Chapter III

THEORETICAL EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Theoretical diversity is a strength, not a weakness of international relations.  

-Fred Halliday

World affairs today can be compared to a disassembled jigsaw puzzle. Each piece shows a small portion of a larger picture that as yet remains difficult to decipher. “Some pieces depict resurgent nationalism; others show spreading democracy, some picture genocide, others portray prosperity through trade and investment, some picture nuclear disarmament, others picture nuclear proliferation, some indicate a reinvigorated United Nations, others show the UN still enfeebled and ineffective, some describe cultural globalization, while others predict clashing civilizations.  

Theories can help us in placing the pieces together to form an accurate picture. However, it would be wrong to assume that a particular theory however useful at the present guiding moment will remain useful in the future as well. All theories are cartographs of possible futures.

As late as 1966 Martin Wight had posed the question why is there no international theory, by which he meant an equivalent body of knowledge to that which comprised political theory. Wight argued that

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there was no body of international theory because the character of international politics was 'incompatible with progressivist theory'. Political theory was philosophically rich because it was concerned with the 'theory of the good life', whereas 'international theory is the theory of survival' in a world where 'international politics is the realm of recurrence and repetition'.

Three decades later the poverty of international theory which Wight identified has been substantially overcome. This is accredited to an explosion of theoretical activity in the field since the 1970s, International Relations can now be regarded as a discipline comprising a range of alternative, overlapping and competing theories of world politics.

There has been a good deal of academic debate over what constitutes "theory". According to Kenneth Waltz, theories explain laws which identify probable associations. Whereas Martin Wight defines it as a tradition of speculation about relations between states. 'Empirical theories' help us to test hypothesis about the world by using observation. While 'normative theory' is a representation of the way the world ought to be. Yet 'critical theory' is an ideological critique of the present which opens up alternative future paths to change, freedom and human autonomy. Last but definitely very important is the 'constitutive theory' which reflects upon the process of theorizing, including questions of epistemology and ontology.

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Above all, there is a consensus among scholars that theory should explain some aspect of the international system that is not easily explained by common sense. International Relations started with the puzzling question why did nation-states continue to go to war when it was already clear that the economic gains made in war would never exceed the economic costs of doing so. Thereby the theories resulted.

Besides, the theory need not necessarily aspire to predict. This is where social science differs from natural science. Social science can never confidently predict because the factors involved in human relations are too numerous. A theory of International Relations brings order and meaning into a pandemonium of unconnected material and prepares the ground for a new international order radically different from that which preceded it. Thus, they enable us to conceptualize both past and contemporary events. They also provide a range of ways of interpreting complex issues. It is a vital task for a theory of politics to anticipate drastic changes in the structure of politics and in the institutions.

Yet, Charles W. Kegley argues that 'a theory of International Relations needs to perform four principal tasks. It should describe, explain, predict and prescribe'. Theories of International Relations can be evaluated against one or more of the following criteria:

- a theory's understanding of an issue or process;

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- its explanatory power;
- its success in predicting events;
- intellectual coherence of the theory;
- and the theory's capacity for critical self-reflection and intellectual engagement with contending theories.

There are two categories of theory representing a fundamental division within the discipline between theories which offer explanatory accounts of International Relations, and those that see theory as constitutive of the reality. According to Hedley Bull, no theoretical enterprise would be complete without both these processes. Many theorists of International Relations share a sense of the importance of theory because it is regarded that the theory versus reality divide is a false dichotomy.

There are categories of theory, such as the division made earlier between explanatory and constitutive theory, which are incommensurable and perhaps incompatible.

According to Thomas Kuhn the growth of knowledge in natural sciences takes place via a series of distinct stages, each dominated by a particular frame of assumptions (paradigms) which render knowledge in one particular period of time incommensurate with knowledge in another. These successive periods of knowledge are separated by confrontations

between opposing sets of ideas which in turn change the actual shape of the discipline. As human knowledge expands, paradigms become intellectually exhausted and impoverished, and are continually superseded as scholars find within them anomalies which cannot be explained.6

There is a great debate over the relevance and applicability of Kuhn's epistemological model to the social sciences, with suggestions that realism, for example, has been the dominant paradigm within the discipline of International Relations. It then becomes possible for scholars to define theoretical disagreements within the discipline as representing 'inter-paradigm debates', the implication being that a dominant theory becomes hegemonic within a discipline because of its intellectual merit.7

Rather than proclaiming an 'official' definition of International Relations theory, it might be better to state the purpose to which these theories are being put. One aim of studying a wide variety of International Relations theories is to make international politics more intelligible and better understood. According to Fred Halliday, we need theories because there need to be some preconception of facts which are significant and which are not.8

The development of International Relations like that of all social sciences is in fact a product not just of two but of three concentric circles of influence, change and debate within the subject itself, the impact of developments in the world, but also the influence of new ideas within other areas of social science. Today, the theoretical developments within the discipline of International Relations have reached a new and exciting stage marked by rapid intellectual challenges, most notably the influences of cognate fields of research, and need to grasp the extraordinary changes currently taking place in global politics.

The enduring concerns of International Relations have two distinct aspects: one is broadly analytic the role of the state in International Relations, the problem of order in the absence of a supreme authority, the causes of conflict and the basis of cooperation. The other is normative the question of when and to what degree it is legitimate to use force, the place of morality in International Relations, the rights and wrongs of intervention.

Major wars have often brought about significant changes in the theoretical interpretation of world affairs and influenced “what ideas and values will predominate, thereby determining the ethos of succeeding ages”. Three such system-transforming wars have dominated the twentieth century. World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Each

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struggle caused the dominant paradigm to be jettisoned and encouraged the search for new theoretical orientation.

Before the outbreak of World War I, not much attention was given to a theory of international politics. Indeed, international politics was never a preoccupation of western political thought, which focused primarily on domestic issues. Thinking about conflict among states was largely fragmentary. By contrast, Western thinking about order, justice, and liberty within Western states had been continuous and well developed: these subjects were found in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Before the twentieth century there was very little work on interstate politics and whatever there were have become classics. Thucydides wrote on the causes of war, Machiavelli and Hobbes on the nature of power, Grotius on human law, Polybius wrote about the war between Rome and Carthage and David Hume on the balance of power.

If there was a focus at all, it was diplomatic history. In a sense, this was international politics because it recounted what had transpired between nations in the past. But in another sense, diplomatic history cannot be equated with a theory of international politics. Discovering what happened in the year immediately before 1914 can yield an enormous amount of information on specific political and military leaders, the political climate, socio-economic conditions within specific countries and how all these interacted to produce World War I.
The search for an end to war was accompanied by a political shift in the domestic policies of the Western democracies, especially Britain and France, which, until World War I, had often been belligerents. This political change was to have a lasting impact on their conduct of foreign policies. Before 1914, the conduct of foreign policy had been left basically to the diplomats and soldiers. It was never regarded as falling within the purview of party politics, but as a matter for experts. After the slaughter of World War I, the people of the Western democracies, who had suffered so much, wanted control over foreign policy as they had over domestic policy. In short, foreign policy was now, like domestic politics, to be subjected to popular accountability.

**Liberal Idealism**

Liberal idealism emphasized ethical principles over the pursuit of power. Its modern proponents included thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Thomas Jefferson, John Stuart Mill, John Locke, David Hume, Jean Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith. They assumed that “people were not by nature sinful or wicked but that harmful behaviour was the result of structural arrangements motivating individuals to act in their own self-interest.”

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10 Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, op.cit., p. 19
It was difficult to separate the foundation of the discipline of International Relations from the intellectual reaction to the horrors of the First World War. The war had shaken the confidence of those who thought diplomacy operated effectively and was properly understood. As an instrument of statecraft war had proven to be immoral and costly. Early scholars in the field, therefore agreed that three questions would dominate their studies:

- What had war achieved, other than death and misery for millions?
- Were there lessons from the war that could be learnt to prevent a recurrence of conflict on this scale?
- Was the war caused by mistake, misunderstanding or evil intent?

In response to these questions, the first 'school' or 'theory' of International Relations emerged to dominate the discipline's early history. The idealists (also known as liberals and utopians) argued that war was not a product of human nature, but the result of misunderstandings by politicians who had lost control of events leading up to hostilities in 1914.

Alliances, arms races, and secret diplomacy frequently were cited as the causes of the World War I. Power politics was blamed; it was alleged that all the great powers had recklessly pursued their national interests. It was further believed that war was not inevitable and its frequency could be reduced by eradicating the institutional arrangements that encouraged it.

The resulting study of international politics concentrated on three different approaches. First, there was the emphasis on the League of
Nations, in which the nations of the world would be represented. In this forum negotiation and debates could be observed by the public of all countries, making it impossible for secret diplomacy to produce another war. Thus in place of competitive, unregulated system, idealists sought to create a new one based on collective security. This approach dealt with the problem of war by declaring any state's aggression was an aggression against all. Second, there were disarmament conferences that aimed to reduce, the number of arms possessed by the great powers. Examples include German disarmament in the Treaty of Versailles (1919). Third, there were legal efforts to decrease the likelihood of war. Idealists emphasized the use of legal processes such as mediation and arbitration to settle disputes and inhibit recourse to armed conflict. This was illustrated by the creation in 1921 of the Permanent Court of International Justice to litigate inter-state conflicts. A specific American contribution was the Kellogg-Briand pact (1928) which for the first time outlawed war as an instrument of state policy, with exception that wars would still be conducted in “self-defence”. Collectively, the twenty years between the two world wars were a time when thinking about International Politics was characterized by the almost complete neglect of the reality of power.

In seeking a more peaceful world, idealists related to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s call for democratic domestic institutions. “Making the world safe for democracy”, idealists believed would also make it secure and free from war. President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech
proposed the creation of the League of Nations, and with it the pursuit of other idealists' aims.

Although idealist paradigm dominated the discipline of International Relations during the inter-war period, little of the idealist tradition was ever attempted. When the winds of international change again shifted and the Axis Powers pursued world conquest, idealism as a world view receded into the annals of history.

Realism

The realist critique of the idealist-liberal school was launched by E.H. Carr immediately before the World War II, sometimes referred to as the discipline's first 'great debate'. Critics blamed the outbreak of war on what they believed to be the idealists' moralistic assumptions about the possibility of the peace and progress and alleged that idealists were utopians who neglected the realities of power politics. The lessons the critics drew from the interwar period gave shape to a new set of beliefs.

It should be obvious from this that in the discipline's formative stages there was an explicit connection between theory and practice and between means and ends. The very purpose of intellectual endeavor was to change the world for the better by eradicating the scourge of war. This was really the only function international theory had.

As the discipline grew this foundational normative concern of International Relations was supplemented by other theoretical issues.
Though the preoccupation with conflict and war remained, the discipline became more generally concerned with a wider range of other international actors and phenomena as well as a series of introspective philosophical questions. This represented nothing short of a revolutionary transformation of the discipline's principle focus.

Just as World War I was blamed on power politics, it was widely believed that World War II stemmed from the neglect of power politics. If an arms race and close alliances were thought to be responsible for the hostilities of 1914-1918, the failure of the British and French to match German arms and to stand together against Hitler precipitated what Churchill was to call the “unnecessary war”.11 “Realism” was the reaction to “idealism”. If war was to be prevented, more than wishful thinking was needed. Advocates of the new, ascendant paradigm known as realism, emerged to frame an intellectual movement whose message reads like the antithesis of idealism. 12

Realism purports to aim at an accurate representation of the ‘reality’ of global politics as opposed to a way of thinking in which some higher state is imagined or recommended as a course of action (idealism). As a matter of fact, realism can be both a conduct for and an expression of conservative ideology.

Realism resurrected traditional ideas that states were the primary actors in international politics, that the environment or state system in which states lived was essentially anarchical, that conflict in this system could at best be managed to reduce the likelihood of war, but war could not be abolished. The central point was that there was no final solution to the problem of war. Management of the system had to be rooted in every state's "national interest" and the best way of preserving peace was to maintain the balance of power. They also had to be flexible and accommodating in their diplomacy. The key figures in the realist revolution were Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan and Reinhold Niebuhr.13

"Classical" realists such as Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Neibuhr believed that states, like human beings, had an innate desire to dominate others, which led them to fight wars. Morgenthau also stressed the virtues of the classical, multipolar, balance-of-power system and saw the bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union as especially dangerous. Morgenthau's textbook, 'Politics among Nations' became the realist bible for the years following World War II. Policy implications flowed from the theory: the most effective technique for managing power is balance of power. Both George Kennan and Henry Kissinger to Presidents

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13 As a political theory, realism can trace its intellectual roots to the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, the writings of Kautilya, the political thought of Niccolo Machiavelli and the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes.
Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford are known to have based their policy recommendations on realist theory.

In a parallel development, a group of realists on the European side of the Atlantic developed what came to be known as the 'English School'.\footnote{Fred Halliday, op. cit., p.11.} Charles Manning, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull emphasized the degree of the international system which was 'anarchical' that is to say without a central ruler. They saw it not as straight forward chaos but in a certain sense a 'society', that is, a group of states that interacted according to certain conventions. These included diplomacy, international law, the balance of power and the role of the great powers.

Some realists strongly tie their thought to a negative characterization of human nature. Theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, who wrote before and after World War II, referred to human nature as "the rock bottom problem". He influenced Hans Morgenthau, who in turn wrote the most widely read world politics textbook of the Cold War. Two infamous tyrants, Hitler and Stalin, and the events surrounding World War II, reinforced this common realist emphasis on a fundamentally bad human nature.

Within the realist paradigm, the purpose of statecraft is national survival in a hostile environment. Similarly, no principle is more important than self-help. In this conception, state sovereignty, a cornerstone of international law, gives heads of state the responsibility to do what ever is necessary in the interests of states. Further, according to this paradigm,
respect for moral principles is a wasteful interference in the rational pursuit of national power.

Although much of the emphasis of realists has traditionally been on conflict among states, they recognize that even self-serving states can rationally cooperate in pursuit of mutual interests—there can be cooperation under anarchy. Cooperation can extend to various security (arms control), economic (trade), and environmental (pollution control) issues. Much realist thought in recent years addresses such cooperation.

Realism was the dominant theoretical tradition throughout the Cold War. It dominated in the Cold War years because “it provided simple but powerful explanations for war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation, and other international phenomena, and because its emphasis on competition was consistent with the central features of the American-Soviet rivalry.”

Realism has thus neglected the existence of a logic of change, though neither Carr nor Morgenthau discount the eventual possibility of alternative structures in the international system. Realism talks about immutable forces inherent in human nature and that the laws of politics are impervious to our preferences therefore, the function of our thinking should be to study a sequence of events which we are powerless to alter or influence and the wisdom lies in adapting oneself to the forces. Realism militates against structural change in the international system.

15 Stephen M. Walt, 'International Relations: One World, ManyTheories', Foreign Affairs (Spring 1998) p. 31
and effectively stifles the possibility of transforming International Relations. In the field of International Relations, the terrain of struggle is systemic, with most political behaviour directed at either the recurrence or revision of the existing international order. Realism thus seeks to resist change and foreclose alternative political practices.

Change is important to realists, but they place greater emphasis on continuity. Realist views of history often begin and end with characterizations of power, power balances, and struggles for security. Realists foresee the same kind of interstate struggle in the future. 16

Realism, however, soon came under attack. For one thing, realism became identified with Morgenthau, whose book Politics Among Nations has a profound influence upon American academia. 17 The works of other analysts, such as Arnold Wolfers, Kennan, and Niebuhr, were largely overlooked at first. 18 One frequent criticism of Morgenthau and, therefore, of realism in general, was that although it claimed to describe international politics as it was and not in utopian terms, its frequent advice to policy makers on the conduct of foreign policy suggested that states did not in fact behave as the realists described. A second criticism was that, despite their common outlook, realists often disagreed with one another. For

example, Morgenthau came out early against U.S. intervention in Vietnam, but others supported that policy. Such disagreements raised questions about the value of realism as a guide to making the correct foreign policy.

A growing number of critics also pointed out that realism did not account for significant new developments in world politics. For instance, it could not explain the forces behind the new institutions coming up in Western Europe in the 1960s, where the co-operative pursuit of mutual advantage rather than narrow self-interest seemed to dominate. Yet other critics pointed to realisms' disregard for ethical principles and for the material costs that some of its policies seemed to impose, such as weak economy resulting from unrestrained military expenditures.

Yet despite the shortcomings of realism, much of the world continues to think about international politics in its terms. Realism enjoyed a resurgence in the early 1980s, as the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union entered a new phase and the role of military power in world politics received renewed emphasis. The wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s similarly resurrected faith in this paradigm. The strength of the realist tradition is its capacity to describe reality, solve problems and understand the continuities of world politics. A normative concern with the causes of war and the conditions of peace, security and order will continue to guide research in International Relations because they are centrally important issues. Realism explains
the inevitability of competition and conflict between states by highlighting
the insecure and anarchical nature of the international environment.

The continuing relevance of realism also finds expression in its
recent “new” reformulation known as “neo-realism” or “structural realism”.
Like realism, it also recognizes the anarchical nature of world politics and
the dominance of the nation-state in the global political arena. However, it
severs the link that realists defined between human nature and the
behaviour of states in world politics. It emphasizes the anarchic structure
of world politics rather than human nature in its explanation of foreign
policy behaviour.

The pioneer of neorealism, Kenneth N.Waltz, in his influential book:
Theory of international Politics set out to convert the loose and disjointed
body of realist “thought” into a formal “theory”. The key question which
Waltz poses and then proceeds to answer is: why do states exhibit similar
foreign policy behaviour despite their different political systems? Waltz
frequently cites the example of superpower behaviour during the Cold War
to refute the argument that it is possible to infer the condition of
international politics from the internal composition of states. The Soviet
Union and the United States comprised quite different political and social
orders. And yet their behaviour during the period of East-West tension is
remarkably similar. Their pursuit of military power and influence, their
competition for strategic advantage and the exploitation of their respective
spheres of influence were strikingly parallel. According to Waltz, the
explanation can be found in the systemic constraints on each state rather than their internal composition. The identification of these systemic forces is perhaps neo-realism's single greatest contribution to international theory.

Waltz advances beyond what he calls 'tradition realism' by arguing that international politics can be thought of as a system with a precisely defined structure. Realism was unable to conceptualise the international system in this way because it was limited by its behaviourist methodology which explains political outcomes through examining the constituent parts of political systems.

Morgenthau attempted to understand and explain international outcomes by examining the actions and interactions of units - the principles of human nature, the idea of interest defined in terms of power, the behaviour of statesmen- rather than focusing on the systemic constraints of international politics. He inferred political outcomes from the salient attributes of the actors producing them and ignored the important effects of structure. Whereas, realists such as Morgenthau argued that power is rooted in the nature of humankind, neo-realists such as Waltz point to the anarchical condition of the international realm which imposes the accumulation of power as a systemic requirement on states. The former account relies on a particular understanding of human nature to explain conflict in international politics. The latter prefers to treat the
international system as a separate domain which conditions the behaviour of all states within it.

Waltz believes the international system has a precisely defined structure with three important characteristics. These are (1) the ordering principle of the system, (2) the character of the units in the system, and (3) the distribution of the capabilities of the units in the system. In domestic political systems the ordering principle is hierarchic, with power exerted through the jurisdiction of political and legal processes. The ordering principle of the international system is anarchic, with an absence of any overarching authority regulating the behaviour of nation-states towards each other.

Thus as in realism, in neorealism anarchy and the absence of central institutions above states characterize the structure of the system. States remain the primary actors acting according to the principle of self-help and seeking to ensure their survival. Thus, it is the neorealists view that states do not differ in the tasks they face, only in their capabilities, Capabilities define the position of states in the system and the distribution of capabilities defines the structure of the system. Power also remains a central concept in neorealism. However, the quest for power is no longer considered an end in itself, as in realism nor does it derive from human nature. Instead, states always pursue power to survive.

To neorealists, the structure of the system, rather than the characteristics of the units that comprise it, determines outcomes.
Neorealists introduce two principal elements into the perspective. First, they focus more heavily than traditional realists on systemic structures and the influences these have on state behaviour. They direct attention to systemic anarchy, to distribution of capabilities within the system, and to the implications these systemic conditions have for individual state behaviour. Second, they posit rational, self-serving states interacting in an environment of anarchy and seek to deduce typical patterns of interaction. Neorealists need not assume an evil human nature to analyze ongoing conflicts of interest. Greater attention to system structure and theory also provides neorealists with a basis for somewhat more extensive consideration of change.

Within the framework established by neo-realists thinking about the international order, many security specifications, “nuclear realists”, have come to see nuclear weapons as the ultimate form of self-help, since states that are able to threaten potential aggressors with nuclear retaliation greatly increase the costs of aggression against themselves. If, as in the case of the two superpowers over the past decades, the nuclear arsenals of opposed states are balanced by one another so that neither dares attack the other, then nuclear weapons can even have a stabilizing effect on International Relations.

Neorealists have also broadened their interests to the study of cooperation. For example, Keohane has analyzed the implications of changes in systemic structure for interstate cooperation on trade and other
issues. This attention to cooperation has at times actually blurred the lines between realism and liberalism.

Scholars have developed other interpretations of realism in addition to neorealism. While neorealism focuses on a few core concepts (structure and balance of power), other interpretations consider different other complexities to Realism. Robert Gilpin, in ‘War and Change in World Politics’, offers one such interpretation. Accepting the realist assumptions that states are the principal actors and the international system structure plays a key role in determining power, Gilpin examines 2,400 years of history, stating that “the distribution of power among states constitutes the principal form of control in every international system.” Gilpin adds a streak of dynamism by discussing history as a series of cycles - cycles of birth, expansion and demise of dominant powers. Whereas, classical realism offers no explanation for decline of powers whereas, Gilpin discusses the importance of economic decline.

Yet another important refinement to realism was the addition of offense-defense theory, as laid out by Robert Jervis and Stephen Van Evera. These scholars argued that war was more likely when states could conquer each other easily. In other words, when defense was easier than offense. For these “defensive” realists, states merely sought to survive and great powers could guarantee their security by forming balancing alliances and choosing defensive military postures (such as retaliatory nuclear
forces).\textsuperscript{19} It was due to this reason that Waltz and other neorealists believed that the United States was extremely secure during the Cold War period. By the end of the Cold War, realism had moved away from Morgenthau's dark brooding about human nature and taken on a slightly more optimistic tone.

Realism had prepared the way for serious theoretical thinking about global conditions and the empirical linkages among them. Nonetheless, as dissatisfaction with its shortcomings mounted, a counter reaction – specifically in terms of language and method – had gained momentum in the 1960s and early 1970s. Because it was defined largely by its application of scientific methods to International Relations, behaviouralism, is better described as a methodology than as a theoretical perspective.\textsuperscript{20}

**Behaviouralism**

Both idealism and realism supplied a unifying focus. What followed in the 1960s and 1970s had no such focus. Instead, what displaced realism were a host of different approaches. Most were characterized by their way of investigating international politics.

The dominance of realism began to be challenged in the 1960s and had remained under pressure ever since. From the early 1960s onwards,

\textsuperscript{19} Stephen M. Walt, op. cit., p. 31

behaviouralism constituted an alternative to orthodox International Relations. This, in part, stimulated the so-called 'Great Debate' in the discipline between 'Scientific' and 'classical approaches'. Looking back thirty years later, it is clear that the debate has resolved nothing. Thus the new 'Scientific' school of International Relations, almost wholly based in the US sought to get away from the traditionalist, use of history and orthodox political terms such as 'state' to a new, quantifiable study of what could be observed, i.e. 'behaviour', in this case, international processes and interactions. Karl Deutche studied the growth of international communications; James Rosenau focused on informal interactions, 'transnational linkages' between societies that bypassed orthodox state-to-state relations; Morton Kaplan developed more 'Scientific' theorisations of the international systems. Thus, a wide ranging debate between 'traditionalists' and 'behaviourists' pursued.

Its advocates stated that their purpose was to investigate international politics without any reformist desires or biased preconceptions.21 Their analysis would be value free or empirical. They intended to observe the many forms of state behaviour, collect the necessary data, and carefully draw conclusions from their studies. They leaned towards using comparative cross-national analyses rather than case studies of particular countries at particular times.

The scientific method claimed not only an unbiased approach to research – that investigators could separate their own values from the facts – but also, as already suggested an ability to generalize about the behaviour of state and other political actors in the international areas. The political scientists looked for patterns of behaviour such as when one of the victors of a war perceives that its interests are not satisfied at the postwar peace conference – or, that its gains are not as great as those of some of its fellow victors – conflict results and war may occur. These generalizations about the conditions under which past wars have erupted allow theorists to hypothesize that if the above conditions exist, then war results.

The behavioural inquiry during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s was also characterized by its use of data, quantitative techniques, computers, formal models, and the general laws of behaviour. According to behaviouralists, only quantitative methods could be free from bias and produce accurate and verifiable empirical studies of the behaviour of international actors. Its goals were to substitute verifiable knowledge for subjective belief and testable evidence for intuitive explanations.

The traditionalists leveled several charges against the behaviouralists, some of these charges included a preoccupation with what sometime appeared to be methodology and a disregard of a word of nuclear weapons, widespread poverty, and injustice.

The overall attempt by the behaviouralists to supplant 'traditional' International Relations failed in three key respects. First, realism, and its
later variant 'neorealism', remained the dominant approach within the academic and policy-related study of International Relations. Secondly, its theoretical promise to come up with major new conclusions on the strength of data collection was never fulfilled. Nevertheless, out of the behaviouralist challenge of transnational and systemic factors a number of minor new sub-fields developed within the discipline, namely, foreign policy analysis, interdependence and international political economy. Thus, if realism and neo-realism remained predominant, they no longer had an intellectual monopoly within the subject. Offshoots of the behavioural approach—foreign policy analysis, interdependence and international political economy, achieved a permanent place in the discipline.

To gather verifiable knowledge was difficult. Early optimism about it began to dissipate as the effort involved failed to produce prompt results. Even within the behavioural movement there were disturbing questions about the approach and its applicability in International Relations. One of the early proponents of behaviouralism, David Easton asked if the field was not moving into a period of “postbehaviouralism,” marked by increasing attention to the policy relevance of research. 22

The general criticisms leveled against them were: (1) that some behaviouralists had become preoccupied with method to the exclusion of

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real-world problems; (2) that behaviouralists often ignored policy makers need for data-based knowledge about how to protect their state's security and make the world a better place; and (3) that behavioral methodology, relied on past patterns of human experience that sometimes failed to apply to the changing world. Hence the findings might be historically accurate but largely irrelevant to today's or tomorrow's world.

Although some behavioural research referred directly to the moral issues that differentiated realism and liberal idealism, it was yet criticized for neglecting many ethical questions such as a world of poverty, hunger, violence, and so on. Hence the post behavioural critique called for a new research agenda that would focus on new issues and reexamine their underlying philosophical implications from a multidisciplinary perspective. However, the advocates of new approaches to International Relations didn't recommend discarding scientific methods. Instead they urged the application of such methods to new kinds of questions and to the reconstruction of theories grounded in the realist and liberal traditions.  

Marxism

Marxist entry into International Relations was on the issue of underdevelopment. According to Marxism, it was in capitalism's interest to

23 Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, op. cit., p. 27.
24 Gustafson, Hugh, 'Realism and the International order After the Cold War', Social Research, vol. 60, No.1, (Spring 1993).
develop the Third World. They claim that the mode of production determines the nature of social and political relations within political entities and among them. When a new mode of production develops, new classes arise and a new class becomes dominant. Domestic and international politics are fundamentally about the struggle for wealth among economic classes. Marxism does envisage that a final end state will emerge with the progress of industrial modernization and the advent of communism.

In arguing for the primacy of an alternative agenda – North-South relations and international structures of exploitation – Marxism left the main terrain of International Relations relatively unscathed.25· This insulation of International Relations from Marxist influence was compounded by the predominance of American writing on the subject. It was only in the 1980s that the situation began to change. Within the writing on international political economy, there was an application of Marxist concepts to analyse the causes and consequences of an increasingly internationalized market.

Marxist theory has been considered inadequate or insufficient by mainstream theorists for the task of explaining International Relations. Despite this inhospitable academic climate, however, some important work has been completed and there are hopeful signs that in the Post Cold War

25 Fred Halliday op. cit., p.17.
period, new thinking in International Relations will have a constructive input from previously marginalized scholarship.

'Marxism-Leninism' was the official ideology of one of the two major protagonists in the Cold War. The International Relations literature thus concerned itself, with explaining the relationship of Marxist thought to the foreign policy of countries which utilized Marxist-derived approaches to develop ideological perspective which shaped both domestic and foreign policy.

The major impact of Marxism on the study of International Relations, has been "the contribution of Marxist thought in its widest sense sometimes termed 'neo-Marxism' to the developments in international theory which have been identified as 'structuralist'. Another, less studied phenomena, has been the impact of Marxist thought on those scholars concerned with the interrelationship of race, class and International Relations." 26

The first set of beliefs in Marxism is found in historical analysis. Whereas for most liberals and realists, history provides various data points from which generalizations can be gleaned, Marxists see historical analysis as fundamental. "Of special relevance to Marxists is the history of the

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production process. Marxists are concerned most with explaining the relationship between production, social relations, and power. 27

The writings of Karl Marx are fundamental to the Marxist line of thought. Marx theorized on the evolution of capitalism based on economic change and class conflict. In capitalism, private interests control labour and market exchanges, creating boundaries from which certain classes try to free themselves. A clash inevitably arises between the controlling, capitalist bourgeois class and the controlled workers, called the proletariat. It is from this violent clash that a new socialist order is born.

For liberals, economic inter-dependence is one possible explanation for international cooperation. For realists and neorealists, economic factors are one of the ingredients of power, one component of the international structure. In neither theory, though, is economics the determining factor. In Marxism, on the other hand, economic factors assume primary importance.

Marxist belief also centers on the structure of the global system. That structure in Marxist thinking is hierarchical and is largely the by-product of imperialism or the expansion of certain economic forms into other areas of the world. Imperialism thus produces the hierarchical international system, in which there are opportunities for some states, and significant constraints on behaviour for others. Developed countries can

expand, enabling them to sell goods and export surplus wealth that they
cannot use at home. Simultaneously, the less-developed countries are
increasingly constrained and dependent on the actions of the developed
world. Marxist and radicals view the economic techniques of domination
and suppression as the means of power in world.

The Russian revolutionary and communist leader V.I. Lenin in his
work: *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, argues that
imperialism inevitably leads to war. Lenin believed that capitalist
countries have to expand through imperialism; it is not a choice, but a
necessity. Once the less-developed markets have been subdivided among
the capitalist states, then war among capitalist states over control of those
markets becomes inevitable. War, then, is an outcome of capitalist
economic competition.

Latter day Marxists recognize that capitalists can use other, more
sophisticated techniques of control. Contemporary Marxists, such as
dependency theorists, attribute primary importance to multinational
corporations and international banks based in developed countries in
exerting fundamental controls over the developing countries. These
organizations are seen as key players in establishing dependency
relationships; they are agents of penetration not benign actors, as liberals
refer, or marginal actors, as seen by realists. These organizations are able
to forge transnational relationships with elites in the developing countries,
so that domestic elites in both exploiter and exploited countries are tightly linked in a symbiotic relationship.

Finally, Marxists are uniformly normative in their orientation. They evaluate the hierarchical capitalist structure as "bad", its methods exploitative. They have clear normative and activist positions about what should be done to ameliorate inequities – ranging from the radical revolution and revolutionary organizations supported by Leninists to more incremental changes suggested by dependency theorists.

"Neo-Marxist" explanations of international politics by contrast provide a broad framework of analysis which considers class as a major factor in International Relations, economic relationships as the key dynamics and international justice and equality as the most important normative concerns. Neo-Marxist theories borrow concepts developed by Marx, such as 'exploitation' and the notion of an oppressed 'proletariat', to help explain the rise of capitalism. They share the Marxist conviction that domestic and international economic processes are key explanatory features of the international system. These theories also have in common with classical Marxist analysis a tendency to incorporate normative features, concerned with ways to change the world as well as to analyse it.

Neo-Marxism has penetrated International Relations by way of major theoretical contributions. The first is the dependency/development studies literature. The second is the 'world system' approach and the third is the neo-Gramscian insertion into the sub-field of international political
economy. Dependency theories reflect a range of political and theoretical perspectives including the vision of the world as the structural domination of an exploited periphery subordinated by an exploiting core the emphasis on capitalist development in the South as being characterized by 'dependent development' and theories stressing 'unequal exchange'. The bulk of the literature has centred on the experience of the Latin American countries which had, although achieved political independence in the early 19th century, yet were still poor and economically underdeveloped.

Wallerstein's importance in the literature, is more for his development of the 'world systems' approach to the study of International Relations. Immanuel Wallerstein links history and the rise of capitalism in 'world-capitalist system' perspective. He examines the emergence of capitalism in Europe since the sixteenth century. At each stage, he identified core geographical areas where development is advanced, the agricultural sector providing sustenance for the industrial workers. Wallerstein identifies peripheral areas also, where raw material is extracted for the developed core. These areas are prevented from developing by the developed core. In between the core and the periphery lies the semiperiphery.

Wallerstein's rendering of history intrinsically recognizes changes. States of the semiperiphery can move into the core and vice-a-versa. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s semiperipheral countries like S. Korea and Taiwan moved into the core, and a few members of the periphery like
Thailand and Malaysia entered the semiperiphery. Thus, for Wallerstein and for most Marxists, focus is on the changes in the system wide phenomenon of capitalism. Change may occur in the semi-periphery and periphery, as states change their relative positions vis-a-vis each other. And capitalism goes through cycles of growth and expansion, as occured during the age of colonialism and imperialism, followed by periods of contraction and decline. So capitalism itself is a dynamic force.

But can the capitalist system itself be changed? In other words, is real system transformation - like the change from the feudal to the capitalist system - possible? Here, the Marxists differ among themselves. Wallerstein is quite pessimistic, claiming that any change that does occur is very slow. On the other hand, George Modelski believes that change will occur: he found one-hundred-year cycles between hegemonic wars, which fundamentally alter the structure of the international system. Changes resulting from the long cycles are inevitable. "Wars are fought, creating a new hegemonic power, that power waxes and then wanes, a struggle follows, and a new hegemon assumes dominance - the cycle begins once again." 28

The third group of theories are those which have utilized Cox's work to develop the Gramscian notion of 'hegemony' as a concept to explain how major powers, particularly the United States, maintain their dominance within the international system. Cox has introduced into mainstream

International Relations theory Marxian concepts by way of the work of the Italian Communist Scholar, Gramsci.

Finally Marxism offered a broad historical vision of the development of the human race from an original condition in which small-scale societies interacted with one another to the modern condition in which the human race is integrated by the rigours of global capitalism. This conception of history remains valid in the contemporary age of globalization. Marx and Marxism ensured that the role of production in transforming the physical environment and the social conditions in which human beings lived became central to the study of society and politics. Marxism also offered a critical account of modes of production which aimed to explain the nature and dynamics of class exploitation and enlighten human subjects about the prospects for new social relations which would increase their freedom. As the analysis of the logic of globalization and fragmentation reveal, Marxism was not concerned with promoting the freedom of the citizens of any particular state or civilization but with promoting the freedom of the whole human race. These are among its greatest achievements.

**Liberalism**

Liberalism holds that human nature is basically good and that innate goodness makes societal progress possible. Evil or unacceptable human behaviour, such as war, is, according to liberals, the product of inadequate or corrupt social institutions and of misunderstandings
among leaders. Thus, liberals believe that war or any other aggressive behaviour is not inevitable, and can be moderated through institutional reform. Through collective action, states can cooperate to eliminate the possibility of war.29

Enlightenment thought of eighteenth-century Europe, nineteenth-century political and economic liberalism, and twentieth century Wilsonian idealism provided the real foundations of liberalism. The scientific and intellectual advances of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries shaped the thought of that period (to which contributed Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Locke, Hume, and Kant). Beginning in the Enlightenment, liberals elaborated various theoretical traditions over the past two hundred to three hundred years such as :-

- First, focus on the individual and protection of human rights in democracy. Some historians regard John Locke as the founder of liberal democratic thought. In a step toward "modern liberalism," Locke, Rousseau, and Kant argued that states should promote education as a foundation of a virtuous citizenry and a better government.

- Second, focus on interactions and interdependence. Adam Smith provided the classic statement of the power of commercial interaction. He argued that the mutual benefit of exchange was a key to the wealth of nations. Immanuel Kant, and Jeremy Bentham

29 Karen Mingst, op. cit., p. 66.
are only a few of those who have elaborated the values of trade and have also linked commerce to improved interstate relations. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye extended the arguments about sociopolitical groupings into the global environment.

Twentieth-century idealism also contributed to liberalism, finding its greatest adherent in the American President Woodrow Wilson, who authored the covenant of the League of Nations. The basic proposition of this idealism is that war is preventable. Thus, the League of Nations illustrated the importance that liberals place on international institution to deal with war, and the opportunity for collective problem-solving in a multilateral forum. Liberals also place faith in international law and legal instruments - mediation, arbitration, and international courts. They also think that war can be eliminated through disarmament. The basis of liberalism remains firmly embedded in the belief in the rationality of man and that through education man can develop institutions to bring out the best characteristics of the human race.

During World War II, liberalism came under intense scrutiny and it fell out of favour as a dominant theoretical perspective. Since the 1970, liberalism has been revived as neoliberal institutionalism. Neoliberal institutionalists such as Robert O. Keohane ask why states cooperate in the anarchic condition of the international system. For them, security is essential, and institutions help to make security possible.
Realists identify states as the central actors in world politics, while liberals believe that the agents who ultimately practice politics are actually individuals. Like states, individuals have interests. Liberals place both the pursuit of personal freedom and of economic well being at the top of the list of interests or values.

Realists perceive a relatively fixed amount of security in the system and view shifts in power and security on the part of one state as mirror images of shifts in power and security of other states. This is called a win-lose or zero-sum perspective, because the value of changes sum to zero across all actors. In contrast liberals believe all actors can simultaneously increase their economic and more general well-being (a win-win or nonzero-sum orientation).

Liberals portray history as largely progressive. Much of that progress is seen in cumulative improvements in the technological capability of humanity and the material advance that technology makes possible. Some progress, may also take the form of moral improvement. For instance, the abolition of slavery represented moral progress by humanity and not simply changed economic conditions. Some liberals even see a combination of moral progress and progress in material well being ultimately leading to the obsolescence of major war.

The common threads of liberal international theory include beliefs in progress conceived in terms of greater human freedom, the importance of cooperation to progress, and a process of scientific and intellectual
modernization as the driving force behind cooperation and human progress.\textsuperscript{30}

Liberals did not want to be branded as idealists as were many interwar liberals. The international events of this century (the two World Wars and the Cold War) have made them wary about being too optimistic and many have felt comfortable explaining than predicting. In fact most international liberals are not "idealists" in the sense that they believe that a perfect harmony of interests waits to be discovered, that the social and political obstacles to the rational and morally right are minimal, and that what obstacles exist are changeable.\textsuperscript{31}

The key for the liberal theorist is to understand the balances between conflicting and mutual interests that exist in particular stages of international history. The second argument is the growth of international cooperation. The third thesis is that International Relations are being transformed by a process of modernization that was unleashed by the scientific revolution and it is promoting cooperation among nations and greater peace, welfare and justice for humankind.

Liberals further believe that progress will also occur in political arrangements. Within states, democracy will increasingly become the preferred form of government. These governments will protect human rights and freedom of individuals. They will also support private property


\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, p. 109.
and the commercial freedom of individuals, both domestically and internationally. Moreover, among states, mutually beneficial exchange will flourish.

For liberals, the possibility of progress is constant but its realization vary over time and space. "Liberals see a set of mutually reinforcing relationships among these progressive phenomena: more educated and competent citizens, active interest groups both within countries and across state boundaries, prosperity and democracy within countries, and commerce and peaceful relationships among them. For instance, they argue that democracies do not fight one another." 

While on the other hand, Realist's argue that trade among countries can be as much a source of conflict as of cooperation. More recently liberals called for general and complete disarmament of the superpowers, and continue to prescribe a world federal government in contrast, more analytical liberals investigate increasing global literacy, protection of individual human rights, spread of democracy, rising trade, decreasing incidence of wars among great powers, and the possible relationships among these changes.

Liberals ignore the power of the state and the probability that it will continue to organize global affairs for a long time. They do, however, see more potential for cooperation among states than do realists, even

32 Ibid, p.121.
33 Barry B. Hughes, op. cit., p. 55.
neorealists. Liberals see unsolved world problems, including global poverty and hunger, environmental damage, and even the potential for nuclear destruction as bases upon which increased interstate cooperation can be anticipated.

The rapid growth of corporations, international organisations and new actors such as terrorists, intelligence agencies and drug dealers, all of which operate globally, have given rise to new issues which can be bracketed under 'transnationalism' and 'interdependence'. Transnationalists describe an inevitable growth in global interactions, driven by advances in communications and transportation technology. Further, the transnationalists advocated the demise of the nation-state as the dominant form of political organisation as issues like pollution, overpopulation, nuclear proliferation and poverty can no longer be resolved within the confines of state unit.

Hobbes had presented a dilemma for governance namely the need to choose either anarchy or an oppressive state. Liberals traditionally resolve the dilemma domestically by supporting a strong state capable of enforcing order, but one with constitutionally limited powers and a built in separation or balance of powers. Because the strong state option is closed to liberals internationally, they support a complex system of governance in which states maintain an important role, but in which they both balance one another and delegate increasing amounts of legitimate authority to large numbers of international organizations.
As the Cold War ended, dissatisfaction with realism and neorealism began to rise. Arguing that it was time for a new, idealist alternative to realism, critics pointed to several shortcomings: first, power-politics perspectives failed to predict the peaceful end of the Cold War and international social changes in general. It was also argued that realist approach would “not be an adequate guide for the future of international politics” because the broadened post–Cold War global agenda included many questions “which realist theory could not answer”. Ecological deterioration, economic underdevelopment and global warming were among those for which realism was seen deficient.

Some critics questioned if realism as a theory of International Relations was over, these critics contended that there was need to rethink neorealism since they perceived it to be a paradigm in crisis. But they advocated the revival of liberalism and that should be treated as a theoretical endeavour in International Relations. In light of this growing sentiment in the early 1990s emerged neoliberalism, a new approach to world politics which concentrates on the ways that international organizations and other non state actors promote international cooperation.

Neoliberalism seeks to build theories of International Relations by giving the basic tenets of classical liberalism and post–World War I idealism a fresh examination. It also explores the mechanisms by which cooperation and change might be fostered. “Moreover, neoliberalism
focuses on the ways in which factors such as democratic governance, public opinion, mass education, free trade, liberal capitalism, international law and organization, arms control and disarmament, can improve life. Because they perceive change in global conditions as progressing through cooperative efforts, neoliberal theorists maintain that the ideals of the liberal legacy today can describe, explain and prescribe international conduct better today than during the conflict ridden Cold War.

The most important debate in the post-Cold War phase has been on the "democratic peace". It rests on the belief that although democracies fight wars as often as other states, they rarely fight one another. Scholars such as Michael Doyle, James Lee Ray and Bruce Russett have offered a number of explanations for this tendency, the most famous being that democracies embrace norms of compromise that restrict the use of force against units propagating similar principles.

The economic strand of liberal theory is still influential. A number of scholars have recently suggested that the "globalization" of world markets, the rise of transnational networks and non-governmental organizations, and the spread of global communications technology are undermining the power of states and shifting attention from military security toward economics and social welfare.

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14 Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf; op. cit., p. 30.
Thus, the end of the Cold War has resuscitated 'liberalism' in the academy. No matter how flawed, its claims about the future of the international order deserve serious investigation as the contours of contemporary International Relations have come to resemble its teleology.

**Post-Positivism**

Also called the third debate, the post-positivist debate involves several streams of thought and a number of different groups of scholars, most notable among them are feminist theorists, critical theorists, and post-modernists. Each group has a different agenda but they all agree that it is necessary to challenge the positivist orientation of most of International Relations theory, including realism, liberalism and Marxism. “Post-positivists claim that mainstream International Relations theorists are locked into a problematic way of understanding theory and reality which inhibits their ability or even desire to widen or change their existing agendas for International Relations theory”\(^{35}\) In short, paradigms such as realism, liberalism, Marxism are ideologically committed to see a particular picture of the international, as a result of which they are also theoretically constrained. In fact, it is their theoretical limitations which structure what they see and think of as important in International Relations.

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The problem with the older paradigms is that they rely on an understanding of the world which involves seeing the world as being divided into distinct bits of reality. Theory is then something used by International Relations theorists either to explain or to understand these pieces of reality, with the possibility of predicting future international events. It is not insignificant that the failure of the academic community of International Relations theorists to predict the demise of communism has been the source of some embarrassment.

The positivist conception of the world and reality embodies much of mainstream International Relations theory in the 1990s despite the emergence of the 'third debate' or the so-called post-positivist revolution. This understanding of the world allows the possibility of thinking that defining identities as the central issues in International Relations theory is not a particularly political significant act; it is merely one of choice. Waltz can choose to study states, wars and the activity of leaders, others can look at the situation of women. Each then collects data and facts about the chosen group and ultimately develops theories about them. Theory, in this context, takes place after the fact.

But theory does not take place after the fact. Theories, instead, play a large part in constructing and defining what the facts are. This is a central claim made by those scholars working on post-positivist perspectives in International Relations theory. However, it is a claim resisted strongly by mainstream International Relations theory, which
remains despite entrenched in a realist-positivist paradigm. When condemned for serving the interests of the powerful and preserving the status quo, classical and neo-realists simply reply that they are uncovering the way they are.

'The way things are' for the realist /positivist core implies an image of the world in which something are regarded important, in relation to international events, whereas others are seen as irrelevant to the practice of International Relations theory. Important includes states, leaders, wars; irrelevant includes femininity, sexuality and ethnicity. Ethnicity might be accepted as giving rise to conflicts but for the neo-realists, systemic theories emphasizing the balance of power between states do not consider such 'variable' as being relevant to the workings of international system.

Post-positivism therefore signifies increasing theoretical expansion of the discipline of International Relations. These developments can be seen as representing a decisive and beneficial stage in the evolution of the subject. The post-positivist phase actually helped rescue the discipline from inertia.

It was in the mid - 1980s that the discipline of the International Relations came under serious challenge from various critical theories. Frankfurt School critical theory and subsequently, postmodernism, dealt severe blows to a discipline which had for so long managed to hide its limitations. A central figure in this challenge was Richard K. Ashley. He was greatly influenced by Habermas and later by thinkers as Michel

"Postmodernists began asking questions about language, contextuality, the foundation of knowledge, the structure of authority and the relationships between power and the agenda."³⁶ As Der Derian noted in 1988, 'International Relations is undergoing an epistemological critique which calls into question the very language, concepts, methods, and history (that is, the dominant discourse) which constitutes and governs a tradition of thought.

The claims of post-modernism are two, first, that there is no single historical narrative, secondly, that the discrete categories of social science and other forms of interpretation conceal a diversity of meanings and identities that make the subjects of political life much more complex and indeterminate than the rational approaches would suggest. Post-modernism's emphasis upon the role of 'discourse' in the widest sense—words, meanings, symbols, identities, forms of communication - in the constitution of society and of power has significant implications for International Relations.

Ever since its inception after the First World War, the discipline of International Relations has guarded its identity and boundaries as vigilantly as the patriotic soldiers patrol their states' frontiers. There

³⁶ Ibid., p.338.
have been debates about purpose (realism versus idealism) and methodology (behaviouralism versus classical theory), but none has posed a challenge to the fundamental ground on which the discipline of International Relations has been erected. It was in the 1980s that International Relations was subjected to criticisms. Questions of purpose and methodology were raised once again, but further questions relating to deeper epistemological and ontological assumptions were also advanced as this discipline felt the impact of critical theory.

'Critical theory has its roots in a strand of thought which is often traced back to the Enlightenment and connected to the writings of Kant, Hegel and Marx'. However, in the twentieth century critical theory became most closely associated with a distinct body of thought known as the Frankfurt School. It is in the work of Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Jurgen Habermas that critical theory acquired a renewed potency.

Critical theorists started to ask questions about the ideological bases of knowledge, the nature of theory, the importance of ethic, the openendedness of politics and the role of intellectual. It draws on a variety of sources from philosophy and sociology. What these approaches have in common is a high degree of scepticism concerning the objectivity and detachment of theory. In other words, theory is not constructed in a vacuum. On the contrary, it is always constructed by an individual with definite views. Therefore, theory cannot be objective and detached.
Instead, it is there to serve a particular purpose. For instance, Morgenthau’s realism justified America’s role in the Cold War, while Gilpin’s theory on hegemony legitimized the United States continued dominance of the international system. Critical International Relations Theory draws its inspiration from two sources, the loosely Marxist-derived work of Habermas and Gramsci, and post-structuralist scholarship. This theory criticizes the realist view of International Relations. Realism assumes that politics is a struggle for power. Critical theorists, on the other hand, perceive change as a central element in social existence. Therefore, an analysis of dynamic forces, such as capitalism, is essential to a full understanding of social existence and the modern world.

Critical International Relations Theory has the potential to revive the ‘Great Debate’ of the 1960s, for it raises the same issue about the status of International Relations Theory. The Critical Theory Debate goes further, however, since it points to the differing conceptions of the social world which underlay the differences between the classical and scientific schools.

And feminist writers started to ask questions about identity, the nature of the political and gender bias in theory and practice. They asked a virtually male dominated discipline to open its door and minds to arguments about gender.

Together, these forms of post-positivism – postmodernism, critical theory and feminist theory – added yet more fissures to a discipline already

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divided by the inter-paradigm debate of the early 1980s. Unlike the school of realism which had developed by the 1980s, the post-positivist approaches did not concentrate on describing the surface forms of power politics, but instead attempted to uncover the deep structures of power knowledge.

**Feminist Theory of International Relations**

Five men, from five different standpoints each obtain incomplete, though partially “correct” views of an elephant. Their different viewpoints leads each to a different conclusion about what the elephant actually is. One man inspecting the trunk of the elephant concludes it must be a snake. Another, whose hands have found the leg, concludes it is like a tree. A third feels the tail and asserts that it must be a rope, and so on. International Relations theory has developed along similar lines; different foci or viewpoints within the discipline produce different explanations of what and why International Relations is. Whilst some theories have claimed to present the whole, grand picture – from tusk to tail – certain essential features were left out, such as the feet or ears. A major criticism of Realism was, among other things, its failure to consider the role of non-state actors. But even bringing together different snapshots of the elephant, like bringing Regime and Interdependence theories under the aegis of neorealism, could not complete the picture. For whilst the outline may have been sketched, thus revealing an elephant-like shape,
the inner organs necessary to its function remained hidden from view, leaving us without a good explanation of why or how the elephant of International Relations moved in certain ways. This is much like leaving gender hidden from view in International Relations.

Gender can be conceived of as forming the organs or "guts" of elephant, partly because gender is generally hidden from view in a discipline concerned almost exclusively with "high politics" issues of interstate/intergovernmental relations, and partly because gendered relations and gendered roles form an integral part of International Relations. Some feminists have argued that by understanding gender relations and how they inform social structures, one can read and predict not only a state's domestic relationships but also its international relationships, from trade agreements through to conflict.

Keohane's perspective remains rooted in a scientific approach to International Relations and he concludes that the most significant contribution feminist approaches should make is to re-examine central concepts of International Relations theory. Scholars working on feminist theory have focused on Machiavelli, Wight, Hobbes, and Morgenthau in presenting the case for the existence of "gender" in Realist thought, illustrating how the underlying ideas of International Relations were taken to be objective, where as in reality they are under-written with distinctly masculine values.
The feminist approaches show that International Relations is gender biased both in theory and in practice and that it is important to address this bias. The feminist approaches address the gender bias of International Relations through the inclusion of subordinated groups in the policy processes and by placing the values and priorities of subgroups at the core of development of ideas.

A body of scholarship that emphasizes gender in the study of world politics arose in the 1960s in response to the pronounced disregard of females in discussions about public and international affairs. As feminist theory crystallized, it moved away from focusing on a history of discrimination against women and began to direct much of its criticism at realism. In particular, many gender studies believed that realism, formulated and denominated by males, was inattentive to human rights.

Derived in part from liberal principles, feminist theory moved beyond the initial critique of realism to formulate an independent theoretical course. This perspective has focused on the performance of women as leaders of government and as members of infantry combat units as well as the plight of women in business and in the Global South.

Perhaps the greatest impact of feminist theory in the field of International Relations has been its rejection of the realist preoccupation with states’ military strategies in favour of developing strategies for world

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security. In this sense, feminist theory, like neoliberalism generally, is motivated by the quest for discovering the paths to greater international cooperation.

Intrinsically, gender analysis has always been geared towards change. It is about understanding power, who has it, on what basis, how it works, and its results. Feminists were the first to assert influentially that politics relates to the private as well as the public sphere. Feminist politics has been increasingly global, addressing tensions as well as commonalities across distinct cultural and social settings.

**Appraisal**

In conclusion, it can be said that International Relations is a subject with a focus but not a periphery. That focus was relations between states. One strategy for putting the subject back together does not require that we subscribe to one paradigm or methodology. Instead, there is a need for a return to the subject's origins. When it all began, in Aberystwyth in 1919, the academic enquiry into International Relations was explicitly constituted to grapple with the great issue of the day. These were issues of peace and war. We might move forward to the next stage not by theoretical arm-wrestling, but by focusing our diverse

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perspectives on the great issues of our day. "To a greater or lesser degree, scholars of all ontological persuasions might agree that the agenda of the subject, and thus of the world, over the next fifty years can be expressed in three ideas: community, security and emancipation. These concepts embrace the key questions for what could be a qualitatively different world order-depending on how well or how badly we reinvent our collective future."^40

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^40 Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), op.cit., p. 341.