CHAPTER I

Indian Theories of Meaning
Before dealing with the theories of meaning as expounded by various Indian philosophical systems, we shall write briefly about the Indian literary theories as they also directly deal with the meaning of literary discourse. We shall now discuss the theories propounded by Bharata's *rasa* theory, Bhamaha and Dandi of alamkara school, Vamana of *riti-guna* school, Dhvanyaloka of Anandavardhana, Vakroktijivita of Kuntaka, Kavyamimamsa of Rajasekhara and Mamata's Kavyaprakasa. Though Bharata's *rasa* theory has not been developed strictly as a literary theory, it is in the background of various literary theories developed in India. Therefore, first of all we will write about the *rasa* theory of Bharata.

**Rasa theory of Bharata**

*Rasa* is defined by Bharata in his *Natyasastra* as follows: vibhavanubhava - vyabhicari - samyogat - rasa - nispattih (Pandit Kedarnath, 1983:93) which means that the "combination of vibhavas (determinants) and anubhavas (consequents) together with vyabhicari bhavas (transitory states) produce rasa" (*Natyasastra, A Board of Scholars, Sri Satguru Publication, Delhi, p73). Rasa is that which is relishable - *rasa iti kah padarthah atrucyate asvadyatvat* (Pandit Kedarnath, 1983:93).

Now we will first define *bhava, vibhava, anubhava* as
these terms have been used in the definition of rasa. Bhava is a particular mental state in specific situations towards something or somebody and that object or that person towards which bhava is expressed is called vibhava. Defining bhava, Bharata says - vagangasattvopetankavyarthanbhavayantiti bhava iti (Pandit Kedarnath, 1983:104). That is to say, bhava are those, 

"which bhavayanti (instill meaning) of the theme of the literary composition into the audience by means of vacika, angika and sattvika means of presentation." (Natyasastra, A Board of Scholars, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi). Thus bhava is actually an instrument of causation which makes the meaning of the literary composition bhavayanti (infuse or pervade the mind of the audience). Bharata explains this instrument of causation in three ways: -

1. as an instrument to bring the theme conveyed into realization.
2. as an instrument to reveal the idea of the poet.
3. as an instrument to make rasas pervade.

Bharata in the seventh chapter writes three slokas related to this:

\[\text{Vibhavairahrto yortho hyanubhavaistu gamyate.}\]
\[\text{Vagangasattvabhinayaih sa bhava iti sangyitah.}\]

(sloka 1, chapter7)

i.e. "when the theme conveyed by the vibhava is brought into realization through anubhava by means of the gestures whether vacika, angika or sattvika, it is termed as bhava."
(Natyasastra, A Board of Scholars, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi). So bhava is the instrumental cause to make the meanings present by vibhava and anubhava pervade the mind and heart of the audience.

The second sloka on bhava is:

Vagangamukharagena sattvenabhinayena ca.
Kaverantargatam bhavam bhavayanubhava ucyate.

(sloka 2, chapter 7)
i.e."That which makes the idea of the poet revealed through words, gesticulation, colours of the face and temperamental representation is called bhava." (Natyasastra, A Board of Scholars, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi). Here also bhava is understood as an instrumental cause to reveal sattva, i.e., the essence of the ideas of the poet through different kinds of abhinaya.

The third sloka on bhava is:

Nanabhinayasambadhanbhavayanti rasaniman.
Yasmattasamadamibhava vigyeya natyayoktrbhih.

(sloka 3, chapter 7)
i.e."Since they make these rasas related to different gestures pervade (the comprehension of the audience) they should be known by the sponsors of the dramatic performance as bhavas." (Natyasastra, A Board of Scholars, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi). Here, bhava is the instrumental cause to establish the required relationship between rasas and
abhinaya into the mind of the audience. Hence, bhava, as understood by Bharata in all these three slokas, is a cause to bring about the meaning manifested by abhinaya.

Next we are going to define vibhava which is translated by Manmohan Ghosh as determinant. According to The Practical Sanskrit English Dictionary of V.S. Apte, the prefix 'vi' means distinct. Hence, vibhava is that distinct instrumental cause which makes the existence of bhavas possible. Vibhava is the cause of bhava. As Bharata says, "vibhavah karanam nimittam heturiti paryayah" (Pandit Kedarnath, 1983:105) i.e. vibhava is the synonym of karana, nimitta and hetu. Karana and hetu are almost perfect synonyms but there is a difference in the meaning of karana and nimitta. Karana is the cause and nimitta is the instrument through which the cause operates to proceed towards the consequence. Hence, there are two kinds of vibhavas - alambana and uddipana. Pt. Jagannatha writes in Rasagangadhara: "evamesam sthayibhavanam loke tattanayakagatanam yanyalambanayoddipinataya va karanatvena prasiddhanika, tanyesu kavyanatyayorvyajyamanesu vibhavasabdena vyapadisyante", (Pandit Jagannatha, 1987:146) i.e. when the causes of sthayibhava which we know as alambana (supporting causes) and uddipana (stimulating or circumstantial causes), are described in the literature or the play they are called vibhava. For example, for the sthayi bhava of rati or Love, the alambana vibhava will be
the hero and the heroin and the uddipana vibhava will be a cloudy weather, solitude and such other circumstances. Further, there are two kinds of alambana - visayalambana and asrayalambana. Visayalambana is the object of the rise of an emotion, that is, a person or object or event for whom or which the emotion has arisen. Asrayalambana is the person in whom the emotion has awakened.

Anubhava is defined as, "anubhavyatenena vagangasattvakrtobhinaya iti" (Pandit Kedarnath, 1983:105), i.e. "Since the dramatic presentation by means of words, gestures and the temperament are made to be felt by this, it is called anubhava (consequent)." (Natyasastra, A Board of Scholars, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi). Anubhava literally means that which follows bhava. Anubhava are the visible effects after the rise of a bhava, i.e., an emotional state. Anubhava is directly related to abhinaya in a literary work as it is the linguistic representation of anubhava that shows the emotional state of a character. On anubhava, Bharata says:

Vagangabhinayeneh yatastvarthonubhavyate.

Sakhangopangasamyuktastvanubhavastatah smrtah.

(Sloka 5, Chapter 7)

i.e."Since the meaning is sought to be felt by the spectators by means of words, gestures and dramatic presentation it is called anubhava and it is remembered as relating to words, gestures and ancillary angas." (Natyasastra, A Board of Scholars, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi).
Bharata further classifies bhavas in three broad categories - sthayi (permanent), vyabhicari or sancari (transitory) and sattvika (which are non-voluntary physical reactions or responses to the rise of a durable emotion). The distinction between sthayi bhava and the sancari bhava is that sthayi bhava is the principal and dominant state of emotion whereas sancari bhava is the subsidiary and auxiliary state of emotion. Sattvika bhava is the non-voluntary response to sthayi bhava.

Bharata expounds eight sthayi bhavas, thirty three sancari bhavas and eight sattvikas. Hence there exist forty nine bhavas. The eight sthayi bhavas are as follows:

1. Rati: The essence of rati is pleasure - the joy in getting the desired object. This is an all pervading permanent state of emotion. The vibhavas awakening this sthayi bhava are favourable seasons, garlands, unguents, ornaments, persons near and dear, lofty abodes, absence of antagonism (from others) etc. These vibhavas may be numerous depending upon the context of the drama and the civilization but the bhava will be the same. The anubhava for representing rati will be face beaming with smiles, words or exquisite sweetness, knitting of the eyebrows, glances etc.

2. Hasa: It is laughter. Incongruity causes laughter. It is produced and also represented by reproducing someone's activities and behaviour by imitation and parody. Also inconsistent utterances, foolish activities and anything contrary to propriety produce laughter.
3. *Soka:* It is sorrow caused by separation from beloved ones, destruction of assets, murder, imprisonment and such other situations. The general *anubhavas* for representing *soka* are shedding tears, lamentations, bewailing, pallor in the face, change of voice, sensation of looseness of limbs, falling on the ground, weeping loudly, writhing and squirming, deep sighs, sluggishness, madness, loss of sense, death etc.

4. *Krodha:* It is anger caused by insulting affront, abusive words, quarrel, dispute, adverse remarks, altercations and such other situations. Bharata classifies anger into five categories and suggests different ways to represent each category of anger. The anger can be against - the open resistance by the enemies, the venerable person, the beloved, the attendant and the pretended anger. Bharata enumerates different *anubhavas* for each kind of anger which are different in each case even though the principal emotion is the same.

5. *Utsaha:* It is energetic enthusiasm resulting from power, courage, heroism, readiness to sacrifice, absence of distress and such other situations. It is a particular psychological state which normally does not have any immediate *vibhava* and Bharata indicates it to be represented by general attitudes such as fortitude, astute readiness to undertake much, alertness and acts of vigilance.

6. *Bhaya:* It is fear mainly in the mean type of persons. The *vibhavas* for this are some crimes committed against
preceptors and kings, wandering through forests and vacant houses, seeing mountains, being rebuked, cloudy days, nocturnal darkness, movement of owls, hearing the shouts of raksasas etc. The anubhavas for bhaya are loosening of limbs, twinkling of eyes, frights, trembling of hands and feet, opening of eyes widely and such similar actions and qualities.

7. Jugupsa: It is disgust arising from hearing and listening to unpleasant things. Its anubhavas are contracting all the limbs, spitting out, twisting of the mouth, heartache etc.

8. Vismaya: It is wonderment produced by vibhavas like jugglery, magical illusion, superhuman activity, wonderful and mysterious body, artistic craft, excellence and the like. Its anubhavas are tears of joy, dilating of eyes, distortion of eyebrows, horripilation, perspiration and sometimes shouting 'bravo, bravo'.

The above mentioned eight sthāyi bhavas constitute the principal emotional states of man. These sthāyi bhavas are supported by forty one vyabhicari or sancari bhavas. The word vyabhicari literally means those that take the movement of different objects towards rasas. There are forty one vyabhicari bhavas:

1. Nirveda: It is despondency produced by vibhavas such as impoverished state, insult, being called by bad names, angry thrashing, separation from dear ones and such others similar.

2. Glani: It is feebleness caused by general illness,
religious penances, old age, excess of drinking, exercise, traveling, hunger or thirst and such other physical conditions.

3. **Sanka**: It is a fearful suspicion.

4. **Asuya**: It is jealousy arising from others' fortune, power, wealth and such other things of which one feels a lack in oneself.

5. **Mada**: It is inebriety caused by intoxication. It is of three kinds - *taruna* (which in this context means excessive), *madhya* (medium) and *avakrsta* (light or low).

6. **Srana**: It is exhaustion or fatigue because of journey, exercise or any such tiring enterprises.

7. **Alasya**: It is lethargy which may be caused by natural inclination, sorrow, walking, satiety, pregnancy, sickness etc.

8. **Dainya**: It is wretchedness and dejection as a consequence of extreme poverty, mental distress etc.

9. **Cinta**: It is anxiety caused by poverty, loss of wealth or theft of some dear object, expectant eager heart etc.

10. **Moha**: It is delusion. Its general vibhavas are adversity, accidents, fear and recollection of previous enmity.

11. **Smrti**: It is recollection produced by means of vibhavas which remind one of things and events producing happiness or misery.

12. **Dhrti**: It is contentment and fortitude. The vibhavas that produce *dhrti* are spiritual knowledge, affluence, devotion to preceptors, good habits and such others which
can counter bhaya (fear), soka (grief) and visada (agony).

13. Vrida: It is shame caused by disrespect to elders, not keeping promises, regret over some wrong that is committed and other similar things.

14. Capalata: It is inconstancy resulting from vibhavas like the absence of restraint in case of passion, hatred, rivalry, excessive anger, jealousy etc.

15. Harsa: It is delight caused by the satisfaction due to the achievement of what is desired like good food, appreciation or someone's love.

16. Avega: It is excitement caused by adverse circumstances and excessively good or bad news.

17. Jadata: It is stupor or sluggishness leading to cessation or reluctance to resume all types of activities. It is caused by sickness and hearing or seeing something extremely desired or completely undesired.

18. Garva: It is arrogance from vibhavas such as excessive affluence, nobility of birth, handsomeness and beauty of form, youth, academic distinction, influence and such other situations.

19. Visada: It is dejection arising out of nonfulfillment of the work undertaken, natural calamities, adverse fate and the like.

20. Autsukya: It is impatience. It may be caused by seeking parks or reflection after the separation from beloved persons.

21. Nidra: It is sleep. It is caused by vibhavas like weakness, fatigue, exhaustion, intoxication, indolence,
excessive thinking, excessive eating, natural soporific tendencies and the like.

22. Apasmara: It is epilepsy produced by means of vibhavas such as malignant possession of an evil deity, serpent, yaksa, raksasa, pisaca and others, recollection of such beings, partaking of the left over foods by others, frequenting empty chambers, going through unclear forests, derangement of bodily hormones etc.

23. Supta: It is dream-sleeping. No vibhavas are mentioned for this.

24. Vibodha: It means waking up. This state arises because of the break of sleep, digestion of food, evil dreams, loud sounds etc.

25. Amarsa: It means anger of indignation which arises in an enthusiastic person when he or she is publicly insulted by someone superior.

26. Avahittha: It is dissimulation caused by shame, fear, defeat, deceit, undue aggressiveness etc.

27. Ugrata: It is ferocity arising as an emotion out of incarceration of the thieves, offense to the kings, speaking offensive words and such other vibhavas.

28. Mati: It is intellectual self-assurance resulting from thinking about the purport of the scriptural texts, considerations and conjecturing and inferences.

29. Vyadhi: It is ailment. Bharata explains the causes of vyadhi in terms of the ayurvedic tradition as vata (wind), pitta (bile) and kapha (phlegm). The attack of these three humours and their cumulative effect leads to vyadhi.
30. **Unmada**: It is insanity produced by vibhavas such as death of a beloved person, loss of wealth, accidental injury, upsetting of the bodily humour etc.

31. **Marana**: It means death. It may be the result of ailment of violent attack.

32. **Trasa**: It is fright produced as a consequence of lightning, comet fall, striking by thunderbolt, earthquake, ominous gathering of clouds, crying of the wild animals and the like.

33. **Vitarka**: It is deliberations caused by vibhavas such as doubt, cogitation, perplexity and the like.

After this Bharata mentions *sattvika bhavas* as a category of those *bhavas* which are *manahprabhavam* - originating in mind. Bharata makes this distinct classification for those *bhavas* whose enactment is possible only by a concentrated effort of mind. The eight categories of *sattvika bhavas* are as follows:

1. **Stambha**: It is paralysis as a result of joy, fear, ailment, wonderment, sadness, inebriety and anger.

2. **Sveda**: It means perspiration which results from anger, fright, delight, bashfulness, sadness, fatigue, sickness, heat, hitting, exercise, weariness, summer heat and affliction.

3. **Romanca**: It is horripilation. Its vibhavas are touch, fear, chillness, delight, anger and ailments.

4. **Svarabheda**: It is affliction in the voice caused by fear, delight, anger, fever, ailments and inebriation.

5. **Vepathu**: It is tremor caused by chillness, fear,
delight, touch and senility.

6. Vaivarnyam: It means the changing of the colour (mainly of the face) as a result of chillness, anger, fear, fatigue, sickness, toil and distress.

7. Asru: It means shedding tears because of vibhavas like joy, indignation, smoke, collyrium, yawning, fear, sadness, staring, cold and sickness.

8. Pralaya: It means sinking or fainting as a result of toil, swoon, intoxication, sleep, injurious attack, delusion etc.

After having defined the bhavas, vibhavas and anubhavas, now we shall enumerate the rasas as expounded by Bharata:

1. Srngara: It is the state of being evoked by the beautiful, the good and the perfect. Its sthāyi bhava is rati. There are two kinds of this - sambhoga srngara (love in union) and vipralambha srngara (love in separation).

2. Hasya: It is humour with hasa as its sthāyi bhava.

3. Karuna: It is pathos with soka (sorrow) being its sthāyi bhava.

4. Raudra: It is translated as impetuous anger or wrath. Its sthāyi bhava is krodha (anger).

5. Vira: It is the heroic sentiment evoked by the sthāyi bhava utsaha present in the persons of superior type.

6. Bhayanaka: It is the terrible sentiment with bhaya as its sthāyi bhava.

7. Bibhatsa: This is the odious sentiment with jugupsa (disgust) as its sthāyi bhava.
8. **Adbhuta**: It is the sentiment related to wonderment and surprise. Vismaya (surprise) is its *sthayi bhava*.

Apart from these eight rasas of Bharata, later scholars of the same tradition write about *santa*, *bhakti* and *vatsalya rasas*. Often *bhakti* is considered to be an admixture of *santa* and *srngara* and *vatsalya* as part of the *sthayi bhava* of *rati*.

**Kavyalamkara of Bhamaha**

Bhamaha (circa 600A.D.) is the first theorist in India who directly dealt with the verbal poetic discourse. Though he mentions the names of poeticians (like Acyutottara in 2.19, Ramasharma in 2.19 and 2.58 and many others) their works seems to have lost forever. Normally, Bhamaha is accepted to be the propounder of the alamkara school. There are six chapters in *Kavyalamkara* which do not appear to have been written in a very systematic manner. There are fiftynine karikas in the first chapter on the purpose, cause, characteristics and types of poetry. The ninetysix karikas of the second chapter are on the qualities and embellishments of poetry. Fiftyeight karikas of the third chapter also deal with the poetic embellishments. Fiftyone karikas of the fourth chapter are on *dosas* defects of poetry. Fifth and sixth chapters discuss philosophy and grammar for the benefit of the poets so that they may avoid the defects according to the logicians and grammarians.

The first available definition of *kavya* in Indian poetics is by Bhamaha - *sabdarthau sahitau kavyam* (1.16)
i.e. the coexistence of sabda and artha constitute poetry. If we read this definition in the context as it appears in the text, sabda stands for sabdalamkara and artha for arthalamkara. Both are equally important and together constitute poetry. Bhamaha indicates that there are contemporary poeticians or prior to him who attach more importance to one of the above mentioned alamkaras and then opines that both of them are equally important in poetry. Though Bhamaha is supposed to be the propounder of the alamkara school, he gives full credence to vakrokti as the most important aspect of poetry. He writes in Kavyalamkara:

Vakrabhidheyasabdoktirista vacamalankrtih (1.36)
(The oblique use of sabda and artha are the embellishment of speech.)

Saisa sarvaiva vakroktiranayartho vibhavyate (2.85)
(This, i.e. atisayokti is the essence of all oblique statement.)

In this karika, vakrokti is compared to poetry and essence of the embellishments of poetic language. Further in the fifth chapter, Bhamaha states:

Vacan vakrarthasabdoktiralamkaraya kalpate (5.66)
(The beauty of speech is attained through oblique word and statement.)

Thus one remarks that since the dawn of Indian poetics, vakrokti or obliqueness is an important parameter to differentiate between the poetic and non-poetic language. However, there has been a consistent effort to formally analyse the poetic language and so the Indian poeticians
have rigorously evolved formal categories of linguistic analysis of the poetic language. Despite devoting major sections of his treatise on the alamkaras Bhamaha accepts vakrokti as the essence of poetry and ananda as the purpose of poetry. Bhamaha is the first one to introduce ananda: Bharata has nowhere mentioned it in his discussion on the purpose of Natya in 1.109-222 of his Natyasastra.

Bhamaha mentions four causes of poetry:

(1) **Pratibha**: Bhamaha writes

Gurupadesadhyetum sastram jadadhiyopyalam.
Kavyam tu jayate jatu kasyacitpratibhavatah. (1.5)

i.e. Even unintelligent people can study sastras with help of teacher's guidance, but poetry flashes only sometimes in some people endowed with pratibha. It is sakti or ability and intuition to create poetic language.

(2) Knowledge of sabda, chanda, abhidhanartha, itihasakatha, loka, tarkasastra, kala (words and its embellishments, meters, meanings understood, history-tales, worldly knowledge, knowledge of treatises on logic and philosophy, knowledge of arts). Bhamaha mentions all these in karika 1.9. Poeticians sometimes denote all these by vyutpatti.

(3) **Abhyasa** or practice: Bhamaha writes

Sabdabhidheye vijnaya krtva tadvidupasanam.
Vilokyanyanibandhansca karyah kavyakriyadarah. (1.10)

i.e. After attaining knowledge of sabda and artha, after rendering due regards to those who know poetry and after
looking at the works of other poets one should begin the act of writing poetry. This act needs continuous reading and writing or else even the best of poets may lose the poetic fervour of language.

(4) In 1.5 quoted above under section on pratibha, it is important to note that poetry flashes only sometimes in some people. 'Sometimes' may connote the presence of those factors which stimulate the poetic creativity. Despite pratibha, vyutapatti and abhyasa, poetic creativity is stimulated only when there is some vibhava, i.e. prerana or immediate cause of poetic flash. The first three are the nimittakarana of poetry which may remain dormant in the absence of an upadanakarana which is prerana.

Bhamaha gives the following classification of poetry:

(1) Gadya and padya on the basis of presence and absence of chanda.

(2) On the basis of language, there are three kinds of poetry: (i) samskrta (ii) prakrta (iii) apabhramsa

(3) On the basis of content, there are four kinds of poetry: (i) khyatavrtta (based on some metanarrative) (ii) kalpita (based on the imagination of the poet) (iii) k alasrita (based on arts) (iv) sastrasrita (based on sastras).

The last two categories are not accepted by later theoreticians because arts and sastras cannot be the main content of a poem. While knowledge of arts and sastra are essential for poetic creativity, they themselves cannot be the overall subject of a poem.
(3) On the basis of form there are five kinds of poetry:
(i) mahakavya (ii) rupaka (iii) akhyayika (iv) katha (v) muktaka. Bhamaha discusses the characteristics of each one of them in detail but we will not go into them as it may not be much relevant for our thesis.

**Dosas or defects of poetry according to Bhamaha**

Before counting the defects of poetry as enumerated in *Kavyalamkara*, one should draw attention to this concept of Bhamaha:

*Sannivesavisesattu duruktamapi sobhate.*

*Nilam palasamababdhamantarale srajamiva.* (1.54)

and

*Kincidasrayasaundaryaddhatte sobhamasadhvapi.*

*Kantavilocananyastam malimasamivanjanam.* (1.55)

i.e. Even the green leaves in a garland of flowers and similar defective expressions sometimes become beautiful because of specificity of context.(1.54) and the defect sometimes becomes beautiful because of its base or dependence on certain factors like even the black mascara looks beautiful when applied on the eyes of a lovely woman.

Thus, though Bhamaha devotes about 170 karikas on formal categorization of defects of poetry, he does not restrict the domain of interpretation of a poetic work.

Bhamaha writes about dosas of poetry mainly in following three places:

(1) In the first chapter he mentions without context the following dosas:

35
Neyartham klistamanyarthamavacakamayuktimat.

Gurhasabdabhidhanam ca kavayo na prayujjate. (1.37)
i.e. neyartha, klista, anyartha, avacaka, ayuktimat and
gurhasabdabhidhana are not used by poets. In 1.38-46,
Bhamaha defines these defects:

Neyartham niyate yuktto yasyarthah krtibhirbalat.

Sabdanyayanuparurhah kathancitsvabhisandhina. (1.38)
i.e. when the language is not used according to its rules
and when the relevant meaning has to be culled forcibly
it is the neyartha defect.

Karika 1.40 defines klista and anyartha as:

Klistan vyavahitan vidyadanyarthan vigame yatha
i.e. hindrance in meaning is klista and non-availability of
meaning is anyartha.

In 1.41, avacaka defect is defined as use of a word in
its unpopular meaning. For example, himapaha (enemy of ice)
to mean fire. Karika 1.42 explains ayuktimata as that which
is illogical according to our experience. For example, use
of cloud, wind, moon and such others as messenger. Bhamaha
implies that they are not endowed with speech and so they
cannot be the messengers. However, a celebrated counter
example to this explanation is Kalidasa's Meghadootam. On
the basis of karika 1.45 and 1.46 gurhasabdabhidhana is
periphrasis on the basis of relatively much lesser known
attributes of someone.

In karika 1.47 four more defects are enumerated:

Srutidustarthaduste ca kalpanadustamityapi.
Srutikastan tathaivahurvacan dosan caturvidham.
i.e. *srutidusta, arthadusta, kalpanadusta* and *srutikasta* - these are said to be four language based defects.

In 1.48 and 1.49, Bhamaha has enumerated words from Samskrita repertoire which are examples of *srutidusta* (unpleasant to hearing sense). According to 1.50 *arthadusta* is such use of words in a sentence which may indicate an uncivilized connotation. If phonetic assimilation of two words lead to the imagination of an undesired meaning it is known as *kalpanadusta* (1.52). Bhamaha does not define *srutikasta*. According to his example in 1.53, it may be understood as those words whose sound sequences are unpleasant to ears.

(2) In second chapter, after explaining *upamalamkara*, Bhamaha quotes Medhavi (his name is mentioned in 2.40 and he may be a precursor of Bhamaha) to enumerate following seven *upamadosas* (defects of simile):

*Hinatasambhavo lingavacobhedor viparayayah.*

*Upamanadhikatvan ca tenasadrsatapi ca.* (2.39)

i.e. Inferiority, impossibility, unmatched gender, comparison of plural with singular, contradiction, exaggeration of object of comparison and dissimilarity between the object compared and object of comparison - these seven are the defects of simile.

'Inferiority' is explained by the comparison of Krishna with cloud. Krishna is with three attributes - yellow attire, conchshell and bow whereas cloud only has rainbow which is comparable to Krishna's bow. The other two attributes of Krishna remain uncomapred. (2.41-42).
'Impossibility' is like comparing radiance of fire with brilliance of moon. (2.49)

Example of 'unmatched gender' is like comparing a king with a river which is a feminine gender word in Samskrta. Similarly, 'comparison of plural with singular' is like comparing the king (who wants to cross the army of opposite side) with 'women' (who want to cross the heart of the king). The comparison of king (in singular) with women (in plural) is a defect called vacanabheda. (based on 2.53). In 2.56, Bhamaha says that though feminine and masculine gender terms should not be compared, the comparison of a neuter gender term with masculine or feminine words is acceptable. However, he indicates that even this is not acceptable for many.

Contradiction or viparyaya are of two kinds: one in which the object compared (upamaya) is inferior and the other in which the object of comparison (upamana) is inferior. The example of first, called hina-viparyaya is in 2.54: Moving ahead and attacking by turning to back you scattered the enemy army in the same way as the dog scatters the herd of dears. Here, the brave warrior or the king has been compared with a dog and hence it is a defect. The example of adhika-viparyaya is given in 2.55: The cakravaka bird sitting on a lotus appears as Brahma who in the beginning of the era wants to create this universe. Here a bird has been compared with Brahma and so it is viparyayadosa.

Karika 2.58 gives an example of upamanadhikatva: Attired
in yellow and holding the bow Krishna's body looked beautiful as well as frightening just like the cloud embellished by moon, lightening and rainbow looks beautiful and frightening at night. Here Krishna is upameya and cloud is upamana. There are only two attributes of upameya - yellow attire and bow. There are three attributes of upamana - lightening, rainbow and moon. Lightening is compared with the yellow attire, rainbow with bow but there is nothing in comparison with the moon. This is an example of upamanadhikatva.

Asadrsata is illustrated in 2.63-64 by a comparison of planets with elephants and peacocks. Planets are neither as buoyant as the elephants nor as beautiful as the peacocks.

(3) Chapter four is completely dedicated to the defects of poetry. In 4.1-2, Bhamaha enumerates following dosas: (i) apartha (ii) vyartha (iii) ekartha (iv) sasamsaya (v) apakrama (vi) sabdahina (vii) yatibhrasta (viii) bhinnavrtta (ix) visandhi (x) desavrodhi (xi) kalavrodhi (xii) kalavrodhi (xiii) lokavrodhi (xiv) nyayavrodhi (xv) agamavrodhi (xvi) pratijnahina (xvii) hetuhina (xviii) drstantahina.

These are illustrated as follows:

(i) Apartha is that which is devoid of meaning.(4.3) This karika when read with 4.8 explains apartha as an instance where the separate terms and sentences contain meaning but altogether there is no discursive meaning when we read these sentences in combination.

(ii) An instance of Vyartha is when the later statement
contradicts the former one.

(iii) When the same word or its synonym is reiterated without any specific purpose, it is ekartha or punarukta (based on 4.12).

(iv) Any use of language which leaves its meaning doubtful is sasamsaya.

(v) According to 5.20, apakrama is an instance when there is fault in correct ordering (it may be a case of anachronism).

(vi) Sabdahina is that use of language which against the norms prescribed by the grammarians - Panini, Katyayana and Patanjali (5.22).

(vii) Yatibhrasta is that which does not follow the punctuation rules of chanda. Yati means punctuational rests while reading in a meter and any fault in these punctuation rests is an example of yatibhrasta (4.24).

(viii) Bhinnavrtta is wrong usage of short and long vowels in a meter. The position of short and long vowels are fixed in a meter and any change in that is termed as bhinnavrtta (4.26).

(ix) Visandhi is not defined. According to its example in 4.28, this is a defect that occurs when phonetic assimilation (sandhi) is not sanctioned by grammarians but this diminishes the beauty of the verse.

(x) When poet's description does not match the realities of a particular locality, it is desavirodhi (4.29).

(xi) When there is wrong ordering or incorrect juxtaposition of the six seasons, it is kalavirodhi.
Karika 4.33 explains kalavirodhi:

Kala samkalana prajna silpanyasyasca gocarah.

Viparyastan tathaivahustadvirodhakaran yatha.

i.e. The intellect that collects is called kala. Crafts (silpa) and such others are its subject. Any wrong description in the rules or their incorrect ordering is kalavirodhi.

That which is against the established norms of the world (loka) is lokavirodhi (4.36).

Whenever the norms of sastras on dharma, artha, kama (trivarga) and the policy of governance (dandaniti) are contradicted it is nyayavirodhi (4.39).

Whenever the dharmasastras and the worldly norms are contradicted, it is agamaavrodh.

Pratijnahina is explained in 5.12-20. Pratijna means the basic premise in formulation of a logical argument. There are six following defects which are collectively termed as pratijnahina:

(a) Tadarthavirodini: That basic premise which contradicts itself as for example - I am biological son of a father who remained ascetic (brahmacari) since his childhood. (5.14).

(b) Hetuvirodini: That basic premise whose universal proposition is not established beyond doubt. For example, soul exists in all beings. (5.15)

(c) Svasiddhantavirodini: The premise which contradicts one's own philosophical ideas. For example, Vaisesika school accepts word as unconventional (anitya) and its...
propounder puts up a basic premise that words are conventional (nitya). (5.17).

(d) Sarvagamavirodhini: That basic premise which are contradictory to all schools of philosophy (5.18). For example, there are three pramanas. This is contrary to all schools of Indian philosophy. The list of pramanas are as follows:

Carvaka: Pratyaksa
Baudha and Vaisesika: Pratyaksa and anumana
Naiyayika: Pratyaksa, anumana, upamana and sabda
Prabhakara school of Mimamsa: Pratyaksa, anumana, upamana, sabda and arthapatti
Bhatta school of Mimamsa and Vedanta: Pratyaksa, anumana, upamana, sabda, arthapatti and anupalabdhi.

Thus the basic premise that there are three pramanas is against all agamas.

(e) Prasiddhadharma: That premise which intends to establish what is already well established. For example, we hear sound through our ears. (5.19).

(f) Pratyaksabadhini: That premise which is contradicted by perception (pratyaksa) itself. For example, fire is cool or there is no form. (5.20).

(xvii) Hetuhina: Hetu means sadhana i.e. 'means'. When we see 'smoke' and conclude that there is 'fire', smoke is sadhana and fire is sadhya. When hetu is not sufficient to arrive at sadhya it is hetuhina or hetvabhasa. There is a brief and vague explanation of this category in 5.11 and 5.21-25. This explanation is not so relevant in poetics and
so this has been omitted by latter poeticians.

(xviii) Drstantahina: When both sadhya and sadhana are present in a proof, it is called drstanta. Absence of any or both of them is drstantahina. (5.26-27).

The last three categories have been left out by the later poeticians as they are hardly of any purpose in analyzing the poetic creativity and poetic meaning. In 5.29, Bhamaha indicates that often even in absence of dosas, it appears as if there is a dosa and calls this situation as dosabhasa. Apart from the above defects, Bhamaha mentions the following dosas in contexts dealing with other topics than dosas:

(1) Apustarthata, vakroktihinata, gramyata and akulata:
while explaining the ritis, Bhamaha writes following karika:

Apustarthamavakrokti prasannamrju komalam.
Bhinnan geyamivedan tu kevalan srutipesalam. (1.34)

i.e. That whose meaning is not clear and which lacks obliqueness and is pleasing, simple and soft is different from (the true poetry). It is only pleasing to ears like the lyrical music. Here vagueness of meaning and lack of obliqueness are indicated as defects of poetry.

The next karika is:

Alamkaravadagramyamarthyan nyayyamanakulam.
Gaudiyamapi sadhiyo vaidarbhimiti nanyatha. (1.35)
i.e. Full of embellishments, lacking rusticness, meaningful, adhering to philosophical norms and non-
difficulty (poetry of) of gaudiya style is also good; otherwise even vaidarbha lacking in these qualities is not good. Here gramyata and akulata are mentioned as defects of poetry.

Similarly, in the following karika, Bhamaha mentions asahrdayata, asunirbheda and apesalata as defects:

Ahrdyamasunirbhedam rasavattvepyapesalam.
Kavyam kapitthamamam yatkesancitsadrsan yatha. (5.62)
i.e. Some people's poetical works are not pleasing despite containing rasa because of its inability to pervade to our emotion and because it does not contain penetrable meaning like the unripe fruit of the kapittha tree. Thus, non-pleasantness, inability to pervade to our emotions and difficulty in comprehension are the defects of poetry.

Further in the following karika four more defects are enumerated:

Viruddhapadamasvartham bahupuranamakulam.
Kurvanti kavyamapare vyayatabhipsaya yatha. (5.67)
i.e. If one wants to unnecessarily elongate one's poetical work, then one's poems contain defects like contradiction in terms, non-beautiful meaning, redundant words and difficulty of comprehension. Thus four defects are mentioned here - viruddhapadam (contradiction in terms), asvartham (non-beautiful meaning), bahupuranam (redundancy in expression) and vyayatata (unnecessary extension of poetical work).

Gunas of poetry
Bhamaha mentions three qualities - oja, madhurya and prasada in the following three karikas:

Madhuryamabhivanchantah prasadanca sumedhasah.
Samasavanti bhuyansi na padani prayujjate. (2.1)
i.e. Those who want sweetness and pleasantness in poetry do not use too many compounded terms.

Kecitojobhidhisantah samasyanti bahunyapi.
Yatha mandarakusumarenupinjiritalaka. (2.2)
i.e. Those who favour oja do samasa of many padas. As for example 'the heroin whose eyelids are yellow like the flowers of mandara'.

Sravyan natismastartham kavyam madhuramisyate.
Avidvadanganabalamuparinjiritalaka. (2.3)
i.e. That poetry which does not have too much of compounding of words and is sweet to listen to is called madhura. That poetry whose meaning is understood by all-scholars, women and children - contains prasada.

Thus Bhamaha enumerates three qualities of poetry:
(1) Oja: That which is abundance in compounded terms.
(2) Madhurya: That which is pleasing to ears and does not contain too many compounded terms.
(3) Prasada: Easy to understand and not containing too many compounded terms.

Now we shall expound the alamkaras enumerated by Bhamaha. Bhamaha, the first poetician of Indian tradition according to available treatises on poetics, is the major exponent of alamkara school in Indian poetics. Eventhough he accepts vakrabhidheyasabdoktirista vacamalankrtih (1.36) he is not
considered in the tradition of vakrokti school. Bhamaha does not say that alamkara is the soul of poetry like Vamana and Anandavardhana who accept respectively riti and dhvani as the soul of poetry. Some conjectural arguments for Bhamaha having attained the status of an alamkarika may be as follows:

(1) In karika 1.13 Bhamaha accepts alamkara as the basis of the ornateness of poetry:

Rupakadiralankarastathanyairbahudhoditah.

Na kantamapi nirbhusan vibhati vanitananam. (1.13)
i.e. Various alamkarikas have mentioned rupaka and other alamkaras in different ways. Even the face of a beautiful woman is not radiant without embellishments.

(2) 151 out of about 400 karikas are on alamkara.

(3) The meaning of the word alamkara was much wider in his time. Even according to Bhamaha the basic element of alamkara (2.81) is atisayokti which means lokatikrantagocara vacana (2.81) i.e. the statement which implies something beyond its popular meaning. Even according to 1.13, all that is the embellishment of poetry is alamkara. It is only in this sense that Bhamaha is an alamkarika. Otherwise, he can be considered the propounder of vakrokti school as he attaches a lot of importance to obliqueness:

Hetusca suksmo lesotha nalankarataya matalah.

Samudayabhidhanasya vakroktyanabhidhanatah. (2.86)
i.e. Hetu, suksma and lesa are not considered as alamkara because they lack obliqueness.
Further in karika 5.66 Bhamaha says vacanvakrarthasabdoktiralankaraya kalpate i.e. beauty of speech is attained through oblique word and meaning.

Thus obliqueness is an essential element of poetic use of language and alamkara is all that (i) acts as an embellishment to the poetic language (ii) which contains an implication beyond its literal sense. The thirty eight alamkaras mentioned by Bhamaha and more alamkaras mentioned by later poeticians are only certain observed frequent instances of such uses of language.

Bhamaha mentions following thirty eight alamkaras in Kavyalamkara:

Two sabdalamkaras: anuprasa and yamaka
Thirtysix arthalamkaras: (1)rupaka (2)dipaka (3)upama (4)aksepa (5)arthantaranyasa (6)vyatireka (7)vibhavana (8)samasokti (9)atisayokti (10)yathasamkhya (11)utpreksa (12)svabhavokti (13)preya (14)rasavat (15)urjasvi (16)paryayokti (17)samahita (18)udatta (19)slista (20)apahnuti (21)visesokti (22)virodha (23)tulyayogita (24)apрастutaprasamsa (25)vyajastuti (26)nidarsana (27)upamarupaka (28)upameyopama (29)sahokti (30)parivrtti (31)sasandeha (32)anavaya (33)utpreksavayava (34)samsrsti (35)bhavikatva (36)asih

Now we shall discuss them one by one in the light of Kavyalamkara. First we take up the two sabdalamkaras:
(1) Anuprasa: Successive use of formally same alphabets is called anuprasa (2.5). In 2.6 and 2.8 Bhamaha gives examples of gramyanuprasa and latanuprasa but does not
explain their characteristics. Anuprasa should be such that their meanings are different but their alphabets are not different (2.7).

(2) Yamaka: Repetition of those alphabets which produce same sound sequence but contain different meanings is yamaka (2.17). There are five kinds of yamaka - adiyamaka, madhyantayamaka, padabhyasa, avali and samastapadayamaka (2.9). When repetition of the same alphabets with different meanings is in the beginning of every foot of the verse, it is adiyamaka (2.11). When similar repetition is in the middle or the end of each verse, it is madhyantayamaka (2.12). When two feet are completely repeated, it is padabhyasa (2.13). When there is a series of different repetitions without adhering to any specific positioning, it is avali (2.14). When in the end of each verse, the same sequence of alphabets are repeated, it is samastapadayamaka (2.15). In 2.18, Bhamaha defines the qualities of yamaka - that yamaka is beautiful in which the words (for sequence of alphabets) are well-known, euphonic combinations are clear and simple, which contain oja, prasada and are easy to pronounce. Otherwise, according to 2.19, if one has to work hard on understanding the repeated sequence of alphabets, it is inferior yamaka and is called prahelika.

Following are the arthalamkaras discussed by Bhamaha:

(1) Rupaka: When an identity is established between the object of comparison and the object compared on the basis of similarity of qualities, it is called rupaka (2.21).
There are two kinds of *rupaka - samastavastuvisaya* and *ekadesavivarti* (2.22). 2.23 and 2.24 respectively exemplify them - their characteristics are not explained separately. When all the elements of comparison evoked are correspondingly mentioned one by one by the words used, it is *samastavastuvisaya*. In *ekadesavivarti*, at least one point of comparison is left for the reader to understand.

(2) *Dipaka*: Bhamaha does not define *dipaka*. He mentions three kinds of *dipaka* - *adi*, *madhya*, and *anta* on the basis of its position of the same characteristics (2.25). Karikas 2.27-29 exemplify these three kinds of *dipaka*.

(3) *Upama*: By virtue of location in space, time and action, even the slightest similarity between the objection of comparison and the object compared, is known as *upama*. There are four karikas (2.31-34) on different kinds of *upama*. In 2.31, Bhamaha exemplifies the *upama* based on a term of comparison such as 'iva' or 'like' or 'similar to'. In 2.32, he mentions another variety of *upama* which is expressed through compounded words. For example, *candramukhi* (the woman whose face like moon). Karika 3.33 mentions that comparison between two actions which is shown by certain affixated inflections of the words used. The last variety of *upama* is that in which the similarity is established between the qualities of two objects mentioned in two separate sentences without using any term of comparison - it is known as *prativastupama* (2.34).

(4) *Aksepa*: Expressing some special meaning by refusing to state it is *aksepa* (2.68). There are two kinds of *aksepa*-
vakṣyamanavisayakṣepa and uktavisayakṣepa which are respectively exemplified in 2.69 and 2.70. However, these examples are not sufficient to understand their characteristics.

(5) Arthantaranyasa: To state something else for clarifying or justifying the preceding statement is arthantaranyasa (2.71). Use of conjunctions like 'because' or saying a sentence with explaining the previous sentence are examples of this alamkara.

(6) Vyatireka: To explain the characteristics of the object compared (upamana) instead of the object of comparison is called vyatireka which literally means to state the specificity of something (2.75). For example, your thickly eyebrowed reddish eyes are white as well as black, but white lotus and blue lotus are either white or black (2.76). Here, characteristics of eyes (upameya) are illustrated instead of those of lotus (upamana).

(7) Vibhavana: When the consequence is mentally constructed without its necessary cause, it is called vibhavana (2.77). For example, peacocks are intoxicated without having drunk wine (2.78).

(8) Samasokti: When statement about something connotes some idea about something else characterized by similar qualities, it is called samasokti because of its brevity (2.79). For example, that firm and great tree grew to maturity but was fell by wind (2.80). This statement implies the downfall of a great man and hence it is samasokti.
(9) Atisayokti: Any connotation beyond the literal meaning stated is atisayokti (2.8).

(10) Yathasamkhya: To juxtapose objects with different qualities and then compare them respectively in order is yathasamkhya (2.89). For example, you have conquered lotus, moon, bees, elephant, cuckoo and peacock by your face, radiance, eyes, gait, speech and hair (2.9).

(11) Utpreksa: Where there is no similarity indicated but there is an element of comparison, such qualities or actions be indicated which is not there in the object compared and which is marked by atisayokti, the embellishment is utpreksa (2.91). For example, feigning as the flowers of kimsuka, fire is looking around in the forest how much of it has burnt and how much is left (2.92).

(12) Svabhavokti: Literal statement of the exact state of an object is called svabhavokti. While defining it in karika 2.93, Bhamaha says some people say so: therefore, it may be conjectured that Bhamaha does not accept it as an alamkara.

(13) Preyas: Bhamaha does not mention its characteristics but only gives an example: What Vidur said when Krishna went to his home is preyas - O Govinda! The pleasure that I got by your visit today will come to me again at the time when you will visit me next (3.5).

(14) Rasavat: Where srngara and such other rasas are clearly exhibited, there is rasavadalamkara (3.6).

(15) Urjasvi: There is no of this alamkara of this alamkara
and even its example in 3.7 does not explain this. The example is: When Karna's arrow returned without killing Arjuna, he removed then he removed the arrow saying that Karna does not aim twice with the same arrow.

(16) **Paryayokta:** If the intended meaning is expressed by stating something else, it is *paryayokta* (3.8). For example, in *Ratnaharana*, Sisupala says to Krishna - whether at home or on the way, we do not eat those grains which have not been eaten by the *Veda*-knowing *Brahmanas* and he said this for avoiding the poison (3.8-9).

(17) **Samahita:** It is not defined but only exemplified: in "Rajamitra", Narada appeared before the *ksatriya*-women going to please Parasurama.

(18) **Udatta:** Bhamaha does not define this but gives three examples of this in three karikas from 3.11-13. According to 3.11, an example of *udatta* is: obeying the words of his father Rama left the achieved kingdom and went for the forest.

(19) **Slista:** If identity between the object compared and the object of comparison is established by their qualities, actions and name, it is *slista* (3.14). The difference between *rupaka* and *slista* is that in the first the identity of name is not required whereas it is a necessary criteria for the later (3.15). Thus *slista* implies more than one meaning of the same word (3.17). There are three varieties of this:

(i) **Sahokti:** When the same word(s) give(s) two meanings - one qualifying *upamana* and the other *upameya*, it is *sahokti*. 

52
slista (3.18).

(ii) **Upamayukta**: When the same word(s) give(s) two meanings which qualify both upamana and upameya but there is a separate term of comparison used between them, it is *upamayukta slista* (3.19).

(iii) **Hetuyukta**: When the same word(s) give(s) two meanings each qualifying upamana and upameya respectively and in each meaning there is a cause indicated for their comparison, it is *hetuyukta slista* (3.20).

(20) **Apahnuti**: When some quality of comparison is hidden, it is *apahnuti* for this word means to hide (3.21). For example, it is not sound of the line of intoxicated bhramaras, but the sound of Kamadeva's bow in preparation (3.22). Here sound of the intoxicated bhramaras is hidden and so there is apahnuti.

(21) **Visesokti**: When one is quality of an object is reduced or lacking and its another quality is explained for enhancing its speciality, it is called *visesokti* (3.24).

(22) **Virodha**: For emphasizing on certain speciality, an action is mentioned in contrast with some quality of action, it is *virodhalamkara* (3.25). For example, this land cooled by the trees planted on the border causes afflicting heat to the enemies who live in far off countries (3.26). Here, the cooled land causing afflicting heat is virodhalamkara.

(23) **Tulyayogita**: For emphasizing on the similarity between the qualities, more important upamanas are compared with less important upameyas, it is *tulyayogita* (3.27).
(24) **Aprastutaprasamsa:** When something not present or distinct from the context is praised, it is aprastutaprasamsa (3.29).

(25) **Vyajastuti:** Praising someone endowed with great qualities and then criticizing someone else by comparing the later to the former is vyajastuti (3.31). For example, Rama made a hole through seven trees and Parasurama through the Kronca mountain: Have you ever done even one hundredth of what they have done (3.32).

(26) **Nidarsana:** To connote some special meaning through some action and without any term of comparison is nidarsana (3.33). For example, rise is the cause of fall, indicating this to rich people the sun is going to set down (3.34).

(27) **Upamarupaka:** When an identity is established between upamana and upameya, it is upamarupaka (3.35). It is difficult to distinguish this from rupaka and perhaps this is the reason why the later alamkarikas do not accept it as a separate category of embellishment.

(28) **Upameyopama:** If two successive comparisons are made by reversing the position and function of upamana and upameya, it is upameyopamalamkara (3.37). For example, fragrant, pleasing to eyes and reddened by intoxication, such face of your is like lotus and lotus is like your face (3.38).

(29) **Sahokti:** When two actions related to two distinct objects are indicated by one word, it is sahokti (3.39).

(30) **Parivrtti:** If something inferior is renounced to achieve something superior and there is arthantaranyasa (a statement explaining the cause of the action in the former
statement), it is parivrtti (3.41). For example, they got fame (something superior) by giving wealth (inferior) to the beggars: this is the firm behaviour of those nice people who do good to all (3.42). The second statement is arthantaranyasa.

(31) Sasandeha: If, for the purpose of praise, a doubtful statement establishing identity as well as distinction between upamana and upameya is uttered, it is sasandeha (3.43). For example: Is it moon? But that does not shine during the day; then is it Kamadeva? But its bow is not of flowers. In this manner, after looking at you, my mind thinking in perplexity is not able to decide what is the fact (3.44).

(32) Ananvaya: When an upameya is compared to itself with a purpose to signify that nothing is comparable to it, there is ananvayalamkara (3.45). For example, reddened with betel leaves and with shining teeth your blue-lotus like face is like your face only (3.46).

(33) Utpreksavayava: Slesa in meaning, some elements of utpreksa and of rupaka - these three are commingled together, there is utpreksavayava (3.47). For example, due to similarity between rising and setting, after the sunset, the tired day appears to enter the dark-house for rest (3.48). Here, the slesa is between rising and setting because it is for both the sun and the day; utpreksa is in 'the tired day appears to enter' and rupaka is in 'dark-house'.

(34) Samsrsti: When many alamkaras exist together like the
garland made with several gems, it is samsrsti (3.49).

(35) Bhavikatva: It is that quality in a prabandhakavya (epic) by virtue of which past and future are perceived clearly (3.53). Variety, sublimity and wonderfulness of meaning, histrionic representability and propriety in use of words are the qualifying elements of bhavika (3.54).

(36) Asih: Bhamaha says that some people accept it as an embellishment but does not give his opinion. He has not explained its characteristics perhaps because it means wishing welfare and praise to someone. There are two kinds of asih - one with view to establishing friendship and the other by showing absence of anything contrary to one's interests. Example of the first would be: shed away your anger for this friend and hug him respectfully. He should drench you with joyful tears in the same as the timely rain drenches the Vindhya mountain (3.56). Example of the second is: let the ruling clan see those cities whose ornateness is completely burnt by your radiance, whose gates have been broken by glorious/intoxicated elephants, where the brave warriors have been killed and the citizens have fled away for fear (3.57).

Kavyadarsa of Dandi

After this brief exposition on Kavyalamkara, now we shall study the Kavyadarsa of Dandin (circa 650 A.D.). Kavyadarsa seems to be very popular as it is available in Kannara and Sinhali respectively with the name Kaviraja.

There are 660 karikas divided in four chapters in Dandi's treatise on poetics. First chapter deals with the characteristics, typology, ritis and ten qualities of poetry. In the second chapter thirty five alamkaras are explained. Third chapter is on sabdalamkara. Fourth chapter is on the defects of poetry. Though Dandi was a follower of alamkara school, he is the first one to have clearly shown the difference between vaidarbhi and gauri ritis (Acharya Baladeva Upadhyaya, 1994:603). Thus he may be considered to be a precursor for the riti school. Since Dandin is an alamkarika and is the first one to discuss the aforementioned two ritis, we will deal mainly with these aspects of his Kavyadarsa.

It has been a general tendency of the Indian poeticians to continuously increase the number of categories while dealing with alamkaras. Dandi has also done the same - he has lots of sub-varieties of some of the alamkaras. To show this kind of sub-categorization, all the sub-categories of upama have been enumerated while defining upamalamkara. Such other subclassifications exist for many other alamkaras but they have not been enumerated because finally we have given the list of all the alamkaras listed by Mammata in his Kavyaparaks which by and large includes all the alamkaras of earlier poeticians.
Ritis in Kavyadarsa

In karika 1.40 Dandi says, "Manifold is the style of composition with minute mutual differences. Of these [styles] the Vaidarbha and the Gaudiya, as being clearly different [from each other], will now be described". And immediately after this in 1.41 the ten characteristics of the vaidarbha style are enumerated," Cohesion (i.43), Lucidity (i.45), Evenness (i.47), Sweetness (i.51), Tenderness (i.69), Explicitness-of-meaning (i.73), Pregnancy [-of-expression] (i.76), Floridity (i.80), Grace (i.85), and Transference (i.93)". The translator has indicated in parenthesis number of the karikas in which these characteristics have been explained. According to karika 1.42, the opposite of these are the characteristics of Gauda style. Following are the explanations of the ten characteristics:

(1) Cohesion: "Cohesive is what does not involve Looseness. Loose is what consists mainly of faintly-aspirated syllables; as for instance - 'Malati-mala lolali-kalila (a garland of Malati [-flowers] laden with longing bees)'

(1.43).

(2) Lucidity: "Having Lucidity is that which conveys a sense that is well-known: 'Indor indivara-dyuti lakshma. lakshmim tanoti (the spot on the Moon shining like a blue-lotus augments her charm)' is [for instance] an expression conveying the sense without any effort" (1.45).

(3) Evenness: "Even is what is not uneven as regards syllable-structures. These structures are soft, harsh, and
temperate, springing from the grouping together of soft, harsh and mixed syllables" (1.47).

(4) Sweetness: "Sweet is what has Sentiment; [for] in words no less than in things Sentiment exists: [Sentiment] whereby the learned are delighted like unto the honey-loving [bees] by honey" (1.51).

(5) Tenderness: "Now Tender is thought to be that which for the most part has no harsh letters; while the fault of a looseness in structure has been [already, i.43] exhibited in a composition with all soft [vocables]" (1.69).

(6) Explicitness-of-meaning: "Explicitness-of-meaning consists in the meaning requiring nothing [extraneous] to be brought over [for completion]; for example - 'Hari [incarnated as Boar] uplifted the earth from the ocean reddened by the blood of serpents" (1.73).

(7) Pregnancy [-of-expression]: "When upon the recitation of a [composition] a certain eminent charm is experienced, that [composition] is styled 'Pregnant-in-expression.' This [charm] lends excellence to poetic style" (1.76).

(8) Floridity: "Floridity consists in a superabundance of compounds. This is the soul of Prose. Even in poetry, for the non-Southerners, this is their sole resort" (1.80).

(9) Grace: "Graceful is what is agreeable to the whole world because [being striking, withal] it does not transcend ordinary possibilities. It is met with in friendly inquiries and also in descriptions" (1.85).

(10) Transference: "When keeping within the limits of mundane possibilities, the nature of a thing is neatly
transferred to another thing distinct from it, that is known as Transference" (1.93).

Dandi mentions following thirty five alamkaras:

1. svabhavokti
2. upama
3. rupaka
4. dipaka
5. arthavrtti
6. aksepa
7. arthantaranyasa
8. vyatireka
9. vibhavana
10. samasokti
11. atisayokti
12. utpreksa
13. Hetu
14. suksma
15. lesa
16. krama
17. preyas
18. rasavat
19. tejasvi
20. paryayokta
21. samahita
22. udatta
23. apahnuti
24. slista
25. visesokti
26. tulyayogita
27. virodha
28. aprastutasamsa
29. vyajastuti
30. nidarsana
31. sahokti
32. parivrtti
33. asih
34. samsrsti
35. bhavikatva.

In karikas 1-77 of the third chapter, Dandi explains yamaka which is a sabdalamkara.

Now we shall explain the afore mentioned alamkaras according to Dandi:

1. Svabhavokti: It is nature-description - "Making bodily manifest the [real] nature of things in varying, situations, the first of these Embellishments is called 'Nature-Description' or 'Class-Portrayal' (2.8).

2. Upama: It is simile - "When in some sort or other a likeness is experienced as springing up [between two things] that is called Simile" (2.14). Dandi adds many other kinds of upama which are not found in Bhamaha's treatment of this alamkara:

i. Dharmopama: It simile in quality - "The palm of your hands, O pretty maiden, is red like a water-lily'- This is Simile with [specified] Quality in as much as the common
quality is directly exhibited here" (2.15).

(ii) Vastupama: It is simile between things - "`Thy face is like a red-lotus; thy eyes like two blue lotuses'- This is Simile [direct] between Things seeing that the [common] quality is merely to be inferred" (2.16).

(iii) Viparyaya upama: It is reversed simile - "`Like your face this lotus has become blooming'- This is understood as Reversed Simile because the established order [of things] is here controverted" (2.17).

(iv) Anyonyopama: It is mutual simile - "`The lotus is like thy face, thy face is like the lotus'- This one is Mutual Simile as it shows forth mutual excellence" (2.18).

(v) Niyopama: It is restrictive simile - "`Thy face is to be likened to the lotus alone: to nothing else whatsoever'- This, in as much as it negatives semblance with another thing, is Restrictive Simile" (2.19).

(vi) Aniyopama: It is unrestrictive simile - "Lotus for its part imitates thy face; if another there be of the same sort let it do likewise'- This is Unrestrictive Simile" (2.20).

(vii) Samuccaya upama: It is cumulative simile - "A Cumulative Simile also there is of the following type- `not in splendour alone but in the action of delighting also thy face imitates the Moon'" (2.21).

(viii) Atisayopama: It is transcendent simile - "`In thee alone is thy face to be seen, while the Moon is seen in the sky: this much is the only difference, no other'- This is Transcendent Simile" (2.22).
(ix) Utpreksitopama: It is fancied simile - "Let not the Moon boast, thinking- in me alone is the splendour of her face, since it does exist even in the lotus'- This is Fancied Simile" (2.23).

(x) Adbhutopama: It is hypothetical simile - "If there were to be a kind of a lotus with upraised eye-brows and with eyes rolling in it, that might be admitted to wear the beauty of thy face'- This is called Hypothetical Simile" (2.24).

(xi) Mohopama: It is simile of illusion - "Fancying thy face, O slender-bodied one, to be the Moon, in my yearning for thy face I am running even after the Moon!'- This is considered Simile of Illusion" (2.25).

(xii) Samsayopama: It is simile with a doubt - "Is it a lotus with bees rolling inside?- Is it thy face with tremulous eyes?- thus does my heart waver'- This one is Simile with a Doubt" (2.26).

(xii) Nirnayopama: It is determinative simile - "In a lotus that the Moon can overpower, there cannot be a splendour that puts the Moon to shame; hence this is only thy face'- This is Determinative Simile" (2.27).

(xiii) Slesopama: It is paronomastic simile - "Out-rivaling, the cold-rayed [Moon], full of splendour and possessing a fragrant breath, thy face is like a lotus <that hates the Moon, that smells fragrantly, and wherein the Goddess-of-Wealth resides>'- This is declared to be Paronomastic Simile" (2.28).

(xiv) Samanopama: It is simile of agreement - "Because it
can be expressed in words having identical forms a Simile is called a Simile of Agreement; for example-'This row of gardens looking beautiful by reason of forests of Sala trees is like a girl <beaming with her face and flowing hair>'' (2.29).

(xv) Nindopama: It is condemnatory simile - "A lotus is full of pollen [or dust]; the Moon is subject to waning [or consumption]. Thy face, though similar to them, towers proudly above them' - This is declared to be Condemnatory Simile" (2.30).

(xvi) Prasamsopama: It is laudatory simile - "Lotus is the place-of-origin of even God Brahmadeva; the Moon is held by God Sambhu upon his head; and these [two] are like thy face' - This is called Laudatory Simile" (2.31).

(xvii) Acikhyasopama: It is simile with suppressed judgment - "My mind desires to declare that thy face is like the Moon; that may be a merit or a blemish' - This is known as Simile with Suppressed Judgment" (2.32).

(xviii) Virodhapama: It is simile of opposition - "The hundred-petaled [lotus], the autumnal Moon and thy face: this triad is mutually opposed'- This is considered Simile of Opposition" (2.33).

(xix) Pratisedhopama: It is inhibitive simile - "There does not at all exist any6 power in the cold <dull> and spotted Moon to roar against (or rival) the face'- This is no other than Inhibitive Simile" (2.34).

(xx) Catupama: It is cajoling simile - "Thy face is marked with the eyes of deer: the Moon is marked by the deer.
itself; and yet the Moon is merely thy equal and does not surpass thee'- This is Cajoling Simile (2.35).

(xxii) Tattvakhyanopama: It is simile based on the statement of fact - "This is not a lotus but the face itself; these are not two bees but the eyes'—this, because the point of similarity is quite evident, is no other than a Simile based upon a Statement of Fact" (2.36).

(xxiii) Asadharanopama: It is absolute simile - "Having transcended the equality with the Moon and with the lotus, thy face has become like unto itself alone'—This is [called] an Absolute Simile" (2.37).

(xxiv) Abhutopama: It is abnormal simile - "Thy face shines like the essence of the splendour of all lotuses as if gathered together in a place'—This is known as Abnormal Simile" (2.38).

(xxv) Asambhavitopama: It is simile of impossibility - "That harsh speech should issue from this mouth is as though poison should issue from the Moon or fire from sandal'—This is Simile of Impossibility" (2.39).

(xxv) Bahupama: It is multiplex simile - "Thy touch is cool like sandal-water, like Moon-beam, like Moon-stone, and such other things'—This, as bringing out the excess [of the quality], is called Multiplex Simile" (2.40).

(xxvi) Vikriyopama: It is modificatory simile - "As if chiseled out of the lunar orb, as if extracted from lotus-interior,is, O slender-bodied one, thy face'—This is Modificatory Simile" (2.41).

(xxvii) Malopama: It is stringed simile - "Valour has lent
thee charm as light does unto the Sun, as the Sun does unto the day, as day does unto the sky'-This is the sequence of a Stringed Simile" (2.42).

(xxviii) Vakyarthopama: It is sentence-simile - "If the sense of a whole sentence is compared with just the sense of another sentence, that is Sentence-Simile, which is twofold according as the word [of comparison] iva (like) is one or not-one" (2.43). This is exemplified in 2.44 and 2.45.

(xxix) Prativastupama: It is simile based upon a correspondence of types - "Having made an assertion about a thing, the putting forth of another thing alike [to it] in qualities- as leading to a recognition of similarity between them- is Simile based upon a Correspondence of Types" (2.46).

(fff) Tulyayogopama: It is simile of analogous pairing - "Having equalized a lower [thing] with a higher in the matter of [performing] identical function, when an assertion is made, that is declared as Simile of Analogous Pairing" (2.49).

(fff) Hetupama: It is simile with a reason - "By thy splendour the Moon, by effulgence the Sun, by courage the Ocean, thou, O king, dost imitate'- This is considered Simile with a Reason" (2.50).

(3) Rupaka: It is metaphor - "Simile itself with the difference [between the standard and object of comparison] concealed is called· Metaphor. For example, 'arm-creeper','hand-lotus','foot-foliage'" (2.66).
Similarly as in the case of upama, even a metaphor can be divided into following varieties - sakalarupakam (total metaphor), avayavarupakam (metaphor of constituent-parts alone), avayavirupakam (metaphor of constituted-whole alone), savisesanarupakam (adjective-metaphor) and others.

(4) Dipaka: It is illuminator - "It [an expression] standing in one place and denoting either genus or activity or quality or individual can [syntactically] serve a number of sentences, that is called Illuminator" (2.97).

(5) Arthavrtti: It is repetition - "The repetition of the sense alone, the word alone, or of both in the very place of an Illuminator is considered as [giving rise to] three figures" (2.116).

(6) Aksepa: It is Interdiction - "Interdiction is an expression of opposition, and is three-fold according to the three [divisions of] time; but, in view of the distinctions in the things interdicted, its varieties are infinite" (2.120).

(7) Arthantaranyasa: It is corroboration - "That is to be understood as Corroboration where, having introduced a certain thing, there is the putting forth of another thing capable of corroborating it" (2.169).

(8) Vyatireka: It is out-matching - "When, in the case of two things, their similarity has been expressed by words or suggested, if, between the same, a difference is stated [to exist], that is called Out-matching" (2.180).

(9) Vibhavana: It is presumption or cause-searching - "Through negation of the well-known causes when some sort
of a new cause, or naturalness, has to be presumed, that is Presumption" (2.199).

(10) Samasokti: It is inclusion or inclusive-assertion - "Having a certain object in mind when an assertion is made about another object analogous to it, that, as being a shortened mode [of expression], is considered Inclusive Assertion" (2.205).

(11) Atisayokti: It is transcending of hyperbole - "The desire to describe a characteristic in a manner transcending worldly limits is [gives rise to] Hyperbole; it is the best of figures" (2.214).

(12) Utpreksa: It is poetic-conception - "When the condition of some sentient or insentient being is poetically-conceived as being otherwise than what it is in reality, that is known as Poetic-Conception" (2.221).

(13) Hetu: It is cause - "The Cause, the Subtle, and the Little are the best embellishments of speech. The Cause is either Efficient or Probatory and both of them have numerous varieties" (2.235).

(14) Suksma: It is subtle - "A thing gathered from gesture or posture is, by reason of its subtleness, known as the Subtle" (2.260).

(15) Lesa: It is slender - "The slender is the concealing by some slender [pretext] of the nature of a thing about to be disclosed. It is in the illustration alone that the nature of this [figure] will become evident" (2.265).

(16) Krama: It is relative-order - "Unto a series of things enumerated a subsequent-reference in [the same] order is
called Relative-Order, as also Enumeration or [simply] Order" (2.273).

(17) Preyas: It is the joyous - "The Joyous is the statement of something very pleasing" (2.275).

(18) Rasavat: It is the impassioned - "the Impassioned is tender through passionateness" (2.275).

(19) Tejasvi: It is vigorous - "the Vigorous is what displays egoism" (2.275).

(20) Paryayokta: It is periphrasis - "Without actually making an intended statement, the expressing of the same in another manner [but] calculated to serve the same end, is considered as Periphrasis" (2.295).

(21) Samahita: It is facilitation - "When unto one about to commence a certain action there results, through the influence of good luck, a further accession of means for the same [end], that they call Facilitation" (2.298).

(22) Udatta: It is exalted - "That pre-eminent greatness either of the emotion or of the affluence [of some one] is what the experts call the figure Exalted" (2.300).

(23) Apahnuti: It is concealment - "Concealment is the concealment of one thing and the exhibition of another. [For example -]`Cupid is not five-arrowed: he has a thousand arrows'" (2.304).

(24) Slista: It is paronomasia - "Paronomasia is defined as a composition having one [and the same] form but more than one sense. It is of two kinds: having-identical-words, and having-for-the-most-part-distinct-words" (2.310).

(25) Visesokti: It is effectuation-through-hindrance -
"When in the quality, genus, function, and so forth [of a thing] there is shown a deficiency [of some sort] just with a view to bring out its special characteristic, that is regarded as Effectuation-through-Hindrance" (2.323).

(26) Tulyayogita: It is equal-pairing - "When with a view to praise it or to blame it, there is the description of some one [person or thing] by putting it on a par with others possessing the quality in question in eminence, that is regarded as Equal-Paring" (2.330).

(27) Virodha: It is contradiction - "Where there is exhibited the bringing-together of contrary things just with a view to bring out their special characteristic, that is considered as Contradiction" (2.333).

(28) Aprastutaprasamsa: It is vicarious-praise - "That is Vicarious-Praise which is a praise of objects not-forming-the-theme-on-hand" (2.340).

(29) Vyajastuti: It is disguised eulogy - "When one praises while apparently censuring that is considered Disguised-Eulogy, wherein it is the good qualities themselves that, under the guise of defects, come into evidence" (2.343).

(30) Nidarsana: It is illustration - "When while about to achieve one end there is deduced another somewhat allied fruit from it, either existing or non-existing, that is Illustration" (2.348).

(31) Sahokti: It is conjoint-description - "Conjoint-Description is a statement of qualities, and of action, as being simultaneous" (2.351).

(32) Parivrtti: It is barter - "...what is [known] as the
exchange of things is Barter" (2.351).
(33) Asih: It is benediction - "Benediction is known as the expressing of good wish unto what is an object of regard; for example - 'May the great Light - beyond the reach of word and mind - protect you!'" (2.357).
(34) Samsrsti: It is commixture - "What is [known as] Accessory to Poetic-Conception is merely a variety of Poetic-Conception itself; while a mixing-together of different embellishments is what is called Commixture" (2.359).
(35) Bhavikutva: It is sustained-intuition - "Sustained-Intuition is declared to be a quality pervading [the whole] poetic-composition; Intuition is the idea of the poet which abides in the composition [from beginning] to the end" (2.364).

Dandi's definitions of yamaka as a sabdalamkara is as follows: "The repetition of syllabic-groups, with or without [other] intervening [syllables], is Yamaka (Chime)" (3.1).

After having discussed the two alamkarikas now we shall discuss Vamana's Kavyalambkarasutra which is the first treatise of the riti-guna school. Vamana, a poetician of about later half of eighth century, has himself written a commentary or vrtti on his Kavyalambkarasutra. Altogether there are 319 sutras in his treatise which are divided in five chapters. The first chapter deals with the purpose and styles of poetry. He discusses the specificity of vaidarbhi, gauri and pancali ritis in this chapter. Chapter
two deals with the defects and concepts of pada, vakya and meaning of vakya (sentence). Third chapter is about ten qualities which become twenty by virtue of being manifested through words or meanings. Fourth chapter is on the embellishments of words and meanings. The last chapter is about correction of certain words and their uses. Since Vamana is primarily the principal proponent of the riti school we shall deal mainly with this aspect of his treatise.

*Kavyalamkarasutravrtti of Vamana*

In sutra 1.2.6 Vamana declares, "ritiratma kavyasya" i.e. "diction is the soul of poetry". Riti is defined as, "visista padaracana ritih" (1.2.7) which means that creation of verses with specialities is riti. Pt. Ganganath Jha translates this sutra as "It is the particular arrangement of words that constitutes 'Diction'." (Ganganath Jha, 1990). In 1.2.8, the specialities in terms of particular arrangement is defined, "Viseso gunatma" (1.2.8) i.e. "The 'particularity' of arrangement consists in the 'qualities of style'." In the vrtti of 3.1.4 Vamana defines style as "By 'style' is meant the composition of words" (Ganganath Jha, 1990). Immediately after 1.2.8, Vamana mentions the kinds of ritis, "Sa tridha - vaidarbhi gaudiya pancali ca" (1.2.9) i.e. "Diction has been classed under three heads: 'Vaidarbhi', 'Gaudiya' and 'Pancali'" (Ganganath Jha, 1990). Definitions of the three ritis are as
follows:

1) Vaidarbhi: Sutra 1.2.11 says - samagraguna vaidarbhi i.e. "The 'Vaidarbhi' is replete with all the 'Qualities of Style'" (Ganganath Jha, 1990). The vrtti on this sutra adds "that Diction which abounds in all the 'Qualities of Style - Floridity, Lucidity and the like,- is called 'Vaidarbhi'" (Ganganath Jha, 1990). Thus that poetry which is full of qualities like oja and prasada, do not contain any defect and is sweet like a lute is in the vaidarbhi riti. According to sutra 1.2.14 "From among these three it is the first (the Vaidarbhi that deserves to be adopted;as it has all the qualities" (Ganganath Jha, 1990). There is a subdivision of this style called suddhavaidarbhi or pure vaidarbhi - a vaidarbhi diction devoid of compound words is suddhavaidarbhi (1.2.19).

2) Gaudiya: Sutra 1.2.12 defines ojah kantimati gaudiya i.e. "The 'Gaudiya' abounds in the Qualities of Floridity and Brilliancy" (Ganganath Jha, 1990). According to the vrtti on this sutra "The 'Gaudiya' diction is that which abounds in long compounds and harsh sounding-words, which are suggestive of the qualities of 'Floridity' and 'Brilliancy'...it is totally devoid of the qualities of 'Sweetness' and 'Softness'" (Ganganath Jha, 1990).

3) Pancali: Sutra 1.2.13 defines madhuryasaukumaryopapanna pancali i.e. "The 'Pancali' is endowed with the qualities of Sweetness and Softness" (Ganganath Jha, 1990). According to its vrtti, this style is devoid of floridity and brilliancy, does not use harsh words and sounds, rather is
tame resembling the style of Puranas.

Though ritis appears to have been dealt with briefly, it forms the basis of studying all the aspects of poetry. Guna, dosa, alamkara and others are all can be classed according to the diction of a particular style. That is why Vamana has defined the concepts on riti and its classification in the beginning of his treatise. By and large, the same alamkaras as defined earlier by Bhamaha and Dandi continue even in Kavyalamkara. Only the axis of study of Vamana is different. We shall now see Vamana's concept of guna because it goes along with riti while naming the different schools of Indian poetics.

According to 3.1.1 kavyasobhayah kartaro dharma gunah: i.e. "Qualities are those characteristics that create or constitute the charm of poetry" (Ganganath Jha, 1990). In this context, Vamana's definition of alamkara can also be referred to - saundaryamalamkarah (1.1.2) i.e. embellishment is the beauty of poetry. Even the name of Vamana's treatise is Kavyalamkarasutra which implies that though his axis of study is riti-guna, he is also primarily concerned with the beauty of poetry like his predecessors. There is a specific relationship between guna and alamkara - tadatisayahetavastvalamkarah (3.1.2) i.e. "The Ornaments on the other hand are such characters as serve to enhance the charm (already produced by the Qualities)". (Ganganath Jha, 1990). It is evident that qualities are prior and more primordial to alamkara. In 3.1.3, Vamana says purve nityah: i.e. "The former (i.e. the Qualities) are permanent" and
continues in its vrtti "The Qualities form permanent features in Poetry; as without them there is no charm (and without charm there is no poetry). [The figures of Speech on the other hand are evanescent, being more accidental embellishment]" (Ganganath Jha, 1990).

In sutra 3.1.4, Vamana enumerates the following ten qualities of style: (1) Floridity (ojas) (2) Plainness or Simplicity (prasada) (3) Coalescence [of words] (slesa) (4) Uniformity [of diction] (samata) (5) Symmetry (samadhi) (6) Sweetness (madhurya) (7) Softness (saukumarya) (8) Raciness (udarata) (9) Explicitness or Lucidity (arthavyakti) (10) Brilliance (kanti).

As mentioned earlier, these ten qualities become twenty as they are applied to words as well as meaning. Vamana explains each of them in the following manner:

(1) Ojas: Gudhabandhatvamojah (3.1.5) i.e. "Floridity consists in orateness (high-sounding words and sentences)" (Ganganath Jha, 1990).

For the meaning, the definition of oja is arthasya praudhirojah (3.2.2) i.e. "Floridity (Ideal) consists in the boldness or sententiousness of conception" (Ganganath Jha, 1990). According to the vrtti on this sutra there are five kinds of oja for meaning - "(i) where a whole sentence is used to express what is expressible by a single word. (ii) where a single word is used to express what is expressed by a sentence (iii) where there is brevity (one sentence serving the purpose of many sentences (iv) where there is diffuseness (many sentences being used to express
what could be expressed by a single sentence) (v)where qualifications are added with a purpose." (Ganganath Jha, 1990). Further in the vṛtti, Vamana clarifies his concept of sentence, "What is meant by a 'sentence' here is only a collection of a number of words (and not necessarily one that expresses a complete idea, containing a finite verb and such other syntactical accessories). (Ganganath Jha, 1990).

(2) Prasada: Saithilyam prasadah (3.1.6) i.e. "'Simplicity' consists in lucidity or plainness'. Here simplicity appears to be in opposition to floridity and yet is considered to be a quality. This contradiction is explained in the next sutra - gunah samplavat (3.1.7) i.e. "'Simplicity' is a Quality, when appearing along with 'Floridity'" (Ganganath Jha, 1990). According to 3.1.9, simplicity becomes a defect if it appears alone.

At the level of meaning arthavaimalyam prasadah (3.2.3) i.e. "'Simplicity' consists in the clearness of meaning" (Ganganath Jha, 1990). The vṛtti say that by 'clearness' is meant the mention of that alone which is absolutely necessary." (Ganganath Jha, 1990).

(3) Slesa: Masrnatvam slesah (3.1.11) i.e. "'Coalescence' consists of smoothness" and its vṛtti adds "By 'smoothness' is meant that quality whereby a number of words coalescing sound as one word" (Ganganath Jha, 1990).

For ideal selsa the sutra says ghatana slesah (3.2.4) i.e. "'Coalescence' consists in the commingling (of many
ideas)." (Ganganath Jha,1990). The vṛtti defines "By 'Commingling' is meant the mention of more than one action partaking of cunning not perceived (by the person concerned), and indicative of reasons (for the commingling of the acts and the non-perception of the cunning)" (Ganganath Jha,1990).

(4) Samata: *Margabhedah samata* (3.1.12) i.e. "'Uniformity' consists in the non-difference or homogeneity of diction" and its vṛtti adds "That is to say, when the style of diction employed in the beginning of a verse or of a complete poetical work, is continued to the end, we have what is called 'Uniformity'" (Ganganath Jha,1990).

For idea, sutra 3.2.5 says *avaisamyam samata* i.e."'Uniformity' consists in the non-relinquishment of proper sequence or contiguity" (Ganganath Jha,1990).

(5) Samadhi: *Arohavarohakramah samadhih* (3.1.13) i.e. "'Symmetry' consists in the orderly sequence of 'ascent' and 'descent'" (Ganganath Jha,1990).

On the level of meaning it is *arthadrsti samadhih* (3.2.7) i.e. "Samadhi (Orderly Sequence) consists in the character by which the meaning is easily grasped" (Ganganath Jha,1990).

(6) Madhurya: *Prthakapadatvam madhuryam* (3.1.21) i.e. "'Sweetness' lies in the distinctness of words" (Ganganath Jha,1990). By extension it shall mean, according to the vṛtti, that the absence of long compounds results in sweetness.
On the level of idea, it is defined as **aparasyam saukumaryam (3.2.12)** i.e. "`Sweetness' consists in the impressiveness of the conception" (Ganganath Jha, 1990).

(7) **Saukumaryam**: *Ajarathatvam saukumaryam (3.1.22)* i.e. "`Softness' consists in the non-harshness of composition" (Ganganath Jha, 1990).

(8) **Udarata**: *Vikatatvamudarata (3.1.23)* i.e. "`Raciness' lies in piquancy of style" (Ganganath Jha, 1990). According to the *vrtti* on it, "It is that quality by virtue of which, in regard to a piece of composition, people speak of the words as if `dancing'; that is to say, where the whole piece is enlivened by the peculiar swing of the words taken together". (Ganganath Jha, 1990).

At the level of meaning, **agramyatvamudarata (3.2.13)** i.e. "`Delicacy' (Udarata) is absence of vulgarity" (Ganganath Jha, 1990).

(9) **Arthavyaktih**: *Arthavyaktihetutvamarthavyaktih (3.1.24)* i.e. "`Explicitness' is that quality by which the meaning is easily comprehended" (Ganganath Jha, 1990).

At the level of idea, its definition is **vastusvabhavasphutatvamarthavyaktih (3.2.14)** i.e. "When the characteristic features of things are made manifest, it is `Explicitness'" (Ganganath Jha, 1990).

(10) **Kanti**: *Aujjvalyam kantih (3.1.25)* i.e. "`Brilliancy' is that richness or ornateness of style [in the absence of which a piece of composition is called an `imitation of the Puranas']" (Ganganath Jha, 1990).

The definition of *kanti* as an ideal quality is
diptarasatvam kantih i.e. "'Brilliancy' is that by which the Emotions [of the Erotic & c] are made conspicuously prominent" (Ganganath Jha, 1990).

Regarding the qualities of the use of words, Vamana gives ten slokas in his vrtti in the end of the section one of chapter three. There are no such slokas about the qualities of meaning in the end of the section two of the same chapter. These slokas are translated as follows:

"(1) The poets give the name of Floridity to the ornate style; words abounding in this quality are very pleasant to the ear.
(2) When Floridity called Simplicity; is accompanied by plainness, without this quality there is no delectation in a poetical work.
(3) Coalescence is that excellent quality by which more words than one coalescing, appear as but one word, the letter-conjunctions being (so smooth and natural) as not to be noticed.
(4) Uniformity is the quality consisting in the using of the same style of diction in each foot or verse; this is difficult of composition and can be distinguished with difficulty.
(5) That wherein the hiatuses ascend in a uniform manner is called the quality of Symmetry; by this quality Speech is rendered pure.
(6) When in a piece of composition each word appears clear and distinct, we have the quality of Sweetness; endowed with this the composition becomes a veritable stream of
honey.

(7) Just as lines are variously cut and arranged by expert painters, in the same manner is speech (words) arranged by intelligent writers, in accordance with various qualities.

(8) Softness consists in the absence of harsh letters; speech devoid of this quality becomes harsh and unpleasant to the ear.

(9) Piquancy of words they call Raciness; in the absence of this, composition remains devoid of variegation (and beauty).

(10) When the idea of the thing expressed comes before the apprehension of the words themselves, the meaning being readily comprehended - we have the quality of Explicitness."

(Ganganath Jha, 1990).

After Vamana there came some poeticians like Udbhata (contemporary to Vamana i.e. end of eighth century), Rudrata (certainly prior to 900 A.D.) and others who followed and continued with the school of alamkara. They went on adding and further classifying the categories of the earlier poeticians. With Anandavardhana's Dhvanyaloka: the inertia of alamkara school received a torque. Anandavardhana had changed the locus of studying poetics. Next we shall deal with the dhvani siddhanta of Anandavardhana (a poetician of later half of ninth century).
Dhvanyaloka of Anandavardhana

Dhvanyaloka is the first treatise (of about 129 karikas divided in four chapters) on the dhvani theory. In the very first karika of the first chapter, Anandavardhana declares kavyasyatma dhvaniriti i.e. suggestion is the soul of poetry. In the second karika, the concept of soul of poetry is defined as "That meaning which wins the admiration of refined critics is decided to be the soul of poetry. The 'explicit' and 'implicit' are regarded as its two aspects" (1.2). Defining 'explicit' or vacya, Anandavardhana says,"...the explicit is commonly known and it has been already set forth in many ways through figures of speech such as the simile by other writers; hence it need not be discussed here at length" (1.3). This is a striking departure from the works of earlier poeticians. Anandavardhana considers the implicit or pratiyamana meaning as the supreme:"But the implicit aspect is quite different from this. In the words of first-rate poets it shines supreme and towers above the beauty of the striking external constituents even as charm in ladies" (1.4). This meaning cannot be understood merely through the literal meaning of words and scrutiny of other embellishments of poetry. "It is not understood by a mere learning in grammar and in dictionary. It is understood only by those who have an insight into the true significance of poetry" (1.7). Anandavardhana almost defines the contours of his study: "That meaning, and that rare word which possesses the
power of conveying it, only these two deserve the careful scrutiny of a first-rate poet" (1.8). Anandavardhana admits in 1.10 that the means to arrive at this conveyed implicit meaning is the scrutiny of explicit sense and defines dhvani in contrast with the explicit meaning: "That kind of poetry, wherein the (conventional) meaning renders itself secondary or the (conventional) word renders its meaning secondary and suggests the (intended or) implied meaning, is designated by the learned as dhvani or 'Suggestive Poetry'" (1.13).

The second and third chapter of Dhvanyaloka deals with the taxonomy of dhvani. Dhvani is first of all divided in vyangya (suggested or of suggestion) and in vyanjaka (the suggester). First we shall deal with the categories of vyangya as it is discussed prior to vyanjaka by Anandavardhana. Before discussing the categories of Dhvanyaloka it should be noted that "both the varieties of suggestion with unintended literal import and resonance-like suggestion are suggested by individual words and by whole sentences" (3.1) (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1982). This implies that the categories of dhvani theory apply to words as well as to sentences. The taxonomic classification (refer to chart no.1) of vyanjaka is as follows:

(1) Avivaksitavacaya dhvani: This is also called laksanamuladhvani. It is 'suggestion with unintended literal import'.

There are two subcategories of this:

Arthantare sankramitamatyantam va tiraskrtam.

Avivaksitavacasya dhvanervacyam dvidha matam. (2.1)
Dhvani

Laksanamula or Avivaksitavacya

Arthantarasamkramita

Laksanamula or vivaksitavacya

Atyantariraskrta

Samlaksyakrama

Its five kinds are based on:
1. Letter
2. Word
3. Sentence
4. Composition or Texture
5. Work as a whole

Other two kinds are:
1. Suddha
2. Samkirna

Which are of three types each depending upon type of composition:
1. Asamasa
2. Madhyamasamasa
3. Dirghasamasa

Chart I

Sabdamula

Arthamula

Ubhayasaktimula
i.e. "Merged in the other meaning' and 'Completely lost'
-these are the two kinds of the expressed in 'Suggestion
with intended literal import" (K.Krishnamoorthy,1982).

According to this sloka the subcategories are named as:
(i) arthantarasamkramita and (ii) atyanta tiraskrta.

(2)Vivaksitabhidheya dhvani: This is also called
abhidhamula dhvani or vivaksitavacya dhvani. It is 'meaning
with intended literal import'. This is also two-fold:

Asamlaksyakramodyotah kramena dyotitah parah

Vivaksitabhidheyasya dhvaneratma dvidha matah (2.2)
i.e. "The nature of suggestion 'with intended literal
import' is also two-fold: (i)'of discernible sequentiality'
and (ii)'of undiscernible sequentiality'. samlaksyakrama:
vyangya is the term for 'discernible sequentiality' and
asamlaksyakrama vyangya is for 'undiscernible
sequentiality'. Asamlaksyakrama vyangya dhvani is also
termed as rasa dhvani as it is the very soul of the
experience of poetry. When the sense is grasped
simultaneously, it is suggestion of undiscernible
sequentiality; otherwise it is suggestion of discernible
sequentiality. Anandavardhana gives examples of
asamlaksyakrama suggestion in 2.3: "Sentiment, emotion, the
semblance of sentiment or mood and their (rise and)
cessation etc., are all of 'undiscerned sequentiality'. It
is decided that when we have the prominent presence of this
variety, we are having the very soul of suggestion"
(K.Krishnamoorthy,1982).

The samlaksyakrama variety is again of three kinds:
(i) sabdamula (based on the power of word) (ii) arthamulca (based on the power meaning) and (iii) ubhayasaktimulca (based on power of both the word and meaning).

Karika 2.20 mentions the first two: "The other element of this suggestion manifests itself in the same way as resonance and the temporal sequentiality of the two meanings will be discernible. It is also two-fold: 'that which is based on the power of word' and 'that which is based on the power of sense'" (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1982).

Ubhayasaktimula is mentioned in 2.23: "A context wherein even a idea suggested by the power of the word and sense is again expressed directly in so many words by the poet, will instance only a figure far removed from suggestion". (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1982).

Sabdamula is defined in 2.21: "Only that instance wherein is present a figure that is not expressed directly by any word but conveyed solely by the suggestive power of the word itself, should be regarded as suggestion based on the power of the word." (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1982).

Arthamula is defined in 2.22: "The other variety of suggestion is based upon the power of sense and it is instanced in places where the second meaning is conveyed only by way of implication by the first meaning and not by the expressed words at all." (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1982).

There are two kinds of arthasaktimula. On this there is a sloka:

Praudhoktimatranispandrasarirah sambhavi svatah.

Arthopi dvividho jneyo vastunonyasya dipakah. (2.24)
i.e. "The sense which suggests another sense is also two-fold: 1. Existing only in ornate expression and 2. Naturally existing" (Krishnamoorthy, 1982).

There are five varieties of asamlaksyakrama related to (i) letter (ii) word (iii) sentence (iv) composition or texture and (v) work as a whole. There is a karika on it: "Suggestion with undiscerned sequentiality will flash forth in letter, word etc., sentence, composition and finally the work as a whole" (3.2) (K. Krishnamoorthy, 1982). For the objection that letter cannot be suggestive, Anandavardhana comments in the vrtti of 3.3, "The (Sanskrit) letter 's' and 's', letters conjunct with 'r' and 'dh' - all these become deterrents of the erotic sentiment. Hence those letters are not conducive to a particular sentiment" and continues in 3.4, "When these very letters are employed in relation to the sentiment of disgust and so forth, they will only intensify them. Hence also letters suggest sentiments." (K. Krishnamoorthy, 1982). According to the commentary on 3.4 the asamlaksyakrama suggestion of sentences can also be of two types: (i) suddha or pure - when the sentence as a whole exquisitely conveys fullness of sentiment (ii) samkirna or mingled - when the sentiment is beautifully suggested by the suggestive figure, metaphor.

According to 3.5, compositions are of three types: (i) without compounds (ii) with medium-sized compounds and (iii) with long compounds. This categorisation is about the nature of lexis used in the composition. Including this
there are six types of asamlaksyakrama samghatana or 'meaning of undiscernible sequentiality in composition':
(i) On the basis of the nature of lexis as mentioned above on the basis of 3.5.
(ii) Based on the decorum of the speaker or vaktr: "The propriety or decorum of the speaker and the spoken is the consideration which governs it" (3.6) (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1982).
(iii) Based on the decorum of the spoken or vacya: this category has been mentioned in the above mentioned 3.6. Further in 3.16, Anandavardhana adds that "Case-terminations, conjugational terminations, number, relation, accidence, primary affixes, secondary affixes, and also compounds - all these become conveyers of suggestion with undiscerned sequentiality" (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1982).
(iv) Visayasraya based on the decorum of the medium: "Another consideration which governs the usage of a texture is its decorum with regard to the literary medium adopted. Texture thus becomes different in different forms of literature" (3.7) (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1982).
(v) Rasabandhoktam based on the decorum of the sentiment: "Texture with decorum in the delineation of sentiments will shine out wherever it might be found. It will, however, assume a shade of variation coupled with the decorum of literary medium" (3.9) (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1982).
(vi) Kathasrita or based on the theme or plot: "Construction of only such a plot, either traditional or invented, as is charming with its decorum of (the accessories of
sentiment, viz.) stimuli of setting, abiding emotions, emotional responses, and passing moods" (3.10) (K. Krishnamoorthy, 1982).

After this brief exposition on the dhvani theory as expounded by Anandavardhana, we shall now study the Kuntaka's theory on obliqueness in poetic meaning of language.

**Vakroktijivita of Kuntaka**

Kuntaka (about 950 A.D.) takes up the concept of vakrokti from his predecessors such as Bhamaha and others. In the section on Bhamaha we have earlier shown that vakrokti is an important feature of poetry. No embellishments can add charm to poetry in absence of vakrokti. After Bhamaha this aspect of poetic theory was ignored by poeticians until Kuntaka. Kuntaka considers vakrokti as the single most aspect of poetry: "Both these are the `adorned'. Their adornment consists in the poetic process known as `artistic turn of speech'" (1.10) (K. Krishnamoorthy, 1977). According to the vrtti on this sutra "Both these' refer to words and meanings which deserve to be looked upon as the subjects of ornamentation for the enhancement of their appeal" (K. Krishnamoorthy, 1977:307). Regarding the ornamentation vrtti says further "What exactly is this common ornaments? `Artistic turn of speech' is the reply." (K. Krishnamoorthy, 1977:307). So, ornamentation is vakrata. This ornamentation gives a twist to meaning.
Kuntaka defines meaning and word in the following *karikas*:

(1) "That 'meaning' is what is signified and 'word' is that which signifies is so well known that it needs no elaboration. Yet, in the province of poetry, their true nature is as follows:—" (1.8) (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1977).

(2) "That unique expression which alone can fully convey the poets' intended meaning out of a hundred alternatives before him is to be regarded as 'word'. Similarly that alone which possesses such refreshing natural beauty as to draw the appreciation of delighted readers is to be reckoned as 'meaning'." (1.9) (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1977).

The *vrtti* on 1.9 adds "In poetry, the entire resource at the disposal of the poet comes to be termed 'word'; and its success is measured by its sole activity to communicate the shade of meaning intended by the poet. What is meant is that it will be so unique as not to permit any substitution. There may be alternate expressions in any number, outwardly meaning the same. But the unique shade of the particular meaning as intended by the poet cannot be fully conveyed by any or all of them." (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1977:301).

Kuntaka seems to have formulated two categories—(i)word and meaning (ii)word and poetic meaning. Every word has a meaning but certain word have specific poetic meaning intended by the poet and the reader under certain circumstances. This understanding appears to be an evolution of Bhamaha's concept that poetry flashes to some gifted ones sometimes under particular circumstances im
presence of necessary stimulation. Further in the vṛttī on 1.9, Kuntaka clearly denotes poetic meaning as the actual meaning of a word: "...the proper definition of 'signification' is that capacity to convey the particular shade of thought intended by the poet" and this intended meaning comes from the imaginative faculty of poet. "In fact, in the world of the poet's creative imagination, things come to life with a touch of original invention; or their real nature gets veiled by a rich affiliates calculated to present the subject in a most attractive light; as such, the process of communication is a slave to the poetic intention. Only when the right verbal correlative for the particular has been found, the delight of the reader is assured." (K. Krishnamoorthy, 1977:302). Regarding the dependence of meaning on the reader and its relationship to appreciation, vṛttī further adds, "Coming to meaning, what is its speciality in poetry? That is precisely what is meant by saying that that alone which possesses such refreshing beauty as to draw the appreciation of delighted readers is to be reckoned "meaning"." (K. Krishnamoorthy, 1977:303). Even in context of defining sahitya, in the vṛttī of 1.17, Kuntaka makes craftiness a necessity for the poetic use of word, "What we mean by Sahitya is not merely the mutual coherence invariably found between word and meaning but their extra-ordinary efficiency in the artistic usage of the poet to bring delight to the readers." (K. Krishnamoorthy, 1977:311). The poet has to establish specific relationships between word
and meaning for a delightful poetic use of word: "The qualification that 'the poetic usage involving neither more nor less than the exact form of word and meaning required to make the whole beautiful' is inserted in order to indicate that the two are competing with each other, as it were, to produce delight. Between the two, there should be no excess nor deficiency in respect of the contribution of either." (K. Krishnamoorthy, 1977: 311). Thus vakrata depends on obliqueness of both the word and meaning and poetic efficiency in the use of their relationship. This meaning and the delightful use of word is understood in the context of a sentence: "...the definition of poetry entails the sentence as a whole since the meaning is completed only at the end of the sentence". (K. Krishnamoorthy, 1977: 311). In Vakroktijivita, Kuntaka deals with meaning, word and artful expression and still says that the "quality delighting men of taste is something over and above the three elements so far considered, namely, 'meaning', 'word' and 'artful expression'. It has a unique beauty of unfailing appeal" (1.23) (K. Krishnamoorthy, 1977).

R.S. Pathak summarizes the salient features of Kuntaka's theory of vakrokti as follows:

"(i) Obliquity is an essential factor in poetry;
(ii) It is a striking mode of speech and depends upon the individual power of the poet;
(iii) It helps poetry to impart an unspeakable delight to the connoisseur;
(iv) It distinguishes poetry from matter-of-fact speech;"
(v) Poetry becomes lively in association with vakrokti;
(vi) Vakrokti is called "obliquity arising out of poetic function" (kavi-vyapara-vakratva). It is also recognized as the embellishment (alankrti) of the word and its meaning, the physical constituents of poetry;
(vii) Vakrokti and poetry are invariably associated with each other; an unembellished poetry can hardly be conceived;
(viii) Poetic delectableness causes an elevation or consummation;

From karika 18-21 of the first chapter, Kuntaka mentions six categories of vakrokti:
(1) "Art in the poetic process is divisible into six categories. Each one of them may have numerous subdivisions, every subdivision striking one bye new shade of beauty." (1.18) (K. Krishnamoorthy,1977).
(2) "Art in the arrangement of syllables, art in the base form of substantives, and also art in their inflection forms." (1.19) (K.Krishnamoorthy,1977).
(3) "And art in a whole sentence admits of a thousand varieties. In it is included the whole lot of Figures of speech." (1.20) (K.Krishnamoorthy,1977).
(4) "The 'beauty of section' and the 'beauty of work' will be treated now under the two heads, 'natural' and 'artificial', both yielding artistic delight." (1.21) (K.Krishnamoorthy,1977).
(5) "When the subject-matter is described in a way conducive to beauty by virtue of its own infinite natural charm and by means of exclusively artistic expressions, we may take it as an instance of creative beauty relating to content" (3.1) (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1977).

Thus there are following six categories of vakrokti:

1. **Varnavakrata**: Obliquity in the arrangement of syllables. All figures of speech related to uses of syllables comes under this heading.

2. **Purvardhapadadavakrata**: Obliquity in the base forms of substantives. Obliquity related to such figures of speech which are based in crafty use of words are in this category. For example, use of hyperbole, synonyms, metaphor and such others.

3. **Pratyayasrayavakrata**: Obliquity in the inflectional forms of substantives. On this there is a karika, "The affix in the middle of a word often adds to the beauty of decorum in the subject described, by virtue of its own excellence. This may be regarded as another type of poetic beauty" (2.17) (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1977). Thus those obliqueness which are achieved by various kinds of usages of affixes are classed under this category.

4. **Vakyavakrata**: Obliquity in a whole sentence. Karikas 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate this: "The artistic beauty of a sentence is something quite distinct from the wealth of beauty due to qualities and figures of speech in so far as they relate to artistic word and content belonging to one or the other of the (three) styles. In fact expressiveness
of the sentence-form should be regarded as the essence of this beauty. It is an index of the unique skill of the poet even as the unique total appeal of a painting which is something quite distinct from the beauty of the individual elements that go to fashion it such as lovely canvas, lines, and colour-shades" (K.Krishnamoorthy,1977). The vṛtti adds on it, "Here the sentence meant is a group of words in syntactical relation with each other. Its beauty should be deemed as distinct from the beauty of its constituent elements.......Only some of the words and some of the meanings therein show a turn different from common usage and get beautified by qualities and figures of speech, so that one kind of poetic beauty is attained that way. This beauty of sentence should be deemed as distinct from that former beauty. Its essence lies in the sentence-form itself, that is to say, that the very process of expressiveness strikes one as uniquely beautiful and therefore it comes to be felt as its life-breath. The nature of that expressiveness is further explained as a unique artistic skill on the part of the poet." (K.Krishnamoorthy,1977).

(5) Arthavakrata: Obliquity of meaning. Many subcategories of arthavakrata is illustrated in chapter three: the essence of all these categories is to enumerate the possibilities of creating rasa for the connoisseurs through meaning. As earlier observed in karika 3.1, it is "creative beauty relating to content". In karika 3.15, rasavat is considered to be "the life essence of all adornments or
figures of speech" and "quintessence of poetry itself".

(6) Prabandhavakrata: Obliquity of whole composition. Even prakaranavakrata or obliquity of parts of incidents is dealt with under this heading.

There are following ten kinds of prakaranavakrata:

(i) "When we find the speakers giving vent to such expression as is replete with the beauty of unlimited enthusiasm and also capable of expressing their ideas powerfully." (4.1) (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1977).

(ii) "When the intended object at the end will remain inscrutable from the beginning (i.e., suspense remains constant till the denouement), the unique and boundless poetic skill underlying it all should be regarded as the poetic beauty of an episode." (4.2) (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1977).

(iii) "When a poet is constructing a plot of his own, based though it might be on a well-known source, if he succeeds in infusing even a small streak of originality, the beauty gained thereby will be singular." (4.3) (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1977).

(iv) On this both 4.5 and 4.6 have to be read together:
"An organic unity which strikingly underlies the various incidents described in different parts of the work leading to the ultimate end intended, each bound to the other by a relation of mutual assistance" (4.5)
"reveals the essence of creative originality which is most aesthetic only in the case of a very rare poetic genius who is endowed by nature with the gift of an extraordinary

(v) For this 4.7 and 4.8 have to be read together:
"When even one and the same theme is again and again described in different places with a new touch of creative originality", (4.7)
"and is made to radiate the glow of sentiments and figures of speech, it manifests a strikingly new mode of artistic beauty." (4.8) (K.Krishnamoorthy,1977).

(vi) "When integrated with the beauty of the plot, even the conventional themes, that come to be described in court-epics and so forth conforming to set patterns, attain a novel artistic beauty." (4.9) (K.Krishnamoorthy,1977)

(vii) "Another type of beauty in respect of Acts etc. is instanced when the beauty is so exclusive to an Act that it cannot be attained by any other Act, either preceding or following, in the play and the Act thus serves as a touchstone in its own way of the ruling sentiment in the play." (4.10) (K.Krishnamoorthy,1977).

(viii) "When the inventiveness of the poet in devising some other incident also ultimately contributes to add significance to the total plot, it should be regarded as another type of beauty of episode." (4.11) (K.Krishnamoorthy,1977).

(ix) We will have to read 4.12 and 4.13 together:
"When actors, expert in the art of pleasing the audience, are seen to play the role of an audience themselves on the stage with other actors performing." (4.12)
"such a play-episode within a play-episode may be regarded
as illustrating a literary art which beautifies the entire drama exquisitely." (4.13) (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1977).

(x) "The art of the dramatic plot should be pleasing by the construction of delightful 'junctures' (Sandhi's); each of the parts should be organically related to each other, the succeeding one following logically from the preceding one." (4.14) (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1977).

Kuntaka carefully adds in the end, "It should not be vitiated by any excessive craze for observing rules even when they are inopportune. Only in such cases, the episodes will reveal a unique charm of originality." (4.15) (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1977).

There are following seven kinds of prabandhavakrata:

(i) We read 4.16 and 4.17 together:

"When there is a departure from the enriched 'rasas' of the source-book and a new delightful 'rasa' is delineated by the poet at the conclusion of his work," (4.16) "so that the delight of the readers is ensured, we should regard it as beauty of a whole work." (4.17) (K.Krishnamoorthy, 1977).

(ii) We read 4.18 and 4.19 together:

"When a good poet concludes his work with only such a select incident in his original source as promotes the singular prosperity of the hero depicted as an ideal character in all the three worlds," (4.18) "with the idea of avoiding the distasteful culmination of the story in the original, it should be regarded as another appealing form of beauty relating to a whole work." (4.19)

95

(iii) We read 4.20 and 4.21 together:
"Supposing the even flow of the main story has been broken and its sentiment impaired by the intrusion of some incident whose connection with the main story is almost indiscernible;" (4.20).
"the poet might give the incident such a turn that it will become inevitable for the conclusion of the main story and thus maintain the unbroken course of 'rasa' and invest his whole work with a very unique novelty thereby." (4.21) (K.Krishnamoorthy,1977).

(iv) We read 4.22 and 4.23 together:
"Again, though the hero is concerned in achieving primarily a single goal, when he is seen to attain incidentally many other equally great fruits," (4.22)
"which add up to make his glory shine very brilliantly, such an assemblage of his great achievements will contribute in another way to the beauty of a work as a whole." (4.23) (K.Krishnamoorthy,1977).

(v) "Even if we let alone the artistic skill of the poet in devising original incidents or episodes, we find that he can display his unique art even in designating his main plot with a very significant title." (4.24) (K.Krishnamoorthy,1977).

(vi) "Even when great poets compose different literary works based on an identical theme, they are each seen to possess infinite individual beauty, each possessing distinctness from the others." (4.25)

(vii) "Whatever works there might be composed by great poets who are able to instruct in new forms of political strategy, they may be taken as embodying literary beauty."


Thus Kuntaka has virtually dealt with many ideas and almost all the categories of his important predecessors but under different kinds of vakrokti. He is almost the first and the last poeticians of vakrokti as no body else before or after him dealt with vakrokti as the single most important encompassing aspect of poetic aesthetics.

After Kuntaka the trend to establish one aspect as the most important one in poetry declined and poeticians started considering various aspects of poetry without emphasizing on any of the schools. After Dhvanyaloka and Vakroktijivita Indian poetics seems to have come to a stage where the poetic meaning could be discussed without any particular reference or emphasis on any schools of Indian poetics. Anthologies with original insights could be written and some new categories not related to alamkara, guna or riti were evolved. Anandavardhana and Kuntaka established poetic meaning in the centre of poetics and evolved a systemic method of its analysis. Many of the later poeticians furthered their task of evolving a comprehensive methodology in poetics. Rajasekhara (later half of tenth or beginning of eleventh century) is first such poetician who wrote an anthological (sangraha) text Kavyamimamsa in which he tried to develop comprehensive
methodological categories and tools for analysis of poetry. In the next section we shall study the concepts of *Kavyamimamsa*.

*Kavyamimamsa of Rajasekhara*

This text has eighteen chapters: there contents can be listed as follows:

Chapter one: Origin of systematic study of poetics.

Chapter two: *Kavya* vis-a-vis *Vedas* and *Kavya* as the seventh *vedanga* as it interprets *Vedas*.

Chapter three: Mythical origin of *Kavyapurusa*, his relation to the poet, his marriage with *Sahityavidya*, and their wanderings all over India in the process of creating *vrttis*, *pravrttis* and *ritis* at different places.

Chapter four: Beginning of *kavirahasya*.

Chapter five: Here Rajasekhara explains kinds of poets and necessary poetic tools for poets.

Chapter six: Here concepts of *pada*, *guna*, *alamkara* and such others are explained.

Chapter seven: In this chapter concepts on *sakti* and *kaku* are explained.

Chapter eight: In this chapter sixteen sources of meaning are explained.

Chapter nine: In this chapter kinds of meaning, unlimitedness of subjects and concepts on kinds of poetry are explained.

Chapter ten: Daily routine of a poet is explained in this
Chapter eleven: In this chapter considerations on borrowings of word, meanings and intertextuality begins.

Chapter twelve: In this chapter concepts related to incorporation of ideas and expression of other texts and poets into one's own works are related.

Chapter thirteen: In this chapter types of meanings are explained.

Chapter fourteen: In this chapter Rajasekhara explains the concept of kavisamaya, jatirupa and dravyarupa.

Chapter fifteen: In this chapter the relationship between the colours and the ideas and rasas are explained.

Chapter sixteen: In this chapter poetical conventions related to heaven and hell are discussed.

Chapter seventeen: In this chapter, geography of the subcontinent and parts of the known world and their ancient names are given. It deals with the ancient methods of describing incidents, places and men.

Chapter eighteen: In this chapter the astronomical details and divisions of time and change of seasons are given.

Now we shall deal with the important concepts of Rajasekhara's Kavyamimamsa.

There are two kinds of literature - sastra and kavya. Sastras are scriptures and books on the accumulated knowledge of a civilization. Kavya is all kinds of literary composition. Before creating kavya it is important to know the sastras. In chapter three, while conceptualizing Kavyapurusa, Rajasekhara declares rasa as the soul of
poetry - *samah prasanno madhura udara ojasvi casi.

Ukticanan te vaco, rasa atma, romani chandansi, prasnottarapravahilakadikan ca vakkelih, anuprasopamadyasca tvamalankurvanti (Ganga Sagar Rai, 1982:13) i.e. 'you are symmetrical, happy, sweet, generous and full of ojas. Your speech is endowed with statements, rasa is your soul, chandas are the pores of your body, question-answer and riddles are your verbal pleasures, and embellishments like anuprasa or upama decorate you'. Thus unlike Bhamaha, Dandi and Vamana, Rajasekhara reasserts the importance of rasa (as propounded by Bharata) poetry.

In the fourth chapter Rajasekhara propounds an important concept of pratibha. He says that there are two kinds of kavya-sakti - pratibha (innate faculty) and vyutpatti (study and analysis of already composed works).

Pratibha is that mental faculty by which things, ideas or mental states not directly perceptible to the poet on account of distance in time, space, gender difference or such others, are easily conceived in mind and consequently expressed through language. There are thus two aspects of pratibha - darsana (imaginative insight) and varnana (power of poetic representation).

There are two kinds of pratibha: karayitri (creative) and bhavayitri (emotive/contemplative). Karayitri pratibha is the necessary prerequisite of poetic creativity and bhavayitri pratibha is an essential precondition for appreciation of poetry.

Karayitri pratibha is of three types - (i) Sahaja
(innate) (ii) Aharya (acquired by abhyasa of sastra) (iii) aupadesiki (instilled by mantras or gifted by the goddess of poetry). These three kinds of karayitri pratibha give rise to three kinds of poets - (i) sarasvata (a buddhimana or wise neophyte as a poet) (ii) abhyasika (from an aharyabuddhi neophyte i.e. that neophyte as a poet who acquired poetic skills by abhyasa) (iii) aupadesika (from a durbuddhi neophyte i.e. that neophyte who creates poetry on the basis of the precepts he receives from his teachers).

Rajasekhara contends that abhyasa is important for all types of poets. Excellence in poetic composition is achieved through a combination of many of the above-mentioned qualities. It is rare to find a poet in whom the qualities of buddhimata, abhyasa and daivisakti are combined.

Bhavayitri pratibha is the faculty essential for critics. A reader is the bhavaka (appreciator). Bhavayitri pratibha is that intellectual capacity which enables the reader to appreciate poetry. It complements the sine qua non of poetic creativity. A bhavaka receives the compositions thus gratifying the efforts of a poet endowed with karayitri pratibha. A bhavaka is sahrdaya (literally this term means 'of similar heart') an empathizer who recreates the poetry in his imagination and thus achieves an emotional identity with the poet or he may even go beyond the emotional states originally intended by the poet. Thus a bhavaka is rasika, i.e. one who is capable of aesthetic appreciation of rasa,
dhvani and alamkara. Rasikata or rasajnata i.e. the capacity to relish the poetic creation is the prerequisite quality of a critic. A bhavaka has to constantly refine his literary sensibility and aesthetic taste by learning good literature and enhancing his capacity for pure and profound response to poetry.

Rajasekhara writes that according to acaryas, there is no difference between the two faculties of karayitri and bhavayitri pratibha as a poet can be a good critic as well. Though these two faculties are distinct the same person may be endowed with both of them. However, Rajasekhara quotes Kalidasa holding another view that the poetical and critical faculties are seldom combined in one and the same person. Kalidasa states that the subject of the poet is kavyanirmana (composition of poetry) while that of the critic is rasasvadana (enjoyment of rasa).

According to Rajasekhara there are four kinds of critics:
(i) Arocaki: One who is disinterested in appreciating poetry.
(ii) Satrnabhyavahari: One who appreciates all poetry irrespective of its quality.
(iii) Matsari: One who refuses to appreciate poetry because of envy.
(iv) Tattvabhinisvesi: One who is an impartial critic.

There are three more categories of bhavaka:
(i) Vagbhavakas: Those who express their appreciation of poetry and give importance to the words (diction, rhyme,
melody etc.) of poetry.
(ii) Hrdayabhavakas: Those who confine their appreciation within their hearts and lay stress on the essence of poetry.
(iii) Those who lay stress on critical appreciation of the sattvika bhavas, angika and anubhavas.

One more four-fold classification of critics is:
(i) Those interested in finding praiseworthy qualities.
(ii) Those who are prone to discover defects in poetry.
(iii) Those who are interested mainly in the rasas.
(iv) Those who are attracted more by the alamkaras in the poetry.

In the fifth chapter Rajasekhara talks about vyutpatti and kavyapaka. Vyutpatti is defined in two ways:
(i) Bahujnata vyutpattiḥ i.e. "knowledge of lots of subjects is vyutpatti.
(ii) Ucitanucitaviveko vyutpattiḥ i.e. "ability to distinguish proper from improper is vyutpatti.

In context of defining vyutpatti Rajasekhara quotes Anandavardhana as holding the opinion that pratibha is preferable to vyutpatti and Mangala as preferring vyutpatti to pratibha. However, he himself contends that those poets are better in whom both pratibha and vyutpatti are combined together. The poets endowed with pratibha and vyutpatti are of three types:
(i) Sastrakavi: One who lays more stress in his poetry on the knowledge of sastras. Such poets do not often create poetry which contains rasa.
(ii) Kavyakavi: One who is more skilled in poetic use of language. Though such poets avoid the logical harshness of sastras they create poetry which mainly contains beautiful use of language.

(iii) Ubhayakavi: One who is a combination of (i) and (ii). Rajasekhara considers this kind poet superior to the above two types of poets.

Further sastrakavis are of three kinds and kavyakavis are of eight types. The three kinds of sastrakavis are:

(i) One who creates sastras.
(ii) One who introduces poetry in sastras.
(iii) One who introduces sastras in poetry.

Following are the eight kinds of kavyakavis:

(i) Racanakavi: One who creates poetry only on the basis of beautiful uses of words and does not stress on the meaning.
(ii) Sabdakavi: There are three kinds of sabdakavis:
   (a) Namakavi: Those who use more nouns in their poetry.
   (b) Akhyatakavi: Those who use more verbs in their poetry.
   (c) Namakhyatakavi: Those who equally use both nouns and verbs in their poetry.
(iii) Arthakavi: Those who lay more stress on the meaning contained in the poetry than the crafty use of words.
(iv) Alamkarakavi: Those who emphasize on the embellishments in their poetic creativity. These alamkarakavis are of two types as there are two types of embellishments in poetry - sabdalamkara and arthalamkara. Some alamkarakavis can attach more importance to sabdalamkara while other to arthalamkaras.
(v) **Uktikavi:** By *ukti* is meant 'presenting an idea in a beautiful style'. *Uktikavi* is one who exhibits one's poetic craft in beautiful descriptions and presentations of ideas.

(vi) **Rasakavi:** One who gives more importance to attainment of rasa through his poetry.

(vii) **Margakavi:** Marga is *riti* or styles of poetry according to local conventions. Three such margas have already been discussed namely *pancali*, *gaudi* and *vadarbhi*. *Margakavi* is one who lays emphasis on the use of styles in his poetry.

(viii) **Sastrarthakavi:** One who incorporates references to *sastras* while creating meaning in his poetry.

Rajasekhara indicates that those who possess two or three of the above qualities are *kanistha* or below average poets, five of these qualities make *madhyama* or average/medium poets and *mahakavis* or great poets possess all of these qualities.

Rajasekhara again gives a ten-fold classification of stages of creativity of poets:

(i) **Kavyavidyasnatakata:** One who studies various branches of poetics under preceptors with a desire to create poetry.

(ii) **Hrdayakavi:** One who creates poetry and keeps it confined to himself.

(iii) **Anyapadesi:** One who presents one's own poems on other's names for fear of the defects in the poems.

(iv) **Sevita:** One who follows the shades, meanings or styles of an earlier poet.

(v) **Ghatamana:** Those who create good poetry but do not keep
them systematically.

(vi) Mahakavi: One who is an expert in writing great poetical work.

(vii) Kaviraja: One who can write poems in different languages and is capable of creating different prabandhakavyas and different rasas. Few poets possess these qualities.

(viii) Avesika: Those who create poetry after attaining poetic insight by receiving stimulation from mantras etc.

(ix) Avicchedi: One who creates poetry only when the desire to write poetry arises in oneself.

(x) Sankramayita: That poet who after attaining specific abilities through ritualistic enchantments and is capable of instilling knowledge and education in young men and women.

After the above taxonomic classification of poets, Rajasekhara defines kavyapaka as the maturity gained by a poet through constant practice in versification of poetic composition. It is that quality absence of which makes even those poems unworthy of relishment which contain all the qualities defined in the study of poetic aesthetics. Rajasekhara quotes some of his predecessors' opinions and finally favours the Avantisundari's view that it is an undefined quality, a maturity attained through experience in creation of poetry. He further distinguishes between sabdapaka and vakyapaka. Sabdapaka is maturity in using apt and appropriate words and expression. Vakyapaka is beautiful patterning and commixture of guna, alamkara,
riti, yukti (logical evolution of poetry) and sabdartha (proper usages of words for conveying the desired meaning). Rajasekhara contends that only the discerning critics can determine the level of maturity attained in a poetic composition.

In the sixth chapter Rajasekhara provides categories for analysing pada and vakya. Rajasekhara defines sabda as that which is approved by the science of grammar and the artha is that which is approved by nirukta, nighantu and such other texts. Pada is that sabda which possesses artha. In other words, pada is like a word which is a sequence of sounds possessing meaning. A meaningful inflected word is called pada. There are five following types of padas:

(i) Subanta: These are words with case endings. Those nouns, pronouns and adjectives which are inflected by `sup' suffix for indicating their relation with the finite verbs in the sentence.

(ii) Samasanta: These are compounded words. When two or more words are joined in a syntactical or semantic connection by merging their suffixes with one of the either, the resulting unitary pada is samasanta. There are following six types of samasanta padas:

(a) Dvandva: Copulative compounds.
(b) Dvigu: Numeral Appositional compounds.
(c) Karmadharaya: Appositional compound.
(d) Bahuvrihi: Attributive compound.
(e) Avyayibhava: Adverbial compound.
(f) Tatpurusa: Determinative compound.
(iii) **Taddhitanta**: Suffixes added to *krdanta* and non-verbs.

(iv) **Krdanta**: Verbal derivatives obtained by adding suffixes to verb roots.

(v) **Tinganta**: 'Ting' suffixes added to verb roots for making the conjugational forms.

The above mentioned five kinds of padas together take infinite forms for expressing infinite meanings. Rajasekhara gives a description of the regional preferences in using different kinds of padas. As for example, the people of *vidarbha* prefer the *subantas*.

In chapter six Rajasekhara also describes five *pravrttis* or potency of padas:

(i) **Jativacaka**: Denoting class such as horses, women, men, etc.

(ii) **Gunavacaka**: Denoting quality/attributes such as white, black, bright etc.

(iii) **Kriyavacaka**: Denoting action such as breathe, walk, run etc.

(iv) **Dravyavacaka**: Denoting substance such as milk, salt etc. and proper names.

(v) **Avyayavacaka**: Indeclinables and grammatical terms such as in, on etc.

Rajasekhara defines *vakya* as *padanamadhitsitarthagrahagrantharanakarah sandarbho vakyaṃ* (Ganga Sagar Rai, 1982:49). That is, 'that organised group of padas is called sentence which expresses the desired meaning'.

There are two parameters for classification of sentences - first on the basis of *abhidha vyapara* i.e. overt marking of
grammatical relations between different parts of a sentence; and second on the basis of the number of verbs in a sentence.

On the basis of abhidha vyapara there are three kinds of sentences:

(i) Vaibhakta: A sentence in which grammatical relations like case terminations, case endings are explicitly marked in each pada.

(ii) Sakta: A sentence in which all grammatical relations are implicit and not overtly marked.

(iii) Ubhayatmaka: A sentence containing such padas which are both explicitly marked and possess implicit zero morpheme markers for grammatical relations.

On the basis of the number of verbs, Rajasekhara gives the following ten-fold typology of sentences:

(i) Ekakhyata: One verb sentence.

(ii) Anekakhyata: Many verb sentence. There are two subcategories of this:

(a) Santara: Interrupted by case-endings.

(b) Nirantara: Not interrupted by case-endings.

(iii) Avrttakhyata: Same verb repeated for several nouns or clauses in a sentence.

(iv) Ekabhidheyakhyata: One noun-subject with many verbs of the same meaning.

(v) Parinatakhyata: Same verb repeated in different clauses, for two different subjects.

(vi) Anuvrttakhyata: Same verb understood in different clauses, or different sentences.
(vii) **Samucitakhyata:** A verb proper to something applied to some other thing on the basis of analogy.

(viii) **Adhyahrtakhyata:** Elided verb.

(ix) **Krdabhihitakhyata:** Derived nominals used as verbs.

(x) **Anapeksitakhyata:** Verbless sentence.

After defining the types of sentences, Rajasekhara defines poetry as *gunavadalamkrtanca vakyameva kavyam* (Ganga Sagar Rai, 1982:55) i.e. the sentence containing *gunas* and *alamkaras* is poetry. Rajasekhara presumes a prior knowledge of *gunas* and *alamkaras*. He neither explains nor writes about their typology as given by his predecessors. Rajasekhara mentions the three *ritis* - *vaidarbhi*, *gaudi* and *pancali* - but does not explain them.

In the seventh chapter, Rajasekhara explains two kinds of *kaku* or intonation in a sentence:

(i) **sakanksa:** That tone or intonation of a sentence which raises linguistic or psychological expectancy is called *sakanksa kaku*. There are three subcategories of this:

(a) **Aksepagarbha:** Suggestive of an objection, disapproval or censure.

(b) **Prasnagarbha:** Suggestive of a question.

(c) **Vitarkagarbha:** Suggestive of doubt or uncertainty.

Rajasekhara carefully mentions that these three intonations are bound by rules and there are infinite number of other intonations which are not bound by rules. Many times different kinds of *kakus* are intermixed in a sentence. Some of them are explained even by *angika abhinaya* i.e. through gestures along with the intonation of.
a sentence.

(ii) Nirakanksa: It is absence of any such expectancy in the tone or intonation of a sentence as the answer may have been provided. There are three varieties of this:

(a) Vidhirupa: Denoting a statement or fact.

(b) Uttararupa: Giving an answer.

(c) Nirnayarupa: Asserting a decision.

In the eighth chapter Rajasekhara enumerates following sixteen sources of meaning:

(i) Sruti: In the Indian context, the four Vedas are sruti. If we extend the concept, it shall imply the cultural patrimony of any civilisation.

(ii) Smrti: These are sastras - the social philosophies and cultural texts.

(iii) Itihasa: As the events have been in the past - the history of one's own civilisation or of the world.

(iv) Puranas: All the knowledge of mythology.

(v) Pramanavidya: Epistemology and logic.

(vi) Rajasiddhantatrayi: Science of erotics (Kamasutra), polity (Arthasastra) and dramaturgy (Natyasastra) are together called rajasiddhantatrayi.

(vii) Loka: Knowledge and experience of the world.

(viii) Viracana: Intertextuality based on the knowledge of other well-known poets and writers. In chapters eleven and twelve this is dealt with in details respectively under headings of sabdaharana (appropriation of words from the works of other poets/writers) and arthaharana (appropriation of meanings and ideas from the works of
other poets/writers). Various categories and subcategories based on different kinds of appropriation of words and ideas are enumerated in these chapters.

(ix) Prakirnaka: Knowledge of sixty-four arts.

(x) 5 minor vedas (itihasa, dhanur, ayur, gana, gandharva).

(xi) 7 auxiliary sciences (siksa, kalpa, vyakarana, nirukta, chhanda, jyotisa, kavya).

(xii) 6 vidyas (varta, kamasutra, silpa-sastra, arthasastra, sahitya-vidya, anviksaki).

Rajasekhara says that the above twelve categories are mentioned by his predecessors and the following four are added by him:

(xiii) Ucitasamyoga: An apt and appropriate juxtaposition facilitating direct comparison.

(xiv) Yoktrsamyoga: Incidental conjunction or a serial analogy on the basis of cause-effect relationship. It may be called an extended simile.

(xv) Utpadasamyoga: Parallel conjunction or a juxtaposition of upamana (the object of comparison) and upameya (the object compared) which are both compounded thus generating two comparisons.

(xvi) Samyogavikara: Inappropriate conjunction with the theme or subject of discourse.

In the ninth chapter Rajasekhara has identified two kinds of poetry - muktaka (isolated verses or dispersed, free and simple poetry) and prabandha (long and continuous literary composition). Each of them can be further classified according to following five kinds of poetry:
(i) **Suddha**: Pure description.
(ii) **Citra**: Extended and arched picturisation.
(iii) **Kathottha**: Based in history, myth and legend.
(iv) **Samvidhanakabhu**: Based in contemporary records.
(v) **Akhyanakavana**: Based in imaginary accounts.

We have dealt with the principal ideas and formal categories of Rajasekhara's *Kavyamimamsa*. Various other aspects of poetry and life of a poet according to the contemporary conventions and repertoire of the speech communities are explained by Rajasekhara. They may not be relevant to our study of poetics and hence we have left them in our discussion. Though Rajasekhara mentions many *alamkaras* there is almost nothing new in his classification and categorisation.

Now we shall discuss *Kavyaprakasa* of Mammata.

**Kavyaprakasa of Mammata**

Mammata, a poetician of second half of eleventh century, is supposed to have written one of the best treatises on poetics in India. He is a follower of *dhvani* school and it remained a matter of prestige among his successors to write commentary on his *Kavyaprakasa*. There are ten chapters in his book. After *parikara alamkara* of the tenth chapter, the book is supposed to have been completed by some scholar named Allata. (Acharya Baladeva Upadhyaya, 1994:610). Chapter one deals with *kavya-svarupa*; chapter two with the definition of word and *abhidha, laksana, vyanjana* types of
meaning; chapter three with the definition of dhvani and situations in which suggestions arise; chapter four with rasa and types of dhvani; chapter five with guni-bhuta vyangya; chapter six with citra-kavya; chapter seven with dosa; chapter eight with guna; chapter nine with sabdalamkara and chapter ten with arthalamkara.

Chapter one: Aim, source and kinds of poetry

Chapter one deals with the aim, source and kinds of poetry. According to karika 1.2 the aim of poetry is to bring "fame and riches, knowledge of the ways of the world and relief from evils, instant and perfect happiness, and counsel sweet as from the lips of a beloved consort". (Ganganath Jha, 1985)

Having defined the purpose of poetry in the second karika, the author defines the source of poetry in 1.3 as "Poetic genius, knowledge born of a study of the world, of sciences and of poems, and the practice of the teachings of those versed in writing poetry - these three together constitute the source of poetry". (Ganganath Jha, 1985). It is similar to the earlier poeticians' contention that pratibha, vyutpatti and abhyasa are the sources of poetry.

Karika 1.4 defines the nature of poetry as "It consists in word and sense - without faults and with merits and excellences of style - which may at times be without Figures of Speech". (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

Mammata classifies poetry in three primary categories - suggestive poetry, poetry of subordinate suggestion and
non-suggestive poetry. He considers the suggestive poetry to be the best, poetry of subordinate suggestion to be of middle excellence and non-suggestive to be of the inferior kind of poetry.

Chapter two: Nature of words and their meaning

In the 2.6 Mammata contend that there are three kinds of words - the expressive, the indicative and the suggestive. Even the meaning and the import are expressed, indicated or suggested.

In the vrtti of 2.6 Mammata refers to abhihitanvayavadins mimamsakas (the followers of Kumarila) and to anvitabhidhanavadins mimamsakas (the followers of Prabakara).

The abhihitanvayavadins contend that when the denotations of a number of words become related together through akanksa (mutual requirement), yogyata (compatibility) and sannidhi (proximity), there appears a resultant in the shape of the 'meaning of the sentence'. This meaning is not expressed by any single word constituting that sentence, and which, being, on that account, of a peculiar character, comes to be called by the name tatparyartha or import.

The anvitabhidhanavadins contend that the meaning of the sentence is the expressed meaning of the words themselves. Mammata further contends in 2.6 that all the three types of meaning namely abhidha or vacya (expressed), laksana (indicated) and vyanjana (suggested) are held to be
suggestive and exemplifies them in his vṛti.

Mammata defines meaning of vācyā in 2.7 as "That which denotes the direct conventional meaning is the "Expressive" word". (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

Defining laksana in 2.9, Mammata says,"When the primary meaning is precluded (by incompatibility), another meaning, in affinity therewith, comes to be implied,- either on the basis of usage or for a special purpose,- this process of imposed implication is called "Indication", Laksana." (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

There are two main varieties of laksana:

(1) Suddha laksana: In 2.10 Mammata defines two kinds of suddha laksana:"Pure' Indication is of two kinds - (a) the 'Inclusive', in which there is implication of the other (the secondary) meaning for the purpose of completing (the logical connection of) the primary meaning itself, and (b) the 'Indicative' in which the primary meaning surrenders itself for the sake of the other (the secondary meaning).

When one says that kuntah pravisanti `lances are entering' and means that `men holding the lances are entering', there is logical connection between `lances' and `entering' which indicates that lances cannot enter by themselves. Hence the meaning inferred from `lances' is `men holding lances'. This is an example of inclusive indication.

Gangayam ghosah or `the ranch in the Ganges' means that the ranch is on the bank of the Ganges river. Here the word ganga surrenders its primary meaning and indicates the
'bank of the river'. This is an example of indicative indication.

(2) Guna or saropa laksana or super-imponent or introsusceptive indication is when the 'imposed' and 'that imposed upon' are both distinctly expressed. For example, the ploughman is an ox. Here the ox-qualities of dullness and stupidity is completely super-imposed upon the ploughman.

There can be following four types of saropa laksana:

(i) When the relation between the two objects is based upon some kind of similarity between them.

(ii) When the relation between the two objects is based upon cause-effect relation.

(iii) When the indication is on the basis of 'subserviency'. As for example, the pillar that subserves the purpose of the worship of Indra is called indra.

(iv) Indication based upon the relationship of whole and part.

Thus there are six kinds of laksana (refer to chart 2) - laksana tena sadvidha (2.12). On the pragmatics of laksana Mammata says in 2.13 that indication "when based upon usage, is without any 'suggested' meaning; but when it is based upon some purpose, it is accompanied by a 'suggested' meaning" and this suggested meaning 'may be either abstruse or explicit'". (Ganganath Jha, 1985). In this way indication can be of three kinds - (a) when there is no suggested meaning (b) when the suggested meaning is abstruse (c) when the suggested meaning is explicit.
After having defined abhidha and laksana on the word level, now Mammata defines vyanjana for words. First he defines the suggestion based on indication. In 2.14 Mammata defines vyanjana as tatra vyaparo vyanjanatmakah i.e. "Of the Indicative Word, that function (which brings about the cognition of the 'purpose' of the indication) is of the nature of 'Suggestion'". (Ganganath Jha, 1985). In the third sutra of 2.14 and first sutra of 2.15 Mammata says, "In regard to that intended idea for bringing about the cognition whereof one has recourse to Indication, (14) and which is cognisable through the word only, the function (of the word) can be none other than 'Suggestion'". (Ganganath Jha, 1985). Vyanjana is that function of word by which some meaning not established by usage is expressed or indicated. According to 2.16, "What is 'indicated' is not the primary meaning; nor is that meaning incompatible; nor has it any connection with the intended idea; nor again is there any purpose served by it (i.e., by making the intended idea an object of further indication); nor lastly is the word itself wanting in the requisite force". (Ganganath Jha, 1985). For example, gangayam ghosah can mean 'ranches on the bank of the Ganges' through indication because gala is incapable of denoting 'bank'. However the same word gala itself can bring forth the idea of 'sanctity' without any help of indication eventhough 'sanctity' is not the primary meaning of the word. When gala means 'sanctity', it is the case of suggestion.

The indication can have a referential object which may
not include the comprehensible qualities of that object. When the word directly gives the idea of some of the qualities of the referential object, it is different from indication and is held as suggestion. Thus indication helps in comprehension of the object through perceptual cognition while recognition of certain qualities can be brought about by other function of vyanjana (suggestion), dhvanana (echo) and dyotana (illumination).

2.19 defines suggestion based on denotation as "When a word having several primary meanings has the range of its denotation restricted by 'connection' and such other conditions, if there appears the cognition of a meaning other than the denoted (or directly expressed) one, that function which brings about this cognition is 'Suggestion'". (Ganganath Jha, 1985). Mammata quotes from Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya that there are fifteen conditions that serve to bring about the idea of a particular meaning of a word. These conditions are:

(1) Connection: In the expression "Hari with conch and discus", the word "Hari" means Vishnu. This word has many meanings but this particular meaning is understood in connection with the conch and discus.

(2) Disjunction: When the meaning is understood on the basis of disjoint connection. For example, in the expression "Hari without the conch and discus", the meaning of Hari is understood as Vishnu because of his disjunction with conch and discus.

(3) Association: In the expression Ramalaksamanau i.e.
"Rama and Laksamana", Rama is none other than the son of Dasaratha because of association with Laksamana.

(4) Enmity: In the expression "the behaviour of these two combatants is like that of Rama and Arjuna", the meaning of 'Rama' is restricted to 'Parasurama' and that of 'Arjuna' to 'Krtavirya'.

(5) Purpose: In the expression "worship sthanu for the purpose of removing the shackles of the world", the meaning of the word 'sthanu' is restricted to Siva.

(6) Context: In the expression "Devā knows everything", the meaning of the word 'deva' is restricted to 'you'. This is done through the context.

(7) Peculiarity: In 'Makaradhvaja is angry', the meaning of the word 'Makaradhvaja' is restricted to the Love-God as the quality of being angry is applicable only to God and not to ocean.

(8) Proximity of another word: In the expression "devasya purarateh", the meaning of the word 'deva' is restricted to Siva because of the proximity of the word 'purarati'.

(9) Capacity: In "the kokila bird is intoxicated by Madhu", the meaning of the word 'Madhu' is restricted to the 'spring' because only the 'spring' and not 'honey' or 'wine' has the capacity to intoxicate the bird.

(10) Compatibility: In patu vo dayitamukham i.e. "confrontation with the beloved's face", the meaning of the word patu (which can mean 'drink' and 'protect' also) is restricted to "confrontation" as only this meaning is compatible with the 'beloved's face'.
(11) Place: In 'paramesvara shines here', the meaning of the word paramesvara is restricted to the 'king' through the place referred to being the king's capital.

(12) Time: In 'citrabhanu is shining', the meaning of the word 'citrabhanu is 'sun' if the statement is uttered during the day and 'fire' if uttered during night.

(13) Gender: In 'mitra shines', the word mitra is used in the neuter gender and hence means 'friend' but if the word is used in masculine gender, it means 'sun'.

(14) Accent: In the expression Indrasatru the meaning depends on the accent. It can mean 'whose killer is Indra' when the accent is on the first word 'Indra' and 'the killer of Indra' when the accent is on the second word 'satru'.

(15) Gesture: It serves to restrict the meaning in such passages as - 'During all these days her breasts have been reduced to this (marked by gestures) size, her eyes have shrunk to this (marked by gestures), and her condition has become like this (marked by gestures).

In case if the meaning of the word is restricted to some particular sense and yet the word can have one or more other significations which cannot be accounted for by abhidha or laksana, the word are considered to be in their suggestive function and the meanings are also considered to be suggestive.

Chapter three: Suggestiveness of meaning

According to 3.21-22, suggestion is that function of the
meaning which brings about the cognition of another meaning, by persons endowed with imaginative intuition, through peculiarities of the following:

(a) Speaker: One who utters the statement.
(b) The person spoken to: One for whose sake the words are used.
(c) Intonation: Variation of tone.
(d) The sentence
(e) The expressed meaning
(f) The presence of another
(g) Context: The occasion on which the statement is uttered.
(h) Place
(i) Time

There can be several other peculiarities also as suggested by 'so forth' in the end of the above list in 3.21-22. This 'so forth' can be considered to include gestures and such other details.

Chapter four: Suggestive Poetry

This chapter deals with the best kind of poetry i.e., dhvani kavya or suggestive poetry. After having defined 'word' and 'meaning' Mammata says in 4.24, "In that 'suggestive' poetry where the 'expressed' meaning is not meant to be applicable, the 'expressed meaning' is either (a) transformed into another meaning or (b) entirely rejected". (Ganganath Jha, 1985). (a) is called arthantara and (b) is known as arthasamkramita atyanta or
arthaṣamkramita tirāskṛta. He further adds in the commentary on karika 24, "The 'expressed meaning' is 'not meant to be applicable' only in cases where predominance attaches to that abstruse 'suggested meaning' which is based upon Indication; and it is such instances that should be understood as 'Dhvani', 'suggestive poetry'". (Ganganath Jha, 1985:49).

The first part of 2.25 says, "That (suggestive poetry), however, where the 'expressed meaning' is meant to be applicable, and is yet subservient to another meaning, is the other kind" (Ganganath Jha, 1985) and in the second part of 2.25 two kinds of this 'other kind' of poetry are enumerated:

(1) Alaksyakramavyangya: One in which the order of sequence of the suggested meaning is not perceptible. (a) Passion, (b) emotion, (c) mixture of these, and the (d) allayment of emotion and such others like (e) the manifestation of emotions (f) the conjuncture of emotions and (g) the admixture of emotions etc. constitute this kind of poetry. On this basis there are eight kinds of poetry:

(i) Rasa kavya: Where passion is dominant.
(ii) Bhava kavya: Where emotion is dominant.
(iii) Rasabhasa kavya: Where there is combined dominance of both rasa and bhava.
(iv) Bhavabhasa kavya: Where there is an appearance of emotions.
(v) Bhavasanti kavya: Where there is an allayment of emotions.

123
(vi) **Bhavodaya kavya:** Where there is a manifestation of emotions.

(vii) **Bhavasandhi kavya:** Where there is an admixture of emotions.

(viii) **Bhavasabalata kavya:** Where one emotion is dominant in case of an admixture of emotions.

Mammata writes in his commentary on 4.26, "In cases where the passion and the rest appear as the predominant factor, they are to be embellished; as is going to be illustrated later on. In other cases, where the literal meaning of the sentence forms the predominant factor, and the passion comes in only as a secondary element, the suggested meaning is subordinated, these same (passion and the rest), become embellishments, known as (a) 'rasavat' (passionate), [where the Passion forms the subordinate factor], (b) 'Preyā' (agreeable) [where emotion forms the subordinate factor], (c) 'urjasvi' (forceful) [where the aberration of passion forms the subordinate factor], (d) 'samahita' (quiescent) [where the allayment of emotion forms the subordinate factor]. (Ganganath Jha, 1985: 51-52).

After this Mammata explains rasa theory. His definition of rasa in 4.28 is *vyaktah sa taivibhavadyaih sthayi bhavo rasah smrtah* i.e. the latent emotion manifested by *vibhavas, anubhavas* and *sancari bhavas* are rasa. In this definition there is no distinction between *sthayi bhava* and rasa. Mammata briefly reports the views of Bhatta-Lolata, Sri Sankuka, Bhatta-Nayaka and Acarya Abhinavagupta. He mentions the eight *rasas* as enumerated by Bharata and then
adds one more in the list - the santa rasa (the quietistic) with nirveda or self-disparagement as its sthayi bhava.

(2) Laksyavyangyakramah: One in which the order of sequence of suggested meaning is perceptible. According to 4.37, this is supposed to be of three kinds:

(i) Sabdasakti: That arising from the force of the word. There are further two subcategories of this based on what is principally represented by the word-- (a) alamkaradhvani or a figure of speech (b) vastudhvani or a simple matter of fact.

(ii) Arthasakti: That arising from the force of the meaning. In this case even the word(s) is changed by its synonym the suggestion may remain the same. According to 4.39-40 and first statement of 4.41 there are twelve kinds of arthasakti laksyavyangyakrama,"Inasmuch as the suggestive object 'based upon the force of the meaning' is: either (a) self-existent (b) or owing its existence to the bold assertion of the poet or (c) owing its existence to the bold assertion of some character portrayed by the poet;' each these three being either a figure of speech or a bare fact, it comes to be of six kinds (39-40); and since each of these suggests a figure or a fact, it comes to be of twelve kinds". (Ganganath Jha, 1985). Mammata explains them as follows:"(a) self-existent: Not only created by the words of the poet but having a real existence in the world. (b) This is created by the poet's imagination, and having no real existence in the external world. (c) This is created by the imagination of a speaker:
portrayed by the poet;" (Ganganath Jha, 1985: 81). According to the last sutra of 4.42, the suggestion based on meaning can occur in a context also. Altogether the twelve varieties can be enumerated as follows:

(a) The self-existent fact suggesting the self-existent fact.

(b) The self-existent fact suggesting a figure.

(c) The self-existent figure suggesting a fact.

(d) The self-existent figure suggesting a figure.

(e) A fact, the creation of the poet's fancy, suggests a fact.

(f) Figure suggested by a fact created by the poet's imagination.

(g) Fact suggested by figure created by the poet's fancy.

(h) Figure suggested by an imaginary fact.

(i) Fact suggested by fact, based upon the bold assertion of an imaginary person.

(j) Figure suggested by fact asserted by an imaginary person.

(k) Fact suggested by figure set forth by an imaginary character.

(l) Figure suggested by figure in the assertion of an imaginary character.

(iii) Ubhayasakti: That arising from the force of both sabda and artha. This arises only in a sentence.

In his commentaries after 2.41 and before the end of 2.42, Mammata enumerates seventeen kinds of suggestions based upon word:
(1) Transference of the expressed meaning to another by a word.

(2) The expressed meaning entirely ignored in a word.

(3) The suggestion of imperceptible sequence in a single word.

(4) Suggestion of perceptible process by a word - founded on the power of words - of figure by fact.

(5) Suggestion of perceptible process - founded on the power of a word - of fact by fact.

(6) Suggestion of perceptible process - by word - founded on the force of meaning - of fact by self-existent fact.

(7) Suggestion of perceptible process - by word - founded on the force of meaning - of figure by a self-existent fact.

(8) Suggestion of perceptible process - by word - based on force of meaning of fact by self-existent figure.

(9) Suggestion of perceptible process, - based on the force of meaning - of figure by self-existent figure.

(10) Suggestion of perceptible process - based on the force of meaning - of fact by imaginary fact.

(11) Suggestion of perceptible process - of figure by an imaginary fact.

(12) Suggestion of perceptible process - of a fact by an imaginary figure.

(13) Suggestion of perceptible process - of a figure by an imaginary figure.

(14) Suggestion of fact by fact, founded upon the assertion of an imaginary person.
(15) Suggestion of perceptible process - of figure by fact asserted by the fanciful assertion of an imaginary person.

(16) Suggestion of perceptible process - of a fact by a figure resting upon the fanciful assertion of an imaginary person.

(17) Suggestion of perceptible process - of figure by figure based upon the fanciful assertion of an imaginary person.

The first sutra of 4.43 states, "Passion (Emotion, Aberrations of Passion, Aberrations of Emotion, Allayement of Emotion, Conjunction of Emotions and Admixture of Emotions) are (suggested imperceptibly) also (a) by parts of words, (b) by style (c) by individual letters". (Ganganath Jha, 1985). Thus there will be six varieties of suggestions in each sentiment based respectively on (i) sentence (ii) word (iii) part of word (iv) style (v) letter and (vi) context.

Altogether there are fifty-one varieties of suggestion. Ganganath Jha comments on it, "(A) That where the expressed meaning is not intended has two varieties - (a) That in which the expressed meaning is transferred into another (b) in which it is entirely ignored, and each of these belonging to word and meaning, make up Four varieties;-(B) that where the expressed meaning is intended to be subservient to another, and the suggestive process is imperceptible, belongs to word, sentence, part of word, style, letters and context, makes up six varieties;-(C) The same where the suggestive process is perceptible has forty-
one varieties as follows: - 2 varieties of that, based on word and each belonging to word and sentence, make four, - 12 varieties of that based on meaning and each belonging to word, sentence and context, make thirty-six; and one variety of that based on both word and meaning; and 4 + 6 + 41 make 51". (Ganganath Jha, 1985: 115). And towards the end of chapter four Mammata suggests that these fifty-one varieties can produce many more by their different combinations.

These fifty-one categories of dhvanis can be enumerated as follows:

1. **Avivaksita vacyadhvani:** There are four varieties of it-
   i. *Pada prakasya arthantara samkramita vacya dhvani*
   ii. *Vakya prakasya arthantara samkramita vacya dhvani*
   iii. *Pada prakasya atyantatiraskrta vacya dhvani*
   iv. *Vakya prakasya atyantatiraskrta vacya dhvani*

2. **Vivaksitanyapara vacyadhvani or asamlaksyakramavyangya dhvani:** There are six varieties of it-
   i. *Pada prakasya asamlaksyakramavyangyadhvani*
   ii. *Vakya prakasya asamlaksyakramavyangyadhvani*
   iii. *Padaikadesa prakasya asamlaksyakramavyangyadhvani*
   iv. *Racana prakasya asamlaksyakramavyangyadhvani*
   v. *Varna prakasya asamlaksyakramavyangyadhvani*
   vi. *Prabandha prakasya asamlaksyakramavyangyadhvani*

3. **Vivaksitanyaparavacya dhvani or samlaksyakramavyangya dhvani:** There are four varieties of it-
   i. *Sabdasaktimula padaprakasya vasturupa vyangya dhvani*
   ii. *Sabdasaktimula padaprakasya alamkararupa vyangya dhvani*
There are two varieties of vyangyadhvani- (i) vasturupa and (ii) alamkararupa. Further there are six following varieties of artha sakti udbhava dhvani:
(i) svatah sambhavi vasturupa vyanjaka artha
(ii) svatah sambhavi alamkararupa vyanjaka artha
(iii) kavipraudhoktisiddha vasturupa vyanjaka artha
(iv) kavipraudhoktisiddha alamkararupa vyanjaka artha
(v) kavinibaddhavaktrpraudhoktisiddha vasturupa vyanjaka artha
(vi) kavinibaddhavaktrpraudhoktisiddha alamkararupa vyanjaka artha

Thus there are twelve varieties of artha sakti udbhava dhvani as these six varieties are multiplied by the two varieties of vyangyadhvani. Again each of these twelve varieties are of following three kinds:
(i) pada-prakasya (ii) vakya-prakasya and (iii) prabandha-prakasya

Thus there are altogether thirty-six varieties of arthasaktimula dhvani.

There is one more sabdarthobhayasaktimula dhvani.

Thus there are altogether 4+6+4+36+1=51 varieties of dhvani.

Chapter five: Poetry of subordinate suggestion
Gunibhutavyangya kavya or poetry of subordinate suggestion is poetry of intermediate order. There are eight varieties of poetry of subordinate suggestion:

1. Agudhavyangya: Where suggested meaning is obvious.
2. Aparangavyangya: Where suggested meaning is subservient to something else.
3. Vacyasiddhavyangya: Where suggested meaning is subservient to the accomplishment of the 'expressed' meaning.
4. Asphutavyangya: Where suggested meaning is so abstruse that even a sahrdaya may find it difficult to understand.
5. Sandigdhapradhanyavyangya: Where suggested meaning is such that its prominence over the expressed meaning remains doubtful.
6. Tulyapradhanyavyangya: Where there is equal importance of the suggested and the expressed meanings.
8. Asundaravyangya: Where suggested meaning is not beautiful.

According to 5.46 the "varieties of these (eight kinds of poetry of subordinate suggestion should be understood to be, as far as possible, like those of which has gone before (i.e. suggestive poetry)"). (Ganganath Jha, 1985). This will make 51x8 varieties of gunibhutavyangyakavya. But in the commentary on 5.46, Mammata through a quotation from Dhvanyaloka indicates that this "has been added with a view to the fact that there is no 'subordination of suggestion'
in a case where a Figure is manifested by a mere Fact". (Ganganath Jha, 1985: 132). The verse quoted by Mammata is 2.29 of Dhvanyaloka which is translated as follows, "Whenever Figures of Speech are suggested by a mere Fact, they only serve the purpose of making it regarded as 'Suggestive Poetry'; because the existence of poetry rests upon those Figures (which, therefore, cannot be regarded as 'Subordinate' to the expressed meaning)". (Ganganath Jha, 1985: 132-133). Thus the following nine varieties of vastuvyangya alamkara vyangya have to be deducted from the fifty-one varieties of dhvani kavya:

1. Padagata-svatah sambhavi-vastuvyangyalamkararupa
2. Vakyagata-svatah sambhavi-vastuvyangyalamkararupa
3. Prabandhagata-svatah sambhavi-vastuvyangyalamkararupa
4. Padagata-kavipraudhoktisiddha-vastuvyangyalamkararupa
5. Vakyagata-kavipraudhoktisiddha-vastuvyangyalamkararupa
6. Prabandhagata-kavipraudhoktisiddha-vastuvyangyalamkararupa
7. Padagata- kavinibaddha- vaktrpraudhoktisiddha-vastuvyangya- alamkararupa
8. Vakyagata - kavinibaddha-vaktrpraudhoktisiddha-vastuvyangya-alamkararupa

Thus instead of 51x8 there are (51-9)x8 = 42x8 = 336 varieties of poetry of subordinate suggestion. Now each of these varieties will have many other subcategories based on the kind of alamkara and various kinds of their own
admixtures. Thus there may be a large number of varieties of poetry of subordinate suggestion.

Chapter six: Poetry of fanciful word and fanciful meaning

Citra-kavya or sabdarthacitra-kavya or poetry of fanciful word and fanciful meaning is the lowest kind of poetry. When the verbal figure of speech is dominant the poetry is regarded to be of 'fanciful word' variety and when the ideal figure of speech is dominant the poetry is regarded to be of 'fanciful meaning' variety. There can be as many varieties of this kind poetry as the number of figures of speech.

Chapter seven: Defects of Poetry

In karika 1.4 while defining poetry Mammata has said that poetry by nature is without faults. In chapter seven he describes the defects of poetry. According to 7.49, "Defect is the repressor of the principal meaning; the 'principal meaning' being the Passion, as also the Expressed Meaning, which is essential for the manifestation of the Passion; both of these requiring the aid of Word and the rest, Defects pertain to these latter also". (Ganganath Jha, 1985). However before actually defining the defects it is important to note that Mammata, like Bhamaha in 1.54-55 of Kavyalakara, accepts that, depending upon the context, the defects can become excellences. Mammata declares in 7.59, "By virtue of the special character of the speaker and the rest, sometimes a defect becomes an
excellence, and sometimes it is neither the one nor the other" (Ganganath Jha, 1985). He further adds in his vṛtti, "By virtue of the importance attaching to the character of - (a) the speaker, (b) the person spoken to, (c) the meaning suggested, (d) the thing described, (e) the context and so forth, - a defect sometimes becomes an excellence; and in certain cases it is neither a defect nor an excellence". (Ganganath Jha, 1985:264).

First of all Mammata enumerates the defects of words:
(1) Srutikatu: Unpleasant to ear.
(2) Cyutamasamkṛti: Lacking correctness.
(3) Apyukta: Unconventional.
(4) Asamartaha: Incapable of giving the intended meaning in its entirety.
(5) Nihitartha: Having its meaning suppressed.
(6) Anucitartha: Having an improper signification.
(7) Nirarthaka: Useless.
(8) Avacaka: Not expressive at all of the intended meaning.
(9) Trividha aslila: Indecorous in three ways. These three ways are vṛida (indecency), jugupsa (disgust) and amangala (inauspiciousness).
(10) Sandigdha: Ambiguous.
(12) Gramya: Vulgar.
(13) Neyartha: Where meaning has to be guessed.
(14) Klista: Obscure. It may arise due to confused order of the words of one single sentence.
(15) Avimrstavidheyamsa: Having the predicative factor not
discriminated.

(16) Viruddhamakrta: Of repugnant implication.

Regarding the defects of sentence karika 7.52 states that excepting cyutasamskrti (lack of correctness), asamartha (incapability of giving sense in its entirety) and nirarthaka (uselessness) all the above mentioned thirteen dosas are defects for sentences. These thirteen are defects of the parts of words as well. The reason for the above mentioned three defects not being found in sentence may be as follows - 'all the words have expectancy in a sentence and if they satisfy the mutual expectancy they cannot lack correctness and thus they will give full sense and they cannot be useless'. In the same way parts of words also have to satisfy mutual expectancy or else they cannot form a word.

There are twenty-one more defects of sentences:

(1) Pratikulavarnatva: Contains discordant letters. Certain letters are supposed to be against the nature of certain rasas: use of such letters in the sentence is discordance of letters.

(2) Upahatavisargatva: When the visarga is blunted.

(3) Luptavisargatva: When the visarga is deleted.

(4) Visandhitva: When the sentence involves an unharmonious euphony. This cacophonous discordance manifests itself in three ways - vislesa (disjunction), aslilatva (indecorousness) and kastatva (harshness).

(5) Hatavrttata: When the sentence involves a marred metre.

(6) Nyunapadata: When the sentence is deficient in words.
(7) **Adhikapadata**: When there is a redundancy in words.

(8) **Kathitapadata**: When the sentence contains repeated words.

(9) **Etat prakarsata**: When the sentence has its excellence receding.

(10) **Samaptapunarattata**: When the sentence resumes that which is concluded.

(11) **Ardhantaraikavacakatva**: When the sentence has a word isolated in a distinct half. Ideally this isolated word should be in the other half than the one in which it exists.

(12) **Abhavanmatayogatva**: When the sentence is devoid of intended connection.

(13) **Anabhihitavacyatva**: When a necessary statement is omitted in the sentence.

(14) **Apadasthapadata** or **asthanasthapadata**: When a word is misplaced in the sentence.

(15) **Apadasthasamasata**: When a compound is misplaced in the sentence.

(16) **Samkirnata**: When there is a confusion in the sentence because the words of a sentence are found scattered in several verses or sentences.

(17) **Garbhitatva**: When the sentence is parenthetical.

(18) **Prasiddhihatatva**: When the sentence is such that it is against the usage.

(19) **Bhagnaprakramata**: When the sentence has its uniformity or continuity of sentence broken.

(20) **Akramata**: When the sentence lacks uniformity.
(21) Amatapararthata: When the sentence has an undesirable second meaning.

The twenty-three defects of meanings are as follows:

(1) Apustatva: Irrelevant.
(2) Kastatva: Obscure.
(3) Vyahatatva: Inconsistent.
(4) Punaruktatva: Tautophonous.
(5) Duskramatva: Irregular.
(6) Gramyatva: Vulgar.
(7) Sandhigdhatva: Dubious.
(8) Nirhetutva: Inconsequential.
(9) Prasiddhiviruddhatva: Opposed to prevailing notions.
(10) Vidyaviruddhatva: Opposed to scholarly notions.
(11) Anavikrtatva: Monotonous.
(12) Saniyamaparivrttatva: Too unspecific.
(13) Aniyamaparivrttatva: Too specific.
(14) Visesaparivrttatva: Too restricted.
(15) Avisesaparivrttatva: Too unrestricted.
(16) Sakanksatva: Incomplete.
(17) Apadayuktatva: Misplaced.
(18) Sahacarabhinnatva: Mismatched.
(19) Prakasitaviruddhatva: Of repugnant implication.
(20) Vidhyayuktatva: With improper predicate.
(21) Anuvadayuktatva: With improper adjunct.
(22) Tyaktapunahsvikrtatva: Resuming the concluded.
(23) Aslilatva: Indecorous.

Following are the ten defects in delineation of rasas:

(1) The mention by name of (a) vyabhicari bhava (b) rasa
(c) *sthayibhava.*

(2) Far fetched indication of *vibhava* and *anubhava.*

(3) Description of such *vibhava,* *anubhava* and *vyabhicari bhava* which are not concordant to the *rasa.*

(4) Repeated emphasis on the *rasa* of the text.

(5) Untimely introduction of the *rasa.*

(6) Untimely interruption of the *rasa.*

(7) Excessive dilatation of the subordinate factors (like long description of the villain or such others) in rise of the *rasa.*

(8) Neglect of the principal factor(s) in rise of *rasa.*

(9) Such perversion of characters which go against the *rasa.*

(10) Description of those which go against the *rasa.*

Chapter eight: Excellences of poetry

In 8.66 Mammata defines *guna* or excellences as those "properties that belong to the Passion, the principal factor,- conducive to its maturity and having an unceasing existence,- are called 'Gunas', 'Excellences', in the same manner as Bravery and such qualities belong to the Soul". (Ganganath Jha,1985).

For distinguishing *guna* from *alamkara,* Mammata defines ornaments in 8.67,"Those qualities which sometimes adorn the existing Passion, through its components,- just as the necklace and the like (do for the Soul, through the body),- are the ornaments (figures of speech), Alliteration, Simile and the rest)". (Ganganath Jha,1985).
Thus existence of *alamkaras* is not essential for *rasa* whereas presence of *guna* is a necessary prerequisite for rise of *rasa*. According to Mammata there are only three *gunas*:

1. **Madhurya**: It is sweetness. It is "a source of delectability; it is what leads to mollification in the case of the Erotic Passion". (8.68) (Ganganath Jha, 1985). According to 8.69, "In the case of the Pathetic, the Privative-Erotic and the Quietistic, it (Sweetness) is present in an excessive degree".

2. **Oja**: It is floridity. "Floridity, the source of the lustrous expanding of the heart, resides in the Heroic Passion". (8.69) (Ganganath Jha, 1985). It is present in an excessive degree in the disgustful and furious passions.

3. **Prasada**: It is lucidity. "That which quickly pervades the other like fire among dry fuel, or like a clean stream of water, is Lucidity, whose presence is proper everywhere". (8.70-71) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

Mammata explains why he does not consider the ten qualities as *guna* which are enumerated by his predecessors. In 8.72, he gives three reasons for considering only three *gunas":

(a) Some (of the ten) are included under these (three); (b) others are resolved into the mere negation of certain defects; (c) the rest, in certain cases, have the character of Defects;— for this reason they are not ten". (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

Mammata indicates in 8.73 that the excellences as pertaining to *rasa* are suggested by letters, compounds and
diction. He gives a list of those letters, such compounds and diction which suggest the excellences:

(1) Madhurya: In 8.74, he writes, "(a) The 'sparsha' [mute] consonants, with the exception of those of the 'ta'-group, combined with the last consonant of their group, - (b) the consonants 'r' and 'n' when short, - (c) expressions free compounds, - (d) compounds of medium length, - and (e) harmonious diction - are (suggestive) of Sweetness". (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

It is added in the vrtti,"(a) All the consonants from k to m - except t, th, d and dh - combined with the last letter of their respective groups, (b) r and n combined with short vowels; - these are the 'letters' (suggestive of Sweetness).

"As for 'compounds' - (e) 'expressions free from compounds' or (d) 'compounds of medium length' (are suggestive of Sweetness).

"(e) 'Harmonious diction'- i.e., such diction in which the words are so combined as to make it soft - is also suggestive of Sweetness". (Ganganath Jha, 1985:311-12).

(2) Oja: Karika 8.75 says,"(A) The combination - (a) of the first and of the third consonants of a group with the consonant following them, - (b) of any consonant with r,- and (c) of any two similar consonants; - (B) the consonants beginning with t, - (C) the consonants s and s - (D) long compounds, - and (E) the bombastic diction,- these are suggestive of Floridity". (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

It is added in the vrtti,"(a) The combination of the
first and third letters of a group with those following them - i.e., with the second and the fourth respectively;-
(b) any consonant having r either above or below it;-
(c) the combination of 'similar consonant' i.e., that of a consonant with itself - (d) the entire t - group with the exception of n - (e) the consonants s and s -(f) long compounds - and (g) bombastic dictive;- all these are suggestive of Floridity". (Ganganath Jha,1985:312-13).

(3) Prasada: According to 8.76,"Lucidity has been held to be that excellence, common to all, by virtue of which the comprehension of meaning of words follows on the mere hearing of it". (Ganganath Jha,1985). The vrtti defines the word 'all' as "all Passions and all styles of diction". (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

Towards the end, in the last karika 8.77 Mammata once more exhibits flexibility in formalisation of above mentioned categories. He says,"The diction, the compounds and the letters are sometimes altered, in accordance with the nature of (a) the speaker, (b) the subject and (c) the form (of the composition)". (8.77) (Ganganath Jha,1985).

Chapter nine: The verbal figures of speech

According to Mammata there are following six kinds of sabdalamkaras:

(1) Vakrokti alamkara: "When what is said by one person in one sense is construed by another person in a different sense - either through punning or through intonation,- it is Equivoque (Vakrokti): and thus it is of two kinds".

141
(9.78) (Ganganath Jha, 1985). Thus there are two kinds of vakrokti alamkaras: (i) slesa vakrokti alamkara and (ii) kaku vakrokti alamkara.

(2) Anuprasa: In 8.79, the first sutra says "alliteration consists in the similarity of letters". By 'similarity of letters' is meant 'similarity of consonants' eventhough the vowels may be different.

The word anuprasa consists of two parts - (a) anu which indicates 'favourable to the delineation of rasa and such other things'. (b) prasa which means here 'excellent allocation of letters'.

There are two kinds of anuprasa:
(i) Chekanuprasa: When there is single repetition of several consonants, it is chekanuprasa or 'isolated alliteration'.
(ii) Vrtyanuprasa: The one consonant is repeated several times, it is vrtyanuprasa or 'complex alliteration'. Since there are three kinds of vrttis, there are three kinds of 'complex alliteration'. The three vrttis are:
(a) Upanagarika - It is 'polished' and similar to the vaidarbhi of Vamana. This diction is characterised by consonants suggestive of sweetness or madhurya. The complex alliteration of this kind is called latanuprasa. On latanuprasa vrtti says, "When there is Alliteration (repetition) of words (not mainly of single consonants as in the other two kinds of Alliteration), and though the form and the meaning of the words thus repeated are the same, yet there is difference in the syntactical relation
of the words,- it is latanuprasa, so called because of its being popular among the inhabitants of the Lata country. (Ganganath Jha, 1985:322). There can be various other subvarieties of this depending upon whether it occurs in a word, in the same substantive base of a word, in the same compound, in different compounds or once in a compound and then one in a non-compound.

(b) Parusa - It is 'harsh' and similar to gaudi. It is characterised by consonants suggestive of floridity.

(c) Komala - It is 'soft' and similar to pancali. Some people call it gramy or 'vulgar' also. The alliteration in this komala is called gramanuprasa.

(3) Yamaka: According to first sutra of 9.83,"The repetition of letters in the same order, with a different meaning,- when there is meaning,- constitute 'Yamaka','Chime'". (Ganganath Jha,1985). By adding 'when there is meaning' in this definition, it is implied that there may not be any meaning in that part where the letters have been repeated. Depending upon the position of occurrence in a word or in a verse, there can be several subvarieties of yamaka.

(4) Slesa: According to 9.84,"When words that are different by reason of the difference in their denotations coalesce (become identified) through the sameness of their pronunciation, it is a case of Coalescence or Pun.; and through Letter and other factors, it is of eight kinds". (Ganganath Jha, 1985). There can be eight kinds of slesa based on its origination in eight different factors: (i)
varna or letters (ii) pada or words (iii) linga or gender (iv) bhasa or dialect (v) prakṛti or when forms of two crude form verbs become similar because of their tense markers or such other factors (vi) pratyaya or affixes (vii) vibhakti or terminations (declensional and conjugational) (viii) vacana or number.

There is one more ninth kind of slesa where there is no difference in crude forms or any of the above mentioned eight factors.

(5) Citra: According to 9.85,"Where the letters assume the forms of such objects as the sword and the like, it is the Figure Pictorial". (Ganganath Jha,1985). The vṛttī adds,"In cases where the letters arranged in particular ways appear in the form of (a) the sword, (b) or the drum, (c) or the lotus and so forth, we have Pictorial Poetry (i.e. Poetry with the Pictorial Figures)". (Ganganath Jha,1985:344).

(6) Punaruktavadabhasa: According to first sūtra of 9.86,"When it appears as if one and the same meaning is expressed by words in diverse forms,- it is Semblance of Repetition". (Ganganath Jha,1985). Thus this alamkāra is based both in word as well as meaning as the vṛttī adds,"When, on the face of it, (there is by chance) an appearance of one and the same meaning, in words of diverse forms,- with or without meaning,- it is "Semblance of Repetition". (Ganganath Jha,1985:346).

Chapter ten: The ideal figures of speech
Mammata mentions following alamkaras as arthalamkaras:
Now we shall define the above mentioned alamkaras:

(1) Upama: It is `simile'. "When there is similarity of properties, while there is difference (between the objects themselves), it is Simile". (first sutra of 10.87) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(2) Ananvaya: It is `absolute comparison'. "When one and the same thing appears in a single sentence as both the `object compared', and the `object compared to' it is `Comparison Absolute'". (first sutra of 10.91) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(3) Upameyopama: It is `reciprocal comparison'. "When there is alternation of these two, it is Reciprocal Comparison".

145
(10.91) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(4) **Utpreksa**: It is `poetic fancy'. "Poetic Fancy consists in the imagining of the thing described as (identical) with a similar thing". (first sutra of 10.92) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(5) **Sasandeha**: It is `doubtful'. "The statement of a doubt constitutes the Doubtful,- the distinction being asserted or not asserted". (10.92) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(6) **Rupaka**: It is `metaphor'. "Where there is non-difference between the `object compared to' and the `object compared', it is Metaphor". (first sutra of 10.93) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

There are four kinds of metaphor:

(i) **samasta vastu visaya rupaka**: "In cases where what is imposed is directly expressed, it is Metaphor Universal". (10.93) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(ii) **Ekadesavivarti rupaka**: "In a case where what is imposed is directly expressed as well as indirectly implied, it is the Partial Metaphor". (first sutra of 10.94) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(iii) **Suddha rupaka**: "That which is devoid of constituents is the Pure Metaphor". (third sutra of 10.94). (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(iv) **Para rupaka**: "Where as a means of the desired imposition, there is imposition of something else, it is the Consequential Metaphor;- where the expressive word is either `coalescent' (in Pun) or `distinct'." (10.95) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).
(7) Apahnuti: It is concealment. "When the object to be described is negatived and another is affirmed, it is Concealment". (first sutra of 10.96) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(8) Slesa: It is paronomasia. "When in a single sentence, there are several meanings, it is Paronomasia". (10.96) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(9) Samasokti: It is 'modal metaphor'. "Where the other object is implied by means of paronomatic differentiating adjusts, it is Modal Metaphor". (first sutra of 10.97) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(10) Nidarsana: It is illustration. "Where an impossible relation of things constitutes the similitude, it is Illustration". (10.97) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

"There is another kind of Illustration, where the action itself indicates the (causal) relation between itself and its cause". (first sutra of 10.98) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(11) Aprastutaprasamsa: It is 'indirect description'. "Where the description of an irrelevant thing points to the object meant to be described, it is Indirect Description". (10.98) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

"It is of five kinds:—...here what is meant to be described is - (a) the effect, or (b) a cause, or (c) Universal, or (d) Particular,—what is actually spoken of is their converse (correlative); and (e) when what is meant to be described is one thing, and what is spoken of is something else of the same class". (10.99) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

According to the vṛtti (e) is again of three kinds, "Of
that case, where what is meant to be described is one thing, what is actually described is something else of the same class,- there are three varieties, according as the indication of one thing by another of the same class (1) by a Pun, or (2) by Modal Metaphor, or (3) by mere similarity". (Ganganath Jha,1985:386).

(12) Atisayokti: It is 'hyperbole'. According to 10.100 and first two sutras of 10.101,"It is to be known as the Hyperbole - (a) when the object to be described is indicated as swallowed by the other;- (b) when the object to be described is represented as another;- (c) where there is an assumption introduced by some term meaning 'if';- and (d) when there is reversal of the normal order of sequence between a cause and its effect". (Ganganath Jha,1985).

(13) Prativastupama: It is 'typical comparison'. "Typical Comparison is that where a single common property stands twice, in two sentences" (first sutra of 10.102) (Ganganath Jha,1985).

(14) Drstanta: It is 'exemplification'. "Exemplification is the reflectional representation of all these". (10.102) (Ganganath Jha,1985). For explaining 'all these', the vṛtti says,"The drstanta is so called because therein is perceived (drsta) the 'definite recognition' (anta) of 'all these' - i.e. of the Common Property (the object compared and the object compared to)". (Ganganath Jha,1985:393).

(15) Dipaka: It is 'illuminator'. It is defined in karika 10.103 along with the 'stringed illuminator' in the first sutra of 10.104. According to 10.103,"(a) When the (common)
property belonging to several objects—that to be
described, as well as those not to be described, occurs
once, and (b) when a single substantive occurs in
connection with several verbs, it is the Illuminator".
(Ganganath Jha, 1985).
The vṛttī adds, "It is Illuminator also when a single
substantive occurs in connection with several verb".
(Ganganath Jha, 1985:395).
"It is the Stringed Illuminator where what precedes
imparts excellence to what follows". (first sutra of 1(f.104)
(Ganganath Jha, 1985).
(16) Tulyayogita: It is 'equal pairing'. "The single
mention of a property as belonging to a number of things of
the same kind constitutes Equal Pairing". (1(f.104)
(Ganganath Jha, 1985).
(17) Vyatireka: It is 'dissimilitude'. "The dissimilitude
of the other to the 'object compared to' constitutes the
figure of the same name" (first sutra of 10.105) (Ganganath
Jha, 1985). The vṛttī defines 'of the other' as 'of the
object compared' and 'dissimilitude' as 'superiority'.
"It is of twenty-four kinds:—(1) When the ground (of
dissimilitude) is mentioned; (2-4) the three cases where
the said ground is not mentioned;—each of these (four) has
the similitude either expressed by word or expressed by
meaning, or implied;—and each of these (twelve) again
occurs in a paronomastic word also". (10.105 and first sutra
of 10.106).
The vṛttī explains it further, "The ground of
dissimilitude - i.e., the ground of the superiority of the 'object compared' and the ground of the inferiority of the 'object compared to' - when both these are mentioned [[it is one kind of Dissimilitude]]; - where one or the other of these, or both, are not mentioned [we have the three other kinds of Dissimilitude]; - we have those four kinds, when the comparison is expressed by words; another four kinds, when each of the said four has the comparison expressed by meaning; - and yet another four kinds when each of them has the comparison only implied; - thus there are twelve varieties (of this figure). - Each of these occurs also in paronomastic expressions (expressions with double meanings), - and thus we get the twenty-four varieties of Dissimilitude". (Ganganath Jha, 1985:397-98).

18) Aksepa: It is 'hint'. "When something desired to be said is, as if, suppressed, for the purpose of conveying a special idea, it is Hint; and it is of two kinds, as having its subject, either (a) about to be mentioned, or (b) already mentioned". (10.106 and first sutra of 10.107) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

19) Vibhavana: It is 'peculiar causation'. "Peculiar Causation consists in the mention of the effect, even though there is denial of the cause". (10.107) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

20) Visesoktī: It is 'peculiar allegation'. "Peculiar Allegation consists in the omission to affirm the effects, even when its causes are present in full force". (first sutra of 10.108).
The vrtti adds, "When, even in the combined presence of all its causes, the effect is not affirmed, it is Peculiar Allegation. It is of three kinds -(a) having the reason (of the non-appearance of the effect) not mentioned, (b) having the reason mentioned and (c) having the reason such as is inconceivable". (Ganganath Jha, 1985:404).

(21) Yathasankhya: It is 'symmetrical'. "The Symmetrical consists in the orderly connection among things mentioned in a definite order". (10.108) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(22) Arthantaranyasa: It is 'transition'. "Where either a Universal or a Particular is supported by its converse, either through similitude or otherwise, it is Transition". (10.109) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(23) Virodha: It is 'contradiction'. "When something is spoken of as contradictory, even when there is no contradiction, it is the Figure Contradiction". (first sutra of 10.110).

This is of ten kinds: "(1-4) The Universal contradicted by the four, (1) Universal [(2) Quality (3) Action and (4) Substance], -(5-7) the Quality contradicted by three [i.e. Quality, Action and Substance], -(8-9) Action contradicted by two [i.e. Action and Substance] - and (10) Substance contradicted by Substance; thus this Figure is of ten kinds". (10.110 and first sutra of 10.111) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(24) Svabhavokti: It is 'natural description'. "When, of the child and other things, their own action and form are described, it is Natural Description". (10.111). The vrtti
explains 'their own' as 'action and form as subsisting in themselves' and 'form' as 'colour and shape'.

(25) Vyajastuti: It is 'dissembling eulogy'. "When, what, on the fact of it, is praise or disparagement, turns out to be otherwise, it is Dissembling Eulogy". (first sutra of 10.112) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(26) Sahokti: It is 'connected description'. "Where one word is expressive of two things, through the force of some synonym of the word 'saha' (along with), - it is Connected Description". (10.112) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(27) Vinokti: It is 'privative description'. "That is Privative Description in which one thing, without the other, is either (a) not beautiful (b) the contrary". (first sutra of 10.113) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(28) Parivrtti: It is 'exchange'. "When there is an interchange between equal or unequal things - it is Exchange". (10.113) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(29) Bhavika: It is 'visualisation'. "When past and future things are delineated as if they were before the eyes, - it is Visualisation". (first sutra of 10.114).

(30) Kavyalinga: It is 'poetical reason'. "When a reason is expressed either (a) by a sentence, or (b) by a word, - it is Poetical Reason". (10.114) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(31) Paryayokta: It is 'periphrasis'. "Periphrasis consists in such description as is independent of the ordinary denotative relation between the expressive word and the expressed meaning". (first sutra of 10.115) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).
(32) Udatta: It is "exalted". "The Exalted consists (a) in the Exaltation of the thing (b) it consists also in the representation of great beings as adjuncts (to the thing exalted)". (10.115) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(33) Samuccaya: It is "concatenation". "(a) It is Concatenation, when, while one cause conducive to the effect in question being already present, another also turns out to be conducive to it.

(b) It is another kind of the same figure (Concatenation) when qualities and actions are (described as) simultaneous". (10.116) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(34) Paryaya: It is "sequence". "When one things occurs successively in more than one, it is Sequence". (First sutra of 10.117) (Ganganath Jha, 1985). "When the process is inverted, it is another kind (of Sequence)". (Second sutra of 10.117) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(35) Anumana: It is "inference". "It is description of the Probans and the Probandum that constitutes Inference". (10.117) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(36) Parikara: It is "insinuation". "Insinuation is description with significant epithets". (First sutra of 10.118) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(37) Vyajokti: It is "artful assertion". "Artful Assertion consists in concealing, by some artifice, the unhidden character of a thing". (10.118) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(38) Parisamkhya: It is "exclusion"."Where something, either (a) asked or (b) unasked, on being mentioned, serves to exclude other things similar thereto, - it is said to be..."
Exclusion". (10.119) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(39) Karanamala: It is 'string of causes'. "Where (among a number of things mentioned), each preceding one appears as the cause of each succeeding one,- it is the String of Causes". (first two sutras of 10.120) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(40) Anyonya: It is 'reciprocal'. "When two things are productive of each other, through an action,- it is the Reciprocal". (10.120) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(41) Uttara: It is 'answer'. "(a) When from the hearing of only the answer, the presumption of the question is made,- (b) or when the question being there, an inconceivable answer is given, and this more than once,- it is Answer". (10.121 and first sutra of 10.122) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(42) Suksma: It is 'subtle'. "Where a subtle fact somehow noticed, is expressed to another person, by means of some property,- it is the Subtle". (10.122 and first sutra of 10.123) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(43) Sara: It is 'climax'. "Climax is the successive rising in the excellence of things to the highest pitch". (10.123) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(44) Asamgati: It is 'disconnection'. "When there is representation of two properties, which bear to each other the relation of cause and effect, as subsisting, at the same time, in totally different places,- it is Disconnection". (10.124) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(45) Samadhi: It is 'convenience'. "When, through the help of other causes, the fulfillment of an effect is described as becoming easier,- it is Convenience". (first sutra of
10.125) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(46) **Sama:** It is 'compatible'. "When the connection (between two things) is considered to be right and proper, it is the Compatible". (10.125) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(47) **Visama:** It is 'incongruous'. "Where - (a) between two things no compatibility can come about, by reason of extreme dissimilitude, -(b) where the agent does not obtain the fruit of his action, but comes by an adverse effect, -(c) where the quality and action of the cause are incompatible respectively, with the quality and action of the effect, - it is held to be the Incongruous". (10.126-7) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(48) **Adhika:** It is 'exceeding'. "When of the Container and the Contained, both of which are large, the respective Contained and Container, though really smaller, are described as larger, - it is the Exceeding" (10.128) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(49) **Pratyānika:** It is 'hostile'. "It is the Hostile, when a person, unable to injure his enemy, is described as offering an insult to a relative of that enemy, - such description tending to eulogise this latter". (10.129) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(50) **Milita:** It is 'obscured'. "When one thing is obscured by another, through a common characteristic, innate or adventitious, - it is the Obscured". (10.130) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(51) **Ekavali:** It is 'necklace'. "Where [among a number of things] the succeeding thing is either (a) affirmed or (b)
denied, as qualifying the preceding things,- it is the
Necklace, which is of two kinds". (10.131) (Ganganath
Jha, 1985).

(52) Smarana: It is 'reminiscence'. "When on the perception
of a thing similar to it, there is remembrance of an object:
as previously perceived,- it is Reminiscence". (first sutra:
of 10.132) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(53) Bhrantiman: It is 'illusion'. "When there is cognition
of another thing, at the sight of a thing similar to it,-
it is Illusion". (10.132) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(54) Pratipa: It is 'converse'. "(a) Where there is:
discarding of the object compared to, or (b) where that
object itself is treated, with a view to its being
condemned, as the object compared,- it is the Converse".
(10.133) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(55) Samanya: It is 'identification'. "Where, with a view
to delineate the presence of common properties, the object
described is represented as identical with another, through
its connection with this latter,- it is held to be:
Identification". (10.134) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(56) Visesa: It is 'extraordinary'. "(a)When the contained
is represented as existing without its recognised
container,- (b) when one things is represented as:
subsisting, in the same form, and at the same time, in
several things;- and (c) where, while a person is engaged
in the doing of one thing, he is described as
accomplishing, in the same manner, a different thing, which
(in reality) is not capable of being accomplished (by that

156
same effort); it constitutes what has been described as: the figure Extraordinary with its three varieties". (10.135-36) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(57) Tadguna: It is 'borrowing of qualities'. "When a thing, through contact with another possessed of extremely brilliant qualities, renounces its own quality and takes up the qualities of that other thing, - it is Quality-borrowing". (10.137) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

(58) Atadguna: It is 'non-borrowing of qualities'. "If, however, there is no absorbsing by the one from the other, it is the Non-borrowing of qualities". (first sutra of 10.138) (Ganganath Jha, 1985). The vṛtti explains, "In a case, where the thing with inferior qualities does not absorb the form of the other thing, - even when such absorption is possible, - then it is the figure named 'Non-borrowing of Qualities'". (Ganganath Jha, 1985:459).

(59) Vyaghata: It is 'frustration'. "When one thing, which has been accomplished, in one way, by one person, is turned otherwise in that same way, by another, - that is called 'Frustration'" (10.138 and first sutra of 10.139).

(60) Samsrti: It is 'collocation of figures'. "When these (figures) are present, distinctly from one another, it is Collocation". (10.139) (Ganganath Jha, 1985). The vṛtti adds, "When the figures of speech described above are present, - as far as possible independently of one another, - in one substratum, - either (a) in the word or (b) in the meaning or (c) in both, - it is called 'Collocation', because it consists in the co-existence of several in one-
thing". (Ganganath Jha, 1985:461-2).

(61) Sankara: It is 'commixture'. "(a) When, however, there is a relation of subserviency among the said figures of speech, which are incapable of independent existence by themselves, then it is Commixture. (b) When there is no reason in support of, nor any objection against, the recognition of any one (to the exclusion of the likely figures), there is Uncertainty (which forms the second variety of Commixture)". (10.140) (Ganganath Jha, 1985).

After the brief expositions of some of the important literary theories, now we shall study the ideas of four philosophical schools and of Bhartrhari on theory of meaning.
According to the metaphysics of the Nyaya system, the world of our experience is real and not projection of mind. It is real as it is knowable (jneya) and nameable (abhidheya). Perception (pratyaksa) is the means of valid knowledge by which we come to know the real world. According to sutra i.1.3 of Nyayasutra there are four pramanas - perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), comparison (upamana) and verbal testimony (sabda). There is a three-fold procedure for knowing anything - naming (the topic) (uddesa), defining (laksana) and critically examining (pariksa). According to Vatsyayana's commentary, "uddesa means the act of referring to an object by name; laksana means the distinguishing characteristic (a-tattva-vyavacchedaka-dharma, lit. the characteristic which differentiates an object from all other objects) of the object named; pariksa means ascertainment, with the help of the pramanas, the appropriateness of the distinguishing characteristic of the object defined". (Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, 1982:11). So, the first step towards knowledge is 'naming an object'. Every name has a referent which can be compared with other referents and then ascertained through pramanas. Thus the knowledge of world is obtained through the 'meaning of those terms which name certain referents'. On the basis of the discussion in ii.1.49 to ii.1.56 of the Nyayasutra, one concludes that the Naiyayikas believe that the referent "object is known from the word because of convention and not because of any".
natural relation, for words are used to denote specific objects according to the (arbitrary) wishes of the seers (rsi-s), the nobles (arya-s) and the barbarians (mleccha-s). If the capacity of words to denote objects were due to natural relation, then (the use of words) could not have been in accordance with their (arbitrary) wishes, just as the capacity of light to reveal colour has no exception in the case of any group of people". (Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, 1982:119). Thus the Naiyayikas believe in the conventionality of relationship between the word and its meaning. The verbal understanding arises through following sequence:

1. The hearer or reader receives the sentence
2. He splits the sentence into morphemes
3. He remembers referents from each morpheme
4. He infers the intention of the speaker and decides the intended meaning of a morpheme
5. He relates meanings thus remembered and understands the sentence-meaning. This is what is called sabdabodha or a verbal understanding.

The minimum meaning-bearing unit is a pada (morpheme) according to this system. The hearer or reader remembers the meaning only if he knows the relationship (vrtti) between a pada and its meaning (padartha)." (V.N. Jha, memeod:4).

Sutras ii.2.58 to ii.2.69 of Nyayasutra deals with the determination of the meaning of a term. Sutra ii.2.58 defines that "they (i.e. group of letters) become terms
(pada) when suffixes are added to them". The discussion on this continues as a doubt is raised in respect of the exact meaning of a term. According to ii.2.59, "there is doubt, because it (term) is found to be in use as 'invariably related' (sannidhi) to (i.e. as conveying) the individual (vyakti), the shape (akrti) and the class-essence (jati)". In sutra ii.2.60 an objection is raised that "the term means the individual (vyakti) because in the following cases, viz.- by the pronoun 'that', by group, by gift, by acceptance of gift, by numbers, by growing fat, by becoming emaciated, by colour, by the use of compound, and by reproduction - colour, by use of compound, and by reproduction - the term is used to mean the individual". In his commentary Vatsyayana gives examples for each of these cases.

In the next sutra ii.2.61, Gautama refutes this view, "No (i.e. the term does not mean the bare individual), because of the absence of any fixed determination of the individual". Gautama continues in ii.2.61, "In spite of the absence of the capacity to mean' (a-tadbhave api) (the objects other than those signified by them), words 'are used to mean' (tat-upacarah) a Brahmin, the platform, straw-mat, the king, the enemy, the sandal-wood, the Ganges, a gown, food, and a person - on the following conditions: association (sahacarana), place of residence (sthana), need (tadarthya), behaviour (vrtta), measurement (mana), container (dharana), nearness (samipya), relation (yoga), cause (sadhana) and prominence (adhipatya)". Thus
there are ten possible conditions which can give rise to laksanartha or 'implied meaning' to a term according to the context.

It is further argued that if the term, as for example 'cow', does not mean the individual, then let it mean "the shape (akṛti), because the knowledge of the existence of the animal is dependent on it (i.e. on the shape). (ii.2.63) (Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya,1982). It is explained in Vatsyayana's commentary, "Shape means the structure constituted by the limbs of the animal as well as the parts of these limbs. When this shape is known, there is the definite knowledge of the existence of the animal as "this is a cow" or "this is a horse"; but when (this shape) is not known (there is no such definite knowledge). The term should mean only that the knowledge of which leads to the definite knowledge of the existence of the animal. Therefore, this shape is meant by it (i.e. by the term)". (Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya,1982:166).

However, the commentary further adds, "... this view is not established. By the term cow is meant the object characterised by the class-essence, i.e. which has relation with the class-essence (viz. cowness). There is no connection of the class-essence with the structure of the limbs etc. (i.e. the shape). With which then is it (i.e. the class-essence) connected? It is connected with the animal as a whole, constituted by the structure of the limbs. Therefore, the term does not mean the shape". (Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya,1982:166).

About this view that the term should mean the class-
essence, an objection is raised, "The term means the class-

essence (jati) because in spite of the presence of

individuality and shape in an earthen cow, it is not made

the object of the ceremony of sprinkling water etc.

(observed in connection with the gift of a cow)". (ii.2.64)

(Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, 1982).

In the next sutra, Gautama answers this objection, "No

(i.e. the term does not mean the class-essence alone),

because the knowledge of the class-essence is not

irrespective of (the knowledge of the shape and the

individual)". (ii.2.65) (Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, 1982).

As a conclusion to this debate, Gautama concludes, "..the:
term means the individual-cum-shape-cum-class-essence"

(ii.2.66) (Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, 1982). In the next three sutras

defines each of the three:

1. Vyakti: "Individual means the `specific image' (murti),

which is the substratum of some qualities (like colour:

etc.). (ii.2.67) (Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, 1982).

2. Akrti: "Shape is that by which is known the class-essence:

of its mark". (ii.2.68) (Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, 1982).

3. Jati: "Class-essence is that which produces the knowledge:

of commonness". (ii.2.69) (Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, 1982).

On the basis of the above brief exposition of the Nyaya

theory of meaning, one can conclude that there is a primary

relation or abhidha and relation based on the intended

meaning or laksana between the word and meaning. There may

not be any space for vyanjana in this system as all

implications tend to be included in laksana. As V.N. Jha.
writes,"...there is a primary relation and an extended relation. There is no necessity in this system of any third variety of relation called vyanjana or suggestion. Thus, there are primary meanings and secondary meanings, and these meanings are nothing more than the referent except the fact that they are designated on the basis of the knowledge of a relationship between that morpheme and what it stands for". (V.N.Jha,memeod:6).

The tradition of Nyaya philosophers developed the concept of tatparyavada in debate with the Mimamsa theories of anvitabhidhanavada and abhihitanvayavada. After defining words and their relationship with meaning, the naiyayikas expounded the concept of tatparya as the power which indicates the mutual relationship among the words in a sentence."The additional element conveyed by a sentence, over and above the separate concepts conveyed by separate words, is the intended relation of the concepts (padartha-samsarga) and this additional element, which is the distinctive feature of a verbal judgment (vakyartha) is conveyed through the particular juxtaposition of words (samsargamaryada), and not through a primary or secondary significative power of words (abhidha or laksana)". (quoted by K.Kunjunni Raja,1963:221 from S. Kuppuswami Sastri, A Primer of Indian Logic,p.258).

According to C.D. Bijalwan, the theory of tatparyavada is first introduced by Jayanta in his Nyayamanjari. Bijalwan writes on Jayanta's theory,"Tatparya, according to him, is the power, on account of which the words convey
a related meaning of the words contained in a sentence". (C.D. Bijalwan, 1977:248). Bijalwan quotes the following verse from Nyayamanjari:

Abhidhatri mata saktih padanam svarthanisthata.

tesam tatparyasaktistu samsargavagamavadhih.

(Nyaya Manjari I-372 as quoted by C.D. Bijalwan, 1977:248)

and illustrates this verse as "The words by their primary power known as abhidha denote their primary meanings. But on being used in a sentence, they have an additional power which continues to work until the meanings of the words are presented to our consciousness as being in relation with one another in a sentence". (C.D. Bijalwan, 1977:248).

The introduction of tatparya as a separate vrtti with abhidha is a unique contribution of Jayantabhatta in the Indian theories of meaning. Theoreticians like Anandavardhana and others have used this concept in their literary theories. (K. Kunjunni Raja, 1963:213). The concept of tatparyavada is so important that often the Nyaya theory of meaning is called the 'theory of tatparya or intentionality'.

Next we shall discuss the Mimamsa theory of meaning.

**Mimamsa theory of meaning**

The primary purpose of Mimamsa philosophy is to interpret Vedas. The Mimamsasutra of Jaimini has evolved many
categories and concepts which help in interpreting and
developing a theory of meaning and interpretation. Though.
Jaimini is primarily concerned with the study of Veda, many
of his concepts can be used in interpretation of other
texts.

The major categories of interpretation of a vedic text
are enumerated in the following sutra of Jaimini: sruti-
linga- vakya- prakarana- sthana- samakhyanam samavaye-
paradaurbalyamarthaviprakarsat (3.3.14) i.e. "In the common
applicability of sruti, linga, vakya, prakarana, sthana and
samakhya, the weakness of the latter is by reason of the
distance of the sense."(M.L.Sandal,1980).

These categories can be explained as follows:

(1) Sruti:"Sruti is a word or collection of words not
depending on any other for its meaning. A word has a
conventional sense attached to it; it is said to be its
primary sense. Primary sense conveyed by a word without the
help of any other is sruti. It is directly heard and as
soon as it is heard, a hearer understands its sense." (M.L.Sandal,1980:xviii).

(2) Linga: "It is the suggestive or the secondary sense of
a word which can be inferred from another word or
collection of words." (M.L.Sandal,1980:xviii). Further,
M.L.Sandal quotes Kishori Lal Sarkar to explain linga,"When
the meaning of a word or expression is not clear on the
face of it and its latent force or suggestive power has to
be brought out by the suggestive power of some other word
or expression, this is called linga". (quoted by-
M.L.Sandal,1980:xviii-xix). For example, in the sentence, `I cut thee, O grass, for the seat of god', the word 'grass' specifically means only the `kusa grass'.

(3) Vakya: "When the meaning of a word or collection of words is gathered from the whole sentence, it is called the principle of vakya by the Mimamsakas". (M.L.Sandal,1980:xix).

For example, 'One whose ladle is made of parna wood does not hear evil things'. In this sentence, it is clear that ladle can be made of any wood but the spiritual quality of not hearing evil thing is achieved only by `parna wood'. This special quality of parna wood is indicated only by the principle of vakya.

(4) Prakarana: "When a sentence or a clause of a sentence is not clear and its meaning cannot be gathered without the context in which it occurs, the construction is governed by the principle of prakarana". (M.L.Sandal,1980:xix).

For example, in the sentence, 'he sacrifices the sacrificial wood', one can know only through the context who sacrifices wood and with what purpose.

If the context related to the principal sense expressed in the sentence, it is called mahaprakarana. If the context relates to the subordinate parts of the sentence, it is called avantara prakarana.

(5) Sthana: When the location or order of words help in interpretation, it is called sthana or position.

For example, `give mangoes, guavas and oranges to Rama, Shyama and Radha' can imply by principle of sthana that
`give mangoes to Rama, guavas to Shyama and oranges to Radha'.

(6) Samakhya: "It is a name or denomination. It is a compound word which should be broken up into its component parts and its meaning should be thus ascertained; as for instance, wine-cup (a cup from which one drinks wine) is distinguishable from the milk-cup." (M.L.Sandal,1980:xx).

Apart from the above categories, the order as found in the text is important for understanding of the text. There can be various kinds of krama or order as shown in the following chart:

```
krama

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sruti</th>
<th>artha</th>
<th>patha</th>
<th>sthana</th>
<th>mukhya</th>
<th>pravrtti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>krama</td>
<td>krama</td>
<td>krama</td>
<td>krama</td>
<td>krama</td>
<td>krama</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

mantra  Brahmana

kevalakramapara  tadvisistapadarthapara
```

Now we shall explain these categories:

(1) Srutikrama: "Srutikrama is the order determined by a direct text. It is of two kinds - 1st kevalakramapara i.e. a text indicating an order or sequence only, as for instance `Vedam krttva vedimkaroti 'He prepares an altar after making the Veda'. The second class is tadvisistapadarthapara indicating the order or sequence in
the course of laying down certain other thing; as for instance "vasatkartuh prathamabhavah". The first drinks is of one who pronounces vasat'. The passage enjoins drinking and by the way indicates the order or sequence. The srutikrama predominates over other kinds of krama". (M.L.Sandal,1980:xxii).

(2) Arthakrama: "Arthakrama is the order determined by the object; as for instance agnihotram juhoti yavangupacati. He performs an agnihotra and cooks yavangu; though yavangu happens to be last in the above quotation, yet as its cooking is indispensable for the performance of the agnihotra, it will be cooked first. The arthakrama therefore predominates over the pathakrama". (M.L.Sandal,1980:xxii).

(3) Pathakrama: "When the order of the execution of things is governed by their order in the text, it is called pathakrama. It is of two kinds, it is either governed by the text of the mantra or by the text of the Brahmana." (M.L.Sandal,1980:xxii).

Mantra is a text which helps one to remember the procedures of sacrifice or alternatively the commandatory portion(s) of Veda. Brahmana is that portion of Veda which contain "reason, explanation, censure, praise, doubt, command, action of a single individual or of many, taking the words in a different sense and comparison". (M.L.Sandal,1980:xxxvii). These ten characteristics of Brahmana can be illustrated as follows:

(i) Hetu: It is reason. For example, surpena juhoti
tenahyannam kriyate i.e. 'he makes an offering with a winnowing basket, because by it corn is sifted'.

(ii) Nirvacanam: It is explanation. For example, taddghnoladhitvam i.e. 'Therefore curd is so called'.

(iii) Ninda: It is censure. For example, moghamannam bindate apraceta i.e. 'An unmindful person gets useless food'.

(iv) Prasamsa: It is praise. For example, vayuvaiksepista: i.e. 'wind is swiftest of all'.

(v) Samsaya: It is doubt. For example, hotavsram garhapatye: na hotavyam i.e. 'whether it should be offered in the domestic fire or not'.

(vi) Vidhi: It is a command. For example, 'kindle fire'.

(vii) Parakriya: It is the action of one individual.

(viii) Purakalpa: "It is the action of many individuals or a nation. These are the historical description of one individual or many individuals and are indicated by the particles 'iti', 'aha' or 'ha". (M.L.Sandal,1980:xxxvii)

(ix) Vyavadharanakalpana: "When a word or a sentence means one thing but taking the surrounding circumstances into consideration, it means another, it is said to be its imagined sense; as for instance yavatosvan pratigrhiyat: 'Let him take as many horses' meaning thereby 'let him be given....'" (M.L.Sandal,1980:xxxvii).

(x) Upamana: It is comparison.

(4) Sthanakrama: "Sthanakrama means presentation. When a thing is transposed from its proper place by reasons of its being preceded by another thing which is followed by"
another, this transposition of the order is called sthanakrama. An illustration will explain it better. In a jyotistoma, there are the agnisomiya, savaniya and anubandhya animal sacrifices in their order; but in a madyaskra which is the modified sacrifice of the jyotistoma, the savaniya, agnisomiya and anubandhya animal sacrifices are performed, because after the drinking of the asvina cup, the savaniya animal sacrifice presents itself first."


(5) Mukhyakrama: "Mykhyakrama is the sequence of the subsidiaries or the subordinate parts according to the order in the principal. In it, the sequence or the order of the details in the subordinate parts is governed by that of the principal of which the subsidiaries are the subordinate parts. As for instance, when ghee is left after the pravaja offering, it will be first offered to Agni and then to Indra because the agneya is prior to aindra oblations. Mukhyakrama predominates over the pravrttikrama and is inferior to the pathakrama". (M.L.Sandal,1980:xxiii).

(6) Pravrttikrama: "Pravrttikrama is the order of a procedure which once begun will apply to others as well. As for instance in a prajapatya sacrifice several animals are sacrificed; you choose one animal at random and perform certain ceremonies on it. The order in which the ceremonies are performed on the first animal will govern the order of the ceremonies on the rest of the animals." (M.L.Sandal,1980:xxiii).

Jaimini accepts only sabda or verbal testimony as the
valid pramana or means of knowledge. In 1.1.5, Jaimini writes on sutra: autpattikastu sabdasyarthenasambandhastasya

\[ jnamupadesovyatirekascarthenupalabdhe \]

\[ tatpramanam \]

badarayanasyanapeksatvat (1.1.5) i.e. "Certainly there is: eternal connection between the word and its meaning; its knowledge is upadesa: it is never erroneous in matters: invisible; it is authoritative in the opinion of Badarayana. by reason of its " not depending on others". (M.L.Sandal,1980:2).

M.L.Sandal comments on this sutra,"The author says that the word and its meaning are eternally connected, this is: one proposition; the knowledge thereof is called upadesa in the language of Mimamsa, it is the second proposition. In matters connected with invisible things it is never erroneous; this is the third proposition. In the opinion of Badarayana the word is authoritative; this is the 4th proposition; and lastly it does not depend upon any other proof and is sufficient in itself." (M.L.Sandal,1980:2).

For analysing sabda, Jaimini divides it into noun or namadheya, adjective or arthavada and verb. By verb Mimamsakas understand only 'doing' or 'action' and not: 'being' or 'existence'. Verbs instigate one to perform certain acts. M.L. Sandal comments on the importance of verbs,"The verb in a sentence plays an important part in determining the apurva. When there are different verbs, they denote different actions and thereby so many apurvas, as for instance vajati, dadati and juhoti sacrifice, gift.
and homa which are meant by the verbs are virtuous acts in themselves and produce different apurvas". (M.L.Sandal, 1980: xli).

M.L. Sandal further writes on verbs, "The actions are of two kinds either principal (pradhana) or subordinate (guna). When the object of an action is to produce invisible effect called the Apurva in the Mimamsa as for instance the attainment of heaven, it is called principal; but when the object is to produce visible effect as some operation on the material, it is called subordinate. The kindling of fire, preparing of cakes and pounding and threshing of rice come under the latter category, as the result of the various action is visible. The materials to be operated upon are the accusative case." (M.L.Sandal, 1980: xxxvi). As examples of the principal action, M.L. Sandal enumerates the following action, "The performance of the sandhya, the reading of the prayajat mantras and repeating of prose and poetry (sastra and stuta) at the time of performance of the sacrifice, come under the principal action, their object being to produce some invisible effect (apurva)." (M.L.Sandal, 1980: xxxvi).

There are a few more important concepts related to verbs and actions in a sentence. They can be enumerated as follows:

(1) "When there is one verb but there are different acts, they will have different apurvas and they, therefore, constitute independent acts", as for example, "He offers sacrificial fuel; he offers to the Tanunapat fire; he
offers Ida; he offers sacrificial grass; he offers svaha'.

The repetition of the same verb in the above quotation shows that there are different apurvas involved in the different acts". (M.L.Sandal,1980:xlii).

(2) Sambhityopa karaka: Those acts which are not independent and have no apurva of their own but lead to the apurva of the principal are referred to under this category. These are like different subordinate acts under one principal.

(3) Different nouns denoting one act: "When different nouns are used in connection with any sacrifice, they mean different independent acts". (M.L.Sandal,1980:xliii).

(4) "When there is a compound sentence and the acts are for different deities, the acts are independent". (M.L.Sandal,1980:xliii).

(5) "When on the other hand the compound sentence denotes one act, it is one independent act though there be two or more coordinate sentences," as for instance, "He performs Agnihotra, he offers curd'. The two sentences describe one act; the first sentence is utpattividhi while the second sentence is gunavidhi". (M.L.Sandal,1980:xliii).

(6) "When the sentence is a complex sentence in which the subordinate depends upon the principal, the action is one and independent," as for instance, "Let one desirous of heaven perform Agnihotra. Let one who is desirous of the strength of the sense organs perform a sacrifice'. Both sentences taken together constitute one complex sentence and denote one independent act in which curd is offered".

174

(7) "When in two or more coordinate sentences, the fruits and actions are described, they denote two or more independent acts" (M.L.Sandal, 1980: xliii). It is coordinate sentences denoting several acts.

(8) Two coordinate sentences denoting one act: "...when one act accomplishes different objects though described in two or more co-ordinate sentences, it is said to be only one independent act". (M.L.Sandal, 1980: xliv).

(9) On a conditional sentence: "...if there is a conditional sentence which lays down the apurva, the conditional sentence or sentences denote subordinate action or actions". (M.L.Sandal, 1980: xliv).

In pada four of chapter one, there is a discussion on nouns and adjective. "Namadheya is a proper noun. It may be either rudhi or yogarudhi. When it is a name of an action in which certain material is used after which it is called, it is a case of vaiyadhikarana. As for instance let us 'play at bat and ball'. It is the name of a play in which bat and ball are used as a means of play. When an action is arbitrarily called by a certain name and the name is identical with the action, it is a case of samanadhikarana, as for instance let us 'play blind man's buff'". (M.L.Sandal, 1980: xxxiv).

There are four categories of namadheya:
(1) matvarthalaksanabhayat
(2) vakyabhedabhayat
(3) tatprakhyah
(4) tadvypadesah.

They can be explained as follows:
(1) Matvarthalaksanabhayat: It is a "proper noun arising from the fear of using the matvartha laksana. It is a figure of speech in which you resort to the matup affix. As for instance `udbhida yajeta pasukamah' `let one perform the udbhida sacrifice if he is desirous of cattle'. Here in the above quotation, the udbhida is the name of a particular sacrifice and is, therefore, a proper noun. If you resort to the matvartha laksana, read udbhidvatā in place of udbhida and interpret it as a sacrifice in which the udbhida is used; it will be an attempt to convert a simple sentence into two compound sentences or one complex sentence and you will thereby commit a mistake which is called the vakyabheda or splitting up of a sentence which is a serious mistake in the eye of a Mimamsaka". (M.L.Sandal,1980:xxv).

(2) Vakyabhedabhayat:"The second class also consists of a proper noun but it arises from the fear of the vakyabheda or splitting of a sentence. As in the instance `citravayajeta pasukamah' `let one desirous of cattle perform citra sacrifice'; it can not indicate the material used in the sacrifice as there is a passage `dadhi, madhupayoghrtam dhana udakam tandulastatsamsrastha: prajapatyam' `curd, honey, milk, ghee, parched grain, water, rice are the mixed offering consecrated to Prajapati'. If you take citrava to mean some subordinate action, you will commit the mistake of vakyabheda which should always be avoided. The citra is, therefore, the name of the sacrifice and can not be considered to be the
subordinate materials used, for fear of the split of a sentence." (M.L. Sandal, 1980:xxv-xxvi).

(3) Tatprakhya: "Tatprakhya is a conventional name given to a particular sacrifice, the description of which is given elsewhere in a separate treatise, as for instance 'agnihotram juhoti' 'he performs Agnihotra'. Agnihotra is a name given to a sacrifice conventionally, the description of which is given elsewhere. As in ordinary language a children's play is called 'blindman's buff' conventionally". (M.L. Sandal, 1980:xxvi).

(4) Tadvyapadesah: It is the "name given to a sacrifice by reason of its resemblance to another, from which it derives its name. As for instance, syenanaga which is performed to destroy one's enemy is called after a hawk, because a sacrificer kills his enemy like a hawk which pounces upon the birds and kills them. In the ordinary language a children's play is called 'duck and drake' by reason of its resemblance of those birds". (M.L. Sandal, 1980:xxvi).

Before defining arthavada, we need to define two technical terms vidhi and nisedha. "Vidhi or injunction is a command, precept or order...... Nisedha is a negative precept just as vidhi is a positive or affirmative precept. It is preventing a man from doing a thing which is injurious or disadvantageous to him". (M.L. Sandal, 1980:xxvi).

M.L. Sandal writes,"Passages in praise or blame are called in the terminology of the Mimamsa, arthavada. They are either complements of a vidhi or nisedha; as for
instance, "vayavyam svetamalabheta bhutikamah because:
vayurvaiksepistadevata. 'Let one who is desirous of
prosperity'- 'sacrifice a white animal to Vayu because Vayu
is the swiftest of the gods'. The first sentence is a vidhi,
and the second sentence being praise of Vayu is an

There are three kinds of arthavada:

\[
\text{Arthavada} \\
\text{gunavada} \quad \text{anuvada} \quad \text{bhutarthavada}
\]

These three can be explained as follows:

(1) Gunavada: "When a text makes a statement which is
contradictory to the existing state of the affair and means:
of proof, it is said to be gunavada". (M.L.Sandal, 1980:xxvii). A hyperbole can come under this category.

(2) Anuvada: "When a text makes a statement which is in.
keeping with the existing state of facts, it is said to be

(3) Bhutarthavada: "When a text makes a statement which is:
neither against the existing state of facts nor is it in.
conformity with it, it is said to be bhutarthavada". (M.L.Sandal, 1980:xxviii).

For example, 'Indra uplifted his thunderbolt against
Vrittra'. In this example, we find a statement which is:
neither against the existing facts nor is it provable by
perception. Hence it is an instance of bhutarthavada.

There is one more type of arthavada discussed through
the example of srsti by Jaimini. M.L. Sandal explains this:
as follows, "The srstī is the name of a particular brick and is a proper noun but as the srstis abound in the agnicayana so all bricks came to be called the srstis. Take the example of Pandit, Seth and Thakur. Thakur originally applies to a warrior class but is also applicable to every landlord irrespective of caste". It should be added here that as such srstī should be an example of namadheya but since it becomes an adjective as it is used for quantitatively and qualitatively specifying all those bricks which are used for the purpose of agnicayana (delineation of the area of sacrificial fire in yajna).

Now we shall discuss the Mimamsaka's concept of a sentence. But before discussing their concept of sentence, we shall define two terms which are important in Mimamsa:

(1) Bhavana: It is a technical term in Mimamsa. M.L. Sandal explains it as "The activity to perform a yajna accompanied by all the psychological factors of the mind is called bhavana in the language of Mimamsa. It is of two kinds sabdi and arthi. The former arises from the word of mouth, i.e. command. When a man is told to do or not to do a thing, he does it or refrains from doing it, because he feels that he is so ordered. I order my servant to bring my horse, he is bound to bring it. In the worldly affairs, the order comes from a superior, but in religious affairs the command comes from the Veda.

"In the arthi bhavana, the energy to act arises from a particular motive or desire to act or refrain from acting. The command has generally the linga form of a verb".

(2) Apurva: "When a text lays down a new injunction for the attainment of our object which you cannot know by any other means, it is said to be apurvavidhi as for instance 'yajetasvargakamah' 'Let one who is desirous of heaven perform a sacrifice'. Here in the text we find that a new thing is laid down, viz, the attainment of heaven; it is further known that you can have it by performing a sacrifice. We also further know that we are entirely ignorant whether heaven can really be obtained by the performance of a sacrifice; it is only from the text that we know it and there is no other means to verify the statement contained in it." (M.L.Sandal,1980:xxiv).

According to the above definition apurva has two parts: (i) a command and (ii) a desire to act. (i) is like sabdi bhavana and (ii) is the source of the arthi bhavana.

Jaimini defines sentence in 2.1.46 as arthaikatvadekam vakyam sakanksam cedvibhage syat i.e. "By reason of the unity of sense there is one sentence; on division it is independent" (M.L.Sandal,1980:54).

M.L. Sandal comments on this sutra, "The author defines a sentence. If it gives one idea, it is simple sentence; but if there are several sentences mutually depending on each other for their meaning, they constitute a complex sentence". (M.L.Sandal,1980:54).

Sutra 2.1.47 deals with 'splitting of sentence': samesu vakyabhedah syat i.e. "In equal, there is a split of sentences". (M.L.Sandal,1980:54). M.L. Sandal comments on.
this *sutra,* "The author says that when the sentences are independent and do not depend on each other for their meaning, they are compound or co-ordinate sentences. There is a split of sentence. For example, "Rama came and Krisna went"." (M.L.Sandal, 1980:54).

Sutra 2.1.48 explains *anusanga*: *anusango vakyasamaptaḥ sarvesu tulyayogitvat* i.e. "Anusanga is a completion of a sentence by reason of the equal fitness in all". (M.L.Sandal, 1980:54). M.L. Sandal comments on this *sutra,* "The author explains what *anusanga* is. In order to understand it, it should be borne in mind that there are three essential things of a sentence *akanksa, yogyata, sannidhi.* The first is the desirability; if you utter the words cow, horse etc. they require the aid of some other words to complete the sense as "Bring a cow or send the horse". *Yogyata* is fitness; if you say "sprinkle with fire" it is not suited; it ought to be "sprinkle with water". *Sannidhi* is proximity. If you say "Bring" in the morning and "water" in the evening, these two words have no meaning if uttered so differently. Now *anusanga* is the insertion of a word or a phrase in order to complete the sentence, so that every part of it may fit in and may not violate the rules enumerated above. It is an ellipsis to be filled in, in order to fit in there." (M.L.Sandal, 1980:54-55).

M.L. Sandal quotes Kisori Lal Sirkar for explaining *anusanga,* "Where there is a number of incomplete clauses followed by one which is completed by a finite verbal clause, this last should be read at the end of each of the..."
other clauses to make them complete". (M.L. Sandal, 1980:xxxviii).

Sutra 2.1.49 gives an example where there is no anusanga: vyavayannanusajyeta i.e. "There is no anusanga by reason of intervention". (M.L. Sandal, 1980:55). M.L. Sandal comments, "The author gives an example where there is no case of anusanga. If there is vyavadhana i.e. intervention by means of a word or phrase which breaks in the continuity, then it is not a case of anusanga". (M.L. Sandal, 1980:55).

In sutra 1.4.29, it is indicated that in case of doubtful meanings one has to understand with help of ellipsis. According to 1.4.30, "An ellipsis is to be determined by the power of the meaning because the adjustment of sense is the part of the Veda" (M.L. Sandal, 1980:41). M.L. Sandal explains this in his commentary, "He makes an offering with a ladle, he makes an offering with a knife, he makes an offering with the hand'. The sense requires that in the first passage ghee is meant, in the second flesh is meant and in the third grain etc. are meant. Take the examples. 'He ate on mat. He ate on a bellmetal vessel'. The meaning is that he sat on a mat and took his food and in the other passage it means, that he took his food which was served in a bell-metal vessel." (M.L. Sandal, 1980:41).

Sentential Meaning

Regarding the constitution of meaning from a sentence, two schools flourished among the Mimamsakas -
anvitabhidhanavada and abhihitanvayavada. "On hearing the words of a sentence, we get a unitary sense which is the meaning of the sentence. The problem is whether this unitary sense arises directly from the collection of the meanings of the individual words that comprise it. The anvitabhidhana theory takes the former view, while the abhihitanvaya theory takes the latter." (K.Kunjuni Raja, 1963:194).

Abhihitanvaya, the theory of Kumarilabhatta's school, is "the theory that views the judgment arising from a proposition as the relation (anvaya) of concepts that are denoted (abhihita) in isolation by the constituent words". (Bishnupada Bhattacharya, 1962:136). K.Kunjuni Raja explains the position of abhihitanvayavadins in following words,"...the meaning of a sentence is a concatenation of the individual items expressed by the words. The individual words have in themselves meanings which can be comprehended separately. On hearing a sentence, we have first an understanding of the separate meanings of the words one after the other; then we put together these meanings according to the three factors akanksa, yogyata, and samnidhi, and we arrive at the meaning of the sentence". (K.Kunjuni Raja, 1963:203-204). Further K.Kunjuni Raja quotes S.C. Chatterjee for explaining the justification of the abhihitanvaya theory,"If the words of a sentence have no separate meanings of their own, then the classification of words into nouns, adjectives, verbs, etc. becomes meaningless. Further, in every case in which we are to
understand the meaning of a sentence, we must first understand the meaning of its component words. Without a previous understanding of the words no one can understand the meaning of a sentence. Moreover, if the meaning of a sentence were quite independent of the meaning of its constituent words, then any sentence could convey any meaning. Lastly, when we understand the meaning of a new verse, we do so obviously on the basis of our knowledge of the words and their separate meanings. This cannot be explained by any understanding of the sentences, since they are new and unintelligible to us. So it is concluded that the meaning of a sentence is just the synthesis of the separate meanings of its words". (quoted from S.C. Chatterjee by K. Kunjunni Raja, 1963:211).

Anvitabhidhanavada is the school of the followers Prabhakara "in whose opinion the judgment that is evidently relational in character is nothing but a juxtaposition of the concepts themselves that are in essence expressed along with the relation that they ultimately bear to one another". (Bishnupada Bhattacharya, 1962:136-137). By 'judgment', Bishnupada Bhattacharya implies 'meaning of the sentence'. K. Kunjunni Raja summarizes the position of anvitabhidhanavadins as,"....there is only one potency for words to express the meaning as related to the rest of the words. It is through recollection that we remember the meanings of words, and this is by rousing the mental impressions of previous experiences that we never come across words except as related in a sentence; isolated.

184
words have no existence in everyday speech-activity (a one-word sentence is a sentence, not an isolated word). The word-meaning and the relation to the other words are known by abhidha itself". (K.Kunjunni Raja, 1963:202). K.Kunjunni Raja further writes, "The anvitabhidhana theory seems to be an advance on the abhihitanvaya theory". (quoted from S.C. Chatterjee by K.Kunjunni Raja, 1963:212). K. Kunjunni Raja illustrates it as, "The meaning of a sentence dominates the meanings of its words; both the speaker and the listener are concerned only with the sentence-meaning. (K. Kunjunni Raja, 1963:212).

After this brief exposition of the Mimamsa theory of meaning, now we shall study the Jaina theory of meaning.
**Jaina theory of meaning**

According to the Jainas, *sabda* is all kinds of sound symbolism. Jaina theorists have classified 'word' in the following categories:

![Diagram of Jaina theory of meaning]

These categories can be defined as follows:

1. **Prayogika**: Those words which are produced by the effort of animate beings. It is of two types - linguistic or non-linguistic. The linguistic signs can be constituted of alphabets or can be devoid of alphabets. Examples of linguistic signs devoid of alphabets are like sighs, cries etc. These linguistic signs can be transformed into alphabetical patterns as they are used in language. Such linguistic signs can be divided into following five:
categories:
(i) Tata: Those sounds which are produced by the instruments wrapped with leather.
(ii) Vitata: Those sounds which are produced by the stringed instruments.
(iii) Ghana: The sounds produced by striking of bells and such other instruments.
(iv) Susira: The sounds produced by winged instruments or conchshells.
(v) Sangharsa: The sounds produced by friction of some objects.

(2) Vaisrasika: Those words which are produced by friction of inanimate objects. For example, sounds produced by thundering clouds.

Words can be either written or spoken. Written word is revealed to us through eyes whereas spoken words through ears. According to Prajnapana Sutra, the sound-waves revealed as words go till the end of the world. (Sagarmal Jain, 1986:31). Jainas consider word a stage of pudgala or matter. According to them, the relation between a word and its meaning is non-eternal. According to Pramananayatattvalokalamkara, one understands meaning of a word on the basis of following three factors: (i) natural potency of words (ii) symbolism (iii) convention. (Sagarmal Jain, 1986:38). Context also helps in determining the meaning(s) of a word.

Jainas define a sentence as "that independent set of
words which require each other for revealing the said meaning'. (Sagarmal Jain, 1986:59). In this definition, the meaning of a sentence can be considered to be independent of the discourse. Sentence is an integral unit of meaning constituted of various segmented units of meaning called word.

Anekantavada, the most essential part of Jaina philosophy, can also provide an understanding of the plurality of textual meaning. For textual interpretation, two important tenets of anekantavada can be used:

(1) Anekantavada as the theory of manifoldness of realities, can account for the complexity and the multiplicity of interpretation of a textual meaning. On anekantavada, Dr. Y. J. Padmarajiah writes, "...`anekantavada', after which the entire Jaina metaphysics is often known, is the postulation of manifoldness, or inherent complexity, within each of the reals in the universe. In other words, reality, according to Jainism, is not merely multiple but each real, in its turn, is manifold or complex to its core. Reality is thus a complex web of manyness (aneka) and manifoldness (anekanta)." (Dr. Y. J. Padmarajiah, 1963:275). This recognition of diversity of reality along with diversity of each reality can be true of textual meaning or meanings.

(2) Anekantavada recognises the objectivity of the material universe. Padmarajiah writes, "...the theory of identity-in-difference, the metaphysical presupposition of anekantavada, animating all the spheres of Jaina..."
philosophical thinking, recognises the objectivity of the material universe. The objectivity of the universe signifies the fact that the universe is independent of the mind of consciousness." (Dr. Y.J. Padmarajiah, 1963:274).

This kind of objectivity can be used for explaining the objectivity of meaning of a literary text. The text can have a meaning-in-itself which may not depend on the subjectivity of the interpreter.

Further if we extend the concept of reality as being manifested through a `complex web of manyness and manifoldness' to the textual interpretation, we may visualise multiplicity of textual meanings. The same text can have multiple layers of meaning interwoven in the complex web of overall discourse meaning which in turn is again manifold. Thus, in the Jaina theory, there is a possibility of accepting the different understandings of a text. This approach can be helpful in analysing a text on the patterns similar to the `reader-response theory'. Multiplicity of meanings can be explained by multiple readings of the text and each interpretation can further have layers of meaning.

Now we shall study the Baudhā theory of meaning.

**Baudhā theory of meaning**

The Buddhist theory of meaning is known as *apohavada*. Ratnakirti defines the term *apoha* in the following manner:"What is meant by the term *apoha* 'Differentiation'?
(There are three possible interpretations). If the etymological sense is taken: (1) A is differentiated from non-A (B); or non-A (B) from A; or (2) B is differentiated out in the midst of A then what is intended by a term is simply A; either the external object or the mental concept separated from (the class of) non-A or else (3) 'Differentiation' is denial (and thus) is mere exclusion of non-A." (Dhirendra Sharma, 1969:49). After having explained these three meanings of apoha, Ratnakirti rejects all of them because they do not imply the affirmation which is intended by the term apoha. Ratnakirti writes, "neither the first nor the second (view obtains) for it is, indeed, an affirmation which is intended by the term apoha. And the last (third) view is also unsatisfactory, since it is contradicted by perception and ordinary understanding. Thus the understanding of the proposition 'There is fire on the mountain' develops on the delineation of something in the affirmative form and not on a purely negative statement: 'there is not non-fire'. (Dhirendra Sharma, 1969:49). Ratnakirti also adds that "what is contrary to perception cannot be justified by some other means (such as an inferential argument." (Dhirendra Sharma, 1969:49). Therefore, according to Ratnakirti, the meaning is posited by an affirmative sense-experience along with the inferential process of differentiation and negation.

According to Buddhists there are "two valid means of acquiring knowledge, i.e. sensation or perception.
(pratyaksa) and inference (anumana). Anumana "refers [not only to the cognitive process but also] to the resulting cognition". (Richard P. Hayes, 1984:231-232). The object of sensation or perception is the 'thing-in-itself' which is efficient to perform any significant act and which is momentary. (Rajnish Kumar Mishra, 1996:148). Inference gives us the samanya laksana (universal properties) whereas pratyaksa gives us the svalaksana or unique particular of an object as a positive existent. "A unique particular is positive existent in the external world, not dependent on space and time, non-explicable in terms of quality or substance, knowable through indeterminate perception, free from the postulates of class, name, configuration etc. The object of inference is universal or the general properties of an object. In Buddhist system of thought, universal has been defined as that which is differential in nature (atadvyavrtti form of the real object), knowable through verbal or inferential sign, conceptual form of the object, non-existent in the external world, dependent on space and time; associated with quality, generic configuration/form, name and class". (Rajnish Kumar Mishra, 1996:149). Rajnish further writes on the words, "It is also important to note that word as a linguistic sign is not different from the inferential sign in Buddhist epistemology. Both linguistic as well as inferential signs (linga = hetu = 'smoke for the cognition of fire') capture only the general properties of the object. This is the reason why Buddhist logicians include verbal testimony and analogy both in inference."
(Rajnish Kumar Mishra, 1996:149). Dinnaga writes in Pramanasamuccaya, "Verbal communication is no different from inference as a means of acquiring knowledge. For it names its object in a way similar to the property of having been produced, by precluding what is incompatible". (Richard P. Hayes, 1984:252).

Regarding the process through which the word refers to an object Dinnaga writes in the karika 12 of the chapter five of Pramanasamuccaya, "Although that which is expressed by a word has many properties, it is not cognized in its entirety through a word. The word performs the task of isolating its referents according to its intrinsic relations to what it expresses". (Richard P. Hayes, 1984:277). In the next karika, Dinnaga further specifies his statement, "A word too has many properties. But it makes its object known only through those properties by which it does not deviate from the object; it does not make its object known through the fact that significant sound is a quality and other such properties". (Richard P. Hayes, 1984:277).

In karika 18 of the fifth chapter, Dinnaga writes about the synonymous expression, "..That which is made known through synonyms is made known through only one of the set of synonymous expressions. If the whole is different from its parts, both grammatical agreement and the qualification relation are contravened". (Richard P. Hayes, 1984:283). Commenting on this, Hayes writes, "...if `blue' and `lotus' are construed as simply naming the same particular, then,
since `blue' and `lotus' are co-extensional, they would be synonyms. In that case, `lotus' might be regarded as a gloss for `blue' in about the same way that in the expression `He is a gentleman, a man of noble birth', the phrase `a man of noble birth' names nothing in addition to what `gentleman' names but serves only to clarify in which of its various allowable sense `gentleman' is being used. But if `blue' and `lotus' are synonymous, then neither word is qualifying or modifying the scope of the other". (Richard P. Hayes, 1984:287).

Words are normally used in certain context and the meaning expressed is complex in nature. On the complexity of meaning Dinnaga opines,"Since the thing expressed is a complex entity, neither blue in isolation nor a lotus in isolation is expressed.[The individual words] have no meaning, just as the individual phonetic components of a word have no meaning". (Richard P. Hayes, 1984:279). Commenting on the possibility of comprehending the compound sentences in the apoha theory, Richard P. Hayes writes,<"How is it that the expression "blue lotus" expresses a single object?" This question possibly anticipates an objection to Dinnaga's apoha theory that might be raised by someone who subscribes to the theory that individual words names individuals and that strings of words taken together as compound expressions name something like the class of things in which all the universals named by the individual words inhere. Under this theory the word "blue" in the expression "blue lotus" has as its warrant of
application (pravrttinimitta) the universal blueness or the quality of blue colour, the word "lotus" has as its warrant of application the universal lotushood, and the warrant for the juxtaposition of the two words is the collocation of these universals in a single locus or set of individual loci, which is expressible by the compound expression. The challenge is now put to Dinnaga to account for the meanings of compound expressions under his theory that denies that words name positive entities such as universals. (Richard P. Hayes, 1984:280).

For answering this objection, Dinnaga puts forward the argument that the complex universals do not exist outside thought. He says, "A unified complex entity does not exist, since it would then follow that the components are identical with one another [and] because it would then follow that the complex entity would be many. They do not give up their individual meanings". (Richard P. Hayes, 1984:282). This argument can be alternatively presented as an emphasis on the view "that the word 'blue' is applicable to the sesame and the lotus not because the sesame and the lotus have in common a property that 'blue' names, but rather because nothing prevents our applying the word 'blue' to the sesame and to the locus. Thus, it is not so much a matter of sesame and lotus being members of the class of blue things as of there being no contradiction involved in our saying 'This is both blue and a sesame'". (Richard P. Hayes, 1984:285).

In the context of apoha, it becomes essential to define
what does a term exclude. Dinnaga explains this in karika twenty five of the fifth chapter of Pramanasamuccaya, "A term does not exclude terms of wider extension, terms of narrower extension or co-extensive terms, even though they differ from it". (Richard P. Hayes, 1984:287). Dinnaga further explains this in karikas twenty six, twenty seven, twenty eight and thirty one which are as follows:

"26.0.0 A wider term does not exclude its narrower terms, because it creates anticipation for them alone. Neither does it entail them, because uncertainty arises concerning which of its narrower terms is applicable. In either case the two terms can apply to the same set of objects.

27.0.0 A narrower term, being restricted to more than one wider term, can entail several wider terms. There is not a symmetrical qualification relation between the two terms.

28.0.0 A narrower term precludes the objects denoted by other narrower terms because of hostility. Because particulars of another wider term are contradicted by the word sismsapa's own wider term.

(Richard P. Hayes, 1984:290-291)

31.0.0 "An alternative explanation is that preclusion is due to non-observation. A wider term would exclude what is narrower than itself. That is not the case, because one does observe that which is connected with other things".

(Richard P. Hayes, 1984:295)

Dinnaga continues with his argument and establishes his hypothesis expressed in the above mentioned 25th karika by the end of the fifth chapter of his Pramanasamuccaya.

In the history of development of Buddhist theory of meaning, Dinnaga's views have been interpreted several times in context of the debates with the competing schools on the theory of meaning. However, from the apoha of
Dinnaga (approximately 4th century A.D.) to the visistapohan of Ratnakirti (approximately 11th century A.D.), the line of argument has been the same that a word posits the positive meaning by means of excluding all its counter-correlates. By direct perception (pratyaksa) we know the positive existent of an object and then we infer the universal properties of that particular object. Since a word names an object on the basis of the mental image of its universal properties, so the inference can be included in the process of verbal communication. In verbal communication, the word performs the task of isolating the referents by identifying the object through contextual exclusion. Even the synonymous expressions can have the same referent only in a particular context of contextual exclusion. This contextual exclusion depends on a lot of factors like the relationship between the enveloping terms with the words denoting the enveloped concepts.

Next we shall discuss Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya to examine the views of the Grammarians' theory of meaning.

Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari

Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari (about 5th Century A.D.) is a text on philosophy of language. In this study, we shall mainly study Bhartrhari's concept of sabda, sphota, dhvani and some aspects of the relationship between lexical and
sentential meaning.

The first karika of Vakyapadiya illustrates sabda as Brahman:

"The Brahman who is without beginning or end, whose very essence is the Word, who is the cause of the manifested phonemes, who appears as the objects, from whom the creation of the world proceeds". (K.A. Subramania Iyer, 1995:1).

There are two aspects of sabda when it acts as a vehicle of expression: "one is the cause of the real word which, the other, is used to convey the meaning". (1.44) (K.A. Subramania Iyer, 1995:52). The first element that is the cause of the real sabda is nada. The second element which conveys the meaning is sphota. Thus the word can convey its form as the sound-sequence and content as the meaning. The discussion on this issue is organised as follows:

mechanisms of arriving at meaning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sign-form</th>
<th>sound-form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gestures</td>
<td>script-form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>human speech</td>
<td>non-human speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cause of spoken sound-sequence form</td>
<td>cause of expressing meaning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to 1.23, the relationship between word and
meaning is nitya, i.e. invariably given. According to 2.235, sabda conveys meaning on the basis of its long grammatical usage. If the word is used wrongly for long, its 'wrong usage' becomes natural. Hearers respond differently to the meaning of the utterance due to their pratibha or 'intellect'. For example, a sentence like 'there is a lion' can cause fear in some and enthusiasm in others. Karikas 2.134 and 2.135 elucidate this point:

"Just as our senses perceive the same object in different ways, in the same way, an object is understood from words in different ways". (2.134)
"The meaning of words, intended by the speaker to be one thing, is understood by different listeners differently, according to their own background". (2.135)

Thus the meaning of a linguistic utterance depends upon the context, condition and individual predispositions of the interlocutors.

There are three dimensions of a sabda - vaikhari (the elaborated), madhyama (the middle one) and pasyanti (the seeing one). The vrtti on 1.142 defines them as follows:

"The Elaborated (Vaikhari) assumes the form of phonemes when the air strikes against the places of articulation and is based on the functioning of the breath of the speakers".
"The Middle One proceeds by going beyond the functioning of breath, has sequence and has the mind alone as its substratum".
"The Seeing One is indivisible and is entirely without sequence. It is the Inner Light, the subtle word, imperishable".

198
It is further added in the vrtti:

"This three-fold word, has, like the appearances of the knots of Consciousness, indefinable dimensions, and a fourth of it exists in man. Even of this, only a little comes within the range of usage, the rest is beyond the usage of ordinary man. It has been said-

"There are four states in regard to the word. The wise among the Brahmanas know them. Three of them are kept in a cave and do not move. Men speak the fourth part of the word".  

The concepts of *sabda* (word or meaningful linguistic utterance) and *sphota* are closely related to the concept of *dhvani* (suggestion). Bhartrhari mentions two kinds of *dhvani* - *prakrta* and *vaikrta*. Iyer translates them as primary and secondary sounds respectively. In the vrtti on 1.76 the two kinds of *dhvani* are defined as follows: "The primary one is that without which the form of the *sphota*, being unmanifested, would remain unperceived. And the secondary one is that by means of which the form of the *sphota* is perceived again and again without interruption". (K.A. Subramania Iyer, 1995:79).

Karikas 1.77 to 1.92 establish that though the meaning is understood only after the utterance of the last sound, each sound of the sound-sequence contributes to the cognition of the word. The successive sounds of the sequence render the perception process clearer but the final meaning is revealed by *sphota* after the last sound is
uttered. Thus the sabda or linguistic utterance stands: indivisible though it can be shown to be constituted of different phonemic units.

Bhartrhari is a supporter of the gestalt view of the meaning of a sentence. According to the vrtti of 2.7 the "sentence is the sphota, either external or internal. It is external when it is clearly uttered. Till then, it is internal. In any case, it is indivisible. It has two aspects: the sound aspect and the meaning aspect which are identified with one another...... The indivisible sentence is the sphota and the indivisible sentence-meaning is pratibha. But both appear to have divisions". (K.A. Subramania Iyer, 1977:4-5). This view is further illustrated in the following karikas:

"Just as the One picture is explained through its different colours like blue which belong to its parts,
in the same way, the One sentence, entirely self-sufficient and complete, is explained through individual words which require one another".
(2.8 and 2.9)

"Just as a word is analysed into stem, suffix etc. in the same way, the analysis of a sentence into individual words is also described".
(2.10)

"Just as one sees in phonemes parts resembling other phonemes, in the same way, one sees (in a sentence) parts which resemble other words".
(2.11)

Though the language can be split into structured units, its meaning is indivisible. As our consciousness cannot be separately structured in different unitary segments, the
complex cognition of the sentence is also not divisible. karika 2.13 states that the "word has no division, how can the meaning have any? But the ignorant person sees division through artificial splitting" and its vṛtti adds,"...division is only a means to an end and that indivisibility is the truth. In any case, doubts sometimes arise as to how the division should be effected". (K.A. Subramania Iyer, 1977:6). Further, the vṛtti of 2.26 emphasises that "...it is futile to try to explain sequence in cognition through the impressions of the sequence of objects which figure in the cognition". (K.A. Subramania Iyer, 1977:13). Though the divisions cannot be created in the cognition, sometimes different cognitions occur due to different divisions of the divisible units of a sentence.

An obvious question arises regarding the understanding of the elliptical sentences. If a sentence is indivisible, how can the elliptical sentences be comprehended? Bhartrhari answers this in 2.40:

"Sometimes, when the relation of identity in the form 'it is this' is understood, then even a single phoneme can be expressive of the meaning of the whole sentence". (K.A. Subramania Iyer, 1977:21).

Bhartrhari puts forth the idea that all the units, whether as individual words or phonemes, together express the meaning of a sentence. This idea can be further extended to understanding the discourse. Just as different words bound together by expectancy produce a sentential
meaning, different sentences bound together by expectancy can produce a discourse meaning. If the sentential meaning is manifested through sphota and pratibha, the discourse meaning can also be manifested through the same process. Different aspects of sabda and dhvani as discussed above can help constitute and reconstitute the meaning(s) of a text. The different division or rather grouping of sentences may produce different textual cognitions resulting in different interpretations.