England was in the midst of a great constitutional experiment to work a democracy, the political organs of the State received due importance with the result that expert planning by those in uniform was attached to and came to be associated with the policy framing mechanism of the Committee of Imperial Defence or the War Council that followed it.

DEVELOPMENTS DURING WORLD WAR I.

POLICY AND EXPERT PLANNING IN ENGLAND.

As a result of the reorganisations at the War Office and the Admiralty, and, more important still, the immense work done by the Committee of Imperial Defence, Great Britain entered the War in 1914 well prepared from the point of view of planning. As Sir Julian Corbett has written in his "Official History of Naval Operations", "Whether the scale on which we prepared was as large as the signs of the times called for, whether we did right to cling to our long tried .....
tried system of a small army and a large navy, are questions that will be long debated; but, given the scale which we deliberately chose to adopt, there is no doubt that the machinery for setting our forces in action had reached an ordered completeness in detail that has no parallel in our history."

In spite of these preparations, there was an almost complete absence of any pre-war plans for reorganising the Government for control in war. The various efforts made to solve this problem from 1914 to 1918 show how difficult it is to devise a system for the conduct of war through a democratic machinery based on the principle of civilian control over the defence forces of the Crown.

For a few weeks after the outbreak of war, the Committee of Imperial Defence carried on as before working mainly through its sub-committees, one of which was concerned with overseas expeditions. In November 1914, however, it was absorbed into the War Council, which made full use of its Secretariat and its machinery.

**THE CABINET OF THE WAR COUNCIL.**

The supreme direction of the war, after its outbreak, still rested in the hands of an unwieldy Cabinet of some 20 members, meeting in the old haphazard way, with neither agenda nor minutes, nor precise records of decisions taken at the meetings. Immediately after the outbreak of war, a Council of War met ......
War met twice under the Prime Minister; this Council included the Foreign Minister, the Secretary of State for War, the First Lord, the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and discussed and settled the problem of what forces should be despatched to France. However, this body did not become a permanent Council for the everyday conduct of war, which task remained firmly vested in the unwieldy Cabinet.

In November 1914, therefore, the Prime Minister set up a War Council which was in essence, as were the succeeding bodies of a similar nature, the Committee of Imperial Defence adapted to war conditions. This War Council consisted of eight members, the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for War, the First Lord, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, with Mr Balfour included as Minister without Portfolio. This body of politicians and those in uniform as members was an experiment at producing proper operational plans with the full cooperation of the military experts like the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. However, no perfection could be attained unless the organisation of the export planners was properly devised and developed on the principle of the Chiefs of Staff Committee which in its modern form emerged after World War I.

The Council.....
The Council did not meet continuously to deal with the daily business of government control of war, but was summoned only when serious questions arose which involved new departures in policy or joint strategic operations. The full Cabinet, however, retained control of general war objectives and the raising of men, the production of munitions, and financial matters. This Council failed, as did the subsequent Dardanelles Committee and the War Committee, because of the inability to solve the problem of reconciling swift action with the collective responsibility of the whole Cabinet. Everything of importance had to be examined twice; once by the War Council which had first-hand information through the machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence and a second time by the full Cabinet, which had inadequate sources of information though possessed of full powers of decision. There was thus a divorce of study and action which proved a fatal flaw.

Further defects soon appeared in the machinery for government control. The staff organisation was unsatisfactory, since the Admiralty and War Office staffs were not in daily contact with one another. The absence of a machinery for joint planning was a grave disadvantage, which weighed heavily against the success of any combined campaign. The planning for the Dardanelles was over-departmentalised and the War Council did not insist upon a joint appreciation by the two staffs. The correct answer to these difficulties was an inter-Service organisation like the Chiefs of Staff Committee but that supreme coordinating....
coordinating machinery was yet to be born. Moreover, the War Council failed to keep the war situation under proper scrutiny.

The customary methods of parliamentary opposition ceased for several months after the out-break of war. Early in 1915, however, some dissatisfaction with the government's policy was evident both in and out of Parliament. Although the Cabinet still commanded general support, it was thought that its policy lacked stability and certainty. This discontent was brought to a head soon after the early failures in the Dardanelles, by the resignation of the First Sea Lord in May 1915. Although no formal action was taken in Parliament, the opposition leaders, in private negotiations, warned the Prime Minister that they would in future criticise the conduct of the war unless important changes were made. As a result, several members of the opposition were now included to form a Coalition Cabinet.

In June 1915, though the Cabinet retained full control, the supervision of the Dardanelles operation was delegated to a Cabinet Committee known as the Dardanelles Committee. This soon proved to be unworkable since the war could not be conducted in water-tight compartments. Therefore, this body began to take all war problems into its own hands. However, like the War Council, which had grown from eight to thirteen members, this Committee of fourteen became too large and its members were all burdened with departmental and Parliamentary duties. It met, however....
however, more frequently and regularly than the War Council, and the Chiefs of Staff began to work better together.

The failure at Suvla Bay brought the Dardanelles Committee into disrepute, and in November 1915, the Prime Minister decided upon a further reorganisation of governmental control. The Dardanelles Committee was scrapped and replaced by a War Committee with only six members, later raised to eleven, (making thirteen in all, with the inclusion of the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff who were invariably present). Cooperation between the Admiralty and the War Office was now much improved and joint memoranda and opinions were frequently provided by the two staffs. This indicates that policy planning by the politicians was based on the expert advice of the Chiefs of Staff of the two Services operating. Once again, there were too many members and its decisions still had to be confirmed by the full Cabinet.

Mr Lloyd George as a member of the Cabinet then proposed a system whereby there would be a small War Committee under his chairmanship subject to the overall authority of the Prime Minister, Mr Asquith. But this scheme failed owing to the Prime Minister's insistence that he alone must have the supreme control and responsibility in war.

The constitutional issue involved in the proposal of Mr Lloyd George and the contention of Mr Asquith is of great significance. It establishes beyond doubt,...
beyond doubt that the supreme responsibility for the
defence of the country falls on the shoulders of the
Prime Minister and he cannot, in this respect,
be relegated to a secondary position. Mr. Asquith
insisted that "whatever changes are made in the
composition or functions of the War Committee, the
Prime Minister must be its Chairman. He cannot be
relegated to the position of an arbiter in the
background or a referee to the Cabinet." It has,
therefore, been quite rightly pointed out by Lord
Hanskey that the "Prime Minister and the Prime
Minister alone, must be the head of the Government
Control in time of war."  

In December 1916, Mr. Lloyd George, the new
Prime Minister, formed his War Cabinet on entirely
new lines. The War Cabinet was composed of five
members only with the Prime Minister (Chairman),
the Lord President of the Council, two Ministers
without Portfolio and the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, who acted as Leader of the House of
Commons and whose function it was to keep the War
Cabinet in touch with the views of the House and
vice versa. Although changes and additions were
made from time to time, the number never exceeded
seven. With the exception of the Chancellor,

all members...

1 J.A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, Life of Lord
Oxford and Asquith, Vol. II, Chapter 1,

2 Lord Hanskey, Government Control in War.
all members of the War Cabinet were free from departmental responsibility and its consequent heavy administrative and parliamentary demands. This War Cabinet was now in supreme control and had no need to refer its decisions to a full Cabinet as the previous War Committee had been obliged to do.

Once more the organisation and technique of the Committee of Imperial Defence had to be adopted. The procedure was elastic. There was a close association of the Chiefs of Staff. Numerous committees and sub-committees were set up to advise. The First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs were in constant attendance. Owing to its compact size, the War Cabinet was able to meet daily.

Although efforts were made to ensure that Ministers outside the War Cabinet were informed of its proceedings, there was a grave danger that departmental administration would not conform to the Cabinet's policy. To overcome this, weekly reports were widely circulated among the Ministries, and Ministers were invited to attend ad hoc meetings for the discussion of any items which concerned their various departments.

However, there were drawbacks in this system too. The War Cabinet was probably overburdened with work for which some of its members were ill suited. Its efforts to raise men were complex and poorly directed and there was great wastage in the supply of munitions. The Prime Minister's interventions were not...
were not always happy in the strategic and tactical spheres. In 1917-18 he wished, against the advice of his generals, to transfer the main weight of effort from Flanders to the Balkans, a course which, whether he was right or wrong, caused friction between the generals and the War Cabinet. These were, however, clashes of personalities and though they do not prove the system to be fundamentally wrong, the organisational set up had certain defects. For example, the technical branches of the War Office and the Admiralty had direct contacts with the War Cabinet of which the professional heads of the Service Department were not members. This seems to have been a departure from the accepted rules of procedure in matters in which the civil and the military work together. Whatever its faults, this War Cabinet became the basis upon which a similar body was built during the World War of 1939-45.

THE COMMONWEALTH AND WORLD WAR I.

During the first two years of the war, little was done except for the interchange of information, and discussion of problems, by cable or letter; this was supplemented by occasional visits to London by the individual Prime Ministers of the Dominions. On such visits the latter would attend meetings of the War Committee in London and express their views on matters affecting their respective Dominions.
One of the proposals of the new government, formed in the United Kingdom in December 1916, for a more effective conduct of the war, was that some aid should be sought from the Dominions. It was felt, however, that such a request should not be made without the offer to the Dominions of a larger share in the conduct of Imperial affairs. It was, therefore, proposed that all Dominions should be invited to send their Prime Ministers, or other representatives, to an Imperial War Conference. During this Conference there were to be held a series of special and continuous meetings of the War Cabinet for the consideration of all urgent questions concerning the prosecution of the war and of the terms upon which the Empire, in conjunction with its allies, might be prepared to end it. For the purpose of these meetings, the Dominion representatives were to be considered as members of the War Cabinet and India was invited to send a representative on the same terms.

All Dominions accepted this invitation, and the Imperial War Cabinet met, holding as many as 14 meetings between the 20th March and 12th May 1917. The Prime Minister presided over the meetings, which were attended by the full British War Cabinet and the Dominion representatives, to discuss the general conduct of the war and the Imperial policy in relation to it.

A second session of the Imperial War Cabinet was held ......
was held from June to August 1918, when the Prime Minister, the rest of the War Cabinet, the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, Colonies, War and Air, and the First Lord attended with representatives from each Dominion and India. Two important decisions in the sphere of constitutional practice were taken at this session. The Prime Minister conceded the right of all Dominion Prime Ministers, as his colleagues in the Imperial War Cabinet, to communicate with him directly on all matters of major Imperial policy. Further, in order to ensure continuity on matters of common interest each Dominion Prime Minister was given the right to nominate one of his own Ministers as a resident or visitor in London, to represent him at the meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet which might be held between its plenary sessions. As a result, several Dominion representatives stayed behind in London and attended meetings of the British War Cabinet, as had been agreed. However, the full development of this system was prevented by the collapse of Germany later in the same year.

The Imperial War Cabinet, of course, had no Prime Minister. The British Prime Minister, who acted as Chairman, was only 

There was no question of collective responsibility since each Prime Minister was answerable to his own Parliament and there was no possibility that majority decisions could be binding. As far as the decisions of the Imperial...
of the Imperial War Cabinet relating to movement and disposition of Imperial forces were concerned, these could be made effective by the issue of orders by the concerned Minister of the British Cabinet since all Dominion forces were under the control of the British government. However, consultations at this Cabinet did give the Dominions some voice in the direction of the movements of their own forces. Even though the ultimate responsibility lay with the British government, the opinion of those Dominions whose forces were involved was of great value and weight. Similarly, executive action in the Dominions could only be taken by the authority of the government concerned; for this, of course, the Dominion Prime Ministers had to rely upon the approval and support of their colleagues at home.

THE PLANNING MACHINERY OF ALLIED COOPERATION IN WORLD WAR I.

In the first few months of the war, cooperation among the allies had been limited to contacts in the field by the British and French Commanders on the spot, supplemented by occasional visits of individual Ministers to Paris or London. Nevertheless, from the middle of 1915 onwards, a system of fairly frequent inter-allied conferences grew up. At first these were attended only by the British and French government representatives, but later included both Italian and Russian representatives. However,

Mr. Lloyd George....
Mr. Lloyd George was never satisfied with this loose arrangement since he felt that the Commander-in-Chief and the Chiefs of Staff, who advised the allied leaders at these meetings, were not collaborating sufficiently to grapple closely with the problems. Here again, was keenly felt the need for an organisation like the present Chiefs of Staff but neither the politician nor the military strategist could bring such an institution into being throughout World War I. However, Mr Lloyd George hoped to establish a much more coordinated system of planning and control together with the appointment of a supreme unified command in the field.

The first attempt to set up a unified command, early in 1917, was a failure as both the British Commander in France and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff were averse to the arrangement, and the French Commander and his staff lacked necessary tact to overcome their objections. In November of the same year, however, after the Italian collapse at Caporetto, the Supreme War Council was established.

The Supreme War Council, as set up at Versailles, was composed of the Prime Minister and other Ministers of each government with their military advisers. Great Britain, France and Italy took part and the United States gave a limited adherence. A Secretariat was formed, on British lines, and

various .....
various inter-allied permanent military representative bodies and a full planning staff were set up.

The Supreme War Council soon became the focus of a vast inter-allied organisation. Committees were formed to deal with such matters as Maritime Transport, Blockade and Tanks, and this system was gradually extended to cover the whole field of inter-allied...

1 A joint staff was at once set up under this Council, which resulted in a dual set of coordinating authorities. One of the members of the Army Council was on the joint staff as a permanent British representative, but the Chief of the Imperial General Staff was not made subordinate to him. The office of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had a somewhat chequered career during the Great War. In the early stages, the War Office was so dominated by Lord Kitchener, the then Secretary of State for War, that the Imperial General Staff virtually disappeared. In September 1915, the Cabinet reconstituted it, and insisted, by an Order in Council, that in future all orders for military operations should be issued and signed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff under the authority of the Secretary of State for War, and not under the authority of the Army Council. This ensured that the War Committee would not be able to issue orders through the Secretary of State for War and the Army Council, until such orders had been submitted to the expert criticism of the Imperial General Staff. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff therefore obtained direct access to the War Committee, which was thus presented with a full military viewpoint. This position of great authority was subsequently much weakened by the appointment of a member of the Army Council to the Supreme War Council, who was to be independent of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. In 1918, the position of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff was reduced to what it was in early 1915, when the Army Council Master was given authority to issue orders as to the use of the strategic reserve which the Allies had agreed to form. In March 1918, the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander still further encroached upon the former sphere of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
inter-allied Shipping, Munitions, Supply and War Transport. The Committee of Permanent Military Representatives was formed as a planning body of service staff and became the chief instrument for the coordination of allied plans before Marshal Foch was appointed Generalissimo. The Allied Naval Council consisted of Ministers and their naval Chiefs of Staff from each nation and dealt with inter-allied naval problems.

None of these bodies, of course, had any executive power. Nevertheless, their policies had the practical effect of governmental decisions since the highest political authorities in each State with the greatest military experts of the nation took part in their deliberations. Furthermore, the Supreme War Council paved the way for the unified command which proved to be such a great asset in the closing months of the Great War.

When the Second World War broke out in 1939, the Supreme War Council was taken as a guide for the inter-allied organs of cooperation which were then established.

THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE AND PLANNING AFTER 1919.

In November 1919, the war-time Cabinet and the Committee of Imperial Defence were dissolved. The War Cabinet was replaced by one of normal size and composition, and the Committee of Imperial Defence was re-established on its old peace-time footing, under its former name, to perform precisely ....
precisely those very functions of investigation and advice which had been of such immense value in the years leading up to the Great War. The Committee, with the same constitutional powers, as when it was first established, continued its work of planning and advice in an ever-widening field of study. The membership of its sub-committees steadily increased, over 900 taking part in them in 1938; almost without exception, both servicemen and civilians were represented on each Sub-Committee. Some idea of the range of activities of these bodies can be had from the organisational chart of the Committee which is given below:

The Cabinet
The Committee of Imperial Defence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 1</th>
<th>Group 2</th>
<th>Group 3</th>
<th>Group 4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategy and Planning</td>
<td>Organization for War Sub-Committees</td>
<td>Manpower Sub-Committees</td>
<td>Supply Sub-Committees</td>
<td>Miscellaneous Sub-Committees</td>
</tr>
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Sub-Committees including Chiefs of Staff

Sub-Committees including Research and Development Sub-Committees.

Joint Planning Committees

Joint Intelligence

This clearly shows how export planning cells were developed into the organisation of higher defence policy....
defense policy planning. However, there was nothing yet to crown the efforts of the expert military planners until the Chiefs of Staff Committee was born not only to take full responsibility for the preparation of expert military plans but also to coordinate the same from the viewpoint of the armed forces as a whole.

The Prime Minister remained the Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence with a nucleus of Ministers and Service Chiefs who were invariably invited to its meetings; these included the Secretaries of State for the Colonies, War, Air and India, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Lord President of the Council, the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services and the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, as head of the Civil Service. The Treasury Secretary, who was also Secretary to the Cabinet, was helped by four Assistant Secretaries, one from each Service and one from India. Other Ministers of the Crown and representatives from the Dominions and India and the Colonies, attended as members whenever their particular interests were involved. Once again, the Committee did its work well and the administrative preparations stood the test when put to practice.
THE AIR BOARD.

Between the wars, the Services continued to be governed by independent Boards or Councils. During the Great War, the Air Ministry was formed to govern the new third Service. In 1918, an Air Board was set up based on the analogy of the Army Council, consisting of the Secretary of State for Air, the Chief of the Air Staff, four Air Members, a Parliamentary Under Secretary and a Permanent Under Secretary who acted as Secretary to the Board. The Secretary of State for Air had the same responsibility towards the Members of the Board as the Secretary of State for War had in regard to the Army Council. The Secretary of State appointed the Members except for the Chief of Staff who was appointed by the King. The other Services continued to be governed by the Board of Admiralty and the Army Council on the same lines as before the Great War.

THE BASIC NECESSITY OF THE PRESENT CONCEPT OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

Before the Great War, as we have seen, planning at political levels was conducted by a number of Ministerial Committees often presided over by the Prime Minister himself. These Committees, including various Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff, reported to the Committee of Imperial Defence on various aspects of defence, such as, for example, Home Defence or the defence of India. The policy accepted by the Committee of Imperial Defence, subject to the ultimate...
ultimate responsibility of the Cabinet, then formed the basis of all plans and preparations. These plans were then worked out in detail by the General Staffs of the Admiralty and the War Office independently. The difficulties resulting from the lack of an organisation to coordinate the plans of the two Services and to present unified recommendations to the Committee of Imperial Defence were further aggravated by the creation of the Air Ministry and the Royal Air Force during the Great War, as a third defence department and a third Service. The new Ministry in its early days was faced with some opposition from the older Ministries. The natural result of this was that its claims were often extravagant; the other Services' view was often too pessimistic of the possibilities of the R.A.F. Consequently, the Committee of Imperial Defence, in many matters of strategy and policy, was confronted with conflicting advice from the Services.
Services, based upon widely differing views, of the respective functions and potentialities of the three arms. It was no longer possible for the politician to reconcile these claims or to effectively coordinate the three Services. The intermingling of political policy planning with expert military planners had to be rectified and put on a proper organisational pattern with a clear-cut division of responsibility.

This was essential and the Chiefs of Staff Committee combining in itself the expert representatives of the three Services fed by a proper organisation of its own was born of sheer necessity. Thus the Chiefs of Staff Committee in England with its present composition and functions is of very recent origin. It was only in 1922 that Sir Lloyd George first conceived of this institution by placing it on a temporary footing when dealing with the "Chanak Crisis". This and subsequent developments are so recent that they can best be stated when describing the organisation of the institution as it exists in the important States of the world today.
The institution of the modern Joint Chiefs of Staff in the USA may be said to have had its beginnings in the latter half of the 19th century. Prior to this period, theories of war and of strategy were practically unknown and in the curriculum of military education, only a minor part was devoted to strategy. The Staff of the Army, as it was known then, consisted of several heads of departments and bureaus in the military organisation, e.g. the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General, Chief of Ordnance etc. None of the Staff Chiefs, however, formulated any plans for war and none of them was ever accustomed to thinking in terms of supplying the needs of mass armies. There were also certain contributory factors which made planning difficult such as the lack of accurate military maps. In no Section of the Staff organisation was there any person or division charged with the function of studying strategy or formulating war plans for even a theoretical war. At the head of the American military mechanism was the President, who was the Commander in Chief of all the armed forces of the nation.

Abraham Lincoln was the first President who combined in himself not only the duties of the Commander-in-Chief...
Comander-in-Chief of the armed forces but also many
of the functions which in a modern system would be
performed by the Chief of the General Staff or by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In other words, he
formulated policy, drew up strategic plans and even
designed and directed tactical movements. It would
appear that the civilian head of the State interfered
with military operations to a large extent
but it was traditional in the American Command
system for the civilian authority to direct strategy
and tactics. It is significant that had the Generals
of Abraham Lincoln been military strategists in the
true sense of the term, perhaps the President would
have interfered less in military affairs. In fact,
Lincoln was willing to discard his judgment of what
was good strategy and abide by the opinion of any
able General who proved his ability to frame and
execute strategic plans. It soon became quite
clear that a line had to be drawn somewhere between
the civil and the military spheres of armed forces
administration, and, consequently, Lincoln evolved
the Command system in 1864 thus making a significant
and permanent contribution to the American military
organisation.

The formulation of a Command system in USA
during 1863-64 was not an overnight achievement
inasmuch as the war years preceding that period

provided.....
provided the necessary experience and background on which to base such a system. Of course, Lincoln and Congress were the principal architects in this regard in that the latter authorised the institutional form of Command system and the former put it into operation. Side by side with the Command system, there was established a military authority at the centre - a General in uniform who was charged with the responsibility of operational planning of American military manoeuvres. The newly created central military figure began to advise the Government in regard to the conduct of war in theatres of operation. This military authority on planning was known as the General in Chief and the first appointment was held by General Grant. The Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces was, however, President Lincoln himself and hence he had the over-riding authority and control over the newly appointed General in Chief who was the strategic head. It is significant to note here that though General Grant was the General in Chief, the actual command of the forces was exercised by the commanders of the Army such as General Meade. The headquarters of the General in Chief was located away from Washington which resulted in him not having daily personal contacts with the President. Nevertheless, General Grant and President Lincoln corresponded with each other through the normal means of communication. But, to facilitate the exchange...
exchange of intelligence between Lincoln and Grant, a new Command Office, the Chief of Staff, was created. It is not known who suggested the office though it is quite possible Lincoln himself may have proposed it. In any case, the need for such an office was clearly felt. Lincoln appointed Halleck, who was the General in Chief prior to General Grant, as the Chief of Staff. Halleck, however, was not a Chief of Staff in the modern sense. He was primarily a channel of communication between Lincoln and Grant and between Grant and the Departmental Commanders. Lincoln's selection of Halleck as the ideal officer to hold the post of Chief of Staff was due in no small measure to the ability of the latter to interpret civilian ideas to the military and vice versa. He could interpret Lincoln's strategic concepts to General Grant and the latter's military language to the President. This led to a greater understanding between the President and the General in Chief. In fact, the General in Chief rarely wrote to the President. On the other hand, he sent most of his dispatches to the Chief of Staff who turned them over to the President with an analysis or explanation when necessary. The Chief of Staff also served as a liaison between the General in Chief and the Generals Commanding the Departments. Thus the appointment of a Chief of Staff to act as an intermediary enabled the General in Chief to concentrate on the formulation of strategic directions for the Departments. Efficient strategic planning would have been very difficult had the General in Chief...
also to read the reports from subordinate Commanders and frame and write instructions for them. The dispatches of Departmental Generals were sent to the Chief of Staff who either transmitted them to General Grant or summarized their comments for the General in Chief. Grant sent most of these orders to subordinates through the Chief of Staff. Often the General in Chief would tell the Chief of Staff in general terms of what he wanted done and it was for the latter to issue written instructions to the subordinates concerned. Sometimes, the General in Chief would even delegate complete authority to the Chief of Staff to handle a situation of a routine nature.

It would appear that the Chief of Staff was a mere coordinator of information with no responsibility except in matters of advice and administration. Though, however, the Chief of Staff's job was, in some respects, unrewarding and unpleasant, nevertheless it was an essential link in the higher military setup of the State. Thus the arrangement of a Commander-in-Chief who was also the political head of the State, a General in Chief in charge of strategic planning and a Chief of Staff to interpret the civilian ideas to the military and vice versa, gave the United States a modern system of command for a modern war. It worked well in the context of the constitutional development of the country in the 19th century but much greater experience was in store for the 20th century. However, it was superior to anything achieved in Europe until von Holtke forged the Prussian Staff machine of 1866 and 1870 as already described.