Chapter four

RESPONSE OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES TO MILITANCY AND CROSS-BORDER TERRORISM
In the previous chapter, it was evident how the problem of militancy and cross-border terrorism has become a terrifying menace in Central Asia. Almost all the states in the region are more or less, suffering from this menace, and are finding ways and means to checkmate it.

After independence, the Central Asian countries faced the ominous challenge of militancy and terrorism of largely cross-border type. The reason being, these states were nascent and of fragile nature with limited political maturity and democratic growth. Moreover, the years of Soviet atheism got an immediate shock by total exposure to the religious upheaval outside the region. The ethnic consolidation was added fuel to the fire. The hostility among different ethnic groups (for example, Tajikistan civil war) created suitable atmosphere for the militant groups to spread their tentacles and expand their terror network. But as the time passed and the republics settled their authority over their respective regions, they also tried to adopt several measures to control these trends individually. The primary measures which they adopted were in the form of constitutional provisions while framing their country's Constitution.

Kazakhstan

The Kazakh Constitution was adopted in 1994. While drafting the Constitution, the framers ostensibly had in mind the various problems facing the country as far as the religious and ethnic aspects were concerned. Hence, the Constitution in its several articles contained several provisions that were aimed at dealing with the ethno-religious aspects as well as making clear the position of the government on these issues. In the clause-1 of the article 1 in section I (General Provisions), the Constitution declares itself a democratic, secular, legal and social
state and highest values of the state are individual, his life, rights and freedoms. Thus, in the opening article, the Constitution clearly spells out the position of the government as far as the religion is concerned. While proclaiming it as a democratic country, the word ‘secular’ has also been added in order to give equal weightage to all religions, not just any particular religion. It makes mandatory for the government constitutionally to provide equal opportunity for all the religions and not to declare any religion a state religion.

Thirdly, the article also narrates that the highest values of the state are individual, his life, rights and freedoms which can be said to be highly humanistic, rational and progressive. The article envisages in it the various aspects of the human being and their needs. The primary duty of any government always is to look after the welfare of its population by ensuring their rights and freedoms. During the Soviet period, though the freedom of the people was largely restricted, in the post-Soviet period, almost all the Central Asian republics have realised its importance. Kazakhstan Constitution also categorically mentions in the same article that the life of an individual is of utmost importance to the government.

In Article 5, part-I, the Constitution says, “The Republic of Kazakhstan shall recognise ideological and political diversity. The merging of public and state institutions and the formation of political party organisations in state bodies shall not be permitted”. This article is an important one from the point of view that in the erstwhile Soviet Union ideological and political diversities were never recognised and any effort in that direction was ruthlessly crushed. The article hence implies the growing accommodation i.e. political - an essential requirement

---

to curb radicalism of any sort. When political and ideological diversities are not recognised it leads to unitary and autocratic form of government, thus giving radical dissidence legitimacy among the masses. By allowing the recognition of the diverse ideologies and political opinions/parties the government has created a ‘safety valve’ to minimise the effects of radical opinion and bringing the opponent to the constitutional fold.

In the Clause-2 of the Article 5, of the section-1, the Constitution says, “public associations shall be equal before the law. Illegal interference of the state in the affairs of the public associations and of the public associations and financing of public associations by the state shall not be permitted”. In this article, the Constitution clearly states that public association of any kind would not be allowed to have a say in the matters of governance. Even the financing of public associations by the state is illegal according to the provision. Thus, the state-sponsored terrorism which is also a worldwide phenomenon and used as a major foreign policy instrument by some governments is banned under the article. Terrorist groups or militant groups are viewed under this law as illegal associations and are rejected from participating in government functions.

The clause-3 of the Article-5 is very much explicit and very important from the point of view of dealing with radical and militant organisations. It says, “formation and functioning of public associations pursuing the goals or actions directed towards a violent change of the constitutional system, violation of the integrity of the republic, undermining the security of the state, inciting social, racial, national, religious, class and tribal enmity, as well as the formation of unauthorised paramilitary units shall be prohibited”.

---

3 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Clause-2, Article 5, Section 1.
4 Ibid. Clause-3, Article- 5, Section- 1.
This article aims at curbing the threat and inception of terrorism. It clearly prohibits formation of public associations with the aim to use violence as an integral tool of terrorism for changing the Constitution, the system or harming the unity and integrity of the republic. It also provides that no public association will be allowed to indulge in activities that would potentially threaten the security of the state and “incite social, racial, national, religious, class and tribal enmity”. The message and the meaning of this article are clear. It not only totally rejects violence as a method for any kind of change, but also the use of any social factor for flaring up enmity. Terrorism theoretically rests upon group activities. Without proper grouping, terrorism can hardly sustain for a long time. At the same time, mutual hatred and enmity works as a fuel for the sustenance of terrorism and gun (weapon) works as the means to achieve the goal (creating terror aimed at achieving political objectives). Keeping in view the basic nature, scope, methodology and means of terrorism, the article intends to deal with them.

Another major requirement of terrorism is the constant flow of money in order to sustain its activities. It is a common phenomenon world over that terrorist organisations functioning in different parts are all flooded with abundant amount of money from different sources; one important source being the finances from across another country. For example, the terrorist outfits like Lashkar-i-Tayyeba (Taiba) generates funds through several sources in Pakistan to fund its activities in India. It runs offices all over the country (Pakistan) and collects funds. Moreover, all Jehadi organisations have rich support all over the world. Similarly, the main financier of the terrorist outfits in Central Asia was the Taliban. Speaking on financing of terrorists by the Taliban, Askar Aytmatov said, “Afghanistan is one of the largest drug producers and a great amount of money circulates around it.... to some

extent, the increase of drug trafficking from Afghanistan through Central Asia, to Russia and Europe may account for this. According to current data, around 30 percent of world’s drug production is concentrated in Afghanistan, from where 65 percent of heroine and hashish is delivered to Europe. This is a financial support for the Taliban in realising their far-reaching strategic targets i.e. the establishment of political influence in Islamic countries and regions. Since Central Asia has been undergoing border and internal problems for a long time now, the region is quite suitable for a possible attack of Islamic extremism”.

The funding across the border takes place mainly in illegal ways and sometimes in the name of charity and aid. To put an effective control on this type of transaction, Clause-4 of Article 5, Section-I of Kazakhstan’s Constitution says, “activities of political parties and trade unions of other states, religious parties as well as financing of political parties and trade unions by foreign legal entities and citizens, foreign states and international organisations shall not be permitted in the Republic”. While aiming at any kind of illegal flow of money for wrong purposes the article even targets the legal money supply for any kind of anti-government purpose.

Religion is by far the most important factor for the promotion of fundamentalism and terrorism in the Central Asian states much alike in other parts of the world. The Kazakh Constitution has also dealt with this possibility in some way. It says “activities of foreign religious associations on the territory of the republic as well as appointment of heads of religious associations in the republics by foreign religious centres shall be carried out in coordination with the respective

---

7 Op. cit., Clause-4, Article 5, Section-I.
state institutions of the republic. In this regard, Prof. Jean Francoi3 Mayer from
University of Friboury, Switzerland, has some interesting and justifying views. He
writes “when religious beliefs are used for justifying violence, violent actions tend
to become endowed with cosmic dimensions, and there is nothing left to restrain
them”. In most of the cases of terrorist activities, the actions are always endowed
with cosmic dimensions - religious approval, for example, ‘Jihad’. Taliban in
Afghanistan had been exhorting the ‘Jihad’ as the ultimate wish of the God. So, the
Kazakh Constitution has provided this article to effectively contain the misuse of
the religion for any kind of indiscipline and terrorist activity.

The Constitution further provides that, “the state shall promote conditions for
the study and development of the language of the people of Kazakhstan”. Before
the independence, Russian was the recognised official language of all the Central
Asian republics, though Kazakh language was the common language among its
people. The imposition of Russian language as the compulsory official medium
had created a lot of resentment among the people of this region. So when they got
their independence they adopted their own language as the official language. This
step has also to a large extent prevented the encashment of the linguistic dissidence
for furthering terrorist objectives. Like religion, language has been a key factor for
common bonding, unity among sections of people and in many cases a kind of
national identity, when the people identifying themselves with the particular
language feel betrayed. Therein lies a great possibility of a violent uprising against
the state and authorities. So, this article of Kazakh Constitution addresses this
problem to a greater extent.

24, 2001, p. 367
After providing several measures to prevent the growth of militancy and terrorism, the Constitution moves forward and prescribes measures to face the menace when it comes. It says, “no one shall have the right to arbitrarily deprive a person of life. The law shall establish death penalty as an extra-ordinary measure of punishment for especially grave crimes and grant the sentenced person the right to appeal for pardon”. Though this is a law practiced in almost all countries of the world and a part of international legal system, the explicit mention of this is necessary to express the resolve of the state in protecting the lives of its own citizens. This is the only provision of the Constitution which comes with a clear articulation of the prescribed punishment in case the rule is violated. It is another deterrent measure aimed at curtailing any violent method for whatever the objective. At the same time, the clause contains a safeguard against the possible misuse of the provision and a scope for reformation. The “right to appeal for pardon” is a humane, rational and reformative step, though, at the discretion and satisfaction of the authorities. This article is a potent weapon in the hands of the government by which it tries to deal with the terrorists by awarding capital punishment, thereby, creating a fear psychosis among the terrorists as well as aspiring terrorists.

In the subsequent article in the same section, the Constitution says, “everyone shall have the right to confidentiality of personal deposits and savings, correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraph and other messages. Limitations of this right shall be permitted only in the cases and according to the procedures directly established by law”. Though the article is in no way new in this Constitution, it has empowered the state security agencies to monitor the

---

information of suspected persons and finances if any. While the first part of the article is a basic, democratic human right the later part is a safeguard on it.

In article 19, the Constitution provides that, “everyone shall have the right to determine and indicate, not to indicate his national, party and religious affiliations”.¹³ This article is a clear deviation from the old Soviet practices when atheism was practised with full force by the state. The article gives the individual the ultimate choice in the matters as important as party and religion. Such articles can best be described as ‘safety valves’ and steps towards mutual co-existence thereby creating a negative atmosphere for the terrorism to breed and grow. Again in the succeeding clause of the same article, the Constitution says, “everyone shall have the right to use his native language and culture, to freely choose the language of communication, education, instruction and creative activities”.¹⁴ Here is again a case, where ‘freedom of choice’ has been advocated forcefully. Like ‘religion’, language has been the most powerful motivating factor of human societies. It is a very strong bonding factor and has the capacity to make well knit groups and associations. When this group or association feels alienated, suppressed, deceived or ignored on linguistic lines they take up their grievances violently. It becomes a divisive force creating inter-linguistic group rivalry and violence. To overcome this possibility equal rights and weightage to each and every language and the freedom to adopt one’s own language has been provided. This not only creates a harmonious atmosphere but also discourages terrorist organisations to take undue advantage of this hostility and propagate their ideology and agenda. Secondly, by giving all sorts of freedom to the individuals in this matter the state virtually closes the option of any anti-state feeling in the masses.

In the next article, while the Constitution again categorically expresses the ‘freedom of speech’, the subsequent clause deals with the right to information. Clause I says, “The freedom of speech and creative activities shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be prohibited”. Clause 2 writes, “Everyone shall have the right to receive and disseminate information by any means not prohibited by law. The list of the items constituting the state secrets of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be determined by law”. The first clause is clearly a democratic and fundamental right, which allows each and every citizen to express his or her opinion or feelings without being restricted by law. This is a measure that goes a long way in building a bridge of trust and mutuality between the ruler and the ruled. Hence, anybody would have taken advantage of the gap which would have been created, had there been no ‘freedom of expression’ or some kind of censorship. The second clause is straighter and sharply aimed one. It almost recognised the spreading of rumour or offensive information a culpable offence. Though it allows everybody to receive and disseminate incorrect or sensitive information. Terrorists thriving on rumour-mongering are the basic targets of this law.

The last clause of the article 20 is, in fact, the most forthright and most important clause that directly targets the terrorist methods of functioning declaring them illegal and disallowance in the state. It mentions “propaganda of or agitation for the forcible change of the constitutional system, violation of the integrity of the republic, undermining of state security, and advocating war, social racial, national, religious, class and clannish superiority as well as the cult of cruelty and violence shall not be allowed”. This is the most important article from the point of view that it has directly dealt with the various facets, methods and types of terrorism.

declaring them constitutionally illegal. Almost all the terrorist activities are aimed at changing the constitutional system through violent methods because terrorists neither believe in democracy nor function democratically. Terrorists always want to engage in violent activities for quick and sharp reaction from the political side. Therefore, they always engage in intra-community, inter-community, inter-state clashes and further their agenda through that. It always aims at taking on the government surreptitiously instigating and taking recourse to racial, clannish religious, class etc. superiority. Basic intention is to create a sense of hatred towards the other community or the government and increase friction in order to draw the attention of the world community to a particular problem. In the world today, there are several such activities going on. In Kashmir, in the Middle East, in Britain, in China, in the US, such type of hatred mongering has been continuing even today basically by some terrorist group or the other to flare up passion and generate clashes. The Kazakh Constitution through this provision has out-rightly rejected them as illegal; thereby the people indulging in it could be punished.

The Kazakh Constitution also somehow wants to bring the terrorist organisation within the perimeter of law and their offence culpable. It says, “citizens of Kazakhstan shall have the right of freedom of forming associations. The activities of the public associations shall be regulated by law.” This provision in the Constitution of Kazakhstan is important in the sense that it legally allows the citizens to lawfully carryout their activities or public associations. It even considers this right of the citizen but at the same time provides that the public associations will have to function according to and within the framework of the law of the land. It is a common experience in the modern day terrorism that most of the militant organisations start their operations under the guise of charity and

---

public welfare organisations to avoid the penalties of the law. Also, there are organisations which work in close coordination with terrorist groups based outside the particular country. They facilitate the operation of the group logistically and financially. Therefore, close scrutiny of public associations and monitoring of their activities and flow of finances to them is an important part of the administration. The Kazakh Constitution has carefully addressed this through the above mentioned provision.

**Constitutional Provisions in Tajikistan**

The preamble of the Tajik Constitution mentions among other things “the equality of rights and friendship of all nationalities and peoples of Tajikistan seeking to build a just society”. The Constitution, by so clearly and boldly declaring the equal treatment to the people of all nationalities and people of Tajikistan, has tried to win the confidence of different nationalities, more or less, are in the governance as well as less opportunity in other fruits of the state might have created a discontent as well as dissent that would have snowballed into violent opposition - a suitable situation or condition for the birth of terrorism and militancy. Therefore, this part of the Constitution is of immense value.

Article 1 of the same Constitution can be seen as an appendage of the preamble. It says, “The republic of Tajikistan is a sovereign, democratic, law-governed, secular and unitary state”. This is more alike the opening provision of Kazakh Constitution. The secular and democratic and law-governed aspects define the position of the government as far as religion, the equality of opportunity and people oriented government and the governing principle of the government respectively. The importance of this article from the point of view of curbing

---

19 Ibid, Article 1, Chapter-1.
terrorism lies in the fact that discrimination or favouritism of any kind on the basis of religion, race, creed or any other criterion would not be a policy of the government thereby, no section of the society feeling left out in enjoying the equal rights on the resources of the country. Similarly, Article 5 of the Constitution provides that 'the life, honour, dignity and other rights of the individuals are sacred. Recognition, observance and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms are the obligation of the state.'

Though this article does not have any specific relevance to the efforts of curbing violence and terrorism, it has certain indirect bearing on that. By ensuring that the life, dignity, honour and all kinds of rights of the individuals be protected by the state, the Constitution again upholds the theory that every individual's protection irrespective of his religious, class, nationality and any other similar connotation is a duty of the government and any violation of this would invite interference from the state.

Next article of the Constitution has specific implications for terrorism and militancy. A part of it says, "no social association, group of people, or individual has the right to seize power. The seizure of power is the gravest crime." As it appears, the article clearly expresses the stand of the government on illegal capture of power other than specified constitutional democratic methods. Capturing power being an integral objective of terrorists and militant-groups, this article spells it out as illegal and as a crime, hence, punishable. It goes a long way in putting a check on the terrorist groups and works like a shot in the arm of law.

Article 8 of the Constitution is highly comprehensive and illustrates the secular aspect of the state, "In Tajikistan, public life is to develop on the basis of political and ideological diversity. No ideology including religious ideology is
granted the status of the state ideology. Social associations are established and will function within the framework of the Constitution and laws. The state provides equal opportunity for their activities. Religious organisations are separate from the state and cannot interfere, with state affairs. The establishment and functioning of the social and religious enmity and hatred as well as advocating the forcible overthrow of the constitutional structures and the formation of armed groups is prohibited".22 This is the most elaborate and specific article in the whole Constitution, which without the use of the words like terrorism or militancy has aimed exactly towards that. It outrightly rejects imposition of any single ideology and speaks clearly about pluralism and co-existence of ideological diversity. State ideology has been rejected. Like Kazakh Constitution, this Constitution also provides for the public associations within the framework of law of the land. One special thing about this article is that it specifically and objectively says that religion and state should function separately without interfering in each other’s affairs. Like Kazakh Constitution, Tajik Constitution also prohibits formation of armed groups, forcible overthrow of the government and flaring up of passion of any kind on the basis of religion, creed, nationality, race etc. This article almost declares any kind of militant or terrorist activity as illegal and unconstitutional.

Article 17 of this Constitution is much similar to that of Kazakh constitutional provision which guarantees the equality of the individuals irrespective of their religion, race, sex, political persuasions, social status, knowledge and property. It also guarantees rights and freedoms to all the individuals irrespective of all the above mentioned considerations. It assures the citizens about their positions and status in the state, hence dissuades them to take recourse to constitutional methods rather than violent means for grievance.

22 Ibid, Article 8, Chapter I.
redressed. It says, “All are equal before the law and the courts. The state guarantees the rights and freedoms of every person regardless of nationality, race, sex, language, religious beliefs, political persuasions, social status, knowledge and property. Men and women have the same rights”.

Much like the Kazakh Constitution, Tajik Constitution also provides specifically the right to freedom of religion. In categorical and unambiguous terms, it specifies that, “every person has the right freely to determine their position towards religion, to profess any religion individually or together with others or not to profess any, and to take part in religious customs and ceremonies”. By allowing the co-existence of all religions and equal legal protection to all of them, this article attempts to create a sense of security among the minority religions thereby dissuading them to live under pressure of any kind. A fear psychosis always helps in the breeding of terrorism and militant activities. But this constitutional provision is a bonafide attempt to counter it.

Article 30 of the same chapter II prohibits the state censorship and prosecution for criticism. It grants the freedom of speech to its citizens. It is an established fact world over that sometimes genuine grievance when forcibly suppressed gives rise to frustration forcing people to take up the matter on to themselves. To avoid such a situation, the article provides that “every person is guaranteed freedom of speech, publishing and the right to use means of mass information. State censorship and prosecution for criticism is prohibited”.

These are some of the provisions in the Tajik Constitution that in one way or the other aim at curbing terrorism and militancy in the country and not letting a situation to arise when such tendencies would find suitable environment to grow.

---

23 Ibid, Article 17, Chapter II.
24 Ibid, Article 26, Chapter II.
25 Ibid, Article 30, Chapter II.
Provisions in Uzbekistan’s Constitution

The article 4 of the Constitution of Uzbekistan forthrightly says, “The state language of the republic of Uzbekistan shall be Uzbek. The republic of Uzbekistan shall ensure a respectful attitude towards the languages, customs and the traditions of all nationalities and ethnic groups living on its territory and create the conditions necessary for their development”.26 As elaborated earlier also, this provision in the Constitution of Uzbekistan is an important one in the sense that it reiterates the government’s commitment and assurance of equal treatment to all the communities - religious, nationalities, ethnic etc. This is basically helpful in creating a sense of confidence in their minds and so that they can be a part of the national mainstream, rather than opposing rebels.

In the next chapter of article 7, the Constitution declares the illegal seizure of power of any kind as unconstitutional. It says, “Any seizure of power belonging to the state authority, suspension or termination of activity of the bodies of the state authority contrary to the procedure prescribed by the Constitution, as well as the formation of any new or parallel bodies of state authority shall be regarded as unconstitutional and punishable by law”.27 With this, the Constitution declares the basic objective of terrorism as illegal and punishable. As discussed in chapter 1 of this article, the ultimate aim of the terrorists or violent militancy is to forcibly capture power to further particular objectives.

Similar to article 5 of Kazakh Constitution and article 8 in Tajik Constitution, article 12 of Uzbek Constitution declares that “in the republic of Uzbekistan, public life shall develop on the basis of a diversity of political institutions, ideologies and opinions. No ideology shall be granted the state

27 Ibid, Article 7, Chapter 2.
ideology”. Though different in language, the spirit, intention and meaning of this article is same as the previous two. By declaring the neutrality of the state in promoting any particular ideology and reorganising the pluralism in the matter of ideology, the Constitution assumes a secular, impartial role, thus, not giving any chance to the radical groups to cash in on any such divisive sentiments.

Article 13 says, “Democracy in the Republic of Uzbekistan shall rest on the principles common to all mankind, according to which the ultimate value is the human being, his life, freedom, honour, dignity and other inalienable rights. Democratic rights and freedoms shall be protected by the Constitution and the laws”. As it has been made clear in the contents of the article itself, the article aims at satisfying certain common principles of the human being. The Constitution, by this, values the life of the human being as the ultimate goal of the state and Constitution. The specific relevance of this article in reference to military and terrorism lies in the interpretation that when democracy succeeds, and human concerns are addressed within it, the terrorist tendencies find it difficult to make an entry into the people of that particular region.

Article 18, is similar in spirit. It says “all citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall have equal rights and freedoms and shall be equal before the law, without distinction by sex, race, nationality, language, religion, social origin, convictions, individuals and social status. Any privilege may be granted solely by the law and shall conform to the principles of social justice”.

This article’s importance lies in the fact that every citizen of the country is promised to be treated equally before the eyes of the law. Inequality in the state

28 Ibid, Article 12, Chapter 2.
29 Ibid, Article 13, Chapter 2.
30 Ibid, Article 18, Chapter 5.
policy worldwide has always been a major reason for dissent - a favourable field for the germination of militancy and terrorist activities.

Article 19 of the Constitution strictly makes illegal any infringement into the rights and freedoms of the citizens, "....no one shall have the power to deny a citizen his rights and freedoms, or to infringe on them except by the sentence of a court". The purpose of quoting the article here is the guarantee that the government provides towards the protection of the rights and freedoms of the citizens.

Article 24 of the same Constitution is very lucid in the explanation when it says, "the right to existence is the inalienable right of every human being. Attempts on everyone’s life shall be regarded as the gravest crime". Under this article, any kind of militant or terrorist activity that threatens the life of the individuals becomes illegal. Basically, terror as a tactics is perpetrated through violence. This article specifically deals with that of possibility.

Article 25, at the same time, guarantees the rights of the innocents and law abiding citizens. Sometimes, the state sponsored excesses result in creation of widespread protest that prepares the ground for the terrorist and militant operations. So, it is absolutely necessary to protect the rights and life of the innocents. "Every one shall have the right to freedom and inviolability of the person. No one may be arrested or taken into custody except on lawful grounds". Some other articles also support this article and basically aim at the objectives specified above. These are: everyone shall be entitled to protection against encroachments on his honour, dignity and interference in his private life, and shall be guaranteed inviolability of the home. No one may enter a home, carry out a

31 Ibid, Article 19, Chapter 8.
32 Ibid, Article 24, Chapter 5.
33 Ibid, Article 25, Chapter 5.
search or an examination or violate the privacy of the correspondence and telephone conversations, except on lawful grounds and in accordance with the procedures specified by law. 34

“Any citizen of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall have the right to freedom of movement in the territory of the republic as well as a free entry to and exit from it, except in the events specified by law”. 35

“Everyone shall be guaranteed freedom of thought, speech and convictions. Everyone shall have the right to seek, obtain and disseminate any information, except that which is directed against the existing constitutional system and in some other instance, specified by law. Freedom of opinion and their expression may be restricted by law if any state or other secret is involved”. 36

Like other constitutions discussed earlier, the Uzbek Constitution also is quite categorical about religion in the state structure. It allows in real secular spirit, the existence of any religion without any interference from the state and imposition of any kind in this matter. Realising that a theocratic mode of state policy always fans the terrorist groups to ‘fish’ in troubled waters, the Constitution prefers to be secular and neutral. It says “freedom of conscience is guaranteed to all. Everyone shall have the right to profess or not to profess any religion. Any compulsory religion shall be impermissible”. 37

Article 33 directly deals with public expressions of anti-state feelings - a policy of the terrorists. It says “citizens shall have the right to engage in public life by holding rallies, meetings, and demonstrations in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The bodies of authority shall have the right to

34 Ibid. Article 27, Chapter 5.
35 Ibid. Article 28, Chapter 5.
36 Ibid. Article 27, Chapter 5.
37 Ibid. Article 31, Chapter 5.
suspend or ban such undertakings, activities exclusively on the grounds of security".38

Some other articles which are relevant as far as militancy and terrorism is concerned are, "every one shall be entitled to legally defend his rights and freedoms, and shall have the right to appeal any lawful action of the state bodies, officials and public associations".39

"The formation and the functioning of political parties and public associations aiming to do the following shall be prohibited: changing the existing constitutional system by force; coming out against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the republic as well as the constitutional rights and freedoms of its citizens; advocating war and social, national, racial and religious hostility and encroaching upon the health and morality of the people as well as of any armed associations and political parties based on the national or religious principles, all secret societies and associations shall be banned".40 The article, as the text speaks, directly deals with the possibility of the menace of militancy and terrorism. Terrorists and militant outfits, most of the time, operate in formal and informal groups - NGOs, charitable and humanitarian organisation. In such cases, dealing with them legally becomes all the more difficult. Secondly, some organisations of equal nature also function secretly and as underground outfits. The article declares them as illegal, facilitating action against them.

Article 58 of the Constitution is also of related and similar in nature. It says, "the state shall safeguard rights and lawful interests of public associations and provide them with equal legal opportunities for participating in public life. Interference by state bodies and officials in the activity of the public associations.
as well as interference by public associations in the activity of the state bodies and officials is impermissible".\footnote{Ibid. Article 58, Chapter 13.}

In the same chapter on "Public Associations", article 61 is one of the most important articles from the point of view of restricting militancy and terrorist activities. It says "religious organisations and associations shall be separated from the state and equal before the law. The state shall not interfere with the activity of the religious associations".\footnote{Ibid, Article 62, Chapter 13.} It reiterates the secular objectives of the Constitution and the state and expresses the commitment of the government of not meddling in the religious affairs of the people.

The article 62 is a supporting article of the earlier article 58. This article brings the public associations, organisations etc. under the purview of the law of the land, court and judiciary to punish them whenever found guilty. It largely puts a rein on the public organisations and acts as a monitoring method for regulating the activities of the public associations. The text says, "Public associations may be dissolved or banned or subject to restricted actively solely by the sentence of a court".\footnote{Ibid.} These are some articles which directly or indirectly deal with curbing the menace of terrorism and militancy in the region.

**Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic**

The Constitution of Kyrgyzstan also contains several provisions which directly or indirectly aim at or discourage terrorist and militant activities. In chapter I of the Constitution, the opening article declares, "the Kyrgyz republic (Kyrgyzstan) is a sovereign, unitary, secular\footnote{Constitution of Kyrgyz Republic, Clause I, Section One, Chapter I, \texttt{www.Kyrgyzstan.org/law/Constitution.htm} downloaded on 15 February 2002.} As the text of the Constitution goes, the state of Kyrgyzstan declares itself a democratic and secular
state, both of the connotations, considered as anti-terrorist and anti-militancy in nature.

The other article which works in the similar perception is the clause 2 of article 2. It says “no separate group of people, no associations, or any individual person shall have the right to usurp power in the government. The usurpation of government power shall be the gravest crime”\(^{45}\) The content is very clear, straightforward and lucid in intent. It declares any attempt on toppling the government and assumes power - the political objective of all terrorist and militant activities as illegal.

Like the constitutions already analysed, the Kyrgyz Constitution also declares the Kyrgyz language as the language of the Republic. It says, “The state language of the Kyrgyz Republic shall be the Kyrgyz language.”\(^{46}\) This provision caters to the aspirations of the majority of the population and settles the question of ethnic supremacy in the state. In the following clause, the Constitution again categorically says “the Kyrgyz Republic guarantees the preservation, equal and free development and functioning of the Russian language and all other languages, used by the population of the republic”.\(^{47}\) This clause is a unique one and is not so unambiguously mentioned in the constitutions analysed earlier. It not only spells out the attitude of the state towards other languages and the groups but also strengthens the preceding clause to a great extent.

Clause 1 of the article 8 says, “Political parties, trade unions and other public associations may be organised in the Kyrgyz republic on the basis of free will and unity of interests. The state shall guarantee the rights and lawful interests of public

\(^{45}\) Ibid. Clause 2, Article 2.

\(^{46}\) Ibid. Clause 2, Article 5, Section One.

\(^{47}\) Ibid. Clause 2, Article 5, Section One.
associations”.

This provision, like provisions of other constitutions, makes the legal associations permissible while keeping a check on the illegal ones. The clause 3 in the same article is another provision which is again very straightforward. It says, “religious and all cults shall be separated from the state”. This is an important provision from the point of view of the separation of religion from state politics. Terrorism and militancy always survive on the diet of religion and religious sentiments. By separating religion from state, the Constitution envisages to cap the growth of militancy and terrorism. In Clause 4 of the same article, the Constitution further provides that the following shall not be allowed in Kyrgyzstan for formation of political parties on religious grounds. Religious organisations must not pursue political goals and objectives, “interference by members of religious organisations and cults with the activity of the state bodies, activities of political parties of the foreign countries”. This is a related provision of its earlier one. In this provision, the Constitution prohibits the involvement of religion in politics and the use of religion as an instrument to capture and run the state power or links of any religious, political party with any foreign country.

“.... Actions aimed at disturbing the peaceful coexistence of people, propaganda and encouragement of ethnic clashes shall be deemed unconstitutional”. Terrorist and militant activities always intend to disturb the peace and harmony. They create and promote hatred among the sections of the society. To speak plainly, they aim at disturbing peace and coexistence to attain their objectives. Therefore, the Constitution declares such activities as unconstitutional hence, illegal and punishable.

48 Ibid, Clause 1, Article 8, Section Two.
49 Ibid, Clause 3, Article 8, Section Two.
50 Ibid, Clause 4, Article 8, Section Two.
51 Ibid, Clause 4, Article 10, Section Two.
In article 15, clause 3 guarantees the equality of every citizen before the law of the land. This attitude of the government towards its own citizens helps curbing the popularity of the militants and terrorists by not creating any kind of dissension. It says, “All persons in the Kyrgyz republic shall be equal before the law and the court. No one may be exposed to any discrimination, infringement of rights and freedoms, on the motives of origin, sex, race, nationality, language, and creed, political and religious convictions or by any other public or personal conditions or circumstances”. 52

Article 16 of the Kyrgyz Constitution consists of a list of various individual rights of the citizens and human rights that the government promises to protect and ensure to its citizens. Among them, the right to “freedom of creed, spirit and warship”, 53 the right to free expression and dissemination of ones thoughts, ideas, opinions, freedom of literary, artistic, scientific and technical creative work, freedom of the press, transmission and dissemination of information, 54 right to freedom of movement, 55 right to association, 56 right to assemble peacefully and without weapons, to free meetings and demonstrations 57 are the important ones, which give the citizens of Kyrgyzstan an opportunity to express themselves without ever resorting to any kind of violent or illegal methods.

Clause 4 of the Article 18 is an important and supporting provision of the earlier provision. It is a kind of safeguard rather, to the earlier provisions. It says “no one may be arrested and detained on the basis other than the law. Any action aimed at imposing a liability on a person before the sentence has been passed by the court, shall not be allowed, and shall be grounds for the material and moral

---

52 Ibid. Clause 3, Article 15, Section I, Chapter Two.
53 Ibid. Clause 2, Article 16, Section I, Chapter Two.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
indemnification to the victim by the court". The relevance of this particular piece of the provision lies in the fact that sometimes the misuse of police power and certain rules results in harassment of innocents who fall prey to the terrorists and militants. Secondly, this provision aims at strengthening the faith of the common citizens in the efficacy of the law and justice.

Article 30 of the Constitution says the citizens of Kyrgyzstan shall have the right to strike. Though this article is intricately related to the ‘right to freedom of expression’, its importance again lies in the fact that it allows the citizens to democratically express their grievances and seek their redressal, therefore, without being trapped by violence and terrorism.

These are the provisions in the Kyrgyz Constitution, which directly or indirectly help to fight or discourage terrorism at different stages. Though it is difficult to ascertain their efficacy, one thing is certain that because of these provisions the fight with the terrorists became easier and even the Constitution, through several of its provisions, acts as a ventilating channel, thereby, discouraging the emergence of terrorism to a certain extent among the local population.

The Constitution of Turkmenistan

Like the other previously discussed constitutions, Turkmenistan’s Constitution also contains certain provisions with direct or indirect implications with the fight against or discouraging terrorism as an instrument of achieving political goal or expression of public opinion.

---

58 Ibid. Clause 3, Article 18, Section 2, Chapter 2.
59 Ibid, Article 30, Section 3.
Article 3 in section I says, “The human beings shall be the highest value of the society and the state in Turkmenistan”.60

The Constitution through this provision sends out a message by which it shows that welfare of the human being is the primary aim of the government. Their development is the sole reason for existence of the government. This wipes out the sense of alienation among the people which induces people to adopt violence as an instrument for furthering their grievances.

Similarly, article 11 of the same section holds that “the state shall guarantee the freedom of religions and confessions and their equality before the law. Religious organisations shall be separate from the state and may not fulfil state functions. The state educational system shall be separate from religion and shall be of a secular nature”.

Every one shall have the right independently to define his attitude towards religion, to profess and disseminate beliefs associated with his attitude to religion; and to participate in the practice of religious cults, rituals and rites.61

This article is one of the most important articles which has several aspects clubbed into one article. It speaks about religious freedom, public and religious associations, freedom of choice and the position before the law. The Constitution in this article proclaims it as secular by allowing all the religions to co-exist without any one of them enjoying any state patronage. The importance of this article lies in the fact that it discourages any religious discrimination, thereby, not hurting any one’s religious sentiments. By providing freedom to profess and propagate one’s own religious belief, the state gives the people a sense of security as far as religion is concerned. Religion is one of the most important factors for the

---

61 Ibid, Article 11, Section 1.
survival of terrorism. The peaceful co-existence of religious and mutual accommodation does not provide it any fertile ground to survive.

The language issue is also addressed in the same section. The provision says, "The state language for Turkmenistan shall be the Turkmen language". Like other Central Asian states, this provision in the Turkmeni Constitution settles the language question once for all. This not only satisfies the majority sentiment in the country but also caps any possibility of future rivalry.

In the next section, the Constitution further says, "human rights shall be inviolable and inalienable. No one shall have the right to deprive a person of any rights or freedom what so ever or to restrict his rights except in accordance with the Constitution and the law...." This article goes much in justifying the opening article of the Constitution that upholds the interest of the human being as sacred and uncompromising.

Article 17 of the same section says, "Turkmenistan shall guarantee the equality of the rights and freedoms of citizens, as well as equality of citizens before the law irrespective of nationality, origin, property status or official position, place of residence, language attitude towards religion, political beliefs or party membership". The article by guaranteeing the equality of the citizens irrespective of their diversities reiterates the secular and non-discriminatory approach. Discrimination always leads to dissension and dissension to violence. Therefore, discrimination discouraged means violence discouraged.

Further, the Article 24 of the same section says, "every one shall have the right to free movement through specific territories, or those relative to specific
persons may be established on the basis of law". The Constitution also ensures the freedom of movements. Restriction on movements of the citizens gives a signal of the lack of the confidence of the state on its own citizens. In that regard, the freedom of movement generates confidence and commitment on the part of the state and the citizens.

In the article 26 of the same section, the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of thought, expression and information. All these are the primary requirements of a free and democratic society. Arbitrary and undemocratic governments and societies are by and large prone to disturbances as it does not provide any space for its citizens to express their opinions and thoughts.

Thus, the foregoing descriptions are expressions of how far the constitutions of the five republics in Central Asia have gone to address the problem of terrorism, militancy and radical fundamentalism which all are related to each other.

Legal Procedures

Apart from the above discussed constitutional provisions, the governments have also taken several legal measures to counter the menace of terrorism they are facing, by adopting specific laws in this regard. Some republics like Kyrgyzstan have their anti-terrorism laws, arms laws, language laws, anti-drugs laws, specifically addressing the problem, its causes and perpetrators. The Kyrgyz Parliament passed a law regulating the legal production of narcotics in the republic for medical and scientific purposes on 24 April. The head of the State Commission for Narcotics Control, Asker Maumeyev, said that the law not only regulates production, but also envisages measures against illegal drug trafficking.

The law was drafted to ensure Kyrgyzstan’s compliance with three UN anti-drug conventions to which the republic signed up in 1994. Countries like

\[65\] Ibid. Article 24, Section II.
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have recently passed anti-terrorism laws specifically dealing with the threat. After 29 September 2001, all the member nations of UN have resolved to pass their anti-terrorism laws as required by the UN resolution. Few of the provisions of some laws in different countries would show how the countries are specifically trying to deal with the problem through legal measures.

The Religious Practices Act in Uzbekistan prohibits or severely restricts activities such as proselytising, imparting and disseminating religious literature and offering religious instruction.66

The law also requires all the religious groups and congregations to register and provides strict and burdensome criteria for their registration. Among its requirements, the law stipulates that each group must present a list of at least hundred Uzbek citizens (compared with the previous minimum of 10) to the local branches of the Ministry of Justice.67 This provision enables the government to ban any group simply by denying its registration petition. The government officials designed the law to target the Muslims who worship outside the system of state organised mosques. A special commission created in 1998 may grant exemptions to the religious laws strict requirements and register groups that have not been registered by the local officials. As of 24 May 2001, the government had registered 2008 religious congregations and organisations.68

The Uzbek parliament passed two laws on May 1998 that restrict religious activities. The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations provides for freedom of worship, freedom from the religious persecution, separation of Church and state and the right to establish schools and train clergy. At the same time the law also severely restricts the religious activities. It restricts

---

67 Section II. Ibid.
68 Ibid.
the religious rights that are judged to be in conflict with national security, prohibits proselytisation, bans religious subjects in the schools, prohibits private teaching of religious principles, forbids the wearing of religious clothing in the public by anyone other than the clerics, and requires the religious groups to obtain a license to publish or distribute materials.69

The second legislative change in May 1998 was consisted of a series of revisions to Criminal and Civil Codes that stiffened the penalties for violating the religion law and other statutes on religious activities. It provided for punishments for activities such as organising a banned religious group, pursuing others to join such a group and drawing minors into religious organisations without the permission of their parents. The criminal code was amended again in 1999 with two changes that affected religious freedom. The changes draw a distinction between the ‘illegal’ groups, which are those that are not registered properly, and ‘prohibited’ groups, which are banned altogether. The first measure makes it a criminal offence punishable with up to 5 years in prison to organise an illegal religious group or to resume activities of such a group (presumably after being denied registration or ordered to disband). Furthermore, the measure punishes any participation in such a group by up to 3 years in prison. The second measure sets out penalties of up to 20 years in prison and confiscation of property for ‘organising or participating’ in the activities of religious extremists, fundamentalists, separatists, or other prohibited groups.70 In practice, the courts ignore the theoretical distinction between illegal and prohibited groups and frequently convict members of disapproved Muslim groups under both statutes.

69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid.
The Uzbek Supreme Soviet also banned foreign aid to political parities through legislation on 16 April 1992. It not only banned foreign government sources but also any individual or organisational sources of funding. The aim was clearly to set up the funding for any kind of illegal and banned activities. As most of the terrorist organisations work either as religious or political organisations with foreign sources of funding this law aimed at cutting off the source of funds for such activities.71

Uzbekistan passed the law on political parties on 6 January 1997. In this law, provisions were made prohibiting parties based on ethnic or religious lines, and also parties advocating war or the subversion of the constitutional order.72 It has made mandatory for prospective parties to submit full details of 5000 members spread over at least eight of Uzbekistan’s 14 regional level administrative territories, along with constituent documents and a registration fee, to the Justice Ministry, which would decide on whether to register them or not. The Supreme Court had the right to suspend registered parties for up to six months and eventually ban them if they persisted in violating the legislation.

It also provided for party funding to be transparent and parties were banned from using foreign bank accounts and accepting donations from state, foreign, religious or anonymous sources.73

The Supreme Court of Uzbekistan on 27 February 1996 decided to introduce tougher punishments for people found guilty of illegally possessing arms and smuggling drugs and weapons. The two resolutions adopted by the plenum of republics Supreme Court envisaged stricter measures against persons who violate legislation relating to the right to possess arms.... there will also be tougher

---

72 Interfax, Moscow, 6 January 1997, rep. in SWB/SU/2811/G/2, 8 January 1997.
73 Ibid.
measures for people who smuggle drugs, arms, ammunitions and other items, the
import and export of which is banned and which pose a serious threat to the public
and the state.\textsuperscript{74} Through such draconian laws the government of Uzbekistan has
tried to contain the proliferation of religious resurgence, particularly the Islamic
fundamentalism in the region.

Like Uzbekistan, another country which is greatly affected by the menace of
terrorism and militancy is Tajikistan. Therefore, the government of Tajikistan has
also formulated certain laws to counteract the spread of terrorism in the region. On
21 April 1997, the President of Tajikistan issued a decree regarding the anti-
terrorism measures to be taken... the decree among other things also instructed the
government to draft an anti-terrorism programme for the period 1998-2000 and
ordered the Security Ministry to create an anti-terrorism department, including
special units, to be staffed with elite troops.\textsuperscript{75} Besides this, the Criminal Code of
the Republic of Tajikistan also contains several stringent measures that aim to
check any violent activity.

The code in article 179, Part-IV provides for capital punishment for acts of
terrorism: illegal trafficking of narcotics (article 200, Part-III), illegal cultivation of
plants containing narcotic substance (article 306), encroachment on the life of a
statesman of the republic of Tajikistan (article 310), intentional violation of the
norms of the international humanitarian law committed in the course of an armed
conflict (article 403, Part -II). It also declares that, “in case of a pardon, death
penalty may be changed to deprivation of freedom for a period of 25 years”.\textsuperscript{76}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
    \item\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Narodnoye Slovo}, Tashkent, 28 February 1996, rep. in \textit{SWB/SU/2548/G/2}, 29 February 1996.
    \item\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Interfax}, Moscow, 21 April 1997, rep. in \textit{SWB/SU/2900/G/1}, 23 April 1997.
    \item\textsuperscript{76} Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan,
    \texttt{http://preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/Tajikistan.htm}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In 1992, the then President of Tajikistan Rakhmov Nabiyev strongly defending the secular character of the state, said in an interview to "Pravda" that it was necessary to create 'the own legal, secular, democratic state based on richest experience of human civilisation'. He also opined that "as far the transformation of the republic of Tajikistan in the near future into an Islamic state, I must say that Tajikistan will maintain the secular character of the state". While from the religious point of view, the state clarified its position of not patronising any particular religion or community. On 4 August 1992, the President passed another decree on disbanding illegal armed formations. Under it, the executive committees of the Soviet People's Deputies of all levels, which created all sorts of self-defence headquarters and detachments not provided for by the law, were instructed to take all measures to have them surrender weapons. Though, these are the few instances of the kind of legislative measures taken by Tajikistan's government there are several other laws which indirectly or directly aim at curbing terrorism in the state. These are the language law, the anti-narcotics law, the arms laws etc.

Similarly, there are several laws with required provisions to counteract terrorism and militancy, enacted by other republics. Kyrgyzstan, on 5 February 1992, adopted a law called "Law on Freedom of Confessions". It encompassed provisions on religious practices as well as on religious organisations. The law imposed restrictions on activities connected to protection of public safety, order, life, health, morals and also the rights and liberties of other citizens.

Apart from these religious regulations, Turkmen government led by Niyazov passed an anti-terrorism law in the country's parliament in 1992 along with an arms law and new language law.

---

Kazakhstan has also passed an anti-terrorism law to counter the menace of terrorism effectively. During his visit to New Delhi in 1992, Nazarbayev told that Kazakhstan will remain a secular state. He said, “The government of Kazakhstan rejects any form of extremism, including religious extremism. Islamic fundamentalism would put us back several centuries.”

On 20 July 1995, the Deputy Prime Minister of Kazakhstan instructed his officials to draw up a document to regulate the activities of the religious groups and sects operating in Kazakhstan after concerns were expressed over the way some of them were behaving. In the meeting, he also said that “some of the embassies of Islamic states are sending young men and women from our country to their countries without obtaining the approval of the Muslim spiritual leadership of Kazakhstan.” Among other sects and religious groups, the main concern of the government is regarding the proliferation of Islamic fundamentalism. Hence, Kazakh government had been monitoring their activities from time to time.

The Kazakh President Nazarbayev has also been actively trying to counteract the spread of Islamic extremism. He therefore, on 22 September 1999, set up an Inter-Departmental Commission of the Security Council to oversee the job. The then aide to the President on national security issues and Secretary of the Security Council of the republic, Marat Tazhin, was appointed to head the commission.

The Kazakh government’s National Security Council on 9 November 1999 approved a security strategy up to 2005. The council did not discuss the case of Islamic fundamentalism especially but adopted plans on the control of the hot spots which were facing armed conflicts. It especially focussed on aviation security.

---

82 Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty, 23 September 1999, rep. in SWB/SU/3650/G/3, 27 September 1999.
meeting and the security strategy adopted there focussed especially on the problems of drug trafficking and drug abuse in Kazakhstan. The security strategy also confirmed the setting up of a special authorised body which was to work to counter the spread of drugs in the republic.83

Despite being a country less affected by terrorism, Kazakhstan has been very cautious in this regard. It still has not attracted the kind of terrorism the others are facing but being situated on the borders of the much more volatile countries like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan has no other option but to be on alert and take necessary steps time to time.

Though Turkmenistan has not been facing militancy and terrorist activities like its other neighbours, it is gradually becoming a transit route for Afghan and Central Asian drugs to the European countries and the sanctuary for the fleeing Afghan and other Central Asian radical Islamic leaders. Considering that the Turkmenistan government has of late started taking suitable legislative measures to check the fundamentalist activities there, especially drug trading.

Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister Avdi Kuliyev on his way back to home from Tehran in February 1992 said that, “our goal is not to islamise our state”. He further explained that the cooperation with the other Islamic countries in the region would not transform Turkmenistan into an Islamic state. He added that, “we are not going to elevate someone’s ideology to the state level, even Islamic, which has its roots in our country. Turkmenistan is neither Islamic, nor Soviet, but a secular and democratic state”.84 Thus, realising the need for being secular, in order to avoid antagonism of any particular community. Turkmenistan declared itself a secular republic as mentioned in its Constitution.

83 Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty, 9 November 1999, rep. in SWB/SU/3689/G/3, 11 November 1999
Besides this, Turkmenistan has passed several laws to successfully counter the problem of fundamentalism, radicalism and the trafficking of drugs. Through these legal measures, Turkmenistan has been able to counter the problem to a great extent.

Another set of measures initiated by President Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan as a policy to counteract the growth of Islamic fundamentalism was that he severed Kazakhstan’s religious ties with the Muslim Religious Boards and created a separate Muftiate in 1990, in an attempt to reduce the spillover effect of the perceived Islamic fundamentalist activities in neighbouring Uzbekistan.\(^{85}\)

Tajikistan became the second Central Asian republic to create its own separate Muftiate in the aftermath of the civil war in 1992, essentially to curtail the influence of the Islamic forces operating within the Uzbek territory, in particular in Fergana Valley, that were sympathetic to the Islamic Renaissance Party. Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan have not yet separated officially solely because, Turkmenistan is not facing the problem of terrorism like others are while Kyrgyzstan’s local mufti is strongly in favour of Tashkent Muftiate and does not want to separate.\(^{86}\)

In addition to these individual legal measures, these countries are members of different international organisations like UN, OSCE, OEC and also part of the CIS Collective Security Agreement. Therefore, the anti-terrorism resolutions passed by these organisations like UN are binding on these states, forcing them to take necessary steps to control it whenever it is essential.

Legal measures always provide the strength and instrument for the enforcement authorities to act against the culprits as to upkeep the law and order in


\(^{86}\) Ibid.
the society. But this is no end in itself nor can it solely fight out the menace successfully. Therefore, armed with legal sanctions and equipped with sophisticated mechanism, the law enforcement agencies try to meet the challenges from the opponents in order to see their elimination. For better understanding, we can call them operational measures to counteract the military and terrorism in the region.

Co-option, Appeasement and Coercion

In another kind of endeavour to stave off the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, the Central Asian governments have resorted to the policies of assimilation of the Islamic forces and appeasement to religious sentiment in general. In both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the official clerical structures have made numerous attempts to co-opt the members of the Islamic opposition so as to prevent further radicalisation of their activities. Mufti Ratbek, for instance, has extended an invitation to the unofficial clergy- particularly from Chimkent and Jambul - sympathetic to the IRP to join the official clerical establishment. In Uzbekistan, the former Mufti Muhammad Sadiq Muhammad Yusuf had met with IRP and unofficial clergy on numerous occasions to assimilate them into the Muftiate, but to no avail. One such meeting was publicised during the fifth Kurultay of the Muslim Religious Board of Central Asia on 26 February 1992. Reportedly, the Mufti Muhammad Yusuf, met with Islamic opposition representatives, including the Mufti of Tashkent, Abduraziz Mansur, an IRP supporter. The meeting was mediated by the Uzbek presidential adviser, Bakhtiyar Nazarov, during which IRP members were offered posts of deputy muftis, but the Muftiate’s proposal was turned down. The basic objection of the Islamic

---

opposition has been the government’s constant monitoring of and interference with, the affairs of the religious establishment. The Central Asian governments have also been active in placating the public in an effort to reduce the appeals of the Islamic opposition forces. This has included financial assistance for the construction and renovation of mosques, which has been done sometimes quietly and indirectly through the official clerical structures, or with fanfare and propaganda, to boost the image of the republican leaders in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as well as in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Karimov has, for instance, organised and refurbished many Islamic holy sites including the Islamic complex at the shrine of the Sufi leader, Khoja Bahauddin Naqsband. In addition, local television and radio stations have incorporated limited Islamic and language programmes designed to reach the more traditional segment of the population in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. On 25 February 1994, Tajikistan banned the broadcast of all programmes “that might offend national traditions and generally accepted moral standards”. The state media has also been prohibited from carrying advertisements for alcoholic beverages and tobacco products.

Another important policy to combat fundamentalism has taken the form of repression and crackdown on the religious opposition that has been carried out systematically in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, but also to some extent, in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.

Governments have declared the prominent groups like IRP, HT, IMU, and Adolat as banned groups. In Tajikistan, presently IRP is a constituent part of the government according to the post-civil war settlement. In 1993, at least 20 high ranking members of the outlawed IRP in Uzbekistan, including its Chairman,

Abdullah Utaev, were jailed.\textsuperscript{90} Members of Adolat who exercised considerable power in Fergana Valley in 1992 were arrested and tried. In Tajikistan, criminal charges were brought against the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the IRP as well as former Kazi Turazanjoda and a leading IRP member, Mullah Abdullah Nuri (Mir Saidov). Since July 1993, a host of other IRP leaders including Ajik Aliyev were tried and sentenced to death by the government of Imamoli Rahmonov.\textsuperscript{91} Several hundred sympathisers of IRP have also been captured and executed without trial since 1992 in the Kulyab and elsewhere in southern Tajikistan. In Kazakhstan, members of the Religious Nationalist Party Alash, have been tried and given jail sentences, forcing its leaders to go into exile.

Prior to this, the Uzbek President on 17 and 18 March ordered the mass arrest of the Muslim leaders in Namangan as a part of his severe crackdown. The police arrested 19 members out of originally listed 71 people. The religious affairs buildings were ransacked and the city was brought under the administration of Ministry of Internal Affairs units.\textsuperscript{92}

During the Tajik civil war, the government took all possible military steps to suppress the armed groups. There were also several cases where massive killings of the armed gangs were carried on, for example, on 11 January 1993, in the Pamir region, the Tajik government forces surrounded, killed and disarmed a large group of militants.\textsuperscript{93}

Karimov came heavily on the armed groups and terrorists. who in February 1993, declared a ‘war’ against organised crime and ordered ‘tough measures’ by

the national security service and Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Uzbek government also took strict steps to control the proliferation of arms and in this regard heavy punishments were awarded. In 1995, when the condition was ‘stable’, according to an officer in the army, Uzbek police seized bug quantity of arms and other contrabands from him.95

Karimov in a strong statement condemning ‘Political Islam’ in 1998 said that he would never allow the religious extremism to take root in Uzbekistan. On 17 April same year, he told the press conference that “we in Uzbekistan will never give the go ahead to those who are today trying by any means to introduce political Islam, religious extremism and fanaticism”. He, in the same conference, also said that one way to avoid religious fanaticism was to ‘integrate with European structures’.96

In the strongest ever gesture and statement, President Karimov in May 1998, told the parliament that he was ready to shoot the leaders of an Islamic fundamentalist movement himself if MPs lack the courage to do so. He said, “such people must be shot on the forehead! If necessary, I will shoot them myself, if you lack the resoluteness!”97 In the same speech, he said that Islamic warriors were trained in Tajikistan in order to ‘blow up their homeland’. Explaining why the law put new restrictions on the registration of religious groups, he further said that if the society did not take strict measures against fundamentalism then, “Tajikistan will become Uzbekistan, tomorrow”. In another bizarre declaration, he announced that there was to be a public trial on 2 May 1998 of ‘bandits’ accused of planning to blow up dairies, water reservoirs, power stations and official buildings in the

Fergana towns of Namangan and Andizhan, and that the trial would eventually be broadcast on state television.\textsuperscript{98} The above description shows the commitment of the President to go to any extent for the cause of suppression of extremists.

A public trial began the next day in which members of an Islamic fundamentalist group whose alleged aim was to set up an Islamic state in the country, Vali Egamberdiyev and Mukhtar Manno nov were shown behind the bars admitting to their connection to the groups and their crimes.\textsuperscript{99}

In another instance of the harsh attitude, Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court on 5 June 1998 sentenced seven men to terms of imprisonment ranging from seven to ten years for attempting to destabilise the country and establish an Islamic state. In the previous month, a court in Namangan had sentenced 12 people to prison terms of five to eight years on similar charges.\textsuperscript{100} Cases of trial and awarding punishment to the suspected Islamic extremists continued in the following months also. There were several cases of capital punishment, which were awarded for charges like attempting to undermine the constitutional system, igniting the ethnic and religious animosity, illegal possession of arms and drugs and terrorism.\textsuperscript{101} These were the common charges under which most of the cases were tried and persons prosecuted. According to one source, while one person was sentenced to death on these charges, another 26 received long prison sentences in 1998.\textsuperscript{102}

The Uzbek crackdown on the Islamic militants went up by leaps and bounds especially after the Tashkent bombing of 16 February 1999 in which an attempt was made on the life of the President himself. On 23 February 1999, the President declared that 30 persons were arrested on charges of bombing.

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{100} Interfax, Moscow, 5 June 1998, rep. in \textit{SWB/SU/5248/G/5}, 9 June 1998.
The Supreme Court of Uzbekistan handed down severe punishment to 22 people in June 1999, who were suspected of involvement in Tashkent bombing. Out of 22, six persons were sentenced death penalty, eight were awarded 20 year jail terms and other eight were sentenced to terms between 10-18 years in high security prisons with confiscation of property.103

Besides closing down the mosques, the Uzbek government in the fear that religious extremism might spill over to Uzbekistan from neighbouring Afghanistan and Tajikistan, intensified the crackdown, with arrests being made for merely wearing beards as a sign of their faith.104

The Fergana Valley is not the only problematic region in Uzbekistan. But while international attention has been directed towards alleged fierce fighting against terrorism in the Fergana Valley, serious repressive measures have been undertaken in other regions, such as that of Surkhan Darya. In August, some 4000 inhabitants were forcibly departed from their homes by the military as a result of collectively punishing entire villages on suspicion of some inhabitants alleged sympathise with and assistance to the IMU. Their villages are burnt.105

In June 2001, 73 men were tried on charges of terrorism and anti-constitutional activities, for “establishing links” with IMU and related acts. All of the 73 men were found guilty and sentenced to between three to eighteen years of imprisonment.

In the post-September 11 attack on World Trade Centre in US and the subsequent American engagement in Afghanistan with a broad slogan “fight against terror”, the anti-terrorism efforts have undergone a substantial change. It is now being viewed by President Karimov as a justification for the repressive

105 Ibid, p. 22.
measures of the previous years and for the crackdown to follow in the future on the Islamic fundamentalists.

A well known poet and activist of ‘Birlik’ movement, Yusuf Jumaev, was arrested on 23 October 2001. He was accused of publicly calling for an “unconstitutional change of the existing order”. 106

Simultaneously, with the crackdown on the fundamentalist religious forces, the Uzbek government is also attacking the major source of sustenance of the terrorism i.e. the drug and arms trade. Strong punishments have been provided in the country’s anti-narcotics laws.

Uzbekistan, from the very beginning, has been dealing with the problems of militancy and terrorism with an ‘iron hand’. Realisation of importance of having a secular, multi-ethnic government and the experience of Afghanistan and Iran in the neighbourhood having an Islamic state, prompted the Central Asian leaders to discourage religious and political extremism through all possible means. Coming from a communist set up in the erstwhile Soviet Union, they had all experienced Stalin’s purges in dealing with the opposition and the methods he adopted to deal with the religious sentiment in that period.

Another country which has been in the vortex of terrorism and religious fundamentalism is Tajikistan. As discussed in the previous chapter, the civil war in the immediate aftermath of independence created a scenario wherein, the state machinery was negated and militarily challenged. In this troubled water, the fundamentalist militant organisations, like IRP, found a suitable opportunity to further their own agenda of establishment of an Islamic state. But the situation improved gradually with the intervention of the international powers and the

106 Ibid. p. 23.
government came out heavily on the Islamists who it thought were trying to foment trouble in the state.

The Tajik government, in May 1992, ordered the border guards to strongly check any kind of border crossing from the other side. In another measure in July 1992, the Tajik government created a department for disarming illegal formations operating on the republics territory. It was expected that the sub-units of this department would employ professionals with a lot of experience in combating organised crime. The department also included snatch groups and motorised units.107 On 12 October 1992, the Tajik National Security Committee set up a General Security Directorate. The directorate was divided into five departments for handling the campaign against illegal armed gangs, protecting constitutional order preventing mass disturbances, fighting corruption and organised crime in the economy and finally fighting organised crime involving smuggling and drugs.108

The government also resorted to rampant and strict prosecution of the leaders of the opposition groups as well as the suspected militants. In January 1993, judicial prosecutions were initiated against Haj Akbar Turanjudzoda, the then spiritual head of Tajik Muslims, Shadmon Yusuf, the leader of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and former Deputy Prime Minister Davlat Usmon, Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Rebirth Party. These leaders were accused of entering into a criminal collusion in May 1992 for the purpose of seizing power and overthrowing the lawfully elected leadership of the republic. They were also charged of creating unlawful armed groups and masterminding combat actions that

led to the fratricidal war and entailed thousand casualties and multi billion dollar damage to the national economy of Tajikistan.\textsuperscript{109}

The Tajikistani leaders also from time to time by their statements, have tried to express their firmness and stringency as far as militancy is concerned. After the murder of the Deputy Prime Minister, the Tajik President almost declared a ‘war’ on crime in his statement on 7 August 1995.\textsuperscript{110} Further, in his Ramadan address to the nation, President Rahmanov categorically rejected religious extremism. In 1998 address, he said, “we will not let an extremist and separatist outlook regardless of how it is dressed up, to be imposed by force on our people because an extremist outlook has not led to peace, tranquillity and calm in any Muslim country”. He also said that it was disrespectful “to the true religion of Islam to put it to the political ends”.\textsuperscript{111}

President Rahmanov, in an address to the Tajik intelligentsia said that the roots of religious extremism and fanaticism were still very much alive in the country and he called upon everybody to eliminate these roots. From the same stage, he decried the then Taliban leadership of Afghanistan for its extremist and ignorant attitude. He accused Taliban of destroying the country’s historical and cultural heritage, in an apparent reference to the destruction of the Buddha statue in Bamiyan. He described the extremist attitude as unislamic and ‘ignorance’.\textsuperscript{112}

Tajikistan’s crackdown also extended to the very sources of support to militancy and extremism. On 12 April 1996, President Imamoli Rahmonov issued a decree spelling out “urgent measures” to tackle the growing drugs problems in

\textsuperscript{109} ITAR-TASS, Moscow, 11January 1993, rep. in SWB/SU/1584/B/8, 12 January 1993.
\textsuperscript{110} ITAR-TASS, Moscow, 4 August 1995, rep. in SWB/SU/2375/G/2, 7 August 1995.
the republic. The decree is designed to curtail drug smuggling and tighten up on the production and marketing of drugs in Tajikistan.113

In another attempt, the Tajik government set up a national headquarter to coordinate the poppy-96 anti-drugs campaign under the leadership of Deputy Prime Minister Jamalidelin Mansurov, the government also through a resolution made it mandatory for all the local authorities to set up similar bodies, and special groups to seek out illegal plantations.114 Tajikistan also took tough judicial measures to curb the drug trafficking. Tajikistan’s penalties for drug traffickers are also stringent. Under article 200 of the Criminal Code, the death penalty may be employed, and fifteen to twenty years sentences are not uncommon.115 The death penalty depends upon the quantity of drugs caught on a person, rather than whether it is a repeated offence. Technically, the penalty can be imposed for anything beyond one kilogram, but it is rarely applied for that quantity.116

The anti-terrorism effort in Tajikistan also has undergone a sea change after the opposition alliance UTO, joined the government which is the first instance of any Islamic organisation joining the government. Now the efforts are basically concentrated on those organisations which are not members of UTO and are carrying out their operations, like Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

The second most important factor which has brought a change is the September 11 attack on US and the subsequent American intervention in Afghanistan. Due to its strategic importance, the international community has widely focussed on the Tajik-Afghan border. In spite of the initial hiccups and internal protests, at a press conference in Dushanbe on 7 November 2001,
President Rahmonov confirmed that the country will provide an air-corridor for conducting military rescue and search actions.\textsuperscript{117}

Tajikistan has also engaged in serious combat against international terrorism. Following UN Security Resolution No. 1373, the Tajik President signed a decree on 13 November that provides, for example, the national bank and the commercial banks are obligated to freeze bank accounts and other financial assets belonging to the persons and organisations who directly or indirectly are connected to the execution of or attempts of terrorist acts. The Ministry of Justice was ordered to submit within one month, suggestions on how to bring all legislations into line with the decree.\textsuperscript{118}

From the foregoing discussions, we can succinctly make out that Tajikistan, next to Uzbekistan, is the most targeted state in Central Asia, by the fundamentalist forces. But after the Tajik civil war, the Tajik authorities have also come down heavily on these forces and are in control of the situation though human rights, democracy and the civil society have been affected to some extent.

The other state in Central Asia to have experienced the impact of militancy and terrorism is Kyrgyzstan. Being a bordering state of China, Kyrgyzstan has also been witnessing the activities of the Uighur separatists of the Xinjiang region in China. Besides that, it being a transit republic from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan's Fergana Valley, Kyrgyzstan has been bearing the brunt of terrorism in the region. More than that, it has become the latest hub of the region’s drug trade and the Afghan drug finds its route through Kyrgyzstan to Russia and Europe.

The relatively less militancy affected republic of Kyrgyzstan became the hot spot of Central Asia after the post-Batken incident of 1999. Not only incursions

\textsuperscript{117} IHF Report, op. cit., p. 18.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
and armed attacks but also the hostage taking of several foreigners including few Japanese geologists drew the attention of the international community towards it, thereby putting tremendous pressure on the administration to toe the line of the other republics in dealing with the terrorists. Equipped with suitable constitutional provisions, anti-terrorism laws, arms laws, language laws, and religious practices laws, Kyrgyzstan has of late come down heavily, militarily on the Islamic fundamentalist forces who are trying to take over the state.

Fearing the heavy crackdown by the Karimov administration, the Islamic fundamentalists of Uzbekistan started fleeing to Kyrgyzstan which has been relatively liberal in dealing with organisations like Hizb-ut-Tahrir and IRP.\(^{119}\) Whereas, in Tajikistan members are sentenced to an average of eight to twelve years in prison for “anti-governmental activities”, they receive an average of two to four years of imprisonment in Kyrgyzstan, and are more often fined than imprisoned.\(^{120}\)

The head of the National Security Services in Osh oblast, Marat Imankulov has said that he does not favour strong arm methods and believes that the local Imams should be at the forefront of the educational work among believers.\(^{121}\)

But under pressure from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan has become harsher in its policy towards all kinds of Islamic forces. In one of the initial measures to curb the spread of radicalism, Kyrgyzstan on 2 October 1995 banned religious and aesthetic teaching in the republic’s educational institutions.\(^{122}\) One of the Bishkek newspapers ‘Svobodnyye Gory’ published a government resolution in August announcing the creation of a body to monitor religious affairs and instructing the


\(^{120}\) Ibid, p. 12.

\(^{121}\) Oibek Khamidov, Evening Bishkek, 28 January 2002, cited in ibid, p. 11.

\(^{122}\) Kabar News Agency (henceforth Kabar), Bishkek, 20October 1995, rep. in SWB/SU/2425/G/2, 4 October 1995.
justice and security services to put a stop to “unconstitutional activities carried out by foreign Kyrgyz citizens under the guise of religion”. The resolution said that the religious climate in the republic as a whole was “cause for concern”. 123

Acting on the alleged separatist activities of the Uighurs, Kyrgyz Justice Ministry issued a resolution suspending the activities of the Ittipak (Union) Society of Ethnic Uighurs for three months for their failure to heed earlier official warnings, on 4 April 1996. 124 The resolution said the Ittipak society has “continued to carry out separatist activities or to be more precise, a policy contradicting the interests of the Chinese people, despite recent warnings of the Ministry of Justice and special resolution of the Prosecutor General”. The activities of the society violated the article in the Kyrgyz Constitution, covering public associations and also the Kyrgyz -China communique, signed on 16 May 1992, on non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. 125 The ban debarred the society from campaigning in the press and media, from organising any meetings, demonstrations or other mass activities in Kyrgyzstan for three months.

In another case of harsh crackdown, the Kyrgyz security forces uncovered an illegal ‘group of foreigners’ sending minors to neighbouring states where they were trained as religious militants in May 1998. The police confiscated hundreds of audio and video cassettes calling for a sacred war against the unfaithful and large quantities of religious literature, with some openly sadistic and extremist publications. 126 Messir Ashirkulov, the Interior Minister said, “Extremism whenever it may come from is a threat to the national security of Kyrgyzstan”. He also added that there were religious leaders in Kyrgyzstan propagating

124 Kyrgyz Radio, Bishkek, 4 April 1996, rep. in SWB/SU/2581/G/5, 9 April 1996.
125 Ibid.
'Wahhabism'. He promised that the National Security Ministry would continue taking resolute steps to stop its spread in Kyrgyzstan.

The Kyrgyz government had become more stringent in its approach to the Islamic extremism in the beginning of 2000. The presidential spokesman Kanibek Imanalyev told Interfax news agency on 12 May 1998 that Kyrgyzstan would act to stop any expression of religious extremism and terrorism in the republic as it poses a threat to national security. Same day in another press briefing, he told that the public was concerned about the religious extremism, particularly the appearance of Wahhabi missionaries, who, according to him were discrediting Islam. He also passed a warning saying that “any movement aimed at personal or other interests under the cover of Islam would be identified and strict action would be taken against them”. 128

In another interesting step, the intellectuals of Kyrgyzstan in August 1998 decided to set up a centre to help end religious extremism, wild outburst of amorality, social cataclysms and nationalist tendencies, which, as they described, are extremely dangerous for "every sensible person and for the whole world public". 129

The President of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akayev in March 2000, expressed apprehension that international terrorist formations might attempt to penetrate Kyrgyzstan from the neighbouring republics. Akayev, at the same time, instructed the law enforcement agencies to beef up the security of important and strategic installations. He also reiterated the strong preparedness of Kyrgyzstan for any kind of terrorist strike. 130

128 Ibid.
Cracking down on the terrorist group can not be successful without cutting down their source of supply in terms of men, money and arms. Therefore, the Kyrgyz government has also taken several operational measures to control drugs trafficking as well as arms proliferation. Tough laws have been enacted to control the drug traffickers and arms proliferators.

In April 1998, Kyrgyzstan was the first country in Central Asia to pass a comprehensive law. Its new criminal code includes the death penalty for large scale drug trafficking. According to the Interior Ministry sources, the law was drafted in compliance with three anti-drug conventions to which the republic signed up in 1994.\textsuperscript{131}

Though Kyrgyzstan is relatively less affected by terrorism and has a well developed legal system as far as fighting terrorism is concerned, it is bowing to the pressures of the neighbouring powers as well as other international forces and has therefore adopted strong arm measures against the militants of several banned groups. There have been several cases of human rights violations and they all have been reported but due to weak political opposition the issue has not come much into limelight.

Being the largest among all the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan has been the natural leader of the region. The sheer size of the country and its geographical location makes it very important as far as approaching Russia is concerned. Therefore, Kazakhstan has also been widely used by the militants Islamists and drug traders in their northward expansion.

\textsuperscript{131} UNODCP. Kyrgyzstan: Country Profile, available at \url{http://www.unodcp.org/Uzbekistan/country-profilekyr.html} and \textit{SWB/SU/3212/G/2/2, 28 April 1998.}
Equipped with an anti-terrorism law and other relevant laws, Kazakhstan as far as cracking down on the militants is concerned, also adopted an aggressive policy. A closer examination of the actions taken over the last few years would give a proper understanding of the nature of the policy the republic of Kazakhstan has adopted towards the problem.

In April 1998, the Kazakh Interior Ministry set up a special unit in Almaty to protect foreign residents from the kidnappers and to investigate crimes committed against them. The step was taken after several cases of hostage taking and extortion were reported last year. 132

In the same year, the Kazakh government cracked down on several missionary groups for propagating radical Islamic religious teaching. The law enforcement agencies also took note of the fact that a number of Kazakh residents were studying at foreign clerical centres preaching Islamic radicalism. 133

Few months later, authorities in Kazakhstan instituted criminal proceedings against members of a radical Islamic sect in the oil rich Atyrau region in Western Kazakhstan in October 1998. About 30 members of this Wahhabi religious sect aged 10 to 40 were arrested and another 100 were put under watch. 134 The Prosecutor’s office said these “Wahhabi” followers were inciting the people to disobey the authorities and follow the sect’s rules. Further, it alleged that the leaders of the sect used as a means of propaganda, audio and video cassettes with recordings of call for ‘jihad’ or ‘holy war’, manuscripts magazines and photocopies of type written texts brought into Kazakhstan from Moscow and Makhachkala (capital city of Russian republic of Dagestan). 135

133 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
In another incident of high importance, seven suspects in Tashkent bombing were arrested and extradited to Uzbekistan in March 1999 by Kazakhstan. For this purpose, the Kazakh authorities checked 50 secret addresses and had questioned 30 witnesses.\textsuperscript{136} All of them were Wahhabis, the IMU. Investigations found that in Almaty was a refuge and safe-haven for them, from where they were sent to other countries. Recruits had been taught how to wage subversive activities and commit acts of terrorism.\textsuperscript{137} The above example is an expression of the desperation of Kazakh authorities not to let their country become a hub of Islamic radical activities. Kazakhs either wanted to send a message to the other groups that their country can not be used for narrow religious objectives or fearful of Uzbek hostility which it could ill afford. On 30 October 1999, Mazhit Isabekov, the Deputy Head of Regional Department of the National Security Committee urged for the tighter supervision of the Islamic groups.

In another very interesting and far reaching step, the Interior Minister of Kazakhstan, Kairbek Suleimanov declared the year 2000 as the “Year of Fighting Organised Crime” in the parliament in March 2000.\textsuperscript{138}

The then newly formed eastern military district of Kazakh armed forces held its first ever exercises in August to thwart any terrorist attack and waging war in mountainous region.\textsuperscript{139} This was a step which was unprecedented at that time. It expressed Kazakhstan’s urge and concerns to fight the menace of terrorism.

Acting in line with a recommendation from Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev on 7 September, the Kazakh authorities decided to recall the Kazakh

\textsuperscript{136} ITAR-TASS, Moscow, 18 March 1999, rep. in SWB/SU/3490/G/2, 23 March 1999.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{139} Kazakh Khabar TV, Almaty, 19 August 2000, rep. in SWB/SU/3924/G/3, 21 August 2000.
students studying at Islamic academic institutions abroad.\textsuperscript{140} The Director of the Kazakh Higher Education Department, Abdumutalib Abzhapparov said that the uncontrolled training of Kazakh citizens at Islamic academic institutions threatened the national security of Kazakhstan.\textsuperscript{141} He further added that most of these people had gone there with the assistance of the mosques, embassies or through private agreements and without the involvement of the Ministry and he was not aware of what they were doing there.

Under the coordination of the National Security Council of Kazakhstan, the President of Kazakhstan approved a programme on fighting terrorism and extremism for the year 2000-2003 on 9 November 2000.\textsuperscript{142}

Kazakhstan also increased its military preparedness in the year 2000. The southern military stationed in the town of Tanaz, the administrative centre of Zambyl region was set up. The detached 5th Motor Rifle Company specialising in military actions in mountainous and desert terrain was trained in the units protecting the border. In addition, active training of the sniper groups was undertaken; people with the background of chasseurs and professional hunters were recruited for military service; the citizens from the local population were also recruited to work as guides.\textsuperscript{143} Through border guards, detachments were set up on the southern front, 25 new customs checkpoints were set up and a rapid reaction patrol company was stationed in Saryagash district of south Kazakhstan.

In addition to this, Kazakhstan's special services created a data bank on all terrorist bands active in the region and on their leaders and members. On the basis

\textsuperscript{140} Kazakh Commercial TV, Almaty, 7 September 2000, rep. in SWB/SU/3941/G/1, 9 September 2000.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{142} Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty, 24 November 2000, rep. in SWB/SU/4008/G/1, 27 November 2000.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
of the information available, urgent search raids were carried out and the ‘activities of the radical Hizb-ut-Tahrir religious grouping were strictly stopped’.

On religious front, intensive works were carried out to prevent and stop radical views. Councils for liaison with religious associations under the government and akims (heads of the regions) were set up to this end.\(^\text{144}\)

Illegal migrations were also strictly prevented to combat terrorism. The regulations for issuing visas to citizens of Tajikistan, Pakistan and a number of other countries were considerably tightened and illegal migrants were also deported on a large scale. Around 1,446 citizens of foreign states were deported from the republic in the first nine months of 2000.

Special watch was also kept on the terrorists who have had links with national or foreign terrorist organisations. A data bank in this regard was also created. Migration control cards were introduced for the inter-regional travellers.\(^\text{145}\)

Confirming these steps taken by Kazakh authorities, the Kazakh Security Council Secretary on 27 November said that Kazakhstan’s armed forces were fully prepared to take part in the Central Asian region.\(^\text{146}\)

In order to curb terrorists activities, Kazakh authorities also have taken some measures to weaken them financially. As discussed earlier, the main sources of the extremists’ finances are drugs and arms trafficking. Therefore, Kazakh government has also targeted these two issues with all out efforts.

First of all, Kazakhstan is reviving the criminal code to ensure law enforcement agencies go after the drug dealers rather than users.\(^\text{147}\) Recently, however, drug trafficking has become so serious that some officials have proposed

\(^{144}\) Ibid.
\(^{145}\) Ibid.
\(^{147}\) "Summary of Fact Finding Mission to Kazakhstan", Eurasianet.
introducing the death penalty for trafficking. That measure has not yet been passed, but officials are taking steps to tighten the borders. In 2000, US$9,00,000 was allocated for this purpose, a figure that rose to US$1 million in 2001 and doubled in 2002.

The anti-terrorism measures have received a tremendous fillip after the recent American intervention in Afghanistan. On 8 November 2001, Allyubek Sarsenbaev, the Security Advisor to the President Nazarbayev said that his country had plans to step up its assistance to the US-led campaign against terrorism. On the same day, President Nazarbayev said during a meeting with the head of diplomatic missions in Almaty that his country was prepared to campaign against terrorism with all means at its disposal. Kazakhstan offered the US to use its airspace and bases.

Since the 11 September incidents, and the launch of war in Afghanistan, there has been a notable increase in security controls at the borders of Kazakhstan. Also, an increasing number of people who are (who are believed to be) members or supporters of Hizb-ut-Tahrir have been arrested in recent months.

Ethnic Tajiks and Kyrgyz men have been deported from the country. Kazakhstan has unilaterally posed restrictions on Tajik citizens regarding their entrance into Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan, though facing low intensity militancy has drastically stepped up its crackdown on religious fundamentalists. The state crackdown increased after 1998 in the post-Tajik civil war period. A possible reason for this could be that in the post-Tajik civil war period the activists of the

---

armed opposition either joined the army or scattered to other countries in search of greener pastures with Kazakhstan receiving a chunk of it. Also, Kazakhstan being a country with little democratic development and faced with the fear of religious radicalism has opted for the path of suppression by force rather than addressing the situation more democratically. Moreover, the US fight against terrorism in Afghanistan has given a certain amount of legitimacy to the Kazakh crackdown on the Islamic radical forces.

As far as the growth of Islamic radicalism and terrorism is concerned, Turkmenistan poses a different picture. It is the only Central Asian republic which maintained a cordial relationship with Taliban throughout its existence. It allowed certain amount of religious activity in the country. But Turkmenistan has responded, though in a lower degree, to the activities of the radical forces.

As early as 19 April 1994, the President of Turkmenistan Samparmurat Niyazov addressed a gathering of the religious leaders in the country where he said that, “any attempt to intervene in state affairs will be decisively stopped”.¹⁵³

In the same meeting, the President further emphasised that Turkmenistan is a “secular democratic state, laws of which give everybody right to freedom of religion”. In a constructive approach to the religious establishments, he appealed for use of their authority to wage a war against drug addiction. He also announced the creation of a Council of Religious Affairs under the President of Turkmenistan which would consist of Muslim qazis together with the workers of the Russian Orthodox Church.¹⁵⁴

In Turkmenistan, only Muslim communities loyal to the officially sanctioned Muslim Board and some parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church have been

---

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.
allowed to register as legal religious communities. Other religious groups and other minority religions face continuing harassments. Numerous non-registered mosques and Qoranic schools have been closed down.\textsuperscript{155} Hundreds of foreign religious activists have been expelled in recent years.\textsuperscript{156}

Though the coverage of the September 11 terrorist attack was minimal in Turkmenistan, it could not keep itself aloof despite its desire to do so. President Niyazov did not allow the US to use the country’s territory for military purposes. Turkmenistan had agreed only to act as a base for humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{157}

According to Vitaly Ponomarov of the ‘Memorial’ - the Moscow based human rights organisation - in the post-September 11 incidents, the members of the suspected supporters of the former political opposition have been increasingly monitored. In 2000, restrictions had already been imposed on the freedom of movement within Turkmenistan, as well as the foreigners visiting the country and many were deported. Since 1988, there have been limitations on Islamic activities.\textsuperscript{158}

Suppression of religious minorities has also been adopted by Turkmenistan as a policy to counter any kind of religious radical upsurge. In 1999, the authorities in Ashgabat spent a week destroying the newly built Adventist Church with bulldozers.\textsuperscript{159} As mentioned before, the authorities also expelled a large number of religious minority people in 1999. Besides, they carried forward their second goal of crushing the religious minorities. But mostly this strong repression is directed towards all non-Islamic sects while Islamic sects - particularly those belonging to

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} Felix Corley, “Turkmenistan: Every Believer is Controlled”, says former Foreign Minister, Keston Institute, www.keston.org, 6 November 2001.
\textsuperscript{157} Nazik Ataeva, “Turkmenistan: Niyazov Ponders War Options”, Institute of War and Peace, RCA No. 72, 1 October 2001, \url{http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca-200109-72-2-eng.txt}
\textsuperscript{158} Report Vitaly Ponomarov, Memorial, Moscow, 28 November 2001.
\textsuperscript{159} Central Asia Monitor, No. 1, 2001, pp. 29-31.
Sunni sect are patronised. Officials at all levels, whether in KNB, the police local administrators or the Council of Religious Affairs, repeatedly declare that the only Islam and Orthodox Church are allowed in the country, despite the fact that nowhere is this stated in the law.\textsuperscript{160} Through these actions, the Turkmen authorities are trying to show a reconciliation attitude towards the Islamic community and win its confidence. Niyazov is fully aware that suppression of Islamic resurgence might be a step but can never be the only step. Therefore, other methods like appeasement have been tried.

Turkmenistan's crackdown on the drug trafficking and production is also equally emphatic. Being a country used as a transit point for drug trafficking to the CIS countries and Europe from Afghanistan, Turkmenistan has in the recent years developed strong attitude towards this business.

President Niyazov, in May 1998, approved a state programme to control illegal drug trafficking, through the year 2000. The programme was scheduled to be carried out by the government commission in charge of the fight against drug trafficking. At the same time, funds for the programme's implementation were allocated.

Besides burning down the seized drugs, Turkmenistan, in February 1998, set up a special anti-drug department. Later, in another decree the banks were prevented from laundering the proceeds from the illegal drug deals, as well as annual exercises for anti-drug units were provisioned.\textsuperscript{161}

Regional Cooperation as a Measure to Fight Militancy

The unrest in Central Asia has forged a consensus among the countries of the region and the great regional powers based on recognition that they are all

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{161} Interfax, Moscow, 11 June 1998, rep. in SWB/SU/3254/G/4, 16 June 1998.
threatened by a syndrome of lawlessness that involves political opposition, radical religious doctrines, gun running and narcotics trafficking. As Kyrgyzstan’s President Askar Akayev, put it, the traffic in drugs and weapons has become “problem number one” for his country. Similarly, Kazakhstan’s President, Nazarbayev warned that drugs, terrorism and competition over the country’s scarce water resources were the threats to stability in Central Asia. During a visit to Kazakh capital, Astana, in March 2000, Defence Minister Igor Sergeev informed his Central Asian colleagues that “the military political situation in this region suggests that the Central Asian states are in the vanguard of the struggle against international terrorism and religious extremism”.

The consensus on the seriousness of the threat brought forth a new spirit of cooperation among the states of the region. Therefore, in order to fight the menace of terrorism and militancy, the Central Asian nations have entered into cooperation and agreements of different kinds. They can be classified into categories such as:

- Bilateral agreements on mutual cooperation against terrorism and drug related crimes.
- Multilateral agreements with more than three countries of Central Asia and CIS countries participated for the same objectives and
- Bilateral agreements between Central Asian states and other foreign powers.

**Bilateral Agreements**

Since 1992, the Central Asian republics have started cooperation efforts to thwart the emergence of militancy and terrorism or often called in politico-legal

---

language as 'organised crime'. Though all the treaties and cooperation declarations do not directly deal with the subject some of them indirectly aim at it.

Abdumalik Abdullozhonov, the then Tajik Premier, met the Uzbek officials on the Tajik-Uzbek border. During the meeting, Uzbek side offered “all round assistance” to stabilise the situation in Tajikistan. On the agreed condition, Uzbekistan set up 40 militia posts on the border with Tajikistan.

An agreement on cooperation or interaction was signed between delegations from the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan and the National Security Service of Uzbekistan in January 1993. The agreement was to enable the two respective security bodies to use the available potential for cooperation, and interaction in the fields of intelligence and counter-intelligence, combating terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime and corruption more actively on a legal basis.

Though the above agreement was in the security services level, there are a series of agreements at the government level. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan governments signed a number of cooperation agreements following talks in Almaty on 2 June 1997. The documents included a protocol on the further deepening of the cooperation and friendly relations between the two countries and agreements on legal assistance in civil, family and criminal cases and the setting up of a joint inter-governmental commission on bilateral cooperation.

Tajik President Rahmonov visited Uzbekistan in 1998. On 4 January, the same year, the Presidents signed a joint communiqué in Tashkent in which they

---

undertook to oppose political and religious extremism. The both sides also condemned ethnic, racial, and religious intolerance.\textsuperscript{168}

During the same meeting, both Uzbek and Tajik Presidents announced plans for joint action to fight the drugs trade which, as Karimov said, was "destabilising the region". Another agreement was signed between the foreign ministers of both the countries in this regard.\textsuperscript{169}

An Uzbek delegation of the heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Security Service and Ministry of Internal Affairs visited Tajikistan. Among a wide range of issues of bilateral relations, the Uzbek and Tajik foreign Ministers signed an inter-governmental agreement in fighting terrorism, religious and other forms of extremism and drugs trafficking. The agreement envisaged close cooperation between the law enforcement agencies, including on the territories of both the countries.\textsuperscript{170}

In another example of bilateral cooperation, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev and his Tajik counterpart Rahmonov signed 14 agreements including joint declarations on deepening and developing relations between the two countries on 6 May 1998. Among others, they signed an agreement on cooperation between the Kyrgyz Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Tajik Ministry of National Security on controlling narcotics and the raw materials from which they are produced.\textsuperscript{171} The custom agencies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed an agreement on cooperation to prevent smuggling and trafficking of arms and drugs.

The Kyrgyz Prime Minister Amangeldi Muraliyev visited Uzbekistan on 9 July 1999. On the same day, the first meeting of the Uzbek-Tajik inter-

\textsuperscript{169} Interfax, Moscow, 5 January 1998, rep. in ibid.
\textsuperscript{170} Uzbek Television, First Channel, Tashkent, 27 May 1999, rep. in SWB/SU/3547/G/2, 29 May 1999.
\textsuperscript{171} Russian TV Channel, Moscow, 6 May 1998, rep. in SWB/SU/3222/G/3, 9 May 1998.
governmental joint commission took place for discussion on broadening mutual cooperation between the two countries. The meeting concluded with the signing up of the inter-governmental and inter-ministerial documents between the republic of Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyzstan. Uzbek Prime Minister Utkir Sultonov and his Kyrgyz counterpart signed two agreements between the governments of both the republics on cooperation in fighting illegal drugs trafficking and on cooperation in fighting crime. A protocol of the inter-governmental joint commission on bilateral cooperation was signed by Deputy Prime Minister of Uzbekistan Rustom Yunusov and his Kyrgyz counterpart Esengül Omuradiyev during the same visit.

In the wake of the armed incursion in August 1999 in the Batken region in south Kyrgyzstan, the then Kazakh acting Defence Minister Bakhtyzhov Yertoyev announced on 30 August 1999 to send ammunitions and the first detachment of Kazakh reservists to Kyrgyzstan. He further disclosed that a group of Kazakh military experts was currently working in Osh region.

In a joint statement issued by the President of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, both the countries on 21 April 2000, on the sidelines of the Central Asian summit in the Uzbek capital Tashkent, pledged to intensify interaction in fighting against the international terrorism, religious and political extremism, smuggling of drugs, psychotropic substances, precursor chemicals and arms and against organised trans-border crime.

They also declared that the sides could perceive any action directed against one of the states as a common threat and would take all measures to counter them. If necessary, joint and coordinated measures would be carried out.

---

173 Khabar TV, Almaty, 30 August 1999, rep. in SWB/SU/3628/G/2, 1 September 1999.
174 Published in Narodnaya Slavo, 22 April 2000, rep. in SWB/SU/3822/G/3, 24 April 2000.
The Kazakhstan President of Nazarbayev visited Tajikistan on 13 June 2000, where he signed nine important documents. Besides exchanging views with his Tajik counterpart on bilateral security, political and religious extremism, drug trade and organised crime, both the leaders signed a declaration on further expansion of relations between Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and inter-governmental agreements on cooperation in the fields of fight against illegal drug trafficking, special official posts on security, arms smuggling etc. The very next day, both the heads of the states decided to create an anti-drug security belt around Afghanistan.

As a quid pro quo of the unprecedented support of the Kyrgyz government to Uzbekistan in August 2000 in the fight against the international terrorists, on 20 August, Uzbek President declared whole-hearted support and approval for the Kyrgyz action on the militants in the south of the country. In a strongly worded statement he said that, "I approve of the Kyrgyz army’s action and I want to say that we are ready to support the Kyrgyz at any time so as to give the bandit formations a real rebuff so that it teaches not only them, but also their children, not to intrude into the territory not only of Kyrgyzstan but of all Central Asian states". The joint military operation of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan managed to halt the progress of gunmen sponsored by IMU. The gunmen were surrounded and most of them were killed.

Kyrgyz Defence Minister, who visited Kazakhstan on 1 March 2001, signed a defence cooperation protocol on further cooperation with his Kazakhstan counterpart. After the ceremony, Kazakh Defence Minister Tokpabakeyev said that the protocol provided for the country’s cooperation in the military and technical

175 Kazakh Television First Channel, Astana, 13 June 2000, rep. in SWB/SU/3867/G/1. 15 June 2000.
sectors. Both sides agreed to regularly exchange operational information especially the tactics that the terrorists used in the military clashes in 1999 and 2000 in Batken. They also agreed for a joint military exercise later in 2001.\textsuperscript{177}

During the same visit, Kazakhstan's Defence Minister strongly committed his country's support to Kyrgyzstan in case of a fresh incursion by the Islamists into the country.\textsuperscript{178}

The bilateral ties among the Central Asian republics have gone a long way in containing militancy and terrorism in the region and cutting down the magnitude of the drugs and arms trade, as in the case of Uzbek-Kyrgyz relations, wherein the cooperation in the military field has contributed tremendously towards meeting the challenges of the militants. Besides this one-to-one joint efforts and tie-ups, there are many multilateral efforts and agreements which have taken place among the Central Asian republics and other CIS countries. They have also contributed to their anti-terrorism endeavour.

**Multilateral Cooperation within CIS Republics**

Besides the bilateral cooperation endeavours discussed above to combat terrorism, there were also several similar efforts on part of Central Asian states involving members of the CIS countries to form a cooperative mechanism which can help them in curbing the menace of terrorism within the CIS framework. They signed several agreements, treaties and declarations expressing their commitment to the cause even though all of them are not affected by this menace the way the five Central Asian countries are.

Though the Central Asian republics are the worst affected ones as far as terrorism is concerned, there are other CIS countries which are facing the growing

\textsuperscript{177} *Interfax*-Kazakhstan, Almaty, 1 March 2001, rep. in SWB/SU/4085/G/1, 3 March 2001.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid.
challenge of these forces, for example, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Therefore, in the
Central Asian efforts to curb the tendency, the other republics are participating in
growing numbers.

On the occasion of the birth anniversary of three Kazakh national figures
(Talebi, Kazbeki and Aytekebi), Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan signed a joint declaration on 28 May 1993 calling upon the three
nations to strengthen friendship and mutual situation in Central Asia.\textsuperscript{179} This
declaration was the first in the series of following multilateral declarations and
treaties within CIS.

An agreement signed between Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek security forces
provided for cooperation between the security forces of these republics. At the
same time, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement for cooperation in the
field of militancy counter-intelligence.\textsuperscript{180}

Russian commander of its border troops, Andrey Ackolayev, signed an
agreement in Tashkent on 2 November 1994, on the joint control of the border with
Afghanistan with his Uzbek and Tajik counterparts. During the same occasion, a
separate ten-year bilateral agreement on regional border security issues was signed
between the Russian military head and Uzbekistan's President. This agreement
provided for joint efforts against terrorism, arms and drugs smuggling, as well as
for social and legal guarantees for troops and families stationed there.\textsuperscript{181}

Uzbek and Belarusian leaders also on 22 December 1994 signed twenty
agreements including one on mutual cooperation in military intelligence, thus
bringing countries like Belarus to the regional security net.\textsuperscript{182} In July 1993, in

\textsuperscript{181} Ostankino Radio Mayak, Moscow, 2 November 1994, rep. in \textit{SWB/SU/2144/G/1}, 4 November
1994.
the field of narcotics control also, the department of narcotics representatives from
Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Uzbek interior ministers met in Kazakhstan to
discuss the ways of cooperating in the fight against drug related crime. They
signed a protocol which was to form the basis of future action by the interior
ministers.\textsuperscript{183}

During the last ten years, several treaties and agreements were signed among
the CIS republics which have provided a counter-force to end militancy and
terrorism in the Central Asian region. The council of the heads of CIS Border
troops meeting in Tajik capital in Dushanbe on 22 December 1995 signed 26
documents coordinating border policy throughout the member states and along the
Tajik-Afghan frontier. The documents included the Russian -Turkmen Agreements
on the presence of up to 1,000 border guards and Russian military advisors in
Turkmenistan and an agreement between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia on
cooperation to combat drug trafficking on the Tajik-Afghan border to stem the
flow of narcotics from Afghanistan to Russia.\textsuperscript{184}

In another far-reaching agreement, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan signed a treaty on “eternal friendship” on 10 January 1997 in
Bishkek. Under the terms of the treaty initiated by Kazakhstan, the three Central
Asian states undertook not to allow their territory to be used for armed aggression
or any other activities hostile to their cosignatories. “Karimov described this effort
as another milestone in the development of good neighbourly relations”.\textsuperscript{185}

Aga Khan Development Foundation, Russia and five Central Asian republics
signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the illegal production
of drugs, drug trafficking and abuse on 15 January 1998,. The sides agreed that the

\textsuperscript{185} \textit{RIA News Agency}, Moscow, 10 January 1997, rep. in \textit{SWB/SU/2816/G/1}, 14 January 1997.
drug problem should be solved through well coordinated concerted action and in cooperation with international organisations like Interpol.\textsuperscript{186}

The heads of the member states of the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan met on 24 June 1999 in Bishkek in ‘an atmosphere of mutual understanding and confidence’. In the meeting, among other things, the sides noted the supreme urgency and importance of joint action against terrorism, religious and political extremism, and the illegal trafficking of drugs, arms and explosives. In this connection, the need was affirmed to adopt joint programmes between foreign ministry departments, special services and other structures to combat these factors. This was the first reaction from CACE on this crucial topic.\textsuperscript{187}

In another very important gesture of mutual cooperation against terrorism, the foreign and defence ministers and heads of the national security of the four Central Asian republics, except Turkmenistan, adopted a joint declaration at the meeting in the town of Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan on 28 August 1999. The declaration confirmed their common position relating to the criminal activities of the militant groups in the south of Kyrgyzstan. They called this an act of terrorism carried out by foreign organisations not recognised by the international community. It also mentioned a joint plan for measures to eliminate the terrorist groups. The declaration asked the citizens of the region to combine efforts to give a good rebuff to the rude assault by the bandits. It also warned that terrorist action involving illegal crossing of a state border and violence against a peaceful population would be halted using the most severe and decisive measures in accordance with international law. The document which was signed by the foreign

ministers of these countries also expressed confidence on the support of the international community. This declaration was basically prompted by the seasonal incursion by armed militants into the southern provinces of Kyrgyzstan, especially Batken region. The August 1999; Batken armed incursion was the most prolonged and dangerous terrorists (mis)adventure in Central Asia.

But as the summer unfolded, the south Kyrgyz region of Batken became again the hot spot with remarkable armed incursions. In order to effectively counter that and keeping up the spirit of cooperation against terrorism, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev and Secretary General of CIS Collective Security Council Vladimir Zemskiy signed an agreement on military assistance to Kyrgyzstan on 2 October in Bishkek. According to the agreement, the six member states of the CIS Collective Security Treaty were to provide weapons and ammunitions for combat action in Kyrgyz mountainous region and Central Asian and Russian military experts were to set up an operations group. The agreement envisioned cooperation of the special services and foreign ministries among the CIS treaty signatories.

The presidents of all the Central Asian republics except Turkmenistan, the respective foreign ministers of the republics along with their Security Council heads met in Tashkent on 20 April 1999 to discuss the terrorist threat to the region. The next day, the Presidents signed an agreement on joint actions in fighting terrorism, political, religious and other kinds of extremism and international organised crime. In implementation of the clauses of this agreement, the central competent bodies of the sides were to cooperate in carrying out special operations and measures involving armed forces contingents and special divisions of law

188 ITAR-TASS, Moscow, 28 August 1999, rep. in SWB/SU/3626/G/1, 30 August 1999.
189 Interfax, Moscow, 2 October 1999 (henceforth Interfax Moscow), rep. in SWB/SU/3657/G/1, 5 October 1999
enforcement structures, exchanging information on crimes, being planned or committed and on those people and organisations involved in them and on carrying out joint operational searches and investigations and searches for those who are hiding from criminal prosecution and imprisonment. The other important aspect of the agreement was that the sides confirmed that they would refuse to grant asylum or concessions to terrorists and extremists and also would endeavour to prosecute them and extradite them to the country concerned on the basis of international extradition agreements.\footnote{190} A summit meeting hosted by Kazakhstan, was held in Alma Ata on 3 July 1998 and attended by Russian Prime Minister, the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Among other things, they expressed concern on the large number of weapons which was being smuggled from Afghanistan to CIS.\footnote{191} Later in a joint statement issued by all the participating countries, it was stressed that they were unanimous that any form of national splitism, ethnic exclusion and religious extremism was unacceptable. The parties would take steps to fight against international terrorism, organised crimes, arms smuggling, the trafficking of drugs and narcotics and other trans-national criminal activities and would not allow their territory to be used for activities undermining the national sovereignty, security and social order of any of the five countries.\footnote{192} Though this declaration was almost a reiteration of the stands taken by the member states earlier, it expressed their determination further in that direction.

All the CIS member states signed nine agreements on joint fight against all types of organised crime at a regular meeting of the Council of Interior Ministers

\footnote{190} Tajikistan Television First Channel, (henceforth Tajik Tv.1), Dushanbe, 21 April 2000, rep. in SWB/SU/3822/G/3, 24 April 2000.  
\footnote{191} ITAR-TASS, Moscow, 3 July 1998, rep. in SWB/SU/3272/G/1, 7 July 1998.  
\footnote{192} Xinhua, Beijing, 3 July 1998, rep. in SWB/SU/3272/G/3, 7 July 1998.
of CIS countries, on 8 September 2000, at Cholpan-Ala, Kyrgyzstan. Among the agreements, the most important was their joint fight against international terrorism.\footnote{\textit{ITAR-TASS}, Moscow, 8 September 2000, rep. in SWB/SU3941/G/1, 9 September 2000.}

As per a report, there were around 200 agreements, treaties, declarations and MoUs regarding bilateral and multilateral cooperation among the Central Asian and among the CIS countries till 1999. They covered almost all the fields of cooperation including terrorism, drugs trafficking and small arms proliferation.\footnote{\textit{ITAR-TASS}, Moscow, 28 August 1999, rep. in SWB/SU/3626/G/1, 30 August 1999} The affected countries have also made a plethora of efforts to draw the cooperation of various countries outside the CIS. In their effort to internationalise their cause and garner the support of the world community, they have signed documents and declarations with countries from Europe, Africa and Asia.

After the Batken incursion in August 1999, President of Kyrgyzstan and the Secretary General of CIS Collective Security Council signed an agreement on military assistance to Kyrgyzstan on 2 October 1999 in Bishkek. According to the agreement, six member states of the CIS collective treaty and Uzbekistan were to provide weapons and ammunition for combat action in Kyrgyzstan. The agreement envisioned cooperation of the special services and foreign ministries among the CIS treaty signatories.\footnote{\textit{Interfax}, Moscow, 2 October 1999, rep. in SWB/SU/3657/G/2, 5 October 1999.} The CIS treaty which was initially aimed at defending CIS countries against an external threat through such agreements had shifted its focus to combating international terrorism.

In another important step towards the cooperation among the CIS states, the secretaries of the security councils of member states of the CIS Collective Security met in a working session in Bishkek on 5 November 1999. It discussed the issues
of fighting terrorism, drug trafficking and arms smuggling. In this regard, the secretaries also adopted a statement of intent.196

Following the Central Asian Security Summit in Bishkek, on 20 August 2000, the presidents of all the Central Asian republics except Turkmenistan and the special envoy of Russia adopted a joint statement declaring that international terrorism was “encroaching upon the constitutional and democratic foundations of our societies”. Pledging to crush terrorism and wipe out terrorists “where there are located”, the statement called for urgent measures to tackle the situation, including strengthening the Tajik-Afghan border, as the southern flank of the CIS (see Appendix 3).197

In a major development, Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov visited Pakistan on 25 January during which both the countries signed an important agreement in the form of an extradition treaty under which both the countries agreed to detain and hand over criminals wanted by the other side.198 This was an important step from the point that Pakistan has been a major player in the Central Asian politics. Secondly, Pakistan being an Islamic state was the main promoter of Taliban, the mainstay of Central Asian terrorism and extremism. Therefore, an extradition treaty with Pakistan would have made it no longer a safe haven for perpetrators of extremist violence in Uzbekistan. During the Tajik civil war and later, many of the members of IRP and IMU like Haji Turazonjada and Abdulla Nuri took shelter in Pakistan to escape the ‘hot pursuit’ followed by Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

In the post-September 11 period, the Central Asian republics became highly focussed from the international strategic point of view. The anti-terrorism efforts

---

of the Central Asian republics received international support and attention. As a result, several efforts for coordination were also made through agreements, declarations and treaties. One such effort was made on 22 January 2002, when General Tommy Franks, the commander of the anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan, visited Tashkent and signed an agreement which outlined future cooperation and more frequent contact between the two countries.\footnote{Keesing's Record of World Events (henceforth Keesing's), Vol. 48, No. 1, 1 January 2002, p. 44555.}

On the same line, the US government on 9 January announced that restrictions on the transfer of military equipment to Tajikistan imposed in 1993 would be lifted following the country's close cooperation with the international anti-terrorism coalition.\footnote{Ibid}

The Kazakh legislature made an amendment to the laws on terrorism and religion on 1 February 2002. The law on terrorism made any attempt on life a state official punishable by a death sentence or a term of 20 years imprisonment and the law on religion permitted the prohibition of any unregistered religious group; required all missionaries to be registered with the authorities; and forbade the legal registration of Muslim organisations except within the framework of the spiritual administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan.\footnote{Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 48, No. 2, February 2002, p. 44617}

The attack on World Trade Centre and Pentagon on 11 September 2001, by Islamic terrorists, linked with Al-Qaeda movement led by Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden brought a major shift in the security scenario in Central Asia. The anti-terrorism endeavour of the affected states in the region found a new ally in US and its other friendly states from Europe and Asia. The US-led coalition against terrorism had to depend on the Central Asian republics for logistical and strategic
reasons, whereas the Central Asian Republics for the first time had an opportunity at their hands to bring to the international community the menace of the religious fundamentalism and terrorism, and to get rid of the constant accusations of human rights violations by the western human rights organisations including the US. Another reason they thought it appropriate to support the coalition in their engagement with Afghanistan was the fact that most of the terrorists in Central Asia were the products of the situation in Afghanistan and were constantly aided and abetted by Afghanistan’s Taliban administration.

The Central Asian republics quickly condemned the attacks in America and offered their help and also supported the retaliatory attacks by America on the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda.

Of all the Central Asian republics Uzbek government emerged as the key ally in terms of US military strategy in October 2001. By an agreement, it gave the US the extended use of Khanabad base in the Karshi province, the biggest airbase in Central Asia.202

While Karimov said the agreement covered the mutual responsibilities and guarantees, the Americans confined themselves to only consultation. However, on 12 October 2001, a US-Uzbek joint statement was issued stating that the US had extended security guarantees to President Islam Karimov’s regime. Subsequently, Uzbekistan which had previously insisted that the US could only use Uzbek facilities for humanitarian and search and rescue missions now sanctioned the use of its military facilities by the US armed forces for offensive military operations against Afghanistan.203

Kyrgyzstan was the next Central Asian republic to grant US military access to its territory. The Kyrgyz parliament agreed to allow the US to set up a military base at Manas International Airport, some 30 kilometres from the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek.\footnote{Ibid.}

President Karimov of Uzbekistan visited US in March 2002 where he signed a Declaration on Strategic Partnership between the US and the Republic of Uzbekistan. It incorporated almost all the suggestions from the Uzbek side.\footnote{Yurri Cherngaev, Kommersant, Moscow, 14 March 2002, rep. in Devendra Kaushik, \textit{Dialogue}, op. cit., pp. 45-46.}

Tajikistan, which along with Russia, Iran and India played a significant role in helping the fight of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban regime, also offered its help to the US by offering three of its airfields namely Kulyab, Khojand and Kurgan-Tyube. “Being in solidarity with the US people, we at the same time, express our willingness to cooperate with international community including US government, in the fight against international terrorism and extremism”, the Tajik President said after the attack in America.\footnote{Quoted in Poonam Mann, \textit{World Focus}, Vol. 23, No. 6, June 2002, p. 18.}

Kazakhstan which has no common border with Afghanistan and did not face any serious threat to its security from the Taliban-supported religious extremism, gave support to the US-led struggle against international terrorism in Afghanistan in the form of over flight clearances. It also offered Washington use of its bases. In his talks with the US Secretary of State Colin Powell in December 2001, President Nazarbayev stated that “from the very first day, Kazakhstan declared that it should be in a coalition fighting terrorism and would help with all the forces it has at its disposal.”\footnote{The Times of Central Asia, 20 December 2001.} Later, during his visit to the US, President Nazarbaev reiterated...
Kazakhstan’s intention to cooperate in the war against terrorism to its conclusion within the framework of international coalition.\textsuperscript{208}

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan has launched itself on a foreign policy course of permanent neutrality. After rejecting all offers of cooperation from several countries including the US and Germany, Turkmenistan agreed to participate in the international efforts in Afghanistan only in terms of humanitarian assistance\textsuperscript{209} after meeting Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.

Through all these show of concern and cooperation to the US-led war on terrorism, the Central Asian countries aimed at the destruction of the radical, extremist terrorist organisations in the region and their bases in Afghanistan and cut off their supplies from Taliban and Pakistan. In appreciation of these gestures, the US government also gave assurances to the regimes of these republics to target IMU as well. US government had included IMU in its list of terrorist organisations in the year 2000.\textsuperscript{210} In his national address on 20 September 2001, US President George W. Bush linked the IMU to Osama bin Laden suggesting the IMU may be a target of the US counter-terrorism efforts in the wake of the 11 September attacks.\textsuperscript{211} Further, the executive order on the terrorist financing of the US government to freeze terrorist assets abroad, also enveloped IMU, thereby attacking the roots of its existence.

Though the foregoing illustrations show the urge of the Central Asian republics to ensure national security through cooperation, they have not been fully successful in this regard. This difference is manifested in the mutual accusations

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{208} Devendra Kaushik, \textit{Dialogue}, op. cit., p. 47.
\item \textsuperscript{209} \textit{News from Russia}, Vol. V, No. 12, 22 March 2002, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{210} Poonam Mann, \textit{World Focus}, op. cit., p. 18
\item \textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
they make against each other from time to time. For example, President of Uzbekistan accused Tajikistan of harbouring and training terrorists. Kyrgyzstan strongly denounced the unilateral action of the Uzbek security forces in its own territory in violation of the standard international norms, and Uzbekistan bombarding southern regions of Kyrgyzstan on the pretext of terrorist movement. To add to this, the constant rivalry which is going on between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for supremacy in the region is jeopardising the spirit of cooperation. Nevertheless, the efforts made by the countries in the region since 1992, are massive in spite of their shortcomings. The few points which can be generalised are:

- The neutrality maintained by Turkmenistan by staying away from the regional cooperation initiatives had its adverse impact on the anti-terrorism and anti-drug trafficking efforts.
- In spite of all the republics coming together except Turkmenistan, all were dependent on Russia for the final nod as the guarantor of regional security.
- Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan befriended more with China and Iran, thereby, keeping their involvement in the region in some pretext or the other.
- Except a single extradition treaty, very few efforts have been made to rope in Pakistan and ensure its involvement in anti-terrorism drive. This, if achieved, would have put the latter in a position, where it would have to divert its attention from Afghanistan and Taliban.
- China has been more concerned with its own problem of terrorism and separatism in the Xinjiang province, where the Uighur separatists are demanding secession from the Chinese mainland. It is for this
reason that China has been showing greater concern for Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan rather than Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

- Iran is playing the most difficult role there. Though it has craving for promoting Islamic groups, it differs from them on the ground that majority of them are ‘Sunnis’ belonging to Hanafi School of Islamic thought. Secondly, these groups being supported by Pakistan, Iran is averse to the idea of Pakistan playing greater role in Central Asian politics.

- Another very important factor that draws the far-off countries like Germany is the huge economic potential of the region in the form of Caspian oil and gas.

- Israel being a country facing perpetual problem of Islamic terrorism has befriended with the Central Asian countries and promised to exchange its anti-terrorism expertise with them.

- Russia’s involvement in Chechnya and Dagestan forced it to support and cooperate with the Central Asian republics and their dealing of the problem of terrorism.

- Finally, US after the 11 September, has learnt that it can not just keep it confined to the issue of non-proliferation by Kazakhstan as far as its policy towards Central Asia is concerned. Secondly, Islamic terrorism and religious fundamentalism is not only the problem of the region, but sooner or later would endanger the security of the world as a whole, including America. Therefore, it has extended its cooperation towards the countries in the region as far as dealing with
terrorism is concerned and at the same time, taking interests in
rescuing the sagging economies of the Central Asian republics.\footnote{US has announced aid worth $ 408 million to these republics in 2002 out of which $81.6 million to Kazakhstan, $49 million to Kyrgyzstan, $85.3 million to Tajikistan, $16.4 million to Turkmenistan and 161.8 million to Uzbekistan. In the year 2001, US provided aid worth $244.2 million including $71.5 million to Kazakhstan, $40.6 million to Kyrgyzstan, $56.4 million to Tajikistan and $12.2 million to Turkmenistan and 55.9 million to Uzbekistan. Cited in Poonam Mann, \textit{World Focus}, op. cit., p. 19.}

As mentioned earlier, the Central Asian republics in spite of their cooperative efforts have not been able to gain a full control over the menace of military and terrorism in the region. In simple words, the cooperative efforts have not worked out as desired by the participating countries. This results both from conflicting views of security interests and from a range of other incompatible aspects of the several countries' political regimes. These are a few factors which are responsible for this failure.

PROBLEMS OF COOPERATION

A. Incompatible Threat Perception

Uzbekistan is often responsible for the lack of security cooperation between Tashkent, Bishkek and Dushanbe.\footnote{"Unichtozhat Terroristov budut poka no kartakh", \textit{Nazavisimaia Gazeta}, 21 March 2001. rep. in ICG Asia, No. 20, op. cit., p. 13.} Kyrgyzstan has a considerable number of serious points of contention with Uzbekistan, apart from the problems with Tashkent over its bombing of Kyrgyz villages and its politics which are perceived as radicalising the Islamist underground throughout the region. In February 2001, a newly printed map of Uzbekistan drew that country's borders into Kyrgyzstan's territory and even showed a land corridor from Uzbekistan to its enclave Sokh in Kyrgyzstan although no such links had been agreed. A secret meeting had given Tashkent reasons to hope that they would get territorial concessions but
Uzbekistan’s highhandedness antagonised the Kyrgyz parliament which had to ratify an agreement which heightened public distrust between the neighbours. 214

While the map drew criticism in Bishkek, Tashkent almost arm twisted Kyrgyzstan by linking the border dispute to the cutting off gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan. 215 It demanded that if Bishkek agreed to cede the corridor to Sokh, then Uzbekistan would resume gas deliveries.

Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan claimed Uzbekistan owed it US $180 million for rent on its territory and exploitation of its gas fields. 216 Kyrgyzstan has also sought to link the issue of gas with water supplies, as Uzbekistan depends on its neighbour for free irrigation. Uzbekistan has resisted any linkage between gas and water provisions despite international support for the countries to trade. 217

In August 2000, Tashkent introduced a visa regime for Kyrgyzstan’s citizens. People living in border areas can still travel to Uzbekistan without visas as long as they do not stay in the country longer than three days. Those needing to stay longer now must present a fee and present justification for their visit. The general consequence of Uzbekistan’s tightening of border controls has been a burgeoning of corruption by border control officials who take bribes from those attempting to violate the border control regime and equally from those who attempt to adhere to the rules. In Kyrgyzstan, there is a perception that terrorists and drug

---

214 ICG Asia, No. 20, op. cit., p. 13.
217 USAID has been pushing for a solution which links water and energy, which Tashkent has found unacceptable. A high level OSCE initiative to resolve regional water disputes, led by Britain foreign and commonwealth office in 1999, encountered by intransigence from the leadership of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan which apparently felt that there was no need to compromise their own position by involving international actors which could give negotiating strength to weaker countries from whom they currently receive summer water releases for their agriculture at no cost. Rep. in ICG Asia, No. 20, op. cit., p. 14.
traffickers can find ways across the borders more readily than law-abiding citizens.218

Tajikistan’s internal strife made the country a problematic strategic partner for its neighbours and it did not develop close relations with any of its neighbours after independence. Tajikistan has been very inwardly oriented, preoccupied with problems of regional disputes over power and the building of integrated institutions in the aftermath of civil war. Indeed, Tajikistan has been a conduit for destabilising influence to its neighbours. There have been some concerns in China that the Uighur separatists might use the country as a route into Xinjiang.

Relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the post-Soviet period have been marked by nearly continuous tensions. Uzbekistan has been seen as sponsoring the aspirations of the northern province of Sughd (formerly Leninabad) to regain the dominance of Tajikistan’s political and economic structures that it had during Soviet times. This issue became prominent after the incursions into northern Tajikistan by Khudaiberdiyev, which Rahmanov attributed directly to Uzbekistan’s sponsorship and to the northern political figure then in exile in Uzbekistan, Abdumallik Abdullajanov. In Tajikistan, a further proof of the meddling of Uzbekistan is seen in the fact that Khudaiberdiyev reportedly fled to Uzbekistan and yet neither Abdullajanov nor Khudaiberdiyev has been turned over to Tajikistan to stand trial.219 Some observers claim that the incursions conducted by Namangani were a direct answer by authorities in Tajikistan to the Khudaiberdiyev incursion.220

218 Ibid.
219 Segodnia, 1 November 1998, rep. in ibid.
For much of the post-Soviet period, Tajikistan has felt itself under siege by Uzbekistan, which has maintained a blockade of sorts to contain the perceived threat of spreading instability. Tajikistan is almost exclusively dependent on Uzbekistan for transport links to the outside world, and yet in crossing into Uzbekistan, citizens of Tajikistan are often humiliated and forced to pay bribes. Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, it is often impossible to get across the country without having all of their assets confiscated. Though much of this is undoubtedly not a specific state policy, it is supported by the general system of corruption existing in the region and in Uzbekistan; it is combined with a tacit endorsement by the official policies whereby containment of instability translated into an ethos of domination by the stronger neighbour.\(^{221}\)

There have also been serious differences between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Though a self-contended state and largely loyal to Russia, Kazakhstan in January 2000, discovered that border guards from Uzbekistan were marking out their border allegedly deep into the territory of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan responded with protest.\(^{222}\) Moreover, Uzbek border guards were frequently caught carrying out unilateral demarcations.\(^{223}\)

Meanwhile, Kazakhstan has occasionally adopted a dominant stance, particularly in relations with Kyrgyzstan. For example, when Kyrgyzstan became the only Central Asian state to be admitted to the World Trade Organisation, Kazakhstan responded by imposing severe restrictions on trade with its weaker neighbour.

From the very beginning, Turkmenistan's policy was to insulate itself from regional conflicts rather than to cooperate in any regional security system.

\(^{221}\) Ibid. p. 15.
\(^{222}\) Panorama, 14 July 2000.
\(^{223}\) Granitsa na Grani, Express-K, 7 September 2000, rep. in ICG Asia, No. 20. op. cit., p. 16.
Relations between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have often been tense and there have been shooting incidents on their common border. President Niyazov called for the construction of border fortifications in the problem areas and reinforced the border guards with an additional 500 servicemen. These incidents led Ashgabat to view its relationship with Tashkent as potentially more volatile than its relations with Kabul.224

All attempts at regional cooperation run up against problems of resources and priorities. While it is evidently a high priority to be perceived as promoting cooperation, as expressed through high profile summits, the practical work of cooperation is often not covered in budgets. For example, though all three countries entered into the regional anti-terrorist centre established in Bishkek in December 2000, as of June 2001, none of them followed through on their financial commitments.225

Cooperation is also hindered by different perceptions of the proper role for outside powers, with Russia and the US sometimes undermining regional cooperation by encouraging bilateral relations and discouraging participation in regional structures. The US appears satisfied that, for example, that Uzbekistan has left the CIS Collective Security Treaty and joined GUUAM. Washington has been sceptical about the participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which increasingly appears oriented against the US and the West. Russia has sought to play a dominant role in the regional groupings in which it participates, such as the CST and the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). The Central Asian States themselves have prioritised bilateral relations over regional structures, and

there have not been any attempts, for example, to employ regional institutions to address border delimitation issues, as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was used to resolve China's border issues with former Soviet states. 226

B. Incomplete Political Systems and Domestic Environments

Cooperation among the Central Asian states is not only difficult because of their divergent security concerns, there is also difference on the ways three states are governed that makes effective cooperation elusive. In Uzbekistan, the media and dissemination of information are tightly controlled and there is little political pluralism. Political parties are illusory having been set up by the regime to give the appearance of democracy. President Karimov has sought to gain legitimacy by appearing strong, and sometimes this has resulted in belittling his neighbours. In a February 1999 radio interview, he accused Akayev of being unable to "do much of anything apart from smile". 227 This had predictable effects on the public opinion in Kyrgyzstan, where parliamentary deputies demanded that cooperation with Uzbekistan be reduced and measures be taken to defend the dignity of the country. President Karimov also frequently broadcast invectives aimed at Tajikistan and its President, reducing further the already dim prospects for friendly relations.

There has also been a widespread outcry in response to Uzbekistan's efforts to seek territorial concessions. The sharp difference between the media cultures and political cultures of the two countries make cooperation often difficult or impossible.

The more open societies in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan present a challenge to Karimov who feels that he must discredit his neighbours in order to validate his

226 JCG Asia, No. 20, op. cit., p. 15.
own authoritarian style of rule.\textsuperscript{228} The presence of a legitimised Islamist party in Tajikistan presents a particular problem since the approach in Uzbekistan is diametrically opposite. Uzbekistan severely restricts the free flow of information but many issues that it considers sensitive are openly discussed in broadcasts from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and to a lesser extent Tajikistan.\textsuperscript{229}

Turkmenistan not only maintains astute neutrality but its administrative pattern has created certain doubts in the minds of the neighbouring countries. Niyazov has declared himself endorsed by the parliament as the President for life. It has come as an irritant for others and following the same pattern, Kazakhstan also tried to perpetuate the rule of Nazarbayev. Other important point of difference is the attitude of Turkmenistan towards Islamic radicals and the problem of drugs. Turkmenistan has never been harsh in dealing with the Islamic forces and it had also allegedly harboured several Islamist leaders who were hounded by Uzbekistan and facilitated their entry into Iran. Turkmenistan never cracked down heavily on the drug traffickers much to the irritation of its neighbours.

The economic differences present additional challenges. Uzbekistan due to its non-convertible currency erects barrier to trade with its neighbours, driving most commerce underground. In Kyrgyzstan, there is a relative free market, corruption and drug trafficking. Because of these factors, the security services are also given the task of imposing restrictions on the flow of goods and populations across the borders, further inhibiting regional cooperation.

From the foregoing discussions on the measures taken by the Central Asian republics against the onslaught of terrorism and drug trafficking, it can be said that the menace has not only confined itself to one particular country but has engulfed the whole region under its fold. The present leaders, who are any way ex-

\textsuperscript{228} ICG Asia, 20, op. cit., p. 16.
\textsuperscript{229} Ibid.

255
Communists, are desperate enough to crush these forces more through military intervention than other diplomatic and non-military measures. The republics being landlocked and sharing common border with each other have proven difficult to be manned and guarded totally from all sides. Therefore, the countries have also tried to ensure security through cooperation among each other as well as with other outside powers. Although it can not be said that all the measures have proved successful but so far they have kept the groups from taking over. In the post-September 11 period, the world attention to this specific problem in the Central Asian region has increased tremendously giving further legitimacy and strength to the efforts of the republics in dealing with terrorism and extremist fundamentalism in the region.